ia1166
1st Apr 2001, 19:39
Did i just lose the plot? one minute this thread was here and now its not. Anyway check out this site www.bahrainairport.com/gf072factualinformation.htm (http://www.bahrainairport.com/gf072factualinformation.htm)
OK, try getting it through the Gulf Air website, it took me to it, but I need Adobe Acrabat reader, and this PC doesn't have it nor will it download it, if anyone does get it, can they post it here.
Alvin
Icarus
1st Apr 2001, 21:30
YEah, I thought I started this thread earlier this aftenoon. What did happen?
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size="2">OK, try getting it through the Gulf Air website, it took me to it, but I need Adobe Acrabat reader, and this PC doesn't have it nor will it download it, if anyone does get it, can they post it here. Alvin</font>
Uhh, it is 64 pages long ... don't think you really want us to post that ... http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/eek.gif
[This message has been edited by SLB (edited 01 April 2001).]
Icarus
2nd Apr 2001, 08:42
Well this is interesting as when I visited the site early yesterday there was more on it than showing now. In fact the factual report was posted as a Word Document at that time, now it appears to be .pdf only.
Drop me an email and when I get home later and I will send you the report in .doc format if that helps.
avlerx
2nd Apr 2001, 14:13
From Gulf air Report:-
Factual Information 1 A320 (A40-EK) Aircraft Accident
1. Factual Information
1.1 History of Flight
On 23 August 2000, about 1930 Bahrain local time,1 Gulf Air flight 072,
(GF-072) an Airbus A320-212, Sultanate of Oman registration A40-EK,
crashed in the Arabian Gulf near Muharraq, Bahrain. GF-072 departed from
Cairo International Airport, Cairo, Egypt (CAI), with 2 pilots, 6 cabin crew, and
135 passengers on board, for Bahrain International Airport (BAH), Muharraq,
State of Bahrain. GF-072 was operating as a regularly scheduled international
passenger service flight under the Convention on International Civil Aviation
and the provisions of Sultanate of Oman Civil Aviation Regulations Part 121
and was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The airplane had been
cleared to land on Runway 12 at BAH, but crashed at sea about 3 miles
north-east of the airport soon after initiating a go-around following the second landing attempt. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces, and all 143 persons on board were killed. Night, visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident.
According to Gulf Air company records and witness statements, the
flight crew arrived at the departure gate at CAI about 25 minutes before the
scheduled departure time of 1600 (Cairo local time)2 on 23 August 2000 and
the flight was airborne at 1652. According to the cockpit voice recorder
(CVR), the captain was performing the pilot-flying (PF) duties, and the first
officer was performing the pilot-not-flying (PNF) duties.
About 1921:48, as GF-072 was descending through approximately
14,000 feet above mean sea level (amsl) and about 30 nautical miles (nm)
north-west of Bahrain Airport, Dammam Approach gave the following
instruction to GF-072: Gulf Air zero seven two, uh, self navigation for runway one two is approved. Three point five (3,500 feet)3 as well approved and
Bahrain Approach one two seven eight five (127.85 MHz)
approved.
During the readback several seconds later, the captain asked, “Gulf Air
zero seven two, confirm we can go for runway one two?” Dammam Approach
responded, “Affirmative. Three approves (approvals) you have. Direct for
one two (Runway 12). Three point five (3,500 feet) approved. One two
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all times are Bahrain local time (Universal Co-ordinated Time
+ 3 hours), based on a 24-hour clock.
2 Cairo and Bahrain are in the same time zone during the summer.
3 For clarification, additional information is provided to explain some CVR comments and is
shown in parentheses. This information was not recorded on the CVR.
Factual Information 3 A320 (A40-EK) Aircraft Accident
land and reported wind from 090 degrees at eight knots. The first officer
acknowledged the transmission. About 1926:13, with the airplane about 5.2
nm from the runway, 1678 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 224 knots, the
captain called for “flaps one.” Seconds later, the captain called for “gear
down”, and FDR data subsequently showed the landing gear moving to the
gear-down position.
About 1926:37, the CVR recorded the captain stating, “Okay, visual
with airfield.” Seconds later, FDR data showed the autopilot and flight director
being disengaged 9 . About 1926:49 and about 2.9 nm from the runway, the
airplane descended through 1,000 feet AGL. About 1926:51, with the
airplane about 2.8 nm from the runway, 976 feet AGL, and 207 knots, the
captain stated, “Have to be established by five hundred feet.” Flaps “two”
were then selected. As the flight continued on its approach for Runway 12,
the captain stated about 1927:06 and again about 1927:13, “….we’re not
going to make it.”
About 1927:23, the captain instructed the first officer to “Tell him to do
a three sixty (360 degree) left (orbit).” The first officer complied and the
request was approved by Bahrain Tower. The left turn was initiated about 0.9
nm from the runway, 584 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 177 knots. During the
airplane’s left turn, FDR data showed the flap configuration going from flaps
“two” to flaps “three” and then to flaps full. About 1928:17, the captain called
for landing checklist. At 1928:28, with the airplane approximately half-way
through the left turn, the first officer stated, “landing checklist completed.”
After about three-fourths of the 360 o turn, the airplane rolled out to wings
level.
FDR data showed that the airplane’s altitude during the left turn ranged
from 965 feet to 332 feet AGL, and that the airplane’s bank angle reached a
maximum of about 36 degrees. About 1928:57, after being cleared again by
Bahrain Tower to land on Runway 12, the captain stated, “…we overshot it.”
FDR data then showed the airplane beginning to turn left again, followed by
changes consistent with an increase in engine thrust. About 1929:07, the
captain stated, “tell him going around” and FDR data indicated an increase to
maximum TOGA 10 engine thrust. Bahrain Tower responded with, “I can see
that. Zero seven two sir uh….would you like radar vectors….for final again?”
The first officer accepted, and Bahrain Tower instructed the crew to, “fly
heading three zero zero (300 degrees), climb (to) two thousand five hundred
9 FDR data indicate that the autothrust remained active throughout the approach, until TOGA was
selected.
10 TOGA stands for Takeoff/Go-Around.
Factual Information 4 A320 (A40-EK) Aircraft Accident
(2,500) feet.” The first officer acknowledged the transmission. During this
time, the flaps were moved to position “three” and the gear was selected up.
FDR data showed that the gear remained retracted until the end of the
recording.
About 1929:41, with the airplane at 1054 feet AGL, at an airspeed of
191 knots, and having just crossed over the runway, the CVR recorded the
beginning of a 14-second interval of the aural Master Warning 11 (consistent
with a flap-overspeed condition), followed by the statement from the first
officer, “speed, overspeed limit…” Approximately two seconds after the
beginning of the Master Warning, FDR data indicated a forward movement of
the captain’s side stick. The captain’s side stick was held forward of the
neutral position 12 for approximately 11 seconds, with a maximum forward
deflection of about 9.7 degrees 13 reached. During this time, the airplane’s
pitch attitude decreased from about 5 degrees nose-up to about 15.5 degrees
nose-down, the recorded vertical acceleration decreased from about +1.0
“G”14 to about +0.5 G’s, and the airspeed increased from about 193 knots to
about 234 knots.
About 1929:51, with the airplane descending through 1004 feet AGL at
an airspeed of 221 knots, the CVR recorded a single aural warning of “sink
rate” from the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), followed by the
repetitive GPWS aural warning “whoop whoop, pull up”, which continued until
the end of the recording.
About 1929:52, the captain requested, “flaps up.” About 1929:54, the
CVR indicated that the Master Warning ceased for about 1 second, but then
began again and lasted about 3 seconds. Approximately 2 seconds after the
GPWS warnings began, FDR data indicated movement of the captain’s side
stick aft of the neutral position, with a maximum aft deflection of
approximately 11.7 degrees reached. However, the FDR data showed that
this nose-up command was not maintained and that subsequent movements
never exceeded 50% of full-aft availability. FDR data indicated no movement
from the first officer’s side stick throughout the approach and accident
sequence.
About 1929:59, the captain requests, “flaps all the way” and the first
officer responded, “zero.” This was the last comment from the crew recorded
on the CVR, which stopped recording at 1930:02. The FDR data showed
continuous movement of the flap position toward the zero position after the
captain’s “flaps up” command. The last flap position recorded on the FDR
was about 2 degrees of extension.
11 The aural Master Warning is a continuous repetitive chime.
12 Forward movement of the sidestick will induce a nose-down pitch response.
13 Maximum fore and aft sidestick deflection is 16 degrees from the neutral position.
14 One G is the nominal acceleration of 9.8 m/sec 2 . Factual Information 5 A320 (A40-EK) Aircraft Accident
The last recorded pitch attitude was about 6 degrees nose-down and last
recorded airspeed was about 282 knots. FDR data indicated that TOGA
selection and corresponding maximum engine thrust remained until the end of the recording.
FDR data indicated that during the go-around after selection of TOGA
thrust, GF-072 was initially at about a 9 degree nose-up pitch attitude.
However, the pitch attitude gradually decreased to about 5 degrees nose-up
over the next 25 seconds, where it remained until the captain’s forward
sidestick commands resulted in nose-down pitch changes.
Figure 1 shows the Instrument Approach Chart for the Bahrain Runway
12 VOR/DME procedure. The VOR/DME radar facility is located
approximately 2.1 miles from the threshold for Runway 12. Figure 2 shows
an overhead view of the GF-072 trajectory, with selected FDR information,
CVR comments and sounds, and air traffic control (ATC) data for the last 4
minutes of flight. Figure 3 shows the side view (vertical profile) for the last 19
seconds of flight.