Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009 [Archive]

YHZChick

12th Mar 2009, 16:59

Halifax Harbour is a significant distance from where she went down.
This is the closest bouy I can find, however I suspect there are others which are closer.

Station 44251 - Nickerson Bank

Wind Direction (WDIR):S ( 180 deg true )http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=wspd&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Wind Speed (WSPD):29.1 ktshttp://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=wgst&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Wind Gust (GST):35.0 ktshttp://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=wvht&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Wave Height (WVHT):7.9 fthttp://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=dmpd&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Dominant Wave Period (DPD):7 sechttp://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=pres&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Atmospheric Pressure (PRES):29.72 inhttp://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=ptnd&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Pressure Tendency (PTDY):-0.20 in ( Falling Rapidly )http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=atmp&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Air Temperature (ATMP):36.0 °Fhttp://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=wtmp&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Water Temperature (WTMP):32.4 °Fhttp://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/images/graph04.gif (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/show_plot.php?station=44251&meas=chil&uom=E&time_diff=3&time_label=ADT)Wind Chill (CHILL):22.3 °F

YHZChick

12th Mar 2009, 17:03

Speaking with a friend at DFO, the CCG is reporting a "large debris field".

newfieboy

12th Mar 2009, 17:46

Latest press conference reporting life rafts recovered empty, 1 survivor, 1 confirmed deceased. 16 still missing.Next press conference at 1930 local time.

YHZChick

12th Mar 2009, 18:02

From a friend with JRCC connections:
"Details are not reliable but there are reports that a Mayday was broadcast for hydraulic failure and the aircraft was entering autorotative flight. "
Debris field is about 6km.

gwillie

12th Mar 2009, 18:31

Periodic live CBC Newsworld coverage and ongoing live discussion here (http://www.cbc.ca/nl/live/cougar/).

newfieboy

12th Mar 2009, 21:03

Here is the CADORS.

Record #7 Cadors Number: 2009A0212
Reporting Region: Atlantic
Occurrence InformationOccurrence Type: Accident
Occurrence Date: 2009/03/12 Occurrence Time: 1215 Z
Day Or Night: day-time Fatalities: 1 Injuries: Canadian Aerodrome ID: Aerodrome Name: Occurrence Location: 472605N515658W
Province: Country: CANADA World Area: North America
Reported By: NAV CANADA AOR Number: 105029-V1
TSB Class Of Investigation: 3
TSB Occurrence No.: Event InformationEngine oil problemForced landingCollision with terrainDiversion
Aircraft InformationFlight #: CHI91 Aircraft Category: HelicopterCountry of Registration: CANADA Make: SIKORSKY Model: S92A Year Built: 2006
Amateur Built: No Engine Make: GENERAL ELECTRIC Engine Model: CT7-8A Engine Type: Turbo shaft Gear Type: Land Phase of Flight: Cruise
Damage: Destroyed Owner: COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC. Operator: COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC. (4791)Operator Type: Commercial Detail InformationUser Name:MacQuarrie, JackDate:2009/03/12Further Action Required:Yes O.P.I.:Maintenance & Manufacturing Narrative:CHI91, S92, enroute from St. John's (CYYT) to the Hibernia Oil Platform at 12:15Z, declared MAYDAY due to a main gear box oil pressure problem and requested to return to St. John's. Air Traffic Control cleared the flight as requested. At 12:25Z aircraft ditched at position 472605N515658W

SASless

12th Mar 2009, 22:23

Just watched the live briefing.

One survivor, one dead, the rest missing. Search continues with one C-130, one Cormorant Helicopter, and surface units.

No EPIRBS being heard, aircraft has sunk in about 400 feet of water.

Search is to continue through the night and into tomorrow.

Debris field is about six miles long.

chester2005

12th Mar 2009, 22:33

Forgive my ignorance , but how can the debris field be that long?
Surely the currents would not have spread debris that far.

Thoughts and hopes to the missing.
RIP to others

Chester

newfieboy

12th Mar 2009, 22:54

The way the wind is here right now, 6mile debris field no problem, its a very sombre mood here in YYT, we are not losing hope yet, but I will pray for any survivors tonight, beleive me they will not have a pleasant one, Gods speed to anyone still afloat, we are doing all we can.

The Sultan

12th Mar 2009, 23:00

The high winds would disburse the floating debris at different rates relative to their individual masses and surface areas.

The Sultan

rumline

13th Mar 2009, 01:28

It has been reported that the pilot turned back after declaring an emergency relating to the main gear box. The aircraft flew for a further 17sm westward towards NL before impacting the water.

My prayers to those searching...and to those waiting.

I won,t however, bide time awaiting official reports before expressing hope that a fleetwide grounding of S-92,s is in the works and that well known MGB problems associated with this type are finally dealt with.
Another issue I,ll toss out is why does the Blackhawk series have a run-dry capability yet from what I can garner from collegues ....the 92 does not....wtf???
As an offshore driver for the better part of 2 decades...I have seen great strides in training and preparation for crews and pax. Tonight many news services have been belabouring that an immersion suit will keep someone alive upto 30hrs in cold water.....maybe so.....but only if proper undergarments are worn and I,m still surprised when I see SLF about to get in my machine with zippers undone and nothing but tees and board-shorts on underneath.

helofixer

13th Mar 2009, 02:31

Sending thoughts and prayers from the Gulf of Mexico.

Codger

13th Mar 2009, 03:15

"No signals from locator beacons on suits worn by oil workers...."

No signals from locator beacons on suits worn by oil workers: officials (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2009/03/12/offshore-helicopter.html)

Red Wine

13th Mar 2009, 04:03

A sad day for the entire industry, yet alone our friends at Cougar and the Offshore workers families.

To say the obvious, 406 beacons won't work underwater.

Vibetribe

13th Mar 2009, 04:20

With initial reports suggesting another tranmission oil system fault, does anyone know if Cougars Emergency check list procedure has been amended to bring back an engine if the associated input has a chip or hot advisory?

my thoughts are with all passengers, families and staff at Cougar

Chopper Jog

13th Mar 2009, 04:27

I am in flying in West Africa and this tragic event has send shock waves around the world - I am still in disbelief that this has actually happened! I flew the S70 Black Hawk and we have never had any MGB issues.

Now I am flying the S92 and there have been multiple incidents with various MGB emergencies/incidents - time to go back to the drawing boards and implement a similar system like the EC225 to provide some dry run capability!

My prayers and thoughts to all the family, friends and staff at Cougar/VIH and the St Johns offshore Industry - know so many of the pilots there!

CJ:uhoh:

Auxair

13th Mar 2009, 05:23

My heart goes out to those missing, those lost and their families.
It sounds like a miracle that even one person was recovered alive
from the scene.

The water and air temperatures and wave action that were reported
made it terribly inhospitable for survival, especially after traumatic ditching
that sounds, by the size of the debris field, to be more like a crash
than a controlled ditching.

The 406mhz personal EPIRBS are water activated so if there are individuals afloat on the surface with these units attached to their immersion suits, they would normally be pinging. I would imagine the
406 ELT on the ship was also water-activated and should be active as well.

Having had some cold water immersion survival instruction from the
US Coast Guard, the facts of exceptionally cold water survival are very straightforward and harsh. It is drilled into students that all garments/undergarments under one's immersion suit
need to be wool or fleece and absolutely not cotton to avoid
cold-saturation to the skin within the suit that occurs when cotton becomes wet (from sweat or water) and cannot dry itself-its terrible for wicking.

Here's to hoping for some of those EPIRB's being heard...and comfort to the families of those who have not yet returned to shore. May the Lord's peace be with them all.

bb in ca

13th Mar 2009, 06:08

I have no words of wisdom or insight to offer but I've raised a glass for the victims.

I wish the best for their friends and families in these difficult days, weeks, months and years. It will get easier. They will not be forgotten.

PO dust devil

13th Mar 2009, 06:33

To the best of my knowledge there were ASB's regarding MGB for S92A.

thoughts go to those involved

DD

212man

13th Mar 2009, 06:41

A very sad day indeed, and I know all of us in the offshore business are thinking about our Cougar colleagues and their families. I stayed up into the early hours waiting for encouraging news reports and finally went to bed with a heavy heart.

rotorknight

13th Mar 2009, 06:58

My thoughts are with all people touched by this tragedy.

As rumline said,it is time for sikorsky to get back to the drawing board and fix not only the MGB problems associated with this helicopter

ReverseFlight

13th Mar 2009, 07:17

A mate of mine who flies offshore in the S76C+ says his only nightmare is a MGB failure. Reading this thread surely sends chills down my spine.

Our prayers for all those on board.

ODEN

13th Mar 2009, 07:21

Everyone RIP, I condole with all the families and friends hit by this accident.

How many incidents and accidents are there going to be before Sikorsky come up with a solution to the known design faults in this gearbox?
The only way to put pressure on the manufacturer is to stop flying until it is fixed...:mad:

Pat Gerard

13th Mar 2009, 07:25

212 MAN

I think something was lost in the translation. I have sent you a PM.

Pat

To Ronnie and Roger at COUGAR

If you read this, my thoughts are with you and I shall get in touch later.

Patrick

Super 61

13th Mar 2009, 08:06

To all our friends at Cougar

Our thoughts and Prayers are with you at this difficult time.

CHC Miri S92 Crews

Horror box

13th Mar 2009, 08:47

A very sad day, and thoughts go out to all the relatives. As a 92 driver, this is particularly relevant and I will be following the events.
The worst bit is that we all knew this would happen. MGB failures been my biggest fear flying the 92. We have had a number of failures in the last 12 months, all fortunately over land, and this has had us all waiting for the inevitable water ditching. The problems are known, and now Sikorsky must ground the fleet, and fix this problem before this happens again.

vanHorck

13th Mar 2009, 08:52

I have never read a thread where drivers are asking so explicitly for a fleet to be grounded till the problem is resolved. I hope somebody of the investigating body is reading here....

rotorrookie

13th Mar 2009, 08:58

My sincerely condoles to the families of those missing in the cold waters. This a sad day for the helicopter industry and offshore industry, and tragic day for Cougar, my thoughts with them right now.
Only few days ago we where screaming in happiness over 18 people rescued in the EC-225 ditching in North Sea, now things are totally the opposite.
Lets keep our prays there will be more survivors.:sad::sad::sad::sad::sad:

9Aplus

13th Mar 2009, 10:51

My deep condolences to all involved parts, especially to fellow pilots and passengers family & friends.

Can someone write here about fact how long can go dry running for MGB on S92.

I know fact for AW101 (Cormoran) or 139 up to 30 min, most eastern models also 30 min, EC225 crew have chosen "safe" controlled ditching on time....with recent happy outcome. Just wondering what went wrong with S92 crew decision?!

rotorknight

13th Mar 2009, 10:57

I could not agree more with you horror box,and with me a lot of my fellow pilots.Hurrah for the newest,most advanced and safest helicopter:yuk:

Camper Van Basten

13th Mar 2009, 11:18

EC225 crew have chosen "safe" controlled ditching on time....with recent happy outcome.

:confused:

If you're talking about the Bond accident, that was neither "safe", "controlled", or indeed a "ditching". It also had nothing to do with Gearboxes running dry, or any other technical fault as far as I know.

Thoughts with the Cougar people and the loved ones of those involved in yesterday's accident.

9Aplus

13th Mar 2009, 11:27

So dear fellows who can answer about dry MBG running?

For the rest my apologies for non intended "speculations".

@Camper Van Basten,
Bond was CFIT?! strange, if really yes, that was miracle.....

rotorrookie

13th Mar 2009, 11:51

It is "claimed” to be 30 min by Sikorsky .... But in reality it is not so I've hear

Old Man Rotor

13th Mar 2009, 12:08

FAR 29.927 Additional tests.

(1) Category A. Unless such failures are extremely remote, it must be shown by test that any failure which results in loss of lubricant in any normal use lubrication system will not prevent continued safe operation, although not necessarily without damage, at a torque and rotational speed prescribed by the applicant for continued flight, for at least 30 minutes after perception by the flightcrew of the lubrication system failure or loss of lubricant.

(2) Category B. The requirements of Category A apply except that the rotor drive system need only be capable of operating under autorotative conditions for at least 15 minutes.

Old Man Rotor

13th Mar 2009, 12:15

Extract: Part 1, Section lll - S92 RFM

7.1 MAIN GEARBOX OIL SYSTEM FAILURE

Symptom:
MGB OIL PRES or MGB OIL HOT or MGB CHIP or ACC 1 CHIP or ACC 2 CHIP or MGB OIL PRES

GEARBOX OIL PRESSURE aural alert.
Confirming:The confirming steps only apply to low oil pressure or high oil
temperature. There are no confirming steps for chip indications.
Main gearbox oil pressure is less than 35 psi
or
Main gearbox oil temperature is greater than 130 degrees.
WARNING
BYP must be selected within 5 seconds after the MGB OIL
PRES warning has illuminated to ensure an adequate
quantity of oil remains in the gearbox.

HeliComparator

13th Mar 2009, 12:19

OMR

Sikorsky and the FAA chose to go with the first sentence "Unless such failures are extremely remote,..." rather than the 30 minutes bit, though it begs the question how such an event can be shown to be extremely remote before an aircraft has even entered service.

But its far too early to say that it was a complete loss of lubricant - IMHO its more likely to be some other transmission malfunction (if indeed it even was a transmission malfunction).

HC

NorthSeaTiger

13th Mar 2009, 14:09

Are 92's still in service today or have they been grounded ?

NST

rotorknight

13th Mar 2009, 14:17

still flying,untill cause of accident is known

SJ-Telegram

13th Mar 2009, 15:00

I’m a reporter with the St. John’s Telegram newspaper in Newfoundland. I am covering the Cougar crash. I am focusing on the history of the Sikorsky S-92. I have conducted a preliminary CADORS search that identified a number of incidents with Sikorskys in this region, although most of them were not MGB-related, that I could tell. I’ve read this discussion with interest, and I’m hoping someone can direct me to more information about these previous incidents, or otherwise walk me through the technical aspects of this problem. I can be reached by e-mail at <[email protected]>. Appreciate any help that can be provided.

Sincerely,
Rob Antle

Beaucoup Movement

13th Mar 2009, 15:06

It is certainly not a good time for aviation just now. Certainly since the beginning of the year until now. :(

I first found out of this accident around 45 minutes after it happened as a friend of mine who was due to be flown on the exact same aircraft on the next rotation phoned me to announce that an S92 had ditched.

He was actually in todays "press & journal" (aberdeen newspaper in the U.K) giving a statement.

Thoughts and prayers to all concerned...

Special 25

13th Mar 2009, 15:24

It isn't soley up to the operator or manufacturer to ground an aircraft, certainly not until some cause has been identified, either through investigation or info passed by the crew before the crash.

As pilots, we must all resist any pressure to fly if we had doubts about the aircraft. If you aren't completely happy to fly it (and it seems that many of you have concerns) then I feel you could hardly been criticised for refusing to fly the S-92. Personally, I don't fly the S-92 and have little knowledge of the previous MGB problems that others are referring to, so as an aircraft I feel it has a safe enough track record to keep it flying. But if you have genuine doubts, I wouldn't get into an aircraft I wasn't happy with and neither should any of us.

If I remember correctly, Sikorski opted to go without the complicated Emergency Gear Box lubrication that newer aircraft were developing, and went for a Bypass System not unlike the L1 Super Puma ? Is that the case or am I behind the times ?

Sikorskyfan

13th Mar 2009, 16:22

There is a news conference scheduled for 14:00 Newfoundland Time (10 minutes from now) where the TSB are going to announce their intention to recover the wreakage. Perhaps there will be some detail regarding the condition of the aircraft, but if they plan to recover it it must be in at least a few big pieces giving a clear indication of how hard it hit the water?

Swamp76

13th Mar 2009, 16:25

The suspected gearbox problem is related to the MAYDAY call made by the crew on RTB.

http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/applica...asp?Position=1 (http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/applications/cadors/English/Query/detailresults.asp?Position=1)

Record #7 Cadors Number: 2009A0212
Reporting Region: Atlantic
Occurrence Information Occurrence Type: Accident
Occurrence Date: 2009/03/12 Occurrence Time: 1215 Z
Day Or Night: day-time Fatalities: 1 Injuries: Canadian Aerodrome ID: Aerodrome Name: Occurrence Location: 472605N515658W
Province: Country: CANADA World Area: North America
Reported By: NAV CANADA AOR Number: 105029-V1
TSB Class Of Investigation: 3
TSB Occurrence No.:
Event Information
Engine oil problem/Forced landing/Collision with terrain/Diversion
Aircraft InformationFlight #: CHI91 Aircraft Category: Helicopter
Country of Registration: CANADA Make: SIKORSKY Model: S92A
Year Built: 2006
Amateur Built: No Engine Make: GENERAL ELECTRIC Engine Model: CT7-8A Engine Type: Turbo shaft Gear Type: Land Phase of Flight: Cruise
Damage: Destroyed Owner: COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC. Operator: COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC. (4791)Operator Type: Commercial Detail InformationUser Name:MacQuarrie, JackDate:2009/03/12 Further Action Required:Yes O.P.I.:Maintenance & Manufacturing
Narrative:CHI91, S92, enroute from St. John's (CYYT) to the Hibernia Oil Platform at 12:15Z, declared MAYDAY due to a main gear box oil pressure problem and requested to return to St. John's. Air Traffic Control cleared the flight as requested. At 12:25Z aircraft ditched at position 472605N515658W.

birrddog

13th Mar 2009, 16:44

In a scenario where a gearbox seizes, is it fair to assume this could slow the rotors during an auto?

Swamp76

13th Mar 2009, 16:48

If it is seized, it is not turning. Therefore, no auto.

The failure would be the equivalent of a main wing spar failure in an airplane.

rumline

13th Mar 2009, 17:03

Correct me if I am wrong but I believe that your wondering is should a gearbox puke out all it,s lubrication ....do the blades keep turning?

Yes they do...until the gears and bearings within the box reach a temperature point that begins to bake the residual lubrication. Without any lubrication , the metal to metal contact and extreme forces that a 15 ton helicopter put upon them, begin to fail as well as build incredibly high frictional forces.
At this point, further application of power can overcome this rapidly increasing friction and keep the blades turning but at some point either the power runs out or the incredible heat build up causes a catastrophic failure and either a blades will begin to slow and eventually sieze or the mast / transmission will fail. At this point your a greasy manhole cover and gravity wins another one
As the gearbox fails, the increasing friction also precludes successful autorotion.
With some operators, an impending gearbox failure (high teps and or low pressure) calls for a Land As Soon As Possible and in other cases....a Land or Ditch IMMEDIATLY I
I am curious as to the S92,s RFM Emergency Checklist and/or Cougar,s ECL calls for with respect to Gear Box malfunctions.

birrddog

13th Mar 2009, 17:10

rumline, yes, that is what I am getting at.

I appreciate it varies from type to type, but are there any quantifiable indications as to how long this might take?

I ask as I would appreciate the experience of other pilots how to treat this type of situation, when overflying an area of hostile terrain, either unsuitable to land, or remote from help (in my case more likely to be over urbanized, mountainous, forested or desert area, rather than the ocean).

Naturally a bias would lean towards Land Immediately, unless otherwise indicated in the relevant type POH, and of course, prevention of getting into this state in the first place, assuming I had influence over the contributing factors.

EN48

13th Mar 2009, 17:24

Only one S92 accident in the NTSB database to date ( National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov) )

and two (including this one) in the Griffin database (Griffin Helicopters | Accident Statistics (http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk/accidentstatindex.asp) ).

This is the only S92 accident in which MGB is identified as a possible issue in these databases, and the only fatal S92 accident in these databases. Is this the first S92 accident in which fatalities have occurred?.

rumline

13th Mar 2009, 17:26

The machines that I am intimate with have never stated outright what those figures are.....and I doubt many will ....unless it.s a MIL Spec proviso (ie Blackhawk)
The figure that gets bandied about by the techs that dig into these hard-to reach places is 30mins....
I have known Bell mediums to sieze within 15mins ...others to have sustained serious damage (scrapped GB) in as little 3 mins...
There are many factors as to whether a gearbox holds together or self-destructs. Things like rate of fluid loss, payload being carried, ambient air temp, transmission design, fluid being used .....all the way to the tolerances within individual boxs (no two are exactly alike)
I have personally had two trannys puke thier fluid out....once from 55psi to Zero in about 30secs (fortunatly was just in the hover....whew!! and another it dropped at a rate about 5psi /min (where I elected to carry on to first landfall....no damage...a/c returned to service)
It is my personal evil monkey lurking in the closet when it comes to helos....You might have 2 hydralics, 2 engines, 2 generators, 2 inverters, instrument redundancy......but there,s only one tranny....take care of it!

Special 25

13th Mar 2009, 17:27

In the event of possible MGB failure, I think all aircraft types would have a Land/Ditch Immediately policy. Obviously, that doesn't apply if you have an emergency lubrication system, or that system has run for its prescribed amount of time. But once you have a gearbox about to fail, there is only one place you should be - On the ground / Water.

As to Autorotation. That isn't a requirement for a Gear Box problem, although I gather that was included in the early reports of this accident. I always understood that in the event of gearbox oil running out, the best policy was to land or ditch with power on, in order to overcome the increasing friction. I seem to remember a story of a Puma (332 or 330J) losing its lubrication and just making it to a deck that was close by - As they lowered the lever on landing, the blades made about 3 rotations and shuddered to a stop together with the smell of hot metal.

rumline

13th Mar 2009, 17:34

Special 25.....know a 212 that lost its lube...flew for about 13min before landing and upon throttle roll-off....blades siezed and spun the machine on the ground...

NorthSeaTiger

13th Mar 2009, 17:36

If you are involved in any way with the S92 then you will know what the issues are, I think at this stage we shouldn't speculate but think of all involved.

NST

EN48

13th Mar 2009, 17:42

Only seven fatal accidents in "newer" Sikorsky helicopters (S76A or later) in last 10 years in NTSB database. None of these show MGB failure as a probable cause, however, in some cases, no cause determined.

SASless

13th Mar 2009, 17:45

Hope fades for 16 missing in Newfoundland helicopter crash (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2009/03/13/helicopter-search-nfld.html)

Latest news....

Search to be carried on until dark today, no more signs of victims, hope fading.

rumline

13th Mar 2009, 17:54

Searching data bases for accidents may not reveal nearly enough information to mold an informed opinion.
Many incidents occur that are resolved at the company level...
Some between the operator and the manufacturer
Others between the Minister, the Company and the Manufacturer.

ie: A MGB return line cracks and leaks oil out....oil pressure drops and pilot returns to base before there is a catastrophic failure.

Oil line is replaced and machine returns to service.

Perhaps the material used to manufacture the line wasn,t resilient enough....or perhaps the stand-offs were not positioned properly....but the fix is made. The company examines other similiar types and also replaces those lines with a stronger one....

Now we have a known issue ...and all the pilots/engineers all know about it but thats where it ends.
Perhaps chatting to collegues reveals that they too, have had similiar incidents....but again...it is possible that a known fault/flaw can go for years before being fully addressed

Terrible news that no one found.
Condolences and peace upon those left behind.

birrddog

13th Mar 2009, 17:58

Scenario1:
I always understood that in the event of gearbox oil running out, the best policy was to land or ditch with power on, in order to overcome the increasing friction. I seem to remember a story of a Puma (332 or 330J) losing its lubrication and just making it to a deck that was close by - As they lowered the lever on landing, the blades made about 3 rotations and shuddered to a stop together with the smell of hot metal.

Scenario2:
know a 212 that lost its lube...flew for about 13min before landing and upon throttle roll-off....blades siezed and spun the machine on the ground...

Would it make sense then, in the above scenarios to:
scenario1 - (Splash 25) override the governor and keep power on when lowering collective
secnario2 - (rumline) roll off power very gradually (I assume this could pose some other risks, depending on state of MGB and various temps /stresses)

i.e. in both scenarios keep one eye glued to RRPM?

rumline

13th Mar 2009, 18:07

In the case of the 212.....the ECL (at the time) called for Land As Soon As Possible)
The PIC elected to fly to the first floating site suitable for landing ....at this point your well outside anything the checklist could possibly cover and just relieved to know your down.
As the tranny thrashes in its death-throes .....how to roll off the throttles was probobly the last thing on thier mind!

victor papa

13th Mar 2009, 18:18

This is very sad and condolonces to all involved.

If it was MGB problems, all you have to do is read the S-92 forum. There has been a few problems with the MGB and the 92. The concentration however has been on it's FAR crashworthiness certification vs other helo models non-FAR(fully compliant) crashworthiness certification.

Personally I want a guarenteed MGB above anything else. We have procedures for almost all failures, but a MGB failure is unthinkable- hydraulics gone on a big machine? Altenators gone? Rotor rpm?

Again, I hope for the best for those unfortunate to be involved, but this must cause some investigation and rectification.

rotornut

13th Mar 2009, 18:35

Just heard on the radio that search will continue until it gets dark this evening (March 13) then will probably resume tomorrow as a recovery effort.
The TSB plans on using a remotely contolled vehicle to conduct the underwater search. More news here:
CTV.ca | Search for chopper crash survivors continues Friday (http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090312/chopper_search_090313/20090313?hub=TopStories)

Special 25

13th Mar 2009, 18:51

I know most people seem to be focusing on the MGB and there was talk of past issues.

Am I correct in thinking that one of the launch machines (Norske Helicopters) had a problem involving Loss of MGB pressure in the first few hours of flying ? Think it was traced to a plastic component in the pump that had failed a bit earlier than expected.

Then there was an incident in Brunei quite recently that necessitated a forced landing. I think that was Main Transmission related, but not sure if the final conclusion has been reached.

Is this a fundemental problem with the 92 Gear Box and Main transmission or are these isolated events. Seems like a lot of issues for such a new aircraft. Hope they don't ground it as the UK Search & Rescue system depend on them now that the AB139 isn't working either !

outhouse

13th Mar 2009, 19:13

I still feel that if you have not got oil pressure you are going to land, if you have a little make sure it don’t get to hot, if you have other indications along with the lack of or low pressure, the only place you are going is down, low, slow and ready for the possible wet arrival.
Any run dry time advertised by any manufacture in my humble view is an advisory regarding your ability to transition from your altitude to a possible safe controlled landing on ground or water.
No gear system will run reliably without oil, it cools lubricates and is the life blood of the transmission system.
After looking at the flight data available on line and the noting the point that they turned back to the shore, how close were they to the destination rig?
My comments above are general ones only and in no way try to explain any aspects of this tragic event.

Outhouse.

Spanish Waltzer

13th Mar 2009, 19:14

Hope they don't ground it as the UK Search & Rescue system depend on them now that the AB139 isn't working either !

A fairly contentious comment on two fronts...

The UK SAR system does not depend on the S92. It is merely one element of a multi agency / platform system. If required to, either the RAF/ RN may be asked to cover for the Coast Guard within the constraints of their own manning / serviceability issues, as they have before, (just like the coastguard have helped out the military before) or the contractor will, as they have done in the past for the 139, provide alternative assets.

secondly, if in due course, the S92 is grounded then it will be for specific safety reasons. In which case I would argue that the safety of the crew(s) is of greater importance than the effect it may or may not have on the UK SAR system.

I appreciate Special that the comment was probably just a throw away line but in the present climate everything on these threads is being scrutinised by the media.

SW

Special 25

13th Mar 2009, 19:25

Fair point and comment withdrawn - Had forgotten about the press !

Yes, it was meant as just a throw-away line, especially as I'm not really sure of the status of the AB139 right now. I guess not the right time for frivilous comments either - Apologies ! S 25

Phil77

13th Mar 2009, 19:38

Outhouse:
After looking at the flight data available on line and the noting the point that they turned back to the shore, how close were they to the destination rig?

I was thinking the same and tried to figure it out:

The last flight of the same aircraft on flightaware.com between CYYT and the platform had a duration of 1:15.
They departed at 11:47 Z and declared the emergency at 12:15 Z. That's 27 min, so not even half way before they turned around and flew for another 10 min (or 17nm).

The media reports indicate an airliner saw the aircraft only minutes (expendable statement) after the crash already upside down... did it capsized after a somewhat successful ditching? Maybe the survivor was/will be able to tell; on TV he seemed to be conscious when they loaded him into the ambulance.

outhouse

13th Mar 2009, 19:57

Phil77
That’s the worrying bit, the short time frame from turn round till the event.
The voice recording will give some info however the recovery of the airframe and CVR+ FDR will be a critical event in the investigation. So how deep is the water in the area and what is the commitment to recover?

Ned-Air2Air

13th Mar 2009, 20:21

Outhouse - Water is about 400ft deep and they said that a recovery vessel will be there on Friday to start recovery process of wreckage.

May they all rest in peace. :(

AirJockey

13th Mar 2009, 20:24

How is it possible for a state of the art S-92 to go down only 7 minutes after a MGB oil pressure loss, bypass or no bypass. It is not possible according to Sikorsky reps. But still it did!! Have we not been told the truth about the MGB weakness?

Any technical history before the flight?

Praying for more survivors :(

Ned-Air2Air

13th Mar 2009, 20:45

Air Jockey - The chance of any more survivors are slim to none. The suits would have given them about 24 hours protection but that time has come and gone now, so things are not good.

:(:(:(

outhouse

13th Mar 2009, 20:48

Thanks Ned, and yes may they all rest in peace.
Not to deep and hopefully the FDR will be recovered and the info made public soon.
outhouse

albatross

13th Mar 2009, 21:03

FlightAware > Live Flight Tracker > Cougar Helicopters, Inc. #91 > 12-Mar-2009 > CYYT-CHIB (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/CHI91/history/20090312/1147Z/CYYT/CHIB)

This was posted on another website yesterday.

I trust it refects the truth.

Just listened to the evening news from NFLD. The search and rescue will be terminated and changed to a recovery mission for the A/C wreckage.

Sad days indeed.

Ned-Air2Air

13th Mar 2009, 21:45

Hope fades in N.L. chopper search

The search for 16 missing passengers of a helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland will end Friday evening, because officials say "the likelihood of finding survivors is no longer there."

13/03/2009 3:53:47 PM

A helicopter travelling from St. John's to the Hibernia offshore oil platform and operated by Cougar Helicopters ditched after experiencing technical problems, Thursday, March 12, 2009. The search continues Friday, March 13, 2009.

The announcement comes more than 30 hours after a chopper heading to an oil platform crashed into frigid waters with 18 people on board.

One survivor was rescued from the water on Thursday and is being treated in hospital for his injuries. One death has been confirmed but 16 others are now presumed dead.

"It appears there are no survivors," said the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre's Maj. Denis McGuire, adding that rescue crews had repeatedly searched a massive area of open water with no sign of life.

The search will officially end at 7:30 p.m. local time.

The operation will now be handed over to the Transportation Safety Board and the RCMP, who will conduct a missing persons investigation.

The chopper crashed and sank in 120 metres of water, and left a debris trail of about six kilometres.

Crash details

The helicopter was en route from St. John's to the Hibernia platform when the pilot reported mechanical troubles and turned back towards St. John's.

The chopper issued a distress call, and eight minutes later, went into the water.

"Mechanical problems were reported and we don't know of what nature," said Julie Leroux, spokesperson for the Transportation Safety Board.

It is believed that the pilot was "ditching" the aircraft, that is, making an attempt to intentionally crash-land the helicopter due to the mechanical problem.

The crew of a Provincial Airlines plane flew over the area within a few minutes of the crash and reported that the helicopter was floating upside down. The helicopter sunk shortly afterwards.

The missing aircraft is operated by Cougar Helicopters in St. John's.

IHL

13th Mar 2009, 22:39

Tragic; new equipment, professionally trained crew, company with an excellent safety record and leaders in the offshore support industry, passengers and crew trained on egress with all the right survival gear. What can I say-

Have they puplished the victims names ?

Fun Police

13th Mar 2009, 22:48

CBC is now reporting that the SAR mission has been handed to the TSB and is now being classified as a "recovery mission".

sad news.

FP

newfieboy

13th Mar 2009, 23:49

I sit now with a heavy heart, at home in St Johns after having walked up my trail with my wife to throw a wreath in the ocean at 19.30local. Gods speed lads and lassies of this fair Isle, you will never be forgotten.

To you Mr Burt, my absolute and utter respects, to the way you handled the media at such a tough time, JJ and all the crews, we have done nothing but pray for your loss .
I fell very privaledged, when home, to live under the flight path of such a profesional operation.

We will not give up hope.

Pilot DAR

14th Mar 2009, 02:04

What a sad event.

Having read about considerations of loss of lubrication of the main transmission (though I am certainly not speculating, because I know nothing of this event) I am reminded of the concerns of a similar nature associated with the fixed wing LearFan of the early '80's. That aircraft had two engines driving one propeller, so it's intended redundancy of powerplants were considered in the context of a helicopter.

The gearbox design, included a block of wax within, which would melt at a suitably high temperature after oil loss for whatever reason. Cast into the wax were spring loaded electrical contacts, which closed once the wax melted. The closed contacts told the pilot that the gearbox was now being lubricated by the wax, and down would be good.

I hope we learn a lesson, which makes the cost seem, in the slightest way, bearable.

Pilot DAR

redflight76

14th Mar 2009, 02:28

I just want to let you all know that my prayers are with you all. My condolences to the families of the crew and passengers. I wish you strength to help sustain you with your sorrow and pain during this terrible time. Guys, hang in there, be strong and know my thoughts are with you all!

Brian Abraham

14th Mar 2009, 02:45

While flying Hueys for Uncle Sam the resident Bell rep advised the main transmission was good for either 30 or 60 minutes dry run, forget which. Had occasion to put it to the test and flew one for 15 minutes minus oil. Maintenance arrived fixed the problem (blown filter seal), filled with oil and they :ooh: (not me) flew it home.

The certification requirement for dry run capability is contained in FAR 29.927, the relevent portion being

(c) Lubrication system failure. For lubrication systems required for proper operation of rotor drive systems, the following apply:

(1) Category A. Unless such failures are extremely remote, it must be shown by test that any failure which results in loss of lubricant in any normal use lubrication system will not prevent continued safe operation, although not necessarily without damage, at a torque and rotational speed prescribed by the applicant for continued flight, for at least 30 minutes after perception by the flightcrew of the lubrication system failure or loss of lubricant.

It is an uneviable position to be in should you have knowledge of the requirement, for you are presented with the dilemma do I follow the checklist and toss it in the water in sea conditions which make survival problematic, or take a punt and continue flight (SHORT) to a known safe haven (safe haven being defined as calmer water (lee side of ship perhaps), beach etc etc).

PS: A T-53-13 will run at take off power for 2 minutes minus oil. Thanks Mr Lycoming :D

SASless

14th Mar 2009, 03:58

I like many sat up and checked the news reports and prayed there would be reports of living victims recovered. That did not happen. I know there are many like me that are grieving the loss of the people aboard the Cougar flight.

My thoughts and prayers go out to those who have lost loved ones in this tragedy.

BOOMER1

14th Mar 2009, 04:01

My heartfelt, sincerest condolences to all those involved.

ToTall

14th Mar 2009, 04:30

Its sad but all hopes are out too find survivors.

My they rest in peace and all thoughts goes to the one left behind.

Lets not speculate but wait for an answer and support those left behind and support them as good as we can.

TT

SARBlade

14th Mar 2009, 05:02

What concerns me about this tragedy is that much has been said about the survival suits, the cold seas, the MGB, but what is missing is anything about the float system. One member mentioned something about the retrofit, but really, in those seas, without the floats going off, there is little time for the persons to get out without the aircraft filling up with water. If, like what has been alluded to, the aircraft crashed without any control, then floats may not have helped. If, however, the pilots were able to have some control and put the aircraft in without much airspeed and somewhat upright, then rolling over, we must have a float system assist the evacuation. I don't want to sound like this is the only issue, but just that the Canadian Cormorant that went down a few years ago, the egress lighting didn't go on as a result of the DC battery being ripped out. The result was that crew members in the back did not have any lighting to emergency exits. As aircrew, I am trusting that equipment installed on board should work when needed the most. I hope that Cougar's crews and pax didn't perish because of malfunctioning safety equipment.

Myt condolences to the families in the communities of Newfoundland and Canada waiting patiently for answers.

malabo

14th Mar 2009, 06:59

What we know from the news reports so far is that the aircraft was seen floating inverted a few minutes after impact, but soon sank. Doesn't sound like the floats were inflated once they were in the water, but maybe all four were damaged on impact or they were never armed. Good question for the 92 guys on the floats: do you fly with them armed over water (like the AW139), are you supposed to blow them before ditching or just put it in the water and wait for the water sensors to work, and will the sensors work inverted or does the float in the sensor have to go up (towards the belly) to make contact with the switch?

skadi

14th Mar 2009, 07:58

Is it known, whether the survivor is one of the passengers or one of the crew?

skadi

AirJockey

14th Mar 2009, 08:24

Arming the floats on the S-92 is a very handicapped procedure. Vy is 80 kts, Arming of floats is Max speed 80 kts..so there is an airspeed limitation to this. If you arm the floats Above 80 kts, you will gett a yellow caution visible all the way to the back seating row 10m behind you.
Best autorotation speed is 80-100kts. ARA`s are done >80kts. You see, the limitation is set to low, and will easily be forgotten in a stressfull situation like this. Seen many times in the sim that it is forgotten because you don`t want a yellow caution in your face.

Understand the impact was quite hard and the fuel tanks came of?

9Aplus

14th Mar 2009, 08:31

@Malabo

That reminds me to 2005 Copterline S76 crash, no emergency flotation deployment

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/185377-s76-down-baltic-sea-now-incl-ntsb-safety-recommendation.html (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/185377-s76-down-baltic-sea-now-incl-ntsb-safety-recommendation.html)

Variable Load

14th Mar 2009, 11:04

Best autorotation speed is 80-100kts. ARA`s are done >80kts.

With regard to the first, I don't think one more yellow caution would really be a distraction when you HAVE to do an auto!

With regard to the second - if that's your Company's SOPs then you should be directing this point to them. There is no reason I can think of why you would want to complete an ARA at a speed greater than 80kts???

YHZChick

14th Mar 2009, 12:08

Survivor was a passenger, to answer an earlier post.

The fact is, once the helo inverted, there was very little chance of anyone escaping. There has been much in the media about the fact that NFLD SAR was in Nova Scotia conducting training exercises at the time, and as a result, Cougar was doing their own SAR.

Those men, and at least one woman, had less than a minute to exit the chopper. Considering they may have been injured, were upside down, cold and in pitch black, that is a huge feat for anyone. They had immersion suits yes, but without an EBS, they would have had seconds.

It would have taken a minimum of 20 minutes for SAR to reach the site from St. John's--that would have been too late for these souls. To say that St. john's based SAR would have made a difference is a fallacy. As it is, there have been aircraft searching the area in rather difficult conditions. I am very frustrated with the criticism in the MSM.

To date, the names of the deceased have not been released. One of the pilots was a former military (Sea King) pilot.

Rest in peace.

AirJockey

14th Mar 2009, 13:29

"With regard to the first, I don't think one more yellow caution would really be a distraction when you HAVE to do an auto!"

VL, I agree but think you are missing the point. If you do this a lot you would know what I`m talking about.
Comparing the SP, I belive you can arm the floats at 135 kts. On the S-92 its 80 kts.

"With regard to the second - if that's your Company's SOPs then you should be directing this point to them. There is no reason I can think of why you would want to complete an ARA at a speed greater than 80kts??? "

VL, Why would you want to fly below Vy on an ARA approach?
The reason for flying an ARA at VY is if you loose an engine at this point, all you would have to do is adjust collective. All the rest is set, a/c attitude, Best Rate of Climb 80kts. The drawback is your speed is to high for arming the floats.

All this is beside the cause of the accident, but explains some details around the float issue.

Special 25

14th Mar 2009, 13:39

I believe there was criticism of the S-92 during the development that it would be quite difficult to evacuate in the event of a ditching. This was in comparison to the EC225 and was due to the size of its cabin (the big selling point of course) and the height of the windows.

Of course, any aircraft that rolls in water is going to be potentially very difficult to get out of. I firmly believe that was the saving grace of the 225 accident last month.

Variable Load

14th Mar 2009, 15:07

but think you are missing the point. If you do this a lot you would know what I`m talking about.

I do concede that I have not done a lot of autorotations for real :eek:

VL, Why would you want to fly below Vy on an ARA approach?
The reason for flying an ARA at VY is if you loose an engine at this point, all you would have to do is adjust collective. All the rest is set, a/c attitude, Best Rate of Climb 80kts. The drawback is your speed is to high for arming the floats.

Why, lot of reasons that any experienced offshore driver could list. In fact I would be surprised if your approach plate did not offer some guidance regarding slowing down close to Vmini. In any case your logic is flawed, the important speed is Vtoss. How do you think an LDP of 50kts is established. Using your logic the LDP should be Vy??

rotornut

14th Mar 2009, 15:11

'xcuse my ignorance but would this helicopter carry a flight data and cockpit voice recorder as reported in the Star?

TheStar.com | Canada | Search for chopper crash victims called off (http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/602355)

Variable Load

14th Mar 2009, 15:23

'xcuse my ignorance but would this helicopter carry a flight data and cockpit voice recorder as reported in the Star?

In a word, yes. It's equipped with a combined CVR/FDR. It would probably also have been equipped with a HFDM/HOMP quick access recorder. Hopefully all this data will be intact and allow a full understanding of the causal factors in this tragic accident.

gomex

14th Mar 2009, 15:49

My sincerest condolences to the families of the Crew and passengers and their friends.

AirJockey

14th Mar 2009, 16:09

I do not recomend using Vmini on any approach even if it is stated in the limitation as a minimum IFR speed. Read Pans-Ops. and you will be enlightened.

Using Vtoss or 50 kts LDP on an ARA approach at MAP 0.75 NM is asking for trouble in any OEI situations and I sincerely hope your instructors do not teach that? Of course you can do it, but try it in 50-60 kts wind. How stable is your aircraft then. Always think worst case scenario, not what the aircraft is capable of doing.

Good luck.

redflight76

14th Mar 2009, 16:26

You know, pilots are quick to arm chair quarterback! It is our nature to analyze and evaluate accidents without much information, which is a good thing. Some of us have been there, done that. Some of us have not. However, during a time like this and considering I have been in this business for 33 years, I think first of the loss of life and grieving of the families. The loss of life is more important to me than trying to figure out what happened at this juncture in time. The facts will come out once the investigation commences when the aircraft is recovered. The aircraft systems analyzed, the training and procedures evaluated and the error chain is recreated. I know the S92 and I trust its systems but systems do have limitations. I know how the training is done but training has limitations. I know how CRM works but it has its limitations. You know, an aircraft accident scenario can sometimes be attributed to one factor or to many. Only time will tell what factors added to this one. Pilots do their best, manufacturers work hard to keep systems reliable, trainers try to train to known and what if scenarios. BUT this industry will always have risks and we all accept that. I accept those risks as did everyone on that aircraft! I mourn their loss, I grieve for their families and friends and for their companies and I want answers too but I will wait for the accident investigation results and go forward from there.

SASless

14th Mar 2009, 17:12

AJ,

Using Vtoss or 50 kts LDP on an ARA approach at MAP 0.75 NM is asking for trouble in any OEI situations and I sincerely hope your instructors do not teach that? Of course you can do it, but try it in 50-60 kts wind. How stable is your aircraft then.

Why would one be at 50 KTS IAS in a 50-60 knot wind?

At least your rate of closure would keep you from running into the rig....but lack of fuel might become a problem.

AirJockey

14th Mar 2009, 17:56

Sasless, you need to read the previous mails from Variable Loads for it to make sense.

ThomasSt

14th Mar 2009, 19:25

They have found the wreck now...

Crashed helicopter found... (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2009/03/14/helicopter-wreck.html?ref=rss)

Crashed helicopter found on sea floor, recovery planned

RCMP identify 10 of 17 killed in crash off Newfoundland's east coast

Last Updated: Saturday, March 14, 2009 | 5:08 PM NT

http://www.cbc.ca/gfx/images/news/photos/2009/03/14/nl-cunningham-mike-20090314.jpg

Mike Cunningham said a TSB team hopes to raise the sunken Cougar Helicopters aircraft early next week. (CBC)

The Transportation Safety Board has confirmed the location of an oil industry helicopter that crashed into the ocean southeast of Newfoundland on Thursday, killing 17 of 18 people on board, while authorities identified many of the dead.

"It looks like the fuselage is relatively intact," lead investigator Mike Cunningham told CBC News on Saturday afternoon, after an underwater remote-operated vehicle confirmed the location of a Cougar Helicopters aircraft that went down in the frigid Atlantic waters.

"It is laying on the bottom, on its side. The tail boom of the helicopter is broken off, but it is laying right beside the rest of the fuselage."
The bodies were not, as yet, located, said Cunningham, but families had been notified. The search for the missing turned to a rescue effort as the sun set Friday evening, about 34 hours after the shuttle, carrying oil industry workers, went into the water about 55 kilometres southeast of St. John's.

RCMP, meanwhile, gave the names of 10 of the deceased in Thursday's crash. The other families were "not prepared at this point of time to release the names of their loved ones, and we respect that," said Supt. Reg Reeves told reporters.
Reeves identified the following, all but one from Newfoundland and Labrador, as having died in the helicopter crash.
Peter Breen, 55, St. John's,
Gary Corbett, 46, Conception Bay South,
Wade Drake, 42, Fortune,
Wade Duggan, 32, Witless Bay,
Colin Henley, 38, St. John's,
Ken Macrae, 476, Greenwood, N.S.,
Derrick Mullowney, 51, Bay Bulls,
Burch Nash, 44, Fortune,
Paul Pike, 49, Spaniard's Bay,
Allison Maher, 26, Mount Pearl, formerly of Aquaforte.Maher's body was pulled from the Atlantic Ocean on Thursday, shortly after a frantic search began for survivors. Her funeral will be held Monday.
Only one person, Robert Decker, who works at the White Rose oilfield, survived the crash. He remains in critical but stable condition in hospital in St. John's and is being treated for multiple injuries.
Reeves said most family members are not willing to interviews at this time. "They would like to have some privacy and respect," Reeves told reporters.

'Fairly large anomaly' led to chopper find

Earlier in the day, Cunningham told a media briefing that a TSB sonar scan had found "a fairly large anomaly," which investigators believed was the Cougar Helicopters aircraft that crashed. At that time, authorities were hoping for a positive identification of the aircraft.
Cunningham said the initial sweep showed the ground floor was largely flat and featureless.
Underwater remote-operated vehicles were in the water Saturday afternoon to glean more information about the helicopter, which may still contain the bodies of the missing.
The TSB has assembled a team of 20 people, including five experts from the U.S. who specialize in helicopters, to work on the investigation.
Cunningham said Canadian military officials have volunteered their assistance.
He said the Atlantic Osprey supply ship was also carrying RCMP investigators as well as officials from Cougar Helicopters and Sikorsky, the chopper's manufacturer.
"If everything goes well, if Mother Nature co-operates with us, if nothing goes against us, we're hoping that we may lift that aircraft out of the water on Monday or Tuesday," Cunningham said.
He added that once the fuselage is recovered, the team will "very respectfully" remove the bodies from the fuselage.

bb in ca

14th Mar 2009, 21:49

GKaplan said

----
Even if you're too fast and/or you forget to arm, this kind of system does work.
It did a good job with Bond's 225 (aircraft flown into the water with landing gear down and floats not inflated -> next thing you know it's floating...thanks AFDS)
----

The aircraft I've flown with AFDS systems operated only when the floats were ARMED. The concept was to provide automatic flotation if the aircraft belly sensors were exposed to salt water and the pilot(s) did not push the float deployment button then the floats would be deployed.

When the floats were unarmed nothing would happen.

bb

Flapwing

14th Mar 2009, 23:05

from: http://vocm.com

RCMP Release Two More Names of Crash Victims
March 14, 2009

Two more families have consented to release the names of their family members were were onboard Cougar Flight 491. Earlier today 10 names were released during a press conference at RCMP Headquarters in White Hills. The names that have been released thus far include:

Tim Lanouette, a 48 years old, Comax, B.C.

First Officer Thomas Anyll, 46 years old, Langley , B.C.

Allison Maher, 26 years old, Aquafort

Peter Breen, 55 years old, St John's

Gary Corbett, 46 years old, Conception Bay South

Wade Drake, 42 years old, Fortune

Wade Duggan, 32 years old, Witless Bay

Colin Henley, 38 years old, St John's

Ken MaCrae, 47, Greenwood, Nova Scotia

Derrick Mullowney, 51 years old, Bay Bulls

Burch Nash, 44 years old, Fortune

Paul Pike, 49 years old, Shearstown.

So far 12 names out of the 18 people who were onboard the helicopter have been released.

Geoffersincornwall

15th Mar 2009, 07:02

I have had a hell of a job convincing folk that the AW139 automatic floats should be operated in the way they were designed to be operated ie. ARMED whenever over conducting (extended) flight over water.

There are those that come for their 139 type rating who have previously been told that floats (on their previous types) should only be armed below a certain airspeed and don't want to change that technique when they learn that the 139 has a different design..... they don't seem to get it .,..... the 139's system was designed to be operated that way and if you don't arm them when over water you may invite catastrophe ..... and you go against the RFM.

What say you now?

Please don't revist the 'inadvertant inflation in flight argument'. This has NEVER happened on the 139 but there are quite a few examples where a truly automatic system may have helped to save lives.

What are you going to go with, something that has never happened before or something that has? Get your calculators out and do the maths on 'probability'.

G

griffothefog

15th Mar 2009, 08:49

Geoffers,

I completely agree with you REF: 139 float system, but there will always be an element of "it only has to happen once" among folks that have only experience of the older systems to deter them from arming the floats at cruise speeds....:ugh:

Condolences to all those who lost their lives in that tragic S92 accident.

VeeAny

15th Mar 2009, 09:02

Slightly off the original thread but for the old timers, what have been previous consequences of inadvertant float deployment at cruise speeds on the older types ?

RIP to those lost in this tragic S92 incident.

skadi

15th Mar 2009, 09:10

This statement, if its really true, maybe should stop the discussion about the floats arming procedures:

Hey Newsmeister, in the breifing this afternoon the TSB said they found one sponson floating with fuel tank included and the covering off the other sponson floating on the ocean thats where the main floatation bags are located on the S-92 so that explains why the rest sank, he must have hit really hard to tear them off, we should know more in a couple of days for sure.

I found this in the comments in the link of post #120. If they really have hit the water that hard, it would probably make no sense, whether the flotationsystem was activated or not.

skadi

Paddyviking

15th Mar 2009, 09:58

It is right that the sponsons are designed to seperate from the the main body of the aircraft with a hard landing (which would explain why the aircraft failed to remain upright or even float properly), but what defines a landing hard enough for this to happen.
With regard to the arming of floats below 80kts, I believe they should be on at all times while over water.

All thoughts and prayers to all connected to this tragedy
pv

NorthSeaTiger

15th Mar 2009, 10:02

That would be true if that's where the floats are located , on the 92 the floats are located at the nose and on the tail boom , there are sponson mounted flats but dependant on mod state and the portion they are connected to is seperate from the fuel tank part of the sponson which is designed to detatch on impact .

NST

Nigel Osborn

15th Mar 2009, 10:31

I remember an incident in the 1980s to an Okanagan S76A cruising along off the coast of India. Both the pilots were over 60, which had nothing to do with the incident. A wire from the float test switches was routed over the sharp corners of the radar & duly chafed through. At aound 135 knots the floats blew up. The 76 bucked & jumped badly, then settled down to a steady 130 knot cruise. Both the pilots were a lot greyer on landing than when they took off!
All our 76s were checked & quite a few were close to repeating the incident. Basically, especially in a 212, it is not nice if the floats inflate in the cruise unless designed to do so.

HeliComparator

15th Mar 2009, 11:15

Geoffers

I presume then that there is no quoted maximum IAS for arming the floats on the 139? Unfortunately on the S92 its 80kts, and I'm sure you wouldn't be encouraging pilots to bust a flight manual limitation?

I don't think we know whether its 80kts for the S92 because that's all they bothered to test it to, or whether they found that it was the maximum before loss of controlled flight (probably the former).

Either way its a significant limitation, that does have an impact on safety, compared to other manufacturers (AS332L max 135, EC225 max 150).

However in this case it seems it would not have made any difference whether the floats were inflated or not.

HC

malabo

15th Mar 2009, 11:26

The arming of floats concept predates the immersion switches technology. Inadvertent float inflation from the automatic system is as rare as a transmission failure. Pilots inadvertently firing the manual system while constantly arming and disarming the system is quite common. What you really have are two separate systems - an auto system that is relied on to work when the belly switches sense water, and a manual system that the pilots can blow when they think they are going into water and don't want to wait for the auto system.

In my opinion, the AW139 is the only aircraft that has got it right. The rest of the manufacturers could follow suit. We have far more helicopters hit the water without inflating the floats that ones that do. Guess why? Because you have either a CFIT situation and didn't plan on going into the water or in the case of a sudden emergency there is no time to get them armed.

Our dunker/HUET training is all about exiting an inverted aircraft, so even if one or two bags are still keeping the aircraft afloat, your odds are better than if none are.

Variable Load

15th Mar 2009, 13:32

In my opinion, the AW139 is the only aircraft that has got it right.

It's not so much the aircraft or manufacturer that has got it right, in this case it was the regulator with primary responsibility for certification. ENAC obviously took a fairly pragmatic view with the AB139 (as it was), whereas the FAA required actual inflation flight tests for the S92.

As HC guessed earlier, Sikorsky went to 80 kts during flight tests, thought "that'll do won't it" and we are stuck with the limitation.

Sandy Toad

15th Mar 2009, 13:36

While we are in midst of massive thread creep....
The arming of floats concept predates the immersion switches technology. I'm not sure it does, as I remember several Royal Navy beasties returning with inflated floats which were of an "Armed" and then automatic Salt Water Activation system back in 60s and 70s.
Obviously there have been improvements over the years and as Geoffers says with the AW139 we should have total confidence in its electical system which never goes wrong, goes wrong, goes bong! :rolleyes:

TipCap

15th Mar 2009, 14:00

There have been several inadvertant inflations in flight in the cruise on the AS332Ls without serious handling problems. In actual fact, if my memory serves me well, one flew quite a distance with its floats inflated (mind you though on the Ws55s3 we flew with our floats inflated all the time :ok:)

SASless

15th Mar 2009, 16:02

Every time we make something "automatic" we risk having an accidental operation.....imagine standing beside the float bags in the hangar when the system decides to operate for some inexplicable reason.

One would think an automatic system using water immersion switches and a manual pilot operated switch with a backup mechanically operated pilot actuated release would be the best of all things.

If we can put Rovers on Mars why can the helicopter industry not come up with a float system that covers all modes?

Likewise....why can we not come up with an AFCS that provides hands off flight right down to a hover and develop procedures to use it safely?

redflight76

15th Mar 2009, 16:26

Just wondering if the 139 floats were flight tested at the flight speed limit or above with actual deployment of the floats? Per Part 29, the 92 was flight tested with deployment of the inadvertant deployment of the floats to speeds above 80 KIAS but that speed was referenced since it is BROC at SL. Benign handling quality changes with the deployments. Arming at high speeds only satisfys the fact that the floats can be armed anytime over water . I'm guessing that the 139 checklist still mentions arming the floats during routine and emergency checklists. AFDS only works when armed first so I agree that flying with armed floats is a great idea if over water but RFM limitations still apply.

The mindset of "it has never happened before" is asking for trouble. There have been many instances of inadvertent float deployments and there always will be. Riding a bucking bronco during inadvertant deployment at high speed is not my idea of fun. Don't think the engineers have completely eliminated the chances of system failures yet.

Since the 92 imersion switches are mounted in the sponsons, breakaway of the sponsons could have negated the auto deployment feature due to severed wires. Sea State 5 bags located on either side of the fwd fuselage and one on the tailboom, State 6 bags add bags on the sponsons. Lots of wire between switches and inflation bottles. I have seen first hand where auto systems have not worked due to the compromise of the structure causing wire harnesses to break.

Also the bags are not tollerent during hard water impacts when inflated prior to water contact. Don't know of any float bags that are.

Like I mentioned in my post earlier, theory and speculation will be answered during the crash investigation. Examination of the float system components, inflation bottles, mounting points, bags and the position of the arming switch will provide the answers. The CVR/FDRs and HUMS will also provide much needed info.

My thoughts and prayers are with the families.

UCLogic

15th Mar 2009, 16:35

For just this reason why the original Bristow system was slightly more complex in that it both catered for a modicum of energy dissipation but more importantly it conducted continued monitoring of the 'sensors' and would cater for the eventuality that the sensors were 'disconnected' during an incident.

If I remember correctly Sikorsky only tested the S76 ability to handle float deployment to a factor above proposed arming speed, can't recall the figure but hence the FM limitation

SASless

15th Mar 2009, 17:03

NoRunway,

I am aware of the SAR machines.....but was suggesting for Non-SAR machines and developing procedures to use that capability in non-SAR operations.

I guess I should have been more specific in what I was saying....but thank you for reminding me of all that.

wde

15th Mar 2009, 18:58

Body recovered from sunken helicopter wreckage (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2009/03/15/helicopter-recovery.html)

... Mike Cunningham, lead investigator with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, told reporters that crews working on the recovery effort were able to see "about 10 to 13 bodies" in the fuselage of the Cougar Helicopters aircraft, which lies beneath 120 metres of water in the Atlantic Ocean.

"That number must be taken as a guess at this time. There may be more," Cunningham told reporters. "It is very delicate work and has to be done very carefully. It's work that could take 18 to 24 hours, if everything goes well."

Also TSB briefing link

http://www.cbc.ca/mrl3/8752/news/features/tsb-newser-090315.wmv

Geoffersincornwall

15th Mar 2009, 22:01

I say again. Inadvertant inflation of the 139 floats IN FLIGHT has never happened. CFIT (into water) has. This is not a question of absolutes but a question of probabilities and as far as I can tell you get a better deal betting on arming the floats...... which, by the way have no limiting speed because they are designed NOT to inflate in flight.

Now I'm not daft enough to say never but based on the facts of the case I'll continue to put my money on arming the floats when I'm over water.

The RFM simply states ' for overwater operations - FLOATS ARM'.

As far as electrical failures are concerned please find out the facts of the case before casting aspersions. Nothing wrong with the basic design but HF related issues can bite you in the bum anywhere anytime.

G

Hummingfrog

15th Mar 2009, 23:40

I had an uncommanded inflation of floats, in a AS365N2 on departure from a platform - no real drama apart from wondering what the hissing noise was and then why my chin window was turning grey!

Eventually flew back to Aberdeen at 89kts with slight drumming from the floats and they were still rock hard 4hrs after inflation.

HF

Outwest

16th Mar 2009, 08:12

Tim Lanouette, a 48 years old, Comax, B.C.

First Officer Thomas Anyll, 46 years old, Langley , B.C.

The press has some of the facts wrong on the names of the crew....... Mr. Anyll was not one of the pilots......the Captains name has not been released yet.......

roundwego

16th Mar 2009, 11:13

YHZChick

16th Mar 2009, 11:26

Here are biographical sketches of some of the people presumed or confirmed dead in the helicopter crash off Newfoundland:
•Ken MacRae, 47, Auburn, Kings County. He was a technician with Alberta-based FGG Inspections. It’s thought MacRae retired from the Armed Forces a couple of years ago and took on casual jobs on the rigs, going to Alberta last fall and then Newfoundland.
•Wade Drake, 42, Fortune, N.L. He moved to Fortune from a neighbouring community within the last few years and built a house after starting to work in the offshore. Fortune Mayor Alec Noseworthy described him as a good golfer and a keen outdoorsman. He was married with two daughters.
•Burch Nash, 44, Fortune, N.L. He grew up in Fortune and his parents still live in the community. Fortune Mayor Alec Noseworthy said his son was close friends with Nash, who moved away from the town after finishing high school, and then settled near St. John’s. Noseworthy said Nash played soccer and hockey in school.
•Wade Duggan, 32, Witless Bay, N.L. Don Drew, mayor of Bay Bulls, said he remembers helping Duggan look for a piece of land in the area before he married and built a house in Witless Bay. "He was a nice, friendly, polite family guy," he said. "He was very close with his family and the family he married into. He became another son to that family."
•Derrick Mullowney, 51, Bay Bulls, N.L. Worked in the offshore for about 30 years. He grew up with several brothers in Bay Bulls. He worked as a steward for East Coast Catering.
•Allison Maher, 26, Aquaforte, N.L., confirmed deceased. Relatives of the only woman on board the helicopter described her as a "spitfire" with a personality that matched her flaming red hair and piercing green eyes. She worked in catering and housekeeping.
•Colin Henley, 38, St. John’s, N.L. He was on his first trip to the oil platforms. He had retrained from a career in real estate to become a weather observer for Provincial Aerospace Ltd. Frank Henley said his son "figured the real estate market was going down and he wanted something where he’d get a regular income."
•John Pelley, 41, Deer Lake, N.L. He was a nurse and worked regularly for the oil industry. He enjoyed hockey and music. The local Red Wings senior men’s hockey team wore black armbands in Deer Lake in his honour on the weekend.
•Peter Breen, 55, St. John’s, N.L. He worked for East Coast Catering. He was one of five people who worked for the company on board the flight.
•Tim Lanouette, 48, Comox, B.C. A pilot, he was the flight’s first officer.
Other victims:
•Corey Eddy, 32, Paradise, originally from Sibley’s Cove, N.L.
•Gary Corbett, 46, Conception Bay South, N.L.
•Paul Pike, 49, Bay Roberts, N.L.
•Thomas Anwyll, 46, Langley, B.C.

The Chronicle Herald (YHZ) says:
Newell identified the pilot as Matthew Davis, 34, of St. John's
However the Times Colonist out of Victoria says:

The other pilot was also a B.C. resident: Thomas Anyll, 46, of Langley.

The above being a perfect example of how the media often gets it wrong...

Outwest

16th Mar 2009, 12:33

Outwest, I don't think the press is saying Mr Lanouette was the captain and your quoted extract above certainly doesn't indicate so.

I don't believe the captain's name has been released yet at the request of his family.

I apologize if my post was not clear, I was not trying to say the crew status ( Capt/FO) was incorrect. I was trying to point out that some news agencies were erroneously reporting that Mr.Anwyll was one of the pilots.

YHZchick's post has now corrected this.......sadly Matthew Davis was the other pilot.

Alloa Akbar

16th Mar 2009, 22:47

The flotation system was fully flight tested during the design phase, and in flight deployment was covered.

Ditching Tests were also carried out using scale models.

There IS an issue ongoing with regard to inadvertant activation of the floats, related to the activation device itself.

These are facts. Whether or not the EFS system was armed is unclear. whether there was an inadvertant deployment is unclear, however this aircraft had the 3 float system, two fwd and one aft, if the tail cone broke off as has been SUGGESTED, then that leaves two bags and a ruddy great hole.. ergo, the EFS, by virtue of the fact that it relies on a certain amount of inherent buoyancy in the aircraft itself, hadn't a hope in hell of keeping the fuselage on the surface, notwithstanding any other system / structural damage caused by impact.

Emergency Flotation works well in a controlled ditching, however in a high force impact, where severe structural damage is sustained, it's about as much use as a snooze button on a smoke detector.

RIP all the victims of the tragedy.

AA:(

newfieboy

16th Mar 2009, 23:51

I sat in my living room window at 01'15 this morning and sat stunned as the Ospey came in. We knew surely it couldn't be survivors, I mean I had throw a wreath in the ocean only a day before with the end of SAR. Then it dawned on me what she would be carrying and I will admit yet more tears came to my eyes. As it transpired in the AM, 9 bodies of the deceased.Although not what my heart had hope for when I first saw the Osprey, I feel relief, as to quote Hank from Cougar, "they are back on the beach'', a term heard commonly in YYT.Gods speed to you poor souls.

I will sit in my window again tonight, with hope I now feel, that she will sail in again with the other souls aboard, and above all I hope she carries Tim and Matt.

I also hope that my time off is to an end,and I am away for the final trip for that fine 92 as she makes her sad final trip home. I am afraid that would be too much.

YHZChick

17th Mar 2009, 10:12

The final seven vicitims of this tragedy were brought ashore in the wee hours. There were concerns yesterday that they would not be able to remove some of them prior to raising the fuselage, so it's a small blessing that they were in fact able to.

Rest in peace. :sad:

Sikorskyfan

17th Mar 2009, 21:24

ST. JOHN'S, N.L. - The Transportation Safety Board says a data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder have been recovered from the wreckage of a helicopter that crashed in the North Atlantic last Thursday.
The two recorders were brought in early Tuesday aboard the Atlantic Osprey when the offshore supply vessel brought back the bodies of the final seven victims in last week's crash. They're on their way to Ottawa for analysis.
"I believe they're in very good condition," Transportation Safety Board lead investigator Mike Cunningham said in an interview.
"They're pretty important, that's just because of the amount of information that they contain."
The Atlantic Osprey left the St. John's harbour just before noon Tuesday, on its way back to the crash site.
It will help pull up the fuselage, which Cunningham said was scattered in hundreds of pieces. The wreckage is sitting on the Atlantic Ocean floor, 178 metres below sea level.
The crash site is about 65 kilometres southeast of St. John's.
Seventeen people died after the chopper went down, and one survivor remains in a St. John's hospital.
By The Canadian Press

Flight Safety

17th Mar 2009, 22:27

Interesting Flight Global article related to an all operators letter sent out by Sikorsky on March 14th.

EASA cautions S-92A operators over Sikorsky letter (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/03/17/323956/easa-cautions-s-92a-operators-over-sikorsky-letter.html)

heli-cal

17th Mar 2009, 22:30

As more official information on the tragedy is released, it emphasizes how remarkable it is that there is a survivor, quite miraculous!

chris28

18th Mar 2009, 01:24

Sincere condolences to all involved in this tragic accident. NL as a whole is in mourning this week and for a long time to come.

I am wondering as an airliner pilot, we see cockpit indications all the time and all pending on the warning we proceed. Obviously heli's are completely different but I am wondering, according to the threads on here with the indication of a gearbox problem being land Immediatley. Is that really what everyone on here would have done? I mean I am just thinking if that were me with that problem I think I would have pressed on as well. Can someone in the know give a run down on what the whole scenario would have went like out there?

Thanks

bb in ca

18th Mar 2009, 02:54

I am wondering as an airliner pilot, we see cockpit indications all the time and all pending on the warning we proceed. Obviously heli's are completely different but I am wondering, according to the threads on here with the indication of a gearbox problem being land Immediatley. Is that really what everyone on here would have done? I mean I am just thinking if that were me with that problem I think I would have pressed on as well. Can someone in the know give a run down on what the whole scenario would have went like out there?

While not typed on the 92 I do fly other sikorsky products in the offshore market.

Most if not all stand alone MGB problems (ie: temperature too high, pressure too low, chip light etc..) will result in the Emergency Checklist suggesting to descend to minimum safe altitude adjust speed and Land as Soon as Possible. Once a MGB problem develops into mulitple problems (ie: one of the previous problems with a grinding sound, abnormal vibration, torque increase with no increase in collective) the Emergency Checklist will suggest for you to Land/Ditch Immediately.

The Cougar 92 may have had just such a scenario as a low oil pressure problem which made the crew decide to turn back to the nearest suitable landing area. The 92 may have then provided more serious symptoms resulting in the Mayday call and the crews decision to ditch in the ocean. Unfortunately the MGB did not allow enough time for the crew to perform a controlled ditching.

I certainly don't claim to know what happend to that crew and what indications they had in the cockpit.

I've seen or heard nothing that would point any blame at the pilots.

Even with CVRs, FDRs, HUMS, eye witness accounts etc... nothing is accurate to what the crew experienced in real-time on that flight.

Hopefully, the investigators will publish information and the manufacturers will redesign parts in time that will prevent this from ever happening again.

chris28

18th Mar 2009, 03:07

Thanks for the info, I also was in absolutle no way blaming the pilots....I have the utmost respect for the cougar team. There is alot of skepticism here now in yyt involving the S-92 and rightfully so. Hears to hoping somthing positive comes from the FDR in which Sikorsky can make a mod to this design for the future. Lets face it ditching off the East Coast of NL would be extremely dangerous on a bright summer day...

malabo

18th Mar 2009, 04:11

How does one retrieve the FDR/CVR from an aircraft sitting on the bottom of the Atlantic in 150 metres of water? Are those things not bolted onto some sturdy panel inside the fuselage structure? Did they do it with sub remotes? If divers, what kind of equipment?

Red Wine

18th Mar 2009, 07:30

The depth of 600 ft [approx] is well within the capacity of Saturation Divers using a Mixed Gas System, most likely Hydreliox or similar.

Various ROV’s maybe able to undertake some work, however as the FDR/CVR devices may have required leverage, cutting or other manipulation to free them, it’s more likely that Sat Divers were used.

Saturation Divers would also make the relocation of the badly damaged airframe onto/into the retrieval framework more easy, together with the more sensitive handling of our colleagues and passengers.

Just my private view.

helimutt

18th Mar 2009, 09:14

I'm not sure but isn't the FDR/CVR in the tail section? If so, wasn't it stated the tail was separated from the fuselage on the sea bed? Maybe they retireved the tail section?

Possible? As I say, I have absolutely no knowledge of a '92 except to know that it's bloody huge compared to what I fly!

Spanish Waltzer

18th Mar 2009, 10:31

Chris,

I am wondering as an airliner pilot, we see cockpit indications all the time and all pending on the warning we proceed. Obviously heli's are completely different but I am wondering, according to the threads on here with the indication of a gearbox problem being land Immediatley. Is that really what everyone on here would have done? I mean I am just thinking if that were me with that problem I think I would have pressed on as well

Forgive me if I have misunderstood your question, and please understand I am in no way referring to this particular dreadful accident, but trying to compare actions in an airliner to actions in a helicopter are like chalk and cheese.

If you suffer a serious malfunction overwater in an airliner that requires you to get it on the ground asap I have no doubt your training is to look to the nearest suitable divert. A landing in the water is generally accepted by the large fixed wing world as one with a low suvivability chance.....hudson river exempt! If you suffer a similar problem in a heli, particularly one that is designed and regularly operated overwater and so is fitted with floats etc and possibly even passengers dressed in survival suits then a controlled water landing even in high sea states may well lead to a more survivable situation than trying to continue flight to reach land only to suffer some catastrophic failure and the water landing being anything but controlled. The flexibiliy of a heli not requiring runways means that generally land immediately emergencies mean just that.

SW

Flight Safety

18th Mar 2009, 11:54

Regarding AD 2005-12-03 for the S-92A, that references replacement of the MGB lubrication/scavange pump vespel spline adapters at 50 hours intervals, to prevent loss of oil pressure. How did this particular problem eventually get resolved? Is it still required to replace these parts every 50 hours?

Thanks.

Sorry, I see this has recently been discussed in the S-92 Design thread.

YHZChick

18th Mar 2009, 12:06

Recovery of the victims, flight recorders, and parts of the victims has all been accomplished with use of ROVs.

vanHorck

18th Mar 2009, 12:16

Is there news of the sole survivor and has any statement from him been released?

YHZChick

18th Mar 2009, 12:49

To the best of my knowledge he is still on a ventilator because of lung damage from sea water, however the RCMP are hopeful that by week's end he will be able to provide a statement.

S92mech

18th Mar 2009, 13:37

There are two FDR/CVR's in the S-92, one at the tail boom transition and one in the left avionics bay. I would like to know how the salvage crew was able to remove one of them with an ROV.

The 50 hour AD is for aircraft with -101 oil pumps installed, there are none of those in service anymore. The initial problem was that the machined surface of the pump drive spline was rougher than drawings called for. The rough surface would abrade the vespel spline adaptor, which lead to one failure. The maintenance manual now calls for the spline adaptors to be replaced 100 hours after installation of a new, repaired or overhauled pump and every 250 hours after the 100 hour replacement. There has been a new part number spline adaptor introduced in the last few weeks that is longer that the original adaptor. The adaptor was made longer due to a failure that occurred due to an adaptor not fully installed resulting in only a portion of the drive spline engaging the adaptor and caused very rapid wear.

Variable Load

18th Mar 2009, 15:01

S92mech, the requirement for two CVR/FDR is a hangup from the FAA regs. The FAA for some reason do not accept a combined CVR/FDR. The rest of the world do, so I would be surprised if the Cougar machine has two boxes as you imply!

SASless

18th Mar 2009, 17:22

Agreed VL, the FAA probably wanted to have two boxes in the hope ONE of them would survive a crash and some data could be recovered. Just a typical FAA corner cutting move for you.

How many "black boxes" do fixed wing tote around these days?

carholme

18th Mar 2009, 18:03

The Canadian TSB has announced that the CVR discussions will not be released, though a Supreme Court decision, previously stated that CVR information is part of the public domain. Regardless of the morbid aspect of these tapes, the questions surrounding the S92 MGB oil supply system and the reports to the public that the aircraft started a return to base based on MGB oil pressure problems, it would seem that there is some reason to keep the lid on at the moment.

With all information seeming to indicate the drastic nature of the problem encountered by the flight crew, one hopes that this information is not supressed for long.

carholme

rotornut

18th Mar 2009, 20:17

The Osprey arrived in St. John's with helicopter wreckage:

Ship carrying helicopter wreckage arrives in St. John's (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2009/03/18/osprey-newfoundland.html)

Also saw on TV news that Cougar has grounded all S-92s and suspended offshore operations until it has determined it's safe to use the 92s - a very tough time for all.

redflight76

19th Mar 2009, 02:21

S92mech is correct about the dual CVR/FDR combo. He is also correct about the installation. One is standard mounted in the LH avionics rack and the second optional equipment mounted above the cargo ramp area transition section just before the tailboom.

I must commend the Canadian TSB and the crews working the recovery efforts. Their speed and compassion is to be commended. The response and efficiency is beyond reproach. Thumbs up to the ROV operators!

Matt and Tim, I will miss you both and remember you always!

stjohnsguy

19th Mar 2009, 03:05

rotornut

19th Mar 2009, 14:35

I must commend the Canadian TSB and the crews working the recovery efforts.
I agree. They showed genuine compassion for the victims and families and worked as efficiently as possible in the recovery. They've been in for a lot of criticism in the past but this time they really deserve a lot of credit.

gwillie

19th Mar 2009, 15:33

...They've been in for a lot of criticism in the past,,,
:confused:

Sikorskyfan

19th Mar 2009, 16:11

A outstanding job by the TSB, heartbreaking that they have gotten so go at this kind of recovery. (Swissair 111).

YHZChick

19th Mar 2009, 18:28

Latest update from the TSB:

The Transportation Safety Board says early indications are the helicopter that crashed off Newfoundland's east coast last week went nose down into the North Atlantic Ocean.
Lead investigator Mike Cunningham says he suspects the chopper went nose down based on the “terrible” condition of the fuselage, which is currently stored at an airport hangar in St. John's.
Mr. Cunningham says most of the 17 who died in last Thursday's sudden crash were found still strapped into their seats. He adds about 80 per cent of the wreckage has been recovered and the Atlantic Osprey offshore supply vessel has returned to the crash site to recover the rest.

According to Cunningham, the cockpit voice recorder and data recorder have not been reviewed yet.

AETECH

19th Mar 2009, 19:53

As someone who was involved the SwissAir 111 recovery effort I can tell you that it is a difficult and gut wrenching effot. Bravo Zulu to the Osprey, her crew, TSB and all involved in this recovery effort. The lessons were well learned and unfortunatly had to be exercised again.

rotornut

19th Mar 2009, 20:48

gwillie
There was a thread on the Canada forum highly critical of them concerning a Beaver crash investigation in BC. Also, they were criticised for taking a long time to come up with a report on the SwissAir accident.
Personally, I think they do an excellent job and I think they've handled the Cougar crash investigation extremely well.

outhouse

20th Mar 2009, 22:26

Please refer to the latest information appearing on the S92 thread re on-going developments just now.
outhouse

stjohnsguy

21st Mar 2009, 01:10

As I am living near St John's, I know a few people connected with the victims or their families. Apparently our survivor is doing well but his injuries are significant. Rumor has it that fuel is involved in his lung issues even though press reports only mention salt water. I heard today that his injuries may include fractured pelvis and vertebrae.

I was told by a frequent passenger that the Cougar seating configuration has one rear facing seat and that this may explain Robert Decker's survival. Apparently most remains were released quickly after the first post-mortem examinations produced consistent results.

Remember this is word of mouth to me, an outsider, from more than one person closer to those involved (but not part of the official investigation).

Those of you with professional expertise may wish to review reports that TSB found a fractured titanium stud inside the MGB. There is apparently an outstanding maintenance item related to this part.

Flapwing

21st Mar 2009, 08:01

The Canadian Press

Investigators have found a broken mounting stud on the main gearbox filter bowl of a helicopter that crashed in the North Atlantic last week, a part that was the subject of a service bulletin issued in January by Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada said the Federal Aviation Administration in the United States will issue an emergency airworthiness directive stipulating that all operators of the Sikorsky S-92A helicopter must install improved steel mounting studs, replacing titanium studs, before the choppers fly again.
But a spokeswoman for the FAA said Friday it was still reviewing what the TSB found.
“We are considering an action to take, but we certainly haven’t issued anything yet and I don’t think we’ve determined when and exactly what we’re going to issue yet,” Laura Brown said from Washington, D.C.
“It’s just a little bit ahead of where we are on this ... they (TSB) made it sound like a fait accompli and it’s not yet.”
Sikorsky issued a service bulletin on Jan. 28 indicating the studs should be replaced and that the modification had to be accomplished within the next 1,250 flight hours or within a year of the bulletin being issued.
Seventeen people died on board Cougar Flight 491 when the chopper crashed into Atlantic Ocean on March 12 as it ferried workers to two offshore oil platforms.
The lone survivor, 27-year-old Robert Decker, has been recovering in a St. John’s hospital from lung injuries and fractures since the crash, about 65 kilometres southeast of St. John’s.
Investigators have said preliminary indications suggest the helicopter slammed into the North Atlantic nose down. The fuselage has been recovered from the ocean floor and is being stored at an airport hangar in St. John’s.
An online Transport Canada database says the helicopter “declared mayday due to a main gearbox oil pressure problem” before the crash. The main gearbox comprises the link between the engines and the transmission.
Meanwhile, the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board says it does not believe there are any safety issues with survival suits used by workers while they are being transported in helicopters.
Premier Danny Williams has said he wants regulatory authorities to examine whether it was time to upgrade the standards for the survival suits.
The provincial government says members of the Canadian General Standards Board have questioned if the standard written in 1999 for the 2007 model suit is deficient.
The province wrote this week to the Canadian General Standards Board and the offshore petroleum board — which regulate the suits — asking if the standard for them should be reviewed.
The petroleum board says it has agreed to help fund a project to revise the standard and it has asked the TSB, the RCMP and the Medical Examiner’s Office to advise if their investigations reveal any safety problems with the suits

Special 25

21st Mar 2009, 08:27

I am intrigued by this theory that the sole surviving occupant of the S-92 accident may have been in a rear facing seat. It is well known that seats facing the rear of the aircraft can give better crash protection, a system that is adopted on many military fixed wing aircraft.

The clients certainly like forward facing seats, and that is how a majority of seats on UK offshore aircraft are configured. I assume that this improves passenger comfort, reduces travel sickness and improves general spatial awareness when traveling in the back of a landing aircraft.

As to this new Airworthiness Directive - Can someone in the know give any idea as to how operators have reacted to the issue regarding the Titanium Bolts.

i) Which incident first alerted the authorities to this problem

ii) Are Steel Bolts routinely available

iii) Have any operators actually installed / ordered these parts yet given that the directive was fairly open to 'getting round to it' on the next major service.

Walrus75

21st Mar 2009, 21:27

FlightAware > Live Flight Tracker > Track Log > CHI91 > 12-Mar-2009 > CYYT-CHIB (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/CHI91/history/20090312/1147Z/CYYT/CHIB/tracklog)

I noticed a way to hand craft the URL for this.

Aircraft last position report altitude 800 for four minutes and 133 knots then one report from 300 feet.
(http://flightaware.com/live/flight/CHI91/history/20090312/1147Z/CYYT/CHIB/tracklog)

Looking at the 3 minutes between 8:21 and 8:24 they must have hoped they were out of the woods (800 feet and speed back up to 133 Knots), which makes the last minute particularly sad reading. 10 minutes from incident occuring to being in the drink is particularly worrying.

Condolances to family and friends.

Upland Goose

21st Mar 2009, 22:11

Rearward Facing Seats

In the British Airways BV234 Chinook accident off Shetland (45 killed?)the only survivors. I believe were the Captain and a Passenger in the rearward facing seat on the other side of the bulkhead behind the Captain's seat.

Yet again it may say something for high impact situations - or perhaps nothing at all.

UG

pohm1

22nd Mar 2009, 03:24

UK Coastguard Response (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/north_east/7956679.stm)

P1

redflight76

22nd Mar 2009, 04:38

There is a tribute video on Youtube. Very moving!
Faces of the Cougar Helicopter Crash 491 March 12th, 2009

heli1

22nd Mar 2009, 09:37

It seems to me that the MCA is assuming that the broken stud bolt is the cause of the Newfoundland crash ,whereas if you look at the reports so far it may have just been a coincidence or a result of the crash.That Sikorsky put out a recommendation over a month before this accident that the bolts be replaced at some future point suggests it was not considered a fatal flaw .
Until the investigation has gone a lot further I don't think anyone should assume anything and certainly not lifting the grounding.

Oldlae

22nd Mar 2009, 09:48

Special25.
We are told that a stud failed not a bolt. I have no knowledge of of the S92 but it is usual when a manufacturer issues a bulletin replacing parts that they have already provisioned the parts ready to send out to the operators.

Teefor Gage

22nd Mar 2009, 10:21

That Sikorsky put out a recommendation over a month before this accident that the bolts be replaced at some future point suggests it was not considered a fatal flaw .

Maybe my memory is failing, but was this not the case when the S76 blades had to be replaced many moons ago. It was only after several fatals that the requirement was more emphatic, but a new blade design had been worked on for some time. If the original blades were thought to be OK, why the radical redesign?

js0987

22nd Mar 2009, 11:09

As memory serves, it was the main rotor hub spindle sleeve on the 76 that was the problem. In at least two fatal instances the sleeves moved outward allowing the spindles to overflex and eventually fail. Sikorsky added a plastic cuff that prevents the sleeve from sliding out and, more importantly, added a stainless steel bolt through the spindle that is capable of bearing the entire centrifical load should the spindle break.

The blades themselves are pretty robust to say the least. I'm aware of one instance of poor auto rotation technique, where the main rotor rpm got down to less than 50%. One blade actually bent - one blade had its damper attachment point ripped out - the pilot was lucky that day.

Speaking of titanium; I'm always amazed at it properties. 76 blade spares, hubs on ST's & 412's, things that flex hundreds of millions of times over their life. On the other hand it is known to have a brittleness. Years ago, the 412 had a problem with a cracked hub and it was found to have been a static stress from a blade flexing up during a thunderstorm. Grumman tried titanium hydraulic lines in the F14 until one broke causing a crash. The Air Force used special brass tools on their SR71's to avoid scratching the metal which can cause stress. So, the question is: what other components use titanium bolts or studs?

Dan Reno

22nd Mar 2009, 14:25

The S-92 is a fine aircraft, period. Could it be better? Sure. Time and money will do anything. The undertone I'm hearing here about mechanical failures is the sudden realization that we're just frail beings hurling through the air who have trusted in the best minds available at the time to design this aircraft. That once superior safety edge of confidence of being at the reins of the latest and greatest flying machine has dwindled due to this event. . Could it be better? Sure. Time and money will do anything, but who's got the money to make every part on a helo to a 'space quality standard? A field rep was once asked by a military maintenance test pilot who was tired of having to do so many test flights following blade replacements in the desert environment why, a blade's manufacturer couldn't develop a leading edge coating that would thwart erosion. The rep responded by saying there already is such a coating, diamond dust, but the owner of your helo will only pay for wood pecker lip dust.' Everything has a price including an individual's trust versus need to hurtle though the air to make a living…or serve one's Country. And for most of us, it still is a choice YOU can freely make. Drive home safely tonight becuase for most of us, that's the most dangerous activity in our daily llives.

SASless

22nd Mar 2009, 15:04

Drive home safely tonight becuase for most of us, that's the most dangerous activity in our daily llives.

Dan,

Why is it....I know of exactly three people who died in car accidents but I have a laundry list of friends or acquaintances who snuffed it in helicopters?:(

Dan Reno

22nd Mar 2009, 15:32

SASless

So do I. Perhaps its because we have no control over the hundreds of vehicles headed our way within a few feet of each day to the point that we've grown numb to the chance we may, or someone we know may, be one of those 40K lost each year on the highway. Helo folk are a relatively small family in this great back and forth business so we tend to remember each and every death and it becomes even more personal when we find ourselves in control of that Corvair or Pinto.

wobblybob

22nd Mar 2009, 15:46

Anyone know what material studs are used in the Blackhawk? Assuming it has the same style of Oil Filter.

malabo

22nd Mar 2009, 16:24

Blackhawk Stud Material?
Anyone know what material studs are used in the Blackhawk? Assuming it has the same style of Oil Filter

Steel.

Lots of other studs on the S92 MGB are titanium. And in the aerospace industry titanium is widely used for fasteners of different sorts. The way these things are overengineered (at 3x or 4x load minimum) you'd never expect there to be a problem with titanium studs in this application. Looking at the design of the oil filter assembly, I think you'd have to break off two studs before the filter body lifted out of the cavity far enough to cause serious leakage.

Was only one stud broken off in this accident, or two? Do we know if the MGB did not have oil in it when inspected? Was there evidence of oil streaming out along the fuselage? Maybe instead of another couple of caution messages on the panel displays what you really need is a tailfin camera so the pilots can look at the aft cowling area - same as Eurocopter giving up on reliable fire-detectors and simply putting an eyebrow mirror above the pilots so they could "see" if they really had a fire.

Fareastdriver

22nd Mar 2009, 16:28

I have a laundry list of friends or acquaintances who snuffed it in helicopters?
and aeroplanes.
I cannot remember anybody killed in a car crash.

[email protected]

22nd Mar 2009, 20:07

Dan - as helo pilots we all can all deal with the fact that sometimes sh8t happens, machines fail and people die but we are talking about an industry that is supposed to have moved into the 21st century.

Passengers in offshore helos should expect to travel in the best safety the industry can manage after all, that is what their employers are paying for.

When a helicopter is marketed as aggresively on a safety ticket as the S92 was, everyone assumed that it really represented a new level of helicopter safety and crashworthiness but we appear to have been short-changed, the manufacturers and regulators have conspired to set poor standards that can be worked around instead of exceeded.

I know the stock answer to this is that every aircraft has its teething problems because that is what often happened in the past; that is not an excuse any more, enough helicopters have been built and crashed to know what works and what doesn't. Building a helicopter to work a long way over the sea (either offshore or SAR) without appropriate redundancy or emergency backup for major components is just bad engineering and bad business.

TRC

22nd Mar 2009, 20:46

I know at least 10 close (ish) mates who have died in helicopter accidents. No-one close to me has died in a car crash. Maybe it's because helicopters are numbered in the hundreds (here, at least) but cars are in their millions?

I cannot understand why such an exotic material as titanium is used for such mundane jobs as oil filter attachment studs, and elsewhere, on the 92. Steel has worked for years in such a boring job, why change it? Weight? Hardly.

I sometimes wish that these effing designers would stop trying to push the envelope in places that really don't warrant it. Titanium M/R hubs a la Lynx maybe are an acceptable use, but why for simple day-in-day-out jobs like low workload attachment hardware?

Beats me.

SASless

22nd Mar 2009, 21:33

Passengers in offshore helos should expect to travel in the best safety the industry can manage after all, that is what their employers are paying for.

I beg to differ Crab.....thou knowst not what thy speaketh of when it comes to the oil patch!

The almighty Dollar/Pound/Niara drives the bottom line on safety, training, and equipment.

It is the Unions and Regulating bodies that drove most of the safety improvements.....not the oil companies.

Their bean counters look at losing lives as being a part of the cost of doing business.

ericferret

23rd Mar 2009, 12:00

I do not think that the material the studs are made from is the issue. Titanium is often used as part of the overall design to save weight while retaining strength albeit at a higher cost.

Hence all the floor screws on the 365 are made from titanium.

If it is a filter retaining stud that has failed, faulty manufacture which has left a stress point from which a crack has developed or overtorquing during maintenance would be my first port of call.

If I remember correctly the Allison 250 engine sufered from a similar problem with it's oil filter in the late 70's early 80's. This was resolved by installing modified shouldered studs.

I understood that all transmissions now have to have a 30 min run dry capabilty. This seems not to have happened if loss of oil was the cause of this accident. This would be a primary certification problem and of great concern.

SASless

23rd Mar 2009, 13:43

I am told the Sikorsky Director of Safety is calling operators and stating the Lead Investigator is saying the cause of the crash is being attributed to the oil filter stud failure and that a press conference is planned very soon to announce that.

Anyone care to confirm this?

finalchecksplease

23rd Mar 2009, 14:03

Ericferret,

As Deux Cent Vingt Cinq said in the “Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations” thread : It's known that Titanium bolts more susceptible to stress fracture, than steel, if not treated carefully and are not suited to applications that require frequent torque cycles. (just google titanium bolts, and you'll find a wealth of information about why they are used, and also why they are not used, depending on the application!)
there is an issue of using titanium.

Greetings,

Finalchecksplease

outhouse

23rd Mar 2009, 14:43

Thanks SASless.
My comment is that studs holding component together have been used since the beginning, materials have become more exotic, techniques to tighten the attachment nuts more accurate and controlled, seems in this age that basic engineering principals and application seem to show failings, the cool and sexy electronic bits have the edge. But it’s still the smelly mechanical stuff that keeps one out of the SH1T.
O
:ok:

[email protected]

23rd Mar 2009, 17:33

[email protected]

23rd Mar 2009, 17:53

P3 - the comments on the N.Sea crash thread, comments on the night offshore approach thread and comments on the new equal time rosters thread.

As I have said I don't work in that environment but when there are sufficient negative comments on this forum, many with a common topic it must go beyond just crewroom whinging and into the realms of Flight Safety concerns which should not be ignored.

SASless

23rd Mar 2009, 18:09

Crab,

If your view is correct then one would assume the highest standard required by any regulator would be the minimum standard for the oil company and thus the "Best Practice" standard would apply to all of their operations world wide even if local requirements were less stringent. That costs a lot of money....a lot of money.....but after all it is all about lives and safety isn't it.....not money!

That does not happen. Never has.....never will.

Prove me wrong!

fkelly

23rd Mar 2009, 18:10

I can guarantee that the oil companies don't willingly put their employees at risk for the sake of a few quid.

Substitute "tacitly" for "willingly" and you might be a long way from guaranteeing it with some companies.

Teefor Gage

23rd Mar 2009, 19:27

It seems from comments on that thread from those in the know that it is the helicopter operators themselves, all busy undercutting the others to get the contract, that have created a poor Flight Safety culture in order to get the job done cheaply.Crab - although I sort of agree with you, who do you think drives the operators to reduce their charges on a regular basis? Could that be their customers?
Oil companies are always being challenged by their top management to reduce costs, thereby increasing profits. Generally they are asked to reduce costs by so many percent across the board, that means they are expected to reduce costs in every part of their organisations, including transportation, by the same percentage.
As all of us on this thread know only too well, rotart wing operating costs are being severely stretched, and have been for many years. So how can you reduce the costs to the customer - something has to give..........

grayhair

23rd Mar 2009, 20:22

After watching as a bystander for over a week I felt it was time to chime in.

I've watched this thread go from sorrow and sympathy, to bashing Sikorsky, and now to bashing the offshore operators.
First: the 92 has not had more MGB problems than any other new A/C put into service. Regretfully I cannot remember one helo, with the exception of the Hughes 500, that went into offshore service in the GOMEX that did not have a fatality.

For the 225 champions, I would like to remind those that aren't old enough to remember that their illustrious manufacturer had a known MGB problem in the grandfather of the 225, the 330J, that caused at least one fatal accident before they told the operators there was a problem.

Also, despite repeated statements to that fact, there is not a lot of commonality between the 92 and the Blackhawk. The are systems that are similar, the same goes for the 61. What the 92 test pilots told me was that they tried to get the best features from the 61,76 and blackhawk, and adapt them to the 92.
If Sikorsky had won the USAF SAR contract, perhaps the "run-dry" MGB would have appeared. My understanding is that Sikorsky ran a transmission, it didn't make 30 min, they made some mods to help with lubrication, and never re-ran the test.

My personal experience is that besides the usual "nusiance" lights that plagued us at the start of operations 4 1/2 years ago, we've had more problems with the CT-7s than with the airframe, and more problems with accesories in the airframe (AirCond etc) than with the A/C itself.
I was suprised to see an earlier post where another 92 pilot thought they should be grounded until an answer is found and "they fix the MGB" when we don't yet know for sure that it was the cause.

Some others have asked the more appropriate question. "When was the MGB filter last serviced?"

We will all find out what the Board determines to be "the cause" when they do, some people may change their mind about what they've said.

[email protected]

23rd Mar 2009, 20:58

Sasless - I cannot prove you wrong , maybe it is a weakness of a system based on profit, not just a healthy operating profit but a greedy pursuance of every last penny that has forced the operators to undercut each other to get the contract and in turn squeeze their own operation until it hurts.

As Teefor says something has to give and it seems that a real Flight Safety culture is paid lip service to in order to protect jobs and pay.

Isn't it strange that onshore, the H&S monster has led to builders not being able to carry bricks up a ladder but offshore there has been a tacit (good word Fkelly)approval by the regulators and oil companies alike of some outdated and risky practices and procedures.

I'm sure that each crash leaves the crews hoping that this will be the one the triggers change and allows the industry to move towards airline levels of safety and reliability.

wobblybob

24th Mar 2009, 02:49

They had a simliar incident in Australia were the Oil filter studs sheared and they lost all Oil from the MRGB.

Would seem to be a weak link much the same as the AS332 old style filter housings which had a plug attached by two wee bolts, when they finally failed it to dumped all it's oil, needless to say Eurocopter redesigned the housing.

Probbaly be wise to redesign this one before it fails again.

sorath5

24th Mar 2009, 03:14

Maybe I'm a little ignorant, but doesn't certification of an acft. include long term airframe sytems to be tested in flight or static be done on it? How can you simulate flight stress without such conditions before hand? It might cost the manufacturer more money, but save lives in the long run. :ok:

gwillie

24th Mar 2009, 05:50

So.......now, it's TWO studs that failed (http://www.thetelegram.com/index.cfm?sid=234801&sc=79)...????????

Variable Load

24th Mar 2009, 06:33

Did someone say only one had failed?

I would guess the triangular layout of the studs would probably require two to fail before the filter housing would break away?

Swamp76

24th Mar 2009, 06:58

Sasless, I may not have flown in the offshore world but I can guarantee that the oil companies don't willingly put their employees at risk for the sake of a few quid.

It has been highlighted on the N sea crash thread that oil workers are extremely safety conscious and have no problem with a pilot saying 'no go' for whatever reason.

It seems from comments on that thread from those in the know that it is the helicopter operators themselves, all busy undercutting the others to get the contract, that have created a poor Flight Safety culture in order to get the job done cheaply.

Clearly, you haven't flown in the offshore world. The first instinct of an oil company when a safety rule is inconvenient is to see if it can be waived.

The best example, and most ludicrous, was doing my 90-day night helideck recurrency at the airport because the rigs were not available. We protested, they approved.

unstable load

24th Mar 2009, 07:14

crab,
Offshore contracts for helicopter services are written by the clients (oil Companies) and dictate their requirements for the duration of the contract.
The tender that gets submitted will be in accordance with a stated requirement for a specified type or class of aircraft and things like flight following, HUMS, ADELT, GPWS etc that are not legally mandated will be included/excluded by the client at their will.

The operators then need to fulfill those requirements that are specified and still leave room for profit while being competetive in the bid. So the statement that the operators are "undercutting each other" is in my opinion a bit harsh, but accurate. After all, in order to get a job in the commercial world a company needs to be more economical than their opposition.

If it was truly about safety and if the oil workers were the number one priority like the oil companies all say they are then surely they would run their own aviation departments all over the oil patch and not just in places like Brunei and Australia (Esso).

You are fotunate to be in the military where you get all the toys you need and some you don't need for free from the taxpayers. Those same taxpayers need to buy their own toys AND pay for yours which makes margins a little tight at times.

[email protected]

24th Mar 2009, 09:31

Unstable Load - we are talking about the oil companies here who are making zillions of pounds a day in profit, not the poor old British taxpayer (and I am one at 40% don't forget).

It would seem that they have been allowed to dictate terms and conditions for too long without adequate control from the regulators. If the standards were set nationally and internationally to the level that the workforce should come to expect nowadays then the oil companies would not be able to screw the nut down so tightly on the operators.

The oil companies will blame the pilots for the N Sea crash and the manufacturers for the Newfoundland crash but they and the regulators are ultimately responsible for what goes on offshore.

If there really is an aspiration to achieve airline levels of safety then the customer will have to put his hand in his very large pocket and the regulators will have to make sure the standards are imposed. I know it flies in the face of current business practise but unless you want another 50 years of wailing and gnashing of teeth every time a foreseable accident occurs offshore, something needs to change.

Tractor_Driver

24th Mar 2009, 09:34

Obviously being paid too much.
I will complain to my M.P.
TD

[email protected]

24th Mar 2009, 09:42

If you tell him you have seen me wasting it (taxpayers money) as well you will probably get a nice quote for the papers:)

tacr2man

24th Mar 2009, 10:15

Looks like its another case of successful "light touch" regulation

not:ugh:

SASless

24th Mar 2009, 13:18

Seems it was two studs of three that failed.....

Emergency Airworthiness Directive: S-92A Main Gearbox Filter Bowl Assembly Mounting Stud - Replacement
Tuesday, March 24, 2009 - FAA

EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
Aircraft Certification Service
Washington, DC
Aircraft Safety Alerts (http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/)

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

DATE: March 23, 2009
AD #: 2009-07-53

This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) is prompted by the failure of 2 main gearbox filter bowl assembly mounting studs (studs) that were found broken during a fatal accident investigation in Canada. Prior to the accident, the manufacturer was investigating a July 2008 incident that also involved broken studs. In both cases, the broken studs resulted in rapid loss of oil. The failures have been tied to fretting and galling of the original titanium studs; therefore, we are requiring the removal of all titanium studs and replacement with steel studs. We are issuing this EmergencyAD to prevent failure of a stud which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the main gearbox, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

We have reviewed Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014A, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009, which describes procedures for removing the main gearbox bowl assembly titanium mounting studs and replacing them with steel mounting studs.

This unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of the same type design. Therefore, this AD requires, before further flight, replacing titanium studs with steel studs. The actions must be accomplished by following specified portions of the alert service bulletin described previously.

This rule is issued under 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, and is effective immediately upon receipt of this emergency AD.

2009-07-53 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-08-AD.

Applicability: Model S-92A helicopters with a main gearbox housing assembly, part number (P/N) 92351-15110-042, -043, or -044, that is not marked with “TS-062-01” near the P/N, certificated in any category.

Compliance: Required before further flight, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent failure of a main gearbox filter bowl assembly mounting stud (stud), which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the main gearbox, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:

(a) Remove the titanium studs by following the Accomplishment Instructions in Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Rev. A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), paragraph 3.A.
Note: Figure 1 of the ASB contains guidance for removal and installation of the studs.

(b) Visually inspect the tapped holes and the main gearbox housing lockring counterbore for damage. If you find damage in the tapped holes or in the main gearbox housing lockring counterbore, contact the Boston Aircraft Certification Office for an approved repair.

(c) Install steel studs and mark the main gearbox housing as “TS-062-01” near the P/N by following the Accomplishment Instructions in the ASB, paragraph 3.C.

(d) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, FAA, ATTN: Kirk Gustafson, Aviation Safety Engineer, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7190, fax (781) 238-7170, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.

(e) Special flight permits will not be issued.

(f) Copies of the applicable service information may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address [email protected], or at Home (http://www.sikorsky.com).

(g) Emergency AD 2009-07-53, issued March 23, 2009, becomes effective upon receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kirk Gustafson, Aviation Safety Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7190, fax (781) 238-7170.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 23, 2009.
Mark R. Schilling,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.

Ian Corrigible

24th Mar 2009, 13:35

Interesting that Cougar says it is to resume operations (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20090324.NATS24-2//TPStory/National) -- the inference from the story being that S-92 ops will be restarted -- even though Sikorsky's own press release (http://www.verticalmag.com/control/news/templates/?a=10381) on the Emergency AD states "...no determination has been made that the broken studs contributed to the accident or if they resulted from it..."

I/C

outhouse

24th Mar 2009, 13:48

SK presently are in a rather iffy state, a number of legal actions must be pending, admitting a cause of failure related to a design problem may not be a good thing just now. Maybe, the legal argument could be placed re the correct application of procedures regarding the tightening of the nuts on the subject studs. Bugger, another can of worms.
O

madrock

24th Mar 2009, 17:00

The exact sequence of events from this latest tragedy will no doubt illuminate one or more probable cause/effect scenarios - and as always there will be some recommendations following. The question that will remain is are we doing enough to make sure to the best of our ability that it doesn't happen again ?
The responsibility of ensuring safe offshore helicopter operations is supposed to be widespread, encompassing not only oil companies, but a/c operators, a/c OEM's, regularity authorities, and, in a perfect world, society in general. In our commercial world, pressure can re-align priorities, and given the inherent risk of helicopter operations in hostile offshore environments, mitigating known risks comes down to preventative action by all parties.
If the intent of the FAR29.927 clause in the Regulations was to ensure 30 minutes of continued operation in the event of complete oil loss (i.e."run dry") from the main lubrication system, why not use the word "complete" in the Regulation and then stipulate there must be a full stand-alone ELS system installen on the a/c, let's see what your design is ?
If this was indeed the intent, the wording in the design criteria, and also in the Procedure for Demonstrating Compliance ( from AC 29-2C) needs to be revised and expanded. Wording such as "remote possibility" or "probably never happen" should not be considered in any future regulation regarding complete oil loss. If a full stand-alone ELS is installed, is 30 minutes continued operating time enough for an offshore flight time of over 60 minutes to destination with no alternate?
A/c designers and manufacturers (OEM's) are by nature technically brilliant, and are (usually) only bound by the laws of physics and the laws of Regulations. They do however have substantial resources dedicated to finding ways around both. They will build what they are allowed to build and will go to extraordinary lengths to sell it, as long as they can sell it and make a profit - that's their business.
A/c operators are in the middle, between the folks that build these infernal flying machines and the folks who want to use them to get someone or something somewhere. They are also technically on the upper end of the scale and deal not only with the actual flying part, but maintaining these machines and at times (especially on new a/c types) figuring out what "bugs" or "gremlins" or otherwise they may unexpectedly encounter. As such they are most familiar with what is currently good and what is not with the a/c. and there is a reporting structure used throughout the industry whereby the operators sumbit Incident Reports, Service Difficulty Reports etc...to the OEM, the Regularity Authority, or both, depending on the type of report ; they in turn can at some point thereafter issue notices to operators of the a/c in the form of Service Bulletins, Airworthiness Directives etc..again depending on the type of report deemed necessary. Not all occurences are formally reported however in the relatively compact world of offshore helicopter operations, word usually gets around.
A question here is why, if there were ever to be a known risk (either demonstrated through previous occurrence, or by compounded evidence) which could have catastrophic results, would any delay whatsoever in preventative action (i.e before further flight) be accepted by anyone in this community ?
What would happen if all pilots and passengers, fixed wing or rotary, commercial or private, were to be asked to sign a waiver before boarding, which explained in clear plain language that there was a known risk with something on the aircraft that could have catastrophic results, but we haven't got round to fixing it yet, do you mind?
Isn't that what we may possibly be allowing today, except it's not explained in clear plain language ?
Like Wall Street, we're dealing with an entire industry here, an institution, too big to fail etc....but if we knew the system was broken, even though it would be extremely painfull and costly to fix, we would fix it.................wouldn't we ?

unstable load

25th Mar 2009, 06:38

Pretty much on the money, crab!

The oil comanies will only do what they NEED to do as far as it gets them out of the responsibility loop then they can blame the operator for the mess if there is one.
They are the regulators of the industry (oil) but also play the local regulations game where if a local law/reg is more favourable then it goes into practice.

After all, if you pay more for services then you have less profit to post.

casteel

25th Mar 2009, 16:25

Can be found here
Ground Sikorsky helicopters until parts replaced: FAA (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2009/03/24/faa-sikorsky.html)

HeliComparator

25th Mar 2009, 21:03

Regarding Crab's point, there is no point in being the safest operator if you go out of business because your costs are too high. It is the nature of our business that we compete with each other primarily on price, and despite their massive profits, the oil companies squeeze us to the bone. It's difficult to see how that will ever change. That is life in civvy world where there is not a bottomless pit of taxpayers money!

HC

SASless

25th Mar 2009, 21:11

HC ,

Just what are you saying.....surely you do not mean one should cut safety standards as a way of staying in business? If you do...then that tells me you endorse trading lives for Dollars/Sterling!

What financial value do you place on a human life HC?

50,000 UKP, 100,000 UKP?

Brian Abraham

26th Mar 2009, 10:50

there is no point in being the safest operator if you go out of business because your costs are too high. It is the nature of our business that we compete with each other primarily on price, and despite their massive profits, the oil companies squeeze us to the bone. It's difficult to see how that will ever change.
HC, you would have enjoyed working with us. First world country, no weather reports to read so necessity to plan alternates or anything else, being caught in weather SOP, dictated by management to do what you're told (non compliance with regs) and there are some here suggesting ownership and operation by an oil company is the way forward. I've got news for them, and none of it good. The aircraft and maintenance were top notch however. The whole problem with the industry is that we don't have paying passengers. If that were the case consumer groups and the media would be on the regulators and politicians case.

outhouse

26th Mar 2009, 12:32

Operator safety, maybe I am missing the plot, all operators are controlled by local regulation regarding minimum standards. Engineering in Europe EASA Part 145, engineering training requirements Part 147. Companies are continually audited by the authority on their compliance and they have to demonstrate that the required procedures are in place and that they are funded to comply. The system is policed in all companies by the required in house Quality Systems again continually audited by the authority.
Operations are again controlled by regulation, JAR now EASA OPS Part 3, licensing and training under EASA FCL regulations. Again continual audits and in house quality oversight.
Ignoring a **** load of other requirement and needed to have systems in place monitoring, recording and with oversight responsibility, maintaining a continued AOC and engineering 145 approvals is controlled to the requirements now in place.
Add to that the continual audit and input from the client oil company.
So if safety is being compromised in the interest of saving money increasing profit and winning contracts in what area are you inferring this is being done?
1. Legislation not being complied with.
2. Companies not complying with the regulations even though they have the systems in place.
3. Sub standard departmental control leading to failings.
4. Not enough cash available to support the required needs.
5. Training and certification of staff not to sufficient levels.
The list could go on. Feel free to add.
Safety can be improved by adding worthwhile and prudent controls to existing legislation.
1. Improvement to existing legislation governing machines in service and new type certificated machines.
2. Legislation that is written in a way to ensures that the intent is clear and not open to ways to bypass original intent.
3. Ensuring helicopters actually fulfil the requirements needed to certify.
4. Reduce the influence of the lobby effect and the interest of big business entities.
5. Review and improvement as technology develops.
Looking at the tragic event driving this thread, the root cause is a combination of a number of failings in the system, we can all see and by now identify.
1. Confusion and misinterpretation of the actual certification state of the affected bit.
2. The failing of a simple component part that caused oil loss and system failure.
3. Less than satisfactory advice to crew that may have influenced the decision making process.
4. Operating in a severe environment.
Again the list could go on.
O

SASless

26th Mar 2009, 12:48

Perhaps I am wrong but don't the Oil Companies (The Customer) have aviation experts and safety operations that are supposed to be monitoring and auditing helicopter operations?

It gets back to my point the Customer/The Oil Companies are the folks that dictate the standards for their operations.

Why then are the Operators, Regulators, and other service providers allowed to get away with this perceived lack of safety and compliance with standards?

When I buy a bag of Dorito's I expect them to be fresh, ready to eat, and in a sealed bag that promises me they are safe from tampering.......why not the helicopter industry?

outhouse

26th Mar 2009, 13:23

Hi SASless,
My last post was going on a bit and I did not want it to be a book. Yes absolutely as I mentioned the client has as you indicate. As one who has been subject to many audits from oil companies and airworthiness authorities, been interrogated and had to demonstrate compliance for not only the contractual obligations but the requirements of legislation I know the form. The detailed inspection of records, and company procedures, and on and on. However the audit report and grading of the findings and the response from the operator and the compliance to the audit findings is never the end.
Yes the oil company douse, but only to the specific requirements they have. They do not dictate the legislation and never will, they can however control there own standard and safety requirements. In some cases they would be expected to pay additional costs to support, (HUMS when it originally was introduced to the NS was financed by Shell and the authority) as an example.
Please when being critical one must be specific, you cannot lump a statement re safety, operators, regulators and other service providers all have different responsibilities.
Comment re Perceived lack of safety and compliance with standards needs clarification, then discussion is productive.
I will state that to a question “Has Helicopter Safety improved in your experience” the answer is “YES”. Is continued improvement required ‘’YES’’ to the question is enough being done to regulate and control ‘’NO’’
O

SASless

26th Mar 2009, 13:46

Outhouse,

Thus we agree.....but add in the other position that I take and you will see why I am very critical of the oil companies. That being....the use of "Best Practice" standards would require the individual oil company to use the most stringent standard worldwide in their operations even if they exceeded the "local" standard. If that were so....the Gulf of Mexico would be a much different place than it is now. Nigeria would be a much different place than it is now.

I dare say there is a particular operation in Oz that would be very much different.

How can an oil company operate to different standards using the "local regulations" as the base for their standards and thus operate so very much differently within their own company as a result?

I again lay the primary responsibility squarely on the back of the oil companies. We could say the same thing about Helicopter Operators....Industry Best Practice Standards should be the requirement and be standardized throughout the company operations.

That would put the oil company into synch with the operators.....as the oil company would then not do business with the operators which fell short of the desired standard possessed by the industry leaders.

We know the oil company prefers the lowest bidder....and will accept a minimum standard rather than pay for the "Industry Best Standards Model".

Geoffersincornwall

26th Mar 2009, 14:27

SAS, OH, et al

The question of standards being dictated by regulation is outdated and it will not achieve the desired improvements in accident rates. Regulations set the lower limits of accepability and should only be used where no 'best practice' standard accepted by industry is available.

The right approach is to look around and see who does it best and how achievable that is in a price sensative market. Note that I didn't suggest that price is the single most important factor. Compromises will always be required but sometimes that means that the customer must pay a little bit more and accept it as the price of progress. The safest way to operate a helicopter is to leave it in the hangar and close the doors but life is about taking risks so we have to get out there in the real world and learn to live with the occasional failure. We must however learn from our failures and seek to raise the benchmark when the balance of cost over safety leans in favour of spending a bit more.

We need to stop berating the authorities for lack of stiff regulation and as professionals demand a minimum acceptable operating standard from our employers on behalf of the many powerless passengers we fly every day.

It was only 50 years ago that the UK government, the UK CAA, the national airline of UK (BOAC), the manufacturers (De Havilland) and the accident investigators* all conspired to hide the cause of fatal accidents caused by performance difficiencies in the Comet airliner. They allowed the famous words 'pilot error' to be attached to the accident reports that lead to the demotion of one Captain and the death of others. It wasn't any of those illustrious bodies that blew the whistle but the pilots. If you don't want to be party to another such event then the remedies are in your hands.

G :sad:

*the accident investigators in those days were I believe part of the CAA and this incident may well have been the reason for the creation of the independent body - the AAIB. All those without such an independent bunch of investigators have good cause to be disappointed. (edited for clarity)

outhouse

26th Mar 2009, 14:39

SASless.
Good stuff, specific topics and discussion points. Common standards based on the best available is what we would all want. Unfortunately as most know some local airworthiness authorities are behind the drag curve. So can a client insist that his safety and operating requirements exceed. Bugger, not so, answer, very nasty and political trying to upgrade the local authority requirements. Maybe the oil company could insist on contract, accept cost penalty and create an even playing field on contract response submission and acceptance. Will this happen NO; the money men are the deciding factor so is real safety a commitment? Possibly NO. Evidence client commitment to accept a higher bid and higher standards.
Operators, outside of a well and defined safety culture and authority that actually has an acceptable airworthiness system will use the advantages available to reduce costs, its life. So unless the oil clients have the commitment to safety and unless the above is there culture, then lower standards and the hazards involved will prevail.
So the end analysis follows yours. Operators of helicopters will I feel want to maintain best standard of safety. In a well regulated environment then it should work (assuming that all regulation requirements are followed) once away from this environment, e.g. Nigeria and similar, oil companies really don’t give evidence that they have any commitment to a true safety culture.
Would have expected that as GOM was in the US that a third world safety culture was difficult to grasp in that area. Still a crap safety record must demonstrate a failing and some response?
O

before landing check list

26th Mar 2009, 15:33

Does anyone else have a checklist that specifies a secondary indication (ie oil temp, chip lights, noises) to effect a land immediately? Or does just a complete loss of oil pressure effect a land immediately?

outhouse

26th Mar 2009, 15:47

Hi Geoff,
Personally I agree with you, however the bottom line is as we all know and the guide is the regulation.
However, question to all.
Your company has not had a fatal accident for 25 years; you are operating to EASA standards and have a large international oil based client bank.
Following the general drift of this conversion, and wishing to improve your standards above the required legalisation requirements, and having the opportunity to address the Board of Directors of your company.
What would be your priorities and justification?
O
:ok:

outhouse

26th Mar 2009, 15:56

No, check lists above in the thread, seems lacking as no mention of the possible 5 psi alleged single pump indication. Seemed last time I looked not to mention the 5 second switching thing. Best ignored and if you are flying the 92 check your own.
O

madrock

26th Mar 2009, 16:56

TSB just announced that on descent, zero MGB pressure at 5700'. Full timeline from information available will be published by TSB today.
Power supply to CVR/FDR interrupted at 800', no data from them after that point. A/c struck surface slight tail down attitude.
They hit hard - TSB estimates + 20g's.
MGB is at SAC for inspection.

Gomer Pylot

26th Mar 2009, 21:13

SASless, nevermind the Doritos, how about peanut butter? Due to the rush to limit government over the past 8 years, inspection of all sorts of food products has been dispensed with, as being too costly to the companies being inspected, and to the government paying the inspectors. That has resulted in many deaths from contaminated food products, which everyone assumed was safe because the government was supposed to be inspecting them. Limit the government too much, and people die. The FAA has been limited as much as any other department, but has always used its power arbitrarily, as shown by the Bob Hoover fiasco. Without continuous Congressional oversight, we will never have adequate safety regulation or enforcement. What we have is the golden rule - those who have the gold get to make the rules, and the rest of us have no say in anything.

Alloa Akbar

26th Mar 2009, 21:53

Fellas,I note from this thread a lot of Sikorsky Bashing (I don't work for them) a lot of oil company bashing (I don't work for them either) and a few questions of the regulatory bodies (Guess who I don't work for either) I have no axe to grind here, however given the basics that a helicopter, by its very nature will ALWAYS have single critical load paths, of which the main tx is one, and also given that even a complex HUMS system would have given no more warning of the failure than an oil px gauge.. since there is much arguments as to the validity of displaying HUMS data to the pilot in flight.. Couple this with the fact that the aircraft is designed and built by men who do their absolute best to deliver the best product they can (I know a lot of the guys at SAC personally.) they select components carefully.. If the studs are titanium, then they were titanuim for a damn good reason. Sadly it seems to me that with the best will in the world, there are times when us mere mortals get caught out. I'm sure SAC will learn, as will everyone, pilots included. But it seems to me that without hindsight, there was very little anyone could do to prevent this.

The Sultan

26th Mar 2009, 23:49

Alloa,

You are wrong. The S-92 shows there were many missed opportunities to avoid this.

The Sultan

Aser

27th Mar 2009, 00:07

If you want to look at the wreckage pictures go here, IF NOT, DON'T CLICK:

Helicopter Crash Off Canada Coast (http://www.heliopshelitacforums.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=792&st=20&start=20)

Really sad.

Regards
Aser

Outwest

27th Mar 2009, 00:59

Alloa,

You are wrong. The S-92 shows there were many missed opportunities to avoid this.

The Sultan

Precisely, and I hope SAC gets their A##es sued off!!!!

rotorfloat

27th Mar 2009, 06:40

Chronology of events (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2009/03/26/heli-chrono.html)

11:48:07 Cougar Flight CHI91 departs St. John's.

12:05:52 CHI91 advises Gander Area Control Centre (ACC) that they have levelled off at 9,000 feet and that their estimated time of arrival at the Hibernia platform is 13:10. Speed is 110 knots.

12:15:05 Rapid loss of main gearbox oil pressure occurs. No abnormal indications of any kind recorded on flight data recorder prior to this event.

12:15:19 CHI91 begins a right turn.

12:15:24 Main gearbox oil pressure decreases to approximately five psi.

12:15:27 CHI91 issues mayday call to Gander ACC and begins descent from 9,000 feet. They are 53 nautical miles from St. John's.

12:15:32 CHI91 advises Gander ACC that they have main gearbox oil pressure problems and requests immediate clearance to return to St. John's.

12:15:43 CHI91 heads back to the coast. Their heading is 290 degrees and their speed is 120 knots.

12:17:04 Main gearbox oil pressure reaches 0 psi.

12:17:25 CHI91 advises Gander ACC that they are heading for nearest land. Their heading is 292 degrees and their speed is 122 knots.

12:17:42 CHI advises Gander ACC that they have lost all main gearbox oil pressure. CHI91 is descending through an altitude of 5,740 feet.

12:18:25 Gander ACC advises CHI91 that they are 42 miles from Cape Spear.

12:19:10 Gander ACC advises CHI91 that search and rescue has been notified.

12:19:18 CHI91 advises Gander ACC that Cougar dispatch has been advised and that another helicopter is being readied.

12:22:20 CHI91 levels off at approximately 800 feet. Their heading is 292 degrees and their speed is 133 knots.

12:24:44 A power interruption to the Flight Data Recorder/Cockpit Voice Recorder occurs.

12:25:36 CHI91 advises Gander ACC that they are preparing to ditch.

12:25:52 St. John's radar records CHI91 at 800 feet. CHI91 subsequently descends to 300 feet in approximately 29 seconds which equates to an approximate rate of descent of 1,000 feet per minute.

12:26:26 St. John's radar records the last radar return of CHI91 at 300 feet.

12:26 Gander ACC advises search and rescue that CHI91 has ditched. Cougar dispatch confirms the ditching with search and rescue, and advises that they will launch Cougar 61 as a rescue helicopter.

12:42 A Provincial Airlines patrol aircraft arrives at crash site and observes two people in orange immersion suits in the water.

13:07 Cougar rescue helicopter departs St. John's.

13:25 Cougar rescue helicopter arrives at crash site and spots two people (one of whom is later confirmed dead), two rafts and helicopter debris.

13:33 Cougar rescue helicopter lowers a rescue person toward the people in the water.

Brian Abraham

27th Mar 2009, 09:45

Unless I've missed it, has anyone any idea of the weather and sea state these poor guys might have been looking at?

Red Wine

27th Mar 2009, 10:02

Brian, stated earlier in the Thread:

A gale force warning is in effect for the area with winds south at 20 knots increasing to 35 early this afternoon. Seas are said to be two-to-three metres and the visibility is 10 nautical miles.

mikelimapapa

27th Mar 2009, 12:14

I don't pretend to know anything about offshore ops, but why would it take 41 mins for the rescue helo to depart after the ditching was confirmed?

Alloa Akbar

27th Mar 2009, 14:38

OUTWEST / SULTAN

I understand that the gearbox has been a topic of discussion for some time, but surely you would agree that anyone who thinks aircraft are built on limitless budgets has their head seriously in the clouds.

People like you and me do their jobs, the best they can with the resource available. I'm not defending SAC as a corporation, rather the guys who do those jobs which dictate things like material and parts selection. I'm sure if they had budgets as big as Oil company profits, then they could build something resembling your idea of a great aircraft.

In this case, Men designed an aircraft according to a budget within Sikorsky. SAC are a business like any other whose sole purpose is to make money and keep people in jobs. To achieve this SAC have to base their budget on the limits imposed by the customer, and the competition. They must also adhere to the regulations imposed by EASA / FAA.

when you design, build and sell and aircraft which meets all of the above, and everyone from the manufacturer to the end user is happy, and then something like this happens, who is to blame??? You say that there were many missed opportunities for SAC to avoid this accident, so why are people buying it? is it their fault? is someone guilty of sending men offshore repeatedly in an aircraft not fit for purpose?

would you buy an automobile with a known problem in the transmission? would you take your family on a drive across the desert in it??

The list of blame / questions goes on and on. My initial point being, can you realistically blame one person / organisation or would you agree, like most accidents, there were a number of contributary factors?

I appreciate emotions run high here, and if I sound like I don't care about the families involved, then be assured that is not the case.:sad:

The Sultan

27th Mar 2009, 15:06

CFO,

First the post should have read S-92 thread.

As to your question.

Norsk,

Two Shell Brunei

Australia

The mysterious Sept draft RFM that no one can share.

The Jan ASB.

While for different reasons, they point to an apparent vunerability of the "worlds safest helicopter". I am not sure of others. History repeats itself.

Read Fineman's Challenger Appendix F (google it).

The Sultan

Alloa Akbar

27th Mar 2009, 15:46

Sultan,

while we disagree slightly on some things.. one area I'm sure you will agree on, is the fact that I find the modern design methods of using computer simulations in place of old fashioned physical testing rather uncomfortable.

Or "qualification by similarity" another well used and uncomfortable phrase..

rotorknight

27th Mar 2009, 16:44

I just want to comment on the line where you said that the end users are happy with the 92.
The end users would be the pilots,and I know a whole lot of 92 drivers that are far from pleased flying this helicopter.This has nothing to do with the above mentioned technical problems,but everything with the vibrations and crazy noise levels up in our fancy super duper cockpits.

Have a good weekend you all

twisted wrench

27th Mar 2009, 17:27

Is there any theory why the CVR FDR stopped recording while the aircraft was still at 800 feet??

Gomer Pylot

27th Mar 2009, 20:40

The report said there was an electrical interruption. I have no idea why that happened.

Outwest

28th Mar 2009, 01:14

Alloa Akbar

We shall visit this again in a couple of years when, hopefully for the families sake, the inevitable law suit is settled.

At that time, we shall see if the courts agree with you that SAC is blameless.

tommo1

28th Mar 2009, 03:17

First post here and let me state that I'm not a S-92 man and certainly not an electrician so this is only theory - not trying to state facts.

In regards to the CVR/FDR electrical interruption I believe there are 2 AC generators being driven by seperate input modules which are attached to the MGB. Lets say the MGB starts to slow down (failing), wouldn't this also cause the generator to slow? If so the generator control unit would sense an under frequency and shut down both generators- no more AC power!

Like I say only a theory and I would welcome enlightenment from anyone directly involved with the S-92.

tommo1

28th Mar 2009, 03:34

Re. my last post - just read 'S-92 design to operations', page 72 #1438. Excellent description by 212man.

SASless

28th Mar 2009, 19:11

There is far more to be reported by this investigation and there are far more questions than answers right now despite all of the conventional wisdom that flows here at pprune.

The legal questions shall be far more complex than the explanation of what caused the aircraft to crash. There are multiple layers of responsibility and multiple layers of actions along with the law and air regulations that will have to be sorted out before the full story comes to light.

Laying blame at any one's door step and saying they were the cause is very premature at this point.

Seventeen People died, one is critically injured.....let's look for lessons learned to begin with and see if we can find solutions to those problems while we wait for the official answer to how this happened.

Have we posted the Authorized Emergency Procedures (in effect at the time of the crash) for the MGB Loss of Pressure and Loss of Lubrication Fluid situation?

Variable Load

28th Mar 2009, 19:30

SASless, from post 1420 on the 'other' thread:

FWJ. I don't have the RFM in front of me so this will (hopefully) be a correct interpretation! I am sure it will be corrected by someone if I get it wrong

The drill covers both a MGB Oil Px CAUTION and an MGB Oil Px WARNING - one yellow, the other red.

1. If MGB Oil Px WARNING then select BYP (this is a MGB oil cooler bypass switch)

2. If MGB Oil Px CAUTION with px above 35 psi
Land as soon as PRACTICAL

3. If MGB Oil Px WARNING, or MGB Oil Px CAUTION with px below 35 psi
Descend MSA
Start APU
Land as soon as POSSIBLE

However if there are secondary indications, which are:
Oil px indicating below 5 psi
Smoke or fumes
Hydraulic failure
Increased power required
Unusual noise or vibration
LAND IMMEDIATELY

VL

SASless

28th Mar 2009, 19:40

Thanks VL,

I thought we had but got lost looking for it.

Questions:

If the APU was running per the checklist....would the CVR and Data Recorder continue to operate normally in the event of a loss of AC Generators?

Would the AC Generators fail due to overheating as a result of loss of oil?

Would the AC Generators fail due to a low Rotor RPM situation such that the system would sense an under frequency or under voltage situation?

Would the APU continue the AC system despite the loss of the AC Generators?

Also....as I look at the time line I see the following entries....

12:17:04 MGB Pressure "Zero"....(I assume it was taken from the Data Recorder or HUMS or whatever.)

28 seconds later....

12:17:42 Crew Reports by Radio "MGB Oil Pressure "0"."

4 min's and 38 seconds later...

12:22:20 Aircraft levels at 800 feet and accelerates to 133 Kts IAS

2 min's and 14 sec's later...

12:24:44 Loss of AC Generator Power Occurs

52 Seconds later....

12:25:36 Crew reports by radio "Preparing to Ditch"

3 Min's and 16 seconds after leveling off and accelerating to normal cruise speed and power setting.....the decision to ditch is announced by the crew.

Why did the crew appear to regain normal cruise flight at 800 feet if they were planning to ditch following their descent to 800 feet after having over seven minutes to complete the emergency checklist and be aware of the "Land Immediately" situation?

This is the key to the fatal outcome of the flight in my view.

Some other questions and observations I have thought about.

A lot of questions being asked could be answered by some of our more expert contributors and even some who have first hand knowledge of how some decisions were arrived at, but due to the situation following such an event like this are probably not free to post here due to legal constraints as they might be considered potential witnesses in some proceeding.

There is much confusion in this thread as to what happened and how it could have been avoided. That is because all the facts are not yet released and Instead of seeking lay blame here, we should all seek ways to be sure the mishap is never repeated.

I posted a question about "Run Dry" Times for common types of aircraft in use in the offshore oil support industry and I got some response.

As I see it, The need to address oil out was introduced as a requirement in 1988, so it is reasonable to assume that most helos certified before that date do not meet the requirement, and have never been tested for oil out. If you search the FAA archives, you'd find that the TCDS (official FAA source for certification basis) lists the below for oil failure qualification:
B412 NOT
S-76 NOT
AS-365 NOT
AW-139 YES
EC-155 YES
EC-225 YES
S-92 YES

FAR Part 29.927 amendment 26, 10/3/1988 states the following:

c) Lubrication system failure. For lubrication systems required for proper operation of rotor drive systems, the following apply:

(1) Category A. Unless such failures are extremely remote, it must be shown by test that any failure which results in loss of lubricant in any normal use lubrication system will not prevent continued safe operation, although not necessarily without damage, at a torque and rotational speed prescribed by the applicant for continued flight, for at least 30 minutes after perception by the flightcrew of the lubrication system failure or loss of lubricant

It is my understanding that the S92 meets the FAR as is (according to its type certificate data sheet) with full compliance, and does so by isolating the internal oil system from the external oil system. The S92 does that for the Tail Rotor Gear Drive and Intermediate Gear Box , as do the AW139 and the EC225 I"d bet..

I hear that the box has some natural oil out resilience, like the UH-60 from which it is derived, so that the common MGB "oil out" situation that would result in a catastrophic MGB failure in less than a minute is not apparent. Those of us who fly older aircraft without that resilience know this, and consider "Land Immediately" as a command to look in the chin bubble, and pick a spot to put the aircraft. Those who do not do this when "Land Immediately" is dictated might find out that they land in the same place, without their pilotage being needed.

I understand that the S92 emergency procedure is specific - if oil leaks as indicated by the quantity indicator, isolate the box by activating the Isolation Switch. Fly home, land as soon as possible. If it leaks completely and the oil pressure becomes nil, land immediately.

As I look at the time line of the accident and as relayed in the CBC broadcast Press Conference I see some question as to whether that was done. I have asked in the past either by PM or on the public forum what might have occurred to sway the crew from continuing on down to the sea and doing a controlled ditching much sooner. I still wonder if there were any other counter-indications or reasons why the crew might have been swayed from either deciding to ditch immediately rather than continuing to fly as they did.

I noticed the data showed the aircraft to descend at about 80 knots but then it leveled off at 800 feet and increased speed to about 133 knots. I assume that would be pretty much normal cruise power rather than a reduced power setting which would have lessened the load on the MGB.

The Press Conference avoided relating any information about the conversation between Cougar Ops and the Flight Crew. Was something said in those exchanges that would have affected the Crew's Decision re ditching immediately?

I have also questioned the lack of urgency in the Bulletin calling for the replacement of the Titanium Studs particularly following the Shell Brunei Incident which 212Man was involved with. I cannot help but think any reasonable examination of that incident by Safety, Type Captains, or Engineering Management would have shown the need for that change to be effected in a most rapid manner. Assigning a year or 1250 flight hours as a limit seems less than wise to me.

One can also ask how replacement steel studs were on the hangar shelf and not on the filter bowl. Also, why would they not be put on immediate order and be installed upon arrival.

I posted questions to others about the Conventional Wisdom of staying airborne until the very last possible time possible despite the instruction to "Land Immediately" being the proper procedure and we found way too many of us agreed with that concept which flies in the face of the checklist and emergency procedures listed for most of the aircraft we fly when it addresses loss of lubrication to gearboxes.

Do we apply the same thought to Main Gear Boxes, Intermediate Gearboxes, Tail Rotor Gear Boxes....or even Engine gear boxes?