Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009

[FH1100 Pilot]

Unless such failures are extremely remote...
Yeah, but again, who gets to determine that? Does the manufacturer have the option of telling the certification authority, "We believe that a failure of the lubrication system of our new transmission will be extremely remote. The case will never crack, and none of the accessories mounted to it, like...ohhhhh...the TRANSMISSION OIL FILTER, which is under considerable pressure...will never crack and allow oil to leak out!"

Is that how it works?

Because that is apparently how it worked for the S-92.

That "unless such failure are extremely remote" stuff is horrible wording for a regulation.

[js0987]

I suppose the problem with regulations is how do you word them to take into account the improbable but obvious. NASA refers to "criticality one" to describe components that, if they fail, the rocket, shuttle etc. will crash.

Anything that flies has, and will always have, lots of items that can be concidered "criticality one." For airplanes, obvously the wings and tails are at the top of the list. For helicopters, blades, masts, gearboxes and even tailbooms are a few such items.

So how does a regulator write language to take into account items like those that are "criticality one?" I would suggest that regulators, like engineers and managers work in a world of compromises. Just as an engineer must design a system that is best possible, by definition he will make compromises, the regulator will write language that will try and make the system the best possible but, in the end will also make compromises.

[HeliComparator]

Back on my hobby horse for a moment (which one you ask?): Which helicopter would you rather fly, the one that loses all its oil quite regularly but has a genuine 30 mins dry running time, or the one that doesn't have 30 mins dry running time but is well designed and never loses its oil?

Personally I would prefer the latter.

The certification standards are not particularly strong in this area. They are more concerned with having a fallback mode following a failure than having no failures in the first place.

Certfication standards are written by engineers that don't actually have to fly the products, nor really understand flying.

The problem with having certification standards is that a lot of effort goes into compliance with the letter of them, sometimes at the expense of making a good product.

In other words its "paper safety" and the real goal of making a robust and reliable helicopter that does not kill people is lost in the beaurocracy.

Maybe we should have no certification standards but rely on the manufacturers fear of being sued to make a robust product? No certification standards means quicker fixes - as has been repeatedly proven, certification does not guarantee (or even make likely) a product that works properly without design flaws, but by heck it certainly slows down bringing any fixes into place to cure those flaws.

HC

[riff_raff]

The FAR29 MRGB 30 minute requirement is for a loss of lube system functionality condition, and does not necessarily imply that the MRGB is operating entirely without lubricant. And as for the S-92 MRGB being qualified as having a lube system failure event considered "extremely remote", that went out the window with AD 2009-07-53 (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/81a534702e44a030862575820077edb8/$FILE/2009-07-53_Emergency.pdf)
That single point lube system filter failure should never have gotten past a proper FMEA of the S-92 lube system.

I have designed some rotorcraft MRGB's. And there are several established ways to ensure a 30 minute loss of lube capability in a rotorcraft MRGB. The most common approach is to use high temperature gear (X-53) or bearing (M50NiL) materials for the critical gears/bearings, that can operate at temperatures up to 600degF without losing temper. The other approach is to provide a secondary, "total loss" back-up lube system that provides just enough lubricant flow to keep the friction heat generated by the critical MRGB gears and bearings within their capabilities.

MRGB lube systems are now always designed with the lube oil pipes as integral parts of the housing castings, in order to minimize leaks. And potential oil system leaks are one of the main things that the FAA looks at when certifying a new MRGB design.

Also, personally I would never have used titanium fasteners on a maintenance item, like Sikorsky did on their S-92 MRGB oil filter housing, due to the known inherent nature of titanium fasteners to gall and seize if not installed under perfect conditions.

Regards,
riff_raff

[squib66]

HC the good news is that there are light, medium and heavy twins that have been sucessfully tested to simulate an uncontained oil loss from anywhere in the oil system AND have no history of leaks either.

There is also a rule called the design assessment, 29-917, that requires the OEM to assess and minimise all geqrbox failures modes that would be catestrophic or require an immediate landing - just like Cougar faced. When Sikorsky fall back on their defence that the RFM says to land immediately they simply show they failed to meet that requirement:-

http://www.pratt-whitney.com/StaticFiles/Sikorsky/Assets/Attachments/NEWSLETTER/commercial/CommLinks_0409.pdf


As an additional safety precaution, in the event of total loss of oil
pressure, a “Land Immediately” instruction is directed by the flight
manual and a controlled landing can be executed.


A burning question is:-
What is Sikorsky doing for the S-76D test?

[FH1100 Pilot]

From Sikorsky:

If an impending failure is suspected, the primary consideration is to land the aircraft before the failure progresses to a gearbox seizure or loss of drive to the main or tail rotor,” the SSA continues. Sikorsky writes that a “single” indication of a MGB problem (pilots receive MGB temperature, pressure and chip detection system readings) dictates that the helicopter should land “as soon as practical”. Multiple indications, Sikorsky notes, “dictate that the helicopter should land as soon as possible,” while an impending transmission failure “would necessitate that the helicopter land immediately.”

Okay, so it puts it back on the pilots. Did they suspect an "impending failure" of the transmission? Obviously not. To us pilots, "land as soon as possible" does not necessarily mean "crash the helicopter if you have to." And even a notice to "land immediately" would be a tough call. If you were over unbroken forest with no clearings, would you put the helicopter down in the trees and intentionally crash? Or would you continue on, hoping for some little hole to stick the thing?

In the case of the Cougar pilots, without reading their minds it is quite obvious that they considered the ocean below them to be an unsuitable area to land...ergo, they assumed that doing so would be tantamount to crashing the helicopter. Why else would they have *not* chosen to land immediately? Instead, they chose the "land as soon as possible" option. And it was the wrong one. By the time they got the indications of impending failure, it was probably too late. (Was it when the tail rotor drive failed? Or did everything come apart at roughly the same time?)

Complicating things is the fact that we have no way of knowing if we've had a completely loss of transmission oil, as there is no gauge attesting to its level. All we have is the pressure and temperature gauges - and the temperature gauge may be unreliable if there is no oil to measure the temperature of.

So what could the Cougar pilots have been thinking - in those nine minutes - as they tried to figure out why they had no transmission pressure? Certainly that particular failure (the fractured filter mounting bolts) had not occurred yet, so it wasn't among the possibilities. If only they had some indication that all of the transmission juice was gone...

But... Again, would they still have landed? Would they have assumed that their transmission about about to fail?

This accident illustrates the uncomfortably tight squeezes between the rocks and those hard places we pilots sometimes find ourselves in.

[noooby]

A burning question is:-
What is Sikorsky doing for the S-76D test?

Possibly nothing. The D model is not a new helicopter, just a C++ with some improvements. Same 76 Type Cert, so I don't think they have to do as much proving work as if it was a new design. Just like Eurocopter with the EC225, it is on the AS332 Type Cert. Saves a LOT of time and money if you can do it that way.

[js0987]

The S92 emergency checklist does list a single indication for a "land immediately." When the MGB oil pressure light is illuminated and the pressure is below 5psi it becomes a "land immediately."

As stated above, the choice of landing in the trees or in freezing water is not much of a choice. Helicopters are the perfect tool for rugged, inhospitable environments - therein lies the dilemma.

[squib66]

CEFOSKY said:
squibb, here is your cue to laud eurocopter ____. you were waiting for an invitation, no?

I honestly wish I could discuss the design and current work we are doing regarding the 92 MGB, but threads like these constantly reinforce why these things must stay confidential in analysis and development.

I'd hate for to take anything more from this thread and source it as fact in his monthly SAC-bashing columns in the canadian press.... as its par for the course for him thus far.

You don't really get it do you? It is no more about promoting one helicopter above the other than the Challenger and Columbia accident investigations promoted the Soviet/Russian space programme. This is about preventing accidents by not fudging critical tests. Engineering ethics in fact.


17 people are dead and you are more worried what a Canuck jounro has to say? Time to rethink your priorities buddy.

Or would you rather write the Cougar 17 out of the history books under the same cloak of secrecy you want to apply to R&D? Perhaps a little more integrity, openess and humility over the weaknesses in aircraft design and fewer people will lose their lives.

Uncle Squib's top tip on building long term market share and brand reputation:- get the aircraft right before you start marketing it under a safety banner. Is that too much to ask?


Most OEMs would not want to be known for producing a rotary Ford Pinto (the Pinto fuel tank was known to be a problem but fixing the problem that was killing people was deemed too expensive).

As comments above show, the Flight Manual is being used as a last ditch attempt to switch the responsibility for product integrity to the crew by forcing them to take actions that themselves are highly dangerous by the very nature of helicopter operations, this is in lieu of providing a capability that other OEMs can deliver without needing to be creative with FAR29.

Engineering ethics.

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---|||4-|||-----Remembering
---|||9-|||-----Cougar
---|||1-|||-----Flight 491
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Remembering Cougar Helicopter's flight 491 | Facebook (http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=68584340571)

BTW I'll be keeping an eye out for the name Peter Cheney - I'd not noticed his name before so thanks for your help on that one buddy!
Articles by peter cheney (http://labs.daylife.com/journalist/peter_cheney)

[dangermouse]

Just to clarify,

how can the S92 still be classed (still officially certified) as a Category A rotorcraft (which by definition it must be under JAR29 due to its weight) if the MGB lubrication failure case has now shown to be not 'extremely remote'?


In order to allow it to continue flying I assume that the rectification action (new studs) revalidated the safety case and that the failure is again regarded as extremely remote hence the S92 is again JAR compliant, but without a 30 minute dry run capability.

or have I got the wrong end of the stick?

DM

[victor papa]

CEFOSKEY, don't you think you are a bit overley defensive? No OEM has made the perfect gearbox, I think the main issue here remains why this gearbox was certified to the highest standard despite it's track record in service after certification. How was it tested if we missed all these possibilities or is it just bad luck? You have to agree that there just seems to be to many loose ends?

[FH1100 Pilot]

To victor-papa, and all who castigate SAC for a seeming "design failure" of the S-92 transmission:

From SAC's point of view, a civilian aircraft losing *all* of its transmission oil is an extremely remote possibility. I mean, nobody is shooting at the thing, right? SAC will probably trot out a hoard of "expert witnesses" who'll testify to that issue. I can imagine if they got...well...me on the stand!

SIKORSKY DEFENSE ATTORNEY: So, Mr. FH1100 Pilot, how long have you been flying?

ME: Err, well sir I've been prostituting myself...that is, doing it for money for, oh, almost 28 years. But I've been flying airplanes since 1973 and began helicopter training in 1977. So...I dunno...32 years for helicopters?

SAC ATTY: And how many hours do you have now?

ME: Well, something more than 11,000. I don't really keep track anymore, except for the damn insurance companies and their...no offense...lawyers.

SAC ATTY: And in that time, how many complete losses of transmission oil quantity or losses of oil pressure have you had?

ME: Me? Well...umm...almost...ahh...one.

SAC ATTY: One??

ME: Almost! None, actually. Nearly one, but not quite.

SAC ATTY: So, Mr. FH1100 Pilot, would you therefore say that the likelihood of a complete loss of transmission lubrication would be extremely remote?

ME: That's a fair statement. May I go now? I have to pee.

SAC ATTY: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS! The Defense calls SASless to the stand!

Despite the fact that this was a tragic, deadly accident, I made the above a little humourous because this is exactly what WILL happen when it comes to trial. No matter what we assumed...no matter what the advertising brochures implied or hinted or even said outright...if those pilots had just landed...JUST PUT THE DAMN THING DOWN!...*all* of those people would not have died. It's sad, but true, no matter how much we don't like to admit it.

Sikorsky did what it did, and is now undoubtedly doing "something" (TBA) to control the damage to its reputation. But you can't say we haven't already learned some things from this accident... Something about operations over inhospitable terrain. Something about pilots faced with a lose/lose proposition. Something about our regulatory agencies. And something about Sikorsky.

[victor papa]

FH1100 PILOT, pls do not catagorise me. I am not castrating Sikorsky or any other OEM. I just thought that the previous post was a bit defensive. I did state NO OEM manufactured the perfect gearbox(332L2 in the North Sea). I also stated how did it pass the tests-in other words as you allude as well are the tests done relevant by the authorities? After only 22 years, 7000hrs and operating only over hostile terrain either military, offshore, HEMS or survey I am not critisizing Sikorsky as such but participate as it leads to a better understanding of the circumstances we operate under and the risks. As you alluded to in your humorous court scenario, the problem I have is that it SEEMS that your answers would differ greatly to your questions unfortunately dependant on whether you fly and know the S92/S92 crew or not.

Sorry if I have the wrong perception!

[FH1100 Pilot]

v-p, my answers would not...could not...change. If an attorney asked me those very questions, there is only one way I could answer. In all my years of flying, I've never had a transmission problem of any kind (other than the spurious chip light). Next witness, please!

In fact...I'm trying to think...I only know of *one* guy who's ever had a transmission failure. He was in a Puma near Atlantic City, New Jersey (U.S.) when it happened. The year was 1978. Fortunately for him, he lived. I don't remember the details, but I do remember that it was hair-curlingly scary to hear them.

Category A. Unless such failures are extremely remote, it must be shown by test that...
Maybe the possibility of transmission failure isn't extremely remote, but the number of actual "such failures" does seem to be. And that is what Sikorsky will argue.

[NonSAC]

Actually, the S-92A experience has shown that Sikorsky won't argue anything; the strategy appears to be to keep it out of the media by settling quietly with the next of kin.

I can't say I agree with CEFOSKEY. Sikorsky was quite pleased to promote the machine on this very 'rumor' forum when it suited their needs. The in-house cheerleaders should convincingly respond to the skeptics rather down pom-poms and and skulk off muttering about their self-proclaimed status as experts in the industry.

Public criticism following the issues with S-92A is healthy, particularly if it pressures the decision makers in Stratford to deal with the issues properly. Personally, I'd like to see the remaining aircraft upgraded with transmission that includes the 'derived out' safety feature. I'd also like to know if the people who are telling the users that steel stubs on the filter housing are the same ones who previously represented that ti would meet the need.

Excellent thread.

[Brian Abraham]

Next witness, please!
Trouble is FH1100 Pilot every one has, or can have, a different story to tell. Chalk up two for me, and saw the results of another where a gear wheel came out through the side of the case and removed a jack in the process. Some died, but the remarkable thing was the majority survived.

Edited to add just remembered two other gear box failures that ended well in our organization, and those happened to the same pilot.

[Dan Reno]

A quick thread observation would be that the MGB incident has all those who ride in the S-92 spooked and wanting to be confident in it once more before getting back on this horse.
Military aviators would simply put this type of issue on the long list of other things trying to kill them and get on with it but civilian types haven't the luxury of having bullets and rockets lobbed at them to help them forget about a questionable MGB issue. I don't believe the helo will ever be as reliable as that most perfect engineering design, the single ball bearing but you can bet SAC works the hardest to make it that way..IMHE.

[madrock]

I think by now we can all understand that the "extremely remote" issue cannot be definitively cleared up either way, as there is no wording regarding context in the regulation,e.g. remote when compared to what, previous occurances?, for all aircraft ?, by manufacturer ?, by type ?, what if it's a radically different design ?,if it does happen once early in service life and is addressed, does the clock get re-wound ? Hopefully regulators will address this issue for future wording. No doubt some lawyers somewhere will make a great deal of money argueing about it, but it's a no win situation either way.

There are some issues with the MRGB - the cracks appearing in the mounting lugs which has the type under a 10 hour inspection schedule does not calm rattled nerves, so the sooner it's resolved the better.

Everybody wants to see confidence back in the machine, none more so than the people who are transported to work in it. It is important to realize that the perception of the ultimate enduser (PAX) is key to getting this back on track, so any questions or concerns they have should be properly addressed in a professional manner, especially by the people whose job it is to address these issues.

Nobody's interested in looking over someone else's shoulder at the OEM - they know their business.

Just fix any outstanding issues, and let people know if there's a new problem and what's being done to address it. No big secret. All machines require maintenance & repairs - offshore workers realize this better than most as their livelyhood depends on doing just that with some of the biggest, most expensive equipment out there.

[JimL]

madrock/FH100 Pilot,

The term 'extremely remote' is assigned a numerical value in FAR 29 - i.e. 1:10,000,000 to 1:1,000,000,000.

Those who are interested in the discussion in this thread might wish to glance through the regulations; in particular a search for 'extremely remote' (in context) in AC 29-2C will provide a great deal of illumination.

Whilst I have the platform, I would like to comment on HC's assertion that pilots are not involved in the provision of the Certification Codes. In my experience, the FAA Rotorcraft Directorate at Forth Worth always has several practicing pilots (and recently one was the Head). The CAA also had a number of pilots in the Flight Department working on the provision of the Certification Codes - fewer now because of EASA.

I also witnessed the failure of a planetary gear in the S61 at my base in the North Sea; it was landing at the time.

Jim

[madrock]

JimL :

Extremely remote events are not expected to occur during the total operational life of a random single rotorcraft of a particular type,but may occur a few times during the total operational life of all rotorcraft of a particular type, that are based on a probability on the order of between 10-7 to 10-9.

....it's still fuzzy......what particular type was used in the original calculation ? all Sikorskys ? all Blackhawks ? all CAT A ? ...........?

[js0987]

While we're on the topic of gearboxes and probablilities, does the current FAR also require a 30 minute run dry demonstration on intermediate and tail rotor gearboxes?

[poppahymen]

While not related to S92 I have witness 2 MGB fail, Hughes 500 and Skycrane. One broken input pinion and the other planet gear dropping through the gearbox. While uncommon not impossible hay? Then of course 2 famious MGB failers this year.
Now back to the S92:ok:

[The Sultan]

Cefoskey

Only 17 perished in the S-92? I guess the Korean who died and all those injured in a fully IFR 92 crash in marginal weather do not count.

The Sultan

[Swamp76]

Past performance is not an accurate indication of future risk.

--------------------------------

1500 hrs in the 212, seen 0 oil press on the C-Box twice. It doesn't scare me away from the type but it makes me pay attention. It is the same for the other types I have flown.

One should never forget that we do our best to see problems coming and minimize or mitigate their impact. That's our job. It upsets us when there are issues we cannot anticipate, prevent, or deal with.

--------------------------------

I work in a war zone and assume the risk of people shooting at me. I don't believe that that impairs my appreciation for a reliable aircraft. I don't see this being different for military pilots.

--------------------------------

I lost a former student in Cougar 491 and I have seen the environment they were flying in. Given the choices available to them, I would never say they did less than their best.

[212man]

I guess the Korean who died and all those injured in a fully IFR 92 crash in marginal weather do not count.


What the hell has that got to do with anything (that relates to this thread topic)?

The aircraft was being landed at an innappropriate site in mountainous terrain in poor VFR conditions. It was flown through a bunch of trees into the ground. If it were not for the aircraft's basic crashworthiness, a lot more injuries and fatalities would have resulted - in fact the owner thanked SAC for providing such a strong airframe and promptly ordered a replacement! (Not sure if the crew received similar praise!:ugh:)

[The Sultan]

212man

Just correcting Cefo's mis-statement that the Cougar 17 were the only fatalities ever in the 92.

The Sultan:D

[[email protected]]

So, according to FH1100's logic, any system failure that hasn't happened to him in 32 years doesn't need to be considered when certifying new aircraft - well that'll make the job much easier and give people a nice warm feeling then:ugh:

The number of MRGB oil losses was legendary on the Sea King (a Sikorsky helicopter) until finally the Emergency Lubrication System (ELS) was fitted - how did Sikorsky not learn this lesson and provide proper backup in their brand new helicopter??

All this cobblers about never flying the A model of anything might have been acceptable in the 60's but in the 21st century should not be even lightly entertained as normal practice.

I agree with DM - how is the certification still valid???

[maxwelg2]

Here's my PAX (and layman's) view of the current situation.

S-92a certificaton should be robust enough to ensure that system design meets all operational requirements, which for offshore means no MGB lube oil leaks, and if one develops then the tranny can last long enough to get safely back to non-hostile terrain i.e. land.

Landing in the drink, whether controlled or otherwise, is the very last resort. Perhaps a tailfin like the Blackhawk would have helped 491 during an AR attempt, perhaps not. Moot point if a controlled landing under power was attempted and SS6 flotation was installed to give PAX a chance.

We have several PAX refusing to fly this helo now on safety grounds via their right to refuse unsafe work, initially after the recent public interview by Robert Decker on the issues with sitting in a non-window seat, now reinforced by the MGB mounting feet cracks. No MGB should develop cracks within 10 hours operation, period, that's just a basic design flaw.

The more publicity on these matters, hence this posting on this public thread, the better. SKY, or SAC or whatever you wish to call them, how about SIKORSKY, have a huge amount of work ahead of them to repair their damaged reputation with this A/C type. Settling out of court with the families of 491 will not be suffice, the ongoing enquiry and pending TSB report will make sure of that.

Safe flying

Max (currently offshore waiting for the new HH HTS-1 flight suit a.k.a. orange body bag to be rubber-stamped by some Transport Canada employee in Ottawa)

[9Aplus]

I am living near much less hostile environment (Adriatic sea) but during some
winter storms, sea shows real nature. Last ditching incident was more than 30 years
ago when one Mil Mi8 T crew made emergency landing near shore line after some
tail rotor heating elements separation in flight causing intensive tail vibrations. Most of PAX drowned. Later investigation find out that crew response, to shut down and autorotate to ditching in sea, without emergency flotation, was mistake.

Out of some recent incidents we can be sure that most of Western
helicopter industry unfortunately approaching to serious technical problems
much in way, like our friend BMax claims "Ostrich engineering"....

Remember AW Tail on AW139
Remmber 2005. S76 Copterline near Tallin, when 14 people perished.
Copterline Flight 103 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copterline_Flight_103)
And this last unfortunate S92 issue...:sad:

[Arnie Madsen]

NEWS UPDATE NOVEMBER 22



Model of chopper that crashed off N.L. failed first test by 20 minutes: FAA

By: Michael Tutton, THE CANADIAN PRESS



HALIFAX, N.S. - A test to certify the model of helicopter involved in a fatal crash off Newfoundland showed it would remain airborne for "around 10 minutes" - about one third of the time required - if oil leaked from its gearbox, aviation regulators say.
Weeks after the crash of Cougar Flight 491 in March, European aviation authority documents revealed that the gearbox of the Sikorsky S-92A model hadn't passed a test that required it to run for 30 minutes without oil in order to meet a safety standard set by the U.S.-based Federal Aviation Administration.

According to additional documents obtained by The Canadian Press on the same Aug. 6, 2002, test, the gearbox fell about 20 minutes short of the goal when it was run at moderate speeds after oil was rapidly drained.
But Sikorsky says it has proven to aviation authorities that the chances of an oil leak from the gearbox housing is extremely unlikely and that the installation of a bypass valve resolves the only identifiable cause of a main gearbox oil leak.
The documents, obtained from the FAA through access-to-information legislation, outline a discussion between American and European aviation regulators on tests of the gearbox.

The European regulators said the test showed a loss of oil would mean the helicopter could only stay in the air for "around 10 minutes," a finding Sikorsky does not dispute
.
FAA spokesman Les Dorr said the test, meant to simulate a "catastrophic loss of lubrication," was stopped at that point.
After the test, Sikorsky and the FAA agreed that the only clear risk for an oil loss would come from an oil cooler that fed into the gearbox.
A second test was then conducted on Nov. 16, 2002, to see if a bypass valve - which pilots would activate by pushing a button - would provide oil to the gearbox if the cooler were to fail. The system worked well and the gearbox kept going for hours.

Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said the company demonstrated to the FAA and European regulators that the probability of a leak from the gearbox housing was "extremely remote" and that installation of the bypass valve "addressed the only identified, non-extremely remote possibility for a main gearbox oil leak.

"It is very important to note that while the Cougar accident was indeed a very tragic event, the worldwide S-92 fleet has about 185,000 operational hours without any other incidents involving this injury," Jackson said in an email.

But in the documents, the European regulators question whether the cooler would be the only likely source of oil leakage, and they asked for information on other possible failures on the main body of the gearbox itself.

Sheldon Peddle, a union leader representing the oil workers who still fly on the helicopters off Newfoundland, said the 30 minute dry-run test is an industry standard which allows pilots more time to react and the possibility of reaching either land or an oil platform.
Peddle said 10 minutes "may meet the legal definition of whatever the FAA has in the regulation," but his view is that it "doesn't meet the expectation people in the industry would have."

Per Gram, a recently retired pilot who tested the S-92A in Norway, said he believes the FAA shouldn't have allowed the certification after it learned of the results from the first test.
"I disagree fully with the FAA for allowing Sikorsky to pass that test on that basis," he said, referring to the second test of the bypass valve.
He said he believes the 30-minute standard should have been maintained for certification purposes of the Sikorsky S-92A.
"It (10 minutes) doesn't allow for human error ... as a passenger, I'd be scared stiff if I knew about this," said Gram.
But Jackson said 10 minutes is sufficient because the flight manual for the S-92A requires pilots to "land immediately."
"The S-92A is certified to fly at a maximum altitude of 15,000 feet. At a comfortable descent rate of 1,500 feet per minute, the aircraft could be on the ground in 10 minutes," he said.

Sikorsky documents used to market the aircraft, dated August 2003, said the gearboxes of the S-92A have a "30-minute drive system after oil leak."
Jackson said this claim was valid because Sikorsky's gearbox had passed the second test showing the bypass valve worked.
"That language is fully compliant with the ... requirement to prove 30 minutes of flight after detection of an oil leak," he said.
"We proved this by assessing the probability of a leak from the gearbox housing as extremely remote."

The Transportation Safety Board is still investigating the cause of the Cougar Flight 491 crash, which killed 17 people.
But the independent agency has said that studs had broken on an oil filter attached to the main gearbox, resulting in the loss of a large quantity of oil.

It also has said that it took 10 minutes and 47 seconds between the time that pilots reported the loss of oil and when the engines were turned off.


...

[madrock]

Couldn't the oil companies take on the leadership role here ? They're the biggest, richest, most powerfull lobby group on the planet - since when if they really want something do they sit back and listen to a myriad of reasons why something can't be done from equipment manufacturers or anyone else ?

This 30 minute wording "requirement" was first "required" what, over 20 years ago ? Well this is 2009, and we're flying 90 minutes out into the North Atlantic, so maybe someone should take another look at what's "required" today.

And before all the naysayers start protesting about the cost, and the weight, and the space limitations, and the engineering, just how fast did it take for someone to engineer a delivery system for a hulking big spare tank of aviation fuel to extend the range ? (don't even want to get into the discussion of where it's located).

Is the technology already there, but it was decided we're not going to use it because...................?

Maybe big oil should say look enough of this debate based on a twenty year old 30 minute wording regulation, here's what we need based on our current and future operating requirements, make it happen - who's going to tell them no, you can't have that ? (especially if military was pushing the same issue).

Given that there's an ongoing accident investigation, public inquiry and possibly litigation at some point, a few choice phone calls from certain CEO's who wanted to change their "requirements" would set a fine example and probably get things moving pretty quickly.

[Deux Cent Vingt Cinq]

Couldn't the oil companies take on the leadership role here ?

You may be surprised by what measures they have taken (well, one of them, anyway) with regard to this type.

[Variable Load]

Madrock

As DCVC has highlighted, you can rest assured that SOME oil companies will be letting Sikorsky know what they think. You can also be reasonably certain the Sikorsky are doing something in response.

The 30 minute requirement was introduced in 1988 via Amdt 26 to JAR 29. You may think this makes it outdated, however by aviation certification requirements this is still relatively new. In fact I believe there are only two heavies that have been certified against this requirement - the S92 and EC225 (I am assuming the AW139 is a medium). Technically the 30 minutes is demanding, which explains the "modifications" both manufacturers developed after the basic MGB run dry tests failed. Even the superior level of safety the EC225 glycol spray system offers, it only provides 30 minutes flight at 80 knots. So approx 40nm then it's "Land Immediately". The bottom line is that the regulators can only ask for what is technically feasible and economical (ALARP if you will). The regulators are also the policeman of the rules, so they have the say when it comes to accepting compliance. Rightly or wrongly, the FAA, EASA and Transport Canada have all accepted S92 compliance against FAR 29.927. Maybe they should be getting more scrutiny and questioning than has been seen so far regarding their decisions?

As for the internal fuel tank that Cougar have fitted. Acceptance of that is down to Transport Canada. Some regulators around the world would not permit such a fit :eek:

[FH1100 Pilot]

A "certain someone" who used to work for a major manu...okay, let's just say it...Sikorsky wrote extensively on this board about the tests SAC did with the S-92 transmission to prove that it could run "for hours" after an oil leak. However, his description of the test was a little...oh...incomplete. He did not say that *all* of the oil leaked out. In fact, there was a leak but the leak was stopped.

We later found out that the test consisted of producing a leak in the lines leading from the transmission to the oil cooler, or perhaps in the cooler itself. After detection of the leak, a bypass system was activated, isolating the oil cooler but stopping the leak. In this mode with uncooled oil of reduced quantity, the transmission was able to run for...what was the duration...2.5 hours? Which the SAC rep seemed to brag about.

What he did *not* brag about was what happened prior to that test. We learn about that from the report noted in madrock's post.
According to additional documents obtained by The Canadian Press on the same Aug. 6, 2002, test, the gearbox fell about 20 minutes short of the goal when it was run at moderate speeds after oil was rapidly drained.

But Sikorsky says it has proven to aviation authorities that the chances of an oil leak from the gearbox housing is extremely unlikely and that the installation of a bypass valve resolves the only identifiable cause of a main gearbox oil leak.

Err...how's that again?
The documents, obtained from the FAA through access-to-information legislation, (ed. note: a FOIA request) outline a discussion between American and European aviation regulators on tests of the gearbox.

The European regulators said the test showed a loss of oil would mean the helicopter could only stay in the air for "around 10 minutes," a finding Sikorsky does not dispute
.
FAA spokesman Les Dorr said the test, meant to simulate a "catastrophic loss of lubrication," was stopped at that point.
After the test, Sikorsky and the FAA agreed that the only clear risk for an oil loss would come from an oil cooler that fed into the gearbox.

Well...
A second test was then conducted on Nov. 16, 2002, to see if a bypass valve - which pilots would activate by pushing a button - would provide oil to the gearbox if the cooler were to fail. The system worked well and the gearbox kept going for hours.

So. In August of 2002 Sikorsky tested their transmission without oil. It lasted about, oh, 10 minutes. And...what a co-inky-dink, Cougar proved that to be true in their real world application of that test! SAC had to come up with something, and three months later, by November of 2002 had devised the bypass valve, which the FAA accepted. Whether this system was "in the works" back in August is unknown at this time. But the time delay between the two tests is curious.

I'll bet that there are a couple of people within the FAA that dearly wish their signatures could disappear from the certification approval documents.

Me, I go either way on this. On one hand, I see SAC's point that transmission failures are relatively (extremely?) rare. On the other hand, it is interesting to see the lengths companies will go to creatively interpret and/or get around a regulatory requirement.

But in the name of God, who could miss that big ol' oil filter bolted to the side of the transmission? Who could look at that and *not* think that there's even a remote chance of a leak developing there? Methinks that the FAA's Les Dorr is sweating a bit right now. Or at least squirming uncomfortably.

[JimL]

FH110 Pilot,

Don't miss the irony of this statement:

Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said the company demonstrated to the FAA and European regulators that the probability of a leak from the gearbox housing was "extremely remote" and that installation of the bypass valve "addressed the only identified, non-extremely remote possibility for a main gearbox oil leak.
Let's hope it wasn't made after the second 'extremely remote' uncontained loss-of-oil-failure within six months.

Jim

[madrock]

DCVC
Glad to hear it, because waiting for regulators is pointless.

VL
The bottom line is that the regulators can only ask for what is technically feasible and economical (ALARP if you will). The regulators are also the policeman of the rules, so they have the say when it comes to accepting compliance.

Well I guess then 20 years ago they thought it was technically feasible but very little has happened since. And if the policeman screwed up when writing (his own) rules, you don't want to expect the same policeman to admit he made a mistake, either during certification, or throughout operational life. And if we're waiting for the politicians (the policeman's boss) to do something good luck.........

The point I was trying to make is regulators will never be the drivers of technological advancement - they tend to follow along with manufacturers' current capabilities - they then update a handbook with minimum requirements, so in fact they're always behind the technology curve, not out in front pushing it.

Offshore operations have changed in the last 20 years - commercial manufacturers will only react to market demand (no demand, no change) - the oil companies have to play a bigger role in making sure manufacturers keep up as they go further and further offshore in hostile environments.

What happens when we go 2 hours offshore - everyone still busy debating the old 30 minutes wording ?

[Codger]

"But in the name of God, who could miss that big ol' oil filter bolted to the side of the transmission? Who could look at that and *not* think that there's even a remote chance of a leak developing there? Methinks that the FAA's Les Dorr is sweating a bit right now. Or at least squirming uncomfortably."


Hindsight is 20/20 most of the time. I've never had an oil filter leak so if you asked me what the risk was I'd have pointed to hoses, clamps, drains and every other point than the filter or it's mount. Granted, I'm just one old guy without all the input that the FAA or any other regulatory body gets, but how many oil filters have you ever heard of that caused a problem?... Unless the darn thing wasn't wired and locked....which isn't the problem in this case.

Fatal reality checks are a bitch.

[FH1100 Pilot]

Fatal reality checks are a bitch.
Amen, Codger. Amen.

But see, guys like me...I'm just a dumb ol' pilot. I don't know what could leak on an S-92 and what could not. I rely on the engineers to design the thing right. Then I rely on the regulatory agencies to verify that it's been designed right before they certify it. Then I rely on the assembly people to build it right. Finally, I rely on the mechanics to maintain it right. (Everyone, in turn, relies on me to fly it right.) That's a whole lot of relying going on.

But I'll say this: I've worked on enough cars and motorcycles in my life to know...to KNOW without a doubt...that any accessory that is bolted to an engine (or in this case a transmission) can leak at the parting surface. And anyone who's ever had the waterpump in their car fail knows that fluid can leak out around a shaft. For the latter, the analogy I'm thinking of is where the tail rotor driveshaft goes into the transmission. Is it impossible for oil to leak out there (although it must be said that this hasn't happened yet on an S-92)? Or is it just "highly unlikely given the current state of seal technology and our general design?"

Apparently, SAC told the FAA that the oil cooler and the lines to it were the only places that transmission oil could leak out of, and the FAA concurred.

The question has been asked, and was glossed-over. But it's a good one: In light of all of the above, how does the S-92 still maintain its airworthiness certificate? Why has it not been revoked?

[Codger]

FH1100

Nothings impossible. It's those highly improbable glitches that bite you on the butt at the worst possible times that prove that the "impossible" does happen. I'm not an engineer either but fortunately or otherwise, have gotten my mitts under plenty of cowlings over the years. There's been more than a couple of times when the impossible or highly improbable stared back at me and with a hand over my heart I've been very thankful that I saw what I did at zero AGL rather than dealing with the consequences at a higher elevation.
If something can shake loose then you lock wire it down. If something can leak then there are more colours of "goop " (technical term) that get placed between the 2 surfaces so that they can't leak.
I don't know why the CofA hasn't been pulled or if it should be pulled... But if you think that any manufacturer of aircraft puts stuff out there for us to drive knowing that there's something in there that will kill us then that's a whole other deal. I've talked with a few engineers and killing us is 180 degrees from what I picked up during those conversations.

[maxwelg2]

Offshore operations have changed in the last 20 years - commercial manufacturers will only react to market demand (no demand, no change) - the oil companies have to play a bigger role in making sure manufacturers keep up as they go further and further offshore in hostile environments.


Madrock, well said, we need the oil companies to push this technology forward and get away from minimum certification standards. I have a few simple but effective design ideas such as dual-redundancy MRGB pressure sensors and lube oil temperature versus casing temperature condition-based monitoring to detect early deterioration of vespel spline pumps to name but a few, but will leave that to the experts who no doubt are re-designing the MRGB for the CH-148 and maybe will utilise some of that advanced design for the S-92b.

As for 2-hour flights using aux fuel tanks and lack of alternates in the Grand Banks, we may have to also work on improving from the current SS6 capability, or start placing tighter limits of helo ops over here e.g. we've already lost night-time flying to fixed platforms (of which there is currently only one) I believe due to tightening of visibility limits.

Safe Flying

Max

[FH1100 Pilot]

Codger:I don't know why the CofA hasn't been pulled or if it should be pulled... But if you think that any manufacturer of aircraft puts stuff out there for us to drive knowing that there's something in there that will kill us then that's a whole other deal.
Nah, that's not what I was getting at.

1) FAR Part 29.927 says that main transmissions of helicopters certified under this part must have a 30-minute operational capability after "loss of lubricant."

2) Sikorsky's S-92 main transmission fails to meet that requirement in 2002.

3) FAR 29.927 allows that "unless such failures are extremely remote," then you don't have to have the 30-minute capability.

4) Sikorsky convinces the FAA that the transmission oil cooler and its associated lines are the *only* area that could result in a leak and loss of lubricant.

5) FAA buys off on SAC's bogus bypass system "workaround."

6) Subsequent events demonstrate that Sikorsky's initial contention that the oil cooler and lines were the *only* source of a leak were, well, inaccurate.

7) Ergo, the S-92 main transmission admittedly does not meet either the letter or spirit of FAR 29.927, despite the workaround.

Seems pretty simple to me. If an aircraft...any aircraft...so blatantly fails to meet its design certification criteria, then shouldn't its Certificate of Airworthiness be...you know...um...revoked?

I'm just sayin'.

Somewhere there is a large Greek man walking around, occasionally flinching uncontrollably at the memory of the bullet he dodged.

[[email protected]]

FH1100 - unfortunately the 18 guys on board didn't get to dodge that same bullet - I wonder if he sleeps at night thinking about it?

[Bomber ARIS]

Surely, to comply safely, the inspection interval should be less than the flight time of flight 491 minus 10 minutes & 47 seconds?

[HeliComparator]

Sven

That might be true if the oil filter were the only possible source of oil loss from the MGB. Unfortunately its not - as has already been suggested, there are other weak points such as entry/exit points of drive shafts, and of course the possibility of a crack in a lower region of the MGB casing, which has happened plenty on the 92 MGB already (fortunately not large enough to release significant quantity of oil so far.)

But lets not lose the plot here, whilst the 92 clearly doesn't meet the 29.927 and so technically should lose its certification, neither do lots of other helicopters that fly around carrying oil workers over hostile seas, simply because they were certified before 29.927 existed in its current form - in the UK thats pretty much everything apart from the 225 and 139.

As people are saying, 30 mins dry run time doesn't necessarily stop a ditching (though here in the N Sea you are pretty much always within 30 mins of somewhere to land) and as Robert Decker himself said, what is of primary importance is to stop the helicopter ending up in the sea in the first place. Therefore concentration should be on preventing the oil loss etc in the first place, rather than what you are going to do once its all gone.

So I don't think the S92s should all be grounded pending compliance, however it is especially gaulling to consider the arrogance by which Sikorsky proclaimed the S92 to be the safest helicopter in the world whilst at the same time they were in full knowledge of its failure to comply with the spirit of 29.927.

And since the safety of any helicopter hangs by a tenous thread, any time a manufacturer gets arrogant (which implies complacency), that should be a danger sign!

HC

[HeliComparator]

Sven

We may have been at cross-purposes here, I thought you were referring to the Oil Filter inspection (if there is one?) but perhaps you were referring to the feet cracking inspection? If so, these are specific inspections of the specific parts, the latter not being related to loss of oil (rather to loss of the entire MGB), and of course the best way to notice a problem is to see oil all over the side of the helicopter after landing. So really the point is, can such a fault develop so as to lose all the oil during the course of 1 flight. Clearly with the oil filter the answer was yes, but as to other possible causes we can't be sure but perhaps its unwise to rule it out.

HC

[madrock]

Sven,

Surely the 10 hours has been deemed to be a very conservative time frame for the time from possible detection of a defect (through this form of inspection) to the time of failure. Somebody would have done a calculation/estimation. To me the 10 h seems VERY conservative indeed.

A Sikorsky rep. was recently quoted ""Analysis shows the aircraft can operate safely for a minimum of 10 hours, even assuming a full mount fracture and resulting worst-case stresses " Jackson said.
He said the company has advised all operators worldwide to visually inspect the footings every 10 hours."

[victor papa]

I don't know what is the right way to go here, but my question is as follow. Somebody mentioned 138 000hrs for the 92 fleet now-how many MGB incidences have we had on the MGB of the 92 in that time and how many of them lead to a unscheduled landing?

If I apply the regulations that prevent me from using something like a single engine 350B3/EC130 in Europe and Britain due to the probability of a engine failure leading to a forced landing I wonder how many Arriel 2B1 failures have occured in 138 000 hours of the 350B3/EC130 fleet leading to a unscheduled landing? Anyone with figures use the worse data you can find out of the total fleet hours which I think is close to 2 million hrs, but i'm not sure.

If we find that more engine failures occured, i stand corrected and apoligise. If we find that less engine failures occured, surely I can use my single engine B3/130 on the basis of "remote possibility" vs MGB failure on a 92?

Stupid question but it puzzles me how this is possible?

[Mars]

VB,

The reliability of engines is generally accepted to be 1:100 000; or in the language of AC 29-2C, failure is 'reasonably probable'.

Mars

[victor papa]

Mars, that is my point. That is why I asked how many incidents have we had on the MGB associated with unscheduled landings. If Cougar was not the only one (but sadly the most tragic), then my point is that if the fleet hours is 138 000hrs and if there were more incidents then the MGB must also be classified as "reasonably probable" until it can beat the 1:100 000 ratio? Isn't that a safety ratio used to increase safe operations by illiminating the risk? What is the 92 risk ratio then on the MGB currently? Maybe that should be the drive factor to fix the problems instead of concentrating on paragraphs that has been proven to be open to interpretation? There is very seldom 2 right answers in maths

[madrock]

victorpapa,

Not a stupid question, in fact very pertinent as to concerns over how these probability calculations are done.

If you do a calculation prior to entry into service, then in operation there is an occurrance and you take some form of corrective action, followed by another probability assessment, can you now discount that occurrance (as some seem to believe) when recalculating probability ?

Or, in simpler terms, if something happens, and you fix it, but it happens again, (either due to the same or different cause/s), do all the flags start to go up, or can you say I'll fix it and continue on with the same level of probability as prior to the occurrance ?

[victor papa]

madrock, tks for getting my point. Why is it simple for engines and not for MGB's and there is no getting around the engine rule so why on something as critical as the MGB?

[[email protected]]

A Sikorsky rep. was recently quoted ""Analysis shows the aircraft can operate safely for a minimum of 10 hours, even assuming a full mount fracture and resulting worst-case stresses " Jackson said.
Since this analysis seems to come from the same bunch whose analysis showed an extremely remote chance of failure of this MGB in the first place, I don't think it counts for much.

[FH1100 Pilot]

It's kind of funny...in a way. SAC is using the 10-hour inspection as a smoke screen. I might remind everyone that no matter how often you inspect a trans for cracks, if an unexpected one *does* occur in flight and all the juice leaks out, the pilots and passengers still only have about 10 minutes to get 'er on the ground. What good is your 10-hour inspection then? Were the cracks in the attachment bolts of Cougar's transmission oil filter detectable within 10 hours of them failing?

The 10-hour inspection does ABSOLUTELY NOTHING with respect to FAR 29.927. Eyewash. That's all it is.

[Horror box]

FH1100pilot, just to try and clarify, as I think a fair bit of confusion is slipping in - to the best of my knowledge, the 10 hour inspection is on the mounting feet of the MGB, not the oil filter housing studs. In fact the inspection has nothing to do with the filter housing as that particular fault has now been "cleared" with modification, however they are still subject to regular inspection and monitoring. The mounting cracking is an entirely different issue and not to be confused with the shearing of the retaining studs on the oil filter housing, the believed cause of the Cougar accident. I am pretty sure we have been round this a couple of times now. The main difference as I see it is that inspection of the mounting feet will very likely detect a crack or weakness before it manifests itself in a catastrophic failure, and the 10 hours is a realistic and practical approach. The issue with the filter housing studs, was that of a material failure, and deemed that the use of titanium instead of steel was a likely design flaw, and weakness, therefore inspection of this area would have been of little use.

[madrock]

One of the lingering issues following on the March accident seems to be why, after the Broome incident, was there such an apparent delay allowed before the problem had to be addressed in the field by means of the bolt changeout.

Now we have a MGB mounting lug that has had cracks appearing, first noticed at the beginning of this year, and as I understand it, the cause has not yet been determined.

The OEM has however stated "Analysis shows the aircraft can operate safely for a minimum of 10 hours, even assuming a full mount fracture and resulting worst-case stresses". I suppose one can probably assume this is where the "10 hours" came from in the current inspection interval.

Even if you have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that the manufacturer was able to replicate all possible known full mount fracture and resultant worst-case stress scenarios during their analysis and that 10 hours is the number, given the potential consequences if further damage were to occur after one mount had been fully fractured, why on earth would you not mandate that until the cause is identified the inspection be done before every flight ?

Is it time to put the calculators down and start doing, let's call it AMARPAMM (As Much As is Reasonably Practical And Money doesn't Matter) until cause/s of any incidents with potentially catastrophic consequences are conclusively dealt with ?

[HeliComparator]

madrock

Inclined to agree with your sentiment. The stress calculations that prove that its safe to operate between checks for 10hrs are presumably done using the same methodology and perhaps by the same guy that did the initial stress calculations and worked out that the feet wouldn't crack within the TBO of the gearbox (2000 hrs or so?) plus a good chunk of safety margin. With the feet cracking at as little as 5 hrs time since new, what does that say for the integrity of the calculations?

But you might find that a prudent operator will be visually checking the feet on every shutdown at base anyway.

HC

[FH1100 Pilot]

Horror Box:FH1100pilot, just to try and clarify, as I think a fair bit of confusion is slipping in - to the best of my knowledge, the 10 hour inspection is on the mounting feet of the MGB, not the oil filter housing studs.
I understand that. But with the issue of the mounting feet cracking we suddenly have turned away from the fact that the S-92 main transmission no longer meets FAR Part 29 certification standards. SAC was quite obviously WRONG about the cooler being the "only" source of an oil leak. Changing from titanium bolts to some new metal does not guarantee that the problem is solved with respect to a possible leak at the filter. If cracks can form in other places (mounting feet, etc.) is it totally impossible for a crack to occur in the transmission case itself?

So.

Do we just forget about it? Do we just say that the 30-minute "run dry" capability is of no real, practical use or value in the real world, so why require it at all?

[heliski22]

From Sikorsky - "That language is fully compliant with the ... requirement to prove 30 minutes of flight after detection of an oil leak."

When the determination of engineering standards is established by interpretation of language, we're moving into the area of cost-saving and ass-covering as the primary tools of achieving those standards. Just think about how much it would have cost to re-design and re-work the MRG to meet the 30-minute standard if, as tested, it was only capable of lasting 10.

A man I know who worked for Bristow Helicopters, bemoaning changes to culture in the company, said to me some years ago that "in Old Man Bristow's day, this was a helicopter company that made a profit, whereas now, it's a profit-making company that uses helicopters. It might as well be lorries for all the difference it makes to the bean-counters!"

The culture of advancement and ass-covering in large corporations is pretty much the same as the culture of advancement and ass-covering in large public service bodies and the use of language is becoming more and more the same - that is to say, it is wilfully misleading while not exposing anybody to challenge. That quote from the Sikorsky man sounds just like something we'd expect to hear in Yes, Minister!

Which of the major car manufacturers allowed a defect to run without a recall because it calculated the likely cost of litigation would be less than the estimated cost of the recall?

And didn't one American airline introduce the concept of "negative profit" (i.e., a loss) way back?

Use of language - what a way to judge engineering standards, eh?

[FH1100 Pilot]

heliski22Which of the major car manufacturers allowed a defect to run without a recall because it calculated the likely cost of litigation would be less than the estimated cost of the recall?
That would have been Ford with their (in)famous Pinto.

Burn, baby, burn!

[heliski22]

And in the end, they had to suffer the litigation costs AND recall/withdraw the car, didn't they?

[[email protected]]

And so the lesson was learned by all the automotive industry - shame the helicopter aviation industry didn't.

[madrock]

Has the cause of the cracks appearing in the MGB mounting feet been determined yet ?

[madrock]

"
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This amendment adopts a new AD for the Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters. This action requires a one-time visual inspection of the MGB lube system filter assembly for oil filter damage. This action also requires if either the primary or secondary oil filter is damaged, replacing both filters, all packings, and the studs before further flight. This action also requires replacing the oil filter bowl within 30 days after replacing a damaged filter and a daily inspection for an oil leak (no oil leaks allowed) during that 30- day interim period. This amendment is prompted by three reports of damaged oil filters or packings resulting from operating with an oversized packing possibly because of incorrect part numbers in the maintenance manual. Sikorsky has issued a temporary revision, T-Rev 63- 19, to the maintenance manual to correct any errors. Installing the filter assembly with an oversized packing (also known as an O-ring) in the oil filter double bypass valve can produce excessive assembly and fatigue loads in the oil filter bowl or the mounting studs that secure the oil filter bowl to the MGB. Based on rig testing, these conditions can result in reduced fatigue life in the studs and the oil filter bowl. Based on information from a previous accident investigation, failure of the oil filter bowl or mounting studs can result in sudden and complete loss of oil from the MGB. This condition, if not corrected, could result in complete loss of oil from the MGB, failure of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. "

[riff_raff]

madrock,

One thing I noticed looking at pictures of the recovered hardware from the S-92 that crashed due to the MRGB oil filter housing failure, was that it had what appeared to be silver-plated locknuts on the housing's titanium studs. The combination of silver and titanium is usually not acceptable due to galvanic corrosion issues. This galvanic corrosion issue would also be exacerbated in a marine environment.

The FAA AD did not specifically mention this issue. But it is something they should have been aware of when qualifying the S-92's MRGB design.

Regards,
riff_raff

[ericferret]

If that is true I wonder why Eurocopter use a silver plated shim between the titanium rotor head and the steel mast on the BO 105. They also use silver plated bushes between the titanium head studs and the steel mast.

Seems to me that they believe silver is an effective anti corrosion measure at a steel titanium interface.

[PhilJ]

Can anyone supply the dimensions of the incorrect and correct o-rings and the o-ring groove?

I'm interested in calculating just how much difference the two o-rings would make to the bolt loading.

[Variable Load]

riff_raff

That's the second time you have thrown your conjecture into this thread. The last time produced no response. However seeing as you are being persistent I will take you up on your assertion. Can you provide some scientific backup to your statement.

I've had a quick look at the anodic indices of silver and titanium, and they are actually acceptably close. Much better than titanium and steel, for example.

[madrock]

"The families of passengers who died in the crash of a Sikorsky helicopter off the coast of Newfoundland last year, as well as the sole survivor of the tragedy, have reached a settlement in their lawsuit against the U.S. company.
The families of 15 passengers and the survivor launched a lawsuit last year in the Philadelphia court of common pleas, alleging that Sikorsky, Keystone Helicopters and their parent company, United Technologies Corp., made false claims about the aircraft’s safety.
Paul Jackson, a spokesman for Sikorsky, said in an email Tuesday that the lawsuit has been settled but details are confidential.
The plaintiffs said in documents filed with the court last July that they had “voluntarily discontinued” their lawsuit to begin negotiations on a possible settlement.
Jackson said a settlement with the families of the helicopter’s two pilots has also been reached.
“All of the claims in regard to the Cougar Flight 491 crew and passengers have been resolved,” Jackson said in the email. “The settlement agreements are private and confidential, so I must decline to provide any details.”
The Cougar Helicopters flight was carrying 16 passengers and two crew members when it crashed in the North Atlantic on March 12 as it was ferrying workers to two offshore oil platforms.
In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged the U.S. firms hadn’t correctly indicated how long a helicopter could safely fly if oil leaked out of its gearbox.
In mid-June, the federal Transportation Safety Board released an update into its probe of the crash and found that while the main rotor blades continued to rotate when the chopper crashed, the tail rotor drive gears were severely damaged.
Investigators said the pilots of the Sikorsky S-92A lost control in the flight’s final moments because of the tail rotor failure.
The issue of the aircraft’s ability to operate without lubricating oil for the gearbox was a key allegation in the 113-page statement of complaint filed in the court in Philadelphia.
The plaintiffs argued the pilots believed the aircraft met U.S. Federal Aviation Administration regulations that certified the aircraft could operate for 30 minutes after losing oil.
They alleged the pilots kept flying the aircraft towards land on that basis, rather than rapidly landing it on the water."

[riff_raff]

Variable Load,

Sorry for the tardy reply. Silver against Ti is usually prohibited due to galvanic corrosion issues. This situation would likely be exacerbated by a marine atmosphere.

Here's NASA's position on the issue (page 3, last sentence):

"Due to corrosion potential, silver plated parts must not contact titanium."

http://engineer.jpl.nasa.gov/practices/2201.pdf

The galvanic potential between silver and titanium is normally less than 0.20V, which would be considered borderline acceptable for other metal combinations. But apparently Ag on Ti is a problem, and I can't give you a technical explanation why.

Hope that satisfies your need for a "scientific" validation of my comments.

Regards,
riff_raff

[riff_raff]

Variable Load,

I did a little research on the subject and I'd like to update my response to you. From what I have read, the issue between silver and titanium alloys is more correctly a stress corrosion phenomena, and not a galvanic corrosion problem. Apparently, under certain conditions, titanium alloys will suffer stress corrosion when in contact with a more noble metal such as silver.

This only occurs with a titanium surface that is not passivated. While titanium fasteners usually have a passivated surface on the threads when new, after a few installation and removal cycles of an all metal locknut, the passivated surface of the titanium threads would be scuffed off. So one can imagine that the unpassivated titanium thread surface in intimate contact with the silver plating on the locknut would present the conditions for stress corrosion cracking to occur. The fact that the titanium studs were highly loaded (or possibly overloaded), combined with the natural stress concentrations the thread roots create, and the extreme notch sensitivity that titanium exhibits, all would contribute to a structural failure initiated by a stress corrosion crack.

Looking forward to your comments on the issue.

Regards,
riff_raff

ps. In response to ericferret's comments on silver plated shims and bushings, the (soft) silver plating is used as an anti-fretting coating, and not for corrosion prevention.

[leopold bloom]

Sikorsky settles with survivor, families of Cougar S-92A crash victims-07/01/2010-Washington DC-Flightglobal.com (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/01/07/336879/sikorsky-settles-with-survivor-families-of-cougar-s-92a-crash.html)


Sikorsky settles with survivor, families of Cougar S-92A crash victims
By John Croft ([email protected])
http://adserver.adtech.de/adserv|3.0|289|1061324|0|277|ADTECH;loc=300;key=key1+key2+ke y3+key4;grp=[group] (http://adserver.adtech.de/adlink|3.0|289|1061324|0|277|ADTECH;loc=300;key=key1+key2+ke y3+key4;grp=[group])

Sikorsky has reached out-of-court settlements with the lone survivor and families of the 17 passengers and crew killed in the crash of an oil industry S-92A off the coast of Newfoundland in March 2009. The company is not revealing details of the settlements, other than to say that “all of the claims in regard to the Cougar Flight 491 crew and passengers have been resolved.”
Named in a lawsuit (shown below) filed in Philadelphia by the lone survivor and 15 other passengers were Sikorsky, its parent company, United Technologies, and its S-92A final assembly centre in Pennsylvania, formerly Keystone Helicopter.
That lawsuit, which had asked for jury trial, claimed that Sikorsky “engaged in a pattern of reckless and conscious disregard for the safety passengers of their S-92A helicopters”, in part by falsely advertising that the S-92A had a 30-min run-dry capability (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/as-the-croft-flies/2009/11/canadians-turn-up-the-heat-on-sikorsky-faa.html)for its main gear box, a factor they say prompted the crew to try to fly back to land rather than plan for an orderly ditching. Canadian press reports that Sikorsky settled separately with the families of the two pilots.
Canadian investigators have determined that the helicopter’s main rotor was turning (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/06/22/328664/tsb-cougar-s-92-experienced-tail-rotor-drive-failure.html)when the aircraft hit the water belly-first about 10 minutes after pilots received an indication that the main gearbox (MGB) transmission fluid had leaked out, but that the gearing to its tail rotor was badly damaged and an autorotation had been attempted.
Flight International previously reported that pre-certification testing of the helicopter revealed a similar duration of the MGB after oil loss, though Sikorsky had determined that an emergency transmission oil bypass system would prevent such an occurence. The company certified the helicopter under the assertion that other MGB failures were "extremely remote", which in US Federal Aviation Administration certification language means one failure per 10 million flight hours for the entire fleet of aircraft type.
Several MGB oil problems in the field before the Cougar accident however indicate that the failure rate was approximately once per 50,000 flight hours.

[choppersky]

A union leader representing oil workers says another offshore chopper crash will happen in Newfoundland and Labrador — and he's calling for changes to improve workers' chances of survival when it does.

Another N.L. chopper crash inevitable: union

Last Updated: Tuesday, February 9, 2010 | 5:11 PM NT

CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/credit.html)


http://www.cbc.ca/gfx/images/news/photos/2010/02/09/nl-brian-murphy-090210.jpg
Brian Murphy of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers union appeared at the offshore helicopter safety inquiry Tuesday. (CBC)
A union leader representing oil workers says another offshore chopper crash will happen in Newfoundland and Labrador — and he's calling for changes to improve workers' chances of survival when it does.
"When the next one goes down, it is going to be full of us," Brian Murphy of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers (CEP) told the inquiry into offshore helicopter safety on Tuesday in St. John's.
"When this happens, it is going to be, 'Put it down wherever you can.' Given that, we want every possible impediment to survival removed."
He was speaking before the inquiry established after a Cougar Helicopters Ltd. chopper crashed into the ocean 55 kilometres east of St. John's on March 12, 2009. Seventeen people died.
Murphy, who is CEP vice-president for the Terra Nova offshore oil production platform, said an auxiliary fuel tank that is now placed in the cabin of the helicopters used by Cougar to transport offshore workers must be removed.
"Why are we flying with these auxiliary tanks inside?" said Murphy, an electrical technician on the Terra Nova oil production platform east of St. John's.
"We are not comfortable with it. If I'm upside-down in a chopper in the water and I'm struggling for my life, I don't want anything in my way."
http://www.cbc.ca/gfx/images/news/photos/2010/02/09/nl-cougar-handout.gif
Cougar Helicopter Ltd. uses Sikorsky S92-A choppers to transport oil industry workers offshore. (Cougar)
Last week a Cougar representative said the tanks are necessary for the company's Sikorsky helicopter to fly hundreds of kilometres offshore to oil industry platforms.
"When it comes to transportation, we are at the mercy of the oil operators, Cougar, Sikorsky and regulators such as the Transportation Safety Board," Murphy said.
He also said survival training for workers must be improved.
He called on the inquiry led by retired Supreme Court Judge Robert Wells to recommend that a fully dedicated, full-time search-and-rescue service be established in St. John's.
"We believe a Department of National Defence search-and-rescue crew like the ones based in Gander — [is] the best suited to do the job," said Murphy.
Right now Cougar is contracted to provide a search-and-rescue service but it must transform one of its transportation choppers into a search-and-rescue chopper before it can answer a call.
2nd union leader also opposes auxiliary tank

A second union leader also spoke at the inquiry.
Sheldon Peddle, president of CEP Local 2121, refused to fly on offshore helicopters because of his concern that the auxiliary tank would prevent passengers from escaping after a crash.
"In our survival training, the simulators that we learned to escape from didn't include an auxiliary tank," he said.
His concerns were investigated and it was decided by the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board — the body that regulates Newfoundland and Labrador's offshore industry — that his concerns were not valid and the auxiliary tanks don't make the helicopters more dangerous.
He was advised to go back to work. He has but he said he disagrees with the CNLOPB's decision.
"It's not just my issue; there was a petition signed by more than 100 workers on this issue," said Peddle.
Family members of some of the people who died in the crash were also expected to speak at the inquiry Wednesday.


Read more: CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - Another N.L. chopper crash inevitable: union (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/02/09/nl-murphy-helicopter-208.html#ixzz0f7oSsL7V)

[dhc2widow]

N.L. chopper's flaw known in 2008
Sikorsky crash killed 17 in March 2009

Last Updated: Friday, March 12, 2010 | 5:37 AM


CBC's The Fifth Estate has found that the maker of a helicopter that crashed near Newfoundland a year ago, killing 17 people, knew more than six months earlier about the gearbox problem that downed the chopper.

The CBC investigation also revealed that U.S. and Canadian aviation safety organizations knew about the Sikorsky helicopter's flaw in August 2008.

On March 12, 2009, Cougar Helicopters Flight 491 slammed into the Atlantic Ocean 55 kilometres southeast of St. John's. Both pilots and 15 passengers died, leaving one survivor: Robert Decker, 28.

The S-92 chopper, made by U.S.-based Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., was ferrying workers to offshore oil-production platforms hundreds of kilometres east of St. John's.

It crashed minutes after the pilots reported the helicopter was losing oil pressure.

It was later determined the crash happened after oil leaked from the chopper's main gearbox, an integral part of the system that turns the helicopter's main rotors.

"Sikorsky should have been paying attention to this," said Shawn Coyle, who used to work for Transport Canada as a helicopter test pilot and now works as a consultant to the industry. "Someone in Sikorsky's organization should have been watching for this sort of thing."

On March 20, just over a week after the crash, Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigators said broken bolts, or studs, securing the oil filter mount to the main gearbox on the helicopter were suspect.

"We went public after we were told by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and by Sikorsky that they were planning on taking action," said the TSB's Mike Cunningham. "We wanted to make sure that all the operators, worldwide, of S-92s got that information in the quickest manner possible."

Less than two weeks after the crash, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration — the organization that had certified the Sikorsky S-92 as safe to fly — grounded all of the choppers and ordered their owners to change titanium studs to steel studs.

It may appear they reacted quickly, but The Fifth Estate's investigation questions that conclusion. The CBC investigation shows that during the summer of 2008, Sikorsky, TSB and the FAA were aware of the possibility of the titanium studs breaking.

On July 2, 2008, a Sikorsky S-92 chopper carrying Australian offshore oil industry workers narrowly avoided tragedy after two studs securing the oil-filter assembly to the main gearbox broke and the helicopter lost oil pressure. The pilots were close enough to land to bring the chopper down safely.

Claimed to be safest

The mechanical failure left some people in the helicopter transportation industry with questions about the S-92 — a helicopter Sikorsky advertised as the safest in the world.

The Australian helicopter was owned by CHC Helicopter Corp. of Vancouver. CHC asked Transportation Safety Board of Canada's West Coast manager, Bill Yearwood, to oversee an independent analysis of what happened to that chopper.

That crucial third-party analysis took place in Richmond, B.C., in the presence of the helicopter's owners and Sikorsky officials.

An Aug. 29, 2008, summary of that examination written by the TSB noted some troubling findings.

"There appears to be several unresolved issues with the oil system, aside from the fractured studs, on this particular aircraft. It seems likely that these issues are related to stud failures," the TSB found.

The TSB also noted that: "It is reported the military S-92s use steel studs to attach the filter bowl to the transmission."

FAA told in 2008

In late August of 2008, the TSB advised the FAA of its findings.

But it wasn't until five months later — on Jan. 28, 2009 — that Sikorsky issued an alert saying the titanium mounting studs should be replaced by steel studs on every helicopter within a year, or within 1,250 flight hours.

Two months after that, on March 23, 2009 — more than seven months after the Australian chopper failure — that the FAA grounded the S-92s and ordered the studs changed.

The Fifth Estate 's Linden MacIntyre asked Coyle about the time it took authorities and Sikorsky to respond to what they learned in August 2008.

"You tell me, is that a reasonable lapse of time?" he asked.

"Well, in hindsight, no," said Coyle.

Neither the FAA nor Transport Canada agreed to on-camera interviews requested by The Fifth Estate. Sikorsky also declined repeated requests for an on-camera interview.
CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - N.L. chopper's flaw known in 2008 (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/03/11/nl-helicrash-fifth-estate-311.html)

[Shawn Coyle]

I haven't seen the program yet, so I'm not sure what was edited out of what was a very long interview.
I was pleased to have the opportunity to put forward some things that had been bothering me about this tragic accident. Hopefully some good will come of it.

[Arnie Madsen]

Shawn Coyle

I watched the Canadian TV documentary " The Fifth Estate" last night and the producers actually did a good job .

You also came across very well Shawn, they used quite a few clips of your interview throughout the hour long show. You came across as knowledgeable and professional yet easy for the non-aviator to understand as well.

[maxwelg2]

The show was good, hopefully it will have a positive impact on the industry. IMO they could have put more updated material in the show, but no doubt the relatively short air time they had limited what they could report. Perhaps there will be a follow-up show to address that, most likely aligned with the eventual release of the findings of commissioner Wells's safety enquiry and/or the pending TSB report.

We've already seen improvements in the survival suit hood design, we have a new 6-stud filter housing, and we will have more robust MGBs installed hopefully soon to address the mounting feet cracks to further improve our confidence in this helo.

What's went quiet is whether a true run-dry MGB design is going to be available in the new gearbox, or are the manufacturer going for an "extremely remote" classification again. IMO that classification should not be an option for this helo, so there is still lots of room for improvement.

In memory of the colleagues that we lost just over a year ago it is our duty to ensure that all lessons learned are implemented and this helo and our survival equipment is truly made as safe as reasonably practicable. This was re-enforced on Friday as I attended the memorial services and talked to some of the family members afterwards, who all want to see some good come out of their loss.

Safe flying

Max

[Shawn Coyle]

Arnie:
thanks for the kind words. It was an interesting interview - and I only wish they had been able to get Transport's management to come on the air.

[widgeon]

Cougar 491 | the fifth estate (http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/2009-2010/cougar_491/)

Link to the CBC Doc .

I don't think it was posted before.

[Outwest]

Link to the CBC Doc .


Not viewable outside Canada

[9Aplus]

Even not with assistance of Canadian PROXI

[choppersky]

CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - Sikorsky chopper grounded over gearbox crack (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/05/06/sikorsky-cougar-crack-506.html)

A Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky chopper has been grounded in St. John's because of a crack near the gearbox, CBC News has learned.

U.S.-based manufacturer Sikorsky said the crack is in a footing that attaches the main rotor's gearbox to the body of the aircraft.

The crack was discovered in the same S-92 helicopter that had been grounded in January with the same problem.

Cougar uses the helicopters to transport crews to fields working in the offshore oilfields east of Newfoundland.

In a separate incident, another Cougar helicopter was grounded in Halifax in November, after a hairline crack was found.

Public scrutiny of Cougar's aircraft has been high since March 2009, when a Sikorsky S-92 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing 17 of the 18 people who were aboard. The Transportation Safety Board has not yet completed its investigation into the crash.

In a statement issued Thursday evening, Cougar Helicopters said it is complying with all directives and that the aircraft will go back into operation as soon as the "maintenance action" is completed.

"As this does not impact the safe operation of the aircraft, this is considered a standard maintenance action and completed as prescribed by the manufacturer (Sikorsky)," the Cougar statement said.

Sikorsky insists that the current issue is not a "flight safety issue," but the European Aviation Safety Agency has said that this problem could lead to loss of control of the helicopter.

Sikorsky said it will replace the gearbox as a precaution. That work was scheduled to start on Thursday. Sikorsky did the same thing after the January and November incidents.

Sikorsky said it is making better gearbox housings to resolve the issue.

[212man]

A singurlarly useless and meaningless link :ugh: I'm sure the boys and girls in Cougar will thankyou for that. :mad:

[zalt]

212man While your are entitled to your opinion, your comment on of "useless and meaningless" could also apply to your own post.

What would you prefer? Total secrecy and suppression of information from passengers? Or are S92 gearbox changes so common as to be unremarkable?

HI do wonder how well briefed are BSP passengers are on the service experience of the S92. Cougar passengers certainly have a desire to be well informed and had a tragic lesson on the fallibility of the S92 on March 2009.

[Horror box]

I think the point is that this is really not newsworthy, and is senseless journalistic sensationalism. The problem is that dramatizing these events has a very negative effect on the industry, both in terms of confidence for the passengers and also with respect to a balanced view for the customers and general public. The fact remains, that this was detected in routine maintenance, exactly as it should be. A crack in the mounting foot is, in itself, not a great problem, especially when you consider that this crack was probably barely visible to the human eye (only to a technicians eye:ok:), and that it certainly is not a catastrophic failure that the press would like to portray. It is a helicopter, and they are grounded all the time for all sorts of reasons, and this will always be the case - fact. That is why we have highly trained maintenance departments. To me this is a very good proof to all passengers and customers that Cougar are doing a professional and very good maintenance operation and detecting all the snags as early as possible, but that does not sound so exciting as a headline in a paper (by the way - I have no connection whatsoever to Cougar). It is not about secrecy and cover-ups, but I really wonder who feeds the press this rubbish, as they should really look at what they are doing and the effect it has. The S92 is and remains to be an extremely reliable and tough machine, despite what a few journos in Canada want to have us believe, but it is just that - a machine, therein lies the weakness. When are we going to stop with this pointless scaremongering.

[Geoffersincornwall]

I once showed my wife a picture of a crack in one of our helicopters and she went white and expressed her shock/horror. I then put her straight......

"Darling, its a helicopter it therefore has a crack somewhere - that's what helicopters do, they vibrate and they crack. Don't worry about it.

I'm not sure how reassured she was but it's close to reality for almost every type I know - look at the doublers on the rear fuselage of any machine more than a year old.

G.

[212man]

What would you prefer? Total secrecy and suppression of information from passengers? Or are S92 gearbox changes so common as to be unremarkable?

HI do wonder how well briefed are BSP passengers are on the service experience of the S92. Cougar passengers certainly have a desire to be well informed and had a tragic lesson on the fallibility of the S92 on March 2009.
zalt is offline Report Post Reply

Thanks zalt - hadn't thought about that! I happen to think that 'our' pax have been as well briefed as any in the world - we even had Mr Pino come and visit, as well as taking a few of the SAC MGB designers offshore on briefings.

So don't give us that sensationalist crap that somehow links an internal catostrophic failure that results in a fatal drive failure, to an external design fault that results in a crack with no safety implications but plenty of embarrassing downtime issues. I think the preferred North American Expression is "give us a f***ing break." We are under no illusions as to your stature within industry - let's not let it distort your actual input and respect!

Horrobox - Fazarkely! Thank God for impartiality and common sense!

[zalt]

we even had Mr Pino come and visit, as well as taking a few of the SAC MGB designers offshore on briefings.


I think that is as much a sign of the wavering confidence in the S92 due to an ongoing series of problems, as sign of proactive Sikorsky commitment.

There is a reason this is big news in Canada and it shows the rather pathetic attitudes of some to simply dismiss these defects.

The revelation that the CBC Fifth Estate documentary that the TSB had actually examined the failed studs from the first S92 total gearbox oil loss (in Australia in 2008) but failed to make a public recommendation prior to the tragedy in St Johns may not have made much of an effect overseas but it did not go unnoticed in Canada. Perhaps the Cougar crew would have ditched in time if they had known the truth from Australia.

I would expect the TSB not to be as dismissive as a bunch of PPRuNe armchair airworthiness engineers. TSB's failure to act certainly dents our faith in their competence (perhaps to be regained when they finally report) and faith in the SMSs in the industry.

[212man]

Zalt,
whatever the validity of your remarks - they bear no commonstance to the points raised in the news link given about the foot cracks.

CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - Sikorsky chopper grounded over gearbox crack (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/05/06/sikorsky-cougar-crack-506.html)

That's the point!

[212man]

The revelation that the CBC Fifth Estate documentary that the TSB had actually examined the failed studs from the first S92 total gearbox oil loss (in Australia in 2008) but failed to make a public recommendation

An entirely different topic!

[Horror box]

I think that is as much a sign of the wavering confidence in the S92 due to an ongoing series of problems, as sign of proactive Sikorsky commitment.

There is a reason this is big news in Canada and it shows the rather pathetic attitudes of some to simply dismiss these defects.

The revelation that the CBC Fifth Estate documentary that the TSB had actually examined the failed studs from the first S92 total gearbox oil loss (in Australia in 2008) but failed to make a public recommendation prior to the tragedy in St Johns may not have made much of an effect overseas but it did not go unnoticed in Canada. Perhaps the Cougar crew would have ditched in time if they had known the truth from Australia.

I would expect the TSB not to be as dismissive as a bunch of PPRuNe armchair airworthiness engineers. TSB's failure to act certainly dents our faith in their competence (perhaps to be regained when they finally report) and faith in the SMSs in the industry.

Wavering confidence in the S92 - what the f###??? I think you are in some sort of different plane of reality to rest of the world of aviation and the offshore helicopter industry. There is definitely not an "ongoing series of problems". The S92 has a far better serviceability record on the line than its rivals. We have just taken another 4 machines in the last 18 months taking us up to 10. Look around at other operations and S92 orders are not doing too badly, and for good reason. I know our customers are also very happy with the reliability, performance and and safety of the S92. It has been a significant improvement in capability from the Puma. I think you are so isolated from the rest of the world that the reality has been very badly distorted due to the tragic cougar accident followed by gross distortion of the facts by the Canadian media.
The issue of the STUDS IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ISSUE OF CRACKED MOUNTING FEET. It has been effectively dealt with following the cougar accident. This has already been covered to death in this thread.
The issue of mounting feet cracking definitely not unique to the S92, and is being dealt with effectively by SAC incorporating new procedures for inspection, precautionary flight procedures, reducing torque, and lengthy investigation and studies. Far more than other companies have been willing to do in the past.
I am all for good discussion about the S92, after all I fly it, so have a vested interest in its safety, but please, don't just regurgitate to us the crap that is being published in the Canadian press, by half informed journalists looking to sell a story. That is the reason it is big news in Canada, and if you speak to anyone actually involved in flying and maintaining this aircraft you will get a very different story, with a good deal more fact.

[maxwelg2]

Strange how it only takes some recent media attention to awaken this thread. CBC did a reasonably good job with the "Fifth Estate" report, but this latest diatribe is reminiscent of their initial coverage of 491. Like vultures they descended upon the Cougar heliport and spewed out inconsistent stories, with the key word being stories, not facts.

I for one have been, and still am, patiently awaiting the pending new S92 MGB and the TSB report findings.

Commendation to the Cougar crew who are doing an excellent and vigilant job of keeping the S92s as safe as currently possible.

IMHO the high visibility in the S92 will not abate for quite some time in NL after 491. We would have had the same scenario with the Super Pumas if a MGB wasn't changed out in time, but the reason that never happened is again due to the excellent work of the Cougar team, who knew how to keep those babies flying. Hindsight is great, but not as good as total flying service/experience of any helo. That's why the Pumas gained an excellent track record, the maintenance regime was set by real-time experience. Hopefully the same will apply to the S92 as the flying hours increase.

Safe flying:)

Max

[Horror box]

Maxwell,
I would remind you that the Super Puma most certainly does not not have a perfect track record, and has also had a number of catastrophic gearbox and other failures. 1997 - Helikopter Service L1 (gearbox failure) and 2009 Bond L2 (geabox failure), MHS L2 in 2007 and 2006, Bristow G-JSAR 2006 so don't lose the perpective. Problems have been serious and numerous over the years, including catastrophic gearbox failure, engine overspeeds resulting in catastrophic failure, hydraulic fires and tail rotor failures. I do not intend to imply that the Puma has a poor safety record, as over the years it has flown many hundreds of thousands of hours, but they certainly do not have an "excellent track record".
Having flown both - I am much happier in an S92.

[maxwelg2]

Yep, lots of historical issues with the Super Puma fleet, some as yet not fully answered, but lots of incident-free flying hours to reduce risk via the law of averages.

From a statistical perspective the S92 doesn't even come near the Super Pumas. That's the key difference right now that only time and further design improvements will change that.

From a personal PAX perspective the S92 shakes badly, especially when icing occurs faster than the RIPS can handle, and has so much bad press that it will never be a preferred helo by PAX. Remember what happened to the Chinook back in the early North Sea days, they didn't last long in offshore use...

Just because we PAX fly in the S92 doesn't mean that we actually like them. Consider it a tolerated condition right now with heavy dependence on the pilots and maintenance teams.

Safe flying

Max

[Horror box]

From a personal PAX perspective the S92 shakes badly, especially when icing occurs faster than the RIPS can handle, and has so much bad press that it will never be a preferred helo by PAX. Remember what happened to the Chinook back in the early North Sea days, they didn't last long in offshore use..

Sorry Max, but this does not cut it with me. Of course you are entitled to your opinion and I cannot tell you what to think, but I believe you are being a little paranoid. How on earth do you know how much ice the RIPS can handle, and when the blades are accreting that amount. I have flown the 92 in heavy icing quite a few times, and I can tell you it is damned impressive, in the fact that it can fly and deal with these conditions with relative ease. The Puma has only a limited icing clearance, in some ops and no blade de-icing capability at all. The 92 does shake when it accretes and sheds ice, and that is a good sign. It allows ice to build up, detects the rate, and commands a schedule to the RIPS to act accordingly in order to best deal with the type of icing experienced, and thus clearing the ice. The shaking you describe, is the normal process of ice shedding, and we consider a good sign.

[maxwelg2]

Thanks Horrorbox, vibration due to the anti-icing system operational characteristics makes complete sense. One more lesson learned for me.

I still think the S92 has to much quiescent vibration, but again that's just my personal opinion. Keeps waking me up with an itchy nose!

As always, I trust the pilots who trust the maintenance support team.

Safe Flying

Max

[riff_raff]

That CBC article from May 6th seemed fairly reasonable. The S-92 MRGB housing inspection directives put in place seem to be working, and this time a housing crack was detected before it caused a problem.

What caught my eye in that article however, was this sentence: "The crack was discovered in the same S-92 helicopter that had been grounded in January with the same problem." If true, it sounds like that particular airframe might have some other issues.

[spheritech]

horror box: "The Puma has only a limited icing clearance, in some ops and no blade de-icing capability at all"

As a matter of fact, the AS332 was the first helicopter to be certified by FAA for flight in icing conditions, thanks to its deicing system.
The EC225 is certified by FAA and EASA for flight in icing conditions with the optional deicing system.

Spheritech

[212man]

Yes, it's called being 'North-Sea-centric'! (no offence intended) combined with Sikorsky hype as if they invented the whole concept!

HB, if you ever get a chance, try and find some photos of the (fully icing cleared) Cougar 332s covered in Ice - eye watering! I think that's what Maxwell is alluding to - the difference in characteristics in ice shedding compared to what they were used to.

[Horror box]

horror box: "The Puma has only a limited icing clearance, in some ops and no blade de-icing capability at all"

As a matter of fact, the AS332 was the first helicopter to be certified by FAA for flight in icing conditions, thanks to its deicing system.
The EC225 is certified by FAA and EASA for flight in icing conditions with the optional deicing system.

Spheritech

I stand corrected. Lagavulin induced error prompted ill-thought our typing! Should have said - "in some ops, no de-icing capability at all, and only a limited icing clearance."

Having flown the 332L without blade de-icing and a limited clearance, I always found icing "interesting", especially when you begin to ponder the performance implications if you ever were to ever find yourself trying to autorotate!

[212man]

Sometimes staying level at Vy and MCP is a more interesting situation.....

[Horror box]

Sometimes staying level at Vy and MCP is a more interesting situation.....

Ahhh, yes agreed. I think we understand the same meaning of the word "interesting" here. Have experienced the mentioned scenario at least a couple of times, usually a little unexpected, and at least once over mountains with one donkey out of action, and at least another time or two due to very rapid onset of ice due to a stupid idiot (me) underestimating the super-cooled LWC of a large bit of cloud.

[zalt]

Confirmation that CBC's reporting is a well recieved public service:

CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC journalists from N.L. receive awards (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/05/10/cbc-ajas-rtndas-awards.html)

CBC Newfoundland and Labrador also won the online reporting award, for the strength of its coverage and use of technology in reporting the Cougar Helicopters crash in March 2009, which killed 17 people. The award went to developer Peter Gosse, writer John Gushue and editor Kathryn King.

CBC Newfoundland and Labrador also won a continuing coverage award for its ongoing reporting on the Cougar crash and its aftermath.

[Horror box]

CBC journalists from Newfoundland and Labrador win honours from their peers this week.

Read more: CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC journalists from N.L. receive awards (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/05/10/cbc-ajas-rtndas-awards.html#ixzz0nYHxM55q)

The self licking lolly. I wouldn't say journalists awarding journalists qualifies CBC as a "public service". They are all in the business of selling stories, and truth is not the most important factor, getting people to read their papers is. Believe it all at your peril.

[pumaboy]

How on earth can reporters now get awarded for the part in reviewing an accident that killed 17 people

This world is a sick place

It goes to show mainstream media journalists will do anything to sell a story and get awarded for it

What about the 17 people who died in the accident, What about the families to know that their loved ones are not coming home, Are they forgotten ?

I'm sorry but mainstream media journalists have lost all respect from my point of view.

[SARBlade]

Totally agree! How is it that a convicted killer, rapist, etc. sells his story from prison and the courts will take away any monies made off the families tragedy, yet journalists do exactly the same thing when it comes to reaping the rewards from family misery. I don't get it sometimes. Yeah the story has to be told and lessons learned, but when it comes to awarding people for these stories, I think it should not be included. Just my rose-coloured glass opinion. :rolleyes:

[maxwelg2]

IMHO lessons learned will only come from those who are qualified to present them, e.g. helicopter safety inquiry team key contributors such as the TSB.

I didn't see any reporters being asked for their input...they almost never get all the facts right, just their biased opinion that sells the most media via forwarding of selective information. If they are to provide any positive input they should provide all the facts and state where conjecture has been applied.

People have the right to make their own conclusions, but require accurate information and informative education to do so. I never treat anything in a tabloid as gospel, just an opinion for consideration. Unfortunately a lot of people believe the media 100% and are mis-informed.

Perhaps they should make a golden vulture award to give out at their next self-elating ceremony.

Safe flying

Max

[Ned-Air2Air]

Pumaboy - Might suggest you clarify that to mainstream media and not trade media who are actually pro the industry. :=

You seem to bag journos at every opportunity you can get. Maybe you should stop reading all those trade magazines that cover the helicopter industry since you detest all us journos so much. :mad:

[heli-cal]

Pumaboy - Might suggest you clarify that to mainstream media and not trade media who are actually pro the industry.

Well said.

[poppahymen]

Hi all, I have not read all 32 pages of this thread but have looked at it from time to time so please be kind. I was always querulous as to what happened after the Australia S92 did its precautionary landing and post the Newfoundland accident was maintenance action revisited. Was the gear further inspected inspected or replaced after the findings etc. I wonder because at the time I did hear the first mummers where over torqued studs on the oil filter. IE lets find someone to blame. Last guy to work on it will do.(Not that we live in a blame culture Ha Ha)
Can someone perhaps from CHC enlighten me. And the guy subject to early rumors of over-torqued studs what happen to him? Please no names.

Thanks Poppahymen:ok:

[riff_raff]

poppahymen,

Here's a website (http://s92facts.wordpress.com/) with lots of links about the recent S-92 issues. It was apparently put together by someone with a vested interest in the matter. Lots of stuff to read there if you want to get up to date on the topic.

Here's a list of transcripts and exhibits (http://www.oshsi.nl.ca/?Content=Transcripts_and_Exhibits) from the official Canadian TSB inquiry into the matter.

Regards,
riff_raff

[Lonewolf_50]

John Dixson: sorry I didn't respond, before, thanks for your replies in re the problems of an S-92 with its tail rotor losing thrust. I do recall the 40-120 kts stuck pedals from *cough* how many years ago was that? :eek:

LW_50

[rotor-rooter]

This might get very interesting! :eek:

Sikorsky has asked a federal judge to absolve it of any liability to Cougar Helicopters and a leasing affiliate of Lloyd’s, following the 2009 crash off Newfoundland of a Cougar helicopter built by Sikorsky that killed 17 people.


Sikorsky bases its case on technical terms of a 2004 contract that it says is binding on Lloyd’s and Cougar. Sikorsky also interprets U.S. maritime law to bar any lawsuit from Cougar.





Link (http://http://www.westfaironline.com/component/zine/article/8025-sikorsky-eyes-helicopter-program.html)

[sox6]

Is that not a pathetic arguement?

[Lonewolf_50]

It's a legal argument. Are those by default pathetic? What one signs up to in a contract tends to be binding. SAC seems to have reason to believe that under the law, the legally binding agreement reduces their liability.

Once things enter the courts, such questions and assertions become the rule.

SAC's position may or may not be upheld.

[Ground flight]

Whats going to happen ?

CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - Cougar sues chopper-maker over deadly crash (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/08/26/nl-cougar-sues-826.html)

Cougar Helicopters and its insurers are suing Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. for more than $25 million in damages following the tragic crash of one of Cougar's Sikorsky helicopters near St. John's on March 12, 2009.
Seventeen people on the helicopter died after it slammed into the ocean 55 kilometres southeast of St. John's. One man, Robert Decker, survived.
Court documents allege Sikorsky "fraudulently misrepresented" the fact that its S-92 helicopter could continue to operate for a half hour after losing oil pressure.
Instead, it appears that on March 12, the Cougar Helicopter crashed 11 minutes after the crew noticed the helicopter was losing oil pressure.
Cougar also claims that Sikorsky failed to tell all helicopter operators of the severity of an August 2008 incident in Australia.
At that time, a Sikorsky S-92 helicopter made an emergency landing after two titanium studs failed, causing a loss of oil pressure.
Cougar says that's "precisely the same series of events that caused" the crash near St. John's in 2009.
U.S.-based Sikorsky has not filed a statement of defence. Cougar's lawsuit was filed on June 24, 2010.
VIH Aviation Group Company, the parent company of Cougar Helicopters, declined to comment on the case.

[Lonewolf_50]

Wasn't that bound to eventually happen? :confused:

[Outwest]

for more than $25 million in damages

I would think it should be more like $250 million......the :mad: bast@rds!!!

[Two's in]

Whats going to happen ?

A lot of lawyers are going to get really, really, rich.

[Canuck Guy]

I would think it should be more like $250 million......the http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/censored.gif bast@rds!!!

That will come from the soon to follow (I'm guessing) class action civil suit from the families of those lost.

[VTA]

$25 Million eh !!! Just about the price of a new 92 after the lawyers have taken their cut....

So.... Mr Sikorsky... You just give us a new a/c (out of court settlement of course, with no real egg of your faces plus no civil class actions) and we'll call it quits eh !!

[eastwood]

Hi there,

I heard of this accident shortly after the cause was in the press. I'm still wondering why the FAA and EASA aren't more into it? I mean the 30 min is not just a good idea it is a requirement and this requirement is obviously not met by this sikorsky gear box, is it? :sad:

cheers
eastwood

[Shawn Coyle]

Canuck Guy:
The families have already settled.

[dangermouse]

For clarity the requirement states that it must have 30 minutes dry run capability unless the likelihood of total oil loss was extremely improbable.

In the case of the S92 the safety case determined that it was extremely improbable and therefore did not require a 30 min capability.

therefore at the time of the accident the S92 was correctly certificated.

in hindsight asking if the safety case is adequate is a whole different question

DM

[fly911]

I'm not judging anyone, but if I didn't have oil pressure, I don't think it would take me 11 minutes to set it down. I would like to read the CVR transcript.

[Special 25]

I don't want to go through the whole debate again, but its a brave pilot who ditches the aircraft and seventeen passengers into a cold North Atlantic, when he still thinks there are 20 minutes still left in the gearbox.

[js0987]

The article is a bit vague as to the claim by Cougar that Sikorsky "fraudulently misrepresented" the aircraft could could continue to operate after a loss of oil pressure. That's different than being able to operate for 30 minutes with no oil. The RFM has always stated that MGB oil pressure below 5psi is a "land immediately."

It will be interesting to see in depositions and testimony just who said what to whom, what claims were made and how those claims were understood. It will also be interesting to see if the case goes forward to trial or gets settled.

[Variable Load]

when he still thinks there are 20 minutes still left in the gearbox.

That's a pretty big assumption you just made. Do you know that to be a fact??

Most (perhaps all?) S92 pilots that I know did not think the aircraft had 30 mins run-dry before the accident. The RFM was clear (less than 5 psi = Land Immediately). The details of certification requirements are not something your average pilot would ever look at. The FlightSafety pilot training courses never mentioned 30 mins run dry, but I can't comment on the Cougar course!

I actually think they were presented with some unusual indications that led them to believe that the lack of oil pressure might be a false indication.

But until CVR extracts are made public I do not think we will know for sure.

[sox6]

Was there not a Sikorsky Safety Advisory on a change to the RFM to detail indications of gearbox oil loss that could (according to Sikorsky) be ignored that was issued just a few weeks after the CHC Australia emergency landing in WA?

Could this have caused confusion?

If I recall Sikorsky also said that smoke in the cabin should not be considered an emergency.

Certainly days after the Cougar crash, EASA issues an emergency directive that the Sikorsky advisory was a proposal and had been rejected. Even the FAA then came out against Sikorsky.

[squib66]

Pilots? families push for helmets - Local - News - The Telegram (http://www.thetelegram.com/News/Local/2010-08-28/article-1706059/Pilots%26rsquo%3B-families-push-for-helmets/1)

“Although not fatally injured during the impact sequence, both pilots received severe injuries due in part to striking their heads/faces against the instrument panel,” said the [TSB] advisory.

Is the TSB implying that the crew may have been able to escape if they had been better protected?

[fly911]

http://www.cbc.ca/gfx/images/news/photos/2010/01/28/tp-cougar-sikorsky.gif
CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - Helicopter crash probe review unfair: lawyer (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/09/06/newfoundland-helicopter-crash-cougar-tsb.html)

The Transportation Safety Board probe into a deadly helicopter crash off Newfoundland is flawed and unfair, say lawyers for the victims of Cougar Flight 491.
A confidential draft of the board's report into last year's tragedy began circulating among reviewers the board selected last month.
It's part of the federally mandated process to collect feedback before the report is finalized and made public.
But lawyers for the crash victims are questioning why they've been shut out of the process. Neither sole survivor Robert Decker nor the families of the two pilots and 15 passengers who died March 12, 2009, were deemed "interested parties" entitled to assess the draft report, they say.
'Closed-door'

"I think the concern that the public should have is that the investigative process appears to be closed-door," said Vancouver lawyer Joe Fiorante.
"We know that ... the operator Cougar and the manufacturer Sikorsky are given access and the opportunity to comment on the draft report whereas the victims are not. So, I think what's at stake is the appearance of whether the investigation is impartial and conducted fairly."
Fiorante, a civil litigator specializing in international aviation, says the board has consistently taken the position in the past that passengers are not to be included in the report review stage.
"It has come as a shock to all of our clients in past cases — and in this case — that they're being shut out of a government investigative process in which Mr. Decker himself personally survived, or in other cases, their loved ones were killed.
"They are put in the same position as the rest of the public and told to wait for final findings."
The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act directs the TSB to send its draft report to "anyone who, in the opinion of the board, has a direct interest in the findings of the board."
2 categories of reviewers

TSB spokesman John Cottreau said the identities of those who received a draft copy are confidential. But he said they fell into two categories the board looks at "for according draft reviewer status."
"The first category is those whose performance or behaviour or products might be commented on in the report and who might see themselves as being adversely affected by the report. The second category is those who can contribute to the completeness and accuracy of the scientific report.
"Essentially, the families do not fall under those two broad categories so they are not accorded draft reviewer status."
Fiorante, part of a consortium of lawyers representing the Cougar families, says that approach defies logic.
"Mr. Decker survived this ordeal. He may well have information that could touch on the survivability of these types of accidents in the future and what could be done to prepare passengers for an ocean ditching."
The pilots were taking offshore oil workers to the Hibernia and White Rose sites when they reported a loss of oil pressure in the chopper's main gearbox and headed back toward land. Eleven minutes later, the helicopter plunged into the sea about 55 kilometres east of St. John's.
Two weeks after Flight 491 went down, the TSB said two of three titanium studs that secure the oil filter bowl assembly to the helicopter's main gearbox broke in flight, causing the loss of oil pressure.
Decker, then 27, survived 75 minutes in the frigid North Atlantic after a harrowing escape from the fast-sinking chopper. He was interviewed by the safety board, Fiorante said.
"But he certainly isn't going to get a chance to see what their take is and how they view it in terms of their analysis of the accident in a draft, confidential report."
St. John's lawyer Steve Marshall, who is also representing the crash victims, said an exclusive review process undermines the perception of fairness.
"They should all be in the same category," Marshall said.
Cottreau said the process is independent and thorough.
"The Transportation Safety Board of Canada performs complete, fair and unbiased investigations to get at what happened, why it happened and how we might be able to prevent it from happening again."
30 days for comments

Reviewers had 30 days to make comments on the draft report. The board responds to the comments in writing. Reviewers can request extensions, however, and Cottreau would not speculate on when the final report will be made public.
Fiorante isn't convinced the document will be as complete as it should be.
"We're going to review it very carefully on behalf of the families, and we are going to look to make sure that it is thorough," he said. "But our past experience has been that we believe firmly that the passengers and their families have information that's important to an investigation of the cause of the crash.
"And we've had a number of cases where we felt the final report didn't fully canvass all the causes or all the important information."

[HeliComparator]

I agree with TSB. If all passengers in an accident had editorial powers (or even commenting power) in the report it would be a nightmare and there would be all sorts of rubbish flying around. Its an expert report on a very technical matter and sorry but passengers don't usually have the expertise to keep their thoughts relevant or technically accurate.

The passengers views are taken into account in a report - following extensive interviewing of the survivor(s) by the investigators, but they have to be screened by the expert interviewer to keep the content within the bound of sanity. TSB's definition of the two groups is totally reasonable (and I suspect an ICAO standard).

What can relatives of deceased passengers possibly bring to a report, other than something they heard on "Air Crash Investigations" on the TV?

HC

[SASless]

HC,

Perhaps Mr. Decker, the sole survivor, could have some first hand observations that might be credible. As he is alive and able to read.....perhaps his review of what the expert interviewer said he said...and what the interveiwer thought important and by omission what was not important might prove beneficial.

He for one is entitled to know what happened to him.

[maxwelg2]

I totally agree SASless, surely a survivor's account and review will provide another valuable insight into this tragic event, especially from a safety procedural context in relation to the difference in brace position adopted versus the stated safety briefing version.

Safe flying

Max

[HeliComparator]

You are both assuming that Mr Decker's account will not be covered in the report, including any feedback from him on theories that might have arisen during the investigation. I am totally confident that you will be proven entirely wrong! Having been involved in such investigations myself (fortunately non-fatal) I can tell you that the state investigators are only too keen to get as much information and feedback from as many sources as possible, including survivors. So in effect, Mr Decker will already have had the opportunity to indicate his agreement or otherwise with the report. But ultimately it must be up to the reporters to form their final opinion on what goes into the report.

So if you think he should be able to edit the report as he sees fit, with his very limited knowledge of aviation, you are mistaken.

Many of our passengers think that if the engines stop, the rotors start going round the other way. That is the sort of level of passenger knowledge the TSB might be up against.

As for the relatives, what could they possibly bring to the report except hearsay

HC

[maxwelg2]

Many of our passengers think that if the engines stop, the rotors start going round the other way. That is the sort of level of passenger knowledge the TSB might be up against.

HC, the TSB report will be factual, but as it will be made public IMO it wouldn't harm to have a "layman's" view and feedback included in the draft. Surely an eye witness PAX has an important input in such a review. Don't forget that it will be up to Robert to decide if he would wish to participate in such a review anyway, he's already shown great courage in being a key part of the inquiry to date. I'm assuming that Robert has not seen the draft report, so how could he possibly provide comment?

Oh, and I think you'll find that PAX are much more technically aware of helo operations these days, that tends to happen when you're made aware of the hazards and risks involved through real-life experiences.

Safe flying

Max

[HeliComparator]

Max, I still disagree. Robert will have had an opportunity to review the parts of the report to which he contributed. As explained by the TSB, the purpose of the external review is to allow those 2 catogories mentioned to review: experts to check for technical error, and those who might come out of the report badly to have the opportunity to defend themselves.

Accident investigation and reporting is done in accordance with ICAO standards (annex 13 I seem to recall), I am sure this private review process is part of that standard. You cannot deviate from the standard on a report-by-report basis just because it hits the newspapers or just because there was only one survivor. If you allowed all passengers to have a review, how would that work out if an A380 crunched in a bit hard - all the pax would want to have their say, it would mostly be about the food and cabin service!

Not surprisingly, this matter is very close to your heart, but sorry the cold reality is that its just another report to the TSB and it must and will be done in the standard way, whether you like it or not.

HC

[maxwelg2]

Thanks for the clarification HC, I wasn't aware that Robert will have had the opportunity to review his input to date.

I totally agree that standards have to be followed otherwise there is chaos.

With a subject so close to the heart 3rd party expertise is key in obtaining the optimum way forward for all.

I'm sure we all, pilots and PAX alike, will await the final public issue of the TSB report with bated breath. The hard fact is that as the TSB report is going to be used as a pivotal piece of evidence in the ongoing safety inquiry there is tremendous focus on its pending issue right now. We are all waiting for the conclusive answer on why 491 was not put down immediately, and whose call it was to continue flying and on what basis.

Safe flying

Max

[SASless]

HC,

You erred in some of your assumptions and assertions.

I said Mr. Decker should be allowed to review that portion of the report to which he contributed as the sole survivor. I noted in my post, which you must have missed, his review should be re what the professional interviewer said he said...and what the professional interviewer thought important and contained in the report or what was not thought important by its omission in the report. I would submit Mr. Decker is fully qualified to make statements about his escape, what went well, what did not, what gear worked, what gear did not, specify what training was effective, what was not....how things could be improved and the like! After all....he is the one guy that got out of the machine and made it to the surface alive and was able to continue living until rescued.



As to parties being harshly treated to have a heads up to defend themselves....pray tell why that is a reason they should be given preferential treatment? They can bloody well defend themselves after the investigative report is published. Are you saying they should be allowed to offer up issues and statements they want to see edited before the report is published?


Many of our passengers think that if the engines stop, the rotors start going round the other way.

Just what kind of safety briefings do you guys do these days HC?

Might be a bit of confusion if some of them are old enough to have flown on the 61's....and now have to do the changeover to EC products which turn the wrong way to as we all well know!

[FH1100 Pilot]

TSB spokesman John Cottreau said the identities of those who received a draft copy are confidential. But he said they fell into two categories the board looks at "for according draft reviewer status."
"The first category is those whose performance or behaviour or products might be commented on in the report and who might see themselves as being adversely affected by the report. The second category is those who can contribute to the completeness and accuracy of the scientific report.

Allowing the families of the victims to see the draft copy of the report would be tantamount to making it public. Sorry, can't happen. Just let TSB do its job without everyone and their brother sticking their fingers in. People are going to get their feelings hurt and it's, like, oh well.

[212man]

This is the Annex 13 guidance:

6.3.1 Recommendation.—
The State conducting the investigation should send, through the State of the Operator, a copy of the draft Final Report to the operator to enable the operator to submit comments on the draft Final Report.

6.3.2 Recommendation.—
The State conducting the investigation should send, through the State of Design and the State of Manufacture, a copy of the draft Final Report to the organizations responsible for the type design and the final assembly of the aircraft to enable them to submit comments on the draft Final Report

[fly911]

That's kind of what lawyers do. They want to be in on everything. They want to have their biased opinion in the report so the eventual jury sees it as the report in being presented to them. When a lawyer says "My client has a right to be included", he means "I want to be included, so I have a better chance of winning my case". Let the experts do what they do best, without outside interference.

[SASless]

FH and HC.....Why run the thing by the two categories of interests as is proposed by the legislation? Why not allow the Investigative Agency do its job....gather the facts....examine the evidence....apply such scientific and investigative processes as necessary....then issue the report of their (operative word.....their) findings.

The "interested" parties can provide their rebuttal or critiques after the report is issued can they not?

This sounds to me like a case of Justice where the killer gets to sit in the Jury Room.

[Lonewolf_50]

Is the TSB implying that the crew may have been able to escape if they had been better protected?
Interesting question.

In 1989, Tom House died in a Seahawk mishap off of Point Loma California (RIP, Tom). Tail Rotor loss of thrust led to an immediate ditch scenario. Henry Harris, Pilot Flying and the AW (Darnit, name not on tip of tongue) egressed successfully. Navy crew, all three were wearing helmets, etc, and usual flight/flotation gear.

Tom, PNF, was knocked out, as best as they could reconstruct afterwards, at water impact. Wearing helmet, when the seat stroked (they didn't hit the water gently, Henry's back was a mess for some time after the crash) his head snapped down and forehead met cyclic stick. Bad luck of geometry. Hard to egress when you are not conscious. :{

Even with a helmet, there is no guarantee that with a hard landing in a ditch/crash one will avoid injury ... but it's the way to bet.

Not sure how that would have helped in this mishap.

[SASless]

Consider this.....the Cougar aircraft hit the water at a fairly high forward speed and the dynamic components "sheared off" from the top of the fuselage (as designed) leaving the fuselage fairly intact and without deformation. I would assume the pilots were not wearing helmets. With an impact that severe....they would have been propelled forward with a very high level of force. The autopsy results would describe the extent of the facial and head injuries they suffered. The extent of those injuries would determine their probability of survival.

I will submit they were incapcitated due to the crash forces and injuries....and probably would not have been much better off had they been wearing helmets. That is an issue that should be addressed in the report.

Salt water gets very hard when hit at high rates of speed and does not give much when hit.

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/as-the-croft-flies/Wreckage%20layout%20and%20reconstruction.jpg

[212man]

SAS, I think we can all agree that's a pretty horrific image, and I still remember 'recoiling' when I first saw the set. However, I think we should wait for the report before drawing too many conclusions. The impression I get - from Decker's account amongst other things - is that much of that fuselage disruption may have been caused post impact. Hitting the sea bed and the subsequent salvage probably caused a lot of damage.

[Treg]

The fact that one person did survive a relatively high speed impact, escaped afterward and continued to stay alive in atrocious sea conditions until rescued; it will be interesting to see if any comments are made in the final report about the possibility of others surviving had a ditching been attempted earlier ?

[212man]

it will be interesting to see if any comments are made in the final report about the possibility of others surviving had a ditching been attempted earlier

No idea what you mean? Of course more would have survived - this was not a ditching in the conventional sense. It was a desprately sad attempt by the crew to deal with an unexpected tail rotor drive failure at low altitude - hence the high speed and impact forces. By all accounts they did as well as could possibly be expected of them in dealing with the final failure. 5 minutes earlier it would have been a controlled landing.

[fly911]

I can't help but wondering how I might have handled the pending emergency with the hindsight that the captain did not have at the time, of course. Not being familiar with 2 meter seas or what it would be like to ditch there, I wonder if it would be feasible to hover as low as possible to allow the passengers time to prepare? Would it be feasible to touch down on the water to unload the MR gearbox with RPM at flight idle to stabilize the ship and keep the heat on until rescue arrives? I'm sure that we've all thought about it. If the same thing happened to you tomorrow, what would you do? What could you do?

[SASless]

As I see it....the Sixty-Four Dollar Question will always be...."From the time the crew observed the MGB Oil Pressure below 5PSI....why did they not make a timely descent and ditching?"

That is not going to be an easy question to answer as they are not here to tell us. The CVR will have most of the answer. I suspect the conversations between Dispatch/Ops and the crew will also bear directly upon that decision.

Hind sight being perfect....they should have ditched the aircraft much sooner than they did. We all know that because of what happened. They did not have the benefit of that knowledge in advance....and did what they thought best at the time.

Why they did what they did is the heart of this investigation. Let's hope the truth comes out...whatever it is.

[[email protected]]

Fly 911 - the Sea King, which is designed to land on the water, is very twitchy especially in roll when afloat - even on a flat calm Canadian lake. The S-92 which isn't designed to land on water would probably be very difficult to keep upright, especially in a 2 metre swell, even with all the flot bags deployed.

Had they made a controlled ditching in those conditions they would probably still have inverted.

[js0987]

Since the question of helmets - or lack of them - has been raised in this investigation, perhaps there is another element that needs to be addressed. Shoulder harnesses and life jackets. There is a tendency for the shoulder straps to slide off to the side of the life jackets. With reports that both pilots struck their heads on the instrument panel, it is a distinct possibility that the shoulder harnesses were not effective.

I find the 92's shoulder harnesses occasionally need adjusting and the C+'s harnesses almost useless unless you cross the straps when you buckle in.

[Horror box]

Fly 911 - the Sea King, which is designed to land on the water, is very twitchy especially in roll when afloat - even on a flat calm Canadian lake. The S-92 which isn't designed to land on water would probably be very difficult to keep upright, especially in a 2 metre swell, even with all the flot bags deployed.

Had they made a controlled ditching in those conditions they would probably still have inverted.


I don't completely agree with you here Crab. I agree that the Sea King was (and still is) rather unstable once on the water, and there is quite a bit of first hand experience around to support this. The Puma has also had a fair degree of time on the water, and has shown that it does not always tip immediately. There have been numerous ditching over the years and quite a few have stayed afloat and upright for quite some time - at least several hours before rolling over, and this has not always been in calm seas. The HS Puma ditching in 1996 is the first that springs to mind. A successful ditch, where all got out safely and the aircraft remained afloat and upright, and it was not calm seas.
The lack of a controlled ditching in a 92 makes this all conjecture, but looking purely at the dimensions of the S92 versus the Puma, we know that the 92 has a relatively lower CG, with a considerably wider base, and a longer base along the middle of the cabin. The S92 is 4.7m high from bottom to top of rotor head, and the Puma 4.6m. The fuselage width of the S92 is 3.18m versus the Puma's 2m. If you inclue the tail stab on the 92 it comes out to 5.26m. I acknowledge that is only theory, and that whilst the S92 was not of course designed to "land" on water, it was certainly designed to float. Certainly the Sea State six floats that are installed in many (if not most) machines now, will add a good degree more stability in the roll axis over the SS5 floats. The SS6 floats provide additional floats in the sponsons, to supplement the floats in the nose and under the tail, and should give a good bit of extra time if the landing is controlled. Of course we must train to and be prepared for the worst case, and there can be other factors. The floats may not deploy properly, or the landing may be unstable with lateral movement adding to the vector and a heavy swell will almost always cause the aircraft to roll. That all being said my expectation would be that the S92 would be considerably more stable that the Puma or Sea King (or S61). The difference between the S92 and Puma is felt the very first time you ground taxy, with the 92 very noticeably more stable, with far less tendancy for body-roll.

[squib66]

I wonder how well a 92 will float after the sponsons break off (as designed to seperate the fuel tanks from the fuselage).

SINTEFs 2000 helicopter safety report did suggest that the anticipated 92 would be inferior to the 332.

It is reported that commissioner Robert Wells of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry will have his report delivered by Oct. 25.

[Hedge36]

Lonewolfe_50: "In 1989, Tom House died in a Seahawk mishap off of Point Loma California (RIP, Tom). Tail Rotor loss of thrust led to an immediate ditch scenario. Henry Harris, Pilot Flying and the AW (Darnit, name not on tip of tongue) egressed successfully. Navy crew, all three were wearing helmets, etc, and usual flight/flotation gear."

Dammit if I can't recall the AW's name on that one as well. I met the guy on a det in '91, I think it was. Man, how time flies.

[zalt]

The Phase 1 report of the Wells inquiry is to be delivered next week.

The court case is developing as Sikorsky try to move the case away from the location of the accident to home territory and object to HSI being dropped as a defendant(!).

Chopper lawsuit gets technical - Business - The Telegram (http://www.thetelegram.com/Business/2010-10-19/article-1859780/Chopper-lawsuit-gets-technical/1)

Lawyers for Cougar Helicopters and Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. were in court Monday to debate a procedural issue in Cougar’s $27-million lawsuit against the U.S. helicopter manufacturer.

At issue is whether or not Cougar can drop a Sikorsky subsidiary, Helicopter Services Inc., from the lawsuit it launched in June.

That matter is also part of a larger argument about which court has jurisdiction to hear the civil action in the first place —Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court or a court in Connecticut.

A hearing is set for Nov. 22-23 in St. John’s to decide jurisdiction.

The lawsuit stems from the March 12, 2009, helicopter crash off Newfoundland that killed 17 of 18 of people on board. The S-92 helicopter was manufactured by Sikorsky.

Last month, Cougar served notice it was discontinuing its civil action against Helicopter Services Inc. (HSI), which provides parts and support services to customers of Sikorsky aircraft, including the S-92 helicopter.

Cougar lawyer Kevin Stamp told the court the St. John’s helicopter transportation company no longer intends to proceed against HSI.

Under the rules, he argued Cougar’s action against HSI can be discontinued any time prior to the November hearing that will determine jurisdiction.

Cougar argues the civil action should be heard in Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court.

Sikorsky lawyer Ronald Noseworthy said Cougar should have asked for permission from the court to withdraw its civil action against HSI — rather than simply issue a notice.

He said discontinuing the civil action is a matter for a judge to decide.

Noseworthy also argued his client maintains that a Connecticut court is the only venue with jurisdiction over a contract between HSI and Cougar.

Toward the end of Monday morning’s proceedings, Justice David Orsborn asked, “Are we dancing on the head of a pin?”

He did not render a decision Monday — saying he would need some time to do so.

Last year, the pilots of Cougar Flight 491 reported a loss of oil pressure in the helicopter’s main gearbox as they were transporting offshore workers to the White Rose and Hibernia oilfields.

Minutes after heading back toward shore, the helicopter plunged into the Atlantic Ocean 55 kilometres east of St. John’s.

Cougar and eight insurance companies launched the lawsuit against Sikorsky and HSI in June.

Cougar claims Sikorsky misrepresented how long its S-92 helicopter could continue flying after losing oil from the main gearbox.
Statements of claim contain allegations that have not been proven in court.

Sikorsky has yet to file a statement of defence.

[Shell Management]

The Flight Manual action was clear. That will be the Sikorsky defence.

[If all else fails]

That's as may be, but will they also be asking “Are we dancing on the head of a pin?”

[zalt]

In a bizzare court appreance Sikorsky's attempt to stop Cougar from dropping there claim against HSI was denied, reinforcing the expectation that their other attempt to get the case of a Canadian operators, Canadian aircraft accident, with Canadian fatalities, off Canada held in the US will fail shortly.

Analysis:
HSI were only a defendant because their role was to supply spare parts to S-92 operators and so it had been claimed that their inability to deliver the steel studs prior to the accident was blameworthy. As it is now clear they did deliver them in a timely manner after they were produces the claim is now more intensly focusing on Sikorsky itself.

Obviously it up to the cout to determine what liability (if any) lies where.

[zalt]

The Wells Inquiry first report is almost out. The next report will examine the conclusions of the TSB's report, due in 'weeks'.

From the Canadian Press

Recommendations from a probe into helicopter safety off Newfoundland are expected this week but they won't be made public right away.

Inquiry commissioner Robert Wells is expected to report by Friday to the federal-provincial board that regulates oil activity offshore.

But it's up to the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board to make those findings public.

The board has 30 days after receiving the report to release it, spokesman Sean Kelly said in an e-mail Monday.

He said board members will take one week to review the recommendations before making them public.

The board established the inquiry after Cougar Flight 491 crashed into the sea off Newfoundland last year, killing 17 of 18 people onboard.

Mr. Wells, a retired justice of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, was to assess whether helicopter travel to offshore oil sites more than 300 kilometres east of St. John's is as safe as possible.

He heard a wide range of evidence after the inquiry began a year ago. It included riveting testimony from Robert Decker, the sole survivor of the Cougar disaster, and heart-wrenching submissions by grieving loved ones of the other victims.

Lawyer Jamie Martin, who represented those families, told the inquiry last month during final presentations that the crash raises serious questions about the offshore oil regulator's independence.

Critics say the board is in a conflict of interest because it is mandated to develop oil resources to the maximum extent while also protecting workers and the environment.

Norway, Australia and the United Kingdom have created separate offshore-safety agencies.

Mr. Martin cited testimony from the families of workers who were killed in the crash. Concerns about helicopter malfunctions, training, ill-fitting immersion suits and a lack of safety information were long-standing and often went unanswered, the inquiry heard.

They underscored “the need for a regulatory board that is responsive, and one that is accountable for its decisions,” said Mr. Martin.

“Mr. Commissioner, the families have every confidence that you will conduct a thorough analysis and consider the need for reforms, and in particular, whether there needs to be a regulator independent of government and industry.”

Mr. Martin's remarks ran counter to the stance taken by the umbrella group for oil companies.

Lewis Manning, the lawyer for the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, told the inquiry there's no need for a regulatory shakeup.

“Everything we've heard from this inquiry indicates that improvements to helicopter passenger safety can be accommodated within the existing regulatory structures,” he said last month.

The report expected by Friday will focus on the first phase of the inquiry.

The second phase will include Mr. Wells's examination of a Transportation Safety Board report on the cause of the crash. The TSB report is expected in the coming weeks.
The TSB has already cited a loss of oil pressure after two titanium studs securing the oil-filter assembly to the Sikorsky S-92's main gearbox snapped in flight. Oil flowing through the main gearbox helps power the chopper's rotor drive.

The pilots of Cougar Flight 491 were taking workers to the White Rose and Hibernia oil fields. They reported a loss of oil pressure about 11 minutes before plunging into the ocean 55 kilometres east of St. John's.

[zalt]

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board will release the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry Phase I Report on the day it is received from the Commissioner.

C-NLOPB || C-NLOPB to release Inquiry Report upon Receipt (http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/news/nr20101101.shtml)

But the terms of reference for Phase 2 have been reduced as noted here:
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163206-sikorsky-s-92-design-operations-94.html#post6028293

[squib66]

The same could be said of some OEM brochures.

Well no oil equals no MGB and no flying pretty quick! The press have been pretty effective at uncovering some shocking aspects to this accident and the S-92 certification IMHO.

[js0987]

I note with interest the claim by Cougar that SAC "misrepresented" how long the 92 would fly without MGB oil. Undoubtedly that was marketed while the AC was undergoing testing and development. Does marketing get out ahead of product development? All the time. Look at the Chevy Volt. Touted as an electric car with a small engine to recharge the batteries, it turns out it is not much more than another hybrid car.

Cougar might want to be careful about how it handles its claim. If they are claiming they have been misled, that infers they still believed the original claim. If management still believed the claim did they pass it on to the crews in training? Did the "land immediately" part of the RFM somehow not receive the emphasis it deserved? If the crews went through FSI for their training, then that was never an issue. I received my type rating at FSI two months before the accident and, at no time, was their ever any discussion of the MGB having a 30 minute run dry cabability. It was treated just like a fire that doesn't go out or a TGB indication with kicking in the pedals - get it on the ground.

[Shawn Coyle]

js0987
My understanding is that the kicking in the pedals in the sim was the indication that you were already too late - the transmission had failed. Did they tell you that?

[sox6]

I have heard from pilots who trained at FSI that FSI included vibration when simulating a MGB pressure loss, which does not seem to be the case the Cougar pilots faced. Could that have been negative learning?

I wonder if the oil cooler bypass valve always 'worked' in the simulator?

JS perhaps Sikorsky would look less callous if they hadn't changed their plan from certifying '30 minutes run dry' to '30 minutes after a leak is detected in the oil cooler and sealed off'.

Remember when Nick Lappos made a great play after certification that they had repeated the 30 minutes test several times (6 times?) back to back? If the crew were thinking of that, perhaps they would choose to press on when they looked over their shoulder at the pax, looked at the sea and calculated the coast was less than 30 minutes away?

How long would it take for an S-92 at its service ceiling (FL20?) be able to decend then line up for a gentle controlled ditching from the time the pressure dropped below 5 psi? And how many minutes away from this would you fly?
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/photos/aviation/a09a0016/images/photo_8.jpg

[JohnDixson]

Sox 6, could you be mixing up two very different tests?

We never passed any, much less six, 30 minute loss of oil tests. That failure led to the bypass switch design.

Following the bypass switch incorporation, multiple tests were accomplished successfully to more than 30 minutes ( remember, in bypass, the oil cooler is out of the flow loop and thus oil temperature is of interest ). The results of those tests are reflected in the RFM procedures.

I've known Nick a long long time and he has never put out anything untrue.

Thanks,
John Dixson

[HeliComparator]

How long would it take for an S-92 at its service ceiling (FL20?) be able to decend then line up for a gentle controlled ditching from the time the pressure dropped below 5 psi?

The S92 is pants but I think even it can manage more than 2000' - or maybe you meant FL200? ;) But don't forget that if you get on with it and descend in near-autorotation, there is very little power going through the transmission and tail rotor drive, thus much less heating effect and probably considerable "dry running time" - not that I want to put that to the test:eek: Anyway, isn't max altitude without oxygen FL100 in EASA-land? I doubt there are many S92s flying around above FL100.

I've known Nick a long long time and he has never put out anything untrue Perhaps true, but plenty that confused or misled.

HC

[js0987]

Haven't had the pleasure of having FSI including MGB pedal kicking as an indication that there's nothing else left to do but die.

I recall the pedal bumps as associated with an impending IGB or TGB failure.

So far the bypass has always worked in the sim - next time I'll have the instructor fail that too.

As far as Sikorsky being "callous" - where did that come from? Corporations do and will defend themselves. The fact that they settled quickly with the families speaks otherwise.

As far as Nick Lappos having a spirited debate about the virtues of the 92 vs the 225, what pilot hasn't done the exact same thing about his favorite aircraft. Speaking of which, what's the latest on the 332 transmission that disintegrated? Ironically, the main argument touting the virtues of a 30 minute run dry proved to be useless in that accident.

I hope all the discussions about the virtues of the 92 and 225 on this board did not play a role in the Cougar pilots decision.

As far as flying at 20,000 feet over the ocean, 30 minute run dry would be great. Never saw much point in going above 6000.

[HeliComparator]

the main argument touting the virtues of a 30 minute run dry proved to be useless in that accident ???? I think the main argument touting the virtues of a 30min dry run time was that it allowed continued flight for a while after losing all the oil. It was not a universal panacea for all transmisison failure modes. But the main main argument was that one should not strongly promote a product by making an important safety claim that one knows to be false. And the main question is, would the crew have followed the same path if SAC and its representatives had never mentioned 30min dry running time?

HC

[js0987]

The only place that really got into the discussion of the 30 minute run dry capability was this message board. A lesson learned - be careful what you read on the internet.

[squib66]

js0287

This site was where the S-92's MGB weakness was first aired and that was before the accident.

You might regard the contributions here as a sound prediction of the S-92's first fatal accident. The misleading claims about the tests that were done with the cooler bypass were the contributions that should have been ignored. - just like a number of marketing presentations that hyped the "latest standards" as a competative advantage.

I think Sox6's ceiling comment really highlights that if Sikorsky wasnt to defend themselves with the excuse that the pilots should have ditched as soon as they got the low oil warning, it shold be possible to do that in the certified flight envelope.

HC

Even if Sikorsky had not been so agressive in their market, would you agree that as FAR29 calls for a 30 minutes loss of lube system test, that the industry would have expected that to either have been done with the worst credible failure or at least an Equivalent Safety Finding raised? Instead the compromise made was no revealed by Sikorsky or FAA.

Sikorsky certainly didn't use the Broome event as a trigger to highlight their weakness to pilots. In fact they were busy issuing advisories on reasons not to land immediately after MGB failure indications and even reiterated those after the Cougar accident prompring this from EASA:
EASA Airworthiness Directives Publishing Tool (http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2009-05)

The whole business of 'Extremely Remote' has been clarified in AC29 to remove the loophole Sikorsky used. While that AC29 came out after S-92 circulation it was drafted, with industry, before the certification....

JohnD

How much better than lying do you think promoting misleading information on a safety issue is while marketing an aircraft?

[js0987]

Suibb66

I've been around a pretty long time and have never attended a manufacturers marketing presentation. Frankly I can't think of any of my fellow peter pilots that have. So, forgive me if I still can't quite understand this obsession with how SAC sold the aircraft. Closest thing to a marketing presentation for me would be the ads in magazines.

You are correct about this board airing this particular issue. That is precisely why the RFM procedure made sense.

[JohnDixson]

Squibb66:

You seem to be saying that Nick Lappos put out misleading marketing information re the S-92 MGB after we had failed the no oil test in the lab and did the bypass switch design. Can you provide a dated proof of that?

Thanks,
John Dixson

[HeliComparator]

js - Sikorsky brought the prototype S92 to a fancy hotel just out of Aberdeen, everyone invited with lots of free food and drink if you listened to the presentation by one Nick Lappos. I recall it was a well attended do with a very believable presentation from NL, and it certainly mentioned 30 mins dry running time.

How about this press release? http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/229507-sikorsky-s-92-archive-copy-4.html#post2636118

You can argue that it says "loss of oil", not "total loss of oil" but to say that it can fly for 30 mins following " a loss of a little bit of oil" is a pointless claim. I seems to me there was clearly an intent to mislead.

JD - surely the tests you mention must have been done before certification was awarded by FAA?

[sox6]

HC's link to post 62 on page 4 of this thread (dated 19 Dec 2002, the date the S-92 was certified) is very powerful in demonstrating misleading marketing claims:


In addition to its civil helicopter capabilities, the rotor system and dynamic components are designed to meet the UH-60 BLACK HAWK ballistic tolerance requirements and all gearboxes are capable of running 30 minutes after loss of oil.


This came out immediately after the FAA certification but prior to the JAA one. After the JAA certification this false claim does not seem to have been repeated.

HC that sales visit was the summer of 2003 IIRC, a year before the JAA certification.

[he1iaviator]

A question and answer from the 225 thread #12 31st July 2004:

Please can you confirm whether or not the S92 also has a true 30 minute run dry gearbox as I'm unclear on this? Is immediate pilot action required in the event of a loss of main gearbox pressure? Does the check-list say "Land Immediately"?

NickLappos

Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: USA
Age: 62
Posts: 2,843



..... the S-92's oil protection system protected the transmission to the FAR/JAR with such aplomb that we shut the test down at 3 hours, not 30 minutes, with the system still running along (but admittedly pretty close to its end). That is 2 1/2 hours longer than required. The pilot must activate the system, but has several seconds to do so after clear indications, and the checklist does not say "land immediately."

[js0987]

Unfortunately the Cougar 92 was going to have to ditch - 30 minute capability or not. I can't imagine a sales pitch seven years prior or a discussion on an internet message board overriding the RFM. I certainly hope that Cougar doesn't push the point because that implies just that.

[HeliComparator]

js - I guess we won't know if it was a factor until all the details come out. Faced with a life-threatening situation, there can be a tendancy to clutch at straws and listen to what you want to hear. Perhaps there was something in the chat between the crew and the base along the lines of:

"it says land immediately, but looking at the sea state, if we do it may not be survivable. I am sure that Sikorsky demonstrated 30 mins dry running time, the land immediately is just the Flight Manual being cautious. Lets carry on for a while whilst SAR get going etc"

Hopefully that was not what happened, but I don't think we can rule it out yet.

HC

[squib66]

Thanks for that folks.

he1iaviator's post confirms the recollection I had that there were claims of 6 x 30 minute cycles (though of course with most of the oil still in the casing and the oil cooler bypassed - a much better scenario than Cougar had).

Helicomparator's post shows that Sikorsky did make those claims after the FAA certification.

On the EC225 thread the S-92 MGB certification was queried by Vertalop in July 2004. Note the very evasive answers:
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/191379-ec225.html

On 1 August 2004 this comment was posted, again asking for clarity:

Nick, is it not true that the only way the 92 got through the certification process regarding the 30 mins dry running was by using a manually activated valve that cuts off oil connections to outside the gearbox (cooler etc). The flight manual requires activation within 5 seconds, which is rushed in a modern multi-crew environment. Thus the oil remaining in the gearbox is hopefully not lost (assuming the leak isn't from the box itself). So the 92 cannot cope with total loss of gearbox lubricant? Is my take on that correct? Some have said that that appears to be a bit of a cheat on the certification requirements.

It does seem a bit hypocritical to crow about the fact that the 92 meets all the requirements of FAR29 (1999 version, wasn't it?) and that the 225 doesn't (which is true for a few small areas of the aircraft that have grandfather rights) when there is this question mark over how you got through certification (touch of patriotism by the FAA perhaps?).


I also draw readers attention to another discussion on MGB certification on page 20 of the Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations thread: http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163206-sikorsky-s-92-design-operations-20.html#post1834904
On 9th April 2005 the following comments on the S-92 FM were made after it had again been claimed that an aircraft that lost oil pressure in Norway and made an emergency landing could have flown for 100s of hours:


Make of it what you will but its interesting to note that if the pressure continues to fall after you have activated the magic switch, its a "Land immediately" item. (this is because there is no true dry running time in an S92). As I understand it the Magic Switch (aka MGB Oil Bypass Switch) cuts off the external pipework to the oil cooler etc to contain leaks. Of course its no good having lots of oil left in the sump if both pumps are duff. I am pretty sure that this was the case in the Norsk incident (there were certainly no leaks, so pressure falling to 5 psi is surely double pump failure - double pump partial failure to be exact as there was some residual pressure.)

According to his last post, Nick's idea of Land Immediately is that its OK to fly for 100s of hours.

start quote:

MAIN GEAR BOX OIL SYSTEM FAILURE

Symptom:

MGB OIL PRES or MGB OIL HOT or MGB CHIP or ACC 1 CHIP or ACC 2 CHIP

CAUTION
The main AC generators are cooled by main gearbox oil. Loss of cooling oil may result in mechanical failure of the generators and loss of main electrical power.

Confirming:

Main gearbox oil pressure is less than 35 psi, or
Main gearbox oil temperature is greater than 130 degrees.

Action:

1. Descend to minimum safe altitude.
2. APU - ON
3. APU GEN - ON
4. Land as soon as possible.

If the MGB OIL PRESS warning indicator also illuminates:

1. MGB OIL BYPASS switch - BYPASS

WARNING
BYPASS must be selected within 5 seconds after the warning indicator has illuminated to ensure an adequate quantity of oil remains in the gearbox. DO NOT activate BYPASS if the warning indicator is not illuminated.

2. Land as soon as possible.

If MGB oil pressure continues to decrease or there are loud/unusual noises, unusual vibrations or progressively increasing power required to maintain flight:

3. Land immediately.

end quote

Its a bit difficult to understand exactly what is going on without the diagram that I asked for - never mind I'll try to see if I can get it another way.

In summary, I maintain that they would (should) have ditched had they not been so close to an installation.



I think this might be the only public domain reference to the FM instructions Cougar 491 pilots had in front of them 4 years later.

I can't help thinking that openess can be far less damaging to the reputation of companies and individuals than evasion.

[squib66]

IIRC correctly Cougar 491 was about 30 minutes from the nearest land...
Perhaps the Cougar crew were also mislead by the 3 other low oil pressure but no opil loss events in Norway and Brunei in thinking they would probably make it to shore OK.

But perhaps they did not read the post by helikiwi on the S-92 thread on 4 July 2008 about the one prior total oil loss.http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163206-sikorsky-s-92-design-operations-56.html#post4222516

The story as relayed to me by those involved....
Day before yesterday an S92 was onroute to Broome on a return flight from an offshore rig when a main Txmsm low oil pressure was noted, shortly afterwards remaining oil pressure ceased completely and a fairly rapid decent was carried out. From time of intial low px indication at 6000ft to touchdown was 8 minutes. The oil filter housing which apparently has 3 studs fastening it to the txmsn was hanging on by one which hadn't broken and most of the oil had been pumped out.
During the incident no overtemp indication occurred and a safe landing was carried out next to a homestead in the middle of nowhere 28 miles north of Broome.
Bristow came to the rescue with a trusty old Puma within 60 mins and the guys were taken on to Broome.
At this stage a Sikorsky rep will be onsite tomorrow with a boroscope to assess the viability of flying it the 28 miles back to Broome where the txmsn will most likely be pulled.


Also on the S-92 thread just a few days before the Cougar accident Horror box posted this:
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163206-sikorsky-s-92-design-operations-60.html#post4743808

Loss of MGB PRESSURE is your subject here, and there are a number of indications and causes, so maybe not quite as simple as loss of XMSN oil, but once the MGB pressure drops below 35psi the red warning light appears and you get an audio warning. One is to then manually operate the MGB OIL BYPASS switch within 5 secs. This then bypasses the oil from the cooling system, which consists of teflon hoses and a radiator, routing it directly back into the MGB. This system is the "known" weakness and is stated as "vulnerable to leaks" in the OM! The procedure is therefore to "hope" this is where the leak was, bypass it and descend to MSA and hope you get no further indications. Get some further indications and you can assume maybe guess 1 was incorrect so you get another go, but dont take too long about it. These would include a further drop in MGBP, a HYDS failure - as there is a hydraulic module drive gear taken off the input drive shaft - therefore indicating impending drive shaft fail, maybe an AC failure, or any loud and unusual noises or a combo of ACC and/or INPUT CHIPS. If guess one was wrong, then we can give guess 2 a go and maybe see if there is anything indicating with the ACC modules or INPUT modules. An INPUT CHIP at this stage will certainly result in bringing an engine back, but only if it is suspected that the failure is here. By this time I suspect most of us are looking to get down and hopefully onto the solid ground PDQ but a ditching is also on the cards if nothing solid is available. If all this is getting a bit confusing we can also consider the possibility that there is a problem in one of the dual vane pumps. These use one element for pressu's postere feed and one for scavenge feed. It has been suggested that if one element fails, in particular the scavenge, then the oil can be sucked out by the pressure feed! Now i am lost. Unfortunately this also cools the AC gens, so things are going from bad to worse once more. Again, looking for somewhere to land.
All in all the situation is not very good, and there is a good deal of room for confusion. There are one or two on this forum who have some much better first hand experience of this, so can maybe explain it better. Bold text added by me.

BTW I notice CEFOSKEY's postive posts on the MGB have gone.

[industry insider]

Squib

I am not quite sure why you are re quoting older posts here but the use of a bypass valve manually (S-92) or automatically (AS332 or EC225) to stop oil going to the cooler is logical as the cooler is a likely place for a leak. EC had automatic oil cooler bypass valves 30 years ago. Why Sikorsky could only manage a manual valve has always been a question in my mind.

Anyway, the leak in both cases was from the filter bowl with terrible consequences.

In the case of the S-92 Sikorsky has now re designed the whole filter bowl assembly (a 2 phase re design but phase 1 is in place now) so I would imagine that the company has gone a very long way to making sure that the oil remains in the MGB casing where it should be.

In my opinion, all transport helicopters operating over hostile environments should be mandated to have a supplementary lubrication system so that the realistically impossible goal of run dry should not be necessary. A few liters of mostly redundant oil in a tank would be a worthwhile thing to have.

[squib66]

In response to false suggestions namely
a) there is a lot of nonsense on PPRuNe. Of course there is but on this matter a number of S-92 critics were spot on before the accident
b) that Sikorsky had not mislead anyone. They did and that is clear.

I agree on most of what you say. The exception are
a) that Sikorsky may have cured one oil loss location but what about the rest?
b) extra oil is only good if it is not pumped out over board at 50l/min or whatever the S-92 pump rate is

[dangermouse]

I.I the statement 'realistically impossible' statement is incorrect, the AW139 and EH101 prove it is possible and that the FAR requirement can be met in full.

A supplementary lubrication system just means you dump that oil overboard as well.

DM:ugh:

[industry insider]

DM

It depends on where the leak is and how large the discharge is. I was thinking more in terms of a loss supplementary system similar to the glycol system on the EC225.

Yes the 101 has run dry but it's not used in the commercial world. So does the UH-60.

That leaves the 139 as the sole current commercial helicopter with certified run dry capability, good on AW for achieving it.

[FH1100 Pilot]

industry insider:Yes the 101 has run dry but it's not used in the commercial world. So does the UH-60.
In light of the fact that the S-92 transmission self-destructed after about 10 minutes of running without oil, and the UH-60 has basically the same transmission design...

The question was asked of me in PMs whether the UH-60 actually has this mythical "run-dry" capability either?

And frankly, I did not know (although I should have). So I put the question out there: Is there an emergency lubrication system or other such device that the UH-60 transmission employs to provide and allow this "30-minute run-dry capability?" If not, how do they do it?

[dangermouse]

The EH101 was civil certified WITH a 30 minute capability in 1994, (EH101-300 and -500 series aircraft) by the CAA, FAA and RAI.

This was amended in 1998 (?) for the -510 variant which the Tokyo police force are still flying as a civil registered aircraft that is fully comliant with the relevant civil regulations.

regardless the same transmission is in use with military 101s with the same 30 minute capability (anybody here got access to a set of Merlin FRCs?)

so it's not just the 139

DM

[sox6]

Aaah
That would explain why in the run up to the Presidential helicopter bid Sikorsky's Project Director wouldn't admit the shortcoming.

[sox6]

And they only flew a couple of minutes longer than our crew in Australia the year before. I bet those guys feel really lucky.

[FH1100 Pilot]

ironchefflay:the MGB on the crashed aircraft did not lose main rotor drive. the main rotor was still turning on impact. you all seem to be avoiding that fact. along with the fact that the engines were shut down and the aircraft appeared to be flaring to ditch. still under control very possibly.

You talking about Cougar? If the engines were off, it is because their tail rotor drive gear in the MGB failed. That is a fact.

[industry insider]

DM

Yes I KNOW the 101 is civil certified, I was involved on the fringes of its civilian NS trials. I also KNOW that it is used on one or two civil registers here and there. I didn't mean to imply that it was military only. However it's not in regular commercial use like the other types here.

FH

The UH-60 was designed to run dry after taking hostile fire. While the S-92 MGB is based on the UH-60 MGB there are bigger differences than was initially intended.

[FH1100 Pilot]

industry insider:The UH-60 was designed to run dry after taking hostile fire. While the S-92 MGB is based on the UH-60 MGB there are bigger differences than was initially intended.

I love a good non-answer! I guess the similarities or differences between the UH-60's trans and the S-92's vary depending on who's doing the talking.

[industry insider]

Not meant to be a non answer, the differences arose because of the heavier MTOW and higher horsepower of the S-92 versus the Hawk. According to Sikorsky, the "architecture" whatever that means is the same but the S-92 box is bigger.

[squib66]

One thing that can not be disputed as it is a simple law of physics is that a lot more power at about the same rpm means a lot more torque and a lot more heat.

[Rotorhead124]

I love a good non-answer! I guess the similarities or differences between the UH-60's trans and the S-92's vary depending on who's doing the talking.

The transmission on the S-92A and the H-60 series are similar like the transmission on a Lincoln Town Car is similar to the transmission on an F-150 pickup truck. They are made by the same company, and they deliver rotary engine power to the wheels (rotors). They don't look remotely the same, they aren't interchangeable and they don't do the same thing in many ways.

[Jack Carson]

In principle the all of the dynamic components on the S-92 were designed with the capability for being back fitted onto Blackhawk models. Operating RPM was increased 5% from the Blackhawk’s 258 rpm to allow for some portion of the increase in required ESHP. Other configuration changes were required to accommodate the relocation of primary servos. Some changes were required as a result of the S-92’s weight growth from its proposed 1993 MGW of 22220 lbs. to it present gross weight of 26500 lbs.

[sox6]

I've been reading the RFM extract originally posted by HC in April 2005
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/365720-helicopter-crash-off-coast-newfoundland-18-aboard-35.html#post6036981

MAIN GEAR BOX OIL SYSTEM FAILURE

Symptom:

MGB OIL PRES or MGB OIL HOT or MGB CHIP or ACC 1 CHIP or ACC 2 CHIP

CAUTION
The main AC generators are cooled by main gearbox oil. Loss of cooling oil may result in mechanical failure of the generators and loss of main electrical power.

Confirming:

Main gearbox oil pressure is less than 35 psi, or
Main gearbox oil temperature is greater than 130 degrees.

Action:

1. Descend to minimum safe altitude.
2. APU - ON
3. APU GEN - ON
4. Land as soon as possible.

If the MGB OIL PRESS warning indicator also illuminates:

1. MGB OIL BYPASS switch - BYPASS

WARNING
BYPASS must be selected within 5 seconds after the warning indicator has illuminated to ensure an adequate quantity of oil remains in the gearbox. DO NOT activate BYPASS if the warning indicator is not illuminated.

2. Land as soon as possible.

If MGB oil pressure continues to decrease or there are loud/unusual noises, unusual vibrations or progressively increasing power required to maintain flight:

3. Land immediately.



It does look a bit more complex then anything similar for the EC & AW products I'm most familiar with. Why the comment about the APU?

It also makes no mention of pressures below 35psi other than continued pressure drops should lead to landing immediately. Was this changed after ther April 2005 near-ditching in Norway?

[inputshaft]

"Why the comment about the APU?"

The answer's there in the CAUTION. The gearbox driven AC generators are cooled by gearbox oil and may fail. Wouldn't it be nice to still have full electrical power supplied by the APU generator? For all the criticism of the S92 it is particularly strong on redundant systems.

[zalt]

Inputshaft

that redundant - TSB reported a power interuption to the FDR, just before the very non redundant tail rotor take off failed.

Sox6

The structure of the checklist buries the actions associated with this failure deep within the checklist.

You are correct there is no warning or clear criteria prior to needing to ditch, especially in light of the late 2008 Sikorsky Safety Advisory that was written to stop ditchings due to vespel spline failures that could cause the oil pressure to drop from 55 psi to just about 7 psi and caused 3 prior emergency landings (1 x Norway, 2 x Brunei).

[HeliComparator]

I am sure 212man will be along shortly (when he wakes up!), but in the mean time I am fairly sure that the emergency landings in Borneo were not as a result of low oil pressure - rather it was the churning thing as a result of too much oil in the wrong place, causing the oil to drastically overheat.

In other words Zalt, demonising the S92 is of course good (if rather easy) sport but one should try to get the facts right, otherwise the impact is lost!

But as a general point it would be interesting for us non-92 pilots to know how easy it is to detect 5 psi as opposed to zero psi. I presume there is a digital readout of the pressure under the bargraph, but that is only as good as the sensor accuracy. My point being, do you always see 0 psi when shutdown, or is it sometimes 1 or 2 due to sensor zero offset?

HC

ps I think the APU has a fairly limited output, not sure if it supplies the entire aircraft's systems (though you would think it would supply the CVFDR). Alternatively perhaps the g switch activated in response to high vibration and shut it off?

[212man]

Sox 6, I'm not sure where the quote above comes from, but this is the relevant extract from the RFM. It's the 2005 version so it was in place at the time of the accident. My bold emphasis.

If the MGB OIL PRES warning or the MGB OIL PRES caution and any of the following secondary indications of gearbox
failure are observed:

MGB oil pressure below 5 psi
Smoke or fumes in the cabin
Any subsequent hydraulic system failure
Progressively increasing power required to maintain flight
Unusual vibrations or noises.
6. Land immediately.

HC is correct - although both our events had some low pressure associated with them, they were not "loss of oil" incidents.

[zalt]

212man

I'm happy to be corrected as the history of failed vespel spline product improvements is rather, erm, 'complex', but I know we can agree that the Norsk case was low oil pressure.

The checklist linked to earlier today was posted by HC in April 2005 just after the Norsk incident. I assume it is an earlier version to yours (repeated below).

Quote:
If the MGB OIL PRES warning or the MGB OIL PRES caution and any of the following secondary indications of gearbox
failure are observed:

MGB oil pressure below 5 psi
Smoke or fumes in the cabin
Any subsequent hydraulic system failure
Progressively increasing power required to maintain flight
Unusual vibrations or noises.
6. Land immediately.

However is your issue pre or post the Norsk event?

I only ask because this could reinforce the point of Sikorsky tinkering with the RFM (to change "If MGB oil pressure continues to decrease" to "MGB oil pressure below 5 psi" to avoid reasons to ditch (in response to less critical gearbox failure modes) prior to the Broome & Newfie events.

I can see how some crews, reading an evolving RFM, without the benefit of frank insight to the S-92A service experience might have assumed this was asign of greater confidence in the MGB, not as was the case, less.

But if neither of the two Shell events were low oil pressure, what triggered the landings into jungle clearings?

I didn't think it was smoke in the cockpit from the leaking seals of the input module which overheating due to churning. But perhaps it was. Certainly with the checklist above, high oil temperature is not a reason to land immediately, while the sounds of a potentially immenent gearbox failure are. Hardly a design sucess either way.

HC makes a good point on the tolerance of MGB pressure gauges and the difficult call crews have had to make.


It would also be nice to hear if anyone is prepared to comment on Shell Management's claims the S-92A was 'non-preferred' for a time.http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163206-sikorsky-s-92-design-operations-97.html#post6043644
I'm waiting for feedback from my own sources in Shell on that one.

[FlyingHead]

Just to clarify, the APU will supply AC power to all the system except RIPS (de-icing), AVC (anti vibration), # 1 engine inlet anti-ice, windshield anti-ice and in case you are equipped the second compressor for the aircon. The AC power also the DC converter, which supply the DC power to all buses. Before Cougar accident the checklist was calling for the APU ON only as a recommendation, but since then it fully integrated in it.

Maybe we should ask if the crew of Cougar turn the APU ON during their emergency?

FH

[HeliComparator]

zalt / 212. The version of the RFM I posted was current during the Norsk incident - according to the RFM they should have ditched, but (with hindsight) they made a good call and stretched it a few minutes to a platform. The version 212 posts is the revision as a result of that event, indicating that provided there is >5psi, you can continue. A little over 5psi is the sort of pressure you could get with a single pump failure at the time (not sure if it's still the case, I believe there has been some to-ing and fro-ing with check valves since then!)

Its interesting to note the continuing reference to increasing transmission drag in the RFM. I can't help thinking that there is a huge amount of energy going through the transmission - the transmission's job is to pass that whilst converting as little as possible to heat - and if more than a very small amount of that energy is converted into heat (such that you notice the loss of performance), and bearing in mind that heat will be quite localised, surely the metal will melt very quickly, as it does so increasing friction thus the amount of energy converted to heat in a runaway-up kind of way. In other words, surely once you notice you torque for fixed colective is increasing, it would be too late unless you are already in a hover?

HC

[zalt]

Flyinghead

A perfectly fair question that I hope the TSB will cover.

However the checklist doesn't suggest the APU is merely a recomendation! Again if that is how crews were trained, no doubt that would have also caused confusion on what other checklist items were optional.

HC

Thanks for the extra information. I agree that the other physical manifestations mentioned in the RFM are pretty terminal warnings!

[Variable Load]

I can see how some crews, reading an evolving RFM, without the benefit of frank insight to the S-92A service experience might have assumed this was a sign of greater confidence in the MGB, not as was the case, less.

Zalt, your posts just get more and more speculative. In fact a better word to describe this one would be ridiculous. := :mad: :mad: :ugh: :ugh:

[212man]

Zalt,
Smoke or fumes in the cabin


(plus, in my case, the 9 EICAS captions - easy decision :uhoh:)

I think it's incorrect to assume line crews monitor RFM changes in the way you suggest - what they actually do is follow their company SOPs and Emergency Checklists that are in the cockpit.

[Geoffersincornwall]

I must agree with 212man. The key is in company SOPs. The RFM is a document based on the basic aircraft and does not integrate these basic procedures with those variations required by the installation of customer options. It is also written in simplistic terms, devoid of context, at the start of an aircraft's life when everything is factory-fresh, shiny-new and unsullied by maintenance methods that are not fault-free at best and downright dangerous at worst.

There is one flight manual out there that invites you to 'continue flight' with both batteries indicating an overtemp condition. That is where good company SOPs step in and return our world to sanity and suggest that maybe any arguments about what to do next take place on terra-firma.

The RFM indicates the minimum you must do when reacting to a situation but only you (actually your CP) can put 'context' into your deliberations and therefore your SOPs.

G. :ok:

[Brian Abraham]

The RFM indicates the minimum you must do when reacting to a situation but only you (actually your CP) can put 'context' into your deliberations and therefore your SOPsUnfortunately CP's don't always get it right either, witness the lack of understanding about Va in the fixed wing world when applied to the rudder. After all they are human too (CP's that is), although some might disagree. :p

Personally I take the view that what is written in the RFM/SOP's is a best suggestion written by an engineer, or some other, in the comfort of a nice warm office with a cup of hot coffee to hand. Mind you there are some emergencies where the course of action required is not up for debate. Some times the course of action required is dictated by the circumstances in which you find yourself, and that decision may be founded on someone else experience, or your own prior experience, and some times taking the bit in your mouth and hoping to hell it gets you out of the jam in which you find yourself.

An example, would you ever recommend a pilot of a single engine turbine taking off after the engine oil pressure had suddenly dropped to zero? The crew of a Huey found themselves with just that predicament. To stay where they were was fraught with risk so they took off and transited until the engine chip came on and then performed a auto into a clear area. People safe and aircraft undamaged save for a burnt up T-53 and a new oil cooler required (hole in which dumped all the oil). The outcome had they not done so does not bare thinking about. To be recommended? Definitely not, but sometimes ............ Fate is the Hunter.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Agree entirely save for warm room and cosy chair I would say that the perspective frequently suggests they are downwind in the circuit on a lovely summer's day. They also appear never to have read an accident report in their lives and therefore cannot subscribe to the theory that there are any lessons to be learnt from what has gone before.

What 'has gone before' include 'Sioux City', the Everglades and countless other lessons about improbable outcomes to unlikely events. Wise virgins would be well-read on such topics and put their own veneer of experience on to the advice given in the RFM.

As to the quality of CPs - what can you expect when you have an industry almost totally devoid of managerial training and consequently constantly populated by more ex-CPs that current CPs.

G :ok:

[zalt]

I accept the points made above that the RFM is mostly actually used by the team producing OMs and checklists. I do think may basic point is still valid as Sikorsky's changes influence those management/trainers and their changes then affect crews.

Having said that, it is not uncommon for operators in North America flying large aircraft to actually have their crews use uncontrolled checklists produced by the simulator training companies! I bet that would shock the North Sea jocks.

When I read:
you have an industry almost totally devoid of managerial training and consequently constantly populated by more ex-CPs that current CPs I did think for a second I was reading the work of Shell Management! But on reflection it does highlight one weakness of many operators when it comes to the continuity of effective flight operations management.

I have recently been pointed (via a series of PMs) at some past comments by Nick Lappos after one of the Shell Brunei incidents (here on 27 Jan 2008 http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163206-sikorsky-s-92-design-operations-49.html#post3867445) - I have made some text bold:
I wrote the S76 checklist, and in the intro paragraph to Chapter 3 gave the pilot the latitude to be more than a sweaty flight-manual reader. The difference between airmanship/wisdom and memorizing flight manuals is the difference between pilots and stick wigglers, IMHO. If the flight manual words say "XXX" and you think you must do it, then do so. However, if the PIC decides to actually try some airmanship, in many cases it would be welcomed.

The ease of saying and preaching (in the ease of a Sunday at the keyboard criticizing your fellow pilot) blind obedience to the flight manual, "land immediately" is often confounded by the actual conditions, and by the fact that the aircraft is still flying nicely, even if a few lights are on. I am reminded of the American Airlines DC10 Chicago engine drop-off accident: In simulator trials afterward, the crews that obeyed the checklist and slowed to Vy (while they were climbing at over 2000 fpm before the slow-down) all died like dogs, those that flew wisely like airmen landed successfully.

I do not know what happened with this specific aircraft, at all, but I am lead to believe from 212man's posts that it did not lose all or most of its oil, rather, it might be that it had an oil leak. Any pilot who ditches a load of passengers with an oil leak (even if he memorized the flight manual in that case) might deserve to be ppruned to death, afterwards.

I note in the last para that "lose all or most oil" is treated differently to an "oil leak". I assume in the latter case a 'ppruning' is not considered to be deserved...

I also see that other people failed to appreciate the subtly of the S-92A RFM, like Variable Load (same page http://www.pprune.org/3868816-post974.html) as they defended the S-92A and compared it to its competitors:

I can tell you that the S92 FM does not say to Land Immediately with low MGB oil pressure, the Land Immediately comes into play when secondary indications of impending gearbox failure are present, such as unusual noises, smoke in cabin, etc.

Nothing about continuing pressure drop there.

The Wells Report is due out this week: N.L. inquiry to release report on fatal offshore helicopter crash (http://www.globalmontreal.com/technology/inquiry+release+report+fatal+offshore+helicopter+crash/3831465/story.html)

Cougar and Sikorsky are in court next week.

[Variable Load]

like Variable Load (same page http://www.pprune.org/3868816-post974.html) as they defended the S-92A

Zalt, unlike you I like to base my posting on facts. If that means I am taking a defensive position, so be it. Surely that is a good quality?

Postings based on dangerous speculation, half truths and damn lies I will leave to some on this forum like yourself :=

[sox6]

In fact VL your post from 2008 is the one that contains the dangerous half truth because you have missed out a key part of the Flight Manual.

Your post above does not put you in any better light.

[JohnDixson]

Just an observation that many pilots seem to believe that the flight manual emergency procedures are written, reviewed and approved by a group of people sitting in offices far from the flight line. I cannot testify for Bell, Boeing, Eurocopter and the rest but I have some experience with what Sikorsky did and can attest that those procedures received a lot of review, to include the crowd who wear flight suits*. No one writes Land Immediately without considering the circumstances that might exist, be it over the swirling ocean or finding the lowest point of foliage over the jungle. The instruction is aimed at making a landing under control, because the alternative is a lot worse.
* As I am sure is the practice at the other manufacturers.

My copy of the S-92 manual is the basic 2002 manual as revised Sept 11, 2004, and it is clear that Land Immediately was called for if, after the bypass was selected ( MGB Oil Press warning on ), the pressure continued to decrease, OR ( my caps ) there are loud/unusual noises, unusual vibrations or progressively increasing power required to maintain flight.

That may have been modified after 2004, but the 2004 writing was pretty clear in that it was OR, not AND.

Thanks,
John Dixson

[zalt]

John

Thanks for further confirming that Sikorsky did water down the RFM from 'continuing pressure drop' after the 35psi warning to '5psi or below' after the incident in Norway in 2005.

I guess they never expected the vespel spline problems.

A 2002 manual would have been pre certification (FAA, TC or JAA). Your approved Sept 2004 amendment came after the foreign certifications. Funny that!

[zalt]

The Wells Report Phase 1 is out: C-NLOPB || Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry (http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/ohsi_information.shtml)
The Phase 2 Inquiry starts after the TSB report comes out.

[212man]

Thanks for further confirming that Sikorsky did water down the RFM from 'continuing pressure drop' after the 35psi warning to '5psi or below' after the incident in Norway in 2005.

I guess they never expected the vespel spline problems.

A 2002 manual would have been pre certification (FAA, TC or JAA). Your approved Sept 2004 amendment came after the foreign certifications. Funny that

What is the exact point you are trying to make, Zalt?

Prior to the Norsk incident, the advice was that if the pressure continued to drop following the activation of the MGB Bypass, then land immediately, as it was assumed that this indicated an uncontained leak. Following the Norsk incident it was realised that the vespel spline failure would result in a very low, but steady, pressure remaining and that tests had proved the integrity of the MGB would not be compromised at that pressure. Therefore, the additional advice about 5 psi was inserted.

This extra information was intended to stop pilots ditching unecessarily, following a pump failure. It quite clearly, though, maintained the original stance that if the pressure continued to drop - below 5 psi - then land immediately. Bear in mind, too, that a pump failure results in an instant drop, whereas a leak is a steady continuous reduction.

[HeliComparator]

Bear in mind, too, that a pump failure results in an instant drop, whereas a leak is a steady continuous reduction.

Why is that then? Surely a leak gives no pressure drop until the pump inlet is uncovered and the pump starts pumping air? With a slow leak there would perhaps be a period of fluctuating oil pressure as the oil sloshes around and covers/uncovers the pump inlet. With a rapid leak such as loss of oil filter lid, I suspect pressure drop would be near-instant. And with a pump drive failure, surely it might not stop dead but start slipping etc, or if internal damage to pump gradually get worse. I just can't see how your statement is robust!

It does seem a strange (ie bad!) design that with 2 pumps you get 60 psi or so, with 1 pump you only get 1/10th of that. I'm still glad I fly EC!

HC

[Brian Abraham]

I suspect pressure drop would be near-instant
In my experience of two MGB loss of oil that was the case. Normal one second, nothing the next. One caused by a blown oil filter seal, the other a hole in MGB case where the rotor brake quill once resided.

[212man]

Obviously there will be variables in both a 'leakage' and a 'pump failure' scenario. The fact that the Bypass needs to be operated within 5 seconds of the MGP OIL PRESS warning indicates the kind of worst case leakage rate that SAC envision - which is rapid, but not instant - but there could be lower rates of loss and it is my belief that these would register as pressure drops too, based on my experience of the type. Similarly, it is true to say that some pump failure modes may show instability initially, but once the drive fails the pressure drop will be pretty much instant.

[maxwelg2]

If the S92 MRGB lube oil system is 2-stage then failure of one of the vespel splines will IMHO cause a large knock-on effect to the next stage e.g. 35 down to 5 psi. If the system is a dual-redundant parallel system then perhaps there are no reverse flow prevention bypass check valves thus causing "windmilling". Perhaps one of the S92 engineers can clarify?

I would guess that a small leak would show up as a loss in net suction pressure to the pumps causing a respective drop in discharge pressure based on the pump curves.

I do not see an Achilles heel present in the current RFM as it does account for total loss of MRGB press i.e. < 5 psi land immediately, regardless of the possible false temperature indication and/or lack of secondary indications of MRGB lube oil loss.

Safe flying

Max

[Variable Load]

Max, that's a fair summation of the current situation. The vespel spline failure, as opposed to a pump seizure, would cause the MGB indicated pressure to fall from 60ish to something "above" 5psi. The pumps are sitting in a "parallel" type circuit, but without check valves.

The check valves were fitted and then removed due to the knock on complications for input module scavenging. Improper scavenging then leads to a build up of oil and then overheating, etc.

So my understanding is that there are plans to improve the scavenging situation in an oil pump fail scenario, which will then enable refitting of the check valves. Net effect will be a much less dramatic fall in oil pressure due to a non-seized but failed MGB oil pump.

In addition to this 'long term enhancement', there are more immediate modifications that will indicate to the pilot if a MGB oil pump has failed, this utilising a "vacuum" sensor in each of the scavenge lines.

I have never perceived any of the RFM changes or modifications as a "watering down" of procedures or safety. They have been robust responses by Sikorsky in the light of experience - something I much prefer compared to the ECF standard response of "it is not a problem" (you have to say that with a strong French accent!). Sure, with hindsight anybody can say "surely you saw that coming", but that's the easiest game in town to play.

MY personal stance in this offshore game is to be open minded and be critical. Always ask why? Don't believe the marketing crap. Always drive for better.

But when challenged by b*llsh*t I will try and play "devil's advocate", because that's how the truth is obtained. The trouble is it's easier to be a doubter than to find the truth. I can start a rumor tomorrow that is complete boll"cks, but it falls within peoples perceptions, it will then become the truth. Just look at snopes.com to see how much crap is out there that people are willing to believe in. Your inbox is probably full of it?

I believe this is what differentiates a professional from the crowd. He makes is own mind up, without bias, always keeps an open mind and is willing to accept his original stance may be wrong.

Long may we continue to have professionals in this industry, rather than those that think that whatever they are currently strapped to is perfect! The perfect helicopter does not (yet!) exist.

[sox6]

VL You complain of "b*llsh*t" but would rather throw mud at other companies over unspecified events than deal with the facts of the specific events that this thread relate to. Still struugling with reality?


QUESTION: If Sikorsky was to take a "robust response" after the surprise of the vespel spline failures should they not have also introdued a warning light or aural warning when 5psi was reached?

[squib66]

Yes, it would have been very sensible to have introduced a attention getter / warning set for the revised, lower, pressure threshold for 'Land Immediately'. It makes no sense to have to 'keep an eye' on a small pressure gauge to detemine if you really have a catastrophic failure mode.

The failure to so was probably Sikorsky's Ford Pinto (http://www.engineering.com/Library/ArticlesPage/tabid/85/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/166/Ford-Pinto.aspx) moment, the case were dangerous design features were left uncorrected because the "company is run by salesmen, not engineers" and the priority was sales, not safety.

In one study of the Pinto it is reported that a meeting was called on the subject:

When time came for the meeting, a grand total of two people showed up... "So you see," continued the anonymous Ford engineer ironically, "there are a few of us here at Ford who are concerned about fire safety." He adds: "They are mostly engineers who have to study a lot of accident reports and look at pictures of burned people. But we don't talk about it much. It isn't a popular subject.

One wonders how much Sikorsky and FAA really considered the safety of the S-92A MGB before certification, or were only interested in safety after an accident (and as Broome was not an accident they didn't worry).

For more in the Pinto see here (http://www.wfu.edu/~palmitar/Law&Valuation/Papers/1999/Leggett-pinto.html)
http://static.seekingalpha.com/wp-content/seekingalpha/images/Pinto_Crash.gif

[squib66]

And as if my magic another S-92A AD has just been issued:
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A (http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/DEE3CE1A1A71D04D862577E0004B68C8?OpenDocument)

It has a 10 hour compliance time, expanding on an earlier AD and seems to throw doubt on the new 'wonder 6 stud' filter casing.

we have determined the need to expand the applicability to include another MGB assembly and MBG housing, which introduced a six-stud attachment for the oil filter bowl and more edge distance on the right and left foot pads. This new housing configuration is added to the applicability of this AD because it is prone to the same cracks as the MGB listed in the current AD. The manufacturer is still investigating the root cause of these cracks. Contributing factors may include corrosion and the bushing press fit in the mounting foot bolt hole. The actions specified in this AD are interim actions until the root cause of the cracking is determined. After that determination, we anticipate further rulemaking.



Still at least thie ASB is backed with an AD an a rapid compliance time unlike the original stud ASB (prior to Cougar 491).

I assume all Canadian passengers will be briefed before the next flight iaw the Wells Report!
CBC News - Nfld. & Labrador - Positive reaction to N.L chopper inquiry report (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/11/18/nl-chopper-report-1118.html)

[industry insider]

This is applicable to phase 2 MGB casings with the new foot and brings inspections into line with those previously in force on phase 1 casings.

The inspection applies to the foot area of the MGB casing and is not to do with the 6 stud filter bowl assembly. The filter bowl assembly is mentioned to differentiate this AD as being applicable to phase 2 MGB casings which is when the 6 stud attachment was introduced.

It does seem that the phase 2 casing alone has not solved the foot crack issue.

[zalt]

ironchefflay, on your planet is an AD an 'Award for Design'?

On our planet the FAA have confirmed that another Sikorsky product improvement has failed and needs mandatory action.

Feet have been cracking for over a year and Sikorsky still don't understand the failure mechanism according to the FAA.

[riff_raff]

It would be interesting to have access to design details of the S-92 MRGB housing. You could use Sikorsky's published design guidelines to see if the S-92 housing passes their own hazard function analysis process.

You can download the Sikorsky design guide here (http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA069835). The hazard function analysis procedure begins on page 69, and includes failure data for housing cracks/fractures.

Have fun.
riff_raff

[squib66]

riff-raff

Many thanks - a great find. I've just started going through it.

Technically it is the Army's guide but they paid Sikorsky to write it. It would be very interesting to know if the S-92 designers read or used this or some subsequent guide.

As it was written in 1979 it captures Sikorsky's thinking at the time of the UH-60 design. One would have expected the state of the art to have advanced in the subsequent 1/4 century prior to the introduction of the S-92.

The Cougar lawyers will no doubt be keen to see one document mentioned on P17 of 91 for both the UH-60 and the S-92:



The functional group charged with drive system design can contribute greatly to the reliability and maintainability of future designs by setting up and continuously updating a problem file. This file, which could be arranged by the various generic components, would essentially be a history of all of the developmental and field problems associated with past and present drive systems. The information contained in this file would consist of descriptions, causes, and solutions of the various problems. The primary purpose of this file would be to prevent past mistakes from being repeated.

It would also serve to centralize that information, which would otherwise be scattered in various memos or in the files of the engineers who worked on the past problems. This procedure also documents "experience" and keeps within the company information that othewise might be lost when experienced engineers leave.

I wonder how many of the S-92 design team actually worked on the original UH-60 in the 70s.

[SansAnhedral]

I wonder how many of the S-92 design team actually worked on the original UH-60 in the 70s.Not many I can tell you that

[zalt]

I wonder if anyone in the team really understood the design they were tinkering with.

In St Johns:

A SAR S-92 arrived in July but was not available for full time SAR until November
It still lacks SS6 floats
It lacks a certified auto-hover
There are still no proper ground facilities for the SAR unit yet


SAR chopper hangar delayed
Published on November 20th, 2010
Moira Baird
The Telegram

Construction of a new search and rescue facility at St. John’s airport for the offshore oil industry won’t meet a year-end deadline. The dedicated search and rescue (SAR) helicopter is in place, but its hangar and crew quarters are still on the drawing board.

And that means it will take longer to achieve the 15- to 20-minute response time recommended by helicopter safety inquiry commissioner Robert Wells when he issued an interim report in February.

Since March, Suncor Energy said the SAR response time has been reduced from the previous one hour to 30 minutes. “The objective is to get it as low as we can reasonably,” said John Downton, spokesman for Suncor, which operates the Terra Nova oilfield. “In order to do that, there are a number of pieces of infrastructure that need to be put in place. “A key piece of it is a hangar facility.

“Cougar, we understand, is working with the various authorities to enable that to happen, but it’s taking some time, and it will take some time to get all the elements in place as we understand it.” Cougar Helicopters provides first-response search and rescue services to the province’s offshore oil industry. Response time is how long it takes to get a search and rescue helicopter in the air.

These days, the SAR duties are carried out by a dedicated S-92 chopper that arrived in the province in July. “We received confirmation that it’s now in full-time dedicated service as of the second week of November,” said Downton. The SAR chopper is due for an upgrade to its flotation system in the new year. All passenger helicopters have already received this upgrade.

Floats provide additional stability following a controlled ditching in the water.
The SAR helicopter has also been equipped with auto-hover technology and forward-looking infrared radar. But the auto-hover — which aids in night rescues — has yet to be activated because it’s still awaiting certification from Transport Canada.

Before that can happen, the technology must first be certified by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) in the U.S., where the helicopter manufacturer is based. “The FAA is working with Sikorsky towards the approval as it pertains to the U.S. type certificate,” said an emailed statement from Transport Canada. “Transport Canada is conducting a concurrent validation of the U.S. approval. Transport Canada will continue to work with the FAA and Sikorsky to support a Canadian approval. “Once U.S. approval is obtained, it is anticipated that Canadian approval could follow within approximately one month.”

In February, Wells recommended a ban on night flights offshore —at least until a dedicated SAR helicopter was outfitted with auto-hover and forward-looking infrared radar. He reiterated that ban in his report issued Wednesday — saying he could not recommend “a return to scheduled night flying.” If night flights are necessary, he recommended decisions to fly be made unanimously by a committee that includes worker representatives.

[212man]

It lacks a certified auto-hover

I'm curious as to why TC haven't certified it. I know the FAA haven't, but that is more a function of them getting the aircraft certification mixed up with Ops approvals, and is not showing them in a good light. The SAR AFCS has been certified by EASA for a few years now - hence the UK Coast Guard aircraft using it.

[zalt]

212man
Quote:
It lacks a certified auto-hover

I'm curious as to why TC haven't certified it. I know the FAA haven't, but that is more a function of them getting the aircraft certification mixed up with Ops approvals, and is not showing them in a good light. The SAR AFCS has been certified by EASA for a few years now - hence the UK Coast Guard aircraft using it.

I had the same thought.

It is a really amazing scenario that is also not putting TC or the offshore industry in a good light now that winter is here.

It also begs questions about Cougar's claims (several years old) of having an All Weather SAR capability.

http://www.cougar.ca/media/images/brochures/cougar-sar.pdf

In practice, despite the FLIR, Nitesun and NVGs, their AWSAR capability seems to be based on dropping SKAD: Cougar Helicopters || A VIH Aviation Group Company (http://www.cougar.ca/Services/SAR/equipment.asp)

Another claim, that "Cougar Helicopters is the first operator, civilian or military to utilize the S-92 in a SAR role", looks less impressive when the actual non-auto hover fit is considered, rather than the brochure.

They did manage to rapidly rescue Robert Dekker after the accident though so perhaps I should not be to harsh.

[maxwelg2]

Just flew in from offshore today, the nice shiny new SAR S-92 (callsign C-GKIN I think) was sitting out last Tuesday when I went out and still sitting out today, also another new S92 is still tucked away (Greenland A/C? with Cougar colours and a red middle stripe instead of dark blue in the decals) next to the old faithful S61, which looks to be fitted for SAR duties as well albeit with icing limitations. I noticed a few new CPs getting buddied up with the more seasoned PICs as well these days up here.

I can't believe that TC is dragging SAR AFCS approval out this long, especially as 212man has stated EASA approved this quite some time ago.

However, with very limited daylight flying hours now and the current restrictions in place for the S92s we are still not flying regular PAX flights outwith daylight flying hours as per Commissioner Well's recommendation, but as medevacs etc. may require night flying I'm assuming that the Cougar SAR S92 can be used for these duties albeit without auto hover. What will be interesting is when the operators will wish to resume night-flying, presumably once the SAR auto-hover is approved and activated on all the S92 fleet here in St. John's, however with the right to refuse night-flying present as stated in the Phase 1 inquiry report I believe that many PAX up here will exercise that right until the outstanding MRGB issues, i.e. mounting feet cracking due to an as yet unknown cause, are resolved unless it's an emergency evacuation of a facility/medevac situation. Night flying and "milk runs" are known to be more risky anyway, and with some of the harshest flying conditions in the world present here in the Grand Banks I for one may be exercising my right to refuse regular night-time flying. Why take the additional risk unless you really have to?

Interesting times ahead.

Safe flying

Max

[sox6]

I was going to have a scan through the Inquiry report in the next few days to see if their is any relevance for the Netherlands. I believe their are statements about informing the passengers of ADs (but not ASBs).

maxwelg2, were you told about the latest AD?

Is this the other S-92 (here coming by boat after a fuel tank was damaged)?:
http://www.thetelegram.com/media/photos/unis/2010/09/14/photo_1165059_resize_article.jpg (http://www.thetelegram.com/media/photos/unis/2010/09/14/photo_1165059_resize.jpg)
Why the red stripe?

Perhaps the SAR aircraft that came on line this month is actually the one used in Greenland during the summer to support Cairn.

[zalt]

Yes, the 3 aircraft Greenland contract took priority over enhancements in St Johns.

Perhaps, the red stripe indicates a SAR aircraft.

Sox, as you read the report it is worth looking at the SAR timeline.

[zalt]

There have been a several cases (5 or 6?) of overpressuring, mostly with the North American operators, during refueling as the left hand tank fills faster than the right hand side and the pressure relief valve was a bit unreliable.

There is a requirement to pre-check the auto-shutoff valve before fuelling but Sikorsky originally expected ground crew to listen for the valve movement - there was no other indication - not really practical on a busy apron or rotors running.

In Europe a mod was developed which allows the crew to replicate the high level sensor closing function and ensure equal filling.

[maxwelg2]

maxwelg2, were you told about the latest AD?

Is this the other S-92 (here coming by boat after a fuel tank was damaged)?:

Sox6, nope, but as I only fly offshore very infrequently I'm not normally privy to this information unless I request it through the operators. I didn't see anything on Searose on the safety bulletin board wrt. ADs, I'll make some enquiries and find out if Robert Wells's recommendation is being rolled out during safety meetings only.

I only saw the latest MRGB AD via this forum.

I know on Hibernia there is a book up outside heli-admin that has all ADs and copies of correspondence between Cougar and HMDC. To my knowledge this was a consequence of numerous requests from offshore workers during departmental safety meetings.

Zalt, the Cougar NL S92 SAR has the dark blue stripe. Question, how would an offshore heli crew know that the tanks had been over-pressurised, via the PIC? What impact would that then have on the helo's return flight?

The helo I saw on Tuesday and yesterday with the red stripe had the main rotor fully re-assembled and was sitting in the same spot as last Tuesday, so I would guess that it is the Greenland one post-repair but IMO it is not currently kitted out for SAR duty as I didn't see any hoist or FLIR installed on it albeit it was tucked behind the SAR-equipped S61 so I may be wrong there. I recall seeing a post a while back on the Greenland contract but can't recall if there was a SAR equipped stipulation and where the A/C were to be based.

Safe flying

Max

[[email protected]]

I can't believe that TC is dragging SAR AFCS approval out this long, especially as 212man has stated EASA approved this quite some time ago. possibly to do with having lost a perfectly serviceable Cormorant and crew to an autopilot release faff (so I am led to believe) - TC might not trust others assessments of SAR modes in helos.

forward-looking infrared radar shame they don't seem to know the difference between FLIR and radar - maybe that's why operators get away with calling an aircraft a SAR one when it doesn't have auto hover and transition modes.

[sox6]

From the inquiry report:

For the interested reader I will give the times of the most significant

events in the search and rescue procedures on March 12, 2009. As best as Inquiry Counsel and I can determine, the correct search and rescue times appear to be
as follows, as taken from Cougar’s evidence:


9:40 a.m. emergency declared by Flight 491



9:45 a.m. Cougar dispatch issues search and rescue alert
to maintenance department




10:34 a.m. Cougar search and rescue helicopter takes off
(49 minutes after reconfiguration alert, 54
minutes after emergency declared)




10:56 a.m. Cougar helicopter arrived at accident scene
(flight time was 22 minutes)
76 minutes total time, declared emergency to arrival at


scene


11:34 a.m. second Cougar helicopter arrives at the accident
scene, freeing first Cougar helicopter to leave
for Health Sciences Centre, St. John’s

11:58 a.m. two DND SAR helicopters arrive at the scene




12:04 p.m. first Cougar helicopter arrives at Health


Sciences Centre, St. John’s
2 hrs. 24 min. total time from declared emergency to delivery


of survivor to hospital, 9:40 a.m. to 12:04 p.m.



but there is this footnote:



When the survivor, Robert Decker, was hoisted on board the first helicopter, it circled the scene for the protection of the rescue technician, who remained in the ocean until he was hoisted by a second helicopter. If the first helicopter had left the rescue technician in the water and returned to St. John’s, a second life would have been at risk.



Why leave the technician in the water and delay the survivors return to medical care? Did the winch fail?

[maxwelg2]

Why leave the technician in the water and delay the survivors return to medical care? Did the winch fail?




Sox6, between 1034 hrs and 1106 hrs the rescue of Robert Decker was performed, the exact sequence of events not released.

I don't know, I'm only a PAX, but Allison Maher was most likely still in the water and the rescue technician may have been hoping she was in cold water shock but still alive and decided to stay with her for rapid location/secondary extraction in order to allow Robert to be expedited back to onshore medical resources. I would assume that it is protocol not to leave a SAR swimmer in the water without air cover.

Perhaps one of the SAR PPRuNers could provide more insight on the hypothetical sequence of events, but for me I'm sure they did all they could as quickly as practically possible.

Safe flying

Max

[zalt]

Max - The only survivor, Robert Decker, mentioned his critically low core temperature on arrival at the hospital when he gave his evidence (28C IIRC). I can't see any reason not to hoist up the other victim immediately and return both to shore asap, unless their was some kind of mechanical malfunction.

Today's shock news came in an announcement from the commissioner that no one had bother to mention a previous fatal helicopter accident off Newfoundland, almost exactly 24 years to the day earlier.

Message from the Commissioner: (November 22, 2010)

As readers of this message will know, my Report was released to the public on Wednesday, November 17, 2010. At page 43 of my Report (Volume 1), I wrote:

"In my opinion, despite the delay in instituting a new occupational health and safety regime, there was no evidence in Phase I of the Inquiry that safety in the C-NL offshore has been compromised in any measurable way by that delay. I have been told that the C-NL offshore safety record, in the past fourteen years of production, has been as good as that of the offshore industry generally. As might be expected, the accident rates may rise or fall to some extent in each year, but until the tragic event of March 12, 2009, there had not been any fatalities since the loss of the Ocean Ranger in 1982."

I believed the foregoing reference to fatalities to be true, but on Friday, November 19th, I was informed by C-NLOPB that there were six fatalities in a crash 25 years ago, on March 13, 1985, when a helicopter owned by Universal Helicopters under contract to Petro Canada crashed near Argentia, NL, shortly after taking off from the rig Bowdrill I which was moored in Placentia Bay for maintenance.

Up until I received that information I was not aware of these fatalities and there was no evidence or reference made to them at the Inquiry proceedings.

I therefore wish to correct the omission of these six fatalities from my Report and to extend my regrets and condolences to the families of the deceased pilots and passengers who were:

Captain Gary Freeman Fowlow
First Officer Frank Kearney
Brian Garbett
Art Smith
Bernie Murphy
Jim Wilson

I am informed by the Transportation Safety Board that the helicopter departed the Bowdrill I at 10:45 p.m. Newfoundland standard time to return to St. John’s on what was intended to be a 20 minute flight. The helicopter crashed less than 1500 meters from the rig.

Sadly, the number of C-NL offshore helicopter fatalities referred to in my Report must be amended from 17 to 23.

I wish to thank C-NLOPB for bringing this matter to my attention.


I believe this was a B214ST and that Universal was an Okanagan subsidiary at the time. Clearly those 6 fatalities didn't stimulate the level of concern in helicopter safety

Anyone know the cause?

[carholme]

I remember the night the 214ST went down and the wx was a bitch. If I recall correctly, the assumption was that both gyros were tumbled and this was noticed by a member of the ground staff who was talking to the crew prior to liftoff. The accident happened a very short distance from the rig which was in Placentia Bay at the time.

carholme

[maxwelg2]

As usual the press and lawyers are ill-informed and spew incorrect facts.

I'm assuming that SAC will state that the Cougar S92 POH will be the applicable legal document albeit based on the S92 RFM, so the false temperature indication issue on loss of MRGB lube oil not captured in the RFM is valid and SAC should IMHO be liable, but not the run-dry statement which was not stated in the RFM albeit in historical SAC sales literature and a perceived abiility by some.

Safe flying

Max


Arguing jurisdiction [The Telegram] The following text has been excerpted from the media outlet cited and is provided to NOIA members for information purposes only. Any opinion expressed therein is neither attributable to nor endorsed by NOIA.

11/24/2010

Cougar Helicopters says St. John’s the proper venue for $27-million lawsuit

Cougar Helicopters argued in court Tuesday that its $27-million lawsuit against helicopter manufacturer Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. should be tried in Newfoundland Supreme Court.

The ongoing hearing will decide whether that case is heard in a courtroom in St. John’s or in Connecticut.

The lawsuit stems from the March 12, 2009 helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland that killed 17 people.

Patrick Saul, one of the lawyers for Cougar, said the case is one of negligence by Sikorsky — and the effects of that negligence were mainly felt in Newfoundland and Labrador.

Cougar operates a fleet of Sikorsky S-92 helicopters to transport offshore workers to the oilfields off Newfoundland.

On the day of the crash, Saul said the decisions and actions of the Cougar Flight 491 pilots were affected by “representations and omissions” by Sikorsky.

En route to the White Rose and Hibernia oilfields, the pilots reported a loss of oil pressure in the main gearbox, which powers the helicopter’s rotor drive. They headed back to land. As the pilots wrestled with the oil-pressure problem, Saul said they relied on the S-92 emergency procedures manual published by Sikorsky.

It said an increase in oil temperature occurs when the oil pressure indicator light comes on. What the manual didn’t say, according to Saul, is the oil temperature gauge doesn’t function when all the oil is lost. He said Sikorsky’s procedure manual “failed in its purpose.”

Saul also said the pilots relied on the information that the S-92 helicopter had a 30-minute run-dry capability — meaning it could continue flying for one-half-hour after losing all oil in its lubrication system.

On the day of the crash, the helicopter flew for 11 minutes after the loss of oil pressure was reported.

The oil lubricates the main gearbox. The lubrication system was attached to the main gearbox by three titanium studs.

Loss in oil pressure

The Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating the cause of the crash, has said two studs broke in flight, resulting in the loss of oil pressure.

Sikorsky has since redesigned the oil lubrication system and replaced the titanium studs with stronger steel studs.

Saul said the titanium studs posed an “unreasonably high risk of failure” — and were a departure from the usual practice of using steel studs. He said the titanium studs were supposed to be replaced every 500 hours of operation; instead, they needed to be changed more frequently.

Saul also said the oil, which is under pressure, was almost completely emptied from the lubrication system on the day of the crash.

At this point, Sikorsky lawyer Robert Bell said Saul had gone too far in stating his case. Justice Richard LeBlanc instructed Saul to stick to the facts contained in Cougar’s statement of claim.

That statement of claim was filed in Newfoundland Supreme Court in June.

Sikorsky has yet to file a statement of defence. It did file an application saying the U.S. District Court in Connecticut is the proper venue for the lawsuit.

The hearing to decide which court has jurisdiction resumes this afternoon in St. John’s.

[sox6]

Having talked to local SAR crews, there is a rumour circulating that only one SAR Technician was on the second Cougar aircraft. Any one care to comment?

[zalt]

I believe that is the case.

Cougar were (and still) only contracted for one SAR helicopter, so a partial crew on the second aircraft dispatched shouldn't be a surprise, as its dispatch was more than could be expected.

What is a surprise is that first Cougar SAR aircraft loitered waiting for the second, putting the survivor at risk, either because it was unable to retrieve its SAR Tech or so as to transfer a crewman to the second helicopter (even though the military Cormorants were on their way).

THis was the second accident in 2009 where Cougar's SAR servive came into question (the other being the GOM S-76 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/356837-phi-crash-louisiana-8-dead-1-injured.html), where despite being contracted by Shell and other oil companies, the VIH Cougar S-61 did not respond).

[squib66]

Today's shock news came in an announcement from the commissioner that no one had bother to mention a previous fatal helicopter accident off Newfoundland, almost exactly 24 years to the day earlier.


The parties, which included Sikorsky, who has remained silent throught the inquiry and contributed no data, analysis or suggestions on the subject of improving offshore safety, also failed to mention that one week after that fatal accident in Newfoundland in 1985 there was a ditching of an S-61 off Halifax after a total MGB oil loss. Fortunately all survived.

On March 20, 1985, an Okanagan Heliocpters S-61N (C-GOKZ) ditched in the Atlantic Ocean off of Owl's Head, Nova Scotia. The aircraft was enroute from the MODU Sedco 709 offshore Nova Scotia to the Halifax International Airport(YHZ)when it suffered total loss of transmission fluid from the Main Gear Box. There were 15 passengers and 2 crew on board. There were no injuries during the ditching, however several passengers suffered from varying degrees of hypothermia.

Rather pertinent?!
I've also heard suggestions of an AS332 ditching off the Atlantic coast of Canada in the 1980s.
Does any one know more details on either?

[carholme]

Squib;

Squib;

Bear in mind that my memory ages as much as I do.

The 332L ditching offshore Newfoundland in the mid 80's was operated by Sealand Helicopters, s/n 2016, C-GSLB.

On approach to an offshore rig, (three attempts, no visual, go home) third approach was underway when PNF called "rig visual" and PF momentarily diverted from the dials and in that short time a high rate of descent occurred and while trying to recover, the a/c struck the water. Luckily, floats saved the day, crew/pax and a/c.

Unfortunately, this was before TSB Canada reports became available online.

carholme

[riff_raff]

Update on S-92 gearbox housing foot cracks:

Root cause of S-92 gearbox cracks remains elusive (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/11/30/350325/root-cause-of-s-92-gearbox-cracks-remains-elusive.html)

US and European regulators say a new and improved main gearbox mounting structure for the Sikorsky S-92A continues to exhibit the cracking problems that plagued an earlier design.
In a new amendment to a 2009 airworthiness directive that requires operators of S-92A heavylift twin-engined helicopters to inspect the mounting feet every 10h, both the Federal Aviation Administration and European Aviation Safety Agency have added the inspection requirement to a modified main gearbox housing that was designed to eliminate the cracking problem.
EASA has mandated that the checks take place before the first flight of each day or at 10h intervals, whichever is first.
"This new housing configuration is added to the applicability of this AD because it is prone to the same cracks as the [main gearbox] listed in the current AD," says the FAA. Sikorsky is still investigating the root cause of these cracks, it adds. "Contributing factors may include corrosion and the bushing press fit in the mounting foot bolt hole," the FAA says.
The new design included a modification to the main gearbox foot pads and the addition of a six-stud attachment for the main gearbox oil filter, a problem area that could be linked to a fatal 2009 ditching of a Cougar Helicopters S-92 en route to an oil platform off the coast of Newfoundland.
In that accident, Canadian investigators found that two of the three titanium filter bowl attachment studs had broken, possibly allowing the main gearbox oil to drain and causing the tail rotor to drive to fail. The Canadian Transportation Safety Board has not yet released its final report on the accident in which 17 passengers and crew died.
The FAA says failure of the mounting feet could cause loss of the main gearbox and "subsequent loss of control of the helicopter".
The agency says the actions in the AD are "interim" until the root cause of the cracking is determined. "After that determination, we anticipate further rulemaking," the FAA says.

[Epiphany]

On approach to an offshore rig, (three attempts, no visual, go home) third approach was underway when PNF called "rig visual" and PF momentarily diverted from the dials and in that short time a high rate of descent occurred and while trying to recover, the a/c struck the water.

For those reading this who wonder if lessons have been learned - well yes - in my company (and many others I believe) - when the PNF calls 'visual' in the latter stages of an ARA the PNF then takes control and lands while the PF (now the PNF) stays on instruments.

[zalt]

Helicopter's redesigned main gearbox still prone to cracks (http://www.theprovince.com/news/Helicopter+redesigned+main+gearbox+still+prone+cracks/3912668/story.html)

Improvements to the main gearbox of the Sikorsky S-92 helicopter — the same model that crashed off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador last year, killing 17 people — haven't solved the problem of cracking foot mounts.
Last month, the U.S. Federal Aviation Authority expanded its previous airworthiness directive to include regular inspections of the new main gearbox assembly that is prone to the same cracks and corrosion as the old assembly.
It directs S-92 operators to continue inspecting the main gearbox mounting foot pad and rib for cracks and corrosion every 10 flight hours.
An S-92 helicopter crashed 55 kilometres east of St. John's in March 2009 while ferrying workers to Newfoundland's oilfields. Only one of the 18 people on board survived.
Since the crash, Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., has redesigned the S-92's main gearbox lubrication system.
Among the changes, the company replaced the three-stud oil filter attachment with a six-stud filter attachment.
"Since we issued the first (airworthiness directive), we found out that the main gearbox assembly and housing that has the six-stud attachment is prone to the same cracks as the one listed in the other (directive)," said Les Dorr, FAA spokesman in Washington.
"Sikorsky is still looking into the root cause, but we needed to take action to expand the AD to those main gearbox assemblies as well."
The pilots of the ill-fated Flight 491 reported a loss of oil pressure in the main gearbox as they were transporting offshore workers to the White Rose and Hibernia oilfields March 12, 2009.
Minutes after the pilots turned back to St. John's, the helicopter plunged into the ocean and sank.
Weeks later, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada said two of three mounting studs broke in flight resulting in a loss of oil from the lubrication system.
Those studs attach the oil filter assembly to the main gearbox.
Without them, oil can leak out of the main gearbox, which powers the helicopter's rotor drive.
Sikorsky is still investigating the root cause of cracks in the main gearbox mounting feet.
Contributing factors may include corrosion and the bushing press fit in the mounting foot bolt hole, said the FAA directive issued Nov. 19.
The actions specified by this directive are intended to prevent the loss of the main gearbox and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
If S-92 operators discover a crack, the directive instructs them to replace the main gearbox before the next flight.
If corrosion, bubbled paint or paint discoloration are detected, the main gearbox must be repaired before the next flight.
Dorr said the FAA will be notified once the root cause is determined.




Any one got any more on the 1985 S-61?

[Outwest]

Any one got any more on the 1985 S-61?

Back then there was a Tee fitting that supplied oil pressure to the torque meter as well as the inputs from the emergency lube system. On the incident a/c this fitting cracked and allowed all the oil, including that supplied from the emergency lube sump/pump to be pumped overboard. As anyone who is familiar with the system on the 61 can tell you, if there is no oil for the inputs they will fry in a matter of seconds.

Okanagan subsequently removed this tee fitting from all their a/c.