C17 Gear Up Landing Bagram

[KPax]

Without prejudging any investigation, I find it hard to believe that a multi crew ac can land these days with it's gear up, unless there was a severe malfunction.
Damaged C-17 moved off Bagram runway - Air Force News, news from Iraq - Air Force Times (http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/02/airforce_c17_bagram_020409w/)

[scarecrow450]

Read somewhere that the gear was only partially down :confused:

[ix_touring]

From the end of th enews item:


The last large Air Force jet to make a gear-up landing was a B-1B Lancer in May 2006. An investigation determined that the four-man aircrew forgot to lower the gear before touching down on a runway at Diego Garcia, an Indian Ocean island.
The investigation found that the pilots hadn't completed a mandatory landing checklist and overlooked a host of warning lights intended to remind them that the bomber's landing gear hadn't been lowered. An audio alarm that would have advised the pilots to lower the gear had been turned off a few minutes before they landed the plane.


So one can quite easily land without lowering the gear, IF you ignore procedures and disable alarms etc.

ix

[Logistics Loader]

Incoming !!

Blame the Effing Movers again !!

[bong-bing]

In response to last -

MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM no i won't:mad:

Accidents:eek:/human error:uhoh: happen, can we, := in a flight safety culture constantly judge so often?

apologise, I bit, its the weekend here.:cool:

[Logistics Loader]

justification for a 4 man front end then !!!!!

i flew left hand seat in Puma...qualified glider pilot but a/c capt said he woul appreciate any calls i gave...

sideline...

anyone looked at the fred perry shirt advert on right handside of the link...

gucci polo shirt...
in white
with flying wings
and Medal Ribbons embroidered !!

only the Americans !!

PRICELESS !!

[brickhistory]

err, seen the line of RAF-sanctioned clothing for sale to the public?

[Earl]

From the picture looks like a Charleston AFB SC bird.
Yellow stripe on the tail and the blue patch with the state tree.
Sure is backing up the cargo flights into there with everyone else.
Shxt happens!

[fallmonk]

Hope for the crew sake it was a technical error ,
If not some one is going to get there arse kicked !
But as mentioned in the report IF there is a known error they tend to divert to a "friendly" air base with better facilitys ! (Turkey/saudi) ?????

[OmegaV6]

Not casting stones or speculating .... but I find it a tad strange that they can just jack it up (ok with some difficulty) and the lower the gear apparently quite easily ... :( before towing it away .....

......the recovery crew managed to lift the aircraft high enough to extend its wheels ......

even allowing for jounalistic inaccuracies ........

[sumps]

Hope for the crew sake it was a technical error ,
If not some one is going to get there arse kicked !

...and in defence of the tech's...i hope it was the crews fault or a design fault...etc

[Old Fella]

I know this is a RUMOUR facility, but how about we wait for the REAL story to come out. Maybe the crew did simply omit to lower the gear. If they did, no excuse. In any event, just wish the 'bean counters' had not convinced the customers that there is no longer a place in the cockpit for a F/E. We did and still do contribute on those aircraft with a crew position for us.

[rolandpull]

So how many aircrew does it take to put the wheels down? I can make a guess for changing a light bulb.......

[JEM60]

When aircraft land wheels up accidently, are not the guys in the tower partly culpable??? Have to say that if I saw a B1B on finals gear up, and I was in the tower I'd probably draw somebody's attention to it? Is it not mandatory these days for a tower guy to observe landing aircraft? or did that only happen in films?

[Cap'n Bunghole]

In Oz it is mandatory for the (military) tower controller to ask all aircraft to check wheels as part of their landing clearance. Many RAAF aircraft have a beeper fitted which pilots must press after readback of "3 greens".

Is this procedure used anywhere else?

May or may not have saved the day in this case but it has been a long while since a RAAF aircraft has landed wheels up unintentionally.

[ORAC]

In Oz it is mandatory for the (military) tower controller to ask all aircraft to check wheels as part of their landing clearance. Many RAAF aircraft have a beeper fitted which pilots must press after readback of "3 greens".

Is this procedure used anywhere else?

Probably a hold-over from the Mirage IIIO. The French build this into their aircraft so the beep sounds on the radio when the gear is down - no pilot button push involved I think.

[charliegolf]

Didn't the Alpha Jet transmit a beep on the currently selected frequency when the gear locked?

I'm sure ShyTorque told me that, so it must be true!:ok:

CG

[The Real Slim Shady]

The JP3 and 5 did the same: a series of 3 tones at the end of the transmission if the gear was down and locked.

[14greens]

interesting the initial report suggests the land gear warning had been silenced earlier
other types out there! older i must say, have a system where with land flap set the warning horn cannot be cancelled unless you pull the cb!
DDM MMEL also does not allow dispatch with warn horn u/s,

did have a a discussion on the flight deck of a jet out in theatre where due to other sytems being disabled for EMCON reasons, it was suggested that Land gear warn horn cb should be pulled to prevent "nuisance" warnings when throttles retarded during level changes on the towline

educated the capt in reason why I was not happy and suggested the odd Nuisance warning worth it rather than the embaressment of gear up landing later
CB stayed set

[Fareastdriver]

Way back the Vampire T11 had a light in the nose that came on when the U/C was down, the absence of which would initiate a barrage of red flares from the runway caravan.

It used to get quite heavy at times.

(All three of mine were bulb failures, honest.)

[Jolly Green]

"In Oz it is mandatory for the (military) tower controller to ask all aircraft to check wheels as part of their landing clearance. Many RAAF aircraft have a beeper fitted which pilots must press after readback of "3 greens".

Is this procedure used anywhere else?"

It's mandatory throughout the USAF as well, but doesn't help much. When making the base call or accepting the landing clearance it becomes punctuation rather than a gear check. It only works as a check for the first few times as the pilot thinks through what he's saying. After that, he doesn't have to think of which leg of the circuit he's on, and certainly "knows" he'll have the gear down. It becomes habit to utter the correct words in sequence.

In fact I know of a gear up USAF landing (completely pilot error) with the tower tape recording of "left base, gear down."

[Double Zero]

It's an unfortnate habit that pilots / crew get so used to routine that aircrew when asked by the tower," confirm ' 3 greens " ' automatically do so; ( 4 in the case of a Harrier, etc - ) it seems red lights and horns are not enough for overworked aircrews, how about a few volts or a 'seat shaker' ?!

[taxydual]

Well, as an ex- Runway Caravan Controller at Linton on Ouse in the late 70's early 80's, I had to blat off a red very in anger, on average, about once a month.

Multiply that by 2 (2 x RWC per day). Factor in 1 RWC when night flying.
Multiply that by the number of FTS's in the UK
Add the odd OCU guy who had a bad day.
Also the odd CR guy who similarly had a bad day.

Agreed, very few land without any gear problems. Little mates in the chequered Ice Cream van, alongside the piano keys, may have something to do with that.

Oh, and to the guys who did avoid the ultimate embarrassment, thanks for the beers afterwards. We appreciated that you appreciated.

Funny, no matter the technology, the mark 1 eyeball still has it's uses.

[Cap'n Bunghole]

It's mandatory throughout the USAF as well, but doesn't help much. When making the base call or accepting the landing clearance it becomes punctuation rather than a gear check. It only works as a check for the first few times as the pilot thinks through what he's saying. After that, he doesn't have to think of which leg of the circuit he's on, and certainly "knows" he'll have the gear down. It becomes habit to utter the correct words in sequence.


Hence the addition of the manual beeper. The pilot must press the switch and a tone will only be transmitted if all gear are down and locked. No beeper will prompt a query from the tower. The pilot then checks his gear indications, throws the gear handle down, calls "3 greens" again, presses the beeper, then buys the controller a beer to keep his mouth shut! :}

[TheShadow]

LINK (http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/C17gearupBagram.htm)

.
Around 10 photos of the damage (and the gear handle's position)

[soddim]

Looks like another salutary lesson to all who lapse into doing things automatically.

Never assume - check!

[Art Field]

Methinks tis a bit more than speed tape in the mending.

[VinRouge]

Was that the second-oldest 17 in the fleet? (serial 0002?)

at least they trashed one of the old ones!

Anyone know what equivalent UK category that is?

Looks as if there has been a bit of a fire from the port CMDS dispenser up to the para door....

Least everyone got off ok! :ok:

[usafaviator]

Just a couple of points:

1. That jet is not the second operational C-17. Jet T1 (the Edwards test jet) is tail 870025 and was delivered in 1987. The first operational jet, P1, made after T1, was 880265. As you can see, the last digits do not indicate where the bird lies in the lineage. Tail 60002 is P34 and was delivered in 1996.

2. If the gear handle was up when the jet was landing, assuming that a CB wasn't pulled, "Betty" would have been saying, "TOO LOW, GEAR" over and over until the jet was nearly over the runway at which point she would have said "TOO LOW, POWER".

3. The flight deck has 4 seats and it is very likely that all 4 would have had an occupant given the location of the landing, most likely 3 pilots and a loadmaster, all of whom are trained to look for the gear handle to be down with 5 green prior to landing (among other safety items).

Bottom line: if this wasn't a malfunction, 4 qualified crewmembers would have had to skip the before landing checklist, not notice as a crew that the gear handle wasn't down, AND either 1) decide to pull the CB (not a common thing to do) or 2) ignore the loud and obnoxious voice repeatedly telling them that their gear wasn't down all the way to touchdown. Would the addition of an FE have prevented this? In this circumstance, I'm going to guess probably not.

By the way, the mains on the C-17 don't extend all that much from the fuselage, so they can be difficult to see from the ground even during the day.

[soddim]

Question for C17 operators - are there abnormal gear configurations that call for a gear up landing in preference to partial gear?

[Aur]

To my inexperienced eyes the landing gear doors look open. Have the recovery team 'cut' their way in?

[Trojan1981]

I wonder how long they had been flying? A USAF C-17 crew I spoke to at RAAF Richmond a couple of years ago told me that they regularly flew sorties of aroung 30 hours with in flight re-fueling. Anyone would start making mistakes after that long in the air.

[CR2]

I've seen some pix. Gear lever is "up".

[Flight Detent]

As I flew P3s and 747s for some very long flights, as well as multi-landings type of days where this sort of thing could quite easily happen...

I developed a VERY easy way to guard against it..

Each and every time the landing checks were done (or I got to an approach height where I thought they should have been done), I ALWAYS, ALWAYS repeated this check, every single time...

"FUC check complete = Flaps + Undercarriage + Clearance"
If those three things were complete, at lease I wouldn't hurt myself with the landing, or get my arse kicked after it!

This I did every single landing, and I'm still here to repeat it!

Cheers...FD...:ok:

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

FD,

You, as well may be the case here THINK you did it every time..........but how do you know for sure you did it every time and never ever ever missed it just once :confused:

[MightyGem]

Quote:
It's an unfortnate habit that pilots / crew get so used to routine that aircrew when asked by the tower," confirm ' 3 greens " ' automatically do so;
How do you know that?
Standard CRM teaching: environmental capure.

[Clockwork Mouse]

Me: Army 7** finals.
Tower: Roger Army 7**, confirm 3 greens.
Me: Negative.
Pause.
Tower: Army 7**, confirm u/c down and locked.
Me: Confirmed down, locked and welded.
I was flying a Sioux.

[Karl Bamforth]

Its kind of difficult to believe the crew could miss all the bells and whistles. Even if a CB was pulled numerous checks would have to be missed to land gear up.

It seems much more likely that the gear lever was selected up deliberately.

It is possible that after touch down, one main gear unlocked/started to retract and the crew selected up to keep the aircraft level ?

An aircraft gear up on the runway is probably a lot more survivable and less of a problem to recover than one that has groundlooped with wing and engine damage.

There is always the chance that someone supplied a pic of a gear up lever that was nothing to do with this accident as a joke or wind up.

[moosemaster]

If it was human error then so be it, however just to let you know that "Betty" bitches about all sorts of things.

Depending on what else was going on at the time, it may have been possible for the crew not to hear her.

I remember 1 landing during a sand storm with bad crosswind and poor vis when "Betty" was bitching about glide slope, power, gear and missile launch.

It was incredibly difficult to distinguish between the calls, especially after "missile launch" so we went round.

[DelaneyT]

Wheels-up C-17 crash caused by pilot error

Friday May 8, 2009

Pilots of a C-17 Globemaster failed to lower the transport’s landing gear, forcing them to make a crash landing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, an Air Mobility Command investigation concluded.

None of the six onboard were injured; the repair bill for the $200 million aircraft, however, totaled $19 million.

The aircrew was assigned to the 16th Airlift Squadron and 437th Airlift Wing at Charleston Air Force Base, S.C. The pilots have been grounded pending a command review of the accident investigation report.

The automated “ground proximately warning system” that would have instructed the crew to lower the wheels was apparently accidentally turned off.

The tower controllers failed to make the required reminder call — “Check wheels down.”

The plane was also flying at 172 mph, 42 mph faster than approach rules called for... had correct procedures been followed, the landing would have been aborted because of the high speed and a second approach made.

The three pilots in the cockpit didn’t realize they missed the “Before Landing Checklist.”

Read the report:
:rolleyes:

http://www.militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/AIBreport.pdf

[Farfrompuken]

Not trying to defend anyone, with no knowledge of the incident nor indeed the type but:

I wonder how far they were into their crew duty day and what their rest pattern was like leading up to the event.......:\

[VinRouge]

And how many hours on type to boot...

[glad rag]

A fast approach at night in hostile territory OK blame the crew but there is more to this than is being said........does anyone know the speed limitations for the gear??

[StopStart]

Read the report. Well rested crew inadvertently switched off the GPWS, didn't do the pre-landing checks and then the captain took control on short finals to recover a biffed approach by the co. They had the speed brakes out to try and kill the speed but landed 3000ft down the runway at 157kts against a Vat of 119 kts. Captain had a total of 1879 hrs with 826 on type. Handling copilot had a total of 402 hrs. Ever. With 149 on the C17. And he'd done 20.7 of those in the previous 7 days :suspect:

VFR night, one helo and one C130 leaving or arriving (very quiet for OAIX) so not a particularly arduous ATC environment.

Reading the report suggests a few "cheese holes" lining up and the captain not taking corrective action early enough to recover a poor approach by the co.

NVGs, "hostile territory", are possibly factors but this just looks like a fundamental failure of flight deck procedures, airmanship and CRM.

OK blame the crew but there is more to this than is being said
No, I really don't think there is.

[Farfrompuken]

SS,

as briefed, read the report.;)

I think 'Oops' sums it up:\

[Brain Potter]

By far the the greatest proportion of responsibility for this accident appears to rest with the crew. However, there does seem to be a degree of mitigation in the TAWS/GPWS issue.

Orders and procedures for the operation of equipment like EGPWS and Predictive Windshear Alerting always focus on the mandatory nature of the subsequent escape manoeuvre, which will call for something like "Aggressively apply maximum thrust, level the wings and rotate to XX degrees pitch attitude...". Training will reinforce that these actions MUST be carried out promptly. However, operations in the real world, particularly in a military environment, can present situations where such actions are not appropriate. Because manufacturers and regulators sometimes do not fully understand the nature of these operations, crews often have to resort to techniques and procedures developed at unit or even individual crew level to cope with these situations.

Switching of the TAWS on receipt of spurious terrain warnings is clearly widespread practice for crews going into Bagram. With a large dose of hindsight, the method employed was unsound due to the ergonomics and chances of switching-off the GPWS instead. Perhaps higher echelons of AMC should take some responsibility for not dealing with problem of nuisance terrain warnings at Bagram? An approved, checklisted and trained procedure for de-selecting TAWS may have been appropriate. More significantly, if Rwy 03 at Bagram has well-known terrain database issues there has to be some blame apportioned to a system that did not correct the problem, particularly since AMC have been using it for 7 years. The continued existence of database anomalies has clearly resulted in crews receiving in nuisance warnings, raising their workload and causing them to make switch selections that the manufacturer did not intend to be made at that stage of flight.

This crew's culpability can only be marginally reduced, but I feel that it is worth pointing-out that the TAWS de-selection was a operational work-around that could/should have been better addressed by higher echelons.

[ZH875]

Tis a bugger when you find it impossible to taxy when engines are at full power.:O

[Biggles225]

In my day young man, we had people called runway controllers who sat in a caravan at the end of the runway and let you know all was not well, a well aimed red across the bows wakes most mortals! :eek: Quite useful and fairly cheap (2 beers were usually enough to say thank you!) :O

[BEagle]

The TAWS/GPWS issue is a red herring.

For 3 pilots all to forget to lower the gear and complete the pre-landing checks in benign weather at a low activity aerodrome is inexcusable. The lack of ATC call didn't help, but the ATCOs weren't on the flight deck!

25 years ago I held on 241OCU before starting my VC10 course. This included plenty of flight deck rides sitting in the corner on a tin ration box and cushion. I learned a heck of a lot from watching others. One day we were flying a procedural approach into Prestwick with take-off flap selected. Then the captain called for "Flap - approach, please". I attracted the attention of the senior QFI (dear old 'JR') on the jump seat and was about to ask "Is this some 10 Sqn SOP?", but he put his fingers to his lips. A few seconds later, the gear warning horn went off - and the crew reacted in total shock. After hurriedly lowering the landing gear and completing the pre-landing checks, we flew a go-around at which point the QFI announced "Grade One Diversion to Newcastle!". The Captain simply handed over control and announced "I need a cigarette!".

The debrief was, I later heard, quiet and damning. "Captain, explain to me why all 4 of you missed the 'gear down, landing checks' cue? Why was it that only the holding officer and I noticed?"

Anyone sitting on a jump seat (assuming they're qualified) must keep their wits about them!

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

There we have it, put a holding officer on every flight deck and the aviation accident rate simply disappears :hmm:

[c130jbloke]

Is it just me, or is the report a difficult read because of death by TLA ?:ugh:

Interestering that the whole thing is signed off by a Col - they obviously don't feel the need for every airship and his dog to get involved........

[Brain Potter]

The TAWS is not a red herring, that's why it featured in the report. If the captain had not inadvertently switched-off the GPWS whilst trying to kill spurious alerts from the TAWS then the aircraft would have issued a "TOO LOW GEAR!" warning. That doesn't excuse any of this crew's poor CRM or airmanship, but a warning system is only fitted because someone envisaged a situation occurring where it might be required. Unfortunately, this crew got themselves into a situation where they needed that warning system but events had conspired to deny it to them. I have never heard of anyone advocating less-than-assiduous adherence to procedures and checklists on the basis that a warning system will save them, but that doesn't alter the fact that, in this case, part of the chain of events was the mistaken de-selection of the GPWS.

I suggest that the GPWS was far more likely to prevented this 'mis-hap' than a routine "Check Wheels" call from ATC. This crew managed to max themselves out to the point that they forgot the gear and the checks, so it seems equally possible that their response to ATC would also have been conditioned by expectation, rather than by examination of what was actually in front of them. However, if the aircraft had begun to shout "TOO LOW GEAR!, TOO LOW GEAR!...." they may well have been brought back to reality.

BEagle, your VC10 crew managed to trigger their aural-warning system but at least the ergonomics of their system didn't present them with the chance to inadvertently switch it off whilst trying to silence some other distracting warning.

[Brian Abraham]

How to nearly land a 747 gear up at LAX. Can be all too simple.
Pelican's Perch #80: Gear-Up Landing In A 747? (http://www.avweb.com/news/pelican/188536-1.html)