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Centaurus
25th Dec 2008, 10:11
In the old days during my Air force flying training on Tiger Moths, if you had not flown solo by ten hours things looked grim career wise. If not by 12 hours you were scrubbed. You could have had an incompetent screamer as instructor but that was your bad luck because if it wasn't working out then it took a brave student to ask for instructor change.

Of course there must be some sort of limit on how long you persist with a student perceived as slow and I guess the 12 hour limit, which was quite arbitary, was used as an average decision point. Keep in mind the military had relatively experienced pilots as flying instructors in terms of total flying hours, even though some may have just graduated as new instructors. For example using my case I had around 1500 hours on heavy bombers (1955 vintage) when I was posted to an instructors course.

This thread is prompted by a AAIB report in another forum about a very hard landing in an A320 by a new first officer with 3-400 hours total time The report was one of the best I have seen for concise writing and gave a potted history of this pilot's flying training up to to where he really stuffed the A320 landing. His progress reports throughout his A320 simulator training and his line training revealed he had re-occuring problems with the flare and touch down.

We have all had occasional "firm" landings in our career. But where it is apparent someone is having a lot more than the usual problems with landing a jet, then somewhere along the line someone has to make the difficult decision to call a halt and examine the options. In other words, ignore what may be a potentially serious lack of skill by the student and look the other way - OR - pull the plug on him/her and wear the tears.

The decision to continue looking the other way or to scrub the student on jet training, is sometimes compounded by a sympathetic instructor knowing the student has already spent a fortune on training. An instructor change may solve things - especially if the new instructor has the conviction to say enough is enough - sorry old chap but you are too erratic in your landings to be safe in a jet transport and I suggest you look around for a job in general aviation. We cannot risk having you as second in command of a big jet.

I surmised from the AAIB report that the first officer paid up front for a first officer's job on a jet. All of his instructors in the simulator could not be wrong, yet it seemed he was let slip through the training system even though there was no shortage of evidence that the poor chap was consistently unable to make safe landings with any degree of consistency.

He was finally let loose from the A320 simulator (there must have been misgivings) and went on to line training where the record revealed same problems with firm landings caused by late or no flare. But the company persisted - perhaps because he was paying for this training under an arrangement. The AAIB report alludes to this.

Regardless of financial arrangements between new pilot and the company, it seems to me the policy of buying a first officer's position in a transport jet needs to be reviewed. In the "old days" (please forgive the use of that term but you must know what I mean), passengers could expect two very experienced pilots up front. This policy has long since gone to be replaced on many occasions by an experienced captain and a very low hour inexperienced (in flying hours) second in command. The second in command bit is scary especially when the truth is the second in command may have less than 1000 hours.

I believe the solution is to bite the bullet and decide by mid way through the type rating course whether or not the candidate will in all probability never be more than below average. Rather than press on at his expense in the hope he will come good eventually, and then duck-shove him to the line training captain who is forced to wear the hard landings and stuff the frightened passengers - maybe the student (for want of a better word) should be told in a sympathetic manner that he is scrubbed.

We have all flown with pilots who are pretty ropey and shouldn't be in the seat. Why were they let go for so long? If the problem with a student arises early in his simulator training, then the instructor should never be put in the position that he is quietly pressured into passing a student on a type rating because of perceived commercial pressures. There is much of value to be learned from reading the A320 AAIB report on the hard landing. I suspect it is the tip of the iceberg in simulator training paid up front by the student.

Hansard
25th Dec 2008, 16:12
"He who pays the piper calls the tune". We need to return to the days of progress based on merit. However, I have a great deal of sympathy for the FO in question. His first mistake was probably buying a quick, cheap 45-hour PPL in the States. As someone on the original thread said, many of these people are not deemed to be fit to fly solo when they return to the UK. As an Instructor who was paid to teach un-selected all-comers, I know that practically everyone can reach an acceptable standard in time and I believe that instruction given and standards set and met during the initial hours of training are crucual to the student's future progress. There were times when I recommended going back to absolute basics with students who were struggling, notably in the circuit phase. By that stage, they should have the feel of the aircraft and should simply be fine-tuning their judgement.

BOAC
25th Dec 2008, 17:24
Brief gap in present opening/dogs/grandchildren/eating etc! Can you post a link to that thread please C to save a bit of searching??

to be replaced on many occasions by an experienced captain and a very low hour inexperienced (in flying hours) second in command. - problems really start, however, when the aviation cycle picks up again and the left seat is not that good either.

It is difficult to do much about the 'crashers' when you only see one bad landing ever from them since you do not fly with them again for ages - we rely on a robust and honest training system. Often 'grabbing it' as you sense the impending doom makes things worse. Given the opportunity to see more than one handling sector makes it easier for us - and then of course you find yourself barring further landings and breathlessy wondering what financial incentive got he/she that far:eek:

Centaurus
26th Dec 2008, 09:19
Brief gap in present opening/dogs/grandchildren/eating etc! Can you post a link to that thread please C to save a bit of searching??


Quote:
Originally Posted by C
to be replaced on many occasions by an experienced captain and a very low hour inexperienced (in flying hours) second in command


BOAC. There is no specific link to the above highlighted statement. I based it upon personal experiences when flying on a contract in Europe many years ago and latterly with simulator observations while training various Asian operators. Low hour first officers crewed with experienced captains is nothing new of course. Like many who subscribe on Pprune there may be an undesirable tendency to generalise based upon what we have seen personally and I am guilty of that occasionally.

It might be that there for the Grace of God go I, feeling, but instructors on transport jets need to be careful that sympathy for a new pilot experiencing significant handling problems does not lead to passing someone for a type rating when they have definately failed to meet a minimim standard.

BOAC
26th Dec 2008, 12:21
This thread is prompted by a AAIB report in another forum - I'd be interested in that link if you would? Sorry - I think you possibly misunderstood the request. Clarity of expression not a highly rated feature of mine:)

parabellum
26th Dec 2008, 22:05
I think it might be this one:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/354969-pay-fly-wannabee-damages-thomas-cook-airbus.html

Blues&twos
26th Dec 2008, 22:06
It is probably this one in this month's AAIB Bulletins.

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/Airbus%20A320,%20G-DHJZ%2012-08.pdf

Reading the report with repeated references to the FO's inconsistent landings it does make you wonder why nothing was done sooner.

Parabellum - just noticed you beat me to it by a few seconds!

BOAC
27th Dec 2008, 08:09
Thanks both. I have had experience of a similar 'performance' but action was taken and it was 'resolved'. Unfortunately it had been considered 'bad form' by some 'experts' to initiate a review.:ugh:

exeng
29th Dec 2008, 21:15
Couldn't resist - sorry. You're actions were quite correct and something should have been said and done sooner. I dressed myself down later on upon reflection.


Regards
Exeng

stue
30th Dec 2008, 14:45
Just as an aside, apologies because it’s a bit of a thread drift........

What would be classed as a low hours F/O? Where would you guys think, being very experienced yourselves, is the change between a low hours F/O and (for want of a better phrase) a “normal” F/O? Obviously I fully understand that there is no defined limit, be it, hours, year’s service etc. But, as a Captain, where would you draw the line between a low hours F/O and a “normal” F/O?

Just curious really....

It’s a very interesting AAIB report though.

B737NG
30th Dec 2008, 17:33
I have trained Pilots with 300 hours and with 3000 hours, sometime the low time where the better ones as they listened what was the Centerline and where happy to get tipps how to do it better. The high timers often thought that the critique is there to demote them, they where mentaly on the left seat and "blocked" them selves to become better and have more finesse.....

Fly safe and land happy

NG

parabellum
30th Dec 2008, 22:59
Stue - training complete and cleared to the line approximately 250 hours a 'Low time F/O', 300 to 500 hours on type moving into the 'Normal' range but as B737NG says, it will vary with individuals, + and - a bit.

jolly girl
31st Dec 2008, 16:08
To piggyback on Stue,
Is a Partially Mission Capable / Fully Mission Capable type structure ever used to evaluate FO perfomance?

L'aviateur
31st Dec 2008, 20:13
Is low hours really the problem? Because with the traditional sponsorship's where the airlines know that all the sponsored students were going to be in the RHS with low hours, and even now a lot of companies including BA like to take on OATS graduates.
Must be benefits with both high and low hour students.

I read the report in question, and must say that i'm surprised after reading the history to see the FO got as far as the Type Rating nevermind the Line Training.

low n' slow
14th Jan 2009, 19:18
Having companies that refuse to ground crews because they will loose the funds with which the pilots bought their line training is unacceptable. The same goes for companies that have such tight economic situations that they cannot afford to ground a pilot due to a sub-standard LPC/PC.

There's a reason that companies are required to maintain an economic level (2 or 3 times?!) above that required to maintain operations.

It's a lesson learned previously the hard way and with this latest economic peak, we've rewritten the rulebook completely, thereby leading us into re-taking the exact same lessons.

It's everybody's fault we've taken this route.
- The companies for inventing it.
- Us for not hindering it properly.
- The newcommers for accepting it.
- The media for not exposing it.

Would you feel as safe beneath a scalpel of a surgeon that cheated through medical school by paying more than everybody else, as you would under one who followed the standard route with selection based on merit?

/LnS

towser
17th Jan 2009, 10:02
JG - In the airline I work for a new to type/company F/O has more restricting operating limits imposed on him/her for the first 6 months i.e. lower cross wind limits , higher visibility etc. So I guess you could compare that to your partial mission ready/fully mission ready

flipster
17th Jan 2009, 12:20
The training dept involved sounds like it was a vulnerable system (Reason) and this incident occurred because there were too many big holes in the 3 layers of swiss cheese - at organizational, supervisional and local levels that allowed the threat of the co's less-than-ideal landing technique to become an accident.

It is good to see that apparently, this is a just-culture in action because blame is not being apportioned to either the co-pilot, the trainer nor the organisation (one hopes?) and that more layers of defence have been put in place - eg better training, supervision and organisational regulations. One also presumes that the co and the trainer have been provided with training opportunities to overcome their own limitations?

However, have other airlines or individuals learnt from this - would they react the same 'just' way or would they prefer to approprion the blame on the crew - if they would, then maybe they are part of a vulnerable system or are themselves vulnerable?

In the light of this incident, one could argue that even more could be done (eg do away with self-funded, non-aptitude-assessed training??). Discuss if you wish.