Pilots and Parachutes. (Merged)

[vabsie]

All ..

I know the parachutes discussion has done the rounds in the past on this forum, but this is the first time that I have actually come across this website:

http://brsparachutes.com/default.aspx

I always used to think that parachutes mostly get added to aeroplanes as part of a factory fitted process, but it appears that this is not the case with all models as the above link suggests.

I have a couple of questions for those of you who might have some experience with these:


If you have one fitted, does it give you a much bigger sense of feeling safe?
Is this easily available in the UK or more the US?
Can it be fitted to say a Piper Warrior?
And this might be a harder question, but if you have to think of all or some of the GA Fatal Incidents that you have read about or know of, what percentage of would possibly not have been fatal if this parachute system was fitted (a rough guess)? I guess the question should really read will this system prevent most fatalities.I had a look at a couple of videos on youtube .. quite interesting.

check out this one: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXQKaxp6Rlk

Anyway, as some of you know I'm not a qualified ppl yet so don't take the p1$$ if some of the questions are silly.

S

[airborne_artist]

There are so many questions, but here's two:

1) How many of the "lives saved" could have made a perfectly good forced landing?

2) What percentage of incidents fall outside of the operating parameters of the BRS due to lack of sufficient altitude?

I'll add though that I know two pilots (instructor and his student) whose lives were saved by conventional parachutes - they jumped from a Bulldog in 1979.

[Mike Cross]

It's not just the parachute, the airframe is important as well.

In the case of the Cirrus for example there is a safety cage to protect the cabin and special high-G seats to protect the occupants. It's said that the impact is equivalent to jumping off a 10 foot wall. Now doing that is bad enough when you land on your legs and they bend to absorb the impact. Jumping off a 10 foot wall and landing on your @rse is in a different league.

Collapse of the undercariage and airframe structure will absorb some of the energy if its been designed for it (bit like crumple zones in a car). Just sticking a BRS into an airframe not designed for one won't necessarily provide much protection.

Then again longitudinal strength will come into it. A Cirrus is supported by strops that go more or less to the lower engine mount positions and to a point behid the cabin. On a conventional airframe those points almost certainly won't take upward wrenching loads and the thing might well fold up in the middle.

[flybymike]

And one cannot help wondering whether what might have turned out to be a successful forced landing is instead replaced by a parachute which dumps the aircraft and its occupants down in the middle of the M1 motorway where they are all promptly run over by a forty ton juggernaut. Clearly when and when not to deploy the chute is highly relevant

[vabsie]

Cheers for the responses so far

flybymike - I agree, it would be great if a landing could be pulled off instead, but having a parachute does not mean use it willy nilly and i'm sure that most experienced pilots would look at other options first.

BUT

Would it not be nice to know you have it in case you have a jam in your control services? (if this is possible) Or at least give you peace of mind that if something like that happend you "might" be OK?

Hence my questions above ..

[flybymike]

Clearly there are circumstances ( engine failure at night, airframe failure, jammed controls, inhospitable terrain, irrecoverable spins, even perhaps ditching) where a pilot might feel a lot happierwith a BRS prachute on board...:)

[Kengineer-130]

From my point of view, it would be the last line of defence. 99% of problems could be sorted out with a forced landing, as even a bad one will still be a better option than a near vertical landing albeit somewhat cushioned...

Main things that would make it a no-brainer to pull the handle would be:

1) Inflight structural failure
2) Mid-air collision
3) unrecoverable spin ( but again, you have to be trying hard to spin accidently if you have passed your PPL)
4) No viable forced landing option.

Can never really see an extra option being a bad thing, as long as the user is aware that it is not a get out of jail free card.

In some ways I find that the more dangerous the activity, the more careful people are, hence aviation safty is very impressive, compared to road users who are molly-coddled by cars with a vast array of "idiot behind the wheel" driver aids such as: ABS/ traction control, stability control, airbags etc etc , and become complacent of (very very)poor driving, hence why road accidents are so common, 95% of the time a modern car covers up peoples appaling driving skills.

[172driver]

Ever tried to open a door at 100+ knts ? :E

[Mike Parsons]

One of the reasons I can think of is that it would make the flight more uncomfortable.

If you compare gliding (which I have done only around 5 hours) the seats are made for a parachute (slightly different I know) and you wouldn't fly without one - partly because it's a nice cushion ;)

[tuscan]

Comfort does it for me, Im 6`4 and any extra in the seat means less space for me.

[18greens]

If you were in the RAF you would wear one because they do. In the civil world they don't because thats what they do. Give civil pilots them the option to jump out??? you'd have the country littered with aeroplanes without pilots, encourages LMF etc etc.

You jump out of a plane if its on fire or the wing breaks, in all other cases landing is safer they say. Gliders fly right next to each other in thermals so higher risk of collision.

If the wing came off the aircraft it would be moving about spectacularly, a 100 mph wind would be the least of your worries.

I think we stopped wearing parachutes when they tried to make aeroplanes like cars, out with the 5 point harness, in with the 3 point inertia reel and comfy seats. Wearing a parachute means you will crash, scary (and it creases your suit)

[Maoraigh1]

If you want a parachute, get a ballistic parachute, for the plane. Airframe failures are so few, I prefer to save money, and fly a Jodel rather than a Cirrus.

[XX621]

RAF pilots wear parachutes as they are exposed to more risk than us PPLs.
Also very expensive to train RAF aircrew - i.e. investment protection.

I have considered getting one of those really slim chutes, but it doesn't really stand up to close scrutiny in PPL land..(exception, aeros obv). The only other scenario I can think of where a chute would be of realistic value in civi flying would an engine donk at altitude and you had time to gather your belongings and jump out whilst straight and level. Although, even then, I think I would rather do a forced landing and, hopefully, save the plane & persons on the ground.

I have often wondered if persons flying around in their shiney Cirrus machines fly Cirrus because it has a "I'm too rich to die like this, get me out of here" handle? :E

[SNS3Guppy]

Yes I have opened the door at 100kts, not easy, especially if the power is on but cut the power and raise the nose if poss and it is easy!


Ever opened the door and climbed out at 100 knots or higher, wearing parachute gear? I surely have...you may have pushed the door open slightly...but you didn't get out of the airplane and think it was easy.

Snag a D ring on the way out and you end up with a pilot chute and bridle wrapped around the airframe and now you're a fatal mishap about to happen.

Ever been under canopy or in free fall?

Many who do wear parachutes, including for aerobatics, have never bothered to get proper instruction in the use of that parachute, parachute malfunctions, etc.

I've had a number of inflight emergencies, ranging from simple engine failures to inflight fires. I've yet to consider getting out, or need a parachute to do it. I've been jumping out of airplanes for years. I'm comfortable doing it. I've had several parachute malfunctions over the years, several reserve rides, and was once hospitalized in intensive care following a jump that ended badly.

I'm not sure the wearing and use of parachutes by the average general aviation pilot is warranted, or necessary.

[liam548]

i dont see how it would work in the real world. If it was a viable option more people would be wearing them.
Would there not be a real risk of hitting youself on the plane as you jumped, its all very nice jumping out of a plane when there is still a pilot flying it nice and steady.

And what about your passengers, i just dont see how it would work..

[Human Factor]

Depends what you're doing. If you're going on a Saturday morning hunt for a £100 bacon buttie, I would say it's pretty unnecessary. If you're planning to fly your aeroplane nearer to it's limits (aerobatics) or in close proximity to other aircraft (formation), I would never be without one.

[eharding]

We've been round this one on a number of previous threads, and I've posted this link before as well but for those who haven't read it, I thoroughly recommend Eddie Goggins' article in the ANR

http://www.aerobatics.org.uk/Journal_Nov_07.pdf#page=39

However, this is in the context of aerobatic types designed with emergency egress by parachute in mind - the average GA touring type was never designed on this basis, which in general makes the whole proposition unfeasible (and that's before we consider the dynamics of getting three or more passengers over the side).

Regarding SN3Guppy's comments - yes, as with any piece of emergency equipment, the user needs to understand the appropriate means of operation and practice correct maintenance and inspection procedures, but whilst I wear a parachute on most occasions I fly, I have yet to make a planned or unplanned descent using one - in the same way that I don't smack my head violently against the tailplane of the Yak whilst wearing a Gentex helmet to make sure I'll be familiar with the experience should I need to jump over the side, or spend a couple of hours bobbing about in a life raft in the North Atlantic to be sure I understand what exposure feels like - I fully expect that should I ever need to use an emergency parachute, it will be a violent, brutally painful experience that will almost certainly result in a couple of broken legs, but that the experience will be preferable to the alternative - frankly, you'd have to be mad to want to use one. :E

[Rod1]

“Can never really see an extra option being a bad thing, as long as the user is aware that it is not a get out of jail free card.”

How about when you clip the far hedge due to all the extra weight?

Rod1

[Legalapproach]

And what would you have done with your passengers?

[Pilot DAR]

Having considered such additional safety equipment, and how or when I would have ever thought to use it, during more than 5000 hours of GA flying, the answer comes back to me: NEVER! Certainly one can speculate on conditions of aircraft failure where such an additional safety feature would be reassuring, but I assure you that in the real world of qualified, well prepared flight, of well maintained aircraft, failures which would justify a whole aircraft chute are so rare that I don't think they are statistically relevent.

There is quite a cost, weight penalty, and cabin space penalty for retrofits, along with recurring inspection costs.

Add to that the STC approved installation in the C150 has just been AD'd. The AD itself says that there are 6 such equipped aircraft in the US, and none in Canada.

It is my opinion that there are a wide variety of things a pilot/owner can do to assure a safe flight. If you are feeling insecure about the reliabilty of the aircraft you fly, get to know it by participating in some maintenance. Either you'll get to be much more reassured, and stop worrying; or realize that the particular aircraft is defective and either fix it, or ground it!

Pilot DAR

[smarthawke]

The Cirrus strops actually attach to the top engine mounts aft of the firewall. An interesting point is the strops are supposed to be replaced every 10 years (IIRC) so there must be some early Cirri coming up to needing a fuselage re-glassing and respray when the strops are removed unless they can be removed from inside, or pulled through.

Another problem is for the fire and rescue services - working through the doorway of a bent Cirrus fuselage with a potentially unstable rocket and the strops running underneath the doorway.

The C150 with a BRS fitted was shown on video demonstrating how hard it would touch down. The bottom of the fuse hit the floor, that's how far the gear legs bent. Cessna 150 seats aren't built the same as Cirri ones....

The weight of a BRS could be used for 10 gallons of fuel and whilst there no doubt are times it would save lives it isn't the toal answer. For instance, structural failure? Best you hope the failed structure (broken wing) isn't going to stop the rocket, parachute and lines deploying and behaving as advertised.

[SNS3Guppy]

if it saves lives on the rare occasion that it is used is it worth it?


Of course, if equipment can be useful in a drive to save lives, it ought to find application. However, improperly used and used without proper training, a parachute can be a dangerous device. As you stated, as a D license jumper, you understand what happens if one allows a container to open in the airplane, or a piece of fabric or a pilot chute to get out the door. Failure to protect handles virtually guarantees a fatality...not just for the user, but for everyone on board.

A parachute is a system, not just a passive piece of equipment. It has to be used with proper procedures, and has emergency procedures which must be done properly and in order...and performing the wrong procedure or failure to recognize the proper type of malfunction can turn a salvagable situation into a fatal one very quickly. This is even more crucial in the use of a parachute for emergency operations, especially for those who might elect to use them at low altitudes, or use them in cases when such use isn't warranted.

A good example if improper use are the majority of the Cirrus CAPS deployments...strongly suggesting that pilots have placed themselves in dangerous positions because of the equipment on board. The parachute then becomes a panic button, and is subsequently used under conditions when they ought not. A pilot that elects to fly in weather and loses control deploys a parachute or exits the airplane...he has pushed the "panic button." Unfortunately, he's also elected to make a parachute descent under conditions when one should never make a parachute jump...the parachute has lulled him into making two very bad decisions, either of which could easily be fatal, to say nothing of having abandoned an airplane over a populace which had no choice in his decision making process.

I have yet to make a planned or unplanned descent using one - in the same way that I don't smack my head violently against the tailplane of the Yak whilst wearing a Gentex helmet to make sure I'll be familiar with the experience should I need to jump over the side, or spend a couple of hours bobbing about in a life raft in the North Atlantic to be sure I understand what exposure feels like - I fully expect that should I ever need to use an emergency parachute, it will be a violent, brutally painful experience that will almost certainly result in a couple of broken legs, but that the experience will be preferable to the alternative - frankly, you'd have to be mad to want to use one.


I own two parachute rigs, and far from "mad to use one," I find making a sport jump a highly desirable aeronautical activity, and simply another facet of general aviation. One flies a canopy and one flies one's body in freefall every bit as much as one flies a single engine Cessna, a sailplane, a gyroplane, or a helicopter, using aerodynamic principles and control inputs.

A big difference exists between wearing one's protective helmet, and wearing a parachute system. Your helmet won't deploy in flight and potentially destroy your aircraft and kill you. Your helmet won't experience malfunctions that can kill you. Your helmet is designed to provide limited blunt trauma protection, not blossom into a flying device which you will operate and manipulate completely independent of your aircraft, to fly to a landing position on the ground.

I frequently wear a helmet while executing pilot duties, too...and unlike you, I've had occasion to test mine, and use mine. In fact, on a regular basis, my helmet is used to protect me from injuries during violent maneuvering when my head may strike the aircraft canopy...and it sometimes does, as well as protection provided during ground impact or a crash (which it has also done).

Your helmet does not require frequent inspection and rebuilding. A parachute requires frequent inspection and repacking. Your helmet does not require operation of handles, releases, controls, whereas a parachute system does. Your helmet does not become a flying machine. Your parachute does. Your helmet does not experience life threatening emergencies which require user correction to prevent injury or death. Your parachute system certainly can.

I carry a firearm, and am required to demonstrate proficiency with the firearm, as well as a working knowledge of the principles and legalities of use of force. Several of my employers, including my current one, have required the carriage of rafts and survival equipment on board the equipment. Accordingly, I have been required to undergo training and to demonstrate water survival, while wearing flying clothing, including righting an overturned raft, providing aid to others in the water, survival away from the raft, etc. I have a fire extinguisher on board, and have not only used it on aircraft fires, but have been required to undergo training in the proper use thereof...to include demonstrating putting out a fire using the extinguisher.

I recently underwent recurrent training. Prior to arriving at the company headquarters for classroom and then simulator training, I was required to demonstrate in the airplane a working knowledge of use of all the emergency exits, equipment, etc...right down to physically opening each kind of exit, retrieving and donning emergency equipment (including onboard firefighting gear), and so forth. You see the point. One might take that example to the extreme and ask if we're required to deploy emergency slides or escape reels...the answer is "no." Due to the cost (hundreds of thousands of dollars) involved in blowing all the slides, we don't do that. The slides undergo regular inspections, however, and even the escape reels must undergo regular drop tests with weights, and must be individually maintained and their wear, use and life limits closely monitored. There's a big difference between getting out of an airplane in flight and freefalling clear in an emergency situation and then deploying a canopy to a successful landing, and jumping onto a rubber slide on a stationary aircraft on the ground.

You shouldn't anticipate a violent parachute jump...it's not the jump, nor the opening, that should be your concern. Neither should the landing be a concern. Being able to get out, get stable, or know when you don't have time to get stable, deploy, recognize a malfunction, recognize a good canopy, clear a malfunction, cut away (if applicable), and maneuver and land the canopy around obstacles such as powerlines, etc...these are critical things you should know and understand not only regarding parachutes in general, but for your specific system. The differences between a round parachute and a ram-air parachute, for example, are significant, as are the differences in their control under normal and abnormal conditions...even releasing one's self or collapsing the canopy...crucial of their own accord in the event of a landing under windy conditions or landing in water. Even a landing in water requires specific training; your helmet won't drown you...but your parachute most definitely can.

A parachute is a full aeronautical system, just like your parachute. You check out on a new airplane, and you receive flight instruction and must demonstrate proficiency in learning to fly. The same should absolutely apply to the use of a parachute.

[execExpress]

"A good example if improper use are the majority of the Cirrus CAPS deployments...strongly suggesting that pilots have placed themselves in dangerous positions because of the equipment on board."
=================================================
Can you direct us to evidence supporting this "strong suggestiveness" and assertions of "majority being improper use" please?

[eharding]

With all due respect to SN3Guppy and Skyhawk Pilot, both self-confessed sport parachutists, I maintain my position that you have to be several iced buns and a couple of pies short of a picnic to want to make a parachute descent on a purely voluntary basis - I note SN3Guppy in a previous post recounts his hospitalisation after one particularly unfortunate event, which in itself doesn't act as an advertisement. However, I recognise that my chosen pursuit, competition aerobatics, might well be regarded by some as being in picnic hamper content deficiency territory, but each to their own.

As regards the comment about helmets not needing frequent inspection and rebuilding - I can only say having experienced the quality of soldering and component fit on an eye-wateringly expensive custom lid from a certain Californian company, that certainly isn't the case - not that the products of other manufacturers seem to be much better, and at least Gentex spares and after-market replacements are easy and cheap to obtain (I heartily recommend the services of Oregon Aero, should you need them).

I suspect than some form of head protection might save a lot more lives in accidents involving typical GA touring types rather than the provision of personal or airframe parachutes, but that is probably another thread's worth on it's own.

[SNS3Guppy]

I note SN3Guppy in a previous post recounts his hospitalisation after one particularly unfortunate event, which in itself doesn't act as an advertisement.


That particular jump occured in strong winds in mountainous terrain with a lot of desert plants such as cactus, and the impact point was on a cliff. Not normal conditions for sport skydives, and an unfortunate result of several culminating events which don't need discussion right now.

I've experienced forced landings, inflight engine and equipment failures, aircraft fires, and other inflight and ground emergencies...do these then mean one shouldn't engage in flight in an airplane?

Parachutes fail. Equipment fails. One should still be fully trained in it's use, and this speaks more to a need for adequate training to handle unusual events...a parachute as much as anything else. After all, we don't train for the times things work properly. We train for those times when they don't.

Can you direct us to evidence supporting this "strong suggestiveness" and assertions of "majority being improper use" please?


Yes. Nearly every CAPS deployment in Cirrus aircraft, for starters. That should suffice.

[Fuji Abound]

Yes. Nearly every CAPS deployment in Cirrus aircraft, for starters. That should suffice.

At the least generous 5/14 hardly qualifies as "nearly every". With a little generousity not even half fall into this category.

[eharding]

That particular jump occured in strong winds in mountainous terrain with a lot of desert plants such as cactus, and the impact point was on a cliff. Not normal conditions for sport skydives, and an unfortunate result of several culminating events which don't need discussion right now.


I'd have loved to have been a fly on the wall at the briefing for that one. "The wind is Oh-Sh!t knots gusting Dear-Sweet-Lord knots, the cactus plants are here, here and here, and the northern edge of the drop zone is roughly 800 feet higher than the southern edge. Any questions?"


I've experienced forced landings, inflight engine and equipment failures, aircraft fires, and other inflight and ground emergencies...do these then mean one shouldn't engage in flight in an airplane?


Well, that depends on the period of time over which these events occurred - if as I understand, they were over several decades and several tens of thousands of hours of flight time, then I think we can just put that down to the law of averages; if, on the other hand, they were all to occur within the space of a couple of weeks, then I'd say there would be a ground frost in Hell before I'd get in an airframe maintained by your engineering organisation, and in fact that the firearms which you tell us you're licensed to hold might well be used to good effect on the individuals within that organisation.

[Mark1234]

You shouldn't anticipate a violent parachute jump...it's not the jump, nor the opening, that should be your concern. Neither should the landing be a concern. Being able to get out, get stable, or know when you don't have time to get stable, deploy, recognize a malfunction, recognize a good canopy, clear a malfunction, cut away (if applicable), and maneuver and land the canopy around obstacles such as powerlines, etc...these are critical things you should know and understand not only regarding parachutes in general, but for your specific system.

In all seriousness, how much of that is applicable to an emergency parachute vs a sport jumper?

Everytime I go up in a glider I strap on one of these irvine (or similar) slimpacks.. They're repacked every 3 months, the aircraft is designed such that I have a reasonable chance of escape, but it's very much a last ditch. I understand the canopy is round, quite small, and the descent rate is "about equivalent to jumping off a double decker bus" i.e. expect broken bones. It's maybe the stuff of legend, but allegedly the gliding club did do an exercise where a few people were trained and jumped under supervision - with about 50% ending up in hospital, so they stopped that idea.

So, if all else fails, scramble clear, pull the red handle and hope. No reserve. If it doesn't deploy, you're stuffed, if it's not stable, you're stuffed, if, etc., etc! It would be useful to know how to kill the canopy - I'm thinking grab one set of lines and pull. I don't believe there's any steering on them..

That said, they do work - there have been some miraculous escapes, even from very low level midairs. But then the gliding folk have this habit of congregating under likely looking clouds, all going round in circles at very close quaters...

[SNS3Guppy]

In all seriousness, how much of that is applicable to an emergency parachute vs a sport jumper?

Everytime I go up in a glider I strap on one of these irvine (or similar) slimpacks.. They're repacked every 3 months, the aircraft is designed such that I have a reasonable chance of escape, but it's very much a last ditch. I understand the canopy is round, quite small, and the descent rate is "about equivalent to jumping off a double decker bus" i.e. expect broken bones. It's maybe the stuff of legend, but allegedly the gliding club did do an exercise where a few people were trained and jumped under supervision - with about 50% ending up in hospital, so they stopped that idea.


Very relevant. It's easy to believe the myths about round parachutes, but goes to prove that clearly the user has no idea what to expect, how to operaterate, how to land, what to do with wire or powerline landing, tree landing, water landing, or even how to do a parachute landing fall. How do you imagine we survived jumping round parachutes all these years? Expect broken bones? This is a cavalier attitude regarding use of a lifesaving device in sheer ignorance of it's function or proper use.

Having jumped and landed round parachutes, including round reserves myself, I can tell you that if 50% of the jumpers are winding up with broken bones...there's a serious issue. It's not with the parachute, either. Next time use proper training and that won't happen. One should never use a parachute that's insufficient for one's loaded weight...which includes the weight of the jumper/user in all his gear, and that of the parachute assembly as well. Jump with too small a parachute then one takes unnecessary risks...but this comes back to proper training. One has no business exceeding the weight limits for an aircraft, either. Same principle applies.

So, if all else fails, scramble clear, pull the red handle and hope. No reserve. If it doesn't deploy, you're stuffed, if it's not stable, you're stuffed, if, etc., etc! It would be useful to know how to kill the canopy - I'm thinking grab one set of lines and pull. I don't believe there's any steering on them..


No, don't guess. No, don't hope. No reserve? It is the reserve. You've got one shot at it; get it right. If it doesn't deploy, you're "stuffed?" Hardly. What to do about a floating pilot chute; it comes off the pack but fails to inflate in the burble behind your back? With proper training, one would know to reach back there and launch it into the slip stream, or dip a shoulder and let the slipstream take it off your back...not knowing that could kill you.

If it's not stable, you say...but it's you that should be getting stable...knowing how to do that is important. Knowing when not to wait is also important. Be unstable and you'll run into the problem I had during an unstable exit while carrying a pumpkin under one arm on halloween...a pilot chute bridle wrapped around one arm and a closed canopy; a total malfunction. Do this on a reserve, unstable, and wind up with a horseshoe malfunction that can't be fixed. You've just killed yourself by failing to get stable.

If it malfunctions you can't do anything about it, you say? Not at all true. Again, particular to the type of canopy you have...many pilot rigs now employ square ram-air canopies...it could be a line-over or it could be an end-cell closure...problems that can dealt with, and should be dealt with.

Not controllable? You mean you don't know how to steer the canopy? This is a big problem. It's nearly inconceivable that one would undertake learning to control an airplane, but strap on a parachute in complete ignorance..."I think I pull this little handle here."

This is aviation. We know. We don't guess.

That device is there to save your life. Isn't your life worth the time it takes to use it properly? Why wear it at all?

At the least generous 5/14 hardly qualifies as "nearly every". With a little generousity not even half fall into this category.


Most certainly do fall into this category. A sampling of Wikipedia's listing of these events, for example, cites the following:

As of April 2007, the CAPS has been deployed over two hundred times (some still under investigation):

1. October 2002, Texas: detached aileron Preflighting airplanes prevents needing to use panic button parachutes, and prevents ailerons from detaching in flight. Note that taken from that NTSB report, the following Cirrus statement is identified: The CAPS deployment is expected to result in the destruction of the airframe, and possible severe injury or death to the occupants.

2. April 2003, British Columbia: loss of control in turbulence (aircraft C-GEMC), 4 uninjured Putting the airplane in places it shouldn't be, such as in high winds at night over the mountains...eliminates the need to use the panic button. High winds over the mountains at night, incidentally, is exactly the wrong place to use a parachute.

3. April 2004, Florida: instrument failure in IFR conditions, 1 uninjured In the real world, we fly the airplane down and train for partial panel situations. A pilot incapable of doing this, who goes into conditions beyond his capabilities based on having the panic button parachute in hand...should never have been there in the first place. An improper preflight failed to drain the static lines, resulting in instrument problems.

4. September 2004, California: loss of control in high-altitude climb above clouds, 2 uninjured Again, a situation that the pilot should never have been in; one flies beyond one's capabilities, one uses the panic button...one has unnecessarily gone where one shouldn't have been and used what didn't need to be used...when the airplane could simply have been flown to a landing. Again, we're not even talking about a broken airpalne here...just a pilot who elected to deploy a parachute on a perfectly good airplane. This brain surgeon-rocket scientist flew into a Level 5 thunderstorm...not really the best place to fly, shows poor judgement, and certainly a very poor place to deploy a parachute canopy.

5. January 2005, California: parachute deployed above design limits, pilot fatality (unknown if intentionally activated) Didn't do this guy a lot of good, did it? A departure in icing conditions and IMC by a very low time pilot who lost control in ice...shouldn't have been there, was beyond his capabilities, didn't help him...and would he have made the flight without that useless panic button there to lure him into a dangerous area?

6. June 2005, New York: pilot incapacitated from undiagnosed brain tumor, 1 injured A possibly valid use, and one of the few in which the parachute didn't lure or goad the pilot into doing something stupid. This case is clearly by far in the minority. The pilot lost control, but had recovered control of the aircraft by 1,700' before deploying the parachute and making a forced landing under canopy in a river, fracturing his vertebrae.

7. January 2006, Alabama: loss of control after pilot flew into icing, 3 uninjured Once again, pilots who flew beyond their own capabilities and that of the aircraft, relying not on airmanship, not on flying a good airplane to a safe landing, but upon the panic button.

8. February 2006, South Dakota: pilot reported disorientation, 2 uninjured Pilot disorientation, again. A common theme. Not a broken airplane...just pilots who shouldn't have been there in the first place, flew beyond their own capabilities, and who then used the panic button to get back down. Did these individuals fly to a place they should never have gone because they had the security of the panic button? A common theme with the vast majority of the deployments.

9. August 2006, Indiana: parachute deployed three miles from departure end of runway, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger because the pilot had fainted, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured While wikipedia states that it was pilot incapacitation, it wasn't. The aircraft was loaded out of CG, the pilot repeatedly stalled the aircraft, the pilot asked the passenger to pull the handle, and the pilot was killed and the passengers injured. The pilot struggled to fly the airplane and badly botched it into a fatal mishap...there was nothing wrong with the airplane other than pilot error in a poor CG with an overloaded baggage compartment. Panic button and an unnecessary crash and loss of life...in fact it wasn't the CG which caused the crash, but the deployment of the CAPS system, and a pilot who couldn't handle the airplane. Chalk it up once again to the same majority of the incidents...pilot error, unnecessary use, and a system that took the pilot to places he wasn't capable of going and to a place where he never should have been.

10. September 2006, Jamaica: pilot activated parachute under unknown circumstances, 4 uninjured VMC, pilot report of engine trouble, and lucky they lived at all. Panic button applied at 4,500', and a subsequent landing in a ravine. In the real world, when we have a functioning airplane, we land the airplane, rather than abandoning control to a parachute attached to the airplane, which the manufacturer states is expected to destroy the airplane, and possibly cause severe injury or death to the occupants...however this falls in the same category as the vast majority of other CAPS deployments...a panic button deployment.

11. September 2006, Colorado: Plane destroyed with 2 fatalities after reports of icing problems at 14,000 feet. A preliminary report from the NTSB contains the sentence "A witness in the area observed a portion of the fuselage being drug by the deployed aircraft recovery parachute." According to the NTSB...The pilot's improper in-flight planning and decision making resulting in an inadvertent encounter with severe icing conditions during cruise flight and subsequent loss of aircraft control. Contributing factors include the pilot's failure to obtain a weather briefing, the thunderstorm, conditions conducive for structural icing, and the pilot's failure to deploy the parachute recovery system. The Cirrus isn't approved for flight into known ice, nor into thunderstorms...not is it advised for low time pilots.

12. February 2007, NSW, Australia: Fuel line pressure sensor connection cap separated and loss of pressure stopped the engine. After an approach to a freeway forced landing, CAPS was activated, the rocket fired, but got tangled with the empennage resulting in parachute undeployment. The plane impacted ground in nose down attitude seriously injuring both occupants. The pilot was setting up for a landing and pulled the panic button anyway...it failed, partially entangling with the empennage, and the airplane veered away from the road, resulting in injuries and damage. Chalk it up to another failure...both to deploy properly, and a deployment that never should have been made in the first place...again, part of the vast majority.

13. April 2007, Luna, New Mexico: The pilot experienced spatial disorientation following loss of the airspeed indicator. After the terrain warning went off, CAPS was activated and the plane came to rest in a forested area. A low-time, inexperienced pilot out of his depth, in a place he shouldn't have been, who lost control. Not because of the airspeed indicator, as that had returned and was functioning when he applied the panic button...he was simply losing control because he wasn't capable and shouldn't have been there in the first place...like most of the other deployments...which are, in fact, the vast majority (as I correctly stated before).

14. August 2007, Nantucket Island, Mass: Two people aboard, one suffered serious injury after their Cirrus made a parachute landing on Nantucket. FAA spokeswoman Holly Baker said the Cirrus aircraft apparently was trying to land at Nantucket under visual flight rules when the weather deteriorated. She said the pilot used the plane's parachute system and the Cirrus made a hard landing, apparently hitting the guy wires of a LORAN tower in the village of Siasconset, about five miles northeast of the Nantucket airport. Surprise, surprise...same story, different day, pilot beyond his capabilities in a place he shouldn't have been, lost control, used the panic button...again. See the trend? Pilots resorting to the panic button when they shouldn't have been there in the first place...over, and over, and over again. Nothing new here, but in the vast majority, all the same.

[chrisN]

In the 1970’s, 7 people from my gliding club went on a parachute course for a weekend, which culminated in one real jump each (I believe with static lines to ensure that they did not forget to pull the D-ring).

One was injured (ankles, came back on crutches), one had a bad exit and started falling on his back so the ‘chute deployed under his armpit until he found out how to roll over, one went through a barn roof (I was told – but only bruising resulted), and two others had non-standard events, so only 2 out of 7 had normal uneventful jumps, IIRC.

I expect that is an atypically high rate of untoward incidents in jump training, but many of us then decided that we would take the remote chance of having to use a parachute in anger with only our normal oral briefing – which happily has worked for almost all the small number of real emergency glider pilot bale-outs. No one from my club has ever had to jump from a glider for real. I don’t have accurate numbers for total UK gliding, but it is less than one a year on average, in over 200,000 flights p.a..

I would like to thank Guppy for the very informative postings.

Chris N.

[SNS3Guppy]

In the 1970’s, 7 people from my gliding club went on a parachute course for a weekend, which culminated in one real jump each (I believe with static lines to ensure that they did not forget to pull the D-ring).

One was injured (ankles, came back on crutches), one had a bad exit and started falling on his back so the ‘chute deployed under his armpit until he found out how to roll over, one went through a barn roof (I was told – but only bruising resulted), and two others had non-standard events, so only 2 out of 7 had normal uneventful jumps, IIRC.


Chris, with modern accelerated free-fall training techniques, with better methods of training, including tandem jumps that can coach a jumper from exit to landing, and with radios and better parachutes...these things need not be a concern any more.

[Fuji Abound]

SNS3Guppy

You must have a very jaundiced view of your fellow pilot?

I am not sure there are many pilots that would skip the pre-flight whilst thinking "not to worry, if something falls off the parachute will get me out of trouble."

I also dont think many pilots continue into IMC when not qualified to do so because they have a chute.

Pilots will go on making bad judgement calls as long as there are pilots. There may even be a very few pilots who set off on a trip they wouldnt have otherwise contemplated making because they had a chute. However, in the main, the pilot didnt make the bad call because he thought he could pull the chute, he made the bad call because of inexperience.

The Cirrus is just another example of an "advanced" aircraft that lulls the pilot into thinking it is more capable aircraft than it is, the chute makes very little difference and is not the factor you believe it to be.

In fact I'd take a bet with you that the majority of these accidents would have happened just the same if the aircraft didnt have a chute. ;)

[SNS3Guppy]

I also dont think many pilots continue into IMC when not qualified to do so because they have a chute.


Perhaps, perhaps not. The vast majority of the CAPS deployments, however, strongly suggest otherwise...as shown here. Virtually every case has been pilots going where they ought not, then unnecessarily resorting to the panic button.

In fact I'd take a bet with you that the majority of these accidents would have happened just the same if the aircraft didnt have a chute.


You'd lose, of course, because in absence of the ability to alter history, you'll be forced to concede that these mishaps did involve the parachute system, and in several cases were caused by the parachute system. The one, you'll recall, which Cirrus states should be "expected to result in the destruction of the airframe, and possible severe injury or death to the occupants." That parachute system.

Most pilots were very inexperienced, several hundred hours. What we have here are people who can afford to buy an airplane, but not the common sense to go with it, who arrogantly step well beyond their capabilities. Cirrus has used the parachute system as a major selling point...look what we have here...a safety device that will save your life (or result in the destruction of the airframe and possible severe injury or death to the occupants)...buy this product...it looks just like your car inside...it's modern, safe...and...did we forget to mention the parachute?

This is a common enticement. I see pilots all the time who think it's okay to fly light airplanes in the ice...because it's got hot props, or boots, or...pick your poison. It's got TKS...everything will be okay. Just like having a parachute, icing equipment is a justification in many cases to do something stupid...remain in ice when at best the equipment should be used for getting out of an encounter, and never to intentionally enter it. Just yesterday I spoke with the owner of a Seneca II who was waiting for a hot windscreen plate so he could go blast off into the ice.

Do parachutes entice pilots to do stupid things? Yes. Civil pilots and military pilots both. Big interiors entice pilots to load the airplane up...I can't count the number of times I've heard said of the Cessna 182 or 206, "It's a big truck. Anything you can fit inside, it can carry." And pilots do. Give a pilot an inch, often as not, he will take a mile...and yes, I do have a VERY low opinion of pilots in general. I have long maintained that 90% of the pilots out there aren't worth their weight in dirty salt...and based on global experience in nearly every facet of aviation out there so far, I'm still convinced this is true.

Make your bet, then.

The Cirrus is just another example of an "advanced" aircraft that lulls the pilot into thinking it is more capable aircraft than it is, the chute makes very little difference and is not the factor you believe it to be.


Again, the data shows otherwise, as do the advertisements and the comments of owners by and large. Do a survey to find out how many though the CAPS system was a factor in their decision to purchase, and in the support of their spouse or partners...and you'll find that the vast majority see it as a major selling point.

As far as advanced...it's another puddle jumper with curvy lines and a high price tag...that's about it.

[Mark1234]

Ok, so I should know better than to stick my neck out :) but at least that's prompted some learning:

Datasheet here: http://www.airborne-sys.com/pdfs/_AS-Website_Marketing_PDFs/11-EMERGENCY%20ESCAPE%20SYSTEMS/Parachute%20Assembly%20650%20range%20(Silhouette)/Silhouette.pdf (http://www.airborne-sys.com/pdfs/_AS-Website_Marketing_PDFs/11-EMERGENCY%20ESCAPE%20SYSTEMS/Parachute%20Assembly%20650%20range%20%28Silhouette%29/Silhouette.pdf)

So, it does have steering (and yes I do know what to do with those, or at least think I do. Have on occasion flown a paraglider). I'm slightly confused now as to what is meant by stabilised - I'd taken that to mean the canopy being stable / not. If you mean stable freefall.. well, all my advice has been of the don't delay, pull the handle before you start tumbling or anything. Given it's somewhat rare to be >5000ft agl, and few pilots are practiced at freefall, that *seems* reasonable - I'm not sure how much time you'd have to mess around.

Just to be clear, I'm not suggesting there's anything wrong with round parachutes. As per the above link, at my circa 100kg fully loaded, that's a descent rate just shy of 7m/s. Nothing to do with roundness, everything to do with size/practicality tradeoff. Broken bones is probably an exaggeration, but that's not what I would consider comfortable or gentle, and not dissimilar to the bus anaolgy.

Very interested in how one should stop the thing once on the ground. Also mulling over the 12000ft max opening alt, and what one would do in the intervening with no experience of freefall..

Rightly or wrongly I think most folks (myself included) consider it a bit like an airbag in a car - to be avoided at all times. If needed, it may save your life, but don't count on it.

[chrisN]

Guppy, Skyhawk (and others), I appreciate your comments, but at my age and with a long-term leg disability, I am not now going to go into any physical training in learning to jump. With a less than 1% chance of having to use one in a long gliding career, most of which is now behind me, I shall take my chance along with the small numbers of glider pilots who have actually had to jump, and hope I will cope as well as they did if it comes to it.

By coincidence, there is a very active correspondence (98 posts so far) on a gliding website at present. Adherents of square chutes are telling everyone how good they are, people who have actually jumped with round chutes are saying they worked okay for them.

As emergency chutes are typically lifed for 15 to 20 years, replacement purchases are pretty infrequent.

Chris N.

[SNS3Guppy]

Rounds vs. squares: I've jumped both, in a wide variety of types and configurations. There's no question that a ram-air (square) parachute is a vast improvement over a round canopy when it comes to landing, controllability, choice of where you'll land, how hard you land, the ability to flare, modern design, etc. However, a square canopy also has disadvantages, too. By and large, the advantages well outweigh any drawbacks.

[poss]

Turning the focus back to airframe fitted chutes for a moment, the Cirrus aircraft that have them are designed to absorb the shock, as someone has already mentioned. This includes seats, airframe, landing gear and so on.... a year or so ago a guy deployed his chute over water when his engine failed, he broke his back on impact as the landing gear wasn't able to do what it was designed to do. The guy had the chance to glide to a nearby beach and carry out a forced landing yet thought hmm I'll deploy my chute without even considering landing the aircraft, in my opinion they give a false sense of security and I would hazard a guess that many people that own aircraft that harbour such devices wouldn't know the correct time to use them.
Fitting one to an aeroplane that wasn't designed to withstand a vertical landing would probably kill the occupant, someone mentioned that Cirrus say the landing is like falling from 10 feet, this is achieved with the combination of features to cushion the fall... features not available to normal aeroplanes so its undoubtedly safer to carry out a proper forced landing.

[Fuji Abound]

Poss

It has been suggested that in the incident to which you refer the pilot was applying power to manoeuver the aircraft. This may have resulted in more impact energy being transmitted to the pilot than would have been the case had power not been applied.

In the event the pilot suffered relatively minor impact damage to two vertebra, such that he was able to vacate the aircraft and swim to the shore and, as it transpired, was snow boarding within three months of the accident.

Clearly the undercarriage will absorb energy however I am not aware how significantly the transfer of energy is increased following a landing on water. My guess is it is not substantial. The other crumple zones will work as intended and whilst the spats will be forced off they present enough surface area that the undercarriage will absorb some of the energy. The wings and tail plane may absorb more energy than would be the case with land. However, I suspect the dynamics are complicated with numerous variables. One water landing does little to provide us with any substantive evidence.

Do we drive differently because we have air bags, crumple zones and anti lock brakes? I doubt it.

Do we fly differently because we have a chute? I doubt we do?

Inexperience puts pilots in danger. New, fast and shiny aircraft with modern avionics lull pilots into thinking the aircraft can make up for what the pilot lacks in experience. However, that’s why the insurance companies now insist on better training for pilots flying these aircraft. Ultimately better trained pilots flying more capable aircraft with chutes in the last resort enhances safety. I’d not be turning back the clock. It might not be the perfect solution, but it’s a lot better than what we had.

You only need to ask, and I tell you how to make a completely safe aircraft.

[chrisN]

Well, I must admit that this video of a square chute opening shows it’s quite quick:

http://www.justsoar.com/public/2NO/ExtremeSports.wmv

(The link was posted on gliding web site ras, which has a vigorous correspondence on round vs square – 127 posts so far.)

Chris N.

[eharding]

Graham Hesketh on Flickr - Photo Sharing!

Thats ME


I have to admit my first reaction on seeing that photo was a flashback to that scene from Forrest Gump, when Forrest jumps over the side of the side of the trawler.

"Yes, Graham, I know you were keen to be first at the club barbeque, but what did you do with the 172?........(looks up)...oh, no. Not again...you tw@t" (sound of a furiously overspeeding propellor ends abruptly will a dull thud)

[sdbeach]

A good example if improper use are the majority of the Cirrus CAPS deployments...strongly suggesting that pilots have placed themselves in dangerous positions because of the equipment on board. The parachute then becomes a panic button, and is subsequently used under conditions when they ought not. A pilot that elects to fly in weather and loses control deploys a parachute or exits the airplane...he has pushed the "panic button." Unfortunately, he's also elected to make a parachute descent under conditions when one should never make a parachute jump...the parachute has lulled him into making two very bad decisions, either of which could easily be fatal, to say nothing of having abandoned an airplane over a populace which had no choice in his decision making process.SNS3Guppy, you are quite forceful, yet eloquent, in your judgment of the Cirrus airframe parachute system. A friend pointed me to your expansive post a bit later in this thread and suggested that I might comment as I have become the de facto accident historian for the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association.

Unfortunately, your logic is backwards.

Over 75% of all fatal accidents in general aviation are attributed to a pilot-related cause. That's the concern that I recommend we address, not the specious argument that the presence of the parachute is the cause or even a factor.

Fortunately, 12 pilots who have gotten into bad situations are alive because of the Cirrus parachute, also 15 additional passengers.

By my reckoning, about half of the Cirrus fatal accidents could have been survivable if the Cirrus parachute had been deployed. That's about 25 of 44 fatal accidents, double the number of Cirrus parachute deployments!

A Cirrus pilot who pulls the CAPS handle to deploy the parachute knows he is in a bad situation. He doesn't need you to remind him. Yet he has acted to use a last-option safety device for himself and any passengers on board.

Cheers
Rick

[sdbeach]

At the least generous 5/14 hardly qualifies as "nearly every". With a little generousity not even half fall into this category. Most certainly do fall into this category. A sampling of Wikipedia's listing of these events, for example, cites the following:As one of the editors of that Wikipedia page, I note with great interest that you have applied a generous dose of interpretation to each event and worked backwards to judge the pilot.

Unless the readers of the this thread would like a rebuttal for your lengthy list, which I am happy to provide, let me respond to one or two selected examples.

1. October 2002, Texas: detached aileron Preflighting airplanes prevents needing to use panic button parachutes, and prevents ailerons from detaching in flight. Note that taken from that NTSB report, the following Cirrus statement is identified: The CAPS deployment is expected to result in the destruction of the airframe, and possible severe injury or death to the occupants.Improper use of the parachute? The cause was the failure of the mechanic to safety wire the aileron hinge nut. The plane was preflighted. The potential problem was not observed. The problem happened in flight. What is improper? Saving oneself? Or not being perfect?

4. September 2004, California: loss of control in high-altitude climb above clouds, 2 uninjured Again, a situation that the pilot should never have been in; one flies beyond one's capabilities, one uses the panic button...one has unnecessarily gone where one shouldn't have been and used what didn't need to be used...when the airplane could simply have been flown to a landing. Again, we're not even talking about a broken airpalne here...just a pilot who elected to deploy a parachute on a perfectly good airplane. This brain surgeon-rocket scientist flew into a Level 5 thunderstorm...not really the best place to fly, shows poor judgement, and certainly a very poor place to deploy a parachute canopy.Ouch! Beyond his capabilities? The pilot is a retired university professor with thousands of hours of flight instruction, including aerobatic instruction, has been instructing in Cirrus airplanes since 2001, and is alive! He is one of my instructors, and I have interviewed him extensively for a safety issue of the Cirrus Pilot magazine (sent to all members of the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association).

He and his wife confirm that they were flying in clear air. You claim he could have simply avoided the thunderstorms and flown to a landing. But he experienced the airplane doing something to him that placed him upside down, spiraling down into the cloud layer below, entering IMC without a horizon or reliable instruments to recover from that unusual attitude.

Yes, there were convective thunderstorms miles away. But the area where they had this incident was actively searched by other pilots sent there by ATC to try to locate the airplane. No thunderstorms in the vincinity at the time of the incident.

Seems the NTSB investigator got a bit rushed in his investigation of a non-fatal accident. And you rushed up the ladder of inference. By the way, the outcome was sufficiently successful that none of the glass ornaments nor bottles of wine or olive oil were broken -- and the airplane flew again!

9. August 2006, Indiana: ...in fact it wasn't the CG which caused the crash, but the deployment of the CAPS system, and a pilot who couldn't handle the airplane. Chalk it up once again to the same majority of the incidents...pilot error, unnecessary use, and a system that took the pilot to places he wasn't capable of going and to a place where he never should have been. You are on a roll. CAPS caused the crash? Unnecessary?

How about a 5-turn spin before deployment causing the crash? Without deploying the parachute, the impact would have been much less survivable.

You have presented an astounding amount of interpretation and judgment about these accidents. Then you conclude that almost all of the Cirrus parachute deployments were improper.

By my reckoning, 27 people survived really bad situations because 12 pilots deployed the parachute. And we are still working on that 75% of accidents attributed to pilot actions.

Cheers
Rick

[sdbeach]

I also dont think many pilots continue into IMC when not qualified to do so because they have a chute.
Perhaps, perhaps not. The vast majority of the CAPS deployments, however, strongly suggest otherwise...as shown here. Virtually every case has been pilots going where they ought not, then unnecessarily resorting to the panic button.SNS3Guppy, as shown here, it was your interpretations and judgments that suggest otherwise.

Most pilots were very inexperienced, several hundred hours.Hmmm... So what experience level would satisfy you?

For the record, over half of the Cirrus pilots who deployed the parachute had more than 800 hours of total time. That's several years of flying experience for more general aviation pilots.

Cheers
Rick

[sdbeach]

... a year or so ago a guy deployed his chute over water when his engine failed, he broke his back on impact as the landing gear wasn't able to do what it was designed to do. The guy had the chance to glide to a nearby beach and carry out a forced landing yet thought hmm I'll deploy my chute without even considering landing the aircraft, ...As Fuji Abound points out, this Cirrus pilot had a compression fracture of his lower back and was functional to exit the airplane and swim half-way to shore before intercepted by rescuers.

"Had the chance"? Maybe, but a pretty slim one. Radar returns show that he was in a rapid descent and accelerating. The last radar return was at 1600 feet at 190 knots descending about 3,000 fpm.

"Yet thought hmm I'll deploy my chute without even considering landing the aircraft"? This Cirrus pilot has written extensively about his thought process. Yes, he decided to deploy without considering to land. As he describes his situation, he lost consciousness for a while then awoke to discover that he was in a high-speed dive. He recovered beyond Vne but was not fully in control as he noticed that his right leg was numb and non-responsive. He immediately pulled the CAPS handle to deploy the parachute.

At least SNS3Guppy considers this a "possibly valid use." Tough critic.

Cheers
Rick

[SNS3Guppy]

Hmmm... So what experience level would satisfy you?


Whatever it takes to not be stupid enough to fly a light single at night over the mountains in British Colombia, into a level 5 thunderstorm and then deploy a parachute...or fly into severe icing...or do all the stupid things that lead to deploying the panic button.

Hours don't mean a lot, but judgment and experience surely does. Hours don't equate to experience.

Flying into thunderstorms and ice and encountering the situations that many of these pilots did...shows poor airmanship and very poor judgement.

For the record, over half of the Cirrus pilots who deployed the parachute had more than 800 hours of total time. That's several years of flying experience for more general aviation pilots.


800 hours is still 800 hours...no matter who's doing the flying. The total time is really quite irrelevant, however. Yes, 800 hours is a very low time pilot...barely enough to qualify flying a VFR single engine charter in the US. Look at their instrument times, however, and you'll see a lot of 30 hour instrument pilots. An 800 hour pilot with 30 hours total instrument experience is a 30 hour pilot when it comes to flying instruments...not an 800 hour pilot.

Many of those identified the incidents and mishaps had only a few hours in type. An 800 hour pilot with 15 hours of cirrus time is a 15 hour cirrus pilot...not an 800 hour pilot. Start combining minimal instrument experience, minimal weather experience, minimal time in type, and very poor judgement, you have a rash of pilots who flew well beyond their own capabilities and that of the airplane, who lost control as a result in most cases, and fell back not on the aerodynamic capabilities of flying a perfectly good airplane...but deploying a parachute.

For those who've never had a parachute canopy collapse in winds and turbulence, an understanding of exactly why deploying a parachute in a thunderstorm is a bad idea...may not sink in. There really isn't any worse place to do so...the pilots who put themselves in that position not only made severely stupid blunders from the outset, but perpetuated and compounded that chain of thought when they elected to deploy parachutes at night or in storms, or both.

SNS3Guppy, as shown here, it was your interpretations and judgments that suggest otherwise.


No, the record speaks for it's self. It's a virtual wall of shame that highlights foolishness and stupidity, and a tribute to luck. Little more...but it does show a remarkable consistency in the nature of those involved, and their actions...which as I stated before, are the vast majority.

Improper use of the parachute? The cause was the failure of the mechanic to safety wire the aileron hinge nut. The plane was preflighted. The potential problem was not observed. The problem happened in flight. What is improper? Saving oneself? Or not being perfect?


Perfection is irrelevant. An airplane coming out of maintenance deserves a close inspection. I see things missed all the time that should have been caught; this should also have been caught. But as you're dragging perfection into it, perhaps you can answer...you preflight airplanes, do you not? Do YOU know what to look for? Do you know how many threads must extend beyond a nut, and whether a metallock nut or a fiberlock is the right choice? Or do you simply look, see something and move on? Do you know how to identify the a proper safety wire job vs. an improper one? Most pilots don't...they assume that what they see is correct, gloss over it, don't know the mechanical standards which they're supposed to be inspecting and approving.

Do you know that a mechanic can approve an aircraft for return to service, but doesn't ever return the aircraft to service? The pilot does that when he or she flies it. The pilot who does so takes full responsibility for the airworthy condition of the aircraft...and unlike the mechanic who merely signs for it, the pilot places his or her life on the line. How much more reason does one need to perform a very thorough inspection and get it right? Perfection? No. Simply doing one's job as PIC is enough...and that didn't get done.

You are on a roll. CAPS caused the crash? Unnecessary?


Yes, CAPS caused the crash, and yes, it's use was unnecessary. You refer to the crash in Indiana. You also state that you're the person who placed the Wikipedia entries (several of which are grossly inaccurate and do not reflect the accident reports). Specifically, Wikipedia states regarding this particular mishap:

August 2006, Indiana: parachute deployed three miles from departure end of runway, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger because the pilot had fainted, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured


The pilot improperly loaded the airplane, stalled, and spun the airplane. The pilot had no idea what was wrong, but was unable to control the airplane. The pilot reported engine trouble when there was none. The actual CG was within limits, although the baggage compartment limits were well exceeded, as was the aircraft gross weight. The aircraft was a flyable airplane...it didn't cease to be flyable until the pilot lost control, and it was no longer flyable when the parachute was deployed, destroying any possibility of landing the aircraft...a perfectly flyable, intact airplane which, while overgross and improperly loaded, was within the aerodynamic CG.

The pilot, while having over 2,500 hours total time, had only 31 hours of actual experience. While total time is often taken to be significant, the duration over which that time is spread is more significant. A man with 31 hours of instrument time in the last week, for example, is likely to be far more proficient than a man with 31 hours of instrument time spread over the past 31 years.

The Wikipedia article states that the parachute was deployed because the pilot fainted, which was NOT the case. The pilot requested his son in law to deploy the parachute, and did not faint. It's important to note that the pilot didn't lose capacity to fly, and the airplane wasn't unflyable; he flew it to four thousand feet under control. Furthermore, a test airplane was loaded identially and flown to determine it's in-flight characteristics, and it flew acceptably. Bottom line is that it was a flyable, controllable airplane which was mismanaged and ultimately became a non-flyable airplane with the introduction of the parachute deployment.

In fact, the report specifically states:

Furthermore, the study indicated that the extra 300 pounds over the certified maximum takeoff weight reduced the available rate-of-climb at 4,000 feet by about 260 ft/min. Consequently, the combination of the excess weight, uncoordinated flight, and use of the air conditioner reduced the available rate-of-climb by about 500 ft/min from the numbers published in the POH. Nonetheless, the airplane still had adequate climb performance, and even at the accident flight conditions should have been able to maintain a steady-state rate-of-climb of about 900 ft/min at 4,000 feet and 105 KIAS. Reducing the airspeed below the best rate-of-climb speed put the airplane "behind the power curve", decreasing the rate-of-climb further to about 500 ft/min, the rate-of-climb present when the airplane stalled.


Unwise, inexperienced pilot flies airplane beyond his and the airplane's capability (was he enticed by the prospect of a free save with the panic button?), deploys the panic button, and is killed by the blunt force trauma resulting from a steep, 70 degree nose down impact under canopy. The chief mechanism of injury...the steep nose down impact, wrought on by a canopy system that didn't function properly and level the airplane to a safer 10 degree nose down status, prior to impact...deploying the parachute from a botched and improperly conducted flight sealed his own fate.

Ouch! Beyond his capabilities? The pilot is a retired university professor with thousands of hours of flight instruction, including aerobatic instruction, has been instructing in Cirrus airplanes since 2001, and is alive! He is one of my instructors, and I have interviewed him extensively for a safety issue of the Cirrus Pilot magazine (sent to all members of the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association).

He and his wife confirm that they were flying in clear air. You claim he could have simply avoided the thunderstorms and flown to a landing. But he experienced the airplane doing something to him that placed him upside down, spiraling down into the cloud layer below, entering IMC without a horizon or reliable instruments to recover from that unusual attitude.

Yes, there were convective thunderstorms miles away. But the area where they had this incident was actively searched by other pilots sent there by ATC to try to locate the airplane. No thunderstorms in the vincinity at the time of the incident.


Yes, beyond his capabilities...he lost control, after all. He experienced "the airplane doing something to him?" Yes, he certainly did...the airplane flying him, instead of him flying the airplane. This is bad.

The recollections of the pilot aren't necessarily relevant. The previous incident in Indiana, in which the aircraft was stalled, was researched, thoroughly tested and a finding made that the 93 decibel stall warning was going off for over a minute! Never the less, the eye-whitnesses, the ones who were there, didn't recall ever even hearing it...those on scene often do the worst job of recalling, and recall incorrectly for a number of reasons. From the record, we do have the following regarding the California incident:

A Convective SIGMET (49W) was issued at 1555, and was valid at the time of the accident. It indicated a severe line of thunderstorms 30 miles wide moving from 300 degrees at 15 knots, with tops to 27,000 feet. The SIGMET also noted the possibility of 1-inch hail and wind gusts up to 50 knots.


The "professor" might or might not be aware, but these aren't considered good conditions in which to be undertaking flight in a light airplane. A full test of the aircraft systems, instruments, and autopilot revealed NO PROBLEMS...fully functional. A ghost problem that couldn't be found or duplicated...or a pilot who lost control? Yes, it was beyond his capabilities, else he wouldn't have lost control.

The official report...

During climbing flight at 16,000 feet, the single engine airplane encountered the outer boundaries of severe convective weather; the airplane departed controlled flight, the pilot deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), and the airplane was substantially damaged during the parachute landing in a walnut grove. The pilot did receive a standard weather briefing, checked radar, and satellite imagery prior to departing on the 600-mile cross-country flight. Throughout the flight the pilot recognized cloud build-ups and steered west to avoid the weather. About an hour into the flight he climbed from 13,500 to 16,000 in an attempt to stay clear of clouds; the autopilot was in heading mode and the vertical speed knob was set to maintain 100 knot climb. About this time radar depicted the airplane descending 1,100 feet in 23 seconds then climbing 1,300 feet in 14 seconds. The pilot heard a "whirring" noise in his headset, prompting him to disconnect the autopilot. The nose pitched up and the left wing dropped. It was at this time that the pilot transmitted that he was out of control and he deployed the CAPS. The airplane then descended by parachute to a landing in a walnut orchard. The radar track of the airplane combined with the weather surveillance radar imagery depicted the airplane encountering a level 5 (intense) area of convective activity moments prior to the final descent (CAPS deployment). Radar derived cloud tops indicated that the tops of the thunderstorms in the accident area were between 15,000 and 20,000 feet. Convective SIGMETs 44W and 47W, had been issued during the hour before departure, and warned of thunderstorms in the vicinity of the pilots' planned route of flight. SIGMET 49W, which covered the area in which the airplane was flying, was issued approximately 10 minutes prior to the airplane departing controlled flight. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of a preimpact malfunction or failure of the control system, autopilot, or power plant.


And the final statement:

AIRCRAFT 1 CAUSE REPORT

The pilot's decision to continue flight into adverse weather and the subsequent encounter with the outer boundaries of a level 5 thunderstorm, which resulted in his loss of control of the airplane.


Readers may reference the report and view for themselves: https://extranet.nasdac.faa.gov/pls/portal/STAGE.NTSB_BRIEF_REPORT?EV_ID=20041007X01591&AC_VAR=FALSE&ENG_VAR=FALSE&INJ_VAR=FALSE&FT_VAR=FALSE&OCC_VAR=FALSE&WTHR_VAR=FALSE&PNARR_VAR=FALSE&FNARR_VAR=FALSE&CNARR_VAR=FALSE&NARR_VAR=

You may call this an overzealous investigator, but this wasn't a cursory investigation, and there's more data to be had than that of the pilot's own statements. He asserts he was well clear of weather, no weather nearby, as you say, and as others suggest when they came looking for him (weather moves, of course), but radar tracks and tapes show otherwise. Furthermore, if there was no weather around him...why did he deploy the parachute when he found he was about to enter "a cloud layer?" One can't have it both ways...his own admission that he was about to enter the clouds, the fact that radar placed both him, and his airplane, and the weather occupying the same space...bears out the fact that he was where he shouldn't have been.

That trinkets on board weren't damaged is really quite irrelevant. Every bit as much as one wouldn't walk down the street with cavalier abandon, point a gun at someone's head, pull the trigger, and then when it fails to go off, state "it's okay. It apparently wasn't loaded." Simply because nobody got hurt, you see, doesn't make it okay, and no, the ends do not justify the means. A series of bad decisions took place culminating with the pilot losing control of his airplane and resorting to the panic button...in an intact airplane perfectly capable of being flown.

Furthermore, this individual claims over two thousand hours of flight time and a thousand of that as instrument time. Even professional instrument pilots (myself included) average approximately 10% instrument time out of our total flying time...but this guy has nearly half of his on instruments. Admirable for him one might suppose, but what that tells me is that his time is more than likely falsified. I've even flown weather research, in which it's all instrument, and it's all intentionally flown inside thunderstorms...and I wouldn't lay claim to having such a large percentage of my own experience as instrument.

As most of his claims appear rather dubious, what we see is an older gentleman who's veracity is in question who simply flew beyond his capabilities, exercised very poor judgement, and ultimately lost control...and was very lucky that he didn't kill himself, his passenger, or anyone on the ground in the process.

[Fuji Abound]

Hours don't mean a lot, but judgment and experience surely does.

and

800 hours is still 800 hours...no matter who's doing the flying.

which appears contradictory. Hours mean a lot. With hours come experience. Given enough hours of even the most benign flying and you will have the pleasure of encountering a few interesting situations. All weather short sector hours may well enable you to gain more experience more quickly I do not doubt.

Yes, 800 hours is a very low time pilot

which is also contradictory, since it depends as you said what the time was spent doing.

Moreover, realistically for most GA pilots 800 hours IS a high time pilot.

An 800 hour pilot with 15 hours of cirrus time is a 15 hour cirrus pilot...not an 800 hour pilot.

Now I think you must be confusing yourself. Either experience, as you suggest, counts, or it does not. Experience gained to deal with weather doesnt vanish because your ride changes.

The Cirrus is a reasonable quick, easy to fly, non complex aircraft. It is a simple aircraft, but performs well compared with most light singles. The only aspect that causes low time pilots problems is that it is significantly quicker and more slippery than most GA singles. Someone transferring from a Mooney with glass with 800 hours is as good as makes no difference an 800 hours Cirrus pilot after 20 hours in the aircraft.

I do wish you wouldnt keep referring to the chute as the "panic button". It makes me think you have never seen a Cirrus.

The chute is there as a means of giving the pilot a second chance when things go wrong. Many pilots kill themselves making forced landings - the outcome is by no means assured. Many pilots in aircraft without chutes get themselves into the same situation as Cirrus pilots. The evidence suggests that in the early days Cirrus pilots suffered a high accident rate than expected, but that is almost certainly no longer the case. Personally I think the reason was far more to do with the aircraft being relatively easy to fly and attractive to a new breed of more wealthy pilots but some of these pilots had not accumulated the experience to take on a high performance light single. This has rightly been addressed.

SNS3Guppy - you appear to be obsessed with the Cirrus and its chute. I dont understand why. Do you have something against chutes other than having convinced yourself a pilot with a chute lets go of the normal rules about blundering into weather?

[sdbeach]

Wow! A treatise almost 2,500 words long. Frankly, I'm not sure what to make of it all.

Is your point that if you push the panic button (your phrase), then instead you should be dead?

Is your point that the Cirrus innovation to certify an aircraft with a whole airframe parachute is bad enough to warrant action, perhaps to remove it (no more panic button)?

Is your point that pilots of Cirrus aircraft are unworthy, improper, inexperienced, and therefore should not be flying?

Is your point that pilots who are stupid enough (your phrase) should not be flying? If so, do you have a test for that?

I'm simply unsure what has you so exercised.

Pilots make mistakes. Pilots make poor judgments. Pilots kill perfectly good airplanes.

So, if a pilot makes a series of mistakes or poor judgments, what is your remedy?

Cheers
Rick

p.s. I hope you have an answer that can help all the pilots of general aviation airplanes, because even without the parachute, 75% of all GA fatal accidents have pilot causes.

[SNS3Guppy]

Moreover, realistically for most GA pilots 800 hours IS a high time pilot.


Quite irrelevant. 800 hours is very inexperienced, no matter how you slice it.

Hours mean a lot.


"Hours" mean very little, and do not equate to experience. Most of the pilots under discussion were fairly inexperienced, regardless of their hours...and their decision making unfortunately showed it to be.

SNS3Guppy - you appear to be obsessed with the Cirrus and its chute. I dont understand why. Do you have something against chutes other than having convinced yourself a pilot with a chute lets go of the normal rules about blundering into weather?


I am not obsessed with cirrus, other than the thread turned in that direction, and specific statements I made were called under question...and quickly shown to be clearly the case.

Do I have something against "chutes?" As I'm one of few in this thread with considerable parachute experience....I think not. More to the point, I strongly advocate the use of parachutes, as well as a thorough knowledge of them, and have repeatedly stressed proper education and training in their use if one does in fact intend to have them available for use. Read the thread.

Cirrus, of course, relies heavily on the parachute as a marketing gimmick to entice inexperienced pilots with more money than training to buy. They market an airplane that feels like a nice car inside. They market it with sleek lines, and sell it as a safe airplane, largely predicated on the parachute. The very fact that Cirrus sells airplanes with the parachute system as a major attraction makes it very much fair game for criticism, and the statistics bear this criticism out.

I do wish you wouldnt keep referring to the chute as the "panic button". It makes me think you have never seen a Cirrus.


You mean the panic button most often used not on airplanes that aren't capable of flying, not by pilots who are incapacitated, but on perfectly good, flyable airplanes by pilots who panic...pilots who have been enticed to fly far, far beyond their own capabilities or means, and even beyond that of the airplane, on the hope of having a safe emergency panic-button backup..that panic button? You don't happen to mean the panic button which the manufacturer itself refers to as expected to cause severe aircraft damage, and that will likely result in severe injury or death? The one which has caused severe injury or death, and in every case results in an airframe which could have been safely flown and landed, being unable to fly and land...that system?

How many of those pilots, of course, had ever bee under a round canopy, could appreciate the vertical descent rate, or the pendulous motion which often accompanies a round canopy during descent...and which can signficantly increase the injuries and damage by contributing to the impact forces? How many of those pilots simply blasted off with the parachute at their disposal, never having used a canopy in their life?

Many pilots kill themselves making forced landings - the outcome is by no means assured.


Ah, but we're not talking forced landing situations. We're not talking airplanes that were unable to fly due to power loss and couldn't be flown safely. We're talking about perfectly flyable aircraft which never required making a forced landing...which if not for the ineptitude and foolishness of their pilots could have been flown cross country at leisure to a landing at an attended airport and runway. There's a big difference between this and a situation in which the aircraft is no longer viable. A better comparison might be made between an aircraft with an ejection seat and the cirrus, and the military aircraft being flown by pilots of questionable competence who fly beyond their means, panic, and punch out. That's what happening with the cirrus pilots under discussion. Yes, it's a panic button, and yes it's the vast majority as shown case, by case.

Is your point that pilots of Cirrus aircraft are unworthy, improper, inexperienced, and therefore should not be flying?


The ones who elect to fly into level 5 thunderstorms, severe icing, and thunderstorms over the mountains at night...yes. Definitely.

Is your point that pilots who are stupid enough (your phrase) should not be flying? If so, do you have a test for that?


Yes, the pilots under discussion have been tested by their own efforts, and have been found wanting. The test results are typically found in accident and mishap reports, just as we see here. Was the stupidity pulling the panic button? No, though it did contribute to some of the crashes and certainly to some fatalities. The stupidity was being there in the first place.

Is your point that the Cirrus innovation to certify an aircraft with a whole airframe parachute is bad enough to warrant action, perhaps to remove it (no more panic button)?


This is a merged thread, involving two separate discussions which have been placed together (and are therefore somewhat out of context) regarding pilot use of parachutes. My point is, and always has been, that the use of parachutes should never be made without proper training. As stated before, I don't carry a firearm without first showing proficiency, including malfunction drills, and a knowledge of when to shoot and when not to shoot, as well as proper care, handling, carriage, storage, etc. I don't own a parachute, and am not allowed to jump it at a drop zone, without meeting the inspection and repack intervals, without proper training and certification, and without having demonstrated capability with that parachute rig.

Conversely, a pilot who can afford an airplane has little safeguards in this respect. A pilot who flies his sailplane or aerobatic airplane straps on a canopy not even knowing the color of the parachute or what it should look like when inflated over his head, not knowing how to steer it or even if it can be steered, not knowing how to safely land in water, in trees, downwind, or to do a proper PLF (parachute landing fall). Excuses run the gamut from "I don't slam my head against the airplane to know how to use my helmet so I don't need to have any training or experience with my parachute to properly use it," to "the odds are very low I'll ever have to use it, so why bother learning?" Dangerous mentalities. We certainly can't apply this line of thinking to an airplane...we study constantly to prepare for an emergency by learning and rhearsing maneuvers we may never need in daily life...never the less, we need to know them. We perform stalls, we perform rejected takeoffs, no-flap approaches, etc...we learn everything about the airplane, even if we may never need to apply that knowledge. To fail to prepare in this way would be very poor airmanship.

A parachute canopy is an aircraft. It's relative wind comes from below, but then so does the airflow through a gyroplane or helicopter in autorotation. It may not be powered, but neither is a sailplane. It moves through the atmosphere, it's proper operation may save your life, it's improper operation may kill you. Learning it is every bit as important as learning your airplane. when you strap a parachute to your back, you're just put on a complete aircraft system.

A pilot who straps on both a parachute and an airplane has a duty and obligation to know both, thoroughly.

Another point of this thread, along with pilots and parachutes, is whether pilots need parachutes...and generally this is not the case. Further, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and the panic button, along with the indiscriminate wearing and use, of parachutes, is indeed a dangerous thing.

Wow! A treatise almost 2,500 words long.


You counted??

[sdbeach]

The very fact that Cirrus sells airplanes with the parachute system as a major attraction makes it very much fair game for criticism, and the statistics bear this criticism out.And SNS3Guppy, you are not the first critic. As for statistics, interesting to note that the market has made the Cirrus SR22 the most purchased single-engine piston aircraft in recent years. In 10 years, there are now over 4,000 airplanes delivered. And the fatal accident rate is comparable to (and slightly below) the single-engine fixed-wing fatal accident rate derived from the annual Nall reports published by the Air Safety Foundation (1.70 fatal accidents per 100,000 flying hours in the past 12 months, 1.57 in the past 36 months for the Cirrus fleet, versus 1.19 for the GA fleet and 1.86 for single-engine fixed-wing).

Cheers
Rick

[SNS3Guppy]

The best selling handguns in the US have always been the cheapest and the worst...why? Because they're cheap. It's a legitimate example, because a handgun is a device intended to save one's life. Never the less, the uninformed buyer and user often selects based on irrational criteria; price is one such example. Point is that simply because something sells well, means very little.

The same may be said of the Cirrus. Is it the best, the worst, or just another aircraft? It could be any of those things, but the numbers sold are irrelevant.

I used to fly the most produced airplane ever built. When I flew it, there were five remaining in the world, and now there are four. Does making the most, or selling the most make it the best or serve as any particular recommendation for the type design? No.

If one experiences a mishap but doesn't die, does this mean it's a safe design? We've cited a number of Cirrus mishaps, most of which weren't fatal...yet very easily could have been for the occupants as well as those on the ground. Several of these incidents were owing to the parachute itself, as previously identified. Simply because someone doesn't die...means very little. One would hardly entertain a prospective pilot for a professional position who's chief qualificationis "Well, I did it before, and I didn't die."

The parachute for the Cirrus is a gimmick. It lures pilots into doing stupid things in the misguided hope of having an "out." Even an ejection seat lures young military pilots into doing stupid things they might not do without the seat, and anti-icing and de-icing equipment lures pilots into the ice...where they wouldn't go without that equipment, shouldn't be with the equipment, but somehow feel justified because of the magic words "known ice."

The parachute assembly on the Cirrus should be considered much like a handgun with one round left. You'll probably get hurt very badly, likely die, but if you've got no choices left, then it's better than nothing. Such events should be reserved for situations such as a wing which is no longer attached to the airplane, not for times when one elects to undertake a foolish and risky flight beyond one's own capabilities and that of the airplane. It's a dubious emergency device, not a hail-mary, and not a get-out-of-jail-free card. It should not be relied upon to work, and one should NEVER predicate a purchase of the aircraft, or undertake a flight, because the CAPS is on board.

When the manufacturer specifically stipulates that the use of the CAPS should be expected to cause significant airframe damage and very likely severe injury or death, this is a telling thing, and shouldn't be lightly disregarded. Remember, that's not the counsel of a critic, but the one selling the aircraft. Too bad such counsel is buried behind slick advertising and a snappy interior and avionics suite that more resembles a rental car than an airplane.

[eharding]

Dangerous mentalities


Given that we're going round in circles with this one, I'll re-iterate that my personal position once more, for clarity - the risk/reward benefit in undergoing jump training as a pre-cursor for wearing an emergency parachute in an aerobatic type simply doesn't add up - the corollary with an automotive airbag has already been made, and whilst not perfect to a degree to comparison stands. If you have any firm statistical data relating the incidence injury of emergency parachute descents from aerobatic types between those with jump training, and those without, I'd genuinely interested in seeing it. I've flown competition sequences both with and without a parachute, and have used a simple cloth helmet on occasions when the Gentex was u/s - I'm not aware that it modified the way I flew either way - but the law of averages means that if both are available, then I'll wear them - would you rather I didn't?

As for airframe parachutes - I'll pass, thanks - as you say, the statistics on those are distinctly uninspiring.

[sdbeach]

Amazing. Simply amazing.

SNS3Guppy, you have produced more words, connected more illogical reasons, and adduced more outcomes than anyone that I have ever encountered!

Yet, I'm left wondering if you believe it possible that innovation in personal air transportation will keep it available and thriving. You seem to have an answer to everything -- except how to ensure that it continues.

My hope is that you spewed so many words that few will indulge in reading them. :)

Cheers
Rick

[execExpress]

SNS3Guppy - the most mass-produced aircraft you flew and four (flying?) left - was that the B17, or what?

I can go along with:
"if you've got no choices left, then it's better than nothing. Such events should be reserved for situations such as a wing which is no longer attached to the airplane,"

Fine- a second-chance (not gauranteed) at surviving what would otherwise appear to the pilot (for whatever reason) to be, or is, a life-threatening situation.So, most people I guess would have common ground thus far?

Now then what about....
IF someone has undertaken a foolish and risky flight beyond one's own capabilities and that of the airplane.

1) Well did they REALLY do that BECAUSE they had the chute? Somehow you are quite certain that is consistently the case, but I can't see how you can assert that other than as a personal interpretation and opinion. Your experience leads you to draw such conslusions but we dont know what that experience is it is - making it hard to follow your thinking as you reverse-engineer from effect to cause. Would like to know more 'history' please.

2) Consider how many pilots without airframe parachutes have flown themselves into the same circumstances and been killed. They flew into those circumstances and they DIDN'T have a parachute? Now just how DUMB/IMPERFECT is that!? Pilots have been getting themselves into big trouble one way or another - with or without a chute. Sadly, they will keep doing so. We can probably all agree on that too, but WHY do they (we) do that? Beacuse they are not like SN3Guppy seems to be the answer. Just HOW did you get to be many multi-thousand hours experence knowing how many many threads should show beyond a nut? If only we could all be like that - but I guess you have military/professional flying behind you that got you to that skygod (for light GA) level? The rest of us don't and won't get that benefit and we are going to keep missing things like a safety-wire having been put in wrong. Maybe if you write a book for us that would be a better alternative to a chute? Seriously. Why not?

You seem to be applying the expectations/standard of whatever aviation world you come from to light GA. I wish more of us could reach those heady heights. The chute isnt a cop out not to try to do so, but it is a last chance (possibly) which might save life when we fail to attain them. Mistakes are going to keep happening, not BECAUSE of the chute, but because of pilot error - and that includes if a pilot allows his judgement to be inappropriately influenced by the equipment aboard.

For me, the chute is a acknowledgement of an unpleasant realities - pilots make mistakes and aviation can be very unmerciful - and offers a last ditch possibility of survival.

Here is the dividing line - you think so lowly of pilots that you feel more of them will kill themselves BECAUSE they have a chute, than those who will be saved that got into difficulty for the same old reasons pilots have, do and will. I don't share that view of the pilot community as a whole. There might be the odd nutter out there I agree. All the more reason to have a chute in case I come across one mid-air I guess. In fact if they all have as much poor judgement as you suggest perhaps I'd be fool to fly without one!

[SNS3Guppy]

SNS3Guppy - the most mass-produced aircraft you flew and four (flying?) left - was that the B17, or what?


PB4Y-2 Privateer; the USN second delivery version of the B24; produced in superior numbers to the B17 with a superior load, speed, and armament. Not a pretty airplane, but a tough one, and a prolific one.

Just HOW did you get to be many multi-thousand hours experence knowing how many many threads should show beyond a nut? If only we could all be like that - but I guess you have military/professional flying behind you that got you to that skygod (for light GA) level? The rest of us don't and won't get that benefit and we are going to keep missing things like a safety-wire having been put in wrong. Maybe if you write a book for us that would be a better alternative to a chute? Seriously. Why not?


This is part of the dangerous mentality to which I previously referred. Knowing the mechanical standards when you inspect your airplane before and after flight aren't of a "skygod" nature; these are basic things that you must know to properly inspect your airplane. How can you walk around it and say you've given it a preflight inspection when you don't know what it is you're seeing?

Write a book? Ample texts are already in production on the subject. A standard in the US which has applicability nearly everywhere is called AC43.13; Acceptable Methods, Techniques, & Practices--Aircraft Inspection and Repair. It comes in two parts; AC43.13 2B, and 1A.

You can find the first part here:

AC 43.13-1B CHG 1 [Large AC. This includes Change 1.] Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices - Aircraft Inspection and Repair (http://rgl.faa.gov/REGULATORY_AND_GUIDANCE_LIBRARY/RGADVISORYCIRCULAR.NSF/0/99C827DB9BAAC81B86256B4500596C4E?OpenDocument)

The circular as follows has been cancelled, but still provides good guidance:

AC 43.13-2A [Large AC] Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices - Aircraft Alterations (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/E533BB05389C90E486256A54006E47B2)

Most instructors don't insist their students learn this material, largely because the instructors don't know it...another area in which the heritage of inexperience fails both the teacher and student. Again, however, I ask how you can preflight your airplane if you don't know what you're seeing?

Here is the dividing line - you think so lowly of pilots that you feel more of them will kill themselves BECAUSE they have a chute, than those who will be saved that got into difficulty for the same old reasons pilots have, do and will.


I said nothing of the kind. You will do well to put words in your mouth, not mine. However, as you've introduced this fallacy, it's well worth noting that a pilot who undertakes the use of a parachute in ignorance takes a mighty big chance. We don't do things in ignorance in aviation. We don't guess. We know.

We don't guess at fuel reserves. We calculate them. We don't guess at weight, nor balance. We calculate them, and know. We don't guess at ETA's; we calculate the time enroute and apply the known performance of the airplane to come up with detailed correct technically-based answers. We don't guess we can land the airplane; we know we can. And certainly we don't guess we might figure out how to handle the parachute on the way down.

It's laughable, really. Pilots seek out an instructor and obtain a checkout when moving from a Cessna 150 to a 152, or when learning a new radio system or display...even the smallest nuances are taken seriously with the airplane. The parachute, however, a compact, inflatable aircraft in a little bag on one's back...is simply taken in complete ignorance and a rough approximation of faith. Do you approach a new airplane by refusing to learn performance numbers, emergency procedures, normal procedures, or refuse to get a checkout? Of course not. But many here balk at the idea of getting proper instruction regarding a parachute.

The problem here? You don't take the parachute seriously. You should. Treat it as though your life depends on it, because it very well may. Improper use of the parachute, something as simple as not performing a pincheck, riser routing, or protecting the system handles, can kill you or create a dire emergency even though there was nothing else amiss in your world. Take the parachute seriously. It's a serious piece of equipment.

[Fuji Abound]

Aircraft fall out of the sky because the engine stops, they structurally fail, they enter a spin from which the pilot cannot recover, they pick up enough ice or encounter the most severe weather. All these situations are life threatening. It is a fine degree of judgement when to throw in the towel.

If the engine stops you have one course - land. With any luck the outcome should be good - unless of course it is night, there is a low base, or the terrain is rugged. In those circumstances the chances of success are less favourable. Pilots aren’t taught to recover from spins these days. Spins aren’t a problem - unless it is your first - which is more than likely these days. Pushing on or retreating from ice and severe weather is a calculated risk. If things have got that bad you need a little luck however much of a sky God you believe yourself to be.

Pilots make mistakes - the number of hours they have or the amount of experience they have makes them no more or less immune, with any luck with experience they just make fewer mistakes. However, we all have to cut our teeth. Pilots aren’t born sky Gods. This means they are more susceptible to making mistakes during their early years. No one said flying is without risk. No one said in single pilot “sport” flying you would be wrapped in cotton wool.

To be blunt SN3Guppy that is the real issue with your posts - your hours and commercial experience long belie any understanding of real world flying for the average private pilot. As I indicated earlier private pilots flying for pleasure make mistakes, they make errors of judgement. They may well manage to get themselves into a spin from which they are unable and unprepared to attempt a recovery, they demonstrably make the mistake time and time again of entering IMC when not qualified to do so, and they take on weather beyond their and their aircrafts ability.

As but one example you wax lyrical about pre-flight checks. However, you appear blind to the pre-flight check most pilots undertake. In that you make the worst of assumptions - the vast majority of GA pilots do not complete an adequate pre flight check.

It is a bit like climbing - you could climb with a rope, or you could chose to free climb. Most opt for the rope, not because they expect to fall, not because they intentionally embark on a pitch knowing it to be beyond their ability, but because they don’t want to pay for their mistakes with their lives.

The chute gives them a second chance - that is it - it is not that complicated. It is no more a gimmick than a rope. It is no more a gimmick that a second engine which wasn’t put there to give you more performance, but to give you a second chance when the first engine fails.

[SNS3Guppy]

Pilots aren’t born sky Gods.


There is no such thing. Again, a dangerous mentality. When we view the basics, the bare-bones basics of flying as a fancy "sky-god" thing, we're in dangerous territory. This isn't high-falutin' wild and fancy stuff, folks. It's the basic standard to which you should be operating.

As I indicated earlier private pilots flying for pleasure make mistakes, they make errors of judgement.


As do we all. As a flight instructor who teaches people to fly, and a long time private pilot myself...I get it. However, electing to fly an airplane into ice isn't a mistake. It's an intentional unsafe action. This isn't a simple "oops" thing. This isn't inadvertant. Inexperience is doing things unknowingly. However, doing foolish things knowingly is the halmark of ignorance and stupidity. Penetrating a level five thunderstorm and then deploying a parachute...stupidity. Flying single engine airplanes over the mountains at night in British Colombia...stupidity. This is knowingly undertaking a stupid act.

Yes, people make errors in judgment. In aviation the penalty is often one's life, or that of others. As stated before...this is aviation. We don't guess, we don't gamble.

As an instructor, I don't believe it's appropriate to humor a pilot who whines "You can't expect us to know this fancy-schmancy stuff! You can't expect us to know we shouldn't fly a light, single engine piston powered airplane into a level five thunderstorm! You can't expect us to know not to fly it into severe icing. I'm a private pilot, and by gum, I'll fly my airplane over the mountains at night in convective weather if I want to!" Why, yes, you will...and you may pay the price for it, too. But don't ever try to cop the excuse that it was all a mistake.

I once asked a pilot who flew for our medical operation why he didn't file IFR. He told me it was his personal preference, and nobody was going to tell him what to do. A few days later a friend of his was killed in a helicopter at night on the same route he usually flew on emergency runs; right into the top of a mountain in the dark. This pilot found his friend...and the wreckage, still smoking. A week later, he still wasn't flying IFR altitudes...he was still doing exactly what the dead pilot did...because nobody was going to tell him what to do.

I'm reminded somewhat of the two ships approaching in the night. The ships captain saw the lights ahead, and ordered the message sent "Turn right ten degrees."

Came the reply, "you turn right twenty degrees."

The ship's captain replied "I am a ships captain, turn right ten degrees."

Came the reply, "I am an ensign. Turn right twenty degrees."

The ship's captain ordered the message sent, "I am a battleship. Alter your course right by ten degrees."

Came the reply, "I am a light house. Turn right, twenty degrees. NOW!"

The ship's captain turned.

Yes, you can be proud to not live by basic tenets of safety, and justify it by arguing that you have a right to make mistakes...just like a man standing in the middle of a highway has the right of way as a pedestrian. He may be a dead pedestrian with a right of way...but by all that's holy, he will have his right of way...even if it kills him.

These are not "skygod" concepts. These are basic, necessary precepts and steps to keep you out of the dirt and rocks, and form a basic standard which if upheld, will save your life, and if ignored, may seal your fate such that nothing can save you.

Who takes ultimate responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight, and pays the ultimate price for failure to do so? That would be you; the pilot in command. Be the PIC, don't make excuses. Measure twice, cut once; don't guess. KNOW.

[Fuji Abound]

There is no such thing.

Indeed, there isnt, I was only teasing. It is our Birtish sense of humour. :)

However, electing to fly an airplane into ice isn't a mistake.

Do you recognise the colour grey?

I know many pilots that fly into icing conditions. They make an assessment about the aircrafts ability to climb into clear air on top without picking up too much ice. They havent made a mistake, they have made a risk assessment. I know many pilots that fly at night in singles. They also would claim they have made a risk assessment. Flying into icing conditions in a Cirrus is illegal - flying at night is legal. More often than not if you have made the correct assessment about the rate of accumulation of ice, the length of time the aircraft will be in icing conditions, and the ability of the "anti-ice" to cope you will do pretty well, however if the engine quits at night chances are the outcome will not be good. Your example is for that reason a poor one.

I'm reminded somewhat of the two ships approaching in the night.

Yes, but the captain in charge of the warship was an American and the light house man was Irish which only goes to prove an Irish light house keeper is brighter than an American Naval captain! :confused:

[execExpress]

These are your words SN3Guppy, I believe in response to Fuji's comment that you must have a very jaundiced view of your fellow pilots: "Give a pilot an inch, often as not, he will take a mile...and yes, I do have a VERY low opinion of pilots in general. I have long maintained that 90% of the pilots out there aren't worth their weight in dirty salt...and based on global experience in nearly every facet of aviation out there so far, I'm still convinced this is true."

Strong views indeed, which it would seem reasonable to assume naturally inform your own judgements on other pilots motivations and actions, and whether BRS systems are a net saver or loser of lives. That is all I wanted to get to understand better really when I read you comments about the majority of CAPS pulls.

I am not arguing against better training, or that mistakes are to be simply accepted or shrugged off.

Thanks for the pointers to the additional reading materials - I am looking forward to reading and learning from them.

I got to tour round an airworthy Privateer in 1998 - an amazing aircraft as you say - made a big impression.

[SNS3Guppy]

Where did you run into the Privateer? Might have been me.

[execExpress]

Ft Wainwright, Fairbanks, Alaska. PB4Y along with a C-97G.

A typcial U.S. GA friendly welcome and tour of the aircraft with a crew member. They hadn't flown a mission for a while but were expecting to next day - July 4th 1998 - apparently the celebration fireworks usually managed to set something on fire!

[sdbeach]

I think Guppy talks a lot of sense.Sure he does. It's a lot of well connected words, phrases and thoughts.

The problem is that he takes a known effect, a parachute pull, works backwards to deduce that the pilot was at fault, then concludes that the parachute made them do it.

But that's looking at only 14 parachute activiations. With 75% of all fatal accidents being attributed to pilot causes, you would expect 10 of those 14 to be dumb pilot mistakes. No surprise, right?

But if there are 4,000 Cirrus airplanes and say, maybe 6,000 Cirrus pilots, what about those other 5,986 pilots with a parachute who did not get into a situation where the parachute made them do it?

If SNS3Guppy made so much sense, then would you not expect a much greater effect?

And if you think that Cirrus airplanes are flown by pilots with much less experience, like the argument made by SNS3Guppy, then consider that every one of those 6,000 Cirrus pilots starts out with zero hours of time-in-type. They all didn't fall out of the sky.

So what about the other fatal Cirrus crashes? There have been 42 other crashes with fatalities and no parachute activation (there were two previously mentioned parachute pulls that resulted in a fatality). Given that we know the flying time of the fleet, we can calculate the rate of the number of fatal accidents per 100,000 hours of flying time, just like the FAA and NTSB does for the general aviation fleet.

If SNS3Guppy were making sense, then one would expect these Cirrus pilots to be lulled into making stupid decisions, showing their lack of expertise, and killing themselves at a prodigious rate to prove him right! They don't.

When you take out the multiengine turboprop and turbojet numbers from the data, you get 1.86 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours in the GA fleet. The Cirrus numbers, depending how you aggregate their relatively small and perhaps statistically insignificant number of fatal accidents, are 1.70 for the past 12 months and 1.57 for the past 36 months. Not so prodigious.

So, it's a dramatic theatrical trick to take the 14 known parachute activations and deduce that the parachute is the problem, or Cirrus pilots are a problem.

His logic is backwards. Even if he sounds good.

Cheers
Rick

[SNS3Guppy]

I know many pilots that fly into icing conditions. They make an assessment about the aircrafts ability to climb into clear air on top without picking up too much ice. They havent made a mistake, they have made a risk assessment. I know many pilots that fly at night in singles. They also would claim they have made a risk assessment. Flying into icing conditions in a Cirrus is illegal - flying at night is legal. More often than not if you have made the correct assessment about the rate of accumulation of ice, the length of time the aircraft will be in icing conditions, and the ability of the "anti-ice" to cope you will do pretty well, however if the engine quits at night chances are the outcome will not be good. Your example is for that reason a poor one.


The great cry of justification. Risk management. Risk assessment. "This is dangerous. I have assessed it, and determined I'll do it anyway"...risk assessment. "This is dangerous and that is more dangerous, so I'll just do this, anyway"...risk management. Practice risk elimination, and neither of those other options are worth anything, because risk assessment (when used to justify taking a risk) and risk management both accept risk, and therefore supposition, guesswork, and invite disaster.

Justification is the narcotic of the soul. Many are addicts.

When someone tells you they know it's a risk, but it's a calculated risk...they've just made an excuse. Boiled down, it may best be paraphrased as "Yes, I know it's dangerous and stupid, but I'm going to do it anyway." It's "calculated" after all. Once it's been "calculated" and becomes a "calculated risk," then it's okay. This is called justification, more plainly described as an excuse. Don't make excuses.

I can tell you about ice, but your words suggest you won't hear it...after all, it's calculated, it's probably okay. I can tell you about experiencing rapid ice buildups in light airplanes (twins) that left me coming down in the mountains, I can tell you about aileron snatch and control problems that developed in large four engine piston airplanes...I can tell you about seeing 3" of ice buildupon the airplane so rapidly it couldn't be shed...all in places where no icing was anticipated, or very light trace icing...and all in cases where it built in less than 60 seconds. A case where the airplane lost 50 knots of airspeed immediately, went through best climb to best angle and then nearly to minimum controllable before settling there in a sustained descent. You don't want to hear that. You take calculated risks, that ignore that, apparently. It's what you don't "calculate" that can kill you.

Flying the airplane into ice is illegal you say...but flying over the mountains at night isn't...so that's okay. It's okay so long as it's not illegal, then? Justification, excuses, calculation, assessment. Even in Russian Roulette, one can calculate and assess the possibility of going at least five times before one pulls the trigger and shoots one's self in the head. This really doesn't make it the right thing to do. In aviation we don't play odds. We calculate, we know, we plan...we don't guess, and we don't take risks because we think the odds favor us.

You can let experience teach you this the hard way, or you can listen to others who have the experience to help you avoid having to learn the hard way. You would seem to be one who prefers to find out the hard way. I don't recommend it.

So, it's a dramatic theatrical trick to take the 14 known parachute activations and deduce that the parachute is the problem, or Cirrus pilots are a problem.


You've clearly missed the point, by more than a mile. The discussion was specifically regarding the parachute incidents, not about Cirrus in general, nor about other cirrus pilots. This is, after all, a discussion about parachutes and pilots. You're very stuck on the cirrus concept. It's a sidetrack to the true nature of this thread...you appear to take it very personally. Don't.

The vast majority of the cirrus parachute activations involved stupid pilot error; I said it before, I was dismissed, and proved I was right based on the stats. That's all. Don't try to carry the example to places it was never intended to go. When we speak of the few cirrus examples involving activations...thats 100% of the set in discussion...the discussion doesn't carry beyond those people, where the cirrus is concerned. If you are emotionally invested in the airplane or fly one yourself, deal with it. Be safe, don't crash...but my comments have nothing to do with you. These pertain the pilots and parachutes, and you're going a little (actually a lot) far afield.

Ft Wainwright, Fairbanks, Alaska. PB4Y along with a C-97G.

A typcial U.S. GA friendly welcome and tour of the aircraft with a crew member. They hadn't flown a mission for a while but were expecting to next day - July 4th 1998 - apparently the celebration fireworks usually managed to set something on fire!


I know who that was, but it wasn't me. Those were in Tanker 124 or 126 for the 4Y's, and Tanker 97 for the C97G. (The pilot on the 97G, incidentally, was the same one that did the flying for the recent remake of Flight of the Phoenix, using one of our C119's). I was in the lower 48 at the time...I believe I was in Florida on fires on that day, actually, also in a PB4Y.

Hopefully you survived the mosquitos in Ft. Wainwright.

Did the airplanes have their nose-art at the time? That turned into quite a saga.

I'm glad they treated you well. I always made sure that visitors got the full tour of the airplane, so long as we weren't about to launch on a fire. I hosted a lot of WWII veterans, many of whom cried when they got in the airplane. I had some follow me, or their sons drive them around to follow us, just so they could have a look. They would bring scrapbooks, and shoe boxes with pictures medals, mementos. They never cried because they missed the airplane, but for the friends of their youth who didn't get to come home.

One old man climbed into the left seat and stared pensively out the window. He finally said that the ground was a lot farther down than he remembered it. Then he allowed that the last time he climbed out of a B24 it was in Holland, and the airplane had been buried nearly up to the cockpit in mud as he crashed in soft earth; he climbed out the cockpit side window and the ground was only a couple of feet below the window.

Another old man flew P47's. He recalled flying up alongside a severely shot-up B24 over Germany. It clearly wasn't going to make it back to England, so he lead it over Switzerland. The nav station was shot out and the side of the airplane missing. One vertical stab detached and wildly spinning on the remains of the control cables, and one aileron separated. As he turned, the B24 followed him. He lead them back again, and then left them, hoping they got out okay. It was the most poignant memory for him of the B24.

A Canadian came to me one day to show me pictures of explosions behind his airplane as they bombed and torpedoed german U boats, shots taken out of the tail turret. I took him into the tail turret, where he hadn't been in many, many years.

I spent a lot of time researching the airplane. When I got typed in it, the flight manuals were old xerox copies. I got my own set of originals, and still have them. I really loved that airplane. The wings came off the one I got typed in, a few years ago, and the fleet was grounded. They've since been auctioned off. I'd love to fly one again one day, but doubt I ever will.

[ProfChrisReed]

To take the discussion back to pilot parachutes, there is some evidence from gliding statistics that possession of a parachute does not lead pilots into taking risks that they would otherwise not have undertaken.

For at least the last ten years the vast majority of flights in single seater gliders in the UK have been made with a parachute. The mid-air collision rate (which is the main risk which parachutes mitigate) seems not to have increased - there are no fully worked-out statistics, but there is a good reporting system and any major increase would have been noticed.

Personal parachutes are certainly not perceived by glider pilots as as panic buttons for when flights go wrong - if anything there is a reluctance to use them even where it would be appropriate. There are several reports of pilots landing a glider with known airframe damage, at least one of which led to a fatal accident when the damage beceme catastrophic while manoeuvring to land. I regularly hear discussions which conclude that the pilot would continue to fly the aircraft if it seemed controllable.

I can see that an airfame parachute might change a pilot's attitude to risk taking, but the fact that it might is not the same as proof that it did. That proof could only come from two sources: (a) higher accident rates for the aircraft type compared to non-parachute equipped aircraft, or (b) higher rates of a particular type of accident (in which possession of a parachute might be expected to reduce the risk of death). If there are no such increases, that is proof that pilot psychology has not been affected in this way by possession of an airframe parachute.

The training question for personal parachutes is not a single question but two different issues. Training in the care and checking of the equipment and planning for its use is obviously sensible, and I see no arguments against it and plenty for. Training in its actual use is more problematic. I'm a moderately active cross-country glider pilot, and the risk that I will ever have to use my parachute before I'm forced by age to give up flying is very small. I balance that against the known risk of injury in training via actual parachute jumps, the known risk to me of injury if I make a jump without training (the expected outcome is severe bruising with the possibility of minor fractures) and my distaste for the whole idea of parachuting if I'm not forced into it. Thus I wear a parachute, know how to check and maintain it, have planned for how I'd use it, but hope never to have to and will not jump voluntarily.

Even if my personal calculations are wrong, I see no argument that I'm better off not wearing a parachute if I refuse to take jump training.

[astir 8]

Quite agree

given the choice of sitting on a parachute or sitting on a seat cushion in a glider, I'll take the parachute. It would improve one's chances quite significantly in the event of losing a wing or similar.

(c.f. K21 struck by lighting some years back, 2 successful bailouts, the Calif breakup even more years back, 2 successful bailouts, mid air at Sutton Bank, only one unfortunately got out, but he survived)

And I've seen quite enough "one jump wonders" bending themselves at our site not to want to do any parachute training. If I'm going to break a leg/hit a barn/tree/powerline I'll take my chance if I ever have to use the chute for real, thanks all the same.

PS I believe the RAF stopped practising 1 engined landings in Mosquitoes because they were killing more people in practices than they were losing with real engine failures. Similar logic I guess. And GA spin training?

[Fuji Abound]

Flying the airplane into ice is illegal you say...but flying over the mountains at night isn't...so that's okay. It's okay so long as it's not illegal, then?

You and I have always had some pretty constructive debates in the past which I have enjoyed. Thank you.

On this occasion you do seem to have lost the plot.

I never said flying over mountains at night was ok. I simply pointed out it was legal - two very different matters. In fact the very point I was making is that it is illegal to fly in icing conditions which may, in some instances, be a great deal safer than flying over mountains at night in a single - or for that matter flying any where at night in a single.

The whole essence of flying is risk management. There is no such thing as a safe flight. What matters is where you draw the line. Some pilots are far more risk adverse than others. However, there are many pilots who will point out that they are prepared to accept the risk of an engine failure in a single at night. They point out that there are many more risky elements in every day life that most of us accept. To every person that smokes there is a greater risk smoking will kill you than flying at night. To everyone that drives if you only fly a few hours at night statistically you are more likely to be killed driving your car. To everyone that is obese (a majority of Americans apparently) you are more likely to die from weight related conditions. For these reasons I do not accept your argument -flying is a study in risk assessment like a great many things we do in life.

To your specific point I would far rather be involved with some one who has calculated the risk. At least if their calculations are accurate they have demonstrated a proper understanding of the factors involved and what actions they will take to mitigate the risk. Find me a surgeon who will guarantee the success of a procedure. A good surgeon understands the risks involved with each procedure he conducts but he knows full well a percentage of patients will die. In many cases the condition is in itself not life threatening, but the patient and the surgeon, knowing the risks agree to the procedure. One patient may accept a 5% chance he will die, another may not. Neither is right - each has hopefully made an informed decision - he has made a risk assessment.

Flying is just another study in risk assessment.

When I collect my aircraft (any aircraft) from its annual there is a whole gamit of things I do I wouldnt normally. For one, I loiter in the overhead for rather a long time. Many of my friends think I am mad. Personally I have recorded maybe a dozen hours in singles at night - I dont enjoy the added risk, and for that reason nearly all my night hours involve two engines. I use to fly across 80 miles of sea in the winter in a single without a second thought. Now days I would only do so in a twin unless I really had no alternative. There lies the issue: what happens if you have no alternative - you can only afford to fly a single, you have to be at a meeting and there is 80 miles of winter ocean between you and the meeting. Do you not go? Do you take a raft? Do you take a raft and jackets? Do you wear a dry suite? Do you fly as high as possible to minimise time over the sea? Do you take a hand held ELT. In reality the risk of an engine failure in the first place is very small. However, should it happen the risk of you dieing from hypothermia is very large. Jackets are of little value, but better than nothing. Some will say a liferaft is the answer, others there is no substitute for a dry suite. You will stand the best chance of survival with all three. Statistically the higher you go the better, but the reduction in the risk is tiny. Of course if you want to carry commercial passengers none of the risks are acceptable, so you bolt on an extra engine.

I worry about you because if you believe you can get in an aircraft an eliminate the risk then most certainly you have never flown - which I do not believe. In fact it is the very failure to assess the risk that leads so often to accidents. There was an accident recently involving two very experienced commercial pilots. They found themselves in a spot of weather and decided to divert without a proper assessment of their diversion. They chose not to assess the risk. Not only did they end up accepting a tail wind but a wet runway that in combination was too short. They killed themselves and their passengers - and took with them all 20,000 odd hours of experience. All your hours of experience and mine count for nothing the moment you forget to assess the risk of what you are about to do - we dont assess the risk to justify our actions, we assess the risk because we know it is inherant to some degree in what we are about to do and by identifying the risk we best establish whether we have taken adequate measures to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level.

[Weeeee]

This is a bit parallel to the main arguments raging here at the moment, but relevant to an earlier post and I believe the merged nature of this thread, so here goes:

Need an emergency parachute for an aerobat, not a parachutist - what are the arguments for round / square and where to get training for care and potential use in UK?

PS on the BRS / Cirrus thing, my view is there are always likely to be people (not just pilots) who believe safety device X makes them relatively immune to certain threats (e.g. believing ABS / Stability systems help cars defy the laws of physics), but that doesn't negate their value for those of us who make good judgements and still end up in the brown stuff, where safety device X has any reasonable chance of saving our bacon.

[SNS3Guppy]

In reality the risk of an engine failure in the first place is very small.

I used to think that. Once. A very long time ago. Before I knew better.

[Fuji Abound]

I used to think that. Once. A very long time ago. Before I knew better.

So what rate of engine failure per 1,000 hours do you consider to be average?

[SNS3Guppy]

I don't. You're asking the wrong question.

You stated that the "risk" of an engine failure is small. It's not. It's a big risk, and perhaps until you have one, or several, then it's an academic one.

You have the same "chance" every time; the engine will either run, or it won't. Better put, it will run properly, or it won't. My last event resulted in a forced landing on the side of a mountain with an engine that was fully responsive to the power lever, and a propeller that wasn't. No oil. While the engine ran fine, it did me no good...so perhaps it's better to say either the engine will work for you, or it won't.

I don't care about five hundred hours, or five thousand, or dividing failures into those hours. I've gone for years without failures, and then had multiple failures in a year or a season, in multiple aircraft for multiple operators. There's really never been anything "average" about them.

The attitude of assuming it's a "small risk" is a dangerous one. I used to think it was a small thing too. After you've made forced landings off field, after you've dealt with some of the things that can go wrong, truly wrong, with an airplane or airframe, then you'll come to appreciate the fallacy of that concept; it's not a small risk, at all. It's very real.

Fly over the freezing water to get to that meeting if you like, but it's not a "small risk." That same flight could be made over the shore, perhaps...taking longer to get where you're going, but with options in the event of a power loss. You could take that flight out in the middle of the night through the mountains and possible weather, or wait until morning so you have options. Me? I wait for morning. I follow the shore line. I stay over roads. Risk elimination is all about identifying risks and eliminating them by avoiding what causes them, or providing a way out, options, so it's no longer a risk.

Accepting risk is to embrace hazard, to marry chance, and to lie with a question. It has no place in aviation, particularly not in private aviation.

[Fuji Abound]

Accepting risk is to embrace hazard, to marry chance, and to lie with a question. It has no place in aviation, particularly not in private aviation.

That seems a very strange assertion from some one who claims an extra engine is there for performance.

BTW, how have you personally elminated risk from the flying you do in a typical GA single?

[SNS3Guppy]

I believe that's already been provided, by example.

This is long, but it's important.

Eliminating risk: refuse a flight. Preflight and find problems before getting in the air. Reject a takeoff. Wait for better weather. Choose routing to avoid hazards. Keep landing sites available in the event of power loss. Avoid single engine IMC operations. Use longer runways. There are many ways to find and eliminate risk. One must always be asking what it is that one doesn't know yet, and accounting for it.

When I approach a ridge on a fire, for example, I approach at an angle. I approach with an exit planned such that if I'm unable to jettison the load, the aircraft can still escape. Everything is made downhill; water flows downhill, and so do I. I know I can't outclimb the mountain; it outclimbs me. Therefore, I don't try.

When I fly cross country, I know it's much harder to run out of fuel if I don't burn off the bottom half of the tank. This doesn't mean one must keep a half tank on board, but it does mean that there's no law against carrying more than the bare minimum fuel reserve. Reserves aren't there to be used as part of regular planning and operation. Never the less, pilots annually continue to run out of fuel. A four and a half hour flight with five hours of fuel is asking for trouble. Make it a four and a half hour flight with six hours of fuel, or seven...now you're talking about eliminating on possible "risk."

Got known ice? Dandy. Is there some law which says you have to go sucking around in the ice to see how well it works? Of course not. Ever have hot props or boots fail you in the ice? Ever have ice come off your props and put holes in the side of the airplane? Ever have ice build fast enough it interfered with the aerodynamic handling of the airplane? I sure have, and it's for that reason that I strongly suggest one learn from other's experiences rather than insisting on experiencing it first hand. Got known ice? Good for you. Avoid ice that's known, so you don't have to see how well it works. Now you're eliminating risk.

Wearing a parachute? Can you recognize a pilot chute in tow? A horseshoe malfunction? A lineover? A mae west? An end cell closure? Can you stop a spin with a released brake line? What about broken lines? Collapsing a canopy? Getting stable in freefall? Do you know what a canopy out of the pack in an airplane can do or how dangerous it is? Ever performed a PLF? Do you know what to do when you land in water? In a tree? To avoid powerlines? How to collapse the parachute in wind? Release the parachute? Any idea what happens if your leg straps aren't TIGHT when you open that canopy?

Of course...we're told it's a "small risk," and therefore you don't need to know it.

Of course.

Perhaps you do.

Can you imagine never being taught to land in a crosswind. It's a small risk. Probably never need to be able to do that. All the winds here are out of the south...all the runways north/south...don't worry about the crosswinds. Don't worry about draining the fuel sumps...probably never any water in the fuel. Small risk, right? Why get to know your equipment...probably never have any problems, right?

Many Cessna 200 owners and pilots aren't aware of the kidney sumps that are below the fuselage, just below where the wing strut attaches to the airframe (or would attach, in the case of most 210's that lack struts, of course). Many don't even know there are drains there, or the significance of those tanks...perfectly happy and content to not know their aircraft fuel system. The problem is that this system can cause what's known as Fuel Flow Fluctuation. Problem is that the same line which feeds that tank from the wing also serves as a vapor return line, and it's the same tank to which hot bypass fuel from the fuel pump is sent.

The real problem is that the hot fuel under the right conditions can cause a vapor lock in the fuel feed line from the tank, causing the engine to sputter and die. The problem is that the Cessna manual dictates turning on the boost pump, switching tanks, then adjusting the mixture...and the real problem is that doing this without taking the time to know the system can prevent you from restoring power...because turning on the boost pump only makes the problem worse by returning even more hot fuel to that same kidney sump/header tank. Go figure. Many general aviation pilots who fly these airplanes don't know it.

You see, knowing your equipment and your systems is very, very important. Every bit as much with the parachute as it is with your airplane. To not learn your airplane is unthinkable...yet still goes on. Little wonder, then, that pilots are dismissive about learning their parachute system. Take it seriously.

I can't count the number of fatality reports I've read with jumpers who died tugging on a piece of their harness instead of an operating handle. Jumpers who were seen frantically pulling on what they thought was a toggle, D-ring, or other control to open their parachute, but instead had grasped a part of the harness webbing...and they fought with it all the way to impact, and to their death.

I think about that every time I jump. I consciously think about that and reach for, and touch every part of the harness, over and over. I want the very last thing that ran through my mind, before an emergency, to be the one thing that will save me.

About five years ago I'd had a modification done by a rigger to a parachute system, moving the pilot chute pocket from a ROL (rear of leg) position to a BOC (bottom of container) position; a safety upgrade which all new systems now use. I tested the system repeatedly on the ground to ensure that the pilot chute would extract comfortably from the sleeve when it came time to pull, and it did.

I rode to 18,000' in a Caravan, and got out. I did a 2-way freefall with someone else down to 4,500', then broke away. I did several turns, a backloop, a roll, and reached to pull. I grasped the toggle on the pilot chute, and pulled, and it was stuck fast. At this point I was below my usual pull atitude of 3,000', passing 2,500', and stable at terminal velocity. I tried a second time and it didn't work. I tried arching my hips one way for leverage while pulling the other, and immediately found myself on my back, with my chest mount altimeter showing through 2,000'. At this point, 10-12 seconds to impact.

I knew that when not in a stable face-to-earth position, the altimeter wouldn't read correctly...I could be lower. The audible alert altimeter in my helmet was a steady loud whine in my ear and my wrist altimeter agreed. I arched hard, pushing my arms and legs out and behind me, my chest up, and quickly flipped over, now turning head down as I righted myself. I noted I was directly above the ramp in front of the main drop zone hangar, and I got ground rush. This is when everything that was small and far away suddenly blossoms and gets detailed; if you get ground rush you're very low, and I was.

At that moment I had the car-crash experience, when everything slows down, and things became very crystal clear. I remembered all the reports of other jumpers going in, bouncing, dying, with a useless handle or the harness in their hand, and thought to myself "you're that guy." I knew that any further hesitation, any further effort to extract that canopy would result in my death. This was perfectly clear, obvious, no question. I knew I had to let go of that handle and open a reserve. The thought briefly flashed through my mind, verifying that I did indeed have a total malfunction and nothing to cut away, and in that moment I released the handle, used both hands, and pulled the reserve D-ring. The reserve parachute, a bright pink square ram-air parachute came off my back under spring tension, and opened hard and fast.

I had time to check the canopy, release the brakes, and I hit the ground.

I'm not telling you these things to give you a hard time. It's usually far better to learn from other people's experiences than from your own; especially when your own may kill you.

Some years ago following a major fire fatality, a discussion came up regarding the actions of the deceased. When the burnover started and they began running for their safety zone, some made it, some didn't. The ones who made it dropped their packs, their chainsaws, and their gear, and ran for their lives. The ones who didn't were found burned beyond recognition in the 2,000 degree heat, with what was left of their tools melted into their charred bodies. It seem so simple, then...drop the tools and run.

One member of the discussion had been a firefighter for 20 years on the line. He was faced with a similiar problem. He knew the score. As the fire exploded behind him, he caught up with a member of his team running, and the member was being slowed down because he was still carrying his saw...a heavy chainsaw full of gasoline. The experienced firefighter screamed at him to drop it, then slapped him hard and took the saw out of the young man's hands. They ran and made it; they arrived at the safe zone. They lived.

When the experienced firefighter look down at his own hands, he found that he held the saw he'd taken from the junior man. His instinct and training had kicked in...the saw is a lifeline, and he'd clutched it as he ran...just as he'd told the others not to do. He couldn't believe it. That was twelve years or so ago now, I think. Probably not the first time, probably not the last. But it wasn't in an airplane, you say, and what does that have to do with parachutes and flying and risk? Everything.

Human nature. In an emergency, we revert to two things; what we know, and our training. We can't revert to what we don't know, save for instinct, and we train the proper response so we don't follow instinct into an early grave.

We can go through life thinking "it's a small risk, so I won't bother," but it's improper, unprofessional, and inappropriate in aviation. But we're private pilots, we don't have to act professionally...I've heard it before. Not so. Professionalism isn't about making money at what you do; it's state of mind. it's the ability to say no, it's the ability to never perform at the minimum level, it's the drive and desire to seek training, seek a higher level of operation, and to maintain a high standard. Simply believing "it's a small risk" won't cut it, and it's no more appropriate for a private pilot than it is for an ATP.

I've worked a lot of jobs to support my flying habit. One of them was as an armed guard, servicing ATM's (teller machines). I carried over two hundred thousand dollars in cash, in a canvas bag, while approaching the machine. As you can imagine, this would be tempting to nearly anyone. In training, on the range, we practiced with heavy canvas bags, carried in the shooting hand. Or one in both hands. When a buzzer sounded, we had to be able to complete the shooting drill accurately without danger to ourselves or targets representing bystanders, while protecting our lives.

You might be shocked at the number of people who failed to drop the money. First step, drop the money. It's no longer a priority. Empty one's hands, abandon what you knew a half a second ago, because your world has now changed. It's a new landscape. Drop the money. Draw. Front sight on target, trigger pressure, fire again. But what did people do? They struggled, went into sensory overload, tried to transfer the bag to the other hand before drawing the weapon to save their life...very bad.

The saying goes that you fight as you train, and it's equally true that you fly as you train. Before I fly, I always rehearse my way out of the harness or seat belt, out of the cockpit, and out of the airplane. I want to be able to do it eyes closed, in the dark, under water, on fire, whatever. I want to be blindfold familiar with the cockpit so I could find anything on command without having to feel for it...intimately knowing the airplane. Same with a parachute. Know every inch of it, inside and out. Know what it looks like open and closed, and what to do. People buy firearms to protect themselves and then die in a gunfight when they don't know how to release the safety under stress. The same can be said for opening a parachute, clearing a fuel flow fluctuation malfunction, or handling an aircraft fire.

I sat in the back of an airliner recently, going home from a 17 day trip on the road. I was in uniform, and the passenger next to me looke surprised when I withdrew the passenger safety briefing card from the seatback in front of me, and began to read it. "But, aren't you a pilot?" He asked. Why, yes. "Why do you need to read that?"

I explained that no matter who we are, or our background, it's important to read that information every single time, and listen to the briefing by the flight attendant. As I glanced around me, I saw what I usually see...nobody reading the cards, nobody watching the flight attendant. The man seated next to me scoffed..."I really don't need anyone to tell me how to undo my seatbelt."

I explained to him that in an emergency, when the airplane is full of smoke and upside down and he's hanging from that belt, when it's dark and there's a lot of yelling and screaming, the one thing he wants running through is mind is the last thing he did, the last thought he had...and that was practicing locating and undoing that buckle. You may find this silly...but as a firefighter I've been inside enough vehicles with crash victims...cars and aircraft, to know that many people can't even fire out where they are, or who they are, or how to release their seatbelt, for that matter. When the chips are down, you really want to be trained in your system...and that includes a parachute.

I've spent most of my adult life, and a good share of my teenage life too, training for and engaged in emergency situations in flight and on the ground. Often as a fucntion of my employment. I sincerely hope that there are those who are able to learn from others who've been through those situations, rather than having to go out and prove it for themselves. This is just as applicable to wearing an emergency parachute as it is to preflighting an airplane or outrunning a fire on the ground. All involve aspects of human nature under stress, or potentially under stress, and all involve an inherent need to get it right, every time, with potentially dire consequences if one fails to do so. A preflight may not be a stressful experience, but dealing with the aftermath of what's missed most certainly can be, to say nothing of the stress one's relatives and friends may feel after the fact. For everyone's sake, think safety first; find the risk, eliminate it.

Eliminate it with thorough training proficiency, and an attitude toward safety. Never think "it's a little risk." It's not. If it's risk, it's worth taking seriously.

[RatherBeFlying]

Free Flightthis year carried two articles on emergency bailout:

Soaring Association of Canada - Downloads | 2000's | free flight (http://www.sac.ca/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=88&Itemid=88)

Well worth reading every Spring if not more often.

The difficult thing to practice in many gliders is getting out after getting rid of the canopy and unstrapping.

The recumbent position and instrument binnacle don't help -- also, the fact that we normally treat the glider with great delicacy getting in and out.

I've been telling myself to use the tow release toggle to pull myself up; even put my feet on the instrument binnacle if that's what's needed to get out.

Yes, many pilots will attempt to land a damaged glider if it's still controllable (i.e. can fly at approach speed and behave properly with spoilers) and a long field into wind is available.

[Fuji Abound]

This is long, but it's important.

I would agree it is very long.

Unfortunately it is very unimportant for the sake of this discussion.

Please forgive me but from my point of view (and I genuinely dont mean to come across as conceited) you have trotted out the usual patter about minimising risk which should be bread and butter to any seasoned pilot. To the wider audience it may be of interest - I hope so.

You havent eliminate risk at all - you have taken some sensible precautions to reduce the risk in certain aspects of the flight all of which are pretty self evident to most experienced pilots.

Avoid single engine IMC operations.

Is this an example of the bleeding obvious or of a pilot who does not understand his trade.

My guess is that if you fly through an overcast at 4,000 feet to be clear on top at 5,000 feet you have not increased the risk at all. Any competant instrument pilot should manage to maintain control through the undercast into VMC at 4,000 and perform as good a forced landing as if the cloud had not been there.

As I tried to explain earlier it would have been interesting to discuss how we assess risk - does the excercise become an unreasonable risk if the cloudbase is at 3,000 feet, or 2,000 feet, or 1,000 feet .. .. .. but your bland assertion is just nonesense and contributes nothing to the debate we were having.

I am afraid your last post just comes across as naive.

Clearly you are not naive when it comes to flying, but you would seem obsessed with broadly dogmatic mantra which may go down well with students but deals with the issues we having been discussing in such a broad brush manner that it does not advance the debate.

Sorry, we are going to have to just disagree on this one.

I enjoyed the debate, however, thanks.

PS I am glad that at least I have convinced you the extra engine is not there for performance. :)

[SNS3Guppy]

I can see this is a waste of time. Better defined as casting one's pearls before swine, so to speak. I'm done with this conversation.

[Fuji Abound]

There is a difference between forthright and your post.

If you thought I was insulting you, you would be wrong.

It is just that your argument does not stack up.

As I said, you havent eliminated risk at all, you have simply trotted out a few of the usual precautions any mature pilot should take.

You have also chosen to ignore my comments about each flight being an excercise in risk assessment followed by an excercise in risk management. I dont as much mind if you disagree with my view, but I do mind that you have not tackled the debate in a constructive way, simply dismissing my assertion that you must elimanate risk without demonstrably explaining how you achieve that.

What worries me is you seem closed to any other position than your own, but arent prepared to justify the view you hold.

I still believe it is almost impossible to eliminate risk in flying a light single if only because as you point out if you fly for long enough the engine will eventually fail on you - it could happen much earlier than you think. Height, visibility, terrain and regular practise are your friends, but even then do not guarantee success every time. Most pilot's erode their friendship with each to some degree otherwise you would severly restrict your flying - rightly or wrongly that is the simple reality. Hence we should debate what degree of erosion is warranted.

Doubtless we may have the debate on another occasion and perhaps with an open mind make more progress. Sorry it did not prove possible on this occasion.

[Contacttower]

:hmm:....This thread does seem rather hard to follow...

Broadly I would agree with Fuji over risk; flying light aircraft will always be risky...although as I think back to a thread on flying and danger last year I remember of course that risk is a relative word and relies on some sort of common consensus of meaning to be used in an absolute sense.

On the subject of parachutes and training though I think it is worth doing a parachute jump if you're a pilot who flies with one. I've done one solo jump and while it's not something I enjoyed enough to spend money on a regular basis it was good to know what actually jumping was like and I now would have less apprehension about using a parachute in anger and therefore feel safer wearing one. To those worrying about the likelihood of injuring themselves modern parachutes are very reliable - of the eight of us or so that jumped in our group no one received any injuries or any sort.

As for the Cirrus parachutes I don't really believe they induce a moral hazard effect - plenty of pilots kill themselves by getting into situations they can't handle without needing or having a parachute to lure them. On a personal level though I actually don't really care either way - the fact that others may have abused a safety feature doesn't make me any more likely to - I would trust myself not be any less conservative with decision making because I had BRS and therefore it can only add to my safety. At the end of the day I know I'd rather have it.

[Fuji Abound]

Contacttower

Simply and well put.

[vabsie]

Contacttower

"flying light aircraft will always be risky"

Not encouraging words for someone like myself who is about to start training, but I have to admit that I have come to a similar conclusion by speaking with various people.

Many of the posts that I have submitted so far might indicate that I'm simply "scared" of flying .. maybe it's a bit of that, and maybe it's also that I would like to know that my safety is in my own hands. Before people start, I KNOW that it's always better to be prepared for the worst ... but would also hate to think that every flight could end up in a big drama, sort of takes the fun out of it. Then again, it's my love for aeroplanes and flying that still makes me want to do it.

S

Not sure how accurate any of the below is but in case anyone is interested/can comment:

General Aviation Safety (http://philip.greenspun.com/flying/safety)

[Contacttower]

Not encouraging words for someone like myself who is about to start training, but I have to admit that I have come to a similar conclusion by speaking with various people.I didn't mean to put you off...:) I posted on your thread about car vs. plane engines that I would have more faith in a modern and well maintained aero engine than in a car one....so it's not all bad. Your slight fear may well actually have given you a head start in terms of safety while flying; certainly I didn't really consider the issue of crashing before learning to fly so it's good that you're thinking about it. You really won't be able to make a judgement as to what you feel comfortable doing until you've been flying a little while though.

Simply and well put.Why thank you Fuji...

[Fuji Abound]

Not encouraging words for someone like myself who is about to start training, but I have to admit that I have come to a similar conclusion by speaking with various people.

Examination of the accident statistics will enable you to form a good assessment of the type of accidents that end up killing most pilots.

The two most significant types are controlled flight into terrain and loss of control.

Ignoring the fatalities connected with flying into mountainous terrain (a type of flying which requires its own skill set) almost all CFIT is associated (not surprisingly) with poor visibility or IMC.

The vast majority of loss of control fatalities are associated with loss of control at low level (often in the circuit in and around base leg and final) and to a much lesser extent, en route weather.

Not surprisingly it takes a hard impact with the ground to kill you, which is why these scenarios are almost always fatal.

From that we can conclude that if you stay away from poor visibility, or ensure you skill set enables you to safely operate in IMC, and you maintain control in the circuit at all cost, you will have eliminated the most common reasons for loss of life.

Accidents which are almost completely outside the control of the pilot are fortunately few and far between and, in any event, often not fatal. Often there is very little a pilot could have done to prevent an engine failure, but the number of engines that fail other than as a result of running out of fuel or evidently poor operating procedures and maintenance are relatively few. In my view any operator should ensure that he always uses a maintenance shop with a proven reputation. Oil analysis is inexpensive and also in my view should always be undertaken as it is a great indicator of impending problems. Low compressions, delaying replacement of vital parts and running engines on condition or close to their service life are also operating procedures which in my view are false economy and increase the chances of an in flight failure. Never the less there is always a risk the best maintained engine can fail at the most unexpected of times for reasons that could not have been detected. However, there is every reason to expect a forced landing will be successful. The chances of success can of course be significantly improved by never putting yourself in a position where the landing becomes a significant lottery - poor terrain, night, water etc, or you have little time for setting up the landing (you are asking for trouble if you give yourself less than 1,000 feet through an undercast). As I indicated earlier, each persons assessment of the level of risk they are prepared to accept in terms of this (and other) scenarios is a matter for them. I know some pilots who regularly fly singles at night. Statistically, if you follow all of the precautions I have mentioned, the chances of a calamitous engine failure are remote - you may be prepared to accept that level of risk, the chances of a successful forced landing at night are clearly rather less than during the day, but there are many success stories. A good friend of mine landed in total darkness, went through a hedge, over a ditch, and a tree took off his starboard wing, but he got out the aircraft without so much as a scratch. It is however a lottery - he might have ploughed head on into the side of a barn and the wall collapse on the aircraft. For that reason, as I said earlier, you cant eliminate risk completely other than by only ever flying in perfect conditions and even then, as just one example, it is a “brave” pilot who can guarantee he is never going to suffer a mid air outside CAS using only the mark 1 eyeball and the other techniques available to reduce the risk of a collision. In my time I have been “involved” with three mid airs which I would consider were uncomfortably close. On one occasion I wasn’t the flying crew - whether I would have seen the aircraft if I had been looking I don’t know to this day. In the second I was receiving a RIS in IMC as was the other aircraft. Prima facia it was ATCs “fault”. In the third I simply never saw the threat until he had passed just beneath me. I often ask if I should have done, but I was taking all the precautions I normally do at the time, both aircraft were fast twins, and I suspect we both just did pick up each other in our scan until it was too late.

So in short, you can make flying a great deal safer than you might imagine, and you can eliminate a significant element of the risk involved, although at least in part only to the extent of being very selective about your operating conditions. However, even then you cannot totally eliminate the risk involved.

[vabsie]

Thanks for the info Fuji.

[Vee1Kut]

Guppy....no need to bring a parachute, all you have to do is pitch for V1 and the plane will always fly...right?

[aseanaero]

It's nearly 15 years ago now but I was flying a Cessna 182 jump plane (and wearing a back pack chute) when on descent from 10,000ft when the prop went from 2,200rpm to redline , I pushed the pitch in and wound the pitch out again to reset for 2,200 rpm where it stayed for a few seconds then redline again ! Then I checked the oil pressure and it was fluctuating from zero to normal from second to second.

I was at 7,000ft right above the airfield so I decided to pull the mixture to idle cut off to try and save the engine and glide it in (hard decision in a single engine to do it for real) What surprised me is the prop stopped dead instead of windmilling !

I spoke with the engineer afterwards and he said if I hadn't killed the engine and tried to land still using power it probably would have split the crankcase so I could have had a lot of oil and smoke and maybe a fire. In that situation with 2,000 or 3,000 ft of altitude or if there was a loss of flying controls I would use the parachute but if the aircraft is still flyable I would prefer to fly the aircraft to a forced landing , safer for me and those on the ground.

I got myself and the plane down without further incident.