AA 757 departed runway at ORD - no injuries

[coolie]

News reports AAL268 SEA-JFK diverted to ORD due to electrical problems, possibly a 757. Anyone have further details?

[Airbubba]

Looks like the plane the guy asked about earlier overran the runway with no reported injuries. BA and VS did go arounds behind it from what I heard on the ATC freqs.



American flight makes emergency landing at O'Hare

September 22, 2008

FROM STNG WIRE REPORTS
An American Airlines flight en route from Seattle to New York City made an emergency landing at O'Hare International Airport on Monday afternoon after reported electrical problems on board.

American Flight 268, a Boeing 757 bound from Seattle-Tacoma International to JFK, made the emergency stop after an indicator light came on in the cockpit, FAA spokeswoman Elizabeth Isham Cory.

The plane landed about 1:42 p.m. on Runway 22 Right and was stopped in the runway's overrun area, Cory said. Passengers were deplaning, as of 2:05 p.m.

Fire dispatch reports said the plane was off the runway and emergency crews were checking the safety of passengers. No injuries were reported as of 2 p.m., but Cory referred all inquiries to American.

American Airlines did not return requests for comment as of 2 p.m.

A spokesman for the city Department of Aviation would say only that American Flight 268 was experiencing "electrical problems."

Fire Media Affairs Asst. Director Eve Rodriguez said the plane experienced radio problems en route to the airport. An EMS Plan 1 and still-and-box response were called at the airport.

The FAA will be investigating the situation, Cory said.

________________________________

Airliner overruns O'Hare runway, no injuries
50 minutes ago

CHICAGO (AP) — Aviation officials say an American Airlines Boeing 757 has blown a tire and run off a runway during an emergency landing at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport.

The Federal Aviation Administration and the airline say no injuries have been reported in the Monday afternoon incident.

22L at ORD has EMAS, does 22R?

[ray cosmic]

BA and VS land on the 22R? are you sure?.

[weasil]

I saw it happen. AA 757 went right off the end of 22R into the grass. Noone was injured and they were going pretty slow when they left the pavement. They blew a tire and skidded to the left a bit and off onto the dirt. Passengers walked off via airstair.

[pointless username]

I don't think that 22R has EMAS yet, it's just the one runway as far as I remember.
BTW we stick the BD A330 in on 22R, and comfortably come off at A (used to be C). Autobrake Med, and Max reverse works a treat.

[Doors to Automatic]

I've been in there on the BMI A330 on a number of occasions. Stops a treat and usually vacates with 2000ft to go.

I'd be interested to learn why the 757 didn't stop.

[BleedingOn]

No problems to use 22R for a 340 on a normal day. I'm sure BA wouldn't have any issues either in a 777 or 747.

[Airbubba]

Here's an audio clip of ORD scanner traffic around the time of the incident:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kord/KORD-Sep-22-2008-1830Z.mp3

Around 10:55 into the clip AA 268 says he's declaring an emergency, seems to know he'll need a lot of runway and extra time to get off. Loss of left hydraulics with no PTU perhaps?

At 14:41 in the audio clip BA 295 gets a go around followed by similar instructions to UA 679 and VS 39, not sure which runway they were going to initially.

No problems to use 22R for a 340 on a normal day. I'm sure BA wouldn't have any issues either in a 777 or 747.

Yep, 772's and 340's do operate off the 'B' runway in NRT which is shorter than 22R. Still, was 22L not available for an emergency landing? It's over 10,000 feet long...

[Roadtrip]

Just the nose gear was off the prepared surface by a few feet.

Just saw a better pic. Looks like all the wheels are off, but no apparent damage.

[Airbubba]

Just the nose gear was off the prepared surface by a few feet.

From the morning paper:

The flight arrived at O'Hare about 1:45 p.m. and blew a tire as it touched down; the aircraft skidded off the side of the runway, leaving the main nose gear and the left main landing gear in some grass, according to Elizabeth Isham Cory, a spokeswoman for the Federal Aviation Administration.


Diverted flight skids off runway :: CHICAGO SUN-TIMES :: Transportation (http://www.suntimes.com/news/transportation/1179523,CST-NWS-plane23.article)

[IGh]

Perhaps not relevant to this B757 case --

??? Electrical problems???

From slot#1:
“... diverted to ORD due to electrical problems ...”
Excerpt from press story in slot #10:
“... arrived at O'Hare about 1:45 p.m. and blew a tire as it touched down; the aircraft skidded ...”
In past examples of skid / tire-failure, an electrical problem had subtly depowered (failed) the Antiskid input to Brake System. No problem, unless (large aircraft) a pilot needs to apply any brakes during landing roll-out.

[Airbubba]

Some observations from a grateful blogger:

That’s when the flight attendent came through. “We’re having a little electrical trouble with the PA. The captain thinks it’s important the he communciate with the flight crew, so we’re going to make an unscheduled landing at O’Hare. We’ll get a mechanical crew on it ASAP. It’s NOT an emergency, it’s just unscheduled.”

I’ve been through worse landings. The plane bounced once, maybe twice and then the brakes went on, hard. Really, I’ve been through worse. But when I looked out the window, a bunch of heavy emergency equipment was heading our way. Fast. I didn’t think it was for us at first, but it was.

The flight attendents came through again saying that there’d been some kind of electrical problem. The pilot landed the plane the old fashioned way, in an odd angle on the grass. I could see tarmac and runway under the wing on my right, lots of grass to the left. And loads of blinky lights, firemen in heavy gear…

We sat for 10, maybe 20 minutes. The air conditioning was dead, the plane got really hot, really fast. The flight attendent told us we were waiting for the ramps, they’d be taking us by bus to the terminal. But we couldn’t get off the plane until they turned the engines off and the left one wasn’t shutting down. The fire trucks shuffled around outside, the firemen stood nearby with extinguishers that looked ridiculously small next to the huge plane wing. The pilot walked through the cabin, looking dead serious and a little old, asking if everyone was okay. He stood chatting with a group in the back of the plane, a round of applause went up as he headed back up the aisle to the cockpit.

No one panicked or freaked out. The flight attendents were like angels, perfectly calm and in good humor. The passengers sat and joked, I snapped pictures of the fire crew out the window and as they boarded the plane. Finally the left engined whirled to a halt and a cheer went up in the cabin.

“Unscheduled Landing” | nerd's eye view (http://www.nerdseyeview.com/blog/2008/09/22/unscheduled-landing/)

[IGh]

From press quote by NTSB spokesman:

"... the National Transportation Safety Board will try to determine what caused the mishap, said NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway...."

As of October 10th, the Board's web-site does NOT show even a preliminary mention of this mishap. There have been numerous similar scenarios investigated by the Board.

Not sure, but as of today, I suspect that neither the Board nor FAA will investigate, and there will be no report -- hope the Board does soon post a preliminary report, to show their intent to do their job.

= = = = = / / Edit / / / = = =

24 Oct08, prelim' posted
CHI08IA292 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20081007X03940&key=1)
NTSB Identification: CHI08IA292
...
September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, a Boeing 757-223, N197AN ... American ... 268, diverted to ... O’Hare ... due to electrical system anomalies. During the landing on runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet), the airplane veered off the left side of the runway resulting in minor damage to the landing gear. ... originated from the Seattle ... intended destination ... JFK ...

While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). ... QRH ... AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, "The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes." The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. The flightcrew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH.

Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. ... over western Michigan and the captain elected ... divert to ORD. Also, the flight attendants discovered that public address (PA) and the cabin/cockpit interphone systems were inoperative. A flight attendant wrote a note and slipped it under the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of their communication problems. A short time later, the cabin crew was informed that they were diverting to ORD. One of the flight attendants then walked through the aisle informing the passengers of the unscheduled landing at Chicago.

While aligned with the runway to land, the flightcrew declared an emergency with the control tower as a precaution. As the airplane neared the runway on final approach, the flightcrew discovered that the elevator and standby elevator trim systems were inoperative. The captain then assisted the first officer on the flight controls and the approach to land was continued. The systems required to slow the airplane on the runway appeared to indicate normal, and with the elevator control issues the flightcrew did not want to perform a go-around to land on a longer runway. Pitch control of the airplane was difficult so the flightcrew elected to stop the flap extension at 20 degrees. The touchdown was smooth despite the control issues, however, the thrust reversers and spoilers did not deploy. The captain attempted to manually deploy the thrust reversers, but still was not sure if they deployed. The captain was concerned about the brake functionality and accumulator pressure so he made one smooth application of the brakes, which did not “perform well.” Due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass.

As the airplane touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway witnesses heard loud pops. Skid marks from the left main gear were evident near the point of touchdown and 165 feet further down the runway skid marks from the right main gear were present. These skid marks were visible for the entire length of the runway up until the airplane departed the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane came to rest approximately 100 feet prior to the end of the blast pad pavement which extended 397 feet past the departure end of the runway.

After coming to a stop, the flightcrew was not able to shut the engines down with either the fuel cutoff valves or by extending the fire handles. The engines were subsequently shutdown by depressing the fire handles. The passengers were then deplaned through the L1 and R4 doors using portable stairs.

Post incident investigation revealed a failure of the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay. With the standby power selector in the AUTO position, this failure would have resulted in a loss of power to the battery bus and the DC standby bus, which would have resulted in the AIR/GND SYS message and illumination of the standby power bus OFF light which the flight crew received.

With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered.

[glob99]

NTSB reviews jet's skid landing at O'Hare - USATODAY.com (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2008-10-23-NTSB-OHare_N.htm)

The pilots had switched to battery power shortly after leaving Seattle when electrical problems developed. The batteries last for about 30 minutes, but the pilots continued toward their destination until the jet's electrical systems began failing about an hour and 40 minutes later.:confused:

[captjns]

There's got to be more to the story than the crew not following their QRH. Come one Seattle to Chicago is about 3 hours. Which means, if the story were true the crew flew for well over two hours without main electrical power.

Could this be more media hype?:rolleyes:

[Airbubba]

The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power.

I agree, this just doesn't sound right...

[Longtimer]

Is it possible they thought the RAT would carry them through the problem?

From an unamed source. The 757 operations manual states the following:

"The ram air trubine (RAT) hydralic pump is located in the body fairing
aft of the right main gear. Inflight the RAT automatically deploys into
the airstream when airspeed is above 80 knots and both engines fail. The
RAT then supplies power to the center system. Once extended, the RAT can
only be retracted on the ground. At speeds above 130 knots, the RAT pro-
vides adequate power for normal center syste[ operation. A Ram Air Turbine
Pressure Light indicates the RAT is providing hydraulic power. The UNLKD
light indicates teh RAT is not locked in the stowed position. Manual control
for extending the RAT is provided by the guarded Ram Air Turbine Switch."

The center hydralic system includes the center autopilot servos, spoilers,
elevators, rudder, yaw dampers, stab trim, and elevator feel. Note that it
doesn't handle the landing gear.

[Junkflyer]

The rat supplies hydraulic pressure not electrical power.

[misd-agin]

With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered.

**********************************************************

It's not that they wouldn't have "main electrical power"

R and L AC were fine.

Battery's powering the standby AC/DC, batt bus and hot batt bus. As long as you have a battery you'll be fine.

But with the Stby power switch in the BAT position the battery charger is disconnected.

How long should you expect the battery to last? Uh, 30 minutes anyone? It lasted 90-100 minutes. :ugh:

[aa73]

It appears that, other than the BAT SB discharge light, there were no other abnormal electrical indications. Once all 4 busses failed, they realized they had a total different set of problems than what the QRH led them to believe. They didn't want to go around to a longer runway with the flight control difficulties. All told, an excellent outcome. Well done guys.

73

[misd-agin]

"Other than the battery discharge light there were no other abnormal indications."

Shouldn't the battery discharging be a very big clue?

[411A]

What this crew needed was a battery charger mode switch.
Standard fit with most TriStars flying today, when switched to the alternate position, keeps the battery charger on line, charging the ships battery.

Ahhhh, Lockheed, just a better design.

[frogone]

I can only comment if this happened on a B737NG.

1. If the 'Standby Power Off' light illuminates, the QRH gives a few lines on what's wrong. The corrective action is:

STANDBY POWER switch.......BAT

End of checklist.

If there's excessive battery discharge (in the 737) the 'BAT DISCHARGE' light will illuminate. In this case the QRH states the obvious that's there's excessive battery discharge and Note: Fully charged batteries provide a minimum of 60 minutes of standby power.

End of checklist.

The second checklist is your heads up to get on terra firma.

Can any 737 engineers tell me if the STANDBY POWER switch is placed to BAT that the batteries should continue to be charged?

IR

[captjns]

This is from the Boeing Maint. Ref. Manual

The main battery charger cannot go into the charge mode
during any of these conditions:

* Fueling station door open
* APU start
* Standby power switch (P5-5) in the BAT position
* Standby power switch (P5-5) in the AUTO position, battery
switch ON, and DC BUS 1 and AC TRANSFER BUS 1 do not
have power
* Main battery overheat.

The auxiliary battery charger cannot go into the charge mode
during any of these conditions:

* Standby power switch (P5-5) in the BAT position
* Standby power switch (P5-5) in the AUTO position, battery
switch ON and DC BUS 1 and AC TRANSFER BUS 1 do not
have power.
* Auxiliary battery overheat.

[ZimmerFly]

Possibly not relevant but.....it is a Boeing

B744 Standby Power Selector

BAT-

Powers...battery bus....from battery

Disables battery chargers

Note

BAT position for ground maintenance only .... power is available for a minimum of 30 minutes. :hmm:

[FlexibleResponse]

While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). ... QRH ... AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, "The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes." The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power

Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. ... over western Michigan and the captain elected ... divert to ORD.

It appears that, other than the BAT SB discharge light, there were no other abnormal electrical indications. Once all 4 busses failed, they realized they had a total different set of problems than what the QRH led them to believe. They didn't want to go around to a longer runway with the flight control difficulties. All told, an excellent outcome. Well done guys.

73

What depth of systems knowledge and logic would lead to this sort of conclusion?

[Swedish Steve]

When we action a stadby power check on the ground on a B757/B767 we select Standby power to BAT. The Battery and APU battery discharge lights come on after a few seconds. We leave it at BAT for a minute then select AUTO. We look on the Elec Maint page and watch that both batteries recharge. It takes over a minute for the batteries to come back to normal.

I hope that lessons have been learned here. When the QRH says 30 mins, it does mean land at once. Perhaps this should be emphasised for those that don't understand. As this crew found out there are loads of circuits connected to the Bat and Stdby busses that make life difficult when they fail.

With hindsight they would have been better off reselecting the Standby switch to Auto until they were within 30mins of landing.

The battery lasted longer than 30mins because a lot of the systems were still using main bus power as it was available. The 30 mins is when you only have battery power. Many systems have dual supplies, they will use AC Main bus power when available, and change to Stdby power when it is not.

[Nocti]

Am I missing something here?

As I see it:

The crew got a warning that the Standby Busses were not powered, and swirched them to Battery supply, giving them at least 30 minutes of power to both busses.

Instead of using that time to get on the ground without further incident they elect to continue on to their destination.


On all aircraft I have flown over many years, going onto battery power inflight is a lifeline of limited duration to get you on the ground as soon as possible.

Is it possible that professional pilots understand their aircraft so poorly that they think everything is ok in this situation?

The mind boggles.

[411A]

Is it possible that professional pilots understand their aircraft so poorly that they think everything is ok in this situation?

The mind boggles.

Yes, and the mind does boggle.
Crews nowadays are actually taught very little about aircraft systems at many airlines in my experience, so many times truly do not comprehend the possible problems involved.

This ain't good, as one might expect.:(

[Huck]

Am I missing something here?


The Captain was an instructor.

And he called maintenance control to see whether it was safe to continue.

That's the rumors on another board, anyway.....

[Ka8 Flyer]

...and probably switching the Stby Bus Switch to AUTO would have recharged the batteries so for the landing they would have had all necessary system...

Heck, alone placing the switch to AUTO without charged batteries would have restored each system except for the STBY DC Bus if I understood the situation correctly.

[411A]

The Captain was an instructor.
And he called maintenance control to see whether it was safe to continue.


The blind leading the blind, so to speak.
Perhaps some now will understand just why I am, personally, so critical of American Airlines, and their so-called operating procedures.

Landing during a big thunderstorm at Little Rock...with a system Chief Pilot at the helm, no less....

Cali, Colombia, rushed approach, no briefing, descending toward a clearly unsuitable waypoint, pulling up with speed brakes extended to avoid GPWS alerts....

A300-600 pilot induced rudder inputs, so that engines, vertical tail soon departed...

Hello, anyone see a cause and effect here?
I sure as hell do.

The oldtimers in charge of training have long since retired, and the new bunch 'in charge' haven't a clue.

Long story short...expect more of the same type of nonsense.

[bubbers44]

411A.

Why the big agenda against AA? Maybe they turned you down? AA training is very good. Yes, they have had accidents that should have not happened but so has every other airline. Maybe you need to look at your need to look down at things that have happened accidentaly and listen to people that have questioned your credibility recently.

[Halfnut]

From the AA Flight Department -

SUBJ: NEW ELECTRICAL CHECKLISTS

A RECENT FLIGHT DIVERTED INTO ORD AFTER COMPLETELY DISCHARGING
THE BATTERY IN FLIGHT. THE CREW FOLLOWED THE CHECKLISTS
CORRECTLY WHICH COME DIRECTLY FROM BOEING AND DID NOT DIRECT
THE CREW TO LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT. I WILL BE
ISSUING A PINK BULLETIN THAT WILL REPLACE YOUR CURRENT QRH
TABS 9 AND 10 CHECKLISTS AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE ELEC SECTION
CHECKLISTS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THESE NEW CHECKLISTS WILL DIRECT
THE CREW TO LAND THE AIRCRAFT AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT
IF THE BATTERY IS DISCHARGING AS WELL AS ADD A LIST OF ALL
ITEMS ON THE STANDBY AC, STANDBY DC, BATTERY BUS AND HOT
BATTERY BUS. YOU WILL SEE THESE CHECKLIST REVISIONS SOON.

FOR THE FLEET SUPPORT TEAM

[bubbers44]

It was a good thing it was not a 767 200 domestic aircraft. No battery means no landing gear and no flaps if that is the only power available. Since this 757 had normal ac for main busses the 767 probably would have been ok. If the 767 200 gets down to battery only on domestic versions the battery is required for gear and flaps.

[411A]

Why the big agenda against AA? Maybe they turned you down?

No, sorry, never applied.
If we look at the accidents that I specified in my prior post, a pattern of we know better because we are American Airlines comes through loud and clear.
I would appear to me that something is seriously wrong at American, as the root cause of their accidents simply does not lend itself to just random acts of forgetfulness.

[stilton]

I am no systems expert but It always amazes me how many people (that are current and qualified on the 75/ 6) think that the RAT is a source of electrical power :sad:

[KC135777]

hey 411a,

fatigue is insidious, and in studies, equates to elevated levels of blood alcohol content. bad decisions are easier to make, as judgment is impaired. (LIT)

some turbulence on departure (preceeding 747?) at JFK for the A300-600 (AA587)...and they really think the FO tore the tail off. yeah right. 2 or 3 FULL rudder throws were recorded...hmmm, I wonder if the rudder could have already been gone/flapping in the wind (AirTransat?), and maybe THAT'S why it was recorded that way. Like a pilot would actually go 3 full throws of the rudder- back and forth.

but, it's always easier to blame the dead pilots, right?

a real AA hater, huh?

kc135777

[411A]

Like a pilot would actually go 3 full throws of the rudder- back and forth.


Recorded on the DFDR, KC135777, for all to see.
And then we come to the AA MD80's...how many was it that the FAA grounded?
How big was the fine?
And Cali...what excuse do you have there?

The AA accident facts speak for themselves.
A very sad story.

[bnt]

A writer at the Seattle PI has questions from a former Boeing designer, asking why the APU was not used (link (http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/aerospace/archives/152485.asp)):
As the guy who designed the auxiliary power unit installation on the 757 in the early 1980s, you'll have to explain to me why the APU wasn't started to provide limitless electrical power for the airplane for the duration of the flight. I read the NTSB prelim report, and it did not mention the APU at all. An APU can be started at any altitude using its own dedicated 24v battery, and once started, capable of providing 90 kVA (same as a single engine generator) until the airplane runs out of fuel. Yes, some non-essential electrical loads must be turned off when only one generator is operative, but that in no way would affect safety of flight.

It is permissible to dispatch an airplane with an inoperative APU (and with inop thrust reversers), but nothing was mentioned in the NTSB's prelim report. Strange.

The APU is the primary backup for main engine generator failures. Sounds like the flight crew needs some remidial training or the NTSB wasn't telling all.

Tim Repp (Boeing retired)
Gig Harbor

[Del Prado]

I am no systems expert but It always amazes me how many people (that are current and qualified on the 75/ 6) think that the RAT is a source of electrical power


I thought it was (but then I don't fly), couple of links here (http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/electronics/q0044c.shtml) and here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ram_air_turbine) with basic descriptions of RAT can anyone clarify better for a humble ATCO?

[captjns]

Can we all agree that loss of life is tragic in any circumstance?

Can’t tragedies be avoided or mitigated with the adherence to proper briefing, preparation, and most of all consideration for those who are in the captains’ charges before taking any unwarranted chances?

We can’t nor should we judge our peers for fortuitous events that take place resulting from poor design or maintenance practices.

[Swedish Steve]

The RAT can drive a hyd pump, or an electrical generator or both. The VC10 even had two RATs, one elec and one hyd.
The problem is that the same word RAT is used for all types so if you have met an el-RAT in your past life, you might think that the hyd-RAT on your present aircraft can produce electricity.
On the B757 the issue is further clouded by the little hydraulically driven electrical generator fitted to some aircraft.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I had heard that the overwater 757's and 767''s could make electricity by the RAT driving the hydraulic system and a hydraulic electrical generator.

Does anyone know if this plane was so equipped?

not that it matters.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I'm not a big fan of American Airlines. They turned me down. I still remember sitting for the written exam and the proctor said, and I am NOT KIDDING< the purpose of this exam is to make sure you are NOT ONE OF THOSE GUYS FROM SAN FRANCISCO...if you are, go up to denver and try to get a job there.

(I was born and raised in San Francisco, but am not gay)

It is sort of funny that American didn't have on the checklist : land asap.

BUT:

I want to say something about american's accidents. American is and was a pioneering airline. Someone had to learn the hard way and other, johnny come lately airlines, had the benefit of the pioneering that American, and many of the other legacy carriers accomplished.


I for one believe that the Airbus 300 crash was not a case of pilot over controlling the rudder. Any plane that would come apart with use of rudder should have a rudder limiter or at least a placcard saying: don't touch the rudder above 200 knots.


The ''grounding'' of the md80 fleet for that wire bundle stuff was a great example of the FAA being screwed up. If anyone knows MD80's it should be American.

The little rock crash...well, it just proves that chief pilots are good at paperwork and should only fly on nice days. Anyone who has flown this series of planes knows that landing on a wet runway smoothly can cause the spoilers to not deploy automatically...you just have to be ready. AND you should never be so damn mission oriented to get into an airport...wait 15 minutes and you will always be shown to be wise.

The cali crash has just shown that computers and pilots don't mix well...we could and did learn from this crash.

American has its problems, just like every other airline. But it shouldn't come in for such flack as it has on this thread.

[bubbers44]

SSR,

I agree completely with your statements about AA.

They seemed to have normal AC power from both engine generators so starting the APU would have been no help. For some reason they had problems with their standby busses, probably standby ac. Switching to bat position uses the battery to use an inverter to power the standby ac. That must have corrected the problem but now they were not charging the battery. I don't think that side panel to check battery voltage works in flight. It would be nice if it did in a case like this.

[KC135777]

FWIW (due to the over-generalizations here), they were both exTWA.

[bubbers44]

Just came in:

NTSB reviews jet's skid landing at O'Hare



The pilots of an American Airlines flight carrying 185 passengers were forced to make an unusual emergency landing last month in Chicago with limited ability to control the jet after they lost electrical power, according to newly released information from a federal investigation.

The Boeing 757 skidded off a runway at O'Hare International Airport on Sept. 22, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said. Although none of the 192 people aboard was injured, the pilots flew on backup battery power for long beyond the 30 minutes that their emergency handbook said the batteries would last, the NTSB said.


The pilots of the Seattle-to-New York flight drained the jet's battery backup system, leaving inoperable vital systems that help stop a jet, according to a preliminary report released this week.


The pilots told investigators they had difficulty raising and lowering the jet's nose and felt they had only one chance to land, the NTSB said.


"They should have landed as soon as practical," said Michael Barr, an instructor at the University of Southern California's Aviation Safety and Security Program. "That would have been the conservative approach. I don't see why they thought they could fly all the way across country on their backup electrical system."




The pilots had switched to battery power shortly after leaving Seattle when electrical problems developed. The batteries last for about 30 minutes, but the pilots continued toward their destination until the jet's electrical systems began failing about an hour and 40 minutes later.


The need to land as soon as possible when aircraft systems begin to fail has been reinforced by several accidents, such as Swiss Air Flight 111 in 1998, Barr said. The Swiss Air pilots attempted to diagnose where smoke was coming from before deciding to divert, Canadian investigators concluded. The jet became engulfed in fire and crashed off Nova Scotia, killing all 229 people aboard.


Last month, the American Airlines pilots had to stop the jet without thrust reversers and other devices that help a jet stop, the NTSB said. The electrical system failure was so complete that the pilots were unable to shut off the engines after they came to a stop, the report said.


Barr said investigators will want to know what the airline's manuals and emergency documentation instructed pilots to do, what the airline's maintenance department advised the pilots to do and how pilots were trained to handle electrical malfunctions.


American and its pilots union, the Allied Pilots Association, declined to comment while the case is under investigation.

************************

FULL REPORT


NTSB Identification: CHI08IA292
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of American Airlines, Inc. (D.B.A. American Airlines)
Incident occurred Monday, September 22, 2008 in Chicago, IL
Aircraft: BOEING 757, registration: N197AN
Injuries: 192 Uninjured.


This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

[bubbers44]

B1 and B2 contacts of K106 caused the failure of the standby busses. That relay supplies power to standby busses during normal operation. The R2-5 relay caused the TOWS to fail on the Madrid crash. I guess anything mechanical can fail but has quality control on relays changed recently?

[sevenstrokeroll]

bubbers

awhile ago counterfit airplane parts was a huge subject...who knows?

the one thing I am very concerned about is this: for years we have heard in all jets that you have 30 minutes to get on the ground with emergency electricity...whatever it is called in that particular plane.

I've said it before, I'll say it again...the DC9/MD80 was/is the last good airliner.

IF EVERY electrical thing failed on a dc9, you can still control pressurization, raise and lower the gear, slats and flaps, you can deploy the thrust reversers and retract them...normal, non anti skid braking would still work.


and , if in addition to losing the electrics, you lost the hyrdaulic pumps, you could still drop the gear and with accumulators use the brakes and thrust reversers...YOU WOULD ALSO have the rudder, ailerons and elevator.


more modern planes have become so dependent upon gadgets that when the gadgets fail you can be in real trouble.

can't you shut down the engines with the fire handles? Or are they electrical too and not cable?


and let's not get into TWA vs. American. TWA, with all of its problems, had a decent training department and was pioneering in the use of 767 transatlantic. if anyone should have known about the electrical system, it should have been a twa pilot...unless the twa fleet ( I know, 767's only) was very different...remember the 76 and 75 are one type rating.


tragic errors in flying by the govt.

deregulation
firing the air traffic controllers
allowing boeing to buy douglas

[sevenstrokeroll]

why do good pilots call mx on the radio for advice on how to fly the plane?

alaska airlines did that and ended up off the coast of oxnard.

this aa pilot ended up in trouble.

I know one guy who couldn't get one gear down on the 737 (main)...he called mx control and they declared: take the crash axe, cut a hole in the floor and cut the hydraulic line so that the hydraulic pressure will release the gear!
IT TURNED OUT THAT MX had left a wheel chock in the wheel well and the gear got hung up on that.

rule one, if you think you should radio mx for advice while inflight...LAND at a good airport NOW...and then telephone them...talk to anyone you like then.

BUT DON'T FORGET, YOU ARE THE PILOT NOT SOME GUY IN MX CONTROL or whatever your airline calls it.


I remember using the acars data link to ask about conditions at syr (syracuse new york)...winter, you can guess.


Didn't get anything, shot the approach, everything looked ok, checked braking action with tower, ****ty but ok, and we landed. stopped, and as we were taxiing to the gate an urgent acars message:

DON'T LAND SYRACUSE conditions too bad!


needless to say, my acars message to THEM was...do you want us to takeoff again?


YOU ARE THE PILOT!!!!!!!!

[Airbubba]

IT TURNED OUT THAT MX had left a wheel chock in the wheel well and the gear got hung up on that.

Was that in CLT years ago? I think I remember that one...

Yep, every large plane I've ever flown has some version of 'Land ASAP' in the checklist when you are on battery power. I'm really surprised a Boeing company checklist didn't have this.

[KC135777]

twa vs. aa....no, wasn't interested in that....just that there's been some fairly BS comments against aa, in general....that's all.

[Nocti]

SSR,

Regarding the A300 accident- it has been proven that no transport category aircraft in the Western Hemisphere has been designed to withstand the forces induces by the cyclical opposing inputs that were used in this case.

There is no excuse for the lack of knowledge in that cockpit that led to this situation. Asking Maintenance how to proceed is an abrogation of position. It beholds every professional pilot to learn and know the threats to his/her aircraft.

Far too often these days I see copilots failing their command checks for lack of situational awareness - there is almost a culture of having answers handed on a plate to them. Sharp reasoning seems to be a thing of the past -if it doesn't appear on the EICAS or ECAM, then there is no problem.

Being a professional has certain obligations as well as benefits. One of those obligations is to know your aircraft and know your limitations. In this case there appears to be serious lack of one if not both.

[411A]

Regarding the A300 accident- it has been proven that no transport category aircraft in the Western Hemisphere has been designed to withstand the forces induces by the cyclical opposing inputs that were used in this case.

There is no excuse for the lack of knowledge in that cockpit that led to this situation. Asking Maintenance how to proceed is an abrogation of position. It beholds every professional pilot to learn and know the threats to his/her aircraft.

Far too often these days I see copilots failing their command checks for lack of situational awareness - there is almost a culture of having answers handed on a plate to them. Sharp reasoning seems to be a thing of the past -if it doesn't appear on the EICAS or ECAM, then there is no problem.

Being a professional has certain obligations as well as benefits. One of those obligations is to know your aircraft and know your limitations. In this case there appears to be serious lack of one if not both.

Very well said, sir, and I would agree 100%.

Gotta know your specific aircrafts systems, otherwise expect rather large difficulties when abnormals occur.

[Huck]

Sharp reasoning seems to be a thing of the past -if it doesn't appear on the EICAS or ECAM, then there is no problem.

Well, if real-dollar salaries are reduced by (effectively) 50% over a 15-year period, one would expect a little loss of intellectual agility.

Wait 'til you see the next generation. The best they can hope for is a strenuous job until 65, no pension, and pay equal to a decent pharma rep or car salesman. You WILL get people to take the job, but not Rhodes scholars.....

[Halfnut]

Ok riddle me this, how are you going to land at the nearest suitable airport in 30 minutes when you are ETOPS with a mere 180 to 205 minutes from the “nearest suitable airport?”

[Chris Scott]

This is getting off-topic; but since you guys have raised it, I'll comment in general terms. The very reliability and system redundancy of airplanes these days, together with their ability to operate in most types of weather, may be ironically creating a problem for commanders. Diversions or delays/cancellations are no longer regarded as routine events. When it happens, it's a big deal, with much wailing and gnashing of teeth all round.

Perhaps captains are becoming blasé; but more likely they are worried about criticism in the event that the costly alternative to pressing on may later be judged to have been unnecessary. Have any of you practising senior line captains found an increasing tendency over the last 20 years for pilot management to be (a) in awe of the accountants; (b) less line-experienced even than junior captains; and (c) less inclined to back up their boys and girls against ill-informed and hind-sighted criticism from other departments?

The fact that the buck stops with the skipper is generally lauded until he or she appears to be costing the company money. Strength of character is essential, but not necessarily perceived as an advantage in selection.

Chris (retired)

[sevenstrokeroll]

nocti

it hasn't been proven to my satisfaction.

I've moved the rudder on the 9...it has a limiter and I couldn't shake it apart.

put a limiter on the a300 and you might have something

there was a dissenting view from one member of the NTSB

[sevenstrokeroll]

halfnut...and you've just thought of that?

YIKES

[sevenstrokeroll]

airbubba

chock/chalk one up for you! ;-)

hand me a colodny burger

[Nocti]

Huck,

I fully appreciate what you are saying, however the responsibilty that goes with the job doesn't change. It's a problem that faces us all in this industry - pay peanuts and you will get monkeys.

HalfNut,

That's the difference between an ETOPS aircraft and a non-ETOPS aircraft. ETOPS time certification takes into account that the aircraft could be at the furthest extremity from a suitable alternate when such a critical failure occurs, and systems are subsequently modified to cater for it.

SSR,
Both Airbus and Boeing developed presentations for all operators in the aftermath of that accident. At low to medium airspeeds rudder limiters would not be of much use, as they kick in at higher Indicated Airspeeds.

They highlighted that it is the cyclical input - say full left rudder followed shortly after by full right rudder, creates a moment way above that ever catered for in design criteria.
At the time of that accident I was flying Boeings and subsequently received training, prepared by Boeing, highlighting the dangers of such manoeuvers and how the risk existed to all large transport aircraft.

[4PW's]

If I recall correctly, our ETOPS B757's had hydraulic driven generators (HDGs) to take care of the electrics' redundancy. The RAT is a hydraulics redundancy for flight controls alone, per someone's earlier inquiry.

[411A]

They highlighted that it is the cyclical input - say full left rudder followed shortly after by full right rudder, creates a moment way above that ever catered for in design criteria.
At the time of that accident I was flying Boeings and subsequently received training, prepared by Boeing, highlighting the dangers of such manoeuvers and how the risk existed to all large transport aircraft.

Yes, and this was known many years ago, when the first B707's were introduced.
Oldtimers retire, new guys on the block are in charge of training...lessons learned a long time ago promptly forgotten.:sad:

[WhatsaLizad?]

411A,

Never flew the 707, but my guess is the fear of stomping the rudders in that jet was due to the dutch roll tendencies of it's 1950's design.

With bad feet skills, I think the 707 would be rolling towards the ground sans it's outboard engines long before failure of the vertical stab.

[Airbubba]

I had heard that the overwater 757's and 767''s could make electricity by the RAT driving the hydraulic system and a hydraulic electrical generator.

Does anyone know if this plane was so equipped?



I don't believe the RAT can ever drive the HDG, RAT pressure is limited to the flight controls part of the center hydraulic system. However, there is an Air Driven Pump on the center system that will drive the HDG with pneumatic power if required on ETOPS planes. I'll add the caveat that Boeing has always been somewhat creative with options like extra pumps and switch positions in aircraft made for different customers and different engines so there may be exceptions to my claim that the RAT can't drive the HDG.

Ok riddle me this, how are you going to land at the nearest suitable airport in 30 minutes when you are ETOPS with a mere 180 to 205 minutes from the “nearest suitable airport?”

Under current ETOPS doctrine I think the acronym for this situation is S.O.L.:)

Actually, there was a Martinair 767 that had some serious hot battery bus problems on a crossing with somewhat similar landing and control issues:

ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 767-31AER PH-MCH Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19960528-0)

They seemed to have normal AC power from both engine generators so starting the APU would have been no help.

And you need the aircraft battery as well as the APU battery to start the APU so if the aircraft battery was dead it wouldn't work anyway.

[bubbers44]

ETOPS aircraft would have to lose both engine generators and the HDG to end up on battery only for 30 minutes. The K106 relay that caused this problem could have done the same. If you start the APU in flight hopefully you will do it before the battery goes dead. It wouldn't have done any good here because both engine generators were working just fine. Standby power loss was the problem because of the faulty relay. Going to bat position gave them back standby power but only for an advertised 30 minutes. Now with no battery charger they lost their standby busses. As far as stabilizer trim some 757's had mechanical cables to the hydraulic valves to control stab trim but most had electrical switches to do so. Apparently they had the switches so elected to land at flaps 20 to have flair capability for landing. No antiskid and other failures caused them to leave the runway a bit but all ended up well.

[411A]

Never flew the 707, but my guess is the fear of stomping the rudders in that jet was due to the dutch roll tendencies of it's 1950's design.

With bad feet skills, I think the 707 would be rolling towards the ground sans it's outboard engines long before failure of the vertical stab.


Having personally flown the 707 for quite a few years, I would agree...outboard engines chucked off the pylons prior to the vertical stab going bye-bye.

[IGh]

AirBubba -- GOOD recollection on that MartinAir B767 event (28May96).

Here's more on that MartinAir case (not in ASN's summary quoted earlier):

NYC96IA116 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20001208X05844&ntsbno=NYC96IA116&akey=1)

Boeing Report

Boeing submitted an event summary based upon the detail summary received from Martinair. The summary of the Boeing report stated:

"Most of the reported events from the flight which diverted to Boston on May 28th, 1996, can be attributed to degraded power on the hot battery bus, left dc and right dc buses. Extensive testing and analysis has been unable to explain the degraded dc bus power as was seen on the Martinair airplane.

The existing design will allow for single bus losses with no loss of primary systems and multiple bus loss will still allow safe operation...."

Additionally, the investigative team noted that while particular items on a bus had failed, the whole bus never failed, and other items on the same bus remained powered. The investigation was unable to explain the selectivity of inoperative components on a bus.

Related Events

The investigation disclosed that similar events had occurred with two other airplanes in the Martinair 767 fleet. The affected airplanes were PH-MCG, line number 279, delivered new to Martinair on September, 1989, and PH-MCL, line number 415, delivered new to Martinair on February, 1992. According to data received from Boeing, events with elements of a similar nature occurred on the following dates in the aircraft listed, with the May 28, 1996, events in PH-MCH being the most extensive.

February 16, 1996 PH-MCG March 24, 1996 PH-MCH May 13, 1996 PH-MCL May 14, 1996 PH-MCG May 28, 1996 PH-MCH Incident Under Investigation September 17, 1996 PH-MCH

[kenparry]

Airbubba:

The B757 & 767 have very different hyd systems. Only the 767 has the ADP on the centre system, that being the "heavy" one, running gear & flaps as well as other things. The B757 hyd is a bit of a mess in comparison, with gear on L system and a PTU to boost the L system in the event of L engine failure.

[mustafagander]

kenparry,

I think you'll find that the ADP in the C hyd system of the B767 is a bit simpler than that. Think ETOPS - L and R hyd systems EDP + electric demand hyd pump, C hyd system electric pumps (2) + what for demand? Only ADP is left for redundancy unless there is the messy complication of PTU and then from which hyd system?

[GK430]

Perhaps a naive question, however how were the crew of 268 communicating with ATC towards the latter part of the flight when batteries failed?

[Chris Scott]

Quote from sevenstrokeroll:
nocti
it hasn't been proven to my satisfaction.
I've moved the rudder on the 9...it has a limiter and I couldn't shake it apart.
put a limiter on the a300 and you might have something
there was a dissenting view from one member of the NTSB


Off topic but, since you've raised this one, it needs to be looked at: I'd be very surprised if the A300-600 hasn't got a rudder travel limiter. The A310 had one from service entry in 1983, and the A300-600 is of similar vintage (1984?). If memory serves, the A310 has a comparable (composite) fin and rudder to the A300-600. The [U]A310-200 limiter "reduces the pedals and rudder deflection from ± 30° at speed below 165kt to ± 5° at 310kt and above." [FCOM, 1985]

Am neither engineer nor test pilot, but what Nocti says makes sense. Presumably, the speed threshold on both types would have been reviewed after the A300-600 accident.

[gregpend]

On September 22nd an American Airlines Boeing 757 went off the runway at Chicago O'Hare after suffering a serious electrical failure. The generator failed and the pilots elected to continue the flight to JFK on batteries for the next hour and a half even though the manual stated that the batteries would only last about 30 minutes. Only after they lost intercom, trim, and several other systems did they elect to divert to ORD. They discovered the hard way that they couldn't deploy full flap or thrust reversers and the captain had to steer it onto the grass to avoid overrunning. Fortunately there was only minor damage and no injuries but it could have been much worse.

NTSP preliminary here:
CHI08IA292 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20081007X03940&key=1)

Not knowing 757 systems I can only speculate on what happened, but it does seem to be a massive error in judgement. Any 757 drivers out there that can add anything?

[bubbers44]

I just reviewed the electrical abnormals on the 757 and it says going to bat on standby power gives about 30 minutes of operation since the battery charger is inop in bat position. Since both generators were operating normally and the relay failure in auto caused the standby busses to fail, one of the radios not using standby power was still being powered. Check lists don't say to do this but since a different relay controls the battery charger maybe going back to auto for a few minutes might have made the battery charge enough to last for landing. I have thought about what to do in case of a total electrical failure over water and saving the battery for the approach was a high priority. I think the abnormal checklist is being changed because of this incident.

[Airbubba]

The B757 & 767 have very different hyd systems. Only the 767 has the ADP on the centre system, that being the "heavy" one, running gear & flaps as well as other things.

Yep, you're right, the ADP is only on the 76, the original question was about both aircraft, I should have been more specific.

The HDG is on both '75's and '76's if they are ETOPS equipped. As far as I can tell N197AN is not an ER bird, so this wouldn't be a player anyway.

Perhaps a naive question, however how were the crew of 268 communicating with ATC towards the latter part of the flight when batteries failed?

My guess is that, as long as the battery switch was still on, standby DC had enough power through the hot battery bus to supply VHF 1 even though the voltage was too low to run most of the other stuff.

_____________________________

Since both generators were operating normally and the relay failure in auto caused the standby busses to fail, one of the radios not using standby power was still being powered.

I like your theory better, you're right, VHF 2 should be powered by one of the main buses, it's a wacky situation with a relay fault.

[ExSp33db1rd]

...lessons learned a long time ago promptly forgotten.

That's why checklists were invented !

The Wright Brothers didn't have a check list, nobody had broken an aeropane at that time. If the new kids on the block are going to re-invent the wheel every 10 years or so, nobody will ever be safe from human error. ( or human misunderstanding of a mechanical problem.)

But wot's new ? Have you ever tried to teach a teenager ANYTHING ! :ugh:

[ExSp33db1rd]

...outboard engines chucked off the pylons prior to the vertical stab going bye-bye.

As PanAm discovered over France one day, whilst re-positioning an empty aeroplane ( no pax. involved)

BOAC lost a 707 on Mt. Fuji 'cos the fin broke off first, different forces at play of course, not crew input.

[Clandestino]

I for one believe that the Airbus 300 crash was not a case of pilot over controlling the rudder. Any plane that would come apart with use of rudder should have a rudder limiter or at least a placcard saying: don't touch the rudder above 200 knots.

(...)

I've moved the rudder on the 9...it has a limiter and I couldn't shake it apart.

(...)

put a limiter on the a300 and you might have something

Excuse me sir, but do you have at least a vague notion of what the diverging oscillation is? What brought the AA587 down was not sustained rudder input but diverging yaw oscillation caused by handling pilot's excessive, rapidly alternating and completely unnecessary pedalling.

Is the using a rudder to pick up a dropped wing a propper technique on modern transport category aeroplane? Yes - provided there is a complete loss of roll control. If you have only a wake turbulence encounter and all your ailerons and spoilers are working normally - absolutely no. Shortly after NTSB's preliminary report became public, my FCOM was updated with information that primary purporse of the powerful rudder attached to my aeroplane's fin is to counteract yawing moment of live engine when one engine packs up at take-off. It was never envisioned to be used as primary flight control and cycling it might cause structural failure even below Va. Mind you, I was flying ATR-42-300 at the time.

So AA had Advanced manuevering training programme, which involved unusal recoveries from unusal attitudes practised in the simulator. The fact about the simulators is that they are only simulators, they can fairly well replicate aeroplane's behaviour within normal operating envelope but if you're involved in some exotic manuevering, you may put your simulated aircraft in the places where no test pilot has ever dared to go with the real thing - for a good reason. Simulator's behaviour under the circumstances is only the best calculation and estimation of what would happen with the real aeroplane and maybe it's completely realistic and maybe it's totally wrong, there's just no practical way of verifying it.

A300 does have a rudder limiter which worked as designed on the day of the accident and it wasn't redesigned post mortem. As the AA587 accelerated rather rapidly, it was in transition from low speed to high speed position at the time of the fin detachment. Now if it moved to high speed position would it prevent the accident? Maybe it would, or maybe we would see a couple more oscillations before fin separation. NTSB mentions that the way the A300's rudder system was designed was contributory cause, but this is analogue to saying that the tree caused the death of the motorist that smashed into it with 80 mph. He might have survived if it wasn't for the three but the actual cause was high speed road excursion, not someone planting a tree at the exactly wrong place a couple of decades ago.

Does 411a have an anti-American stance? Absolutely, but it is completely besides the point. Every case study he mentioned was reported correctly. He even failed to mention Bradley accident where improper non-precision approach technique, improper use of alt hold and nonchalance about correctly setting the altimeters led to Super80 flying through trees on the final approach. American or non-American, any company whose pilots don't know that battery that just keeps on discharging in flight is land ASAP item on any battery-equipped aeroplane, notwithstanding what their ECAM/EICAS/CCAS/whatever tells them, has some serious training issues.

[bugg smasher]

The fact that the buck stops with the skipper is generally lauded until he or she appears to be costing the company money. Strength of character is essential, but not necessarily perceived as an advantage in selection.

Yes indeed, and further to your very astute observation Chris, perhaps the old adage 'aviate, navigate, communicate' should be updated to reflect current thinking in many cockpits; 'calculate, documentate, litigate'.

[sevenstrokeroll]

clandestino

then tell me why, after taking over 10 different licensing exams with the FAA that this was never mentioned in 33 years of flying...until after the fact of course?

tell me why the A300 didn't have a placcard saying not to cycle the rudder back and forth?

sorry pal, a plane that will come apart with any control movement needs either a better limiter or a placcard. I've flown planes with both.

all the paperwork in the world after the fact means nothing...lawyers covering their respective company's a$%$


as to the bradley bit...that was an interesting near crash...have you flown into or out of BDL?

[Huck]

The fact that the buck stops with the skipper is generally lauded until he or she appears to be costing the company money. Strength of character is essential, but not necessarily perceived as an advantage in selection.


Let us not forget - there was a tumultuous thread on this board a few months ago regarding whether one should cross the Atlantic Ocean after a massive gear retraction problem.....

[rcl7700]

Maybe I'm not following, but is it correct to say that the B757 does not have Transformer Rectifier Units to provide DC power? All DC comes from the batts which have to be constantly charged to keep up? Just wondering.

rcl

[Junkflyer]

If it is like the 767 (which I believe it its) then yes there are t/r's which supply dc. When the standby power selector is moved to the bat position then the batteries (both main and apu on 767 300 er) supply the standby ac and dc buses as well as the battery and hot battery buses and the chargers are taken out of the loop.

[rcl7700]

Thanks. I guess the plane I fly would need a total AC failure, including the Air Driven Generator, to actually have such DC issues, it's hard to imagine all this happening with both AC gens online.

rcl

[bubbers44]

The 757 and 767 electrical systems are almost the same. Hydraulics are different. Both have T/Rs in auto and switch to battery when bat is selected for standby power. An inverter supplies the standby ac bus. 30 minutes is the estimated life of the battery in bat mode.

[SMOC]

tell me why the A300 didn't have a placcard saying not to cycle the rudder back and forth?

sorry pal, a plane that will come apart with any control movement needs either a better limiter or a placcard. I've flown planes with both.

11 years ago when I first got on the 747 I was trained ! never to use the rudder in an upset or UA, it was purely for use eng out and for X-wind T/O and LDGs, after the A300 incident nothing in our training manuals changed.

The 747 has always had a limiter but never a placard, correct training meant we knew when to use the rudder.

[sevenstrokeroll]

tell me, did the 747 flight manual state in the limitations section that you can, not should, but can only use the rudder for engine out and x winds?

I recall the 747 that managed to survive a violent upset, tearing off part of the elevator or was it stabilizer, to manage an emergency landing at KSFO.

[Clandestino]

then tell me why, after taking over 10 different licensing exams with the FAA that this was never mentioned in 33 years of flying...until after the fact of course?

Can't tell, I never took a single FAA exam. However, one of the lessons drummed into me during my PPL course was: never, ever rapidy cycle any flight control at any flying speed, on any aeroplane as you might get into resonance with something or other and get your flight control surface ripped off the airplane, sometimes together with the large parts of the airframe clinging on to it. Why FAA licensed flight schools fail to teach their students this fact of life is way beyond me. Perhaps Richard L. Collins hit the nail on the head when he wrote about proliferation of stall/spin accidents among the PPLs:

As the present pilot population ages and flies slowly off into sunset,somebody, in the very necessary zeal to attract new pilots, had better pay some atention to the lousy job we have done in making sure that pilots understand the risky part of flying. The job is not only to convince new people to fly and spend money on the activity, it has to also be to keep them alive.

I am sorry if my original question came across as ironic or rethorical, it wasn't meant to be. Here it goes again: do you have a notion of what divergent oscillation is? You certainly should as it caused a lot of aircrews to come to grief, not just AA587.

tell me why the A300 didn't have a placcard saying not to cycle the rudder back and forth?

Perhaps Airbus tought that every pilot knows that. Disclaimer at the beginning of my A320 FCOM says that this manual is not intended to teach the crew how to fly but rather to enable experienced crew to operate the related airplane type safely and proficiently.

[sevenstrokeroll]

are you saying the american airlines crew that died weren't experienced?

let me put it this way...we want to prevent accidents don't we?

I'm glad your private pilot course taught you all about this stuff.

But why didn't the FAA approved course teach these American pilots about this?

Why wasn't it included in any FAA course that I attended? (expostofacto not included)

Why haven't any US made planes fallen out of the skys with rapid cyclical rudder movememt?

why did the similiar A310 lose a piece of rudder and make an emergency return to Cuba?

glad that I don't fly the 'bus

[bubbers44]

The AA587 A300 was delivered from the factory with a patch on the vertical stabilizer because of delamination. It was at the base of the stab on the leading edge right where it separated from the aircraft that day. Since using those supposed wild alternating rudder applications just because of some wake turbulence would have probably killed any FA in the back out of her seat why did he elect to do it that day and why would the captain allow it?

If that vertical stab had failed initially at that patch can you imagine the wild yaw induced before it separated? Dead pilots always seem to be the least expensive way to settle an accident investigation.

[Huck]

Don't forget, rudder pedal position is NOT rudder pedal force. There was no force data on the FDR.

Also don't forget, the yaw damper had been written up and re-racked before the fatal flight.

[Pugilistic Animus]

tell me why the A300 didn't have a placcard saying not to cycle the rudder back and forth?perhaps it should have, but it isn't too well known that an aircraft's certified maneuver speed only protects against full rudder deflection in one direction NO aircraft is protected from sudden control reversal----even with rudder limiting---you can take off the tail/wings of any plane [even below Va] if you try to

[aa73]

Recorded on the DFDR, KC135777, for all to see.
And then we come to the AA MD80's...how many was it that the FAA grounded?
How big was the fine?
And Cali...what excuse do you have there?

The AA accident facts speak for themselves.
A very sad story.

411A, you are speaking out of your arse. Every airline in the US has had a string of accidents at one point in time or another. To sit here and blame AA procedures is in extremely poor taste. We have a training program as good as anyone else's - not without faults, but just as good none the less. The accidents AA has had have all been preceded in the past, and some will unfortunately reoccur in the future.

The MD80 debacle was NOT AA's fault, it was an FAA-mandated directive that came about after the whole SWA/FAA friendly fiasco, and they decided to crack down. AA was affected the most due to their big # of MD80s.

Cali was pilot error, no doubt. So was LIT. So was USAir in LGA - twice. So was DL in DFW, twice. So was CAL in DEN. Anything else? Pilot error can and will happen again. AA's pilot error record is no different than any other US airline.

I guess AA 1400 in STL (emergency landing after left engine exploded due to start valve open in flight, loss of hydraulics, single engine go-around) was just plain dumb luck, not pilot skill.

Get a clue.
73

[aa73]

perhaps it should have, but it isn't too well known that an aircraft's certified maneuver speed only protects against full rudder deflection in one direction NO aircraft is protected from sudden control reversal----even with rudder limiting---you can take off the tail/wings of any plane [even below Va] if you try to

there is no hard evidence that the rudder reversal was caused by the f/o. all the dfdr records is rudder movement, NOT rudder pedal movement. and with past problems with A300/A310-series aircraft and their tails, most folks do believe that blaming the pilot vs the aircraft manufacturer was the way to cover this up.

also glad I'm not on the 'Bus.
73

[aa73]

regarding our ORD 757. I've said this before and I'll say it again:

NO pilot in their right mind would continue a flight on battery power alone. Because of that, there is more to this story than what's in the report. Our pilots followed the Boeing-style QRH to the letter. Now there is an imminent change coming in the next revision. It is my belief the QRH led them down the wrong path, leading to battery discharge.

Regarding comments on poor system knowledge - the CA was an experienced and highly respected 757/767 ground instructor for years, who probably knew 757 systems as much as Boeing engineers. Highly unlikely he would have not known what was going on.

[Pugilistic Animus]

aa73---I made no mention of pilot actions just the fact that a low airspeed wont protect against rudder reversal--no matter how it was accomplished anyway I never really blamed the pilot--just the training thereof AA should have known that--somebody there should have

[Chris Scott]

aa73,

Regardless of what 411A has said – the post you quote from seems to be missing as I write this – we seem to be getting more heat than light from several of you American cousins on this thread.

You and sevenstrokeroll add no credibility to your arguments by resorting to cheap shots at a foreign (to you) manufacturer. Many of us have been involved in aviation long enough to know that non-American aircraft do not have a monopoly of accidents involving structural failure.

We also understand that all airline training departments are fallible, even in Europe and America. At worst, they fail to hand down well-documented lessons that previous generations of their own crews – and even more likely the crews of rival airlines – have learned, often at great cost. It's part of the human condition, and as an old fart I observe the traditional tendency for young whiz-kids to think that history is irrelevant.
For what it's worth, I well remember doing my sim and base conversion on the B707 with AA at DFW in 1975. The jammed-stab arrival from Waco at a busy DFW was interesting, even in those days of a flight-engineer, but no complaints.


Don't know the Seven-Five, but electrical systems seem to evolve considerably on a given type; perhaps to an untidy complexity where it's impossible for pilots to understand all the possible implications of an obscure failure. Even if the fault indication(s) have been correctly identified, it may be that the EICAS/ECAM and QRH seem to suggest different courses of action. Load shedding MIGHT extend battery life. If in doubt, land within 30 minutes... But, by the time you've worked your way through the drills, most of the thirty are already gone.

It follows that unannounced further failures on final approach to a strange airfield – maybe cockpit lighting and EFIS failures at night – are likely. With the best will in the world, you may not know if you're going to get lift-dump, anti-skid, or which thrust-reversers might work. [Not suggesting this all applies to the B757.]

As any thinking pilot or F/E who routinely flies more than 30 minutes from the nearest suitable aerodrome – but on a route not requiring ETOPS equipment – will tell you, a 30-minute guarantee is not enough. Perhaps we should be installing batteries somewhat bigger than fitted in a large automobile or truck?

[Roadtrip]

Some 757s can draw stby power from both the main and APU batteries. AAs are configured only to draw from the main, hence the 30 minute theoretical limit.

As far as working the problem taking a bulk of that 30 minutes, If you have a failure of the normal powering of the stby buses, it seems wise that you'd start pointing the aircraft towards the closest good airport, while you noted what was working and what wasn't (determine which stby bus was affected) and worked the very short checklist . . . Stby Power Switch - BAT, and called the ground engineers for an additional inputs.

From there you could figure out if you think you could land within the life of the battery, and if not maybe conserving battery by going back to AUTO.

[sevenstrokeroll]

bubbers 44 is right about the rudder problems...thanks for posting it.

as to the LGA crashes of USAIR...there is more to that/those than meet the eye.

the 737-400 that went off the end...I hope you will recall that boeing redesigned the rudder trim after the accident.

though certainly the pilot didn't help matters that day...I knew the copilot and heard the whole story.

also the F28...that crash is interesting because another F28 in canada crashed due to similiar circumstances and the information was not passed on properly.


chris scott...I have had the pleasure of flying 2 british built planes, one japanese built plane and numerous US built planes. All were very,very strong planes. And the rudder didn' t come off.

so don't tell me I am picking on a foreign manufacturer. I am picking on a particular type of plane though.

[aa73]

Chris Scott - no cheap shots from me at a foreign manufacturer. But you will continue to get heat from a lot of us AA folks simply due to the fact that the NTSB investigation NEVER was able to determine whether the f/o manipulated the rudder the way he did. And our training program never had us resorting to rudder only during a wake encounter. Unusual attitudes, yes - ailerons supplemented with rudder. But not just a wake encounter. And due to the history of the Airbus' rudder/tail problems, it is very suspect.

[Pugilistic Animus]

chris scott...I have had the pleasure of flying 2 british built planes, one japanese built plane and numerous US built planes. All were very,very strong planes. And the rudder didn' t come off.



Sevenstrokeroll---again, NO AIRPLANE!!!!! is certified for sudden complete control reversal--NONE..none whatsoever:=

[sevenstrokeroll]

animus

and what if the rudder came apart first causing the wild movement instead of the blame being placed on the dead copilot?

[Pugilistic Animus]

SSR,

It doesn't matter the cause of the oscillations only the effects:\---even if a magical djini did it---and I don't blame the pilots if it were really SOP at AA then I blame the training--- I've always thought the co-pilot was unfairly blamed as he was following procedure:ugh:

PA

[KC135777]

AA had an MD80 that was literally rolling over, due to wake vortices, on initial takeoff in DFW. High AOA portion of takeoff. FULL aileron was NOT effective in stopping/countering imminent unusual attitude at low altitude.

ONLY by applying opposite rudder, in this relatively low airspeed, high AOA scenario, was the aircraft saved.

When the airleron's not working for you- the rudder will/can save your ass.

This was the basis for AA's AAMP training.

I too, believe what was recorded on AA587's FDR was NOT caused by the feet of FO Sten Molin.

KC135777

[metrodriver]

Why in the chicago 757 incident did the engines not shut down using the fire handles? In most aircraft pulling the handles will shut of fuel and hydraulics going to the engine, with a cable operated mechanism. How does this work on the 757?

The AA Little Rock accident: I was flying around that monster storm at the time of the accident. It was the worst storm I have ever seen from an aircraft with constant lightning (you could read a paper) shooting everywhere. This one deserved at least 20 miles distance. Nobody had any business being anywhere close to this storm. So untill this day I'm still wondering: what the hell were they thinking?????

[bugg smasher]

Long day, wanna get home, fatigued to the bone, ugly weather everywhere, support not to be seen. Delays measure now in multiples of hours, passengers in full revolt, FA’s swamped, overloaded and needy. If you don’t make this landing, the rest of yer month goes south, won’t make the guarantee, probably have to make it up with another three-day trip somewhere in the off days. So much for your five-year olds’ school play. And God help you if you break the airplane, lotsa trees die for that paperwork.

The MBA touts who now write the rules we all live, die, and make our mortgage payments by, well, something has gone terribly wrong here. You want safety? Talk to the six-figured idiot-savants who control the money and write the plan, funny how they always come out spanking clean, and barring that, at least several millions in recompense to crawl back into the miserable holes they impossibly came from.

Not that I’m bitter or anything, it’s just that I really love my job, flying commercial jets is a very romantic occupation, the women on my crew would be lining up at my hotel room door, if they weren’t so damned dog-tired from flying eighteen hours a day.

I also hear some pilots fly turboprops in Tahiti, and life is tropical and good, in a Pina Colada kinda way. Would anyone happen to have a line on that employment?

[IGh]

Some misinformation was posted earlier.


Posted by “AA73”, slot #95, dated 29Oct, re’ AA587 12Nov01:

“... there is no hard evidence that the rudder reversal was caused by the f/o. all the dfdr records is rudder movement, NOT rudder pedal movement....”

Posted by “KC135777” in slot #105, date 29Oct:

“... what was recorded on AA587's FDR was NOT caused by the feet of FO ...”

Hmmmm, No Pedal Position recorded????
That item (Pedal Position) was surprise for everyone: the sensors for Pedal Position had been retrofitted prior to that mishap; from AAR-04/04, pgs 3-6 [the Pedal Position is plotted on page 6]
“...Between 0915:36 and 0915:41,the FDR recorded movement of the control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals. Specifically ... the rudder pedals movedfrom about 0.1 inch left (the starting point for the pedals) to about 0.1 inch right and 0.2 inch left ... According to the FDR, the airplane’s bank angle moved from 23º to 25º left wing down at 0915:51.5, the control wheel moved to 64º right at 0915:51.5, and the rudder pedals moved to 1.7 inches right at 0915:51.9.... According to the FDR, the rudder pedals moved
from 1.7 inches right
to 1.7 inches left,
1.7 inches right, 2.0 inches right,
2.4 inches left, and
1.3 inches right
between 0915:52 and 0915:58.5....”

3.2 Probable Cause
... Safety Board determines ... probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

[Clandestino]

are you saying the american airlines crew that died weren't experienced?

I'm not saying that and I have never said that, but as Collin Powell recently observed: "Experience is helpful but it is decisions that count". The last captain of PH-BUF was very experienced. So were the captains of TC-GEN, YU-ANA, N651AA and HB-IXM. It is a pity that no one will ever be able to benefit from their experience. It seems that crew involved in KORD runway excursion were very experienced but that didn't prevent them from draining their battery inflight.

I'm glad your private pilot course taught you all about this stuff.

But why didn't the FAA approved course teach these American pilots about this?

Sir, you are still evading the answer! For the third time: do you know what divergent oscillation is? I'm not asking you to explain it, a simple "yea" or "nay" would suffice. Perhaps it wasn't emphasised during your trainning but I'm certain it gets mentioned in my 2003. edition of FAA Pilot's aviation knowledge handbook. Also it is part of JAA ATPL syllabus. Why some people fail to heed a good advice is beyond me.

bubbers 44 is right about the rudder problems...thanks for posting it.

What rudder problems? He was writing about fin being repaired before the aeroplane being delivered to AA. It is completely irellevant as NTSB analysis found that fin failed during extreme sideslip, at load that heftily exceeded the ultimate design load. Ergo it took more than its fair share of punishment before parting with the aeroplane. And since you've mentioned the Air Transat incident, had the rudder of N14503 came apart before the fin failed, chances are that we wouldn't have an accident to discuss.

also the F28...that crash is interesting because another F28 in canada crashed due to similiar circumstances and the information was not passed on properly.

What information? That it is unwise to take off with upper wing surface contaminated with ice? If you had read the full NTSB report on LaGuardia accident, you would have known that this fact was known from at least 1930ies and it was made part of a lot of aeronautical regulations. And yet we've had that infamous Iberia thread here.

glad that I don't fly the 'bus
Well, then there's a piece of Airbus trivia for you: A320's speedbrakes retract automatically upon aplication of TOGA power.

AA had an MD80 that was literally rolling over, due to wake vortices, on initial takeoff in DFW. High AOA portion of takeoff. FULL aileron was NOT effective in stopping/countering imminent unusual attitude at low altitude.

What I'd like to know is how did they manage to get themselves into such a violent wake vortex in the first place. Is the report available? Or at least an ILAFFT story?

And our training program never had us resorting to rudder only during a wake encounter. Unusual attitudes, yes - ailerons supplemented with rudder.

It is tragic that someone needed the broken fin to realize that the rudder is not primary roll control surface. But it is beyond tragic that some pilots still don't accept the fact that this procedure has proven itself to be lethaly wrong. Especially so on swept wing twins with wing mounted engines.

the NTSB investigation NEVER was able to determine

So we have come to the point at last! NTSB comes out with probable cause and recomendations on how to avoid similar occurences in the future and here we have PPRuNers that know better than NTSB's experts but don't tell us what their superior analysis came out with. All we get are oblique hints unsupported by the known facts. For my part, I'll be glad if they're actually not rated to fly anything that isn't powered by Microsoft.

[sevenstrokeroll]

clandestino

YES

OK, so how come it wasn't in the PHAK books before the crash?

Collin POWELL is not an expert in aviation. Do you recall his presentation to the UN with the artists conception of portable BIO Weapons Labs? OOPS.

Collin POwell's endorsement of obama...ah yes, Obama was in diapers during the Cuban Missile Crisis. McCain was in a navy attack plane. Experience doesn'T matter....I guess duty honor and country don't matter either.

Why not publish the dissenting opinion of the NTSB board member?

I take it you learned to fly this century and not the last one.


heeding advice after the fact...makes good sense...last time I checked 2003 was after the crash.

as to icing...the point was planes without leading edge devices are more prone to problems than those with leading edge devices. the crash in canada and its resulting information was not passed on to US operators of another funky european plane.

rudder not primary roll control...really...gee Orville taught that to me. have you ever been locked into a wingtip wake vortex? can you name any jet transport that crashed in wake turbulence?


sorry boys and girls for leaving the idea of the 757 ORD. i don't like american airlines, but I won't have the clueless lead us down the wrong localizer.

[Clandestino]

Collin Powell is not an aviation safety expert indeed. Nevermind his character&deeds, my opinion is that his statement:

Experience is helpful but it is decisions that count.

...is very true for life in general and aviation safety in particular. It was only fair of me to credit the author properly.

OK, so how come it wasn't in the PHAK books before the crash?

I'm unable to verify that tere were even PHAK books before 2003. edition. However warnings about dynamic unstabillity and pilot induced oscillations can be found in any aerodynamics handbook worthy of its name, even decades before AA587. As Marlene Dietrich commented about the matter that has no connection with flying, but I find it relevant nevertheless:
Those who wanted to know, knew.

as to icing...the point was planes without leading edge devices are more prone to problems than those with leading edge devices. the crash in canada and its resulting information was not passed on to US operators of another funky european plane.

So is your point that we can be more carreless with wing ice if our aeroplane is slats equipped? Also it seems that I have to spell it out: I don't like oblique hints! If you think that Dryden accident had some sinister connections with Roselawn, way don't you say it out loud?

have you ever been locked into a wingtip wake vortex

I'm fiery supporter of avoidance-is-easier-than-recovery theory. That's why I always warn ATC I need 2mins separation behind 757 when cleared to line up behind one at LHR and LGW. I have never encountered wake below 4000AGL and certanly have never been locked into one.

I take it you learned to fly this century and not the last one.

Irelevant. Newton's and Bernoulli's laws haven't been amended since the first issue or had they area of aplicability changed. Those who learnt to fly 100 years ago and those who made their first solo yesterday had to obey the same laws to stay airborne. Anyway, you've got even the millenium wrong.

[Swedish Steve]

Why in the chicago 757 incident did the engines not shut down using the fire handles? In most aircraft pulling the handles will shut of fuel and hydraulics going to the engine, with a cable operated mechanism. How does this work on the 757?
All RB211 from the first -22B on the Tristar to the latest Trent have electrically operated HP and LP fuel shut off valves and spar valves. The spar valves are powered by the battery for safety, I suppose the case where the crew will knowingly deplete the battery, but still have main DC bus power was not envisaged in the design case.
The B777 even has special spar valve batteries to cater for this case, so perhaps they though of it?

[timbob]

IGh...just curious what amount of rudder displacement occured with those pedal movements..I don't know the airbus, but that amount of pedal displacement at relatively low speed doesn't sound like a tremendous amount..granted the rapid, cyclical inputs are puzzling...have only observed one pedal left-right or right-left rapid input and that is engine failure drills in the simulator after V1 when the wrong rudder is applied just prior to rotation..then its oops...other way and hold the pedal displacement..never to and fro. Timbob.

[Shore Guy]

Hopefully back to thread here....

Has AA come out with any changes to QRH procedures yet? When they do, would someone please post.

[IGh]

TB, in slot #113, posed a question about the special characteristic of that -600 model
"... what amount of rudder displacement occurred with those pedal movements ...[?] ... that amount of pedal displacement ... doesn't sound like a tremendous amount ..."
These pilot-readers are mostly focused on PILOT-factors, the engineering weaknesses sometimes get less attention on such forums.

Aircraft Pilot Coupling is discussed in that AAR-04/04, on pgs 150-2,"... Another design characteristic of the A300-600 rudder system that may increase its susceptibility to an APC event is the changing performance as airspeed increases (a characteristic of all variable stop rudder systems). For APC prevention, the NRC report notes that a flight control system should be designed “to perform consistently throughout as much of the flight envelope as possible.” Although the design characteristics of the A300-600 provide a consistent ratio between the rudder pedal and rudder surface deflection at all airspeeds, the response of the airplane to a given rudder pedal input increases as airspeed increases, resulting in significantly different performance characteristics at opposite ends of the design envelope...."

In the flight 587 accident sequence, the small pedal displacements of the A300-600 rudder control system at 240 knots may have facilitated the first officer’s large, rapid inputs to the rudder system. The first officer performed sustained full alternating rudder pedal inputs that led to a hazardous buildup in sideslip angle in a short period of time. A system with large pedal displacements would make achieving these inputs more demanding physically, providing greater feedback regarding the magnitude of the pilot’s efforts on the controls. Thus, the ability to achieve full rudder deflection with the small pedal displacements on the A300-600 at 240 knots was a likely factor in sustaining the flight 587 event.

From AAR pg 24 you can read about magnitudes, here's the point:"... In designing the A300-600 rudder control system, Airbus made two changes to the rudder control system that was used on the airplane’s predecessors, the A300B2 and A300B4. First, Airbus decreased the forces required to depress the rudder pedals on the A300-600...."

[IweinVanCaelenberg]

Why anybody would want to turn this discussion into a crazy AA bashing contest is beyond me, but here's a quote from my 757-200 QRH. Sorry I can't render all the Boeing typography. The dotted lines below step 3 an 4 stand for 'end of checklist'

STANDBY BUS OFF

message:STANDBY BUS OFF
condition:one or more of these busses are not energized
.AC standby bus
.DC standby bus

1. STBY POWER selector............BAT

2. choose one:

*standby power bus OFF light stays illuminated and right bus off
light is not illuminated
>> goto step 4

*standby power bus OFF light is not illuminated or right BUS OFF light
stays illuminated
>> goto step 3

3. the battery will provide standby bus power for approximately 90
minutes
---------------------------

4. standby power selector.........AUTO
---------------------------

[Nocti]

Airbus vs Boeing..........and all that crap.......


In the light of the A300 accident all manufacturers provided guidance on the use of the rudder, as cyclical use of it could greatly exceed design parameters.

Think about it - it is a huge control surface designed to give way more control moment than any other - aileron or elevator; to cater for an extreme situation, where at minimum control speed, Vmca, with one engine at full thrust and the other at idle, directional control can be maintained.

It was never considered in the design that the structure would have to cope with full deflection in one direction rapidly followed by the opposite. To go rapidly from Full Scale Deflection in one direction to FSD in the other creates a force way beyond the design parameters.

The NTSB and all other agencies associated with the A300 accident came to the same conclusion, that sufficent loads were generated in the manouevres involved that resulted in the fin detaching itself from its mountings. If replicated in just about any other transport category aircraft, the result would be the same.

The repercussions are simple - we (professional pilots) all fly aircraft that have limitations on handling. Rudders have the greatest amount of gearing compared with other surfaces and have the highest risk of being over extended. Full control input followed by full opposite input may exceed the structural integrity of the aircraft.

I think it is quite amazing that such lessons are only being learnt in the 21st century- one hundred years after we first learnt to fly.

[411A]

I think it is quite amazing that such lessons are only being learnt in the 21st century...
Interesting comment, wrong conclusion.
Boeing positively knew about large powered rudder abrupt cyclic movements a long time ago, circa 1950's, with the original B707.

Large airline training departments as well, as nearly all of these airlines had B707 aircraft in their fleets.

Page forward many years, the old hands in the training departments(s) retire, new young turks in charge who, quite frankly wouldn't know a B707 if they saw one (let alone having actually flown one), introduce an abrupt control 'advanced' :rolleyes: maneuvering training program...and find, through the inappropriate use of the powered rudder, severe structural failure, and much loss of life.

The majority blame for the loss of the AA A300-600 rests squarely at the doorstep of American Airlines, and nowhere else.
Minority blame can be attributed to the specific aircraft design.

[FlexibleResponse]

Chris Scott - no cheap shots from me at a foreign manufacturer. But you will continue to get heat from a lot of us AA folks simply due to the fact that the NTSB investigation NEVER was able to determine whether the f/o manipulated the rudder the way he did. And our training program never had us resorting to rudder only during a wake encounter. Unusual attitudes, yes - ailerons supplemented with rudder. But not just a wake encounter. And due to the history of the Airbus' rudder/tail problems, it is very suspect.

Absolute Rubbish!

These statements are in direct conflict with the conclusions of the Accident Report (Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04). In particular, read the evidence given by other AA flight deck crew who witnessed this FO previously performing "aggressive" rudder inputs in similar circumstances. When questioned, the FO defended himself by saying that "the AA Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program directed him to use to rudder pedals in that manner" (page 12 if you are interested).

Read the goddam Report before sprouting such rubbish. A lot of perople died in this accident and if you don't understand what happened then their sacrifice (both the lives of the crew and passengers) are wasted and we are doomed to repeat history.

Please sick to the facts. We don't need a bunch of clowns going around sprouting self-opinionated or other political bull**** to try and change history so those extremely valuable lessons that we in the professional aviation community have learned at enormous human cost are simply denigrated.

[Airbubba]

When questioned, the FO defended himself by saying that "the AA Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program directed him to use to rudder pedals in that manner"

I had this training program inflicted upon me in the late 1990's during sim training.

Probably a matter of interpretation by the sim instructor but I repeatedly raised the BS flag and questioned whether such agressive rudder deflection was appropriate in an airliner. I was assured that it was.

[lomapaseo]

....Read the goddam Report before sprouting such rubbish. A lot of perople died in this accident and if you don't understand what happened then their sacrifice (both the lives of the crew and passengers) are wasted and we are doomed to repeat history.

Please sick to the facts. We don't need a bunch of clowns going around sprouting self-opinionated or other political bull**** to try and change history so those extremely valuable lessons that we in the professional aviation community have learned at enormous human cost are simply denigrated.

This strikes me as little too vitrolic. We should not be looking back at accidents in a blame culture but rather forward in what we would do in the future. I have not interpreted anything that says that anybody intends to ignore the significance of cycling a rudder by command.

[IGh]

B737 cases offer some lessons regarding RELAY-to- Bus faults.

If you are fascinated by various electrical failure-interactions, you’ll enjoy reading the report from Danish AIB [HCLJ], re’ a B737 failure of a RELAY to the Battery Bus (this is an 18-page pdf with photographs of failed relay): the file http://www.aaiu.ie/upload/general/3582-0.pdf
“... The crew were not aware that they could reestablish normal functions and indications by switching STANDBY POWER (P5-5) to the BAT position , as the relevant manuals and checklists for the aircraft did not contain procedures concerning this problem....”

“... Furthermore Boeing explains that these incorrect and lacking indications will vary depending on the specific type of extra equipment installed ...

“... Boeing concludes its ... Bulletin by writing:
Boeing has no technical objection to an airline incorporating a loss of Battery Bus procedure in their Operations Manual. However, since there are so many different electrical configurations throughout the 737 fleet, Boeing is unable to publish a generic procedure in the Boeing Operations Manual which will work for all 737-300/400/500 airplanes.

EDIT -- Here's another B737 case:
AAIB Bulletin: 4/2006 G-EZYN EW/A2005/03/02
... Boeing 737-33V, G-EZYN
... 22 March 2005 at 1050 hrs

"... from Nice to Luton ... experienced progressive abnormal annunciator indications.... there were no procedures in the ... [QRH] ... a failure of a contact post ... the R1 relay ... power had been lost from this Busbar in flight.... no drills published for such a failure ... many different configurations of the electrical system in the Boeing 737-300/400/500 fleet have made it difficult for the manufacturer to produce a generic procedure for this failure, although they have provided information to enable operators to write a procedure for their own aircraft...."

These odd electrical mishaps highlight a manufacturer’s annunciation philosophy, and the operator’s associated checklist philosophy. If the aircraft model includes an EXPLICIT “alert” [eg, an annunciator or EICAS message for specific fault], then the QRH will include a crew response.

?? B757 “MAIN BAT DISCH” message/light ???

[Reviewing discussion in slots # 19 through #29 points up some details.]

IweinVanCaelenberg, in slot #116, you showed a crew’s QRH response to the B757’s “STANDBY BUS OFF” message. Once you switched the STBY POWER selector to “BAT”, wouldn’t you expect [???]: -- the Standby Bus to be repowered, and thus the message (Standby Bus Off) to extinguish;

-- and then you’ld expect the “MAIN BAT DISCH” message to appear [???] sending you to that procedure.
The NTSB’s Preliminary report does NOT mention anything about any MAIN BAT DISCH message/light, but the Board’s Preliminary report does mention that lastly the “...flightcrew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH....”

It could be that this victim-crew followed their QRH’s printed procedures to the letter.
It may prove ironic that AA had initiated an MD80 modification to add a “BATTERY CHARGER” annunciator (Overhead Annunciator Panel) as just such an explicit alert.

[SMOC]

Was there anything wrong with holding the checklist till TOD? Were there any system failures that needed to be restored immediately as a result of the standby bus off?

[bubbers44]

Why would you hold a checklist for TOD?

[SMOC]

When I flew the classic the F/Es during their bi-annual checks were always asked to understand the intent of the checklist and therefore the appropriate time to action it, or part there of in case of running multiple checklists that possibly overlapped. I must admit flying glass it's all to easy to jump straight in with the QRH or electronic checklist as soon as an EICAS/ECAM appears, as that's the way it usually works in the sim.

A case like this may have allowed the crew to say ok the STBY BUS is unpowered however the A/C is flying normally X,Y and Z are powered by it, but haven't failed at this point or have but are not required until decent/approach or landing therefore we have time to collect more information from the FCOM other manuals, engineering.

If it's obvious that the failure needs to be actioned immediately then it will and an immediate landing may be made.

It may have been possible to cycle the stby power switch to re-charge the batteries. Checklists cannot cover all scenarios and this is a good example which may result in a system or SOP/QRH change.

Crew did what they thought was right as they should, all safe and we get to learn something that may help in the future.

[bubbers44]

Flying a trip not having standby power doesn't sound very smart to me. Landing seems smart. 30 minutes of battery time is on a fresh battery. How fresh is the one in your aircraft? We can second guess what they did but why not just use the checklist and if it says you have 30 minutes just land. I think they actually tried to extend their trip to destination thinking they could deal with it on the descent but it didn't work. Some of those relay failure problems get pretty tricky.

[bubbers44]

Yes, I think going back to auto on standby power would have charged the battery up again probably losing the standby bus but no checklist says to do that and going to bat again on approach. They landed safely so maybe something will be learned from this incident.

[SMOC]

Also totally agree once your going down the battery road it's time to land. So again in this case it might be prudent to delay the checklist till within 30mins of landing, I used TOD as a point about 30mins out. If you choose to continue or are over the ocean then a good understanding of the intent of the checklist needs to be there so you don't run them flat.

[aa73]

Absolute Rubbish!

These statements are in direct conflict with the conclusions of the Accident Report (Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04). In particular, read the evidence given by other AA flight deck crew who witnessed this FO previously performing "aggressive" rudder inputs in similar circumstances. When questioned, the FO defended himself by saying that "the AA Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program directed him to use to rudder pedals in that manner" (page 12 if you are interested).

Read the goddam Report before sprouting such rubbish. A lot of perople died in this accident and if you don't understand what happened then their sacrifice (both the lives of the crew and passengers) are wasted and we are doomed to repeat history.

Please sick to the facts. We don't need a bunch of clowns going around sprouting self-opinionated or other political bull**** to try and change history so those extremely valuable lessons that we in the professional aviation community have learned at enormous human cost are simply denigrated.


I fly for AA and am very well aware of the human cost. It's clear you put absolutely blind faith in an NTSB report without taking into account that sometimes hidden agendas and political plays affect the outcomes of investigations. If you don't believe me just remember TWA 800.

I attended AAMP when it was introduced and, while I disagreed with heavy dependence on the rudder in certain situations, merely getting out of wake turbulence was not one of them. Aileron first and then rudder to supplement, if necessary. Those are FACTS.

[Ignition Override]

As for the AA A-300 disaster, just after this crash, an aviation magazine ("Av. Week"?) described some unexplained rudder anomolies onboard some foreign airlines' A-300/A-310.
These happened with no pilot inputs on the rudder pedals.

Mentioned were former East German Interflug, Air France and possibly a third airline (Fedex?).
Pilots are such easy scapegoats when they are dead.

Oh well, back to the SKS and Mosin Nagant 44 websites :).
Do most pilots have hobbies, or just Pprune?

[Shore Guy]

No editorial comment here…..per our manuals, these are the busses/items that would have been lost in this scenario…

Significantly, earlier B-757 aircraft had alternate stab trim “handles” that were direct cabled to valves.


HOT BATTERY BUS
Clock time references
Fire extinguisher bottles
Fueling system
IRS emergency power (R continuous, L & C for 5 minutes)
Landing gear alternate extension
Park brake valve
RAT manual deployment

BATTERY BUS
Alternate equipment cooling
Alternate stabilizer trim switches**
Antiskid system for inboard wheels
APU fuel valve
DC fuel pump
Engine anti-ice
Engine, APU and cargo fire detection
Engine driven hydraulic pump shutoff valves
Engine fuel control valves
Engine start controls
Forward cockpit dome lighting
Fuel crossfeed valve(s)
Fuel quantity system
Generator controls
Hydraulic PTU control
Interphone systems
Landing gear air/ground system
RAT automatic deployment
Spar fuel valves
Standby Engine Indication (SEI)

STANDBY DC BUS
Bleed air isolation valve
Electric stabilizer trim
Left aural warning speaker
Left stick shaker
Left VHF comm system
Left yaw damper*
Manual cabin altitude pressure control
Rudder ratio changer
Rudder trim
Stab trim shutoff valves
Standby Attitude Indicator

Rudder ratio changer***
Rudder trim
Stab trim shutoff valves
Standby Attitude Indicator

STANDBY AC BUS
Bleed air isolation valve*
Cabin altitude/differential pressure indications
Center ILS system
Engine ignition
Left navigation system (VOR, Air Data Computer (ADC) & RDMI)
Left yaw damper*
Main panel flood lights
Standby Instrument Panel lights
Three spoiler pairs
Wheel well fire detection
*Requires both AC and DC power to operate

[IweinVanCaelenberg]

IGh wrote:



IweinVanCaelenberg, in slot #116, you showed a crew’s QRH response to the B757’s “STANDBY BUS OFF” message. Once you switched the STBY POWER selector to “BAT”, wouldn’t you expect [???]: -- the Standby Bus to be repowered, and thus the message (Standby Bus Off) to extinguish;



-- and then you’ld expect the “MAIN BAT DISCH” message to appear [???] sending you to that procedure.


Yep. And here it is. some procedure eh?

MAIN BATTERY DISCHARGE
message: MAIN BAT DISCH
condition: a main battery discharge occurs
----------------------

(The dotted line does mean end of checklist.) For all clarity: I am not passing any judgement on this AA crew or on any other for that matter. Only the stupid, the very lucky or the very inexperienced would do that and I am neither.

[layinlow]

An American Airlines 757 loses power shortly after takeoff. The pilot decides he can fly to New York on battery power alone. Gets as far as Chicago when more and more equipmrnt goes off line. Makes an emergency landing and does not have enough battery power left to shut downt he engines normally. Is that stupid or what? Who wants to bet his ticket is on the line?

[bubbers44]

They had a lot of electrical power left when they landed since both engine driven ac generators were working supplying everything but the four busses shown above. By selecting standby power to bat they removed the battery charger from the system and the battery went dead because it was supplying power to these busses.

[Junkflyer]

They had a lot of power, but you lose a lot without those buses including some pretty handy things like fire detection/protection.

[manrow]

But would the check list tell you that junk flyer

[bubbers44]

At that point in their flight I would have really liked antiskid, spoilers and stabilizer trim more than fire protection. That is what put them off the runway.

[sevenstrokeroll]

didn't fire protection exist for the engines...if they burned they would eventually fall off

apu in fire proof container

[bubbers44]

That would work but letting engines burn off aircraft isn't an approved procedure yet. Hopefully just following the procedure and time limits will work better.

[FlexibleResponse]

I fly for AA and am very well aware of the human cost. It's clear you put absolutely blind faith in an NTSB report without taking into account that sometimes hidden agendas and political plays affect the outcomes of investigations. If you don't believe me just remember TWA 800.

No, one doesn't have to have blind faith in NTSC reports and their conclusions, but NTSC reports do try to report the facts as accurately as is possible. However, most aviators would have very definite problems with folks who try to change the reported factual data to suit their own agenda.

I attended AAMP when it was introduced and, while I disagreed with heavy dependence on the rudder in certain situations, merely getting out of wake turbulence was not one of them. Aileron first and then rudder to supplement, if necessary. Those are FACTS.

This is not really relevant that YOU disagreed with the AA AAMP training as you were not the accident FO. The accident FO was reported for how HE felt about the AAMP and what the AAMP training directed him to do. If anyone is aware or has any evidence that the AA witnesses were lying about this, then they should send that information to the NTSB.

Every man and his dog on this planet are entitled to come to a different conclusion when considering the established facts of the NTSB report. That is a right and privilege of every man.

But, aviators generally don't like folks tampering with or trying to change the facts of an investigation, as they have found by bitter experience that in aviation, bull**** kills.

[sevenstrokeroll]

is it or isn't it true that at least one board member of the NTSB dissented with the final report?

also

I read a summary of what happened at the ORD incident and it said that the thrust reversers didn't automatically deploy

now, I think it was misprint and they meant spoilers, but will someone verify.

[bubbers44]

I looked at the above post showing what was on the 4 busses lost and didn't see reversers. I think they meant the 3 pairs of spoilers that were lost.

[bubbers44]

Landing gear air/ gnd system circuit was affected reading it again. That might have put the logic for the reversers in air mode.

[ZimmerFly]

I think the clue might be Landing gear air/ground system


This will prevent reverse being selected (amongst other things) if the signal is "in air" rather than "on ground"

I see you came to the same conclusion !

[Flamin_Squirrel]

Would that prevent the fuel cut off switches from moving to cut off when they tried to shut down the engines too?

[IGh]

In slot 141, SSR posed a question about the P.C. wording for AA587 [that P.C. statement is shown in slot #108, bottom].

From AAR-04/04, pg 165:"Board Member Statements

"Member Carol J. Carmody’s Statement, in which Member Richard F. Healing joined
"I support the probable cause language in the original staff draft, which listed contributing factors as the ... Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program and characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system. I heard no reason either during the staff presentations, or in the explanation provided by the Vice Chairman in submitting his substitute, to reverse this order. To diminish the role of the AAMP in the accident is to downplay the role it played in the pilot’s actions which caused the accident. One of the undeniable facts of this accident is the pilot’s inappropriate use of rudder. Staff was unable to find any example of unusual rudder use by the pilot before his AAMP training. When questioned by a captain for using the rudder in an earlier incident, the first officer “insisted that the AAMP directed him to use the rudder pedals in that manner.” To elevate the characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system in the hierarchy of contributing factors ignores the fact that this system had not been an issue in some 16 million hours of testing and operator experience—until the AAMP trained pilot flew it. The justification for the change was that the Board must address the future and, therefore, must give more attention to the aircraft rudder characteristics. That is what our recommendations are designed to do, and our recommendations do address the design issues. The probable cause should reflect accurately what the investigation and the report demonstrate; the substitute probable cause does not do that."

The final P.C. reads:"... 3.2 Probable Cause
... Safety Board determines ... probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

For "AA73", who revealed his objection or suspicion about the Board's P.C. in the AA587 case: I was going to disagree with your skeptical comments about the Board's investigations -- then I recalled one more recent case in which the Board, the airline, and YOUR pilots' association completely botched their roles in an investigation. Take a look at the corrected [and still erroneous] PC for this case: DEN06IA051 21Mar06, DEN06IA051 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20060330X00368&key=1) then click "narrative".
Note the "**" which reflect the revisions from the originally published report, which included such interesting assertions as the Pitch ATT at touchdown was 31.6 degrees NU. That operator has always published a deception, showing an erroneous transcription from FAA Order 8400.10. See if you can recognize the deception: the difference between that airline's wording, and the FAA's actual wording in 8400.10 for "turbojet" ops. Those mishap-pilots had no way of knowing about the airline's deception.