Air Transat - "Panic in the Cockpit" recording

[a300guy]

Does anyone have a link to the ATC recording of the March 2008 incident involving Air Transat departing Quebec City? This was the recording that had inadvertently recorded the cockpit conversations on an ATC frequency due to a held mike switch.

This recording was originally available on Live ATC, but seems to have been removed.

[Dream Land]

I just listened to it at Live ATC.net, all in French. :eek:

Link (http://archive-server.liveatc.net/cyqb/CYQB-Mar-05-2008-1930Z.mp3), you must register. ::(

[Jumbo744]

:eek: real panic. horrible to hear those voices screaming. good they made it.

[411A]

I just listened to it at Live ATC.net, all in French. :eek:

Perhaps that's why the panic...:rolleyes:

I can honestly say, that in 40 years of professional flying, never have I had 'panic' on the FD.

Of course, there was the one time....
when all the switchlights on the flight controls electronic panel were flashing like mad, just after takeoff, and at the same time, number three engine was having a case of pod nod whereupon the Flight Engineer was beside himself...I reset a couple of flight control monitor switchlights and adjusted the number three throttle to stop the pod nod, and he soon stopped screaming...OMG, we're all going to die.:ugh::ugh:

[ETOPS]

What was the panic all about? Don't speak French malheuresment

[jimworcs]

Any chance of the actual address to go to?

[threemiles]

You will find it under Captured Recordings, then March 15, 2008
To access the area you need to register

[212man]

What was the incident, and why did they only declare a PAN if they/he were/was that alarmed? (what would the reaction to a MAYDAY event be???)

[Dream Land]

Sorry about the link, here is the home page: LiveATC Discussion Forums - Index | LiveATC.net (http://www.liveatc.net/forums/index.php)

why did they only declare a PAN if they/he were/was that alarmed? (what would the reaction to a MAYDAY event be???) That's what I was thinking. :rolleyes:

[BeechNut]

I'm fluent in French (in fact do most of my radio work in French here in Quebec), so I'll take a crack at it. Here's a summary of the incident:

They took off from YQB with RVR of 1400 ft (given the date, I'd say another of the many snowstorms in YQB this past winter).

On initial climb, there was a panicked female voice in the cockpit saying "what's going on", and some sort of bell ringing; another male voice said "tabarnac" (Québecois slang expletive, based on a sacred religious object, but you can insert "sh!t" here and get the same effect), and also "what's going on?".

Then in French they declared a "pan pan pan", stating an airspeed indication problem, and asked for immediate clearance to a higher altitude (10,000 ft). On the way up they asked tower for a groundspeed and altitude readout.

By the time they reached 10k ft, they asked for another altitude check and they asked for a climb to FL220; they got 13k initially, then FL220. The problem seems to have sorted itself out and airspeed indication restored to normal and they canceled the Pan call and proceeded to YUL.

One assumes that the request for both altitude and speed readouts from the tower was to diagnose if it was the pitot or static port that was plugged.

Not a good situation to lose your instruments actually, they were in solid IMC.

Beech

[Jumbo744]

translation of the guy screaming:

"What's happening!!! what's happening!!!!"
"God damn!!!"
"Hervé (not sure about it) what is going on??!!!!"
"I know, I know but...."

beechnut has a more detailed version, thanks beechnut. I heard they had hit windshear and lost 1700' from 3000'

[westinghouse]

what was the acft type in this incident?
anyone has the full translation?

[silverhawk]

411A

re panic

in your decades of magnificent flying, I think there was panic every time an FO saw your name on his/her roster.

Retirement is a two pronged tool.

[Jumbo744]

i think it was a A310

[threemiles]

On the way up they asked tower for a groundspeed and altitude readout.

If there is a pitot tube blocked the radar controller will not give you a different altitude than your altimeter, except on 1013 than local QNH. Aero Peru 757 Flight 603 relied on the same misunderstanding and touched the ocean's surface. Ground speed may help a little to judge IAS, though.

[alph2z]

WOW, pretty erie, :eek:

For a full transcription and translation see

airdisaster.info • View topic - Air Transat 211 Panic in the Cockpit recording (http://www.airdisaster.info/forums/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=1281)

.

[Raredata]

Something really scared those guys!!.Quite chilling!Makes me air all stand up! Ugly business at times flying !! What happened?

[fullyspooled]

Sounds chilling indeed - whatever the cause! I doubt that any ppruners (except perhaps 411) would consider it innapropriate that the Captain's over riding concen, despite his (or her) state of alarm, was altitude and airspeed (or groundspeed, given the possible circumstances).

Over to 411, who I am sure has far more experience with dealing with such matters - and without the input of an FE.

[BeechNut]

If there is a pitot tube blocked the radar controller will not give you a different altitude than your altimeter, except on 1013 than local QNH. Aero Peru 757 Flight 603 relied on the same misunderstanding and touched the ocean's surface. Ground speed may help a little to judge IAS, though.

What does a blocked pitot tube have to do with erroneous altitude indications???

I have had blocked pitots before but never any issue with altitude readouts.

And wasn't the issue in the Aero Peru accident blocked static ports?

Beech

[CdnAvSpotter]

First it was an Airbus A310 that they were flying and not a tristar L-1011. Air transat does not have any active L1011's in their fleet. So there is no flight engineer.

It appears that they flew into some wind sheer, dropped from 3000 ft to 1300 ft which caused a loss of altitude and airspeed indications. They then asked for their ground speed and altitude from the controller and then climbed to 6000 ft. After climbing, they restored the instruments and were transfered to Montreal Centre.

[Gonzalo]

Were they having wrong altitude or speed readings maybe ? Perhaps a pitot or a static blocked causing confusing read outs in the cockpit ? The controller can't help in that situation, you have the same info in both places ( the cockpit and the controller's radar screen ), the controller screen shows data received from the aircraft's transponder, so if you have a pitot or a static/port blocked the controller probably has the same wrong information you have in the cockpit. This problem occurs in two deadly accidents ( Birgenair for a pitot and Aeroperú for the static, both times 757 ). The only way you can get a reliable source in a situation like that is another aircraft flying next to you and telling your speed and altitude...Aeroperu's crew request that help but sadly they crashed before a cargo jet reach them.

[ABUKABOY]

A300-B4 has a placard in the cockpit giving pitch and power settings to achieve climb, cruise and descent at various altitudes, weights, speeds and flap settings. A very satisfying exercise to do in the sim. The figures do, of course, work admirably, but to button-down and actually do it in a crisis takes some discipline and a cool head while all about is confusing the $%*& out of you.
Do most aircraft have these placards? (Just trying to illustrate that there is another way other than an aircraft flying alongside).
Always assuming your pitch information has not gone walkabout too!

[HarryMann]

Does the climb/descent rate variometer use the same static ports?

[threemiles]

I correct pitot for static port.

There is no FE on the A310.

Track Flight Status for (TS) Air Transat 211 (http://www.flightstats.com/go/FlightStatus/flightStatusByFlight.do?&id=120030092&airlineCode=TS&flightNumber=211)

[ABUKABOY]

But there is on the A300-B4, and rather than unpredictable girly-screamers, I've been in compromising situations with F/E's that remain calm, of the utmost help, even reading-out the parameters I am trying to achieve with various stages of a no-ASI scenario from the QRH while the F/O busies himself with something else useful to the situation.

Don't belittle the F/E. His days may be numbered, but a more experienced and professional bunch of people I have yet to meet. Always a cool and invaluable hand in a crisis. Don't knock the threesome it if you haven't tried it!

[tubby linton]

The vsi in the airbus is inertial with a pressure back up signal.I believe that early A310 -200 had an F/E position.I seem to remember this may have been true for the Cyprus Airways aircraft.

[Desert Cat]

I have listened to the recording months ago.

Can't really help in getting it back though. Sorry!

The guys just took off from CYQB and had unreliable instruments (airspeed for sure) most probably due to frozen or defective pitot static system. Winter flying and icing I believe. They thought they were stalling but could not initially quite figure out what was going on. There are some hills nearby to the north of the airport and I can understand the extreme anxiety the crew was subjected to at the time.

What is referred to as "panic" is really lots of heavy breathing from adrenaline rushing and a good measure of fear while one of the guys was basically yelling "What is going on" or something to that effect... to eventually realize "hey... we are still flying here and climbing away"... I don't remember the exact details of it but being French Canadian, I understood everything they were saying and the intonations as well...

I fly A330-340s but never flew A300 or 310 and don't have any idea how that aircraft type behaves in an unreliable airspeed (and other instruments) scenario. I have seen this kind of scenario in my recent training while I was expecting it and thought it was a hand full with all the bells and warnings that are triggered by alpha, flap and speed protections which are all bogus then. If you don't know it is coming and have never seen it in the simulator, that could be a very scary situation to be in...

These guys obviously figured it out on that day...

I have been flying military and civilian jets for 23 years and I have to admit, and although I think I have a pretty cool head, I really wander how I would have reacted in the same situation...

[TotalBeginner]

Did they continue to their destination? :confused:

[sec 3]

ASFK or whatever. Never flew a Tristar eh ? You don't know what you missed. Better aircraft than most of the new ones today.

[alph2z]

Anybody know what the repeating chime was for, that we hear in the back ?
.

[tubby linton]

I never flew the 310 but I have lots of time in the 306.The warning in the background is probably the aural stall warning.In the 306 it is called the crickets and has a different sound.I cannot think of anything else which would have induced the level of panic in the pilots voice.When the old bus gets close to the stall it goes into alpha floor and full power is automatically applied.This power increase has a pitch coupling which initially increases the nose up attitude.
If the incident took place at 3000 ft above ground the windshear warning would not be working.It has on some aircraft a voice announcing "windshear" and the word windshear appears on the pfd.
He was probably hand flying as when the aircraft approaches a stall the autopilot drops out with its associated warnings,yet we do not hear the autopilot disconnect.
I have frequently seen a FAC failure on the aircraft which removes a lot of the information on the speed tape and the flight director bars disappear.The cause usually is an Angle of attack vane problem.You just have to fly a sensible pitch and N1 until you can hand over control and select alternate systems.
The A300/310 family are a hybrid of 1970s aeroplane and 1980s computers,and I am constantly vigilant for any unexpected malfunction.My colleagues joke that we go in the sim every six months for a rest!The aircraft is like a woman-neglect to pay her enough attention and she will bite you badly

[Captain Big Iron]

A310 capt seven years.
I haven't listened to the recording, but you are likely hearing a compendium of the CRC, stall warning and single advisory chime.

I had this happen once at altitude once, where we were flying in clear air around a typhoon into a band of disturbed Alto Cumulous that didn't really look that bad. (But it was)

LOUD ice hit the windscreen, we lost everything on both sides, the autopilot let go, the speed tapes went nuts and our company had the warnings (which could only be set on the ground) at max volume; no way to cancel some of the CRC (same as fire bell) so you had to shout loudly to communicate. (Sounded like panic on the radio, I'm sure, but it's more frustration that there's no way to kill the CRC (continuous repetitive chime) on the A310.

We picked up a shidload of ice, the airplane, according to the standby altimeter was going downhill fast but it was eratic as well. We had no idea what altitude or airspeed we were at so I just set 98% N1 and held about 4 degrees pitch IIRC.

About seven minutes later everything was recovered on it's own, and we discovered we were flying about 2500 feet off assigned.

The A310: she was a good old girl, but like many of your old flames she had some annoying computer habits (nag, nag, nag with the chime all night long.) :\

[alph2z]

Audio file, should start .mp3 download.

LiveATC.net (http://www.liveatc.net/forums/atcaviation-audio-clips/air-transat-panic-in-the-cockpit/?action=dlattach;attach=1665)

Starts at 4:50.
.

[xetroV]

I've once had the opposite experience: a blocked static port during descent, causing unreliable airspeed on the captain's PFD. In that stage of the flight it wasn't really difficult to figure out what was happening, but the stress factor was still high due to the false aural warning (continuous loud clacker).

So I can understand that the same failure during take-off must be really stressful, especially since I'd rather experience a false overspeed warning than a false stickshaker. Having a distinct impression (even temporarily) of stalling near the ground must be pretty nerve wracking.

[Ditchdigger]

For those that don't wish to register at Live ATC, the audio has also been posted at YouTube: YouTube - Airbus A310 Panic in the Cockpit Recording (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xUhMGGIsc00)

[411A]

OTOH, knowing full well just where the multi-sound CB is located...might well find the operating crew in these situations in better circumstances.

KNOW your airplane electrical (and other) systems)...for best results.

Guaranteed.:ok:

[Captain Big Iron]

411A,

No, that won't help you on the A310 I'm afraid. There's no such named breaker on the -200's I flew (vintage 77'.) There's an audio CB but then you'd be lost com and no fire warning, no GPWS, no mask mic, no alt alerter or system warnings or anything (was strictly not allowed.) The A310-200 doesn't have an engineer despite what some have posted here, so without fuel alerts that's a real good way to flame out engines. There is a warning override button that only affects the lower level alerts and then there's the ground prox which on your old L1011 you wouldn't think twice about pulling. Not so on the Mother Airbus first glass airplane. If you do this, you will dick up all kinds of systems, possibly loose pressurization, window and probe heat, etc, etc.

I flew a lot of the American designs 747, 727, DC-10, 737 and they are designed around the pilot and your old school technique worked great; whereas the airbus transfers fuel and goes into a 90 degree straight up deck angle without telling the pilots why it wants these things (unless you're lucky and you happen to be staring at the FMA or the Fuel Page when it gets these great ideas.) It just doesn't know that you can't possibly have a stick shaker followed by a clacker in less than a second.... All it knows is that it will prevent overspeed at all costs.... And it doesn't happen slow and obvious like a lumbering tristar; the power to weight ratio is so much better with the composite airframe it can get away from you rather quickly; hence the type's high "tail slide/Bob Hoover incident/accident rate.

411A, watch the movie "2001" and you will have some idea what happens when you design a computer with higher authority than a crewmember. But understanding this is power. You can step in early and be "Dave Bowman" and disconnect "Hal" early on before he gets you killed.

So, the moral of the story is A310 crewmembers learned not to be a test pilot never pull CB's not called for in the checklist: or else you stood an excellent chance of making your problems even worse. Experienced computer guys understood: Disconnect all the flight automation and hand fly body angel and N1, ignore all the haywire pandemonium and let the Pilot-not-handling go through the checklist and if that doesn't apply or work then you're a test pilot.

Or just play it safe, and let the crappy 186 code try to cool down and sort itself out. This bird was created with singular failures in mind. The automation can't handle multiple probes/static ports frozen.

All JMHO's.

[BRE]

"There's no such named breaker on the -200's I flew (vintage 77'.) "

Hey, that's five years before first flight!

[BRE]

I assume he's talking about the A310-200

[PanPanYourself]

Uh, how soundproof are the cockpits on these aircraft?

One may suppose hearing screams of "what the hell is going on" accompanied by alarming chimes coming from the cockpit might make the rest of the flight a little uncomfortable for some of the SLF.

[Rainboe]

Well at last I've listened to the recording, and I think most of you will agree with my interpretation. Panic? You think that's panic? You haven't lived? I hear a crew dealing with some mysterious problem, having to shout because of the dratted loud continuous warning chiming going on- absolutely no 'panic'. I heard no panic- urgency yes...and I'm glad there was urgency, but this poor crew are being slated for panic and it's really a little daft, so can we stop being so excitable and using the word 'panic', because that is not what I'm hearing!

I also object to CVR use when it is purely an accident investigation device and is not intended for public entertainment.

[alph2z]

"I also object to CVR use when it is purely an accident investigation device and is not intended for public entertainment."

It's not from CVR, nor ATC tapes, it's from an open mike.
.

[Rainboe]

Withdrawn! Thank you.

[gumbi]

It's actually an open mike transmission that was picked up by an unscrupulous journo on his scanner and who immediately made sure it would make the six o'clock news.

Beware my friends, beware... Absolutely everything we say is monitored by someone somewhere.

[alph2z]

picked up by an unscrupulous journo on his scanner and who immediately made sure it would make the six o'clock news.

Not a journo, and it took almost a week to get on the news, I believe.

It`s from a group of volunteers, I believe.
.

[pirlipinpin]

YouTube - Airbus A310 Panic in the Cockpit Recording, No Crash (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xUhMGGIsc00)

[Jumbo744]

Definition of Panic:

Great agitation and anxiety caused by the expectation or the realization of danger. A sudden, overpowering terror, often affecting many people at once.

[punkalouver]

Narrative: TSC211, an Airbus 310 operated by Air Transat, was conducting an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight departing from Quebec/Jean-Lesage (CYQB) to Montreal/Trudeau (CYUL). Shortly after takeoff, the pilot declared an emergency (PAN PAN). At the same time, the radar registered a drop in altitude from 3 000 ft to 1 300 ft. The pilot then asked to confirm aircraft speed and altitude. He said there had been a problem with speed indication, which seemed to be resolved now. The emergency was cancelled at 1949Z and the aircraft continued its flight to destination.

Narrative: Update #1: The TSB occurrence number and class of investigation were added. The aircraft registration was added. Event name "Aircraft navigation/communication equipment" replaced with "Weather clear air turbulence (CAT)/wind shear/turbulence. According to TSB Report #A08Q0051, an airbus 310, operated by Air Transat, departed from Quebec/Jean-Lesage (CYQB) bound for Montreal/Trudeau (CYUL). During flap retraction at 3 000 feet, strong wind shears caused fluctuations of altitude and airspeed. The crew declared a PAN PAN emergency. A few seconds later, flight conditions returned to normal. The aircraft continued to climb normally, pursued its flight to Montreal/Trudeau and landed without incident. In accordance with aircraft maintenance manual (AMM) 0551-17, a check was made for severe turbulence and to determine if the aircraft exceeded Mmo/Vmo limits. No damage was found. The flight recorder was also removed. Flight data analysis revealed that load factor was not exceeded.

Narrative: Update #2: Investigation Class 5 changed to investigation Class 3.


A class 3 investigation means that a final report should be issued eventually.

[MAN2YKF]

This is what i know about the incident.
The Captain is still on stress leave and looks as though he won't come back.
The incident is under serious investigation.
I have heard that they were seconds from crashing.
There was a check captain in the cockpit of this flight, i believe it was his voice we could here on the recordings. "whats going on, whats going on?"
There was no windshear reported so it seems that a major error in the cockpit caused this. Possible wrong settings? something not switched on or off?
The aircraft was found to be in full working order.

[ProM]

Be nice when multi-lateration is rolled out everywhere, enabling ATC to give an independent and accurate altitude (and rate of climb/descent if necessary). Might alleviate some worrying situations

[tubby linton]

I had a look at the TSB Canada website today .The list of reports was from 2007 and this incident took place in 2008 so we will probably have to wait a bit longer for it.

[DownIn3Green]

Silver and Fully...personal chides, whether tounge-in-cheek or not are pretty petty, don't you think?

CVR's are sacred, but once your words are transmitted over the R/T everything you say becomes fair game...including "panic"...

[punkalouver]

Keep in mind that the copilot was a training captain.

If anyone can translate appendix B from french to english, it would be greatly appreciated.

http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/a08q0051/a08q0051.pdf

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
1.The take-off briefing did not take into account the elements that contributed to the aircraft’s exceptional climb performance; as a result, the briefing did not improve cohesion in the cockpit as it should have done.

2.Following the disconnection of the co-pilot’s headset, the “Rotate” call was missed during the take-off run. The aircraft lifted off at 182 knots, or 44 knots above the rotation speed calculated by the crew.

3.The actions required to follow the flight path and climb profile contributed to overloading the crew and resulted in errors. The sequence of actions and standard calls during the climb was disrupted. As a result, the crew did not select Climb Thrust (CL) on the thrust rating panel (TRP).

4.When levelling off at 3000 feet, the captain activated the electric trim until the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) reached its nose down stop. This resulted in an out-of-trim condition.

5.To reduce the aircraft’s speed, the captain retarded the throttles. However, he activated the Go Levers without noticing. The go-around mode was activated, power increased to the maximum, and the aircraft’s speed continued to increase.

6.The unexpected change to go-around mode confused the captain when he had a heavy workload. Exposed to information overload, preoccupied by the aircraft’s increasing speed, and experiencing a somatogravic illusion, the captain focused all his attention on the aircraft’s speed rather than on the instruments. As a result, the captain did not realize that the aircraft was accelerating towards the ground, and mistakenly believed that the indicated speed was incorrect.

7.The captain did not react to the co-pilot’s warnings that the aircraft’s attitude did not comply with the desired flight profile. As a result, the co-pilot took control of the aircraft without recognizing that the aircraft was out of trim.

8.When he took the controls, the co-pilot did not realize that the aircraft was out of trim despite the exceptionally high control column forces. As a result, the pitch trim was not used to reduce the control column forces.

9.Because of the proximity of the ground, the crew had little time to identify the problem, determine and consider the options, and coordinate their efforts. As a result, the effect of the time-related stress could have precipitated each pilot into incorrectly diagnosing the source of the problem.

10.The crew’s performance suggests that some elements of the company’s training program did not reach the targeted objectives regarding the coordination of crew members, the regulations concerning take-off limits, the recognition of an out-of-trim condition, the autopilot use and the understanding and application of abnormal procedures.

[Machdiamond]

Loss of situational awareness leading to an upset down to 1000ft AGL at a speed of 370KIAS is not for the faint hearted indeed.

Translation of French BEA comments in Appendix B:
===quote
The event is considered as loss of control in pitch by the BST. The BEA rather considers that the event is a loss of situational awareness starting at takeoff roll, becoming worse during level off and descent.

Indeed, during takeoff roll the rotate speed is not called off by the crew. A gear down climb to 1700ft follows.

At level off, the aircraft is placed in untrimmed condition when the pilot substantially trims the nose down while he nearly simultaneously pulls the control column, the key element of the event.

Finally during the descent, the crew applies up elevator while remaining in nose down untrimmed condition despite the control column stiffness sensations allowing to become aware of this untrimmed condition.

At an altitude of about 1000ft, despite the trim still nose down, the combination of stick pull and the increase in thrust will allow the aircraft to level off and then begin a climb.

During all these stages, the aircraft responded coherently to the crew actions.
===endquote

The rest of the appendix refers to comments apparently made by BEA on a draft report because they seem to be incorporated in the final report.

[40&80]

In retirement I am amazed to read that major airline Airbus pilots seem unable to fly manual throttle and apparently fail to scan their flight instruments sufficiently in a non normal situation to keep their aircraft the right way up.
A warning light or an aural alert seems to auto cancel their ability to fly instruments....they do not seem very good at using the radar to avoid weather either.