BA038 (B777) Thread

[Landroger]

Just need to tell you that I'm in the middle of the school run at the moment; but will respond to this later on, as soon as I can.

Your patience does you even more credit sir. Most of your peers have been generous with their praise, rightly so, and they are the people who really know what you and your crew achieved, but I would like to add my (SLF and interested non aero engineer) appreciation of your actions that day.

Even from day one, when only the sketchiest details were available, I always thought the crew must have been something very special and now I know it. I have to hold my hand up though and admit that I remain strangely unconvinced as to the reasons why and how your engines let you down so badly. Maybe it was an entirely new phenomenon, but the published reason gives this engineer goose bumps.

But that's not your worry. All the very best for you in the future and I really hope I end up flying in very close formation with you one day. :)

Roger.

[bearfoil]

The salient "hypothesis" has to do with many hours of flight through very cold temps, in this case very cold temps. 038 flew at 38k for some time, and had poured most of its fuel through the engines by the time AT requested high thrust at short final. This high thrust value was attained and maintained for many seconds, so conclusion 1: the narrowest part of the fuel passage even if it was partially occluded by ice, was sufficient to provide fuel for the thrust selected.

Evidence was noted of cavitation concurrent with interruption of fuel flow, suggesting the fuel passage was plugged sufficient to cause rollback, hence conclusion 2: Ice had collected at some point upstream of HP pumps, Preventing flow, though 1.03 and 1.02 epr were noted. The engines continued to run.

Photographic evidence of surface accumulation of "Ice" on the interior of the fuel line was noted post test. Ice packed around the entry port of the HE was also demonstrated.

Hypothesis: Ice accumulation was allowed by a combination of factors suggesting that it was allowable quantities of water contamination of fuel building up over long hours of cruise flight that was responsible for the "plug at the face" of the FOHE which prevented fuel flow.

Having lain dormant as "sticky Ice" right up to throttle refusal, how did it arrive at the Inlet matrix? A number of possibilities come to mind. Warming temps at let down? Sudden increase of flow, lessening of hydraulic pressure? Vibration of pylon tree and FOHE on the shroud at first Increase? Since it was AT throttling up, my 'guess' is that extreme vibration associated with high thrust shook loose the Ice that choked the flow that prevented normal operation. Similar quantities/temps. caused the seeming "simultaneous" loss of power that was initially so startling, but that in hindsight seems reasonable enough.

These are questions that come to mind without assigning any mysterious characteristic to the fuel. Were these tested? Were they assumed? Look, either it is mysterious and more work (much more) needs to be done, or it is actually a straightforward case of a very rare combination of unlikely factors combining to cause starvation.


The major portion of the body of work done by the investigators is misleading, insufficient, inconclusive, and patronizing. The Chinese Fuel could have been crap, but it was shown that in spec fuel was found remaindered in 038. The Trent may need a more thorough re-engineering relative to fuel system (to include the airframe), including HP prior to FOHE, Bypass, Recirculating Spill, etc. How would anybody know? Because Boeing and FAA say so? They've not addressed this. Personally, I like the 757 for my trips to Hawaii.

The bolding is not meant to be aggressive, but I needed something stronger than italics, this is a very frustrating accident.

Then there's DELTA. What if cavitation had caused both FOHE cannisters to collapse over the Rockies?

bear

[RatherBeFlying]

I just want to add my thanks to Mmmayday38 for the excellent insights he has shared with us along with my admiration for having done so well.

That day looking out the window produced a result that many engineers and pilots on simulators over several months could not improve upon:ok:

[Mmmayday38]

Thanks for some great replies to the ‘army of 1’ and although they are very accurate (ta CaptPlaystation #3009 & 3015, Baron Rouge #3131, Pettifogger #3034) with some good insight into the atmosphere in the f/d that day; I feel that SFLY needs me to say it so he can adhere to some other posters’ advise? (CaptPlaystation #3002 and Tima9x #2999 !!) ;)

Again SFLY, Boeing tried all angles of dangles and differing AoAs with differing airspeeds, on the G/S and below it, to try and get further; they couldn’t. So if it appears to you that the a/c staying on the G/S until nearing the stall was wrong, it did not detrement the distance flown at all.

I can’t find the actual post anymore (there have been a few posts deleted by the mod with regards to me!!) but someone mentioned about the lack of throttle usage on the approach. On the BA38 this was my attempt at performing a CDA (continuous descent approach) into LHR... something BA pride themselves for doing well at. On the day, it was fairly gusty below 5000’ with winds in the region of 25-35kts, so the continuous descent was a little more challenging, so as not to level fly at 3000’ over the city to intercept the glide, and of course throttling up in the process! I was pleased with my CDA, as we were spot on the glide on localiser intercept I think. However, in hindsight this was perhaps even more fortuitous, as had we throttled up and the fuel flows had increased, this could well have caused an earlier rollback; this time at 3000’ over London city! Of course being clean we would have glided much further... anyway, I’ve lived through all these scenarios ever since in my dreams, day and night! Anyway, enough of the ‘ifs’....:confused:

On the BA38 approach at approx 1200’, I was PH and at this height the throttles danced around a gust with the usual trend arrow throwing up about a 10kt surge in speed. I mentioned this to John, and said something like “that wasn’t me, it’s the a/t doing there thing”... meaning they’re reacting as usual to the gusts. Then I added, “It might be a good idea to keep the a/p in a bit longer than usual until the wind dies down across the terminal”...”Good idea” came his reply. SA shared and understood.

At about 800’ John took control and said “I have control”...”You have control”, I added.

Between the rollbacks John shared with me his problem with the throttles (splitting at this point), but then as the left engine suffered it’s rollback, the throttles married up again, so would appear normal for a while.... until at 430’ ish, we knew the required power was not being delivered.

“Pete I can’t get any power” from John, “It looks like a double eng failure” from Conor. I was looking at the eng instruments , and , yes it looks like double eng failure but isn’t. The Insts were blank but the demand line was at max. No warnings...that’s very odd, I thought.

I then elected to leave John in control... because he was a competent pilot and could carry on whilst I used the available resourses and managed the situation.

I first of all went for the continuous ignition (I’m sure I said “**** it’s a roller”... but never heard it on the CVR) but of course being RR there wasn’t one!! So I turned the switch to ‘start’ anyway seeing as my hand was there. I scanned the fuel panel to check the pumps were still on. Continuing down the panel I checked the fuel gauges ... still over 5 tonnes in each wing, pretty much balanced. Back to the throttles, again pushing them forward manually, they were firewalled. Checked the speed brake lever wasn’t out. Checked the fuel switches were running. Checked the fire handles were down.

As I was pushing down on the fire handles, “Airspeed Low” master caution....nasty sound! :ooh: And the first audible warning that was heard in the flight deck. I sternly said “Airspeed Low” in my best attention grabbing voice, looking over at John he was concentrating hard and was in control. We were on the G/S and the speed had naturally dropped back. The descent rate started to increase and was at 1800 fpm. Looking out the window, we were heading for Hatton Cross and the r/w was flying up the screen! I needed to reduce the drag, as easy as that, otherwise we were all toast. I changed the flaps.

John was in and out of the stick shaker, perfect, he was still controlling the a/c well, and I could see we might actually clear the road. Plane sorted, path sorted (as best I could) and now the people? It was 200’.... I won’t do a “brace”, the passengers are sitting happy and relaxed. Kegworth flashed through my thoughts and the amount of limb breaks produced by bad bracing of the passengers. I’ll do a Mayday to look after them... I might not be able to after we crash, who knows?

That’s roughly how it went... SFLY; but lots lots more thinking in between; but if I wrote it all, it would be quite a bit of my book ! Not that I’d be expecting you to want to read it.

None of us heard the warnings after “Airspeed Low”... the GPWS or the A/P disconnect; it was an intense period of the flight and we didn’t hear ‘useless’ warnings that we knew were non-actionable. I remember wanting to do a g/a instinctively at Airspeed low!! :hmm:

I’m actually pleased the a/p stayed in until it did; it helped to get us as far as we did I think. Boeing didn’t get further from that point doing anything else. I said before, if I’d known we’d not get power back, I’d have selected lower flap sooner, at 500’ I think we’d have greased it on . I love hindsight and now knowing what a rollback is!

I believe that a pilot handling with his hands on the control column is in control, a/p in or not, as long as the a/c is doing what the pilot wants it to be doing. If it doesn’t, do something about it, using a/p or not! John was in control of the a/c and when it wasn’t doing what he felt comfortable with he did something about it. I have no problems with John’s actions that day. I had half a glance at the picture every now and again and was happy with it (you know what I mean) but would have said something to him if I hadn’t been.

Basically this is what a lot of the other posts have said this afternoon, but I’ve added some frilly bits! :ok:

Info for 'Suninmyeyes'... I can't post any links about it (cos that would be advertising) but the book's hopefully out in approx 6-8 weeks? As we are having to self publish, as no publisher wanted it, it will be sold mostly through my website (again can't 'URL' it here cos of adverts) but some of you might have found it? I'll have to buy the books upfront, and am thinking of about 500. I've got a few requests off my site, so I'm guesstimating ;)

[Mr Optimistic]

just roughly.

[Mmmayday38]

We definitely want it below £10. We think it could be around the £9 mark.

The manuscript is with the publishers now and they could only give us a rough idea for how much it costs to print a 5x8 book with 73000 words, paperback, approx 20 b+w photos. Until they have prepared a full layout they cannot say for definite how much per book to print, so until that point we don't have a definite cost but a ball park figure.

This book was written for our sons to give them a factual account of why their little lives have changed so drastically. I am sure when they are old enough to want to know, we would have been a bit hazy on events. We are not wanting to make a huge profit and would love to make enough to cover out costs.

We didn't want to put a huge mark up on this as some people will be interested in the aviation part and not much else, others will be interested in all of it. Either way if people are wanting to buy a copy then we are honoured that you could be that interested.

[RatherBeFlying]

Hey Mods!

Would it be possible to freebie an ad for PB's book -- or make a deal for each copy sold via PPRuNe?

[ABO944]

Well, I shall be buying a copy !

Congrats on a job well done my good man :ok: Don't listen to the old women on here, they're only jelous ;)

[captplaystation]

If it sells a few million I'll be looking for a cut if you quote from my "posts", well , jeez I am Scottish. ;)

Cheers, well done for everything, keep your spirits right up there & good luck wherever you end up flying next, but for chrissake never say " at my last airline" := :D

[mary meagher]

P.B. I've done 2 books self publishing. The hard part for me is selling the books, believe me, you will have no trouble with that at all. A lot of people will want to read your story, so if I were you don't underestimate demand.
And a tenner a book usually works well, be sure and cover your costs.

The detail on your recent post that most amused me was "the runway was flying up the screen!" When my dear departed husband was flying an early solo in his K-8 at the age of 65, we watched in horror as he just barely managed to hop over the hedge. Said he, " I was told that I was undershooting if the reference point was moving up the canopy.....EVERYTHING was moving up the canopy......!"

If you'd like any help with the book, PM...

Mary

[BossEyed]

What is obvious from the last couple of day's posts that not only is Captain Burkill a consummate professional*, he's also a complete gentleman. :ok:

...but I’ve added some frilly bits! :ok:

Haven't you, just. :D Thank you, Peter.

I'm yet another punter for the book - no question.




*As are SFO Coward, FO Magenis, the ATCO (whose name I've failed to Google - sorry), Heathrow RFFS, AAIB and, clearly, many others.

[Bill G Kerr]

Anyone know how 'the poor bloke with the gear in his leg' is faring?

[infrequentflyer789]

Even then, they cannot have been sure that they would not get the power back. There is no big red flag that pops out and says ‘sorry chaps, that’s it for today.’ So it was entirely reasonable to continue to follow the ILS glidescope, whether assisted by the autopilot or not. There is no suggestion in the report that the PF was not monitoring the approach with hands on the yoke.

Entirely agreed. Also worth noting (from section 1 of the report):

Some 34 seconds before touchdown, at 430 ft agl, the commander announced that the approach was stable, to which the co-pilot responded “just”. Seven seconds later, the co-pilot noticed that the airspeed was reducing below the expected approach speed of 135 kt.

The comment I've put in italics appears (to me) to confirm that PF was indeed still following the glideslope well below 600ft, whether (as you say) assisted by autopilot or not. He knows there's a thrust problem and that PNF is troubleshooting.

According to the report it's not until about 7secs later (300ft ?) that speed drops below Vref, and even then PF is probably still thinking/hoping thrust will kick in any second now...

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Guys.

The reason we discuss stuff like this on pprune is that it is informative.

Plainly, due to this accident, peeps have learned that pulling the flaps in will, in certain circumstances, get them nearer to where they're going.

No bad thing.:ok:

Hopefully they have also learned that if you lose all your thrust on final, like FR did at Rome, the a/c will stall in unless you take the autopilot off.

No bad thing.:ok:

Pprune is many things. But it's not a 'love in'.

NO shame at all to the crew, but a 777 is a 777.

And £160m is just that.

As someone above posted. Fly the aircraft. Yourself.

[Stanley Eevil]

though 1.03 and 1.02 epr were noted. The engines continued to run

Peter, the EPR data is interesting. On my ac type we fly N2 RPM as the main power parameter on our approaches. Typically, with flap 45 and engines spooled up this would typically be 83 - 84 % N2.
What would have been a `normal` spooled up EPR value for the B777 at 750` AGL? In other words, in percentage terms, how much thrust was `missing`?

[Flightmech]

Stanley Eevil,

Interesting you use N2? Assuming you are flying a type with hi-bypass fan engines, you use a parameter for a section of the engine that produces around only 20% of total thrust? I assumed most operators use N1 for a GE or EPR for a PW/RR? Obviously not. You learn something every day on here.

[N2NB9H]

Page 139 of the final report:
Actions of the co-pilot

The co-pilot initially believed he had disconnected the autopilot at the intended height on the approach in order to carry out a manual landing on Runway 27L. However, as the aircraft descended through 600 ft he became aware of a problem with the engines, indicated by a split in the thrust lever positions. It is likely that, in attempting to understand the sudden and unprecedented problem with which he was presented he was distracted and thus omitted to disconnect the autopilot at this point.

Engine power had now reduced to a level at which the aircraft was losing airspeed and it started to descend below the glideslope. As the autopilot had remained engaged it attempted to maintain the ILS glide path by increasing the aircraft’s pitch attitude. This led to a further gradual reduction of airspeed, the initial ‘airspeed low’ master caution and the eventual triggering of the stall warning stick shaker. It was at this stage the co-pilot promptly pushed the control column forward, leading to the disconnect of the autopilot. However, the aircraft was now only 150 ft above the ground
Boeing Non-Normal Situation Guidelines for automated approach monitoring, issued March 2009 (not mentioned in the AAIB report):
• NON-NORMAL RECOGNITION:
o The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and
precisely.
• MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL:
o It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane.
• ANALYZE THE SITUATION:
o Any further action should only be initiated after the malfunctioning
system has been positively identified.

[VR-HFX]

Peter

Send Adrian Swire and Rod Eddington a copy of the book with a note. :ok:

If you need their addresses, PM me.

All the best and look forward to seeing you out this way.

Turn a deaf ear to the naysayers, you have been closer than any of us to the edge and proved that line guys can get the job done.

There is no way I would have taken the a/c off the F/O in a situation like yours either, unless I was working for an outfit that puts 500hr people in the RHS.

Good luck .. you and Sully are in the same class.

BTW, where can I buy 10 copies?

[elgnin]

It looks like the order for 500 copies might be on the lean side........

[d71146]

I will be buying a copy as well.

[Mr Optimistic]

...shall hunt down your web site

[Bill G Kerr]

Me too!
Where can it be ordered?

[arem]

me too- BTW I flew with your father on 707's a looong time ago - how is he, is he still around?

[maliyahsdad2]

For the book try Peters website = his name dot com or google it.

[juniour jetset]

I look forward to reading you book too Peter. I'm sure your book will be a "laster" and through the years will sell consistently as it is the type of book most aviators and some other curious folk will be very interested in. After all, you will forever be etched in Aviation History and held in such high regard.

Also, it is the kind of book that all aspiring/new pilots coming into the aviation world wil want to read.

I'm sure most Libraries around the country would also want to stock it.

Sales may take time to gather pace, but I'd be surprised if it didn't sell well into the thousands. Aviation disaters are a global subject/interest and all English speaking countries for starters are potential markets.

Further out, next christmas should be a great time for ramping up Sales. There are alot of retired pilots, ex Military guys, aviation enthusiasts that would love getting your book as a gift.

In the world of the internet and very quick word of mouth and easy global courrier services, good things can surely happen for your book.

I take note though, that you have written this book for your Children first and foremost.

Best of luck with everything,
JJ

[DozyWannabe]

Regarding all this back-and-forth about autopilot and having control, let me see if I've got this straight:

- AP was engaged on approach, FO was PF from 800' onwards
- Due to worsening situation, FO did not explicitly disconnect the AP - entirely forgiveable in the circumstances
- FO had hands on the yoke at all times and as soon as the AOA looked iffy provided corrective action

So, the PF was hands-on-yoke, monitoring AOA and providing corrective action, which sounds pretty "in control" to me. Far more importantly, the AAIB considered he was in control and his captain also considered he was in control. At the end of the day that's all that should matter - anything else is just nitpicking to the level of those complaining that Sullenberger and Skiles didn't hit the "ditch" button, even though the structural damage rendered the effectiveness moot.

Great result, and what a thoroughly good bloke to boot.

[Mmmayday38]

Bill G Kerr:
Anyone know how 'the poor bloke with the gear in his leg' is faring?

Yes, I've tracked him down. He's made of Australian stuff, and he's OK. :D

[ABO944]

Peter ...

After the accident, what happened with all the pax / you and your crew ?

Did they open the survivors reception centre you hear about, by old stand C18 ?

Well done again !

[TIMA9X]

You see, Peter even cares enough to track down an injured PAX, as an Aussie myself I am sure he would appreciate the thought. V Australia have 777's I am sure that the Aussies would love to have Peter as a 777 Captain fly the Pacific for them.
Come on Aussie come on!

Good one Pete!

Tima9x

[Mmmayday38]

TIMA9X
V Australia have 777's I am sure that the Aussies would love to have Peter as a 777 Captain fly the Pacific for them.
Come on Aussie come on!


Yep, application in and talking to the CEO; also being helped by another pruner not too far away on this thread. :ok:

[Desk Jockey]

I spent quite a few Hatton Cross restaurant breakfasts at the engineering base wondering why they built that brick shed that took off the u/c just where they did. I guess if I had said anything at the time no one would have listened to a 16 year old engineering apprentice. I'd like to see areas before the threshold reserved and clear.
Looking forward to the book Pete! Hopefully one day you will feel like giving a talk about your experiences with an audience of friends...

Posted in memory of KL who sadly died recently after a very long struggle, an engineer at BA who I had the great privilege of working with.

[bearfoil]

Not all that long ago a Captain lost an engine over the Midwestern US, (one of three). Fortunately an additional Captain was aboard, and between the three crew, the star crossed DC-10 crashed short of Sioux City, but on the airport. Many died. Acclaimed a hero, Captain Haynes humbly said, "too many died.....so many". He went on to retirement and travelled widely, speaking to many many people as the hero he was.

Without available power, Captain Burkill and F/O Coward brought a two hundred ton glider safely to rest at the threshold of his cleared r/w.

One person was badly hurt, has recovered, and the rest are safe and sound. Both equipment failures (another thread), with dedicated crew and quick thinking action.

Captain Haynes had some time to plan his controlled crash, Captain Burkill had forty seconds, with his F/O at the controls when things went quiet.

I can understand a few in the flying community picking nits about 038, but I am astonished that Captain Burkill isn't enjoying the same attention and plaudits as Haynes in the public arena. I am drawing a blank here; both heavies were even BLUE for goodness' sake. Sully had far longer to set up.

:D

bear

[captplaystation]

I agree entirely, I think there has also been a distinct lack of appreciation of the pilotage shown by my erstwhile colleague in Ryanair, who sucessfully (except once again from an insurers viewpoint ) converted a single engined go-around he was handed by his colleague , into a deadstick landing on a not terribly long runway.
Well done Fred :ok: Glider pilots Eh ?

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Playstation,

Thank goodness the 'good' engine chucked it more or less straight away..............otherwise?

Land the f$cker!:ok:

[infrequentflyer789]

Not all that long ago a Captain lost an engine over the Midwestern US, (one of three).
[...]
Captain Haynes had some time to plan his controlled crash,


Come on, be fair all round. Haynes didn't just lose one engine of three, the shrapnel took out all his hydraulics to boot. He didn't make a "controlled" crash - he had no control surfaces. That they made it back to anywhere near an airport, let alone a runway, is amazing. I fully expect that Haynes would have traded all his engines for working control surfaces on that day.

[just to be clear, none of the foregoing is intended to diminish the achievements of BA38 crew].

[captplaystation]

Ken (if I may foreshorten you ;) )
Lots more to say on that one me old mucker, I understand that cojo, who was PF ,said "go around flap 15" or such-like, entirely correct as regards Boeing /RYR after an eng failure on app (although I believe that both would allow that in a time /height limited situation a landing would be an acceptable alternative)

I believe the Capt possibly thought " Oh Alfred Hitchcock" (or something ryhming with) & would have possibly taken the opportunity to put the thing on the ground given the impressive flying display nature had afforded him.
However, by this stage our steely young chap in the RHS had done all the good stuff & skyward they went.
No doubt one could analyse the cost/benefit of the energy they gained by pushing TOGA & launching skyward followed by sudden silence & the need to aggresively change to an attitude required for a no-engine landing fairly far down the RW vs a slightly more forward thinking " Oh Sh1t" that was a LOT of birdies , one is gone , maybe better to land , approach.

All I will offer here, is my profound thanks that the "live" engine didn't function for an additional 10 seconds or so more . . . that would NOT have been helpful.
As always, some hindsight employed here, but I feel, had I been PIC , that G/A call may have been responded to INSTANTLY with " I HAVE CONTROL", followed by a landing, but then again, I am now guilty of what I accused you of on the BA038 thread, who knows EH? Good weekend me man :ok:


P.S , I didn't at any stage mention that the copilot was Dutch, and that his dad was on here instantly shaying how good he did, did I ? ? :D

[crippen]

Count me in for a book. As a simple SLF, I think I would pick 'Peter':ok: as my crew if the same thing were to happen to any plane I was flying in.

[fdr]

Dear M'day38,

Please print sufficient copies on your 1st run to allow for me to purchase 2 x copy please.

In the 35 seconds or so from recognition of any abnormality to impact, you and your crew performed commendably. The action taken in this hectic period was remarkable. The raising of the flaps to F25 in that time frame is quite amazing, and the benefit is identifiable; BA-038 missed a lot of frangible and non frangible objects that would not have otherwise been the case. The trade off of F30 v F25 is highly dependent on the energy transfer available, and on analysis, you guys did the right thing.

In all honesty, I think BA and the BA-038 passengers and crew could not have asked for a better performance than was demonstrated on the day. I remain thankful that my 777's (PW's & GE's) apparently weren't susceptible to the same anomaly.

The problem facing your flight and the timing of the event is fortunately rare, so much so that it is not even in general terms trained by any civil organisation I am aware of, so you and your crews actions stand as an example of the ability of the human to adapt and react in a time of critical stress and uncertainty, where heuristic based solutions are not readily forthcoming due to the nature of the abnormality (see refs).

With respect to S.F.L.Y. and similar viewpoints on this forum, your responses have been refreshing and thankfully tolerant. Given the process you have had to endure since the event, tolerance is an attribute that could be reasonably seen as being diminished, yet that is not the case. Your actions stand in the full light of day, and do not cast any shadow of doubt on the performance of the crew.

If any criticism is felt to be forthcoming from this open forum, be assured that such views only reinforce the fact that the event you experienced was remarkable, and that the remarkable outcome stands in mute testament to the crew's performance.

"Character is like a tree and reputation like it's shadow. the shadow is what we think of it; the tree is the real thing".

Abraham Lincoln (1805 -1865), Lincoln's Own stories



Cheers,

FDR
Warm Springs

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[DERG]

"I remain thankful that my 777's (PW's & GE's) apparently weren't susceptible to the same anomaly."

lets wait and see...

[sky9]

There is a common thread between this accident and other earlier ones and that is the lack of awareness in the cockpit of what is happening with the largest flight control on the aircraft.

On Boeing 75,76 and 77 aircraft the control column and rudder pedals show you what is happening to all the flying controls except the stabiliser that goes on it own merry way with the only indication a small green indicator out of the pilot's field of view.

When flying the classic 737 I always found that the clanking of the stab trim wheel was a good indication of something happening when the autopilot was engaged that might need my attention, whether it was a minor jet upset or lack of power on the approach. When I converted onto the 767 the ability of the stab-trim to wind on loads of stabiliser without any obvious indication to the crew was, I thought a retrograde step.

This isn't the first time that a proper stab trim wheel would have alerted the crew to a problem (still engaged A/P and falling AS) and increased their awareness of the situation.


It is a shame that Mr P A Sleight & Mr R D G Carter didn't add another Safety Recommendation to the Accident Report: Bring back the Stab trim wheel to increase aircrew awareness of what is happening with the Stab Trim during all phases of flight.
They might also have added another. Double engine failure on finals:...........G/A flaps. We could call it the PB recall item. Well done mate, it wasn't just you that was able to speak to your wife afterwards.

[TIMA9X]

By FDR In the 35 seconds or so from recognition of any abnormality to impact, you and your crew performed commendably. The action taken in this hectic period was remarkable. The raising of the flaps to F25 in that time frame is quite amazing, and the benefit is identifiable; BA-038 missed a lot of frangible and non frangible objects that would not have otherwise been the case. The trade off of F30 v F25 is highly dependent on the energy transfer available, and on analysis, you guys did the right thing.

Your posts are always a pleasure to read, I was looking forward to hearing from you and your views on this matter.

sky9When flying the classic 737 I always found that the clanking of the stab trim wheel was a good indication of something happening when the autopilot was engaged that might need my attention, whether it was a minor jet upset or lack of power on the approach. When I converted onto the 767 the ability of the stab-trim to wind on loads of stabiliser without any obvious indication to the crew was, I thought a retrograde step.


Another fantastic point of view which I relate to, and certainly got me thinking!

Thanks for the input guys nice to get some positive informative points, just "great insight for guys like me."

Cheers
timA9x

[captplaystation]

I agree, the trim clanking round on the 737 is a valuable cue. . . . but, it didn't seem to be noticed by the Turkish crew, or indeed the Thomson crew in BOH :rolleyes:

[N2NB9H]

but, it didn't seem to be noticed by the Turkish crew, or indeed the Thomson crew in BOH :rolleyes:

I thought that we shouldn't make any comparison with these incidents/accidents :oh:

The Turkish auto-throttle induced accident resulted in the following Boeing guidelines for non-normal situations:
NON-NORMAL RECOGNITION:
o The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and
precisely.
• MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL:
o It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane.
• ANALYZE THE SITUATION:
o Any further action should only be initiated after the malfunctioning
system has been positively identified.

Link: Flight Crew Monitoring During Automatic Flight (http://rcoco.com/sdoc/data/pdfs//plane/boeing/B737/misc/Flight_Crew_Monitoring_During_Automatic_Flight.pdf)

It also says:
Early intervention prevents unsatisfactory airplane performance or a degraded flight path.When the automatic systems as described above do not perform as expected, the PF should reduce the level of automation to ensure proper control of the airplane is maintained.

The application of these recommendations also prevents trim induced issues. AT and AP are quite interdependent systems and the second one will definitely be affected by issues related to the first one.

Keeping one system without the other can be tricky.

[holteboy]

Wonder if anyone has tracked down the character who climbed back up the escape chute to get his personal effects ?

OK - I'll be benevolent - shock !

[BoeingMEL]

..My log-book shows that it's almost 25 years since I flew a 733... but I always believed that that saw-bench stab-trim wheel spinning by my right thigh was one of the most reliable flight-status/aircraft-configuration indicators on-board.

I'm happy to join those rooting for Pete... he's a thoroughly decent and modest professional. Australia tho?... C'mon Pete..who else is going to share my CabSauv? Cheers bm :ok:

[Baron rouge]

In your long answer to SFLY #3038, you said:

I believe that a pilot handling with his hands on the control column is in control, a/p in or not, as long as the a/c is doing what the pilot wants it to be doing. If it doesn’t, do something about it, using a/p or not! John was in control of the a/c and when it wasn’t doing what he felt comfortable with he did something about it. I have no problems with John’s actions that day. I had half a glance at the picture every now and again and was happy with it (you know what I mean) but would have said something to him if I hadn’t been.

Would you agree then, that as a crew, you deliberately chose, having noticed the reduction in airspeed, to keep the A/C on the glide slope inducing the inevitable drop on the wrong side of the drag curve, and a big big increase in drag.

You were perfectly aware that your A/C needed less drag, hence the flaps reduction, but your copilot let the speed decay to stick shaker speed, this is neither coherent nor safe for a pilot flying a then glider.

But in the end he was right as everybody walked out from that landing.

[sky9]

Baron rouge,

I think you are being a little unfair, the crew were placed in unfamiliar territory with only about a 5 sec window to do anything that would have allowed the aircraft to reach the runway and no help from previous experience other than the experience of knowing what happens to an aircraft with idle thrust and full flap. In my view the only thing they could have done was immediately bring the flaps up to G/A flap to reduce drag, otherwise there but by the grace of God go I.

As I wrote before the elimination of the stab trim wheel in Boeing aircraft (and the total lack of flight control feed back and throttle movement in Airbus aircraft) was a retrograde step as it makes monitoring an aircraft totally dependent on visual clues.

[barit1]

I've oft been known to stick my foot in my mouth - and this is no exception:

Assuming (we all know what that means) that one has a choice of speeds at which to touch down off-runway, would you not prefer to do so in a minimum energy state, rather than at Vref? In other words (to quote my father, a WWII F/I) run out of airspeed and altitude at the same time?

Granted - there is a technique to doing so, best practiced more than a few times on the aircraft in question.

Purely hypothetical, no flames please.

[Baron rouge]

Barit 1, You are right, this is called flare the A/C, and if done correctly you touch wheels just above stalling speed and as in the case of Ba 038 when you have full HYD power you can even use full flaps just before touching down;)

[barit1]

Of course it's called the flare. I was just being a mite academic.

And I suppose a tailstrike would be the least of your worries.

Thanks for the confirmation, anyway, BR.

[MathFox]

I think that finding an area that allows for a smooth shedding of landing energy also is of importance to keep damage to passengers, crew and plane down. Touching down in the safety zone of a runway, avoiding major obstacles (or picking a nice, obstacle free stretch of water, like Sully did), helps to keep injuries down.

[Heidhurtin]

I'm not a pilot by any stretch of the imagination (barely able to control a car ;)) so I'm not qualified to comment on the technical matters here. I've been in the British Army for 28 years though, and am familiar with situations which are unexpected, sudden, require an immediate decision with rapid assimilation of data, would have catastrophic consequences if made wrongly and have many dependant souls. In such circumstances a combination of training and experience kick into play very quickly, and it's this combination that gives one confidence and allows one to think outside the (SOP) box if required. I'm gratified that, in this button-pushing age, some pilots still have the "gut knowledge" to take the correct action. (I know this debate continues elsewhere and although I have an opinion, I don't really want to get involved so please be gentle).

My real point though is this - Capt B sir, if you managed to get through those 30-odd seconds without uttering a single expletive, then you are, truly, a better man than I. :D

Cap doffed

[RatherBeFlying]

Decreasing the flaps from 30 to 25 got the a/c an extra 50 m. which avoided hitting the ILS (localiser) antenna array.

There have been suggestions that go-around flaps instead of 25 could have obtained a better result and doubtless simulator trials could establish whether that would have helped or not.

In the abbreviated time available to the crew, any such results were not available.

There is a conflict between obtaining good enough and the best possible. The danger in trying to improve upon good enough in a limited information context is that you might go too far. It's well known that every decrease in flaps increases stall speed, but less well known is that flap retraction can call for lowering the nose to regain the correct speed -- the ground can get in the way of that as the experience with flapped gliders has shown.

Alaska Airlines Flight 261 is instructive in this context. The crew had regained control from loss of stabiliser control and began to vary the flaps. The initial selection of slats and flaps had fortuitously worked well, but retraction put the a/c into a degrading control situation as the already heavily stressed jackscrew gave way.

In BA's case the crew wisely restrained themselves from explorations better confined to a simulator once a good enough result had been assured.

[Dave Gittins]

As has been explained most precisely, eloquently and at great length by the man himself, Capt B, (try post 2964) even Boeing's best in the sim trying every possibility couldn't improve on the distance that 30 reduced to 25 gave.

[Baron rouge]

Dear DAVE Gittings

Do you really believe that ?

Do you think an A/C flying at VSS, on the wrong side of the drag curve, could land as far as one flying at VREF and using the surplus energy to flare and make a controled landing?

You have a poor opinion about our American friends.

[Dont Hang Up]

Do you think an A/C flying at VSS, on the wrong side of the drag curve, could land as far as one flying at VREF and using the surplus energy to flare and make a controled landing?


Looks like we're going round the argument yet again.

Isn't the point that they were already on the back of the drag curve by the time it became clear they were landing with little or no power? Trying to retrieve Vref from there would surely result in the ground getting in the way.

Theoretical conjecture about what may have been achieved by a crew in full readiness for double engine failure at 600ft seems pointless.

[infrequentflyer789]

Dear DAVE Gittings

Do you really believe that ?

Do you think an A/C flying at VSS, on the wrong side of the drag curve, could land as far as one flying at VREF and using the surplus energy to flare and make a controled landing?


So, do you believe that Capt B lied on this forum - because that is what you seem to be implying ?

The results might be counterintuitive, and there might be interesting reasons why no one got further, but to simply deny that the results were as stated (because you find them odd) is a serious accusation.

[TIMA9X]

By Don't Hang Up Looks like we're going round the argument yet again.
I have to agree!:ugh:

The report is out, this thread has been over and over this sort of stuff to the point it just does not matter anymore, or just plain meaningless!

There have been too many current pilots with a lot of combined commercial flying hours flying the heavies who have praised the crew for their actions. If Boeing could not simulate a better result then why are people at this point of the thread still banging on about the same old stuff!

The 777 is roughly 270 tons and I am convinced the crew did the right thing by raising the flaps back to 25 (pretty quick thinking don't you think considering the time they had) probably a major factor that got the AC over the fence and those ILS antennas etc. This crew did know the feel of 777 when it goes against what it is usually supposed to be doing, and got the thing down with no power and with no deaths. Can't we give them some credit for this instead of returning the thread to all the what if's! IT'S LIKE SAYING THE CREW DID NOT KNOW THE DIABOLICAL SITUATION THEY WERE IN ( A FEW SECONDS TO FIGURE IT ALL OUT) ON APPROACH TO LHR R27L THEIR HOME BASE!

Blythy it makes sense to have as little flaps as possible puts it well. In this case it is really that simple!

[EBMissfit]

Lets put this one to bed - The decision to go to flaps 25 was the right one - and got them further than staying at 30 would have done. Pete himself said had he realised earlier that the power wasn't coming back he would have gone earlier and possibly to 20. What SFLY & others are arguing and what PB would probably agree with is that if at the very moment the second engine rolled back, they had configured to 20 and pitced for best glide, they may have got further, possibly even to the rwy. What they are ignoring is that this could only happen if you were expecting that. People also keep talking as if they "lost" the engines. The engines were producing thrust above flight idle the whole way - there would be none of the usual indications of an engine out - no bells, whisltes, flashing lights screaming at you that you had an engine out situation. As it is in very short order (within 30 seconds of the first rollback) they had identified that something was wrong at they were down on thrust. Within 30 seconds of that they had reconfigured the plane at got it as for as possible in that timeframe.

[Baron rouge]

We have yet to read any official information about Boeing simulator trials on this case, but my little finger tells me that certain Airline 777 captains, flying speed instead of glide slope managed to grease it just on the runway or slightly before with a much better controlled rate of descent.

Nobody is lying here, maybe some information is a tad incomplete.

Great job from the Captain thinking about reducing the flaps setting, but is it wrong to question why, as aware as he was, thirty seconds before touch down, of decaying speed, why he elected to let his copilot fly the glide slope to VSS.

[Knackered Nigel]

Baron Rouge,

What other options to following a 3 degree glide 30 seconds out over London with little power from the engines, were there?

Shallow the path, the speed decays even more quickly, increase rate of descent and you end up in Hatton Cross.

I take it you are not familiar with the LHR 27L undershoot.

Why am I bothering to reply to your post anyway.....:ugh:

Is this really a Professional Pilots Forum? It seems to be armchair assassination of supposed colleagues. I despair and will now flounce off here for a while..:rolleyes:

[atakacs]

Just to clarify something I might have missed reading the report and the 3000+ messages here (yes): there is a clear understanding that flap 25 vs 30 was beneficial. Is there any further official analysis (be it manufacturer, AAIB, etc) of what could have been achieved in those circumstances ?

I'm also somewhat surprised by the little mention in this discussion of what I believe to be the main factor in the relative benign consequences of this accident, namely luck...

[atakacs]

i'm staggered at the comments regarding what 'could' have been done. This crew did bloody well, and the flight simulator and light aircraft pilots should perhaps keep their ignorance to themselves.

Again given the circumstances (completely unexpected - and to be frank still unexplained - failure, very little time to react, no specific training) I would say that the outcome was the result of sheer luck. In my view the flap reduction was mostly instinctive (good call btw) and they where spectators of a once in a lifetime event. Don’t think anyone could fault them with anything but on the other hand I don’t see exceptional airmanship either. At best job well done – it’s a sad testimony of the state of the industry if this deserve such high praise.

I respectfully have some concerns about the apparent taboo discussing actual facts and figures – if available – about what was the best possible outcome. If nothing else this might be helpful should this unlikely black swan show it’s ugly head again…

[Landroger]

And while the big boys squabble about the unarguable, the elephant in the living room is being ignored. For the most part and with a few, notable exceptions, the discussion as to why two, high bypass fan jets with enviable reliability records, mounted in the same world class aeroplane with an enviable safety record, suddenly decided not play in BA038's garden - probably. :eek:

Roger. (Puzzled of south London)

[atakacs]

For the most part and with a few, notable exceptions, the discussion as to why two, high bypass fan jets with enviable reliability records, mounted in the same world class aeroplane with an enviable safety record, suddenly decided not play in BA038's garden - probably

good point. I'm afraid this will stay a mystery for the foreseeable future :(

[Flatspin_Fumble]

Barbiesboyfriend,

you presented your case very well, and for what it's worth, I think you are spot on with your comments, but what do I know
:sad: - not a lot some would say, but I assure you a lot more than most.

I am surprised you have not made a contribution to the Cabin Crew Forum regarding the BA Ballot, but perhaps like me, you feel there is no point. Their union's cause is wasted. Their case has no substance and is complete and utter tosh. I have not met one single member of the travelling First and Clubworld public, who has any sympathy, whatsoever. It will be interesting to see what next week brings.

[bearfoil]

Landroger

You are not alone. "Wait for the Final Report". Ad Nauseum. My reply then, as now, WHY? "We'll just snip off these little tubes a little shorter, right, then, done. Oh, and if they roll back (THEY, mind), throttle up, better still, throttle up every once in a while just to keep the oil hot so's to melt the mystery away in the name of safety. In other words, the fix we ordered doesn't (may not) work as advertised when it is critical, like, when the oil is cool in descent or high cruise." The identified (Boeing) problem for the Trent, the lack of spill (!) and the lack of any heating or cavitation bypass isn't important enough, and it certainly isn't the Fuel. How could it be the Fuel? All that's ordered (?) is some "research". "Simultaneous binary engine failure in ETOPS?" IMPOSSIBLE. Except for the two times it's happened?

LASHUP.

bear, not impressed

[woodpecker]

Shallow the path, the speed decays even more quickly, increase rate of descent and you end up in Hatton Cross.

Knackered Nigel, I think you have got it totally wrong. Personally having flown into LHR for 35 years, the last 6 on the B777, I feel if they had thrown the glidepath away and held onto the speed there is now way they would have got any where near Hatton Cross. They would have had the speed, all be it with a high rate of descent, to complete the flare but would it have been on a level surface? Most certainly not!

[infrequentflyer789]

"Simultaneous binary engine failure in ETOPS?" IMPOSSIBLE. Except for the two times it's happened?


Three, recently, that I can think of (discounting those who went in for gliding practice by runing out of fuel).

BA38, and two birdies (Sully and FR at Rome - either of those could have gone very wrong had captain not taken charge and taken unconventional decisions, breaking SOPs etc.). Have I missed any ?

Note that N862DA rolled back like BA38, but only one engine. It was not "simultaneous binary engine failure".

To me, the birds are the bigger problem.
We know the exact cause (have the smoking gun / remains)
Incidents not type specific (bird or plane).
Larger number of (dual engine loss in twin) incidents
BA38 rollbacks have a recovery procedure (if you have the height) - wheras the best engineer in the world isn't going to get sully's engines going again.
BA38 rollback could occur anywhere (N862DA at cruise) - birdies are most likely when you are low in critical flight phaseThere's an engineering improvement (I won't say "fix" since there is only a probable cause not a proven, or reproducible, one to test against) for BA38 - engineered to make the plubming more robust to ice/slush blockage.

Where's the fix / improvement for the birds ? <deafening silence>
Is there even any research been recommened (like for BA38) ?
Doesn't anyone find that (more) worrying ?

[xcxpx]

I think it was great work by both Peter and John, saved a lot of lives that day...

[lomapaseo]

Where's the fix / improvement for the birds ? <deafening silence>
Is there even any research been recommened (like for BA38) ?
Doesn't anyone find that (more) worrying ?

The recommendations haven't been published yet.

Just what did you have in mind?

something practical I trust.

It's a little bit like designing over-run areas at the ends of runways ... just how far beyond the airport property should they extend?

How needed are they compared to other places to put your research effort like pilot training, enhanced ground proximity systems, etec. etc.

[Mmmayday38]

xcxpx;

I notice you've been an observer Pprune for a while now, and I appreciate your first post.
:ok:

[Brian Abraham]

Have only been dipping in and out of this thread so not aware if this has been noted. Came across it accidentally while looking for other info. Seems like a lot of water called out in (c). Interesting how this after all these years of turbine high altitude operations an apparent curve ball brings an aircraft undone. BZ Peter, John and crew.

FAR § 25.951 General.

(a) Each fuel system must be constructed and arranged to ensure a flow of fuel at a rate and pressure established for proper engine and auxiliary power unit functioning under each likely operating condition, including any maneuver for which certification is requested and during which the engine or auxiliary power unit is permitted to be in operation.

(b) Each fuel system must be arranged so that any air which is introduced into the system will not result in—

(1) Power interruption for more than 20 seconds for reciprocating engines; or

(2) Flameout for turbine engines.

(c) Each fuel system for a turbine engine must be capable of sustained operation throughout its flow and pressure range with fuel initially saturated with water at 80 °F and having 0.75cc of free water per gallon added and cooled to the most critical condition for icing likely to be encountered in operation.

(d) Each fuel system for a turbine engine powered airplane must meet the applicable fuel venting requirements of part 34 of this chapter.

[MATELO]

Again given the circumstances (completely unexpected - and to be frank still unexplained - failure, very little time to react, no specific training) I would say that the outcome was the result of sheer luck. In my view the flap reduction was mostly instinctive (good call btw) and they where spectators of a once in a lifetime event. Don’t think anyone could fault them with anything but on the other hand I don’t see exceptional airmanship either. At best job well done – it’s a sad testimony of the state of the industry if this deserve such high praise.

I respectfully have some concerns about the apparent taboo discussing actual facts and figures – if available – about what was the best possible outcome. If nothing else this might be helpful should this unlikely black swan show it’s ugly head again…

So, you reckon it was luck, but still compliment the crew on their "instinctive" reactions?? Is that really luck or years of experience making a good call.

Also, yes a job well done worthy of such high praise, if according to you there was little time to react and no specific training.

Cant have it both ways:=

[atakacs]

Also, yes a job well done worthy of such high praise, if according to you there was little time to react and no specific training.

Well I guess nobody can claim that luck wasn't the biggest factor on that day. Everybody involved was extremely fortunate to walk off this one.

In my book there is a difference between a job well done and sheer brilliance. At this stage I don't see any evidence of the latter but I would be the first to change my mind should I come across any hard evidence.

[Global Warrior]

Every passenger on board that plane had a ticket stating the destination was LHR. The boys in the front got them to LHR!!! Awesome job. Well done.

GW

[MathFox]

Every passenger on board that plane had a ticket stating the destination was LHR. The boys in the front got them to LHR!!! Awesome job. Well done.
Yeah, let's blame BAA for not providing busses quick enough so that passengers could connect to their scheduled flights. :) And for the late luggage delivery!

[Whiskey Papa]

It's funny isn't it? The more you train and the more experience you accumulate, the luckier you get!


WP

[TIMA9X]

by atakacs
In my book there is a difference between a job well done and sheer brilliance. At this stage I don't see any evidence of the latter but I would be the first to change my mind should I come across any hard evidence.I don't know what book you are reading, but with respect you are rather harsh with your post and possibly setting the standard a little too high.
In Ba 038's case are you implying you could do it better? If so what would you have done to make it "sheer brilliance."

Hell what have I done, I have started the flap settings guys, the when the AP should have been switched off guys, the angle of attack guys, and the why did PB let the FO keep flying the AC salivating! I don't know how many times on this thread all of this kind of stuff has been discussed, even by the PIC himself.

Many pilots with thousands of hours flying the heavies have deserted this thread because I am sure they are simply fed up with this rather repetitive style of posts.

I will always maintain that what they did in the time they had was "sheer brilliance." We are down to the low depths of semantics between the words "sheer brilliance" and "a job well done," for me it is all the same, everyone survived that day! Can't we just leave it, and possibly look at some other interesting threads which still don't have answers? PpruNe is full of them.

Again atakacs I write this with my understanding of the word respect.
Tima9x

[Global Warrior]

Well im not sure the BAA are negligent for that.......... more for not building a remote stand at the threshold of of 27L as a result of recent airport expansion. I think the DOT's involvement in placing Hatton Cross Tube Station where they have is highly contentious and its typical in situations like this that something as innocuous as an ILS antenna is vying for publicity. Im sure the most famous ILS antenna on the planet is currently in talks with Max Clifford to sell its side of the Story.

[M.Mouse]

atakacs makes plain, simple and unemotional statements and immediately gets shot down in flames.

He was asked what he would have done. The point is there was not much could be done given the time and circumstances. Raising the flaps gained 50 metres. It is claimed that Boeing test pilots could do no better but I have seen no details of what they tried and what they achieved. The main contentious issue is the AP being allowed to fly the aircraft to the point of stall before the aircraft hit the ground with insufficient energy remaining to arrest the high rate of descent.

So apart from instinctively raising the flaps with no other ideas or options was there not a great element of luck involved in the outcome?

The accident has, on the face of it, had a detrimental effect on Peter's whole life. It could well have been me in his place having flown that aircraft only a few months previously. I have no idea how I would have reacted no more than anybody else truly knows although we can all imagine how we would want to have reacted having thought about it for 24 months.

Having no real options, no real time and raising the flaps from F30 to F25 in my mind reaffirms my belief that he (Peter) was an experienced and competent captain faced with an unprecedented situation who also had a healthy dollop of luck when he most needed it. Luck that the undercarriage broke off and absorbed so much energy, luck that there was a large grass undershoot, luck that the aircraft on its belly in the soft ground rapidly decelerated, luck that the aircraft hit nothing, luck it stopped before the hard surface, luck that no fire ensued.

[SiriusTheDogStar]

:suspect:

"Where's the fix / improvement for the birds ? <deafening silence>
Is there even any research been recommened (like for BA38) ?
Doesn't anyone find that (more) worrying ?"

There are some eloquent master pieces of prose on this subject on this web site and occasionally the odd fling with applied science.

Well YES Infrequentflyer I agree.

It turns out that the academics these days no longer publish UNLESS the sponsor has filed a patent claim.

FAO Pprune moderators: please have the courtesy to inform me if you don't agree with my posts.:suspect:

[Joetom]

I know it's a long thread, but need to remember.

A non-normal event on approach, power was ok but less than required, crew had very limited information, aircraft/eicas/cockpit indications were not clear as to problem.

Crew made some very very quick decisions with limited information, they appear to have ended the flight in good shape.

Appears to me this crew did a good job on that day, appears this event will save others.

Max Resepect to all crew and pax on that flight, you saved many others.....

[p51guy]

If this situation ever happens again what would have going full flaps right as they were about to hit the ground have done? Just wondering if it would have broke the descent rate.

[TIMA9X]

M.Mouseatakacs makes plain, simple and unemotional statements and immediately gets shot down in flames.

He was asked what he would have done. The point is there was not much could be done given the time and circumstances. Raising the flaps gained 50 metres. It is claimed that Boeing test pilots could do no better but I have seen no details of what they tried and what they achieved. The main contentious issue is the AP being allowed to fly the aircraft to the point of stall before the aircraft hit the ground with insufficient energy remaining to arrest the high rate of descent.

So apart from instinctively raising the flaps with no other ideas or options was there not a great element of luck involved in the outcome?

The accident has, on the face of it, had a detrimental effect on Peter's whole life.Just great words and from a pilot who flies the same AC type.
Sorry if you felt that I was emotional, it was not intended to come out like this, (it's hard to read into peoples feelings on threads such as this) but atakacs previously made some pretty good points in his posts, it was the last post I just did not understand in the context of his other ones. In all survival accidents there is always an element of luck, some in the high degree category and some in the low degree category. Sully said himself that he was lucky that day the Hudson was flat and calm, it can be a pretty windy rough patch of water more days than not. My post was not just aimed at atakacs but others as well. My reasons are;

1. Since the BA038 incident the British press never left the issue alone, in many cases quoting almost directly from Pprune, sometimes skewing the reasons for the incident towards the crew, it must have been hell at times for Peter and John!

2. Probably the same reason as you, the incident did change Peter and his families lives. I am sure this will be well explained in his book.

3. Every comment (some just plain stupid) from people who tend to cloud the pilot handling issues of that day may contribute the Peter finding it hard to get a new job! I know from many PM's I have exchanged with pilots who know Peter well worry about this issue.


By landrogerAnd while the big boys squabble about the unarguable, the elephant in the living room is being ignored. For the most part and with a few, notable exceptions, the discussion as to why two, high bypass fan jets with enviable reliability records, mounted in the same world class aeroplane with an enviable safety record, suddenly decided not play in BA038's garden - probably. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/eek.gifFor me one of the best posts for a long time since PB wrote his long informative post after the report came out. The report has not convinced me RR and Boeing have explained enough about their findings, but this has nothing to do with the way PBs crew as pilots handled the situation which they were faced with that day! (as M.MOUSE explained so well in his post.) For me there are two issues that have emerged now,

1.The great handling of the situation the crew were faced with, ending in a great result considering BA038 was an unprecedented situation for all well trained pilots.
2. The murky technical issues neither RR or Boeing have explained to my satisfaction possibly pointing to hidden commercial pressures of some kind.
3. May be it is time to split the thread on these two issues.

Finally,

p51guyIf this situation ever happens again what would have going full flaps right as they were about to hit the ground have done? Just wondering if it would have broke the descent rate.A good question, but a question of timing, Trippe 7 flap movements take time, so it is my view with all the chaos going on in the cockpit even if the crew decided to go F25 (which they did) then somewhere in the diminishing seconds they had left, go to the full flap settings again is a timing issue that probably would not have changed the outcome too much, only my point view, would be interested in M.Mouse's point of view.

[sky9]

I would have thought that both RR and Boeing have a lot to thank the crew for.

You would have the that RR would have taken them down to Goodwood and asked them what colour they would like. The reputation of RR was saved by the crew that day.

I wonder if they did get a thank you.

[lomapaseo]

I would have thought that both RR and Boeing have a lot to thank the crew for.

You would have the that RR would have taken them down to Goodwood and asked them what colour they would like. The reputation of RR was saved by the crew that day.

I wonder if they did get a thank you.


The engine behaved as designed and specified. No need for a thanks.

There is an interface issue between the design of the engine and the design of the aircraft which is being attended to by the airplane design regulator through research.

All the issues here are mostly chance and pilot skill. Whether it's extraordinary skill or average pilot skill is in the eye of the beholder. I suspect that based on the lessons learned so far that most of the like equipment pilots reading this thread will do as well

[Joetom]

A previous posting asks if selecting more flap just before contact may have been better.

History shows us that vertical and forward speeds plus pitch and roll and gear and flaps config were on the numbers in this event.

We can talk around the houses as to "what ifs" and "buts" however we can't change the outcome of this event, a super result, Max respect to crew and pax.

[Mr Optimistic]

Given the uncertainties over the mechanics of the build up to failure, no reason to suppose it couldn't have happened 30 seconds earlier. The crew must have nightmares about that.

[captplaystation]

Don't think it would have made so much difference. It was the demand for "more" thrust , and lack of response to that demand, that alerted them to the problem.

If, as the PIC has said, he hadn't flown a half-decent CDA however, well, whoops, additional thrust would have been required earlier, probably over a populated bit of W London.

You can imagine the rest, I would rather not.

[regularpassenger]

Just in response to the posts on previous page...questioning what they would have done.

Speaking as SLF of course...

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but given this had never happened before, they could not have known what was causing the failure to command thrust, and they had only seconds to react I think they did a damn good job. An outstanding sign of airmanship is surely the ability to fly the aircraft primarily when its all going t*ts up around you. They did that even if it was with autopilot or whatever.

I'd be happy for both of them to be sat at the front of any aircraft I'm on any day of the week. In my humble opinion they are a credit to your profession.


RP

[CONF iture]

If, as the PIC has said, he hadn't flown a half-decent CDA however, well, whoops, additional thrust would have been required earlier, probably over a populated bit of W London.
You can imagine the rest, I would rather not.
Then it's more like a Gimli / Terceira scenario, but with some little thrust available and full hydraulic. All about managing the drag out at the right time to reach but not overfly the 12000 feet runway ... I believe the crew would have loved that challenge compared to what they had to face.

[atakacs]

Then it's more like a Gimli / Terceira scenario, but with some little thrust available and full hydraulic. All about managing the drag out at the right time to reach but not overfly the 12000 feet runway ... I believe the crew would have loved that challenge compared to what they had to face.
In any case I would find an actual study of glide performances - and subsequent recommendations as of how to best manage it most interesting. Be it bird strike, fuel leak or incomprehensible ice creation there have been a non negligible count of cases where a modern airliner had to glide. As far as I can tell these are so far considered exotic circumstances and not trained in sim or even mentioned in performance charts. It might be worth (re)visiting.

[PJ2]

atakacs;
In any case I would find an actual study of glide performances - and subsequent recommendations as of how to best manage it most interesting. Be it bird strike, fuel leak or incomprehensible ice creation there have been a non negligible count of cases where a modern airliner had to glide. As far as I can tell these are so far considered exotic circumstances and not trained in sim or even mentioned in performance charts. It might be worth (re)visiting.
Perhaps. We might first acknowledge the data already available on the PFD's of most later glass airplanes; the best L/D ratio is presented on the PFD in the Airbus A320/A330/A340 (and I suspect the A380) series as "Green dot" speed. I am unsure if there is such a presentation for the B777, (My manual doesn't seem to indicate any). Unless it's changed the B767 does not have such an indication. So some types provide the crew with immediate best lift-drag speed information.

This information would be for an undamaged, clean (uncontaminated) wing with different slat-flap configurations but not with landing gear extended or partial slats/flaps (abnormal config).

The Gimli crew relied upon timing their rate of descent (by timing how long it took to loose 1000ft) as there is no IVSI in the standby group. They then used radar distance to the drag strip to judge the rate of descent. The aircraft was kept intentionally slightly high and when they knew they could make the strip, the captain side-slipped the aircraft just like a Piper Cub.

Not sure how the Azores A330 was flown as I'm not sure the data is available in any report, (anyone?). The A330 fuel leak trouble-shooting procedures were changed after that incident.

What needs revisiting perhaps is what caused the requirement to glide in the first place and I think the Gimli and Azores incidents have been addressed. I know the SAS MD80 accident was a dead-stick but can't recall the details. The DC9 in Florida was dual engine damage if I recall - not much to be done there except the usual caution regarding staying away from thunderstorms. Other than the present incident and the Pinnacle RJ which suffered core-lock after the engines flamed out at 410, (crew messing with the airplane on a non-rev flight - both killed), what other dual engine failures have we seen?

[p51guy]

I agree, the crew did a perfect job of reconfiguring to a cleaner approach configuration and added 50 meters to their impact point. The last three second flap addition would only possibly help the flair lowering the stall speed and increasing lift. Adding them before the flair would have been detrimental. If they didn't get all the way to full maybe what ever they got would help some. Since nobody trains for this situation because it never happens now that it happened why not put ourselves in their position and think of the alternatives available?

[lomapaseo]

I know the SAS MD80 accident was a dead-stick but can't recall the details. The DC9 in Florida was dual engine damage if I recall - not much to be done there except the usual caution regarding staying away from thunderstorms. Other than the present incident and the Pinnacle RJ which suffered core-lock after the engines flamed out at 410, (crew messing with the airplane on a non-rev flight - both killed), what other dual engine failures have we seen?

I don't mean to be pedanic here and only hope to continue contributing possible facts for whatever discussion points folks want to make.

The DC9 you mention I suspect was SO242 in Georgia and it could have been landed if the crew had known about the closest airstrip.

Then there was the Avanca B707 near JFK .that almost landed except for rising terrain and trees.

There was The Ethiopian B737 in Bar har dar. That was landed in a swamp off airport but caught a ditch on the skid out.

The SAS MD80 was pretty much a controled landing save for some tree tops, at least they missed the large rock in the field.

The Tacca B737 on a levey

And the Austrian F100 in a snow covered field.

I have no message myself, so pick and choose from these survivable accidents yourselves to make a point.

None of the above were ETOPs operations and engine reliability had nothing to do with them. They all involved being overwhelmed with common cause problems , birds, rain-hail-ice, or fuel starvation.

[PJ2]

Thank you, lomapaseo; I knew there were more but am focussed on other things at the moment. cheers, - PJ2

[fotoguzzi]

Four engines, no fuel.

[Green-dot]

lomapaseo wrote:

And the Austrian F100 in a snow covered field.

None of the above were ETOPs operations and engine reliability had nothing to do with them. They all involved being overwhelmed with common cause problems , birds, rain-hail-ice, or fuel starvation.

Correction. It was an Austrian F70 that landed in a snow covered field. Although the long flight duration in moderate icing in connection with low engine thrust was a factor, the main cause was that the bonded joints of the ice impact panels of both engine cases failed. The ice impact panels detached, due to poor bonding, and became trapped in front of the outlet guide vanes of the low pressure compressor. This affected the airflow in the by-pass duct in such a way that the engines produced little thrust.

With regards to the BA038 incident, hats off to Peter Burkill and his crew. 30 seconds to impact with no time to reconsider the choices made, to me indicates they made the right choices and all aboard survived. All other options discussed remain theory.

Just as many others, I am interested in Peter's upcoming book and will certainly buy a copy.


Regards,

Green-dot

[captplaystation]

PJ2, to the list add Ryanair in Ciampino (birdies) & 2 or, was it 3 ? 737 classics a few years back who lost both in heavy rain/hail.
1 restarted & resulted in new underwear (UK? ) the other (Indonesia? ) ended up in a field. The third (? ) was the Taca refered to by a previous poster methinks. Normally :rolleyes: CFM solved that one with new procedures & higher flight idle speeds . . . but .

[Landroger]

I'm not sure if this is relevant, but didn't a BA 742 have all four donks choked by pumice dust from a volcano in Jakarta? In the eighties? I accept that actual total loss of thrust was not the whole period of the incident and may thus disqualify it from the terms of this discussion. I believe the engines where shut down or flamed out of their own accord, one at a time until there were none. Then, after huge effort on the part of the crew and the fact that the aeroplane had flown out of the plume, engines were restarted one by one.

From memory, the incident happened at FL370 and they got one engine - the one they shut down at the beginning of the incident - restarted at around 12,000 which slowed the descent to about 300ft/min.

Digressing only slightly to the engines themselves, this incident demonstrated, to me at least, just how bomb proof modern High Bypass Fan jets are. I recall seeing photographs of one of those engines after partial tear down and the damage from accreated pumice was massive.

Anyway, I offer all four engines out - BA??? 747 198x?

Roger.

[Green-dot]

Anyway, I offer all four engines out - BA??? 747 198x?



BA009, 747-236B G-BDXH 'City of Edinburgh' June 24, 1982.

The aircraft was at 13,500 ft when the first engine, engine No. 4, burst back to life. Towards 12,000ft the second engine, engine No. 3 restarted. Soon after engines No, 1 and No. 2 relit.



Green-dot

[Chronus]

The most unfortunate elements common to this and the Concorde crash is that they both nearly made it to a runway. Perhaps looking back at history we may find that systems such as JATO and RATO, necessitated by the lack of technology two manufacture large by pass fan jet engines producing huge power, were effective in assisting heavy metal off the ground. Why such a concept cannot be applied to modern aircraft design. Had these been available I am sure the BA crew would not have had the desperate need to look for assistance from the APU and the AF Concorde would have had that small but crucial burst of energy to give them a fighting chance to make it to Le Bourget. I think in these days of two powerplants and ETOPS, manufacturers ought perhaps consider some form of emergency power back up system that may provide a short but vital source of energy when all else has failed.

[CONF iture]

Not sure how the Azores A330 was flown as I'm not sure the data is available in any report
Only data from the radar. Early in the process, they had the runway lights in sight. They crossed the extended runway center line, 8 NM final at 13000 feet, so opted for a kind of 360 degrees turn but were still 8000 feet 9 NM final. The only drag available was one set of slats and the landing gear. Not sure about that, but I think they opted for aggressive S turns to dissipate energy. The target speed was 170 knots but had still an extra 30 over the threshold.

A movie on its way …

[atakacs]

We might first acknowledge the data already available on the PFD's of most later glass airplanes; the best L/D ratio is presented on the PFD in the Airbus A320/A330/A340 (and I suspect the A380) series as "Green dot" speed.

Most interesting

This information would be for an undamaged, clean (uncontaminated) wing with different slat-flap configurations but not with landing gear extended or partial slats/flaps (abnormal config).

I guess would not be much of an effort to integrate those factors... Good to know anyway :)

[PJ2]

atakacs;
I guess would not be much of an effort to integrate those factors...
The calculation of best L/D speed would be done from standard formulae using specific engineering data regarding the wing, power plant performance data, air data, weight, CofG, etc and presentation is a matter of design and/or convention as glass presentations developed. The basis for the construction of performance tables would be taken out of the books and into the FMGC for real-time presentation on the primary flight displays - that's the 10,000ft, (perhaps 100,000ft!) view.

By way of explanation in re integrating abnormal configurations into speed presentations for crew information with an apology for the return to FMGC (Flight Management Guidance Computer) basics and the thread diversion for a moment, the notion of "prediction" is necessarily based upon known performance quantities such as speed/altitude/rate-of-descent-pilot-entered speed/altitude contraints and so on, - in short, the energy level of the airplane as affected by known configuration changes and the required altitude and/or speed constraints at pilot-entered or FMGC-database waypoints. Because these other quantities are known, FMGC predictions include fuel usage/fuel remaining and ETAs over programmed waypoints as well as at destination and alternate.

Such predictions work extremely well when all is normal. At present and to my knowledge, (the B787 may do so), such information as may be available now, does not take into account the following:

- extended landing gear
- abnormal slat or flap configuration
- engine out
- contaminated wing
- aircraft damage, such as loss of a winglet, etc

The moment an abnormality occurs which affects lift/drag, FMGC predictions regarding times, fuel usage, the achievment of altitude and/or speed constraints etc, are all unreliable and as the FMGC manual states, must not be used. That is when the crew must go back to the books or the QRH.

Bear in mind that this is complex stuff and there will be exceptions/subtleties which we can delve into but which won't change this basis understanding a great deal. I ask others to leap in here if there is something missed, however.

Abnormal slat/flap configurations or extended landing gear will, depending upon configuration, more than double fuel flow and as such, all fuel, time, altitude and speed predictions are lost - rather, they assume a "normal" airplane. This would include the presentation of the best L/D speed so in abnormal circumstances, one returns to the books.

I am guessing when I say that such predictions are certainly possible but computer constraints, (memory, calculating power, cost), actual testing and then certification of same may be part of the constraints in creating new designs which present this kind of data to the crew. There would certainly be a cost-benefit analysis and given that such events are rare, it is probably better to go to the books.

FMGC information, like automation itself, it is tempting to believe all the time what the FMGC is telling the crew but in fact even the FCOM/AOM tells the crew that the FMGC is a guide and not THE performance indicator. The only tool that the crew should rely upon is the official flight plan which is (and must be) the most accurate information for prediction even though it is not in real time. In fact, data in real-time can be very misleading and should be taken in context of the entire flight.

Sorry for the thread-walk.

PJ2

[bearfoil]

PJ2

No disagreement here, only a philosophical muse relative to the topic you bring to the fore. Appreciating how dynamic and challenging flight can be, I see a trend toward solutions that involve further refinement of problems not solved by automation, but instead caused by them. Reliability is the fulcrum of any solution to an aerodynamic challenge.

Historically, extremely odd and cataclysmic events have shown up to shake the confidence one develops in systems in a lifetime of relying upon them. In BA038, we see one of these (actually two). I deplore the fascination with the flight crew's responses to these two simultaneous events. Their handling was superb, by any measure.

We are left with equipment failure, and evidently having a second engine is not enough. Who'd have predicted dual failure of these two powerplants in simultaneous fashion?

Delta survived a similar (?) occurrence, though the failure happened at altitude, affording a human solution to an engineering (?) problem. At some point, and to the relief of most of us, I would say, a better understanding of systems and piloting relating to how the two work together is needed.

447? Who needs an old fashioned horizon when there are three computers? Pitots? BA038? Who can entertain the "maybe" relative to thrust loss further away from the runway? Was Delta lucky in recovering the one instead of losing the second? As safe as it is, I don't believe stuffing the computer with solutions to oddball scenarios is the way to go. I'd say the pilot part of the process is just fine. What of the mechanical?

[misd-agin]

More deadsticks,

DL 767 that shutdown the engines departing LAX. Restart worked. :eek:

DC-9 diverting from SXM to STX.

'Dead idle stall issues on 757's'. Yes, the engines were still running be they just increased the plane's glide ratio.

Gimbli(sp?) glider. Air Canada 767.

SAS MD-80 with FOD onto frozen lake.

MD-80 with dual compressor stalls, unrecoverable, after takeoff.

A310 enroute from Turkey(?) to N. Germany. Unable to retract gear...deadsticked in Salzburg(?). Believe the fuel gauges, not the FMC computations!

[misd-agin]

Best dual engine failure best glides speeds SWAGS(Scientific, Wild *ss Guesses)

757/767 - Vref 30 + 90

737 - Vref 15 + 60

Perfect? No. Sometimes 'good enough' is just right until you get the checklist(if you have time).

[J52]

I was told at that time the saving grace for the BA crew was that the engines were RR (triple spool) and if they had been US manufacturers then probably not restartable under any circumstances due to pumice damage.
Anyone else heard this?

Pumice is really nasty stuff, saw a military plane sand blasted to bare metal after a young pilot wanted to find out what it would be like to fly through a plume from one of NZ'zzzzz volcanoes.

[Sir Richard]

KLM's Volcanic incident near Anchorage a few years later (Nearly new 744) certainly didn't have RR engines...they landed with a few of them running after multiple flameouts...:8

KLM 867, 15/12/1989

[lomapaseo]

I was told at that time the saving grace for the BA crew was that the engines were RR (triple spool) and if they had been US manufacturers then probably not restartable under any circumstances due to pumice damage.
Anyone else heard this?


There are a lot of old wifs tales being told arround ... all of them just speculation.

restarting is mostly a case of setting the right air speed and altitude conditions. Acceling the engine above idle is another thing. There is no such thing as "rugged" when it comes to fine ash sticking to stuff in the hot section.

You're surely not going to hear bragging from the engine manufacturers about running into volcanic ash any more than encountering birds, rain and hail.

[bearfoil]

Each Trent 8 selected for the 777 instead of GE saves 2200 pounds. Together, that is 4400 pounds. Weight is everything, where did it go?
Draw one's own conclusions.

bear

[barit1]

Sir Richard

The KLM 747 at ANC report is NTSB ANC90FA020 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X29893&key=1). I can lend a bit of insight - the volcanic ash ingestion eroded the compressor, and upon passing through the burner, melted into glass droplets that tended to "plate" the nozzle guide vanes of the HP turbine. The combination of these two effects robbed the stall (surge) margin of the HP compressor system, and compressor stalls occurred. Some engines flamed out.

The shock cooling from the flameout caused crazing/cracking of the glass coating on the NGV's, and some of the glass flaked off and exited the tailpipe.

This had the effect of restoring some of the stall margin, and it was possible to restart all engines after that.

This effect has been observed on other engines, notably in test bench ops subjected to dust- or sandstorms. I have little doubt this was the scenario in the BA 747 case.

[clivewatson]

Best dual engine failure best glides speeds SWAGS(Scientific, Wild *ss Guesses)

757/767 - Vref 30 + 90

737 - Vref 15 + 60

Perfect? No. Sometimes 'good enough' is just right until you get the checklist(if you have time).Do we really need to guess when in a hurry?

From the very beginning of flight training "airspeed" is drummed into us, so perhaps we should be forgiven for having developed into a breed that seems to place so much emphasis on this one data input that is absolutely meaningless when considered on its own. We use reams of charts presenting us with PA, OAT and Weights to determine "speeds" that in reality correspond to an "angle of attack," the value of which is displayed on what I am sure is one of the least used and least understood instruments on a flight deck. As I don't fly either the 777 or A320, I have no idea if they are even fitted with an AOA indicator, but I'll bet few posters have received the benefit of much, if any, instruction on the use of this valuable little dial. I certainly hadn't, until I was fortunate to meet an instructor who knew more than a little bit about how the AOA indicator could help me. For a given aircraft type (and config) the AOA indicator will guide one swiftly to fly at the correct corresponding "speed" for a variety of flight regimes, irrespective of the WAT. Vref and V2 are perhaps the easiest examples to quote as we all know the values to look for; and further the configs are of no relavence (for these two examples). Similarly, in crusing flight (gear and flaps retracted), if one knows the angle of attack values for a given aircraft, calculations are of secondary priority when "speeds" for drift down, holding and even more importantly best glide (for max range in still air) may be needed in a hurry. Even during more leisurely moments, when perhaps ATC might ask if we can make another 2000 feet up, this magic little dial can guide us to an answer in an instant. I am not suggesting for one moment that the BA777 crew should or could have done anything at all different to change the outcome, in fact I congratulate and admire them for doing exactly what they did, especially the flap reduction. Knowing any AOA values for the config they were in at the time, and with the height available would not, I suspect, have made any difference to the outcome.
I am however sure that the outcome of at least twoother major hull losses could have been prevented if the crew had been able to make use of an AOA indicator, if indeed fitted, to either the Birgenair 301that departed with blocked pitot tubes, or the Aero Peru 603 with taped up static vents. (both Boeing 757's).

[Smilin_Ed]

Clive, I've been thinking for sometime that I should jump in here and mention Angle of Attack. Glad you did. Flying the correct AoA allows you to forget about a whole host of things and simply concentrate on one. The U.S. Navy has been making aircraft carrier approaches using AoA for decades. They never have to worry about weight, temperature, or anything else. Just fly the specified AoA for the configuration (which usually is simply gear down and flaps full down) and you will be at the optimum approach speed. (That, by the way, is not necessarily the best glide speed.) These guys did a fantastic job of making the best out of a truly horrendous situation but we could give the next crew encountering such a situation some help by teaching them a bit about AoA (and providing an AoA indicator).

BTW, AoA at cruise speeds is not very useful. At cruise it's awfully hard to fly an accurate AoA since the faster you go the less AoA changes with speed changes.

[clivewatson]

Thanks Ed,

I agree that the AOA changes are of lesser magnitude in cruising flight, but similarly so are the "speed" spreads that the manuals would otherwise determine. If the AOA value (for a given type) is known, it is far more expedient to fly it first, then if one needs the comfort of a speed target, then by all means look up the equivalent.if time permits.

The point I was trying to convey (which I am sure you grasped) is that all "speeds" are those which result only when the correct angle of attack is achieved, and for just about anything you wish to do in a given type there is only one corresponding AOA to fly it at, irrespective of the WAT. Best rate, best angle, best glide, min sink, and a LOT more.

The trick here is to learn the AOA's for your type....and I suspect this will only come by ASKING those who are responsible for training on your type.

Incidentally, I recently had reason to conduct two test flights, one in a factory new aircraft, and one on an aircraft fresh out of maintenance. Both schedules included confirming the AOA indication at which the stick shaker and push triggered. In all configurations in both aircraft the events triggered within less than 1% of the manufacturer margins.Clearly it is an accurate indicator.

Its only limitations? It requires electrical power, and anti icing.
Industry limitations? We need to be taught how to make best use of it!

[Bis47]

If only things were that simple!

Aircraft performance is much more complex than simple aerodynamics theory.

Engine efficciency is an important element, and this one is a function of many intricate factors.
To start with, forget about thrust being in a direct, constant ratio to fuel flow ....
Then, give me please that unique AOA for best rate of climb with a jet ? ...:uhoh:

Wind is another important factor when it comes to flying best range, best angle of climb, best glide ...

When it comes to keeping a decent safety margin above stall, and especially when you don't have two big engines responding immediately to very sensitive sensors, wind gradiant, and gusts are then of prime importance as well ...

Up to now, I don't know of a single instrument, nor of a single computer program that would dispense a crew member of being a knowledgeable pilot.

Shame on the manufacturers for not puting emphasis on the kind of graph that is dispayed here (Page 148 of this thread (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/340666-ba038-b777-thread-148.html#post5502907))
Shame on the authorities for not making it mandatory.

[bearfoil]

"....and the rest of the flight was uneventful."

Aren't two running engines MEL? Right then.

[Max Angle]

The "rest of the flight" might well have been a return to land which was "uneventful".

[im1234]

PB's story is covered in one of the Sunday's here (http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2010/03/21/heathrow-s-hero-pilot-peter-burkill-is-on-the-dole-115875-22126308/)

[Hey Driver]

Shame, shame, shame, BA Tech Crew should be holding their heads low after allowing this to have happened.

Some solidarity around a colleague after a major incident or accident, would have been the decent thing to do.

Reserving judgement and quashing rumuor until the official findings are clear.

[Mmmayday38]

Wow IM1234 you were quick!

Also here (http://www.mailonsunday.co.uk/femail/article-1259477/At-times-I-feel-wife-children-better-Id-crashed-plane-died-.html)

And if you want the full unedited version it's here (http://peterburkill.com/blog.html)


I expect some people will find reason to slate me for doing this story but I hope that most will understand the position I am in and therefore tolerate my decisions.

[thegypsy]

Mmmayday38

See my post 26. I did warn you that you would regret leaving BA. You were not forced out but took voluntary redundancy.Harsh maybe but true.You should have had the courage of your convictions and remained at BA.

You were naive in the extreme in thinking you would get any other job yet alone on a B777 as only large well known airlines operate them and I take no pleasure in seeing that my predictions have come true.

Perhaps you should pay Pablo Mason a visit at his hotel in Leamington Spa and compare notes.

Best of luck still for the future.

[TWT]

It's not up to you judge anyone's decisions unless you 'have walked in their shoes'.You weren't there.

[thegypsy]

TWT If he chooses to air his washing in public then he must expect comments like mine.

[Banzai Eagle]

The Gypsy
Not only were you not "there", but you haven't had to put up with what happened afterwards. Least the Captain had the courage to walk away. On that basis alone I wish his luck changes

[captplaystation]

Peter,
Without knowing the "ambience" that you felt going to work I don't think it is fair that any of us pass judgement on your leaving decision, and I hope nobody would have the cheek to criticise any decision you make as regards contact with the press, finally we all need to eat.
With the benefit of hindsight it is all too easy to say that you should have secured some commitment from another company before taking the plunge, but it was your call on the day.
Perhaps too, the long term effects of this accident could also have manifested themselves in an ¡ncreased sensitivity to perceived criticism, but to be honest I think that is just touchy-feely BS, and you were merely hurt and piqued by the veneer of respect shown by some who knew cack all, that in reality cloaked back stabbing snipes at your professionalism.
Knowing you had done the right thing, whilst feeling at the same time "gagged", and even ,for chrissakes, not trusted, is indeed not a very healthy working environment.

All of us here (well the ones that count anyhow, I won't speak for a few "notable" exceptions) have admired your patient handling of sometimes inane criticism/probing into, your actions that day. It is only partially possible for us to imagine the frustration of having 30 very frantic unrehearsed seconds of your life replayed in slo-mo and subjected to conjecture by some who frankly appeared not to know their @rse from their elbow.

One unfortunate by product of your participation in this forum, and through TV interviews, your website and the book, is that you can be perceived by H.R. Dept's of various airlines as a "personality/celebrity".
I fully understand in the modern soundbite era how you have ended up in this situation, however, it remains a sad fact of life that most of the "human resources" types (and indeed CEO'S/ Chief Pilots ) do not want someone with a "personality" or even an "opinion" on their hands.
The old joke concerning how a line pilot would like his chief pilot to refer to him, when mentioned . . . " I would like him to say WHO ? " springs to mind here. :hmm:
Hopefully some company with a modicum of imagination will see beyond your unchosen "circumstances" and employ you as "Capt Any Bloke" in the near future.
You deserve no less, we are all rooting for you, I know however that doesn't change much ,as DFO'S/ C.P.'s don't conduct a straw poll before offering positions.
You have a great deal of admiration from, & the support of, your peer group, I hope that is at least a crumb of comfort, whilst you get your life sorted.
All the best :ok:

[Mmmayday38]

Maybe no-one physically forced me out of BA, however for the sake of my sanity,marriage and family I felt emotionally forced out. I have been approached since with ex-colleagues/friends questioning whether I was in the right frame of mind to make this decision but at the time it seemed the only thing possible. I had also been given an informal nod that I would have a job to go to and this appeared like an escape route.

You were the only person who ever voiced (and even then it was after I had already left - due to no fault of your own) the thought that other large airlines would refuse to take me based on the premise of the crash and publicity. No-one at BA, either management or union ever passed that thought or suggestion - when they knew I was thinking of leaving.

I have over 13,000 hours total on heavy jets all multi-crew
Almost 10,000 hours on 777 with over 3,500 hours as PIC
I hold a current ICAO ATPL
My english language is fluent
I am current - within 12 months
I have a valid medical

With the above qualifications I more than qualify for an interview with an airline recruiting for 777. I deserved an interview, yet as you have rightly pointed out NO interview came. So what would the reasoning behind that be?

***(obviously I've applied to other airlines with a lot smaller aircraft, I have not been surprised that I've not had an interview with them as I am not type-rated and there are more than enough type-rated pilots out there who deserve the job above me)***

Other pilots who have had crashes have been interviewed and succesfully became employed. So why is mine different?

The high profile nature of it and media attention around me?

Is this my fault? The immediate aftermath of the crash and media attention was invoked due to the company I was flying for and the airport we impacted into. This was not my fault. The AAIB have ruled it was not my fault. The AAIB have commended my actions.

Therefore 'thegypsy', should I assume that you are inferring that from my moment of impact on 17 Jan 2008, I had become unemployable to the rest of the airlines worldwide?

I remained silent until the final report was released. I had already been refused an interview by these various airlines BEFORE my website/BBC TV interview/mention of our book. Therefore, it goes back to the fact that airlines must have been put off by the publicity that surrounded the actual crash, not MY website etc.

I will make the future better for my family and I. As I say in my blog, there are times I get bitter but when those times happen I have to push them to one side. I cannot allow myself to wallow. It is sad and it isn't fair but as a family we will turn this around.

Sadly, 'thegypsy' your prediction has come true, and if anything, let this be a warning to unsuspecting future pilots who are unfortunate to be involved in a high profile incident.

[RatherBeFlying]

Peter,

You are by no means alone in making career decisions that months or years later, hindsight tells you that the premises for the decision, including declined opportunities because of misplaced loyalty to an employer that did not deserve it, were incorrect.

Your situation confers a black eye on the entire industry.

[Chris Scott]

Quote from captplaystation:
...it remains a sad fact of life that most of the "human resources" types (and indeed CEO'S/ Chief Pilots ) do not want someone with a "personality" or even an "opinion" on their hands.
The old joke concerning how a line pilot would like his chief pilot to refer to him, when mentioned . . . " I would like him to say WHO ? " springs to mind here.

Spot on. Without reference to any particular case, these guys are terrified that their part of the operation might be the subject of controversial scrutiny, possibly jeopardising their grip on a greasy pole.

It's a cliché to say that fleet managers, and their dwindling number of flight-crew assistants, have to spend too much time at their desks, but it means that their peer group – the people they need to ingratiate themselves with – now consists mainly of people who have no cockpit experience.

There was a time when CEOs and Chief Pilots were arguably too ready to heap praise on their pilots in the aftermath of an accident. There is now a culture that the line operation is a completely straightforward business, which should be 100% reliable. Today's fleet managers – themselves often relatively inexperienced in the line operation – may be guilty of tacitly accepting this illusion, in the interest of keeping on-side.

In the event of any incident – or even a costly delay – lengthy discussions will usually uncover some perceived error on the part of the crew, generally showing the captain to be fallible in some degree. It's a long time before he or she lives down the resulting stigma, even if any formal investigation absolves him/her of blame.

Administrators, on the other hand, seem to be relatively immune from the consequences of their errors, do not have to possess a licence, let alone a type rating, and are in a position to negotiate their pay when switching employer. Management pilots are less mobile in their employment, unless they have qualifications in other fields. With mortgages and pensions to protect, brave decisions are best avoided.

[speedbump59]

Peter,

Whether you are a "hero" pilot or not for your actions on BA038 I cannot judge. But sure as heck you are not at fault for the plane crash. 100% blameless is absolutely sure.

It is clear that the irrational fear of office bureaucrats has predjudiced them against them hiring you. A bit strange. Movie companies do their best to hire the biggest celebrities that they can find to attract attention to their films. I don't think Sully's fame was a negative thing for his airline. I would think your "celebrity" and "hero" status might be a bonus for some airlines.

Anyhow, my advice is to legally change your name and go find an undercover job for a few years flying for Air Siberia. Fair? No. But maybe better than the alternatives you may be facing at the moment.

pothole

[Global Warrior]

Actually

I would suggest keeping your name and maybe apply for a corporate operator. There are many good jobs available, even today and regardless of what the general public or your previous employer might think to the publicity, the CEO that understands his life is in the hands of the chaps (chapesses) up front will know, that when the chips were down, your actions brought about the best result of a bad situation. Thats the kind of stuff the boss wants to know we are all made of. Thankfully...... we never really get to let him know if his faith in us is misplaced or not.

If its something you want to consider and need help with...... PM me

[stylo4444]

I hope these leading airlines around the world take note of all this and one of them makes the wise decision of hiring Peter. A hero pilot who is more than deserving of an opportunity.

[Albert Driver]

Just an idle thought:

There was once another BA pilot who was also uncomfortable with the media attention given to his equally spectacular "incident".

After unsuccessfully trying to avoid the limelight he finally accepted the inevitable and concluded that he may as well become a media aviation "expert" where at least he could control the media comment on his own event and might just add a little informed comment to the complete nonsense poured out by journalists with every other new aviation incident. Maybe Peter could consider following Eric Moody.

Heaven knows there's a need for someone to interpret modern aviation to the idiots who call themselves Transport Correspondents these days.

[suninmyeyes]

Hey Driver,

You said


Shame, shame, shame, BA Tech Crew should be holding their heads low after allowing this to have happened.

Some solidarity around a colleague after a major incident or accident, would have been the decent thing to do.

Reserving judgement and quashing rumuor until the official findings are clear.


I think you will find that BA tech crew were proud of Pete's handling of the incident and have no criticism of him.

It was the cabin crew instructors that spread rumours that upset Pete.

I suspect a lot of the criticisms on this forum by people who were not there, not qualified on the 777 and not familiar with BA procedures probably upset him too.

Have you thought of reapplying to BA Pete? I'd be happy to see you reinstated in your original position and seniority. It would be a nice gesture from BA to make an exception for you.

[Jumpjim]

Pete, I said I didn't think you should go in Hong Kong and I stand by that.

There is an increasing groundswell of opinion in BA that you should come back to us, and those I've spoken to below you (Including myself) are MORE than happy to take a drop of one in seniority to welcome you back to the fold.

Have you thought about it? Maybe the mis-informed crew have thought better about their comments now the details are out.You, John and Connor did us all proud on that day.

Give it some thought...We'd really like you back!! :ok::ok::ok:

[CONF iture]

Jumpjim and suninmyeyes,
Your comments are first class, BRAVO !

[Ancient Observer]

I'm very surprised by the impact that the desert seems to have on Chief Pilots' and CEOs' judgment, and very possibly their integrity..

Why these guys in the sandpit have been less than completely honest with Peter is beyond me.

I know that one of the Chief Pilots regularly reads pprune. I wonder if he would care to defend his (apparent/alleged) er, very mixed messages, on here??

Maybe the ranting that some of the sandpit pilots do in the Middle East threads is accurate.

[A2QFI]

As an ex-military pilot, who has some knowledge of this incident but has not read the whole thread I can only say that such an event occuring in the Military would probably result in an early award of a Queen's Commendation for Valuable Services in the air, a lot of goodwill and kudos within the Service and perhaps a promotion.

[TIMA9X]

PB,
The media have always scared airline management, unless the story was favourable to the airline.

This whole BA038 story is a good example of of the diminishing support tech crews receive by airlines, supporting their staff until the final report is in public.

I think it is also fair to say, it is possible your situation was not as well handled by your company/media departments as it should have been or lets hope that the industry is reminded about the silent personal suffering tech crews may endure after been deemed "hero's" by the airline, the media and the public.

I trust that some B777 carriers could see the value in having you on board soon. It is now clear you did all you could to save that load of people that day and am sure the SLFs will board just as quickly knowing that PB was in the front left seat.

As a PB supporter on this thread along the bumpy ride of its contents, simply just want to say "wishing you all the best for the future."

[M.Mouse]

I trust that some B777 carriers could see the value in having you on board soon.

If you were an airline recruitment manager would you employ:

a) a well known name, associated with a nasty accident not of his making, who has his own website, has written a book (which the author has implied contains a few things which his former management will not like) and resigned from the accident company for reasons which remain unclear?

or

b) a qualified pilot with good references?

....just want to say "wishing you all the best for the future."

Most of us feel the same sentiment.

[doubledolphins]

But he "felt" he was forced out. Do I see a case of Constructive Dismissal" looming?

[Mmmayday38]

If you were an airline recruitment manager would you employ:

a) a well known name, associated with a nasty accident not of his making, who has his own website, has written a book (which the author has implied contains a few things which his former management will not like) and resigned from the accident company for reasons which remain unclear?

The book covers the crash and the aftermath. The reasons for leaving will therefore be clear. The book is factual and if the 'former management' do not like it, then hopefully they will learn from what happened and ensure no other pilot has to experience the same. The book can be seen as something to learn from and I hope that they will take something from it.

Therefore anything that may appear to be negative can be rectified by acknowledging there was a flaw in the system and finding ways to fix it. The clock cannot be turned back for me, but if 'former management' can see that things could be different then the book can be turned into a positive.

Refusals for interview came before there was a website, before there was talk of a book. Refusals for interview cannot be blamed on the site or book.

My name and incident were high profile - not my fault.


or

b) a qualified pilot with good references?

I am qualified on the 777 and BA would give me a reference so I definitely fall into catagory B!

[chris weston]

What say a campaign for a PB gong? MBE/OBE - you tell me.

I look at some of the showbiz names that get these and think "you must be kidding - or on Class A controlled "; now here's a chap who really has done something useful!

Yes I know, criteria.

And yes, I've bought a book.

CW

[737forever]

What is realy the reason that some airlines would not employ a pilot involved in a crash,even when invastgation give him credit for doing a good job.I have heard stories of doctor,s saying post traumatic stress can give flashback in a new emergency,but this is I belive a very inaccurate science.I strongly belive a pilot who is climbing on the horse again so soon after such an event as Mr Burkill did,will do it with growing confidence knowing he can handle an emergency.Most pilots never face a critical situation like this,and it is natural to think "How will I react if this or that happen?"
To Mr Burkill:Hope you will get a new job soon.If not succeding with a 777 job,could you consider another aircraft type?You have probably many typeratings which I off course know nothing about.I know that in Scandinavian there is no major different in pilot,s pay between an 737 driver or an A330 driver,but I am not sure how this is in the rest of the world between the different aircraft size,s
Anyway I wish you and you family a happy future,and hope I will be your passanger one day.

[Chief Brody]

Peter,

What I am about to say is said with the following in mind:

1. Nobody but you knows how you felt after returning to work - it must have been both trying and frustrating to say the very least what with the rumour mill in overdrive.

2. The 130,000 (less taxmans share) plus an implied nod with another carrier no doubt seemed very appealing especially given point 1.

3. The desire to put pen to paper and document your version must have been huge, especially since the company were so sluggish in stopping the rumour mill in its tracks - Robert Piche (Air Transat A330) and Bob Pearson (AC 767 Gimli Glider) have both done it.

That said (and understanding there was a time window element to the VR scheme), maybe it would have been more prudent to forego the VR golden handshake, instead secure in writing a place with another outfit no matter how long it took and leave after the standard three month notice period. At least that way you would still be doing the job you love, still have your family home etc etc.

That out of the way, you and your crews actions were beyond words.

Sir, I salute you.

CB

[RB311]

Peter,

I was driving home from having flown one sector this morning and was very moved by your story on Radio 5 Live. How you described the event and what happened was one of the most gripping pieces of radio I have ever heard.

I think what happened afterwards to you sums up a great deal about what aviation is like today.

Maybe the beancounters who run airlines these days realise that doing double entry book keeping will never turn up a situation where they might be lauded a hero and thus don't want someone to take the limelight away from them (However inadvertantly). Hence the constant down grading of aircrew's Ts and Cs and general status in society.

All I can say is that you did a fantastic job and i wish you and your family all the very best for the future.

[Two-Tone-Blue]

VERY late on this thread, may I just say as an ex-ATCO [military] I wish you the very best of luck for the future?

I have seen, from Local, too many people who did not achieve what you did. I have seen the smoking holes, and watched it happen whilst hitting the Crash bells far too often ... and had the traditional "drink on his Bar Book until midnight" because the Mess Bill will be written off. I don't want to think about counting how often, but having been there too often it's a difficult feeling.

You and your pax walked away. :ok:

God bless and good luck for your future.

[Oldlae]

I also heard your explanation on radio 5 live. As a Licensed Engineer, I applaud your actions, I am sure that you will find alternative employment in time.
Best Regards,

[Herc708]

Whilst in the sim, people parrot out the correct Mayday call with the correct info in the event of calamity - particularly engine fire on ground etc. It apears that for a variety of reasons, these calls are not made in the event of the real thing

When the BA RJ nose leg collapsed at LCY last year, all that came over the radio was a shrieked ladies voice stating '......This is an emergency!.....' - nothing more. In that case, the important info was the number of people on board and that they are stopping and evacuating on the runway or heading for a swim (which would have been very useful if it was about to happen) - it was blindingly (i.e. sparks in the dark) obvious that an emergency was underway. LCY had lots of turboprops with engines running within yards of the BA RJ - ready for the pax to walk into the props

Reading the book, a lot of emphasis is placed on the lack of this call. In the BA 777 case, it would not have made any difference. At LCY, with the BA RJ, it would have been vital if the BA RJ had been landing the other way (r/w 10) in reduced viz and heading into the water etc

I think the BA training could be imprpoved to cover this aspect and the AAIB report did not highlight this as a safey issue in either the BA 777 or BA RJ reports

[Me Myself]

Peter

As a 777 skipper ( AF ) I find your story very humbling. We can all be as cocky as we want, when fate makes the kind of call you had to handle, how many of us would come out blameless. I sure hope to God this never happens to me.

The kind of crap you apparently had to deal with withing your own airline is mind blowing and of course it is hard to put oneself in your shoes as to why you took such a decision. However, my woossy self tends to think I wouldn't have ventured out in the cold and certainly not with an " informal " promise from Emirates of all bean counters.
So, you made a bad decision. Should you be left out to dry for it ??? I think not and I strongly support the view you should be reinstated as a 777 Captain.
Had I known you then, I would never have told you other airlines were going to snatch your hand given the sour course your story had taken. Airlines hate publicity they cannot control. We learned it the hard way following the loss of 447.

One more question : what became of your relationship with your 2 copilots while you were considering leaving ? I take it that they stayed, didn't they ?
I've ordered your book and I am looking foward to a very informative read.
All the very best.

Me

[sunbird123]

Mayday calls have a use if you have the luxury of time to do something and receive help. If not as in this case a total waste of time,same for the ditching in the hudson,the ryanair birdsrikes in rome.Nothing would have changed if they spent the whole time broadcasting mayday.
A lot of companies over train in the use of mayday calls. Thinking time is more important than mayday calls.

[Me Myself]

What an intergalactical stupid thing to say.
The guys were trying to keep this aircraft flying with hundreds of fault messages on the screen trying to figure out what the hell is going on.
What is a mayday call going to achieve in the middle of the Atlantic where no one can help you.
Are you for real ?

[Basil]

1. Aviate
2. Navigate
3. Communicate

and if that doesn't work:

1. Protection
2. Location.
3. Water
4. Food
:}

Thought out in advance so we don't have to.

[Bizman]

Peter

I have just listened to your interview with Glenn Pew on AvWeb:
The Crash of BA038 (http://www.avweb.com/podcast/podcast/AudioPodcast_CaptainPeterBurkill_BritishAirways_HeathrowCras h_202246-1.html?kw=RelatedStory)

Two things struck me about your interview:
1. Your command decision to leave John as PF while you took command of the situation was outstanding, and clearly led to the next decision which saved a worse outcome.
2. Your command decision, devoid of any procedural or sim justification, to go F25 has been vindicated as resulting in a far better outcome than hitting the ILS antenna.

Your description of your 6 secs of aircraft checks that led to the decision to go F25 demonstrates true Command skill. You gave yourself thinking time from a broader perspective.

Reading that, my thoughts turned to AA965 on 20Dec1995; the B757 that hit terrain at night after a botched approach to Cali, Columbia. Although the FO, who was PF and equally as experienced on the B757 as the Capt, the report stated "Although the accident flightcrew articulated misgivings several times during the approach, neither pilot displayed the objectivity necessary to recognize that they had lost situation awareness and effective CRM."

Interpreted, this suggests the Capt failed to look at the whole situation and recognise the flight as having departed a whole set of criteria required to continue the approach. Once the GPWS sounded and the FO executed the escape manoeuvre, he appears not to have done what you did in scanning and ensuring the aircraft configuration was optimal. He missed the air brakes still being extended. The aircraft impacted 250 feet below the top of the ridge. As with the AAIB, the report could not speculate on the outcome had they been retracted in time, other than to say "Because the B-757 flight simulators could not be back driven during the tests, it could not be determined with precision whether the airplane would have missed the mountain/tree tops if the speedbrakes had been retracted during the escape attempt." We are all left to guess that outcome. It is one of multiple events during their approach where "if only if..."

And that "if only" comes back to the Captain exercising command overview, rather than getting buried in the operating mode.

Peter, I chose the AA965 example simply to illustrate that your command of BA38 that day was exemplary, and will be studied by pilots for years to come. Not necessarily for any heroics, or piloting skills, but for the subtle, professional, skilled SITUATIONAL MANAGEMENT you demonstrated.

Sir, I tip my hat to you, and wish you a productive, happy future, now that you have given yourself the opportunity to play a far larger and more important role than as "just another" Captain (not said with any disrespect).

Now you can pass on experience, perspective, and inspiration to many more people in a broader cross-section of skills development, and make a bigger (and deservedly more remunerative) contribution as a result. I am sure you will have new opportunities presented to you now ... having shifted your perspective from returning to airline Captaincy.

I have one question. Since that day, have you ever considered whether an alternate action could have been useful, i.e. after going F25, lowering the nose to gain speed, and then using ground effect to stretch the glide to the runway?

Sailplane pilots know the major increase in L/D achieved on "hangar flights" from the far end of the runway once at about a wingspan above the ground. Of course, this is way outside any airline or Boeing practice, or possibly even any study, but I wonder if you had been presented with a serious undershoot, whether you would have encouraged John to "lower the nose ...." ?

Sincere best wishes
:D:D:D

[kappa]

Don't think anyone has posted this (http://www.avweb.com/podcast/files/2010-04-02_PeterBurkill-HeathrowCrashCaptain-B.mp3). Peter's words don't put certain elements of BA in a very favorable light.

Quite a difference in hearing it from him rather than reading his reports of the aftermath.

http://www.avweb.com/podcast/files/2010-04-02_PeterBurkill-HeathrowCrashCaptain-B.mp3

I hope these links work?

[rmac]

Peter,

Why would you give a rats ____ what the CC are/were saying. Basically I can imagine that the average CC gossip exchange is similar to a bunch of extras around the tea urn on location for the filiming of "Priscilla Queen of the Desert".

I'm probably too politically incorrect to work for a company like BA, but if I did, in your situation I would have been tempted to gather for a pre-flight brief, look them straight in the eye and tell them that if they had any problems flying with you, they should take a sickie.....maybe have the FO standing on your shoulder to emphasise that if he is happy to fly with you, so should they be.

Having brought you down with their childish back biting and juicy rumour mongering, behaviour that they should have left behind in primary six, they are now busy trying to bring down the airline and who would blame you if you were savouring the managements discomfort at this moment......

Wonder how long this will stay up before I receive CC hate mail :} or before it is :mad: by a CC mod with a thin skin...

Good luck to you Peter, I hope it works out in the end for you..


Best

Rmac

[arem]

rmac

I totally agree with you and I hope Pete gets his job back with BA soon:D:D

rmcd

[M.Mouse]

....with hundreds of fault messages on the screen...

Why would there be so many? I thought the engines were still running albeit at low power and that nothing had failed.

1. Your command decision to leave John as PF while you took command of the situation was outstanding, and clearly led to the next decision which saved a worse outcome.

Sorry to interrupt your eulogising but that is the way BA train the handling of the majority of non-normal situations.

I totally agree with you and I hope Pete gets his job back with BA soon.

That would be good because I know of several others who took VR who would also like to rejoin.

[Bizman]

M.Mouse

Quote:

1. Your command decision to leave John as PF while you took command of the situation was outstanding, and clearly led to the next decision which saved a worse outcome.

Sorry to interrupt your eulogising but that is the way BA train the handling of the majority of non-normal situations....


... and I understand that BA was one of the very early adopters of this philosophy.

My point is that Capt. Burkill exemplified this philosophy and put it to good use under extreme stress.

If we haven't been in the position he was, how do we know whether a eulogy is deserved or not?

I prefer to allow him the benefit of praise for his actions because we will never know whether all BA Captains, with the benefit of their training, would have responded equally or not.

[Me Myself]

[QUOTE]Since I'm apparently as thick as a plank and you apparently have more knowledge about what was happening in the cockpit than the entire French investigation team, I'd suggest you call them and offer the inquiry your expert opinion. It's clearly wasted here./QUOTE]

Thick as a plank ?? Dunno, just a tad slow prehaps ?
Anyhoo, I think there is a thread somewhere that fits the 447 topic.

[Wizofoz]

Another flight may have heard a mayday. A mayday might have given the rescuers a clue where to look. A mayday might have launched the search effort within minutes instead of hours later.

It wouldn't have saved the aircraft but it might have saved a lot of effort finding the accident site and, consequently, the flight recorders.

Since I'm apparently as thick as a plank and you apparently have more knowledge about what was happening in the cockpit than the entire French investigation team, I'd suggest you call them and offer the inquiry your expert opinion. It's clearly wasted here.

Yep, that's right.

When I'm trying to save the lives of hundreds of passengers and crew (not least my own!!), a MAJOR priority is making sure they know where to look for the bodies should I fail........

MONUMENTALLY stupid initial comment, made all the worse by the above attempt to justify the indefensible.....

[kappa]

Why has this thread about BA038 (B777) become the place to argue about a MayDay call (or lack thereof) on AF477?

[Loose rivets]

Especially since twice, there seems to be confusion about the one being discussed.

[Global Warrior]

For Pete's sake

I wish i had a vacancy............ i'd interview this guy in a heart beat.

GW

[ExSp33db1rd]

M.Mouse Ref: # 3194


Controversial, moi?


Living up to your PPRuNe Moniker, are we ?

Hope you're never in the same position.

Bizman - spot on.

[Pinkman]

...has clearly lost the will to live. It was good, now it needs to be put out of its misery. Send it to dignitas, someone, please....

[chris weston]

Pinkman sir,

I do know what you mean after some of the recent posts here but, ultimately, I do disagree with you; as a fully paid up head banging veteran of every post I think we need to keep this thread going until we get the final report.

Yes I bought the book.

I have been both informed and saddened by it, I am quite certain that most families would not have coped as well as PB's.

From the normality of obscurity to feeling the need to employ Max Clifford is frightening indeed and this visited on a chap who, at the very least, is judged to have done a "good job".

Lets keep it rolling if we can.

CW

[M.Mouse]

as a fully paid up head banging veteran of every post I think we need to keep this thread going until we get the final report.

Do you mean the final report published in February 2010?

AAIB Link to report. (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/sites/aaib/publications/formal_reports/1_2010_g_ymmm/g_ymmm_report_sections.cfm)

[RetiredBA/BY]

Having read much of this thread, and listened to the podcast, I can only conclude that Peter Burkhill has been very severely wronged by BA management and badly let down by BALPA.

As I see it, (from the perspective of being a retired 757/767 captain and I guess most pilots would share this view, so I may be stating the obvious) cabin crew trainers are NOT qualified to make any judgement about a pilot's technical handling of an accident such as this particularly when they are not privy to an investigation which has not even been concluded.

For cabin crew trainers, of all people, to make judgement of this captain, or indeed any other pilot, BEFORE the publication of the internal BA report and BEFORE the publication of the AAIB report and pass on this criticism to their trainees strikes me as grossly irresponsible to put it mildly.

Perhaps someone legally qualified could cast some light on whether Peter might have grounds to sue the perpetrators for slander, it should not be difficult to track down those "trainers".

In the meantime I wish him every good luck for the future.

[L337]

For cabin crew trainers, of all people, to make judgement of this captain, or indeed any other pilot, BEFORE the publication of the internal BA report and BEFORE the publication of the AAIB report and pass on this criticism to their trainees strikes me as grossly irresponsible to put it mildly.

Absolutely. And demonstrates perfectly how dysfunctional BA is at LHR.

[obie2]

So, what does all this prove??...

NEVER, EVER, go into print after a prang!

[Nerik]

Buying the book is one way of showing our support for Peter. It has been tough for him and all this for saving the lives of many.

I look forward to reading the book. I just hope that the cabin crew trainer who spread this rumour was not just passing on what someone else in another management position or training position had told him.

[Chronus]

I have bought Peter`s book and am half way through it. I must say I am flabbergasted by its revelations to such an extent that I will have to put a sling around my head to avoid a Gordonian jaw droop. Has anyone read the book and what is their view.

[bearfoil]

How about some perspective? Through no fault of their own, Burkill and Coward landed a 150 ton glider reasonably close to the runway, without loss of life, and the Boeing deserved to be written off for letting them down. What would a pax on Colgan have given to be with these two chaps instead of chatty and the screamer in Buffalo? What about the Turkish? Their a/c was serviceable, but they managed to screw the Poodle anyway. The Mary thread is in San Francisco, let's have a break from the whining. Pete, John, :ok:

bear

[Desk Jockey]

It isn't the first time that someone in BA has made a misrepresentation of an aircraft accident to make a training point. Twice I have had to pull a trainer up for it. On one occasion they would have had no real knowledge of the incident and no real technical knowledge of the subject at all and in the other they should just have known better.

[Desk Jockey]

I have bought Peter`s book and am half way through it. I must say I am flabbergasted by its revelations to such an extent that I will have to put a sling around my head to avoid a Gordonian jaw droop. Has anyone read the book and what is their view.

I read Pete and Marias book within a couple of days of getting it. I'ts not a happy read and sadly I wasn't surprised at much of the contents with respect to BA's actions. It's a very personal reflection of what happened to them and worth buying to support a super crew who were dealt a very poor hand in more ways than one.

[Joshilini]

I am also half way through reading Pete and Maria's book. I would like to point out that it has been an excellent read so far and is very difficult to put down!

The way that Pete and Maria were handled by BA is beyond ridiculous. I couldn't believe BA's approach to this entire incident. I was gobsmacked. I wasn't entirely surprised by the actions of this country's press.

However Pete, I do want to ask you/Maria a question. Do you regret reading the tabloids after this incident? I think, in hindsight, that reading the tabloids was probably not the best of ideas because tabloids tend to make somebody look like a hero one moment and then a villain the next, without any concrete facts.

The rumours which circulated on the other hand could not have helped your recovery process. In fact, if I was you and was told that cabin crews were being told by trainers that I had froze at the controls, I would have confronted the trainers personally and put them straight.

Anyway, good luck with finding a job. I will read the rest of the book within a few days and then post a review on Amazon!

P.S: Oh, I found it extraordinary that John posed for the tabloids with his family and BA advised you not to.

[Jal]

I've read the book as well, and it is an excellent read. The main thing that stands out is the incompetence of the BA management and BALPA in dealing with the situation, it appeared as though they didn't care about Peter and basically left him to fend for himself. I'm glad I no longer work for BA.

[Charley B]

The book is an excellent read-it arrived on Saturday and it got read cover to cover,I couldn't put it down.
Think BA treated Pete and Maria very badly-the CC trainers should be totally ashamed of themselves.
Buy the book-it is available in many places and well worth a read:ok:

[d71146]

I am another who has purchased Peter and Maria's most excellent book it is an eye opener the way the situation was dealt with by this airline and,what they have been through as a family since in coming to terms and dealing admirably with the situation.
I stand by my post a couple of days after the accident that it was a very bad management decision to parade the crew on TV as the crew were still clearly in a state of shock naturally.
Still, Peter and Maria best of luck for the future things will turn around for you of that I am sure.

[Joetom]

Quote from d71146

"I stand by my post a couple of days after the accident that it was a very bad management decision to parade the crew on TV as the crew were still clearly in a state of shock naturally"

Could not agree more with you d71146, a bad decision, lets hope management types have learned from it.

I will also be buying the book and look fwd to reading it.

Best wishes to all the crew and passengers on that flight.

[Tonka Toy]

Whilst I think about it, Explosive decompression on an aircraft operating low level off the horn of africa one crew member almost lost. Aircraft under control - sort of, no one to hear a mayday, first opportunity lets relay it!! - great idea until you realise you get the only guy on the planet who says the exact opposite of what you said to who you want it to be said to!!! May Day calls don't neccessarily do what you want them to do!!!!

[robert f jones]

Am I missing the point in this conversation re taking action against the Airline and individual pilot management. As a retired BA pilot it was my understanding that Captain Burkhill had taken voluntary retirement, probably trusting for further employment as a direct entry captain. Unfortunately that did not materialise for whatever reason.

[Chronus]

Robert f Jones wonders whether he is missing the point. Well the point is simply this. Peter was 43 years of age at the time of the accident, with 12700 hrs of flying time to his credit, an unblemished record and a loyal long serving employee of BA, whose pilot training had been sponsored by BA. He was offered and accepted so called "early retirement".
Why should anyone of his age and position retire early. It leads one to suspect that it was not a matter of retirement but was one of resignation. Is it not a possibility that there may have been irresistible financial inducements, sufficently persuasive, particularly influential at such difficult times when he was unable to exercise best judgment, for him to accept to be fitted out with the gentle cloak of retirement. So the ultimate question is was he gently leaned on, pushed or shoved out of BA.
The question for law is whether or not there is a case for constructive dismissal. Ofcourse in seeking redress in law would the outcome of such a course of action be likely to yield a better remedy for Peter and his family.
It would seem there simply is no accident without a victim.

[Basil]

Explosive decompression on an aircraft operating low level
That's unusual; what were the circumstances?

[Tonka Toy]

Climbing, pressurisng, door went bang. Indeed, unusual. Heads have been scratched.

[Me Myself]

[QUOTE]So the ultimate question is was he gently leaned on, pushed or shoved out of BA.[QUOTE]

Which is a very good question to ask.
I've read the book, in 2 days and that's because I was busy. These would have been trying times for a normal familiy ( 3 children in 3 years ), add a crash on top of this and you create the perfect environment for a well balanced individual to lose the plot.
Now, who is the sleezy twatt who sold that chocolate licking picture to the tabloïds ?
Second, how in God's name could a man let himself be so put down by trolley dollies gossip and quit his job ??
Third, BALPA calls itself a union ??? LOL !!! That's your idea of supporting a colleague ?? Go for a curry and get sloushed after a major accident ??? And then leave him with a fig leave when it comes to salary and reputation ?? We've heard the lousy job BA managers did but hey !!! smell the coffee here, what about BALPA when it came to the man's reputation. Nothing but a very loud silence. How about facing those trainers and do what you wrere supposed to do.............represent a member ???? Let me explain the concept to you : It spells " Making a claim on somebody else's behalf who cannot, at the given time, defend himself as well as he otherwise would " Capicce ???
I'm sure no one at BA or BALPA gives a toss about Peter Burkill's fate and now he is out not even his book will create a ripple in this " pond of corporate tranquility " .

[Desk Jockey]

I seem to remember that on early retirement or voluntary severance as BA call it you sign to say that you will not take any legal action against BA. Don't know if this would actually stand up to legal scrutiny.

[GK430]

The book, a terrific read, raises more questions than it answers.
My lasting impression will be one that the Burkill's treatment by his employer was an utter disgrace.

Why was the Captain isolated from his crew in the immediate aftermath?
Why all the immediate questioning after the end of a very long traumatic day?

How can any organisation promote getting its staff drunk as a solution to dealing with shock?
Why was he kept from the ones that he cared about for so long?
Why was there no moral, humanitarian and immediate financial support given to his wife and family?
Couldn't his employer even provide him with some clothing at the end of the day?
Why couldn't the internal report be produced in a more timely manner and when it was, why were the findings concealed from all but the management?

The company's disinterest or inability to deal with the rumours.

etc. etc. etc.

There seems to be a huge warning sign to this company's aircrew here - avoid accidents at all costs, because your employer is not going to do the right thing by you after the event.

I'm left bemused. Did Capt. Burkill and his F/O achieve the same outcome as Capt. Sullenberger and his F/O? Perhaps, by virtue of the later timescale, that statement should be reversed - but the US Air crew would not have been keen on Peter's treatment, would they.
If that is indeed the case and passengers and friends and families from both accidents are able to make the most of the lives that they are now lucky enough to have to-gether - then why are the different situations that these two pilots find themselves in like chalk from cheese?

Is this a European/British psyche versus the American? We know how good the British media are at shooting the good guys off pedestals!

Having gone through a clearly horrendous time, how long would it take and with what psychological support would the average person be able to make sound decisions about the shape their future should take? Even one that had shown the ultimate professionalism in the cockpit.

Yet again, the uninformed point the finger at his (their) decision making with little understanding of the pressures on them at probably a very emotional and vulnerable time.

We would like to think that passengers and their Friends & Family are well catered for post accident by the world's leading airlines.
Have some overlooked their crew's needs?

The accident happened at the airline's base - Heathrow. One can but contemplate their fete had the aircraft come down on another continent and the nights that his wife might have had to cope all alone having been instructed by B.A. to leave the sanctity of her own home.

BALPA ......on second thoughts, if all you'll need is a curry and a stiff drink, keep paying your dues.

Hopefully this whole fiasco will become an academic case study for an esteemed psychologist/psychiatrist and lessons can be learned and safeguards enshrined.

[Joshilini]

GK340, the points you have raised are excellent and were exactly what I was thinking when I was reading the book.

BA and BALPA handled this dreadfully. Were Cpt Eric Moody and the rest of his crew treated like this by BA after their incident back in 1982? Were Cpt Tim Lancaster, F/O Alastair Atchison and the rest of their crew treated like this by BA after their incident back in 1990?

As for your point about US Airways 1549 - I did initially think about that. However, with the US Airways incident, it was far more obvious to the public at the time that it was not pilot error, whereas with BA 038 it was not absolutely known what the problem was and whether the crew had made a slip up during the flight.

I also wondered why the ATC tapes were released to the public for the US Airways flight and not BA flight. Could somebody answer this? I'm assuming (and most likely wrong) that it was because there were two mistakes (understable given the pressure!!!!!) by Pete on the BA ATC tapes - even though they were very minor.

[RetiredBA/BY]

May I offer another reaon why I absolutely believe this whole thing stinks.

In the last ten years or so TWO One World jets have been destroyed, a QF 744 in BKK (yes I know it was "repaired" ) and the BA777 at LHR.

I have read the accident reports on both :
In one, a perfectly serviceable jet was "badly mishandled" being polite after reading the CASA synopsis. The Captain still flies, with his original employer, having made some very serious and fundamental errors of basic airmanship which caused the "loss" of his aircraft. I make that statement after almost 20 years in the LHS of various Boeings and after reading the report in detail.

In the other, a captain saved a situation which few, if any, of us had been trained for. He had less than 50 seconds before he hit the ground. The report makes NO significant criticism of his handlng of the event and concurrs that his flap retraction WAS the right and only thing he could have done to save the day.

This captain is now out of a job.

That, to me at least, seems a HUGE injustice.

[juniour jetset]

You couldn't have summed it up better RetiredBA/BY!

"This captain is now out of a job. That, to me at least, seems a HUGE injustice" me too and I'm sure a whole lot of other folk!

[rowan11]

I also agree with your comments, it is a HUGE injustice - it is a national disgrace, which makes me ashamed to be British.

I have just started to read Peter and Marias book, so I will be returning.

[Jabawocky]

Why don't you folk at BA and other British airlines and unions get together and petition the heck out of BA to fix the situation.

They could now make some great publicity out of it........ or more the point Virgin Atlantic, and Sir Richard is always looking for a timely shot at BA. That would be a sweet victory for VA.

After all he offered Sully the world if he wanted it........

[Teevee]

Not part of the industry, but as this discussion seems to be considering attitudes and actions of senior managers I'd just like to make an observation if I could, based on experience of similar happenings in other industries.

Of course its an injustice, an absolutely terrible injustice, but senior managers don't seem to want, for want of a better term 'heroes' - leaders who can perform under terrific pressure and cope with the most dire of circumstances in a way that perhaps many couldn't. They don't want people who the general public look up to and recognise are deserving of the utmost respect, because, I suspect they show where the TRUE worth and professionalism lies. Their presence could become an embarrassment and result in a lack of public support for management at the next round of pay cuts etc, or worse still, when it is revealed how much the CEO and his mates earn compared to the real 'heroes'. So after the initial lauding, they are quietly pushed to one side to avoid further embarrassment.

Sorry for butting in, but my thanks to all those to whom I entrust my life every time I step on an aircraft.

[OverFlare]

I really really liked the book and would like to thank Peter and Maria for writing it. It is a heartbreaking story - I am a pilot but in some respects the parts of the book which affected me most were Maria's accounts of how she and the children coped in the hours, days and weeks which followed the crash. The book is well written and I would recommend it to anyone.

I have now given some serious thought to the steps I would take in the immediate aftermath of such a serious incident. My wife and I also have a far clearer idea now of what we would need to do to as a family and how we might deal with the press intrusion.

I hope, like the authors, that this book will cause BA to stop and think about its internal procedures. In particular I find it bizarre that BA had no procedure for taking care of Maria and the children in the hours after the incident. If they want the wives of staff members to avoid the press perhaps they might consider being a bit more proactive in helping out when a pack of photographers pitch up outside? I also find it hard to understand how Flight Ops managers appeared unable to address some defamatory statements about Peter being issued from SEP trainers.

Peter I'm sorry you felt you had to leave BA. I hope life works out. I know there is something of a campaign to get you back in which I hope works out if that's what you want to do now.

You - and your wife - are heroes.

[ehwatezedoing]

Talk about being hang out dry by blatantly non founded gossip and rumors!
Those SEP trainers should have been fired :*

Does anyone know if they have been at list reprimanded ?

The way BA's management handle the situation is a total disgrace!

[wiggy]

I also find it hard to understand how Flight Ops managers appeared unable to address some defamatory statements about Peter being issued from SEP trainers.


Sadly a lot of us find it very easy to understand...

[Chronus]

I have recently finished reading the book. I must say I am left with a sense of disappointment. The book is an account of the personal difficulties suffered by the family as a result of the crash , developing into a crisis and affecting even the eldest of their young children. But I am afraid the question that it has brought to my mind is how much of the post-crash events are of their own making and how much of these are down to BA. Is it 10:90, 50:50, 40:60 or any other. Where is that particular display of stiff upper lip, understatement and sang froid which was once so much the conduct expected of a British Captain at times of adversity and crisis. Instead we have a Captain accepting advice to go and get paraletic drunk immediately after such a serious accident, could it not be said that this is yet another display of conformance to the current binge culture. Ofcourse the most important question is the one that his FO posed why did Peter put his name forward for early retirement. The whole issue is one of good judgement and correct decision making at all times.
Even taking account of the time factor this was not the greatest feat of deadsticking an airliner. Let us not forget the Azores Glider, the A330-200 of Air Transit Flight 236. Captain Robert Piche and his FO pulled off the biggest stunt ever in an all engines out at night landing at Lajes Air Base on the tiny rock of Tercia, Azores. I would recommend Robert Poche`s book "Hands on Destiny". It is enlightening. I would be interested to read commentry on the differing backgrounds of the two Captains, institutionilised but in their own particularly different ways.

[S76Heavy]

Having yet to read the actual book, I understand that its initial purpose was to later explain to the children why their parents' lives had changed so much when they were much too young to understand when it all happened.

As such, it is probably not a hero's tale of how he saved the day by saving the lives of his passengers, but more a tale of what happens to people when something unforeseen occurs in their lives and the decisions they make based on their understanding of the facts at that time.

I'm eager to put my order in and read the story for myself, but to me the most interesting part will be after the crash landing. Flying much smaller hardware in a somewhat more risky environment, dealing with a potential incident or accident (and I have lost friends and colleagues already) as a family (or by my family as it may be) is what is often on my mind. To me the hero part is not in gliding the aircraft but in keeping the family together in difficult times under a lot of pressure and public scrutiny. That is the bit I want to read about.

I agree that there have been many other examples of good airmanship that saved the day and that books have been published about. That does not detract from the merit of this book and the real subject of the story, IMO.

Now off to order a book..

[captplaystation]

Chronus

I have to say I find that just a little harsh.

Very difficult to know how one would react given the back stabbing innuendo going on behind his back which no-one seemed too keen to eradicate in a timely fashion.
We are all different, and just because someone isn't a hard nosed b@st@rd able to rest totally insensitive to what is said & happening around him , doesn't , in my eyes at least, disqualify him from having "the right stuff."

BALPA seem to have been pretty ineffectual too, sorry to dissapoint you but I would probably have gone out and got totally trashed too, however I wouldn't have done so with the union lackies as my first choice of company.

Don't think this incident compares too well with either Sully or Air Transat.
If you want a better comparison try Ryanair in Ciampino, they both had to react instinctively in a very short time scale, the other two incidents, whilst also displaying exemplary handling skills, were also blessed with just a bit more time to execute the manouveres required.
Something you do miss in your eulogy to them however, is that there was, I believe, some criticism attached to the procedures used and lack of monitoring prior to the Air Transat incident.
They did famously to pick up all the pieces at the end, but if memory serves me well were judged to have had a part in the problem along with the technical issues they were handed. This is most certainly NOT the case in the other 3 incidents I have mentioned.

[M.Mouse]

Not read the book yet but how exactly do you control rumours and innuendo?

[woodpecker]

I also find it hard to understand how Flight Ops managers appeared unable to address some defamatory statements about Peter being issued from SEP trainers.

Perhaps you have to go back a few years to understand the attitude of Cabin Crew trainers at Cranebank. During new entrant cabin crew training various means were employed to make it easier for the new entrants to remember equipment locations on the 757. The one that upset many of us was the aide memoir to remember the location of the BCF and Water Glycol extinguishers in the flight deck....

"The BCF is behind the Bast**d and the Water is behind the Wank*r"

Our management were made aware of these practises but did nothing.

[captplaystation]

M Mouse, don't think this post will be here for long. . . but, indeed you cannot control it, however a bit more effort to identify those responsible for propogating it might not have gone amiss. Of course the ones responsible seem to have somehow elevated themselves, in the useless self serving middle managements eyes, to having status superior to the mere "drivers".

Unfortunately, when you allow a bunch of "luvvies" to call themselves "directors" :yuk: and to actually believe THEY are actually in charge of the cabin of the aircraft (I.E. responsible legally , and indeed ahead of the SFO /F/O in pecking order) Oh and to add insult to injury pay them as if they ACTUALLY were, well what can you expect.

One of the reasons why the company is in the sh1t now too of course, or are we not allowed to say that (or indeed use the word luvvie) on pprune ? :hmm:

Bah Humbug ! !

[OverFlare]

I doubt any of us knows quite how we'd react in the circumstances Peter and Maria have found themselves in. But I don't think they are looking for sympathy or trying to suggest they did nothing they might now regret. They certainly give the impression they wish they had been able to communicate better with each other during the period and I think, on the whole, the book is a very brave approach to take.

It was in this sense that I think the two are heroes - for having the guts to reveal these things to help other people. Having said that, I think getting the aircraft down with no deaths, in a situation that nobody ever practices, was definitely something to be very proud of.

I don't think they are particularly trying to blame others either although I agree with them that BA could look at some of its protocols. If I were in their shoes I would definitely throw more mud at BA's door (subject to UK libel laws I suppose, yawn); and if I were a BA manager I'd be very unhappy with how this all played out - I might even resign.

And for me, as I wrote above, reading the book has been, I think, very helpful. Would I do everything the same way as the Burkills have done? I doubt it but that's not to criticise: we are all different, have different perspectives on life, and different instincts. Would I suffer from the form of post-trauma stress that they did? I just don't know and neither does anybody really. Would this approach that I've got planned work out any better for me than their approach did for them. Again, absolutely no idea at all.

Edited to add: the moderators appear to have deleted my super cool last sentence. Suffice it to say I'm not sure the "stiff upper lip" would have been that helpful.

[Feathers McGraw]

M. Mouse I think that the way one controls rumours and innuendo is to make an unequivocal, accurate statement to all of the company detailing what was done by all of the flight and cabin crew on BA38. It may not square with the "say nothing until the AAIB report is out" approach, but surely getting this information out is beneficial to everyone because it clears the air and ensures that people have knowledge of the things that didn't work as they should have (evacuation alarm).

[Coireall]

:ok::

Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 15:38:09 +0800
Subject: CX780 SUB-HKG 13 April 2010
To All Airbus Cockpit Crew,
As already covered by company news information and the public media, a major event occurred on flight CX780 Surabaya – Hong Kong on 13 April.
The crew had operated the aircraft, B-HLL, on the previous evening from Hong Kong to Surabaya. Crew complement was normal with two pilots and eleven cabin crew.
Routine maintenance checks were carried out overnight. All pre-departure preparations ex SUB were normal. There was nothing unusual about the aircraft weight, FOB (CFP fuel) and distribution. RTOW data used was in accordance with the Minimum Ground roll procedure as applicable to Surabaya. Weather at departure, en-route and arrival was good and not considered to be relevant to the event.
Initial Onset Conditions
Just before TOC, the aircraft experienced minor low frequency EPR oscillations. These oscillations had associated tracking of Fuel Flow. Later, this observation was followed with an ECAM message on ENG 2. After consultation with IOC, it was decided that the situation did not warrant an in-flight diversion.
Subsequent Engine Behaviour
During initial descent (passing FL310) ENG 2 experienced a surge and stall, and the engine could only be recovered to sub-idle speed for the remainder of the flight. Whilst levelling off at an intermediate lower altitude in the latter part of the descent, ENG 1 additionally experienced a gradual loss of thrust lever control, eventually resulting in an uncontrolled thrust increase to approximately 70% N1. The engine remained at this thrust level for the remainder of the flight.
Aircraft Flight Path
The aircraft was able to maintain altitude and speed until closer to the airfield, when further descent was commenced for an ILS approach onto RWY 07L. With the high residual thrust present on No1 engine, speed on intermediate and final approach remained high. Final configuration consisted of Flap 1 (with flap lever position at Flap 2), resulting in an approach speed of 230kts at the threshold. Flare and touchdown (at 220kts) was normal for these circumstances. Successful selection of REV, and appropriate braking enabled the aircraft to be stopped within 1,000ft of the threshold of RWY 25R.
After Landing
After the aircraft came to a stop, both engines were shut down (thrust on Eng 1 had remained at 70% N1). Brake temperatures rose rapidly. Comms were established with rescue services who advised tyre deflation and the presence of smoke/fire around the wheels. An emergency evacuation was successfully carried out with minor injuries to a small number of passengers.
Crew Actions
The Captain and First Officer both displayed commendable professionalism and airmanship of the highest order in successfully handling the challenging situation they faced.

Initial Investigations
CAD is conducting the investigation into this event, supported by CSD. An initial interview with the flight crew by CAD has taken place. EEC, QAR, and DFDR data have been successfully downloaded and are being analysed. All avenues of investigation, including fuel system fault and contamination, are being actively conducted with direct assistance and involvement from Airbus, and Rolls Royce.
Rolls Royce and Airbus have not issued any additional operational recommendations at this time. Updates on the investigation will be provided to all crew as soon as more information becomes available.
In the interim, crews are advised to contact Maintenance Control via IOC, if any abnormal engine behaviour is observed.

Kind Regards,

Steve Mihos & Gavin Haslemore
Airbus Fleet Office Attached Thumbnails http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=805&stc=1&thumb=1&d=1271352693 (http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=805&d=1271352693) http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=806&stc=1&thumb=1&d=1271352710 (http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=806&d=1271352710) http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=807&stc=1&thumb=1&d=1271352723 (http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=807&d=1271352723) http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=808&stc=1&thumb=1&d=1271352739 (http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=808&d=1271352739) http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=809&stc=1&thumb=1&d=1271352749 (http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=809&d=1271352749)

http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=810&stc=1&thumb=1&d=1271352757 (http://www.777expats.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=810&d=1271352757)

:

[Errol Sinclair]

Peter,

Really enjoyed the book. You, John and the crew did your company proud. You displayed great instinct and backbone - something the management obviously lacked. You and your crew are an inspiration, your management are a worry and I'm sad to say our management have also displayed very similar behaviour in a current incident investigation and I feel desperately sorry for the crew.

BALPA's actions were no great surprise. Have experienced and seen their 'input' all too often. Why o why couldn't they just ask "Pete, what do you need us to do?".

Well done and all the best! :D

[rowan11]

Congratulations on a great book Peter and Maria, what a difficult and horrendous time you have had, through no fault of your own.

Such situations require good managing and communication, and to put it mildly both were lacking in your case. Heard your broadcast yesterday, lets hope you and BALPA can get some protocols going soon. You are more than generous to your fellow professionals.

No Peter - you were not well enough to make your decision on VR, but more to the point, it should not have been accepted by your company, but words fail me regarding the company which led you to believe they wanted to employ you and then let you down.

Good luck to you both, you are very special people.

[thecontroller]

interview with pilot, starts at about 14 mins

BBC iPlayer - You and Yours: 28/04/2010 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00s2p3t/You_and_Yours_28_04_2010/)

[Biggles78]

Personally I hope Peter applies for VAustralia. Imagine the advertising coup that Richard Branson is famous for. We have a pilot who with :mad: all time to think, made a decision that saved all the lives on his aircraft and this after 12 hours (?) sitting on bum contemplating the meaning of life. (Ok, the last bit is mine but I hope you know what I mean)

I for one would delay a flight just to make sure I knew the guy in the pointy end was not found wanting at crunch time. (No pun intended) Peter Burkill and his crew were not found wanting.

And just to go offtopic a bit, this is a classic reason why P2F should NOT occupy the RHS. If this had been the case with this flight, the outcome would have been substantially different. No way could the Captain have left the flying to a 300 hour Total Time FO. (I am making a point so please no flames for lack of technical accuracy. Ta :))

Apologies if this has already been stated in the thread. Bit of a memory issue with the 2,500+ posts and 126 pages.

[Nerik]

Just finished reading the book. It is a very good read. I hope that many people read it. I hope that many people within aviation read it and that it helps companies learn how to deal with similar scenarios in the future.

[DozyWannabe]

Read the book last week, but I've been insanely busy and unable to post. Not only is it good stuff and well-written, but it provides a major cautionary tale for management.

What really struck me was the thought that in an organisation with a safety record like BA's, largely due to fostering a culture of attention to detail when it comes to operational matters - that safety record can have a negative impact in breeding another type of complacency when it comes to providing a safety net when things do go wrong - in this case through no fault of any member of the crew.

I hope that Peter and his family have a much smoother ride from here on.

[Whiskey Papa]

I’ve read Peter and Maria’s book, and I was intrigued by Peter’s analysis of the effect of the ILS antenna and runway approach lighting array could have had on the aircrafts’ structure. Peter is convinced that the extra few metres gained by the flap retraction resulted in G-YMMM missing these obstructions which could have inflicted serious damage to the aircraft. All very logical.

Two days later I drove on the M1 immediately adjacent to the extended centre line of runway 27 at East Midlands Airport, exactly where the British Midland 734 came to grief in January 1989. Imagine my astonishment when I saw that a massive full motorway width sign gantry has been erected exactly on the crash site! The gantry is just a few feet in front of the penultimate array of approach lighting, precisely on the runway centre line and if it had been present when the BM 737 arrived, the result that day could only have been worse. It’s just 600 metres from the runway threshold, and an aircraft has already needed to occupy the space where it stands waiting like a giant can opener! Google Earth shows this well. Did no one think to keep this area clear of obstructions? Where’s ‘elf and safety when you need them?

WP

[Tarq57]

WP, in an ideal world.....
The required obstacle clearance limits and spaces are defined, as is the runway end safety area.
Mostly, when all is well, they are adequate.
You can't design an aerodrome that will guarantee a safe arrival for every eventuality, sadly. There will always be a case where a little more flat land a little further from the airport would have made a difference.
(Case in point, Smolensk, where the Polish president's a/c crashed. Plenty others.)

[Airclues]

Pete, I would also say that you have a substantial case for legal action against BA for defamation of character / slander due to the actions of the SEP training staff.


These were also my thoughts as I read the book. Could I ask Mmmayday38 whether he has taken legal advice on this?

Dave

[Bronx]

Pete, I would also say that you have a substantial case for legal action against BA for defamation of character / slander due to the actions of the SEP training staff.
If what Captain Burkill says is the truth and the WHOLE truth about why he took voluntary redundancy then I guess he'd have a substantial case for legal action against BA for defamation of character / slander or constructive dismissal, but before you get into a legal action you got to make sure there ain't a skeleton you'd prefer to keep in the closet.

There can be times when a company and an employee part company amicably with both sides agreeing to say nothing about the true reason.

Aviation's a very small world.


Just for example - to avoid publicizing in the UK an incident that happened down route, or to avoid embarassing/hurting an innocent third party or third parties, or even a mixture of both reasons.
Maybe BA have been a whole lot more generous to the captain than some folks have been led to believe.
As I say, aviation's a very small world.

[Mmmayday38]

Airclues

I can say that I have not sought legal advice as regard action against BA. However, it is also my understanding that any action (if any were to be taken) should have been lodged within 2 years of an incident. This time frame has passed.


Bronx

I took Voluntary Redundancy which was 52 weeks basic pay. I received no other payment or even payment in kind. BA have not been "any more generous" to me than they were to the other 77 pilots who took VR in Aug 09.

I have nothing to hide, in fact I believe that the worst photos that could have appeared from an incident that happened down route, or to avoid embarassing/hurting an innocent third party or third parties, or even a mixture of both reasons"
already appeared in a red top tabloid within days of the accident. I am sure if there had been other skeletons in the closet they would have already appeared. What can be worse than a chocolate covered pilot being licked clean by hosties/licorice games/and articles describing s:\x fests in a Sunday national newspaper?

I have taken great pains to ensure that our book was written correctly, accurately and factually, so therefore our book is the WHOLE truth - sometimes hard and uncomfortable to believe, but was necessary to attempt to prevent any other pilot having to go through the same.

I am aware the airline industry is a small world, unfortunately for me 17 Jan 2008 made it even smaller. After having applied to numerous recruiting airlines for both 777 (9 currently recruiting non-rated pilots that I am aware of) and also aircraft a lot smaller (eg Biz Jets), my current tally of those who have refused to interview me is now 19.

Obviously some of these airlines have refused to interview me based on the fact I am not type rated to their aircraft and there are plenty of pilots who are, there have been some refusals based on the airline not wanting a pilot to have been involved in a crash. I have been told by various people in various size airlines that the "high profile nature and media interest in the BA38" has gone against me.

[paweas]

Hi Peter just recieved the book this morning great read spent all day in bed reading lol compliments to you and you wife..

Seems to me from reading that the Mighty BA seemed almost embarrased that one of their aircraft could be involved in an accident and decided to attempt to sweep this under the carpet publicly, i was shocked at the treatment you recieved.I remember that day clearly i spent hours watching on sky news.. first thought came to mind was "immpossible" how that aircraft managed to remain almost intact was stunning,the more i read the more i was amazed by the totaly brilliant job you and you crew did that day.Wish you well for the future seems airlines these days care little for their staff or indeed passengers only the almighty dollar.

[Heliport]

Seems to me from reading that the Mighty BA .......... decided to attempt to sweep this under the carpet publiclyYeah, hardly any media coverage of the incident. :rolleyes:

[paweas]

:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:
My dear Heliport If you'd bothered to read the book you would realize that BA went to great lengths to avoid all publicity of the accident and the events surrounding it regardless of the media coverage.Peter was told not to make any statement to the press despite some of the nonsense that was printed about him.Coupled with the fact that Peter's working life became intolerable after the event with nasty rumours circulating in-house doesnt take a genius to conclude that BA indeed wanted this sweeped under the carpet also notable was the fact that RR and Boeing didnt say too much about the event either.........

[TIMA9X]

By paweas If you'd bothered to read the book you would realize that BA went to great lengths to avoid all publicity of the accident and the events surrounding it regardless of the media coverage.Peter was told not to make any statement to the press despite some of the nonsense that was printed about him.

I have to agree with this statement, I have read the book as well, and have followed this thread since it started. It is painfully clear when coupling what was said on this thread, in the British media and the silence from BA publicly seemed to have left Peter & Maria dangling on a hook with the media circling around looking for an angle that may sell newspapers! What has been said time and time again on this thread 30 seconds is not long to dot all the iii's & cross the ttt's but still it was rumoured that Pete froze which is clearly not the case at all.

Aviation's a very small world

Yep it is, and it didn't take too long to find out that Peter was a dedicated 777 Captain who was loyal to BA, his company that employed him for 20 years, he took the advice from the appropriate departments no questions asked way before he decided to write his book. As time went by he realised he needed BA to assist him with a short statement to clear up what amounted to become an unbearable set of rumours that lead to PB taking VR. We can all offer our personal views whether Pete should have or shouldn't have taken VR but at the end of the day none of us really knew what Pete was feeling except of course Pete himself as well as the impact on his family.

I don't think Pete and Maria ever said a bad word in public about BA throughout this ordeal so when he announced he was writing a book I thought "well here goes, he is going to dump on them. As it turns out he didn't but together with his wife wrote a book that really is a wake up call to the industry. I learned a lot from reading it as I too have three kids of a similar age as the Birkills. I think there is something for everyone in its contents.

[Biggles78]

am aware the airline industry is a small world, unfortunately for me 17 Jan 2008 made it even smaller. After having applied to numerous recruiting airlines for both 777 (9 currently recruiting non-rated pilots that I am aware of) and also aircraft a lot smaller (eg Biz Jets), my current tally of those who have refused to interview me is now 19.

Obviously some of these airlines have refused to interview me based on the fact I am not type rated to their aircraft and there are plenty of pilots who are, there have been some refusals based on the airline not wanting a pilot to have been involved in a crash. I have been told by various people in various size airlines that the "high profile nature and media interest in the BA38" has gone against me.
Why hasn't Branson given you a call? After all he has offer Sully a job if he wants one and Sully had an eternity compared to your situation. This is just DUMB!!

[TIMA9X]

Why hasn't Branson given you a call? After all he has offer Sully a job if he wants one and Sully had an eternity compared to your situation. This is just DUMB!!I think there are many pilots who would agree with this statement, I feel that if Pete was involved in the same situation but lived in another country things would be different for him today. It appears that the British press have claimed another victim in its haste to get a story that sells papers. When it could not get what it wanted, the press continued with its own version of the facts without regard for the Birkill family forcing BA to possibly make decisions to protect itself even when the final report was far from public knowledge.

It is my view, a simple statement along these lines from BA at the time protecting its staff should have solved this part of the BA038 aftermath for the Birkills.

It really isn't rocket science for a well established airline such as BA..

[bearfoil]

I think Pete got it right. But Sully said two words post-goose.

"My airplane". Doesn't, shouldn't matter, but it does to the numpties.

Hats off to a gentleman pilot, Captain B.

bear

[DozyWannabe]

Bearfoil, saying "I have control" at the point things started to go wrong would likely have caused the FO (as PF) to relinquish the primary flight controls - the precise opposite of what Capt. Burkill was after. The infinitessimal issue that got blown up out of any kind of proportion was that the initial evacuate transmission either did not work or was not heard - it's not clear which, nor is it ever likely to be.

The scandal of the Burkills' treatment stems from the fact that BA issued the crew a blanket order not to talk to the press, but (and I mean this as no criticism of the FO) the press managed to pressure a member of the FO's family to talk him into providing an exclusive, whereas Capt. Burkill stuck by his instructions, causing the press to dig up any information they could get their hands on - most of it not relevant, a little of it not particularly flattering.

BA's public relations department was essentially caught on the hop by this accident - they said they'd handle the press and then clammed up. The combination of Capt. Burkill's statement which, like Sullenberger's, praised the whole crew and didn't aggrandise his own efforts - along with sticking to orders about not talking to the press while the FO did - gave rise to the false narrative that Capt. Burkill "froze" - whether this was an act of spite by the press or simple chinese whispers we're also unlikely to ever know.

[bearfoil]

DozyWannabe

Could not be in more agreement. Thought I was clear. My bad.

[Biggles78]

Attempted post number 2.
I think Pete got it right. But Sully said two words post-goose.

"My airplane". Doesn't, shouldn't matter, but it does to the numpties.
Bearfoil, you may have missed it in the previous 164 pages, 3,200+ replies, but Peter said it was BA training to leave the FO flying and that left the Captain to sort out the problem. In the few seconds that this took and for the flap retract decision and action, this would have left precious little time for Peter to "My airplaine", get his hand in and complete what remained of the flight. Therefore, Peter made TWO critical decision in that very short time from that resulted in the best possible outcome in the circumstances.

One was to reduce the flap setting and two was to leave John (who had the feel of the aircraft) to complete the landing. I am sure if the FO had low time on type then Peter may indeed have taken flying control but as he had also stated he was happy with John at the controls. It must have been difficult for him to leave someone else to finish the landing (or it may just be the command control freak in me) but that decision most likely saved lives.

One thing that hasn't been mentioned is not only did Peter's decisions that day directly save all the lives of passengers and crew aboard his aircraft but is also indirectly affected the spouses, children, grandchildren, extended family, friends, work colleagues etc etc who have not had to go through the grieving process.

I hope the above brings some comfort to Peter when the days do not seem so good.

[bearfoil]

Biggles78

I tried to explain to Dozywannabe, perhaps I was too brief.

I agree 100 percent. That means I think you are correct in everything you say.

1. I acknowledge the Captain's skill, and have throughout this thread.

2. Keeping the yoke in John's capable hands and up to the second concentration was of course indicated.

3. I wish him well and have even made inquiries on his behalf.

4. How do you react to those who actually disagree with you? (This is rhetorical in nature and does not require a response, really).

5. The only thing left unsettled about 038 is the fuel, imo.

Tailwinds and strong coffee my friend.

bear

[DozyWannabe]

Bearfoil:

Am I right in thinking that by "my airplane" you actually meant taking responsibility for those on it? I should be at least a little apologetic if so, because I misread it as the US version of the "I have control" callout. So apologies.

For those who haven't read the book, it begins with an eye-opening account of Capt. Burkill's thought processes, elaborated on later, that explain what was going through his mind and why he made the decisions he made. The fact that these thought processes take up several pages, yet the incident left him with a few seconds to think through and make those decisions is a testament to just how level-headed one has to be to pull a result like that out of your hat, and it's something we can all aspire to. But Capt. Burkill relates events just so, and still does not claim to have done anything special.

Peter, my hat is duly doffed - and as I said before, I hope things improve for you and your family from this point on. The hat remains doffed for the first officer and the rest of the crew on the flight - whose behaviour appears to have been no less exemplary.

[infrequentflyer789]

Bearfoil:

Am I right in thinking that by "my airplane" you actually meant taking responsibility for those on it? I should be at least a little apologetic if so, because I misread it as the US version of the "I have control" callout.

It's hard watching people misunderstanding that they are actually agreeing with each other...

At the risk of confusing things still futher, I don't think that was the bit of Bearfoils post that you misread.

I read the "my airplane" as referring exactly to the taking of control, with the point being that in the eyes of many those two words and the fact that Sully "took control" made him a hero, and the fact that Peter didn't... well, many people don't get it. That simple impression has stuck regardless of whether or not taking control was the right decision.


Just to be absolutely clear - we are all in agreement that Peter did the right thing by not taking control, analyzing the situation, and moving the flaps. Those actions probably saved many lives. Sadly, we lost most tabloid readers at "analyzing" and if they get as far as "flaps" they are probably thinkng of the things you slam down over your oversized luggage in the overheads.

No, it's not fair or just, but the court of media and public opinion rarely is.

[bearfoil]

infrequentflyer789

Thank You. That was indeed my point. I thought Sullenberger made the right call, in the end, He and Skiles know exactly. It is odd that if Captain Burkill had done the same as Sullenberger, the wrong thing, he'd have none of the 'flap', assuming a good result. Truth be told, Sullenberger, of the two Captains, had the (far) easier challenge.

Misfortune and misunderstanding sell Press, and are fertile fields for outrageous gossip.

The Outcome must not be misunderstood: Captain Burkill performed with great skill and crisis management, and was responsible for an excellent outcome.

I know that, you know that, the ones questioning the facts aren't qualified to decide.

[DozyWannabe]

bearfoil:
Truth be told, Sullenberger, of the two Captains, had the (far) easier challenge.
I understand what you're getting at, but I wouldn't go that far. Both scenarios are pretty much the dictionary definition of "fresh underwear time". I think in terms of the media response, Capt. Sullenberger was luckier in that it's pretty easy to explain to a layman exactly what he had to do, whereas Capt. Burkill's situation was more complicated in terms of thought process and explanation.

A lot of people aren't aware that the Captain can still be in command while not personally manipulating the primary flight controls. Still fewer are aware that a Captain can sometimes be more effective in an emergency situation when he is not the handling pilot - UA232 was a major case in point, and this has now been joined by BA038.

[EDIT : I realise that strictly speaking, with UA232 Capt. Haynes was handling the primary flight controls, but because they were next to useless with the hydraulics gone, Capt. Fitch was effectively the handling pilot, manipulating the throttles.]

[bearfoil]

Hmm. Briefly, I will say you are not wrong, however, you miss my point. Taken as a whole, Sullenberger was a great deal luckier and was treated like an apostle after the fact. Taken as a whole, the outcomes were both satisfying. In a way you prove my point. It is a long discussion that could end with either verdict, so I will simply join your accolade to the BA pilots and crew. Don't eat the chicken. Go with the Lamb.

bear

[GK430]

The whole comparison with BA038 and the US Air 1549 is what in my mind has left PB the 'loser' - the very undeserving pilot who for the last two plus years has been left with such an uncertain future.
The 777 crew confronted by what? Was the word Rollback such a familiar aeronautical term that the Media and general public could grasp? Hardly, and they were not going to get the official explanation there and then - investigations take time, but aren't so many keen to have their speculative say!
Two years down the line the Official Report is published but in the meantime the world seemingly wants to villify someone. The AAIB are thorough and time should not be their constraint, but why could B.A. not have stood up and be seen to be totally supportive?

Sullenberger - Birdstrike, so obvious and plain for all to see, let alone for the crew who were not left in any doubt as to what had just occurred.

From a lay perspective, the B.A. crew had to re-assess their actions leading up to the loss of thrust and realising that their actions had been text book and nothing missed, now try to analyse how to make the best of the situation - with so few seconds remaining.

So the crew of the US Air are instant heroes because we could all grasp what had happened and because PB retained his professional discipline and adhered to all that was demanded of him the world made its impatient judgement.

More than words are now needed to show the appreciation that is long overdue.

[Jabawocky]

YES

BA should be lobbied by you, your unions the media etc to publically squash the ill truths and make a generous offer to re-employ the pilot with all entitlements.

If I was Willie Walsh, I would have not let management accept his VR application, rather had him promoted instead.

The facts were there, and after reading PB's book it seems quite clear, BA stuck its head in the sand and refused to correct its ways for the sake of "losing face". A concept not well iked in aviation:hmm:.

Unless the guy is a complete :mad:....the BA folk among you should lobby the company to fix its wrong doings.

Lets face it, the actions of both the crew saved BA from a massive disaster, one that would have cost many times more than the one they had. They deserve a massive bonus....one would think:cool:.

J

[wiggy]

With all the arguments around here as to who was the "best pilot", (a lot of it seemingly coming from non-pilots) this thread is turning into X-Factor or some other celebrity game. Well here, thankfully we don't get a vote.

Firstly PB and Sully were both presented with a heap of c**p at a critical stage of flight.

Sullenberger was a great deal luckier

Why? Do you think think in the wash up he said: "Man, I was really lucky only to fly through a flock of Geese, I'm really glad I didn't have a double engine roll back on Final"

IMHO Sullenberger's decision relatively early on to consider the Hudson as an option - and ultimately decide to use it, was not down to luck, it was decision making of the highest order. The survival of his passengers and crew was not down to him being "luckier" than PB.

(but yes, PB was badly let down by BA, Sully's achievements were rightly recognised.)

[Bronx]

and :mad: the lawyers and the shareholders

Just like you're entitled to :mad: the financial advisors you pay to give you tax planning advice.
And :mad: the doctors who give you medical advice.
And :mad: any expert whose paid to give you expert advice.

:rolleyes:

[Spendid Cruiser]

Still fewer are aware that a Captain can sometimes be more effective in an emergency situation when he is not the handling pilot.
Possibly the Turkish accident at Schipol as an example. I could be infered that the Captain taking control exacerbated the situation and critically hindered the recovery. From the report the F/O appeared to be the first to react and I suspect that had he remaining in control the thrust levers would not have returned to idle.