The Coventry Incident - the ONLY thread?

[London Flyer]

Reports That Two Light Aircraft Crash At Combe Abbey Near Coventry | UK News | Sky News (http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/UK-News/Reports-That-Two-Light-Aircraft-Crash-At-Combe-Abbey-Near-Coventry/Article/200808315080662?lpos=UK%2BNews_3&lid=ARTICLE_15080662_Reports%2BThat%2BTwo%2BLight%2BAircraft %2BCrash%2BAt%2BCombe%2BAbbey%2BNear%2BCoventry)

[Dannyboyblue]

Two light planes collide mid-air
Map of area

Five people have been killed when two light aircraft crashed in Warwickshire after colliding mid-air.

West Midlands Ambulance said one aircraft crashed into Brandon Woods in Coventry. The other crashed into a field between Brinklow and the city.

It is understood both planes were making their final approach to the airport when they collided.

The Air Accident Investigation Branch is aware and emergency services are in attendance.

[vanHorck]

Thread is running on Rumours, dunno why

Alledged to be a Cessna 402 and a home built, 5 people killed. It's horrific!

[rocket3]

sky news says cessna on 3 mile final, micolight crossing flight path at 90 degrees hit by cessna.

terrible news.

[Mercenary Pilot]

Plea for Coventry air crash witnesses

Aug 18 2008 (http://www.coventrytelegraph.net/news/coventry-news/2008/08/18/) By Michaelm Corley

STUNNED emergency service workers have vowed to launch a thorough investigation after Coventry and Warwickshire suffered one of its worst air disasters.


The mid-air collision, which claimed five lives, sparked a massive search-and-rescue operation which covered a three-mile radius between Coombe Abbey and Binley Woods.


Speaking just a few hundred yards from where debris had landed on Brinklow Road, Det Supt Adrian McGee, of Warwickshire Police, said yesterday: "How they collided and how they came to the collision we still do not know.


"Our main aim now is to recover the bodies as quickly as we can.
"Then we will conduct a thorough investigation. "We already have witnesses and two sites of debris to check.
"But we need more witnesses, and we appeal to anyone who saw anything to contact us."



He confirmed that both pilots had been in touch with Coventry Airport's air traffic control just moments before the disaster happened.


Mick Leach, incident commander of Warwickshire Fire and Rescue Service, said: "At the moment our thoughts are really on getting the task done.
"Clearly there are a lot of people who are going to get some very distressing news.


"Our priority is that we can retrieve the bodies as quickly as possible and that those relatives can be notified and can have time and privacy to mourn their loss."


He added that specialist equipment, including lifting, cutting and lighting gear, had been called in to help with the recovery operation.



Three paramedic officers, an ambulance and the Warwickshire and Northamptonshire Air Ambulance had also been sent to the scene.
Richard Topping, of West Midlands Ambulance Service, was at home in Rugby when the call came in.


He said: "We received several calls to say two light aircraft had been in a collision to the east of the Coventry Road.


"The services arrived and the situation was very confused.
"All five persons were confirmed dead at the scene."


Mr Topping said the nearest home was about two miles away from the crash site.


He added: "We were all working together - the police, the fire service, the ambulance services and the police air operation to locate the scene.
"There was significant wreckage over the area."


Emergency service workers confirmed that the single-engined aircraft came down in a field close to Coventry Road - between Brinklow and Coventry. The pilot was confirmed dead at the scene.


The other aircraft, a twin-engined Cessna, came down in Birchley Wood.
Four people, including the pilot, were confirmed dead at the scene by the doctor from the Warwickshire and Northamptonshire Air Ambulance.


A West Midlands Ambulance Service spokesman said: "The helicopter assisted the ambulance service by making it easier to find the locations of the two aircraft which were approximately a mile apart.


"Sadly there was nothing that could be done other than the grim task of confirming the deaths of the five people."

As I said in the previous thread, its possible that the next-of-kin hadn't been informed. I don't think there is anything "dodgy" going on, the thread has obviously been deleted by ether the Mods or the original poster.

While I don't usually see a problem with accident discussions on here, I hadn't realised that the bodies are still in situ so out of respect I will not be posting further on this subject until the bodies have been recovered and the pilots officially identified.

My condolences to the families of the deceased at this difficult time.

[IO540]

I posted this on the original thread (most likely deleted by the thread starter; it happens - I deleted the Graham Hill thread because some ATCOs didnt like me repeating stuff that's already been written in some books covering the incident)

I'm amazed we don't bump into each other more often than we actually do and delighted too.The UK average is about one per year over the last 10 years. All except one were below 1000ft; the last one (not the current one) was reportedly at 1800ft, and this one (assuming 2 to 2.5nm from runway, as reported) would have likely also been below 1000ft. Clearly, the risk is at very low levels.

All were in VMC. The last civilian GA IMC mid-air in UK airspace was reportedly c. 1942.

I think it would be helpful if the AAIB issued a brief stement of the FACTS as known, within 24 hrs of a high profile incident like this, to help prevent speculation. I believe the NTSB in the USA do something like this. It could include whether next of kin have been informed or not. The problem is that waiting for the full report will take up to a year, and callous though it might seem, most of us will have forgotten the incident.Very much agree. Especially as so many GA AAIB reports are highly speculative in the really important areas (no CVR, no FDR).

The one thing I would like to know is what clearance, if any, the SE pilot had. The collision would appear to be within the ATZ.

[PPRuNe Towers]

Having an X files moment here in the Towers and looking for the thread.

Regards
Rob

[airborne_artist]

Haven't seen the old thread for a few hours, but saw this:

BMAA Online (http://www.bmaa.org/newsitem.asp?NewsID=161)

It is being widely reported that the mid-air collision at Coventry on 17th August involved a microlight aircraft. Using the CAA UK Register I have confirmed that the aircraft was not a microlight. It was a two seat homebuilt light aircraft from the LAA fleet.
Irrespective of aircraft type I would like to offer the condolences of all the BMAA membership to the families and friends of the pilots and passengers of the two aircraft.


Geoff Weighell 08-2008

Rod1 suggested an aircraft type in the old thread, and this may confirm that suggestion.

[ComJam]

If thread has been lost I hope it was during an attempt to move it to a more suitable and respectful position. Private Flying was absoultely the wrong place for it to be...the Crew of the RVL aircraft were fellow professionals flying for a Commercial purpose.

Can i suggest that if Rumours and News wasn't deemed suitable then maybe Bizjets and GA might.

Cheers

[airborne_artist]

The collision would appear to be within the ATZ.

The controlled airspace overlay that I have for Google Earth suggests that the 402 came down about 600 m outside the ATZ, and the SEP about 2000m outside the ATZ.

[Rod1]

I had it down as about ½ a mile outside the ATZ. If, as has been reported, both aircraft were inbound, one would have expected both to be talking to the same people. Does Coventry fly a large circuit? Could the Smaller aircraft have been X wind and the 402 on a straight in?

Rod1

[PPRuNe Towers]

I am afraid all 8 pages of the original thread are gone.

We've made a thorough check of the logs since I last wrote and they clearly indicate the thread was deleted by Danny.

He is adamant that he did no such thing and at the moment we are drilling down deeper into the software to see if it it a further 'spinnoff' of the dire consequences of changes made in America to the site last Friday.

All I can do is offer a straightforward apology to everyone reading this thread. Yet another hideous snafu to complete a dire weekend for the service PPRuNe should but hasn't offered.

The subject is absolutely open to discussion, informed speculation and, most importantly, operations such as the approach on 23 beginning in open airspace.

The information, tributes and the safety discussion regarding transponders, whether mode S or not, is a loss to us all whatever licence we hold. The immediate aftermath of a tragedy such as this provides a vital window when entrenched views and dogma are open to change. The simple fact is that when the report is issued any resulting thread is miniscule by comparison both in size, quality and in the power to change minds.

And for that reason Danny and I apologise once more and unreservedly.

Rob Lloyd

[Keith_P]

Unless things have changed since I did my early PPL training, the reported position of the accident near to Coombe is well outside the circuit at Coventry.

[vanHorck]

last discussion before the thread went to the stars was about the identity of the SEP.

Via the Flyer website found this posting on the BMAAe site.

18-Aug-2008 - Mid-Air collision at Coventry
It is being widely reported that the mid-air collision at Coventry on 17th August involved a microlight aircraft.
Using the CAA UK Register I have confirmed that the aircraft was not a microlight. It was a two seat homebuilt light aircraft from the LAA fleet.
Irrespective of aircraft type I would like to offer the condolences of all the BMAA membership to the families and friends of the pilots and passengers of the two aircraft.
Geoff Weighell 08-2008

Why this secrecy? What type of plane was it and where was it based?

[Local Variation]

Firstly condolences to those involved and also to those at CVT ATC whom no doubt feel pretty shaken.

There does need to be a debate at an appropriate time, probably on another thread regarding CVT as Pprune Towers eludes.

The approach to 23 is in open airspace through a corridor of traffic that routes north to south via the Lichfield NDB east of BHX and west of EMA. On the other side of the M1 there is Husbands Bosworth, one of the busiest glider sites in the UK. As a regular user of this airspace, you need alot of eyes to keep a good continual watchout and CVT can be found to be busy.

Extending the class D controlled airspace towards Bitteswell VRP maybe one recommendation that comes out of this tragedy.

[tuscan]

ComJam,

this accident has also affected private flyers, inparticularly the light aircraft pilot involved in this incident. Respect comes in many forms and this is as good a place as any for private flyers and those of us aspiring to commercial flight to pass on condolances and also to speculate a little, its our nature to do so.

[dangrey]

The thread may still be recoverable, it's probably still in the database, but needs some expert SQL poking to retrieve. Seen it before.

BTW, I'm a gliderpilot, and the importance of a constant lookout is drilled into us. We also have the benefit of excellent visibility from our cockpits with no pillars for other aircraft to hide behind. Never hurts to say it again -- an effective, constant horizon scan can be vital, especially in areas where aircraft congregate.

There's also the Flarm system which is very popular in Europe, but not so much in the UK. I hope that changes; it's no replacement for a lookout, but as someone testing Flarm once said, "it's the one you don't see that matters".

[EGCA]

Condolences and thoughts for all those involved.

I was visiting the Ryton Organic Gardens at Ryton on Dunsmore on Friday afternoon, my first visit to that area just East of Coventry, situated slightly to the South of the approach, and under a very busy piece of airspace.

Singles, twins, a helicopter, two historic flight aircraft, faster traffic overtaking slower aircraft, and all turning to make approaches into Coventry. I had no idea the place was so busy GA-wise.

I'm just a layman enthusiast, not a flyer, so I make no judgement or inference whatsoever, I just report what I saw on Friday.

EGCA

[slip and turn]

Well as for where the original went, it looked to me as if someone had tried to restore it to R&N, but if the "Moved To" device was still operating, one could imagine what kind of spiral dive that could create! Meantime, I am sure someone in PPRuNe proper will find enough of it to do a proper restoration job soon.

As for the type of the SEP, someone on seemingly good authority in the original thread (I think it was Rod1 ) said he'd been told it was a XXX ... I found some library images on Google ... looks quite a decent bit of kit.

[PPRuNe Pop]

Stormvector, let us get one thing straight here.

You started a thread on R&N. It was the wrong forum and should have been in Private Flying. In this forum 4 other people decided to start a thread on the same subject. The simple fact is that we do not allow that.

Between us, PPRuNe Towers and I had to merge the other threads. Yours in R&N I closed but you can add it to this thread if you wish.

As PT said, we have had a time of it since Friday, and no one is trying harder than the mods to ensure that PPRuNe is running at its best.

PPP

[egbt]

Why this secrecy? What type of plane was it and where was it based?

It's all very secrative. Some people on another website stated they know the plane, and know the guy. Notwithstanding the next-of-kin issue, surely the type of aircraft would be known at this time?


As a home build it could be the only one flying in UK or one of a very small number the next of kin issue is therefore potentially significant.

[Rod1]

There have been several unsubstantiated reports on the identity of the “second aircraft”. I have received messages indicating a 152, a PA28 and a KR2. I have no conformation of what the type is. IF it is a KR2 then there are about 25 on the UK register, so no “identification” issues. I know two owners, one based locally to the incident. I have picked up the phone and put it down several times… If anybody actually knows anything (by PM if you want to keep it confidential) then I would very much like to know one way or the other.

Rod1

[vanHorck]

there are more than 10 KR2 on the active register (if it was an KR2)

[LINEFINDER100]

Me too, Rod1. I seriously hope it wasn't him. Seems Geoff Weighall knows the reg, but isn't releasing it.
Dave

[vanHorck]

I m sure Geoff reads this forum. Perhaps he can pm you guys?

[englishal]

If thread has been lost I hope it was during an attempt to move it to a more suitable and respectful position. Private Flying was absoultely the wrong place for it to be...the Crew of the RVL aircraft were fellow professionals flying for a Commercial purpose.
For the record there are a number of us on here who hold commercial licences and get paid to fly from time to time. We also fly privately, as I suspect the second aeroplane in this incident was being flown.

Who gives a damn where the thread appears? It'll get a wider audience on the PF forum, that is the only one I and many others bother to visit.

[wulf190a]

Lets get sanity and above all,FACTS.When I had my near fatal crash, when I woke up seven weeks later all sorts of rumours had started all b**ll**** Geoff Weighill from the BMAA has the reg and it is not a microlight. Stop the assumptions and think of thr familys left to deal with this.wulf

[Standard Noise]

I have it on fairly good authority that it was a KR2, and the reg details show that the registered owner is local to Coventry.

[gemini76]

Rod1 ..... check your pm's

[stormvector]

Wrong end of sticks... Stormvector wasnt kicking pprunes arse, he was commenting in on others points that were a little unhelpful regarding microlights, private or commercial, should we talk about this or should we not, ect...

To UNDERLINE my point, if this is a forum for Aviation Chat ect (regardless if its in R & N, private flying or what ever) then cool... lets talk and share info, and try to figure the facts out... without p***ing contests of "commercial vs private" or "real planes vs microlights", thats what i was saying...

having had experiences very simlilar to the one in Q, a forum such as this is invaluble for gaining insight into incidents, to inform and highlight points that we can all learn from...

Anyhow back to my other points, re was the 402 flight checking and was the Radar F/S ect... any info?...

[Rod1]

Thanks for the PM’s. My friend was not involved.

Condolences to all affected.

Rod1

[Standard Noise]

Pieceing together what I am hearing, GEYES had been out on an environmental survey and was on approach having been handed over form RAD to TWR, then the incident happened further down the approach. Radar was fully servicable and manned at the time.

But having worked RAD at Cov (on the set up they still have), I can tell you that it's not easy doing radar in Class G airspace, especially primary radar. After you transfer any IFR inbound to TWR, you can only watch the surrounding area and hope that other airspace users will try to avoid the instrument approach path. You can only pass traffic info to the TWR to pass onto inbounds, there's nothing else you can do.
Of the two ATCOs on duty yesterday, I think they were both there back in 1994 when the 737 went into Willenhall Wood.

[Rod1]

Both aircraft were in radio contact with Cov.

Rod1

[Southernboy]

having to simply hope is unacceptable. Airports with instrument approaches should have some form of protection. The decision can consider local conditions but this is more CAA "hands off."

[DX Wombat]

I'm a gliderpilot, and the importance of a constant lookout is drilled into usThat's a nasty comment. The implication that the pilots involved were not keeping a good lookout is reprehensible. The ONLY people who know whether or not this is true are those involved and, sadly, they cannot tell us. What makes you think pilots of powered aircraft don't have the same or even better training? I certainly did and it was commented on when I had a check flight for another club. Please refrain from trying to score one-upmanship points on such a sad thread as this one. We should all have respect for those who have died and their families and friends and leave the discernment of the cause(s) to the AAIB who have far greater skills at determining the reasons than anyone here - except their investigators should any of them post on/read PPRuNe.

[VP959]

I think that's a bit harsh - like it or not, gliders, like some microlights, paragliders etc, DO have much better provision for keeping a good lookout.

Also, gliders, like other soaring aircraft, spend a fair bit of time flying at close quarters with other aircraft, so their pilots tend to be more aware of keeping a CONSTANT good lookout.

This isn't a criticism of other aviators, it's simple fact.

I've flown many different types and know full well that visibility varies enormously. I never, ever, felt wholly comfortable flying under VFR in a twin turbo prop, for example, as the "letterbox" view out always made me feel as if I was missing the view of so much of the sky. Flying a glider, or flexwing microlight, has conditioned me to appreciate the virtues of good cockpit visibility and also understand the vulnerability of flying something slow and light in the presence of heavier stuff.

Whatever the AAIB outcome, we can conclude that two aircraft colliding in Class G is very likely to have had an element of poor lookout as a causal factor.

VP

[grizzled]

DX Wombat: Your reaction to dangrey's post was way over the top. I've read it re-read it and there is nothing in there that suggests he was criticising those involved in this horrific accident -- or anybody else for that matter. I've been involved in aircraft accident investigation for many years and I believe that a reminder of the importance of diligent scanning is something that can save lives, and wasn't out of place here.

Grizz

[El Grifo]

Stormvector, let us get one thing straight here.

You started a thread on R&N. It was the wrong forum and should have been in Private Flying. In this forum 4 other people decided to start a thread on the same subject. The simple fact is that we do not allow that.

Between us, PPRuNe Towers and I had to merge the other threads. Yours in R&N I closed but you can add it to this thread if you wish.



It appears there are more twists in more knickers that was previously imagined.

It was I who started the thread on R+N, seconds after hearing of the tragic situation on Sky News.

It was a reported as a collision between two aircraft in the vicinity of a civil airfield.

It was more than just a rumour and certainly news, so that is where I chose to post it.

A fairly embarrassing display of ego-tripping then took place about where the posts should be located, eclipsing the real and tragic content.

At that point I butted out, my prick firmly secured within my Y-Fronts.

I do not know why this kind of thing brings out the worst in aviators or wannabe aviators, I only know that it does!


I certainly did not delete said post.

Perhaps however, it was better that somebody did for the avoidance of further embarrassment!

Cheers
El G.

[frontlefthamster]

Whatever the AAIB outcome, we can conclude that two aircraft colliding in Class G is very likely to have had an element of poor lookout as a causal factor.


Utter sanctimonious and deeply offensive rubbish.

The inadequate functioning of the human being and its senses, with respect to achieving effective lookout in the aviation environment, may turn out to be critical. But to suggest 'poor lookout' is outrageous. I strongly suggest you withdraw your remark immediately; when you have, I'll withdraw mine.

[El Grifo]

I herewith, rest my case. :(

El G.

[dope05]

what a load of egotistical sanctimonious prats that run this site, this thread has been moved to "Private Flying"---- quote " and some other people". As far as I am aware the C402 was on a sortie with 3 commercial pilots on board and an engineer. Maybe it is to free up space in rumours and news (obviously the deaths of five people is not news!_ but hey a 738 blowing a tyre is STOP PRESS!), so those overpaid system monitor idiots that sit at the front pushing buttons and massaging their own egos can whinge about some other non event

OUT- forever

[stanleysteamer]

I took a look at this thread to see if I could find out if I knew anyone in GEYES from AAG where I worked for ten years, pity that with the loss of so many lives, all I see is arguing among the ppruners. Have a little compasion, what ever your feeling may be on how why etc

[stanleysteamer]

Hey dope05 I agree with you, but pprune is full of compalining pilots that think the world owes them a living, always has been. Too many pilots think they are something very special these days, see what they think when the next downturn arrives, coming soon me thinks

[IO540]

Whatever the AAIB outcome, we can conclude that two aircraft colliding in Class G is very likely to have had an element of poor lookout as a causal factor.

I don't see much evidence for that - other than tradition.

As has been said here many times before, assuming straight trajectories, a target on a genuine collision course will be a stationary point in your field of view, and unless contrast is working in your favour you won't spot it until too late.

All those who 'nearly hit and would have done had I not taken evasive action' were PROB99 not on an accurate collision track with you in the first place.

The Mk1 eyeball is a cornerstone of aviation tradition (along with epaulettes, stopwatches, circular slide rules) but in reality it is about as good as a chocolate teapot. It works if the target is not on a straight trajectory so it probably works OK in gliding, but in GA most people fly straight lines most of the time.

If one plane is flying the ILS, accurately, and perhaps doing an ILS survey (the wreckage movie on sky.com shows the gear UP and normally you would have the gear down at 2-3D if you were going to land) and somebody flies in from the side at say 100kt, you won't spot him.

No doubt we won't find out - rumours and leaks aside - why the SE traffic was where it was until the AAIB report comes out a year from now, which is a great pity IMHO.

The great protector is the big sky and incredibly low traffic density (compared to say a road). That's why midairs happen at low levels, generally 1000ft or below.

[VFE]

Condolences to all affected by this terrible accident.

Speculation is a positive thing in my view so long as it refrains from negative or offensive assumptions on deceased aviators abilities. Clearly nobody here was involved in the accident on sunday so I doubt very much whether anyone can catagorically state that a poor lookout was the overriding factor in this accident. Although 'lookout' may play a part one must also realise that any number of other factors could be involved including airspace classification, ATC limitations and not least a bit of sunshine on a weekend bringing many flyers into the busy UK skies. My sources tell me Coventry was extremely busy on sunday.

To insinuate the pilots involved were not maintaining a proper lookout is... well... I refer readers to the red writing at the bottom of this page! Constant bearing = constant danger and as the above poster states, you probably won't spot it until it's too late.

My thoughts are with all those affected by this awful accident.

RIP fellow aviators. :(

VFE.

[hec7or]

Sorry mods, but as I understand it, G EYES was flying in a commercial capacity with a commercial pilot at the controls on approach to an airport approved for public transport.

I fly 737s in and out of CVT for a living, and would like to know more about why a light aircraft could collide with a public transport cat aircraft at 5 miles on the the ILS at my home base without having to trawl through some of the the more obscure threads of this website.

No disrespect to private pilots intended, but would it not be appropriate to keep this thread in R & N or Airports and Routes for the time being as I'm sure people will keep opening threads on those forums in order to find out more about this serious accident.

[S-Works]

Sorry mods, but as I understand it, G EYES was flying in a commercial capacity with a commercial pilot at the controls on approach to an airport approved for public transport.

And what about the other victim, not flying public transport, seemingly a private flyer in a private aircraft on a private flight?

[fisbangwollop]

Its a sad fact that any time we have an accident, fatal or not the speculation and comments on pprune generally turns into a bit of a bun fight!! As far as i am concerned lives here have been lost and that is so sad, I earn my living by looking after GA traffic as far as ATC is concened, I love my job and also the people I speak to in carrying out my task so any loss is a great loss to me.........that said my own views on this is that it appears that 2 aircraft have collided in class G airspace whilst operating VFR....if they were recieving an ATC service or not the buck stops with the aircraft commanders maintaining a good look out!! In this case I fear that this failing was the ultimate cause of this tragic accident.

[VP959]

Look, I don't mean to be offensive, but how else do two aircraft come to collide in good vis and class G if there isn't an "element of poor lookout" involved? Both were responsible for their own navigation, notwithstanding the fact that at least one was making an approach.

Like many of you, I've seen most of the ways in which other aircraft can remain near-invisible, particularly if they are on a collision course and so have no apparent relative motion. However, safe operation under VFR means see and avoid. I'm in no way apportioning blame, or casting aspersions as to ability, but the fact remains that neither of these competent pilots, both of whom were operating under VFR, saw the other in time to avoid a collision.

Maybe that means that the lookout of both was exemplary but that some other factor caused both pilots to simultaneously experience something that made them unable to avoid the other. We will find out in due course, when the report is published. I'll re-open this thread then and see whether or not my assertion that there was an "element of poor lookout as a causal factor" turns out to be correct. If it isn't, then I will apologise profusely.

In the meantime, it behoves us all to think a little more about how effective our lookout really is, irrespective of the cause of this tragedy. I make no apology for highlighting this aspect, as I know beyond doubt that many of us could keep a better lookout than we do.

VP

[frontlefthamster]

the buck stops with the aircraft commanders maintaining a good look out


What is it with this desire to blame???

We are human, the folk in those aircraft were human. A human may do his utmost, highly-trained best, to achieve a good lookout, but may still find himself in a collision. This is because the human eye and brain are very poor at identifying targets with which they will collide.

So please would you stop blaming the pilots and start simply accepting that the human is not good at lookout (in the same way he's not good at avoiding CFIT), and that technology may be the answer.

I pointed out, in the lost thread, that the leisure aviation community was unwilling to accept Mode S. I said that, in my view, those who voted against it gave up their right to bemoan collisions. If you can't be bothered to put up with the expense and weight of fitting a transponder, you have no right to worry about collision, because you could have done something to avoid it and you haven't.

Until and unless transponder carriage is mandatory, there will be no demonstrable case for fitting TCAS to small aircraft, and the opportunity to prevent collisions will continue to be missed.

Please remember too that the relatives and friends of those deceased will read this.

Once again, I offer my heartfelt condolences.

[NorthSouth]

None of you can possibly say poor lookout had anything to do with this. How many times have you actually had traffic info and had several pairs of eyes looking for it and never seen it? I've had lots. And as for 'big sky' etc, this collision happened at approximately 3nm final at a full ATC radar-equipped airport, with one and possibly both a/c speaking to ATC. Not the same as a random conflict in the FIR.
NS

[Lost man standing]

IO540I deleted the Graham Hill thread because some ATCOs didnt like me repeating stuff that's already been written in some books covering the incidentI am not a controller and never have been, although many of my friends are or have been.

It is a libel whether you read it in a book or not, and you are still responsible for it. Try reading the report you claim to be referring to, and telling the truth about why you deleted the thread. Instead of attacking those that correct you have the guts to give the apology you owe to the controller involved.

Oh, and in future stick to commenting on things you know about.

On this thread you are still giving a poor argument. Aircraft on a closing trajectory are not that difficult to spot. Even if not on a constant bearing the relative movement is small enough to be irrelevant at any great distance, and I and pilots I have flown with have seen many aircraft at a great distance. Noting the poor lookout of some others I have flown with, who have failed to spot everything I have seen, I can see how some pilots think it is useless to try to maintain visual separation.

See and avoid is difficult, but it also does work. It is stupid and dangerous to suggest otherwise.

P.S. I am not criticising either pilot in this case. I have not been in the UK since it happened, and even if I had seen all the reporting I would not know the real facts. See and avoid can fail through no fault of the crew, but to suggest it is useless is ridiculous.

[englishal]

Two aeroplanes collided in VMC. Obviously they didn't spot each other or else they wouldn't have collided. So something must have gone wrong, and "see and avoid" failed - whether it was bad airframe design creating a blind spot, sun in the eyes, not looking out, looking at the airport instead of "up final", concentrating on flying an ILS and looking at the instruments, another problem diverting crew's attention.....whatever

One thing that was mentioned was instrument approaches. An IAP in VMC does not absolve the commander of "see and avoid" any more than a VFR pilot joining the circuit. That goes for a 747 or a C150.

Perhaps it is time to enforce a) collision avoidance systems on ALL commercial aeroplanes and b) mandatory transponders on all aircraft?

Some will say this is a knee jerk reaction, but if we can't rely on See and Avoid then should something be done?

[mm_flynn]

I pointed out, in the lost thread, that the leisure aviation community was unwilling to accept Mode S. I said that, in my view, those who voted against it gave up their right to bemoan collisions. If you can't be bothered to put up with the expense and weight of fitting a transponder, you have no right to worry about collision, because you could have done something to avoid it and you haven't.
The 'leisure aviation' community didn't object to Mode-S as a whole - the arguments where that Mode S vs Mode C was unnecessary and that it was not technically possible to fit transponders to many aircraft and in light of this technical detail a mandate to do so was silly. (there was a smaller 'civil liberty group' who have objected to transponders on general principle and I would agree with your comment as it applies to this group)

In addition - and possibly relevant in this case, was the argument that the lack of TIS and/or 'lars' Radar Service resulted in very little benefit to those fitting the technology. It will be a very sorry comment on the Safety Regulation approach of the UK if it transpires both aircraft were transponding.

The 402 surely had Mode-S and Glass (so in the US would have TIS). In addition, the decision by the regulator to allow the sale of radar data to support NATS' profits rather than cover marginal cost (and therefore being 'expensive') will have been a part in Coventry operating their own primary only radar rather than a primary/secondary feed from NATS. My untrained eye finds it much easier to see conflicts on the NATS screens than on Coventry's.

[Lost man standing]

mm_flynn

Glass? TIS? What do you mean?

I suspect you are talking about technological solutions. However the 402 is an old aircraft, not often kitted with such things. That does not mean it is unsafe, or that it should necessarily be fitted due to a rare and unfortunate occurence. I think too many people are trying to find a reason for a tragic accident and make it impossible to happen again, when such things have always occured and always will, and risks must be balanced by rewards. Maybe you agree, I am not sure from your post whether you think the technology should have been fitted or not.

Thoughts about how to make accidents less likely are good. Technical solutions can be very good too. Some days, though, an accident occurs and we should leave it at that, until we have more information. Even then we should consider the perspective of the accident, and its rarity.

[VFE]

Sorry to be the bearer of scary realities here but you can be maintaining a great lookout and still miss another aircraft on a direct collision course!

To insinuate "poor lookout" purely because a collision occured in VMC is absurd... and very unfair given the fact those involved cannot voice their account. Shameful to say the least.

VFE.

[rmac]

Now I see where I have been getting it wrong all this time. There I was thinking that if I was cleared on an ILS approach (not a practice ILS approach) to a radar equipped airport that all I should have to do was concentrate on my scan till DH regardless of what the weather was doing outside of the window and I would be protected....clear skies and a quick lookout just being a bonus.

Would any of the "see and avoid" advocates in this case like to extend their argument to explain how a large commercial aircraft with a fairly swift approach speed (say Concorde or an A380) is supposed to see and avoid a microlight in those conditions ?

Surely the approach is either protected or it isn't ?

[robin]

We'll have to wait for more information from AAIB so there is little point in speculating.

However, it would be a relief to some of us to rule out the involvement of friends and colleagues asap. It is now over 24 hours since the incident and we still don't know, officially, of the type involved. If the BMAA knew hours ago the type of the SEP involved, it seems odd that that the media is still peddling false stories.

In particular, there is a presumption amongst the Great British Public (as I found out at work today) that the Cessna 402 was automatically in the right because it was filled with experienced commercial pilots.

In the sport and recreational area we have to be careful not to be labelled as casual and dangerous playboys getting in the way of 'important' traffic

There is no doubt that something went wrong with look-out - be it visual or electronically assisted, and there, for the grace of God, go all of us. But in the meantime more facts are needed to make any judgements. These will emerge in time, so let's wait for them to appear.

[Say again s l o w l y]

VP959. I'm trying to assume you have more than 5 minutes in your logbook, but each time you post that lookout is an infallible way of keeping traffic apart 100% I doubt it more and more.

This was a tragic accident. The fact that the two crews didn't see eachother is going to be a factor obviously (you generally don't fly into things you have seen and positively identified) but that doesn't mean that anyone is at fault.

I was based at CVT for a while and operating into there during the day could be an absolute nightmare. We had TCAS and two crew with their eyes wired outside the cockpit, but the simple fact is that even with a controller telling you where traffic is, TCAS showing you and with you looking hard, you just don't see it.

We generally operated at night, which cut down the problems of Commercial Vs GA, but if we were late back in the mornings, then descending into CVT at 200+kts could be a scary experience. I pitied the poor controllers who were looking after us, they had us under radar control and were just trying to do their best to thread us through the maze of airspace and aircraft. We'd often stay a bit high and slow down as much as we could and if we could go VFR to help the eyeball count under a RAS we'd do it. Not exactly commercially expedient, but neither is smashing into someone.

As for glider pilots keeping great lookouts, why did I have to file an airprox from within controlled airspace on an IFR plan when we flew straight through a gaggle of thermalling gliders 2000ft up into the London CTA? How we didn't collect any I'll never know, it scared the living the daylights out of me at the time.

RIP chaps.

I have a horrid feeling that this may have been an accident waiting to happen in that area, but I know nothing more than what has been reported on the news. I know there has been a move to increase CVT's airspace, accidents like this if proven to be because mixing IFR and transiting VFR traffic, then there is no option really.

[mad_jock]

http://www.bredow-web.de/ILA_2004/Grossraumflugzeuge/Cessna_F-406_Caravan_II/Cessna-F-406-Cockpit.JPG

The 404 cockpit is very similar to the F406.

My thoughts are with everyone down in COV.

And to be honest I don't think TCAS would have helped in this situation anyway being inside 3 miles. TCAS II goes into TA only below 1000ft agl.
And just above that it goes a bit funny and flips between RA and TA depending what rate of decent you have on. It can generate confusing cycling between warnings and resolutions. By the time it had triggered with a traffic traffic and you had spotted where the danger was and started looking for it, it would have proberly happend. That is if you hadn't presumed it was some knob who had just turn their mode C on sitting at the hold waiting for line up.

[Pace]

I tend to support FrontLeftHampster on this. See and avoid is unrealistic. Flying an aircraft especially single pilot will sadly mean that he will have to not only be looking out but within too.
Especially on approach the commander will be selecting flap and gear, checklists and approach plates as well as scanning instruments.
Even looking out in certain light and angles its likely that he will not see another aircraft.

GA is the poor man in aviation. More and more airspace is being put over to IFR traffic and VFR is being squeezed into less and less space.

Even with the best controllers offering RIS how many times are aircraft missed?

I was flying around London a few years ago as a safety pilot into sun in a 172 around London. The controller who was giving us an RIS missed an aircraft coming out of the sun towards us. I was looking up some frequences. When I looked up another aircraft passed within 12 feet over the top of us. So close I could see the tread on the tyres.

The Cirrus has a ballistic Parachute system. Maybe all aircraft should have transponders, Maybe all singles should have ballistic parachute systems and maybe maybe all twins and above should have TICAS fitted.

We have all been there where an aircraft got too close or was missed for some reason. This was unlucky but it will happen again.

Pace

[Facelookbovvered]

I find all this talk of see and be seen, well rather misplaced here and point less. We all know the out come, if not the reason and this should not happen to any aircraft on short final to a commercial airport (or another airport for that matter) as tragic as this is, this could very easliy have been a 737 with loss of a 100+ lives and answers are required in due course, to make sure as far as is possible that it never happens again at any airport or ideally anywhere else.

Back to see and be seen, not as easy as it sounds, i was flying in the area on the day and vis was good or very good, but even with TCAS and radar control some 'targets' were not eyeballed at even a few miles range and we knew where to look for them.

If you fly either for a living or fun we are all in the same sky and all are pilots, if you are not a pilot, then by all means express your sympathy at our loss, but please leave it at that, RIP

but for the grace of God:sad:

[Gertrude the Wombat]

Now I see where I have been getting it wrong all this time. There I was thinking that if I was cleared on an ILS approach (not a practice ILS approach) to a radar equipped airport that all I should have to do was concentrate on my scan till DH regardless of what the weather was doing outside of the window and I would be protected....clear skies and a quick lookout just being a bonus.
Yup. You've been getting it wrong.

Would any of the "see and avoid" advocates in this case like to extend their argument to explain how a large commercial aircraft with a fairly swift approach speed (say Concorde or an A380) is supposed to see and avoid a microlight in those conditions ?

Easy. Choose not to operate into airports which involve flying the approach in uncontrolled airspace.

Surely the approach is either protected or it isn't ?
Correct. And you can tell the difference by looking at the chart, which will tell you whether the approach is in controlled airspace (protected) or not (not).

[slip and turn]

One thing that was mentioned was instrument approaches. An IAP in VMC does not absolve the commander of "see and avoid" any more than a VFR pilot joining the circuit. That goes for a 747 or a C150.all of which is not usually what (most?) IFR pilots descending with an ILS actually are thinking about in the UK after receiving clearance to land...there's an emerging hole in the UK versus US way of doing things here, surely?

This is beginning to exhibit hallmarks of a classic accident at a busy airfield supporting busy VFR circuits entwined with straight in ILS traffic.

Coventry has long been home of an instructor school and CPL school I think, and our dearly beloved Air Atlantique plus various larger commercial operations like ThomsonFly from time to time. They must have almost bombproof procedures with all that instruction and testing going on. Has this type of conflict been a problem previously? Background noise on PPRuNe earlier indicated vicinity of CT locator can be a bit busy. Are all those training on instrument approaches taught that either they or their instructor will be keeping eyes peeled as they 'encroach'? into the circuit from long final? Seems a bit unlikely to me ...

I certainly do not remember it being drilled into my brain at ANOther airfield where CX & long straight in ILS are mixed. There was Radar coverage and I am now sorry to say that I relied heavily upon it unless particularly warned otherwise on the day. Whilst I expected to be aware of any radio clues of upset in the circuit, I certainly wasn't looking left or right while I was trying to hand fly the ILS...I will go as far as to say that by 3 miles and cleared to land then it was MY ILS, and I was Number 1 ...

Is Coventry a one-off? Has it always been eyes out all the way down the ILS for a full scan?

I DO recall having it drilled into me to look back (out) along final before turning final, but that's just one pair of MkI eyeballs as a last resort - again at a busy airport like this I think as circuit traffic I'd anticipate some correspondence whilst downwind on whether I had contact with the ILS traffic?

Each such airfield is different of course but though I hesitate to say it because it plays to media speculation i.e. 'what if it was a big jet', the background noise on this accident suggests we must surely see the Coventry instrument approach/radar coverage urgently re-evaluated. I only hesitate further to ask the counter question "Well if there was anything wrong with it, there would surely have been other incidents over the years ... and there haven't been ..."(?)

I hope we don't have to wait long for an official synopsis of this one because it takes a rather good GA pilot to nail an ILS and to do a full effective scan left and right at the same time, and it is easy for one pair of eyes on base to miss a fast one on long final unless told it's there and potentially conflicting.

[frontlefthamster]

A quick word of reply about a couple of things:

First: lookout and see and avoid. I fly aircraft, both big and small, in and out of CAS. Lookout is my last line of defence. I don't trust it, but it works most of the time. I simply know that because I'm human, it can't be relied upon. Interestingly, I fly with some people who are very recently experienced in air combat, and I give myself a huge pat on the back if I spot something before they do (this happens quite rarely). This tells me that, generally speaking, you can be better at lookout if you've been trained properly and your life has depended on it in a serious way.

Second: Mode S and Mode C.

Mode S is here; it works; and it's not terribly expensive compared to Mode C. Any move towards mandating Mode C would be pointless.

Yes, there are technical problems with the ultra-compact Mode S kit which is under development, but there's nothing like a blossoming market to sort out the geeks.

There are things afoot in the regulatory world which appear likely to put a stop to commercial operations outside CAS, because it's impossible to put together a reliable safety case against mid-air collisions, and mid-air collisions are quite common.

This might have one of three rough outcomes: either the commercial world stops operating outside CAS, or the other operators have to do something to address the threat that they (leisure pilots) pose to the commercial world (who are there for a purpose, not fun), or there's some sort of elastoplast job in the short term with a view to a better resolution in the longer game. No prizes for guessing how that might play out.

Finally, to mm flynn, the safety case has nothing to do with individual accidents; it's 'big picture' stuff, and I'm not even sure whose work covers the circumstances of this collision. Certainly, it's something the major ANSP would not be keen to associate themselves with, in my view.

[Put1992]

This thread is about two issues

1 is the Crash
2 is about the location of this thread, namely under private flying and not news and rumours

This is stupid and unnecessary.

I have therefore just opened another thread about the location of this thread.

This should enable the discussion to be split, here only about the fatal crash, the other one about our moderators and their choices

How will that help matters in any shape or form?

[SA120]

Condolences to the pilots that have lost there lives and their families that now have to deal with this tragedy.

I dont think it is helpful to portion blame to what happened but look at the evidence and try to find out what occured and why and what could be done to avoid a re occurence. (In Aviation learn from everyone and everything all of the time).

The Cessna is assumed to be on final approach but as mentioned earlier the gear was still up (what where their respective speeds )as clearly seen on the sky news film showing the aircraft upside down. Was the aircraft intending to land ? The aircraft is equipped for survey and calibration work, was the aircraft calibrating the ILS ? or testing its own equipment involving all crew on callibration/survey equipment question on board.

If both aircraft where talking to CVT where they talking to Radar or Twr. Where both aircraft reporting their correct positions. Did ATC warn of the other at any stage.

How many times have pilots been informed of other aircraft by a ATC service provider whether FIS or RIS on open airspace and being looking very hard for it and never seen it pass by. ( I have lots of times )

It would appear the smaller aircraft (what ever type) is approaching from one side and would have needed to look at 90 degrees or more to see the faster approaching C402. It would seem the C402 may have had the smaller aircraft ahead/to one side and the C402 would likely be travelling a lot faster in a clean configuration and a much higher powered machine.

Did the smaller aircraft have a transponder. Whether it did or did not is a good question. ATC would be able to see it. Did G-EYES have TCAS ? I think likely not therefore it would not pick up anything anyway.

The airspace around there and between Birmingham and East Mids and around Coventry is very busy with lots of users funnelled into the class G condensing the traffic. Birmingham and East Mids can ask pilots to remain clear of CAS usually initially and ask pilots to standby due a variety of factors and can sometimes be too busy to get back to them before they are approaching the CAS for a transit which will keep pilots in the corridor Also many pilots weaker on radio, not liking radio or not wishing to encumber anybody will not ask for a transit and will be happy to fly using gps or other means around any airspace increasing traffic density at certain periods in these hot spots, sometimes there is so much traffic in the hot spots that ATC may be unable to give a service of much value. Is there a way better to use Class D in order to help to reduce hot spots in class G or open FIR ? This was not likely a factor in this accident however could be worth noting to increase vigilance in these areas.

This is a terrible tragedy but this type of accident will happen again it is just a question of when and all pilots should be as vigilant as possible and practise good look out and scan techniques however ther will be always be times when you have to look inside the aircraft or even just in the other direction.

There for the grace of god go I.

[Fuji Abound]

I dont know these pilots but I am part of their community. I am very sorry for their loss.

My remarks that follow have potentially nothing to do with this accident but I cant help but comment on see and avoid.

I fly with TCAS for much of the time. Recently, and for the first time, I used TCAS to find and then formate with another aircraft (not the usual way I go about this). If you get the chance try it. It is a very good way of demonstrating even when you know where the traffic is just how difficult it can be to spot, particularly when you are moving parallel and at a similar speed to the traffic.

I have had three close misses. On one occasion over Germany I wasn’t the handling pilot and was looking at some papers. A brief look up and another aircraft was coming straight towards us. I could not believe the other pilot had not see it, or it us for that matter. Very rapid intervention on my part avoided and almost certain mid air. The handling pilot to this day can not believe how it was possible he hadn’t seen the traffic.

On final it is very likely a pilot will become fixated on the threshold or will momentarily avert his gaze to operate the gear, or flaps, or some element concerned with configuring the aircraft for the landing.

There is a mountain of evidence to suggest that see and avoid is not reliable even at GA speeds. See and avoid is not the salvation of avoiding collisions most of the time.

In a few thousand of hours of flying in VMC I become more and more concerned to use everything I know and every aid I have to minimise my reliance on see and avoid. Having done so I try to be meticulous about maintaining my scan as the arbiter of last resort.

As another example of course our scan should have started in the climb out. Anywhere in the circuit and the risk of a collision is high. The fact is the vast majority of low time pilots will not see an aircraft that cuts through their climb out from a position above them and to the left or right.

The fact is in my opinion see and avoid does not work. It does not work because we are fallible. Fly with most pilots and watch what they are doing after the take off. Are they doing anything to look above the aircraft? Are they scanning left and right? Nah. They are fixated on what’s ahead, and tasks in the cockpit.

Fortunately collisions are very rare but don’t kid yourself that this is because we are all really good at seeing and avoiding each other. Fact is the "perfect" pilot might do a reasonable job relying on see and avoid most of the time but there are very few among us that are perfect pilots.

In my opinion you are deluding yourself if you believe see and avoid will always ensure you avoid other traffic - I think we all dance on that particular pin head, and stay on the head but for the Grace of God - sadly in this case whether for this reason or some other reason these pilots luck ran out.

If you can guarantee me you would have avoided this collision or any other 100% of the time you have a great deal more courage in your convictions than I would or you have caught a healthy dose of blind faith.

IMHO if you take nothing from this thread other than more than a few pilots telling you that in their opinion see and avoid is not reliable which in turn leads you to question your approach to VFR flying outside CAS something will have been achieved.

[Flybywyre]

On the subject of lookout/radar etc a few of you may be surprised to learn that some composite type aircraft have been known not to paint on radar..............
EVEN WITH THE TRANSPONDER TURNED ON :eek:

[Voroff]

A lot of comments on this thread about CAS being an issue here however if the incident happened as a lot of reports have said between two aircraft inbound to Coventry then it isn't really the main issue as both aircraft were hopefully in contact with ATC as they were landing at the field.

CAS is all about creating a known traffic area so that ATC can deconflict transit traffic against inbound or outbound traffic. So CAS in my view isn't the main factor here as an incident like this could quite as easily happen between an ILS inbound and circuit/visual joining traffic in CAS as it could at an ATC airport in class G.

The only difference between this situation occuring just outside an ATZ in class G and at an airport in CAS is that you could say that there is no legal requirement for pilots outside CAS airspace to comply with ATC instructions however In my experience this has never been an issue.

[singleacting]

Great posts guys, I hope you are all proud of your conjecture, especially when you realise that relatives and friends of those that have perished can look in and read all your ramblings.

[Crash one]

I am finding it difficult to believe that educated aviators can be so far up their own arses to speculate, decide on what happened, blame, pontificate & generally write a load of egotistical garbage. My thoughts are with the relatives & Cov ATC. Why not let these poor unfortunate people deal with this tragedy & wait till someone who knows what they are talking about tells you what happened.

[flybymike]

Frontlefthamster, when you say that there are things afoot in the regulatory world which appear likely to put a stop to commercial operations outside controlled airspace, do you mean that commercial operations outside CAS are to cease ? or alternatively that all airspace encompassing commercial operations is to become controlled?

There are incidentally many GA users who are out there "for a purpose" and not for fun, (including business use and aerial work etc,) just as the majority of holidaymakers in the metal tubes are out there for fun and not for a purpose.

[radar707]

The airspace around there and between Birmingham and East Mids and around Coventry is very busy with lots of users funnelled into the class G condensing the traffic. Birmingham and East Mids usually will not offer any zone transits and ask all to remain clear of the controlled airspace. This can compund traffic density. Should ATC allow better use of Class D to reduce hot spots in class G or open FIR ?

All aircraft requesting a transit of Birmingham controlled airspace will be allowed to do so subject to traffic conditions and controller workload. I have never refused a transit to anyone wanting to do so. We routinely advise pilots to remain outside controlled airspace to remind them that they haven't got a clearance to enter not because we are refusing a transit, thereby preventing a potential incursion of CAS The majority of GA traffic inbound to / outbound from EGBE generally has no requirement to transit controlled airspace. If you want to transit, call 118.050 and ASK!


Coventry operating their own primary only radar rather than a primary/secondary feed from NATS. My untrained eye finds it much easier to see conflicts on the NATS screens than on Coventry's.

Coventry have secondary radar

[prx]

Likewise East Mids are also good at ofering transits - I can only remember being refused once and it was clear that the controller was quite busy. They sounded almost apolgetic at having to refuse.

Birminghmam, I guess has more issues as their runway is largely N/S as will be (I guess) most of the light GA traffic wanting a transit. That siad, I've heard quite a few transits given and have had one myself.... It was offered. I didn't even ask!

[athonite]

What was the ATC policy at EGBE re mixing of IFR and VFR trafiic (rwy23) on the day of the accident. Was it possible for:

(a) VFR traffic to commence base leg while IFR traffic was localiser established

(b) VFR traffic to commence base leg while IFR traffic was inbound from CT (finals).

I think I know what in reality was the situation over the years has been at Coventry regarding IFR/VFR traffic, but I would be interested to know what the experience of others have been over the years.

[IO540]

Surely the approach is either protected or it isn't ?As I think somebody wrote already, once you get handed from approach to tower (which happens when you call Localiser Established) you lose the "radar service".

So the last 6-8nm, possibly more depending on vectoring etc, is flown without a radar service.

My guess is that the tower controller is not allowed to pass traffic info even if can see a radar screen (for the same legal reasons that e.g. London Information cannot), but in an obviously dire scenario the approach controller could tell the tower controller to warn the pilot.

But if e.g. the SE aircraft was not transponding, there would not be a height readout and what assumption would a (any) Radar controller make then? I don't know the rules. I do know that if you fly through the Luton-Stansted gap without a transponder, Radar will assume you are OCAS i.e. below 2500ft (nothing else they can realistically do).

And if the SE aircraft had a poor/nonexistent primary return (e.g. largely non-metallic) then you have nothing at all. But is a zero return possible this close to the radar?? The engine is still metallic, and pretty rough shaped.

OCAS, any "protection" on an approach is no more than what you get when you get under any radar service. They will pass traffic, workload permitting. If the whole approach was in CAS, you get the additional protection that conflicting traffic is less likely to be there because if they were in there they would be illegal (but obviously they can still be there of course). Also different rules apply in that IF the CAS extends down to ground then ATC can take immediate action if they see even a primary return. AIUI.

There are no absolutes.

[seaskimmer]

Why all this unhealthy speculation?

I don't need to remind you that aviation is inherently dangerous, but that is part of why we do it, theres a romance to it.

for me there is no issue of who or what is to blame, that is for another group of professionals to decide.

I just feel sad for the loss of fellow aviators, and particularily the 4 dedicated to specialised duties.

[500 above]

RIP JB. You will be missed mate.

Condolences to all the families involved.

[Chilli Monster]

Birmingham and East Mids usually will not offer any zone transits and ask all to remain clear of the controlled airspace.

I have refused ONE transit of EMA CAS in the last 2 years - and that was because he called half a mile from the edge of CAS and I was working like a one armed paper hangar.

Yes - you will be told to remain outside in the initial call, so as to stop you blundering in. 9 times out of 10 you will also be told that either you're not YET cleared in or you'll get transit clearance when you get closer. I have data at work that will show the number of refusals is probably less than 0.1% of requested transits.

As far as Brum is concerned - I've asked for transit 7 times (normally 4000ft through the overhead) and got 7 transits in the past year.

I think you owe some people a retraction / apology.

[blondechick]

there is alot in this thread i don't understand and to be honest i don't want to when a excellent pilot has gone in such awful circumstances all i want to know is he's gone somewhere safe and is still watching all his friends and family who love and miss him dearly. Am sure the insights to what happened will come out later. But as someone above said JB RIP u were a great guy x x x

[Pace]

Blondechick

Take what you are saying as I am sure everyone here is devastated and shocked by this dreadful accident but the fact of the matter is that those poor people have gone.

That makes the rest of us more aware of the potential for a midair and what we can do or not do to avoid something simular.
it also makes us more aware of where the risk holes are more concentrated and the possibilities of where and how technology can help to make a midair less likely.

Sitting and waiting for some report months down the line on what is obvious (the obvious being that for whatever reason two aircraft did not see each other and collided ) is not going to help us now to avoid a simular occurence.
Remember another collision could occur to any of us posting in this forum tomorrow not months away after some AAIB report. Accidents dont wait for the posting of AAIB reports!

Chatting here even if it achieves nothing but making us more allert to the potential of a midair has to be good surely?

Pace

[CrazyMonkey]

Pace

Well said. It has certainly reminded me of the importance of an exceptional lookout in any class of airspace.

[newcomer]

Just a little about flying a cessna twin, Ive done quite a bit on the Riems 406, at 3 miles he wouldnt have been clean, most likely gear down with app flaps but still at about 120 kts. Its very hard too see anything that close to you with such a high nose attitude and such huge engines (prop line are in line with the aft nose locker) that are pretty much blocking your viz on both side and you wouldnt be able to see anything thing below them. And no RVL a/c are fitted with TCAS. Its just a real same, You guys will really be missed

[blondechick]

Oh i totally agree i wasn't having a go. forget it when ever i say anything on here it gets totally out of context! am just going to delete my profile i was just giving my condolences seeing as i know one of the men. and u have a go. have some compassion for people who are grieving ie me

[flyinginthesun]

I have been reading this thread with interest, I am not a pilot but married to one who flies out of Coventry - so some of what I have read on here makes slightly worrying reading - I understand your sentiments Blondechick - but I also agree with what Pace is saying - it is important for those who fly to try and make some sense of this and understand the potential for this situation to occur again - In this situation people feel the need to do something and to almost be connected to their fellow aviators and this is the site where that happens. This does not in my very humble opinion detract from the absolute horror and tragedy of what has happened and the fact that there are families and friends grieving at this time. Everyone on here whatever their opinion or seemingly insensitive comments will I am sure be sending their sympathy, heartfelt thoughts and love to those people. Rest assured Blondechick that your friend is at peace and in a safe place.

[avlerx]

Got to agree with Chilli Monster, East Midland are very good at giving transits. Can't remember the last time I heard a refusal.

[Rod1]

A lot of comment on “see and avoid” on this thread. I am an ex glider pilot and have had the honour of flying 300 hours with an ex member of the Royal Observers in the right hand seat. See and avoid may not be 100% but some people are much better at it than others. The more effort you put in and the more experience you gain trying, the better it will work for you. Nick (my ROC mate) can spot an aircraft, identify type and tell you the threat level very early in an encounter. By seeing what can be done I have improved towards his standard, but I still have a long way to go.

It is also worth investing in an aircraft you can see out off, as some are much harder than others and therefore less safe.

Rod1

[IO540]

One should not forget the statistics though. Flying above 1000ft or in IMC appears to offer virtually total protection. The risk is in low level situations which, for most people, are when taking off or landing, and during those times one's ability to look out is compromised by various factors e.g. nose up attitude during takeoff.

Enroute, the risk is negligible unless one is really crawling in the gutter. I know many pilots do fly low, but they don't have to.

[NIGELINOZ]

Well said. It has certainly reminded me of the importance of an exceptional lookout in any class of airspace.

I am not making any comment about the circumstances that led to this tragic accident as i do not have enough information to make any judgements,but I do remember on my very first lesson of my PPL course in Australia my instructor told me the first rule of flying is A.N.C.
Aviate,Navigate.Communicate.and I have always taken that to mean that flying the plane whilst keeping a lookout was a fundamental principle of safe flying,but as I said I am NOT suggesting that the pilots involved in the tragedy were not doing exactly that,it is not for me to judge,others with more knowledge will do that.
All I know is that it is a tragedy and people have lost their lives,and that is the fact we must all remember,regardless of the cause of the accident.
Condolences to the families of those involved.

[ComJam]

Newcomer

We understand he was practicing ILS Calibration approaches, these are generally flown to a low go-around gear up.



I'm particularly upset by this accident as Calibration flying is what I spend my time at work doing. Unfortunately some of us have to fly at low level VFR outside of CAS in order to do the job.



Blondechick

I know the thoughts of the aircrew at Teesside are with all at RVL.

[stop, stop, stop]

My condolences to all involved with this tradgic accident.

As is usually the case with air disasters, I just hope that many lessons are learned by the aviation community, and that the rest of us can go about the rest of our days that little bit safer.

RIP.

SSS

[Rod1]

The Pilot of the Rand KR2 has been named as Brian Normington, the details of the Cessna 402 crew are yet to be released.

Rod1

[one post only!]

Still bothers me that this collision occurred while one aircraft was flying the ILS and one was making a VFR approach. Fortunately I'm in the position where I don't ever find myself doing an ILS outside of controlled airspace!! You do expect certain protections though surely, particularly at a time when workload can be very high. Lookout may be brief and at random intervals (even with 2 crew) making it very difficult to spot the constant bearing target! At other airfields Tower always passes circuit traffic information so we can attempt to spot them. Normally the VFR traffic is second to us and will have to pick us up visually before they can continue. Frightening that 2 aircraft can be on approach to the same runway both in radio contact with the tower and meet in mid air!! I hate to say it but I do think the IFR traffic should take precedent and VFR traffic should be instructed to follow us when we are both coming in at the same time. One aircraft on instruments, one visually operating, makes sense but those instructions need to come from somewhere....ATC.
Could this just be a horrible set of circumstances where both aircraft were in blind spots to one another? How then can you totally rely on the mark one eyeball? If you are practising an ILS calibration you cannot weave down the approach to look beneath you to the sides!
This is a dreadful accident and I wonder if it may lead to a review of some airspace's around the UK. Any loss of life is dreadful be it 5 in a 402/KR2 or 150 in a 737. Could this lead to GA being moved further out of the way???? Would be a shame but......! The press would have had a field day had it been a 737!

The findings from the AAIB may make quite sobering reading. Sad day indeed.

[Rod1]

Any further narrowing of the Birmingham / East Mids gap will have a significant impact on VFR traffic density. The corridor is already very busy with light aircraft and military aircraft, all operating VFR. I hope we can at least get a LARS to help. This is the second fatal mid air in the corridor in the last 12 months. The other was at 1450 ft AGL, so even the “ok above 1000 ft” idea will not necessarily save you.

Rod1

[Pace]

BlondeChick

I was not having a go at you either as you expressed the sentiments very well as to how most probably feel especially if you knew the people and it was close to home.

I used to fly the citation that crashed at Biggin and knew the pilot so I understand where you are coming from.

Often text is misunderstood and my comments were not aimed at you but only to make a point as to why it is important with current pilots to discuss accidents even if by doing so it can come across as cold.

On the face of it this appears to be one of those 1 in a million tragic accidents and we can only take note and be extra aware of that potential.

So thanks for your warmth and take care

Pace

[CRX]

ONEPOSTONLY -
A few points regarding your post,
I believe that the IFR ILS approaches you fly differ from the VFR ILS approaches being flown here. Stay with me on this...
When I first started flying in Inverness I was treated to a discussion with the SATCO about the difference between VFR, IFR and VISUAL approaches. As I understand if you started out IFR and want to make a VISUAL approach then you will still be treated in the eyes of ATC as being an IFR (and still expected to fly the published missed approach if you went around) despite being able to see where you are going.
If you 'cancel IFR' (normally using that phrase) you are now treated as a VFR flight (because you now are!) and seperation now VFR against VFR, ie not given. You are now responsible for see and avoid, although of course FIS may be provided with traffic info given. (if you go around you will be expected to fly a visual circuit by the way).
The relevance of this is that although we believe the 402 (not a 406 by the way, there is quite a difference) was flying practice ILS approaches for CALIBRATION purposes, therefore I believe that the purpose of the two pilots up front was to provide safety pilot look out whilst the other was busy. Remember this is a single crew aircraft and will be flown as such with single crew SOPS, there will be no challenge and response stuff and the HP (or PF if you prefer) will be doing it all. The second pilot in this case was probably also acting in an instructing capacity too as he/she was a CRE/line trainer.
Incidentally it is not unusual for aircraft to fly ILS approaches as VFR traffic for several reasons, most commonly for training OPC LPC stuff. In Inverness we choose to do this when the conditions allow of course, because otherwise the slots available for IFR training (as a pukka IFR flight with seperation) are much harder to get.
I believe this accident would be highly unlikely to happen with larger IFR commercial traffic because that aircraft would retain its IFR status down to the ground and ATC seperation would apply. Of course there is nothing to stop anyone flying across the path of an ILS outside the ATZ, but that is not peculiar to CVT, try Blackpool, Filton, Cambridge, and Cranfield for starters...
I have worked for the Atlantic Group (and spin off companies) for 12 years and have flown over 200 hours in EYES. I am very sad for those affected by this accident.

CRX.

Ps: ATC comment about my understanding of the above is welcome.

[one post only!]

Sorry, knew it was a 402, slip of the finger, corrected that ta.

Totally correct, thanks for that. I was thinking with an airliner brain and was thinking ILS at the end of a IFR flight. Didn't think they might have done it after a VFR sortie. So long since I have done it forgotten it happens!!!! Very much stuck in the IFR world it seems!

As you say, there is nothing but "airmanship" to prevent someone flying across the instrument approach path while outside controlled airspace. Just have to hope it prevails!!!

Thanks for that post, cleared a lot up.

Such an unfortunate accident.

[VP959]

SAS wrote: VP959. I'm trying to assume you have more than 5 minutes in your logbook, but each time you post that lookout is an infallible way of keeping traffic apart 100% I doubt it more and more.


Not what I wrote at all, as you would have realised if you took the time to read it properly, instead of jumping to an incorrect conclusion.

I merely restated the rules under which both of these aircraft were operating, and didn't comment as to whether or not the rules were either sensible or able to be complied with.

You may care to note that I also made an observation regarding the ease of keeping a good lookout, or otherwise, in some types, without making any comment as to the personal skills of any type of pilot. It's a fact that if your flying a paraglider, a glider or some types of microlight, then it's very much easier to keep a good lookout than it is when flying some other types with more restricted visibility. Add in congested skies, occupied by aircraft with widely differing speeds and the inevitable higher workload when flying an approach through the midst of all this and the chance of ANY pilot maintaining a first class lookout is pretty slim.

I'm frankly surprised at the venom that's being directed my way at pointing out what seems to be obvious, and equally amazed at the way that some have opted to deliberately misconstrue my meaning.

VP

[CaptRicardo]

I would just like to express my condolences to the families and loved ones affected by this. Coventry Airport is a very special and close knit community and this tragedy will have affected everyone to the core. There is nothing more I can say.

[Alloa Akbar]

As a former employee of Atlantic, I'd just like to add my condolences to the families and friends of those affected.

AA

[PompeyPaul]

Whilst I've read through the bickering and to'ing and through'ing of "keeping a good lookout" it's still strange that the light aircraft was transiting an active approach ?

I wonder how they strayed there, if it were poor navigation, incorrect altimeter setting.

Very sad.

[mcgoo]

It wasn't transiting or strayed there, both aircraft were approaching to land at Cov, quote below is AAIB press statement.


19 August 2008
PRESS STATEMENT
Mid-air collision involving a Cessna 402C aircraft
and a Rand KR-2 aircraft near Coventry Airport on 17 August 2008
On 17 August 2008, at approximately 1138 hrs local time, a twin-engine Cessna 402C
aircraft and a single-engine Rand KR-2 aircraft were involved in a mid-air collision near
Coombe Abbey in Warwickshire. The four occupants of the Cessna 402C and the pilot
of the Rand KR-2 were fatally injured. Both aircraft were approaching to land at
Coventry Airport at the time of the collision.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch were notified of the accident at 1205 hrs and
accident investigators were on site later the same day to examine the wreckage of both
aircraft and to commence a field investigation examining all aspects of both aircraft
operation.
The wreckage from both aircraft will be recovered to the AAIB’s facility at Farnborough
for more detailed examination.
An AAIB Field investigation is now underway and an accident report will be released in
due course.

[viaEGLL]

10 days ago i was having lunch with 1 of the pilots killed!
A good guy and 100% commited pilot! My condolences to all the families who are grieving.

[ExSimGuy]

Someone mentioned earlier about the visibility of a "microlight" (as it was then assumed to be) on radar.

A few years ago I was working with a Middle-East Government and a N.American company on "Low-Altitude and Low Radar Cross-Section incursion detection" The website for the "light" shows around 200kg empty weight -yes, the engine is probably a fair proportion of that weight but on its own it would have presented a very poor radar X-section and the chances of it being seen reliably by a "regular" (civil or military) radar would not be good.

(Off-topic, but for interest, we were using a 2-metre Doppler-shift type of detection which did not give az-el information, but would be set out in about 1-km "sectors" to allow suitable aerial/missile interception to be launched. A principle that Boeing and I both discovered at around the same time many years ago - but they patented it!)

Maybe there's an argument for "tinfoil" to be incorporated in the GRP panels of such "very-lights"? Just my 2 dirhams worth?

[ComJam]

Generally speaking when we're Calibrating it's done VFR, it allows us to self-position more quickly than being IFR and vectored, it also gives us more flexibility in holding / manouevering and allows air traffic to apply VFR separation with us.

As for the crewing thing, our B200's are "single-pilot" aircraft but we are required to operate 2 crew on precision calibration tasks. There is a lot going on during a calibration with both front-end guys busy looking out, flying, navigating, liasing with air-traffic, co-ordinating with our rear-end NavAid Inspector and of course looking out again! (Hopefully)

Personally i'd be very happy if ALL aircraft (including microlights, balloons and gliders) were required to carry at least Mode 3 A/C transponders and if all aircraft involved in our kind of operation were required to carry TCAS. At present we have a TCAD system which is a lot better than nothing but still not really good enough.

[egbt]

Very sad

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whilst I've read through the bickering and to'ing and through'ing of "keeping a good lookout" it's still strange that the light aircraft was transiting an active approach ?

I wonder how they strayed there, if it were poor navigation, incorrect altimeter setting.

Very sad.

Who said one was transiting? The statement said both were on approach.

[Neon Circuits]

Both were working ATC

[VP959]

Am I alone in being slightly unnerved by one or two posts on here from people who seem to suggest that they believed they would automatically have a right of way when flying an ILS approach in class G, above VMC minima?

It has been widely reported that both aircraft were making an approach at the time of this accident (I have no idea as to whether that is wholly correct, but will assume for now that it is). As such, both would seem to be subject to the normal GFR/VFR "give way" rules (neither would have an automatic right of way as being the aircraft "approaching to land" under Rule 17 (6)), irrespective of whether or not one or both were taking advantage of the ILS . Similarly, neither aircraft was under control from an ATC unit, in fact neither could legally have accepted control, had it been offered, as I understand it, as the conditions were better than VMC minima and the accident occurred in class G airspace.

The whole idea of flying ILS approaches in class G, in good vis, gives me the willies, particularly as it seems to becoming more widespread as the budget airlines move out to cheaper satellite airports. I'm in no way associating this with the accident in question, before I get leapt upon once more, just raising the whole issue as to whether it's safe practice to do this.

VP

[Del Prado]

this thread from last week may be interesting (http://www.pprune.org/atc-issues/339115-question-u-s-u-k-atcs.html)

[Spitoon]

Before anything else, I offer my condolences to those who lost their lives (or their loved ones and friends) in this accident.

Whilst we will have to wait for the outcome of the investigation to know how this happened, there have been many comments out airspace classes and flight rules, many of which appear either incorrect or based on misunderstanding. As I understand the situation, both aircraft were in communication with Coventry ATC.

Although airspace class and flight rules are not entirely irrelevant, there is a very grey area over what ATC has responsibility for in the vicinity of an aerodrome, and particularly the aerodrome controller's responsibilities for managing an orderly flow of air traffic. Make no mistake, the aerodrome controller's job in an environment like Coventry is not easy - whether issues of airspace, flight rules or IFR/commercial flight outside CAS etc. are particularly relevant will no doubt become clearer from the investigation, but if it results in the clarification the grey area of aerodrome control responsibilities it will be no bad thing - for pilots and controllers alike.

[S-Works]

This does make me wonder if there could be an element of error on the part of ATC?

2 Aircraft talking to ATC collide on final, see and avoid aside what happened to ATC input?

[Lima Juliet]

Here is a picture of the RAND KR-2, she's not much bigger than a 3 axis microlight (400kg MTOW) - hard to see and, by the looks of her, hard to see out of:

http://www.abpic.co.uk/images/images/1090630F.jpg

Very sad, but these things will happen without mandating aids such as FLARM or TCAS/ACAS. I remember a trial done by the MOD's DERA (now QinetiQ) in the 90s that said "see and avoid" below 2000ft was about 99% effective if you look 70% outside and 30% on the instruments - bad news if you are the 1%! I believe that the technology to reduce the risk of this occuring again is now available and it's time for us to invest in it - unpalatable as it is to us hard-pressed GA pilots (ie. Lightweight Mode S + TCAS/ACAS or FLARM).

My condolences to the families involved...

LJ

[IO540]

I remember a trial done by the MOD's DERA (now QinetiQ) in the 90s that said "see and avoid" below 2000ft was about 99% effective if you look 70% outside and 30% on the instruments

I'd like to know how they arrived at that amazing 99% figure.

You can put four pilots into a 4-seater and fly around under a radar information service, on a gin clear day, and count how many of the reported targets that group of 4 people manage to spot.

It won't be 99%, it won't be even 50%.

Flying alone, on autopilot so hands and eyes free, I manage perhaps 10% - but then I fly higher than GA average, as high as CAS allows, so nearly everybody is below me, against the ground and very hard to spot.

And the majority of reported traffic is 'level unknown' i.e. nontransponding so you have no idea where to look for it vertically, but when you do spot it, it is way down below maybe 95% of the time.

[INKJET]

Unless you are flying an aircraft with a full FD/AP system capable of flying a coupled approach how are you able to look outside, other than a quick glance?

I think its fair to say that 99% of people flying an ILS expect total protection on an ILS approach, it matters not that the conditions are visual or IMC you are flying a PA.

If the 402 was cleared for the ILS then there should have been no conflicting traffic period, i will leave the rest to the AAIB...........RIP Guys

[2 sheds]

Flying Officer Kite

"When flying an ILS one does not expect other traffic to be in the vicinity whether VFR or IFR. Hopefully".

Could I commend to you a visit to the radar unit of an aerodrome with IAPs in Class G airspace?


Spitoon

A very sensible comment - as to be expected.


2 s

[NigelOnDraft]

If the 402 was cleared for the ILS then there should have been no conflicting traffic period,Amazed how you can state that :( Outside of CAS, then anybody can do what they like, and if you are there, then the rules are "see and be seen" - whether in an LAA homebuilt, or a 747.

I fly from an LAA homebuilt, to an ex-military Jet, ex-Eastern Bloc trainers and public transport airliners. Each have their own "risks", which differ considerably, both for me, and my colleagues / passengers / other airspace users. I do trust others also (apart from the passengers), understand those risks.... and the tragic events of Sunday are hardly unexpected, unique, or unlikely to be repeated. If you want to minimise the risks, then please understand that short of full Radar Control, in CAS, your best defence (but not absolute), is to have your eyes and ears "outside" 80+% of the time. But there's still the 20% or so when it's just not your day... :{

NoD

[Archangel 01]

A truly sad event...
Thoughts with 'S.P.' (and all the others who lost their lives...) you always had a smile and a warm heart...

you will be missed

[VFE]

In an ideal world the ILS should be within the controlled airspace but like quite a few in the UK, it sadly was not. An accident waiting to happen? Hmmm.......

On another note, the amount of traffic reports I recieve on a daily basis with "height unknown" (no transponder or simply not squarking mode C?) is seriously begining to irk me when all the safety groups have been banging on about the requirement to squark mode C (if equipped) or to have a transponder switched on.

Work as a flying instructor for a week and see how many people forget or choose not to switch it on, when they have been told time and time again about it's importance.

VFE.

[Gertrude the Wombat]

I think its fair to say that 99% of people flying an ILS expect total protection on an ILS approach, it matters not that the conditions are visual or IMC you are flying a PA.

If the 402 was cleared for the ILS then there should have been no conflicting traffic period
Please make sure you don't fly anywhere near me until you have learned the rules.

[hollo]

In an ideal world the ILS should be within the controlled airspace but like quite a few in the UK, it sadly was not.There are lots of posts saying something along these lines, and others saying that extending CAS around all the airports with instrument approach would eat up large quantities of class G airspace.

Where there is an ILS in class G it is marked on the chart. If I am flying near one I am certain not to cross it at a height which would put me on the glide path. Would it not be possible to give an implicit extension to the ATZ along the ILS glide path to make avoiding this area required rather than just sensible? It would only need to be 500ft above/below the 3 degree glide path, and a short distance to either side, and would take little airspace. I guess most pilots avoid this piece of airspace anyway.

I'm not suggesting this would have been helpful in this sad accident, just responding to the issue raised above.

[ComJam]

NigelonDraft

Thanks, that's the most sensible post on the subject so far.



It's impossible to be 100% safe when flying outside of CAS (or within it to be honest).

Inkjet: I understand your point but...i spend most of my working day hand flying ILS calibrations without the autopilot in, without the flight-director and in VFR conditions. That's exactly what (i understand) the 402 was doing.

Ultimately, when calibrating we're flying visual approaches (with all that it entails) and NOT flying a precision instrument approach. We can't fly precision instrument approaches when the engineers are deliberately mis-aligning the LOC or GS in order to check the Alarms etc etc.

So, in this case, you'll find that both aircraft were (in all probability) flying visual approaches and the supposed protection of flying an ILS was not required.

Whether traffic information was passed by ATC to the 2 aircraft involved remains to be seen.

In the end it's a horrific accident that comes down to "see and be seen" not working. Only TCAS and transponding aircraft might have saved the situation.

[22/04]

Well

I woud hope that any glider pilot/ PPL would realise that an approach to any airfield with potential instrument approaches in Class G is to be treated with the utmost respect.

Situational awareness hasn't ben mentioned but is key here. If both pilots were taliking or even monitoring CVT then they should have been in a see and avoid or (the Rand pilot) does not cross the approach.

I have to admit there are many private pilots who do not fully understand this or get into overload so readily that they can't practise it.

[Corsairoz]

Of course, condolences to all those involved and affected.

With all this discussion on the methodology and statistics of a good lookout, has anyone thought of the relevance of the time and the weather?

Assuming the 402 was on a straight in approach to runway 23, and assuming the KR2 was in a left hand circuit, with the time at 1138 would the KR2 not be directly into the sun from the 402 cockpit as it approached to turn onto finals?

Idle musings, probably assuming too much

[NorthSouth]

ComJam:In the end it's a horrific accident that comes down to "see and be seen" not working. Only TCAS and transponding aircraft might have saved the situation.I don't think you can say that either because you don't know what ATC instructions either aircraft had received. One might have been told "cleared low approach and go around" while the other was told to orbit on base (or whatever). ATC instructions are a vital part of the picture so until we know what those were you can't say it was a failure of see and avoid. Anyone who's flown at Coventry will know that instructions to aircraft in the circuit are many and varied because of the diverse mix of VFR and IFR traffic.
NS

[ComJam]

NorthSouth, in common with most airfields in the UK the users are many and varied, there are many ATC instructions involved and there's a mix of IFR and VFR.

However, if the aircraft is VFR the responsibility for not ramming another aircraft rests with the the Captain regardless of ATC instructions. That goes for both aircraft involved.

We will not know what the ATC instructions were, what traffic information was passed or what each aircraft was actually doing until the AAIB complete their report.

I am absolutely NOT trying to blame anyone, it's a terrible accident that I feel close to and one that I hope we can all learn from.

[Clutter & Gain]

A very sad incident and my condolences for all involved.
There are too many unknowns about the incident, most mentioned already, for any wise man to make any assumptions.

However, what is worrying when these incidents happen is the lack of understanding or misunderstanding of rules, airspace, responsibilities, flight rules and separation standards made by people posting their comments.

Pilots - I urge you to visit your local control tower, especially if they operate inside Class G airspace with radar. If this is not possible try and phone the SATCO or another ATCO at the unit for a briefing on local operating procedures and equipment available to them. Please brush up on relevant sections, discussed on this forum, from the AIP.
ATCOs - If you havn't flown in a light A/C before please try and arrange it. It will show you how much harder it is to spot the A/C you should be following compared to the moving picture we have on the radar/ATM. I think it will make for a more understanding controller.

CRX
Generally right, but as for the extra separation for the B737 if he was IFR doesn't really apply (except for vortex if a/c following). The Aerodrome (or Approach) controller is responsible for providing advice and instructions if needed for the safe integration of VFR flights against aircraft making instrument approaches irrespective of their flight rules, so the actions in most cases would be the same as there are no separation standards applicable in either case.

G-EMMA
You seem to have been taught well but it is only recommended that pilots call ATC when flying close to an airfield with IAPs. There are a small minority of pilots who are more than happy to fly through final approach between 2 and 8 miles that do not want to talk to ATC, I dare say keeping a good lookout. So I would say that most, if not all, ATCOs at the airports you mentioned would love some protected airspace, if not CAS something similiar to a MATZ would be ideal and surely would keep everyone happy.

I hope my first ramblings are received in the spirit they are intended.
Will stop now... fingers struggling to keep up with little brain.:zzz:

[VP959]

Having refreshed my ancient knowledge of the ANO, and leaving aside the practicalities of keeping a good lookout when flying a non-coupled ILS approach, I am still surprised that there is a view that ATC can, or should, provide anything other than advice to any aircraft flying in class G.

I wholeheartedly agree that it would be reasonable for a pilot to expect some form of protection when flying an instrument approach into a big airport, but as I read the ANO no such protection actually exists in law in this case - just like anyone else in that bit of airspace (notwithstanding the priority given by Rule 17) the pilot has to use see and avoid as his/her primary means of avoiding a collision.

Clearly this is unrealistic, which highlights again how iffy this whole concept is. Add in the liklihood that many private flyers will assume (perhaps wrongly) that any aircraft making an approach in class G, better than VMC minima, will be flying under VFR and there is an even greater liklihood of a problem (give way rules etc, where you shouldn't give way if you have the right of way unless a collision is likely - to give way when you shouldn't can increase the collision risk).

All very sad, but we can, perhaps, hope that this dreadful accident highlights what I think is a serious issue that needs to be addressed to prevent further deaths.

VP

[IO540]

I think its fair to say that 99% of people flying an ILS expect total protection on an ILS approach, it matters not that the conditions are visual or IMC you are flying a PA.

If the 402 was cleared for the ILS then there should have been no conflicting traffic period

I think they key here is that the Cessna, ILS or not, was on a VFR flight as far as ATC were concerned.

An inbound 737 would have been IFR all the way down to the runway and would have received IFR separation (from participating traffic only, obviously, this being Class G).

[criss]

Separation in class G??

[mm_flynn]

Clearly there are many facts not yet available in this particular case, but the general case of mixing IFR and VFR traffic seems to have generated a lot of confusion.

As I understand the ICAO rules -only in Class B and C are VFR and IFR actually separated. In all other classes IFR flights either get traffic information on VFR or nothing.

In most countries, on a VMC day there will be VFR and IFR traffic both using an airport and most countries don't have the VFR traffic orbit for 5 minutes while an IFR approach happens, they slot the traffic together efficiently - just like what probably was happening in Coventry - why it didn't work and what should be done about it awaits the AAIB report.

However, it is concerning that such a volume of people are operating IFR, apparently unaware that the cacooned world of low level Class A and Class D operated like Class B that is the South of England is the exception rather than the norm. In particular, the expectation that being 'IFR' in Class G gives some sort of protected airspace. Although sometimes it feels like we have four types of flight rules (VFR, VFR in IMC, IFR non-airways, IFR airways) - There really are only two and IFR coming off an airway (or cleared on an ILS) may get a different default service from ATC, but to my knowledge it isn't a different set of rules to other IFR flying.

As I understand it in France, Benelux, Germany, Australia, USA, South Africa, etc. VFR traffic can and do operate into most airports and in 'airways airspace' up to roughly 18000 feet intermixed with IFR traffic.

The UK is however clearly unique in the world in having such large amounts of heavily trafficked Class G AND allowing flight in this airspace in IMC without participating in any separation or information service AND providing a Class G separation to participating IFR traffic from SOME other IFR and VFR traffic. To that extent, I think there are some real questions about airspace design and separation service. HOWEVER, this doesn't seem to be relevant to a situation where (on current information) both aircraft were in contact with ATC and both were approaching to land, the conditions were VMC - this could equally have happened in Class D airspace (operated to ICAO standards), and it could have happened regardless of which flight rules the 402 was following (clearly if the 402 was receiving a RAS service he would be separated from everything - but once again a UK unique service)

[IO540]

Separation in class G??Fair enough, what I meant is that traffic in the circuit would have received polite requests to do such and such.

There are many grey areas in this stuff.

Obviously a 737 cannot fit into a visual circuit with five C152s going round in it - it cannot fly slowly enough. Something has to give. Like I say, grey areas.

Well said, mm_flynn. The UK is indeed much busier with VFR GA than anywhere else I have been in Europe. I would say of the order of 5-10 times more than France, for example.

[criss]

But its the problem of the operator that sends a 737 to a class G airport known for lots of VFR.

Judging from this thread, one source of the problem is lack of understanding of airspace classes.

I'm not sure whether UK has that much more VFR/GA traffic than Europe - rather it has much more uncontrolled airports used by IFR traffic.

[dragqueen120]

Zones and airspace, rules and regs dont physically stop aeroplanes, Just like red lights dont physically stop cars. Keep ya eye out people, where ever the fault lies the most important thing is to be aware and stay alive.

Thoughts go out to the famillies and friends this effects.

[Kursaal Flyer]

Air crash: Blackdown pilot among the dead - Leamington Spa Today - Back to Home Page (http://www.leamingtoncourier.co.uk/news/Air-crash-all-five-bodies.4400046.jp)

Condolences to all concerned.

[slip and turn]

It is heartening to see thoughts rapidly crystallising in this thread now. I think there has always been a somewhat undefined problem with airspace and approaches like this - witness the few feathers on the VFR chart - they are only there surely to indicate a hazard, but what exactly? I don't know when they were first introduced but they've been on the half mill for at least twenty years to my knowledge. Generally each one is quite different. Pilots have generally needed to go to a particular aerodrome with a feather and talk to locals to see what it really might mean.

However, the hazard also varies with each one according to particular aerodrome use from day to day. For some years in the last twenty I can even imagine that one or two of these aerodromes have been so quiet that local flyers barely give the feathers a second thought. But UK wide I guess we are busier than ever at the moment. Incidentally, slightly countering IO540's experience, many UK PPLs will be familiar with sometimes very busy airfields sur le continent not dissimilar to this, so although we obviously have much higher population density, it may not simply be a UK problem.

As to the hazard itself, traffic density coupled with effectiveness of radar oversight is key, of course, as is the knock on effect of interventions in neighbouring airspace use and design.

I am sure all those mourning the loss of the five at Coventry (and I am sure there are many near and far) will be pleased to see that in the space of just a couple of days the informal analysis (like this thread) is already helping thousands of flyers re-evaluate and sharpen up pending official AAIB conclusions.

Ultimately I am sure it will boil down to 'just one of those things but it was the third that tipped the scale' but irrespective of the exact cause of this accident, safety around aerodromes will already be improved by awareness generated here.

The variation in existing understanding may surprise some, but focussed learning or re-learning of the MO of other flyers and of what improves the odds of avoiding future upset in local areas or elsewhere is a valuable lesson for all.

It remains to be seen what, if any, firm changes may be required after AAIB reports in due course.

[DX Wombat]

volrider, you and your fellow workers have my total admiration for what you do. I am a retired nurse so have a reasonable idea of what you probably face when you arrive at such a scene especially when it involves people you know. What we see in A&E Departments is bad enough. Thank you for what you do, I'm sure the families and friends involved appreciate it.

[olster]

Condolences to all involved in this tragic and awful accident;also justifiable praise and admiration to all rescue services who arrive on the scene.As a pilot for the obvious 737 operator in and out of CVT I have been dreading this news for a long time.

I am a keen supporter of general aviation and currently fly privately as well as professionally but whatever the 'rights and wrongs' this is an accident that should never have been allowed to happen.There is a similar setup at DSA and the mix of IFR and VFR traffic is potentially catastrophic. I would have no interest in speculation as to how the system broke down but I would suspect that frequent users of CVT airspace certainly would not have predicted this but would have feared an event such as this or indeed one involving a 737.

The current system is at fault and there are many potential solutions not least mandatory TCAS for all aircraft.Very sad for all involved.

[S-Works]

I see 3/4 of the Cessna crew have now been identified and the pilot of the SE. Do we know who the 4th person from the Cessna is yet.

I knew the pilot of the Cessna Sophie, a fine pilot and and pleasant person and knew James in passing from WW.

I understand that the training Capt from RV was onboard so I assume it that was the other female. The lady who flies/flew the DC3 for Atlantic?

A very sad loss.

[mm_flynn]

...the mix of IFR and VFR traffic is potentially catastrophic.

...The current system is at fault and there are many potential solutions not least mandatory TCAS for all aircraft.

Why IFR/VFR? Why TCAS? There are plenty of places that manage the mix at much higher levels of traffic density. In this case it doesn't even appear anyone was IFR - it is a problem that could happen anywhere - other than an airport that allows only radar vectored ILSs.

Something clearly has gone badly wrong and as an industry we need to understand and respond. But even with TCAS and Mode S and IFR only operations and two person crews and positive radar control we have unfortunately demonstrated twice in recent years you can still crash aircraft into each other. Once the facts are available, then solutions can be proposed.

[matspart3]

Does Coventry Tower have an ATM?

[CRX]

Just to confirm that the 'other' female onboard was indeed an instructor with the company, but that it WAS NOT Capt Burnham, well known in flight training circles and for flying the DC3. She will no doubt be acting as a strong pillar within the company right now, as she did with us at Highland when we lost our colleague several years ago. The lady deserves wider recognition (though she would never want it!) for her steadfastness and professionalism in every aspect of her work, I for one have been grateful for her wise words many many times.
Thinking of those at CVT in the long days ahead.

Paul.

[olster]

mmflynn: there is absolutely no way at this time that I will have adversarial dialogue with you over this terrible accident.The airspace issues @CVT/DSA are well documented within my company(note,not other airfields)and despite everybody's best efforts the worst case scenario has happened.It could only be worse in terms of scale if a commercial airliner was involved.I do not know why 'sad for all involved' needs to be quoted but it manifestly is.Out.

[dreamliner787]

Just to confirm that the 'other' female onboard was indeed an instructor with the company

Sad Loss

RIP to all

[plinkplinkfizz]

RIP all those tragically involved. From a personal perspective, WW will never seem quite the same again.

Those of us left - please lookout/listen out as much as is humanly possible. All of our lives depend on it.

Heartfelt condolences to the families of everyone involved.

Al

[Munnyspinner]

Firstly, this is a tragic accident and my thoughts are with family and friends who have suffered a loss.

In reading through this thread, whilst it is always helpful to see healthy discussion over the likley cause of any accident - and in so doing hopefully avoid a repetition - I am concerned over any speculation as to WHO might be to blame.

Clearly, something went seriuosly wrong here and questions need answers. Firstly, what happened? How did this happen? How can we avoid this happening again?

Until these questions are answered we will be no wiser. I am not familiar with CVT but , at 3 miles out the KR3 might reasonably have been turning finals and being in a banked left turnn would have had the approaching Cessna under his Straboard wing. Equally, the Cessna being established on the approach ( landing gear down), would have the KR2 obscured under the port wing.

Eyewitness reports the KR2 flying into the Cessna but it just as plausible that the Cessna descended into the KR2. Whatever the circumstances there was a fatal collision and neither aircraft saw the other until too late. There will be a reason their aircraft found themselves occupying same airspace - both perhaps in the belief that the other was elsewhere.

If the KR2 vanished under the port wing/engine of the cessna and the Cessna was blanked by the KR2 starboard wing in a left turn an accident of timing ( I guess 70Kts Vs 120Kts) might have easily resulted in the relative juxtapositions at 3 miles out.

[niknak]

At least we know that the Air Accident Investigation Branch have the resources to conduct a full and unmitigated investigation, and that a soon as they can release any substantial facts (prior to the publication of the full report) which may help such an awful accident happening again, they will do so.

Until then, professional discussion or genuine questions are perfectly acceptable, finger pointing or specualtion helps no one, especially the families etc of those involved.

[x933]

Bose-X - One of the females on board flew for AACF but not on the Dak. More often seen helming the Prentice or Dragon Rapide. A tragic accident. My condolences to all involved - everyone knows everyone in that particular corner of Coventry West, my thoughts are with you at this time.

[singleacting]

Paul I can Confirm that Kath is alive and well in Nova Scotia. I just wish I could say the same about Sybilla, Harvey, Sofie and Jim.

[Human Factor]

The BBC is now showing the names of all five who died.

[CRX]

Singleacting- Thanks for the post, however I think you misunderstood mine, I was confirming to BOSE X that she wasnt on board as a result of his post.
Confused? Me too.
Anyhow I have had comms from Kath since Sunday, thanks mate.
And I share your feeling about the others only too well.
Stay strong.

Paul.

[singleacting]

Sorry Paul

Give me a call sometime I think you know who I am.

I too have been in touch with Kath when I can get hold of her , my place in NS where she is staying has no phone line!

[NorthSouth]

mm flynn: this could equally have happened in Class D airspace (operated to ICAO standards), and it could have happened regardless of which flight rules the 402 was followingExactly. The "separations" between IFR and VFR - or VFR and VFR - on final approach in Class D are in effect the same as in Class G. They rely on what IO540 has dubbed "grey areas". There is one other thing though. Aircraft in contact with Tower and operating in the vicinity of an ATZ are receiving an ATC service and are expected to comply with ATC instructions - even if they're in Class G.

clearly if the 402 was receiving a RAS service he would be separated from everythingNot in this case. Coventry can't provide a RAS below 1700 feet in this area and in any case if he's been transferred to Tower he's effectively (another grey area...) no longer in receipt of a radar service.
NS

[22/04]

As the AAIB press release states BOTH a/c were inbound to Coventry this is more of an issue about how airports such as CVT operate than a Class G unprotected approach issue IMHO.

[SA120]

Please accept my apology of incorrect phrasing ref controllers around the Birmingham and Eastmids area.(I have amended the para) This was not aimed at anybody and my comment did not mean to highlight this area only there are many hotspots with high risk of a collision between luton and stansted is a classic and most of the london area. this was intended to be helpful and create awareness of high risk areas.
This accident could have happened to anybody pretty much at any time and I believe all of the crews to be of a very high standard. ATC in the uk provide an excellent service.

I offer my thoughts to all affected crews, families and ATC involved. this was a tragedy and a big loss to aviation.

[5150]

I'm absolutely gutted for all those involved.
Sybille will leave a huge gap in the company - I did my initial IR with her and worked under her for a year prior to flying full time - she took no sh!t off anyone and knew her stuff inside out . . . hugely respected, , ,

I flew with Harvey too - a true gent . . . .

Rest in Peace you guys
CB

[BoeingMEL]

Not wishing to drift the thread here (I am as saddened as any.)

However, out there right now there is/are one or two CVT controllers who were, most likely, doing their professional best last Saturday morning - and all within the constraints of the CVT ATC/ANO infrastructure many of us have known for years.

My own experience flying from CVT (starting 1968) was always that CVT controllers have been 100% helpful, co-operative and endlessly patient. You'd need a heart of stone not to feel for whoever was i/c on 119.25 on Saturday. Bless you and sleep well, you can't make a silk purse from a sow's ear.

Memories of many happy days restored by this tragic event.

Cheers bm

[IO540]

Aircraft in contact with Tower and operating in the vicinity of an ATZ are receiving an ATC service and are expected to comply with ATC instructions - even if they're in Class G.

Many people would disagree with the above (Class G is Class G regardless of who you are talking to) even if it seems perfectly reasonable to me that one should follow ATC instructions since they are usually given for a good reason.

[astir 8]

Much earlier on in this thread, someone mentioned that TCAS can have problems at low level and/or can give spurious readings from a/c on the ground if they have transponders switched on.

Can anyone provide informed comment?

[IO540]

The "GA" TCAS systems e.g. the Avidyne 600 work just fine.

They give useless readings from Mode A transponders because there is no altitude information.

But in the circuit, the information is presented OK, and is usable if everybody is transponding Mode C/S.

I've for some time been tempted to get the system but it's about £15k (plus or minus 5k depending whether G or N reg, which avionics shop you use, and whether you free issue parts bought from the USA) and the biggest problem is that existing antennae need relocating and that makes the installation into a very large job requiring the removal of the entire aircraft interior, and not many avionics shops can do a neat job of that on a TB20.

[Spitoon]

Aircraft in contact with Tower and operating in the vicinity of an ATZ are receiving an ATC service and are expected to comply with ATC instructions - even if they're in Class G.

Many people would disagree with the above (Class G is Class G regardless of who you are talking to) even if it seems perfectly reasonable to me that one should follow ATC instructions since they are usually given for a good reason.And here is a large part of the grey area that needs to be clarified.

[Crosswind Limits]

RIP Jimbo, will have that drink on you!

[Fuji Abound]

TCAS works just fine in the circuit particularly if you can display the traffic on an MDF. However, as has been commented, the aircraft must be transponding. In my experience even with mode A its a great benefit although of course there is no height information.

Not a comment on this dreadful accident but a response to the earlier post.

[NigelOnDraft]

"Proper" TCAS, and associated RAs etc. are not really designed for Circuit type operations... hence why they disable themselves below ~1000R, and in turn need a Rad Alt fitted (more cost for GA :( ). They cause problems with parallel approaches, hindering the whole ATC idea/system... They also need each aircraft's performance programmed in...

So we now get reduced to TAs, and/or the screen display... and just encourage everybody to fly around eyes in trying to do ATCs job for them :{

GPS is part of the problem, with everybody now flying eyes in following the damn thing - whereas if they actually had to look out for features etc. and navigate, they might notice the odd other aircraft around ;) I instruct on JPs, and it is truly frightning to see someone eyes in at 200K+ "progrmaming" the thing :{

None of the above is intended to relate to Sunday's events, which the AAIB, and the AAIB alone, are fit to declare lessons to be learnt from :D

NoD

[NorthSouth]

IO540: Many people would disagree with the above (Class G is Class G regardless of who you are talking to) even if it seems perfectly reasonable to me that one should follow ATC instructions since they are usually given for a good reasonI'd venture that it's not just when they're given for a good reason that you should follow them. You should follow them because the ATCO expects that you will follow them and will have developed his plan on that basis. So if you think they're bad instructions you should tell the ATCO straight away that you intend to do something else. That's why you will frequently hear ATCOs saying things like "report if you wish to do X" because they recognise you have the freedom to do that but they want to make sure they're kept in the loop.

NB no suggestion being made here that any of this happened at Coventry last weekend.

NS

[dublinpilot]

Aircraft in contact with Tower and operating in the vicinity of an ATZ are receiving an ATC service and are expected to comply with ATC instructions - even if they're in Class G.
Many people would disagree with the above (Class G is Class G regardless of who you are talking to) even if it seems perfectly reasonable to me that one should follow ATC instructions since they are usually given for a good reason.

They would be wrong to disagree I'm afraid. This is not a gray area, but is actually very clear. It appears in MATS, though I don't have the time right now to look it up again.

There is a proviso though, and that's "Unless you tell them that you are not going to comply."

An ATC'er can expect you to comply with his instruction/requests in class G airspace, unless you tell him that you will not. You are under no obligation to comply with such instructions, but you are under an obligation to tell them if you will not comply.

I suppose this is simply to avoid an ATC'er telling someone to climb to 3000ft, the pilot acknowledging it, but thinking "**** him. I'm in uncontrolled airspace and staying at 2000ft" ,while the controller (not unreasonably) thinks that you are complying with his instruction/request.

We have discussed this before, and the appropriate references to the part in MATS has been provided.

dp

[englishal]

I normally rent aeroplanes with a Traffic info system in the USA and in the circuit it can be invaluable. Last time I was over we were in the circuit with about 4 other aeroplanes with a turboprop joining on the 45, parallel runway operations and aeroplanes coming in on an ILS for an intersecting runway. Scary place to be, even with traffic but at least we could see where everyone was despite the late afternoon sunshine and the mist, which made vis a nightmare.

I'm sure it did save our bacon once though. Same airport and we were departing straight out from a LH runway. ATC cleared a plane that had just departed from the RH runway for a "left departure". It was night time and we heard this and so were watching the lights, but of course it is difficult to see what is going on and where the other plane is going until it gets rather close. Suddenly we get a traffic alert, and so we stopped our climb and even started to decend and the other aeroplane went over the top of us at less than 100'. We were non too happy about this of course, but the controller was very apologetic claiming he thought the other aeroplane was higher.......

But for the grace of traffic-alert-systems.

[IO540]

Proper" TCAS, and associated RAs etc. are not really designed for Circuit type operations... hence why they disable themselves below ~1000R, and in turn need a Rad Alt fitted

The above is not applicable to any current GA (piston type aircraft) system.

GPS is part of the problem, with everybody now flying eyes in following the damn thing - whereas if they actually had to look out for features etc. and navigate, they might notice the odd other aircraft around

Nonsense. GPS frees up one's attention span to look outside.

I instruct on JPs, and it is truly frightning to see someone eyes in at 200K+ "progrmaming" the thing

You should send them on some training, so they can manage their aviation tasks correctly.

[VP959]

There's a terminology issue here, I believe. This is how I understand this grey area to work (but I am as fallible as anyone else):

- An ATC unit cannot issue you with an INSTRUCTION in class G, as that would mean that you would be obliged to always obey, which clearly you can't if you are in charge of your own navigation under VFR.

- An ATC unit can issue you with a REQUEST in class G, which you are obliged to acknowledge. You are free to accept or decline such a request, but you should not just ignore it, as has already been pointed out.

It seem that this principle is generally poorly understood, which in itself is worrying. I've long felt that the growing complexity of the rules framework that we operate in is to blame for this - it's unreasonable to expect any of us to fully understand the plethora of rules upon rules upon rules that we now have.

VP

[Fuji Abound]

"Non proper" TCAS with a MDF works just fine in the circuit because it does not switch itself off unless you tell it to. Its a great aid combined with the mark 1 eyeball for picking up circuit traffic. In fact it also works fine for traffic with only mode A because whilst it does not give you a height the diamond is enough to give you a heads up where the traffic is and where it is going relative to you. The automatic alert "traffic, traffic, traffic" gets your attention if you have missed something for whatever reason. It is not perfect, but it is a great help.

I had an occasion recently where traffic appeared on the screen almost exactly paralelling my track and at almost the same speed. It was all too easy to imagine it was a false return. We looked for the traffic in not the best of vis. - neither of us could see it. Our tracks were very slowly converging. Sure enough, it was there, but we could not believe how late we spotted the traffic. A bit of vigorous wing waggling was not enough to grab the other pilots attention.

I recall another occasion down mig alley. The traffic was not working any of the service providers but unervingly almost exactly paralleled our course just holding off on the starboard side. We knew it wasnt working air traffic because in the end we got the jitters because we could not see it and asked if they were receiving a return and working with him. They confirmed they had a contact on radar although occasionally intermittent but were not working the traffic. We never did see that traffic.

Many years ago I was in the hold in IMC - popped out for a brief moment and there was a Warrior coming straight at me. That gave me one hell of a fright. I got a verbal apology from the controller back on the ground who was working us both and who was aware the Warrior had passed straight through the hold at same level as me. I wish I had had TCAS or PCAS then.

The trouble with PCAS, and even TCAS to a degree, is there could be a temptation not to believe it, which is why I have related these experiences. Need less to say believe it every time, even if it subsequently proves to have been wrong. I have only had a few readings that were almost certainly false whilst using PCAS.

I know most of us are not lucky enough to have TCAS but it is well worth the cost and failing that PCAS is a few hundreds of pounds and still pretty good.

There are those that might say it encourages you to keep your head in the cockpit. They would be wrong. If you wish ignore the PFD, ignore the PCAS display, maintain your visual scan - there is no need to look at either. While your eyes are busy outside or with the task in hand the audible alarm will instantly grab your attention, a quick glance at the screen and you know where you should be looking in that moment.

[englishal]

This whole incident has convinced me to buy a Zaon PCAS device and interface it to my G496. Seems like $1700 is a good insurance policy, and HAD I been the "other" aeroplane in this sad incident, it would probably have worked quite well (i.e. all commercial twins will have Mode S).

If you look at: WebTrak: Bournemouth (http://boh.webtrak-lochard.com/template/index.html) and choose 11:45 on 28th July and look to the top left (near Blandford, may have to zoom out or move map) there are two aeroplanes, one transponding 7370 which come pretty close. 7370 was me, and despite what the altitude readouts say we were pretty much at the same level. We didn't see each other until it was pretty close, and he saw me before I saw him....it was a "whites of the eyes" moment.....

[danieloakworth]

Re terminology, have got to disagree. Regardless of whether ATC pass an instruction or a request to you in Class G, it would be gross bad airmanship to not acknowledge.

[VP959]

Re terminology, have got to disagree. Regardless of whether ATC pass an instruction or a request to you in Class G, it would be gross bad airmanship to not acknowledge.

???????

I didn't even hint at "not acknowledging" any radio transmission in my post on terminology, so where did that idea come from? Did you actually bother to read and understand what I wrote before posting your disagreement with it?


Mind you, if I was flying non-radio (which I do a fair bit of the time, for purely practical reasons associated with having no electrical power) then I wouldn't know that any ATC unit was trying to talk to me, and wouldn't be able to acknowledge any call. Of course, I'd question the wisdom of flying non-radio in an area as dodgy as this, but it would be perfectly legitimate, if very unwise IMHO.

VP

[dublinpilot]

Ok, have a bit more time now to look up the reference.

It's from MATS part 1, Section 3, Chapter 1 "Approach Control"

1.4.2 Aircraft within an ATZ are required to comply with instructions from the ATC unit. Flight in Class F and G airspace outside the zone is permitted without an ATC clearance. However, controllers may assume that pilots of aircraft flying in the vicinity of the aerodrome in RTF contact with the ATC unit are complying with instructions unless they state otherwise. Controllers are to provide an ATC service accordingly.

Hopefully that remove some of the gray ;)

dp

[Just another student]

As a former employee of Atlantic in OPS, I would like to pass on my condolences to those who are no longer with us and their families.


SG,HA,JB.... my thoughts are with you always

R.I.P

JAS

[Yorky Towers]

Back to the real subject: thoughts and sincere condolences to the families and friends of the five Aviation people involved in this tragic accident.

Yorky Towers

[BizJetJockey]

Keep flying Jimbo...I'm sure many pints will be risen in celebration and remembrance! Your memory will live on at WW and I'm sure at Coventry as well.

My condolences to the rest of those involved.

RCW

[Rod1]

“I'd question the wisdom of flying non-radio in an area as dodgy as this, but it would be perfectly legitimate”

Lots of non radio aircraft based in the area. This includes Micros, LAA and Gliders from multiple strips and airfields. However, I would have thought that non would be at 900ft 3nm for Cov. I following the last fatal mid air I did an analysis of the aircraft in my vicinity (10 min flying time north of this incident) and concluded that 80% would not be transponder equipped.

Rod1

[Standard Noise]

I'd question the wisdom of flying non-radio in an area as dodgy as this
Says the bloke who admitted flying non-radio 'a fair bit of the time'.
What exactly is this 'dodgy' bit your talking about. It's Class G airspace, you don't have to be equipped with a radio. If the CAA started telling the flying fraternity that they had to be radio equipped regardless of a/c type and airspace used, the noise would be deafening, it'd sound like a slaughterhouse on porky pig day! Why don't you email that comment to the BGA and see what response you get.
The airspace round Cov isn't dodgy, it's just Class G, there's a difference.

[Lister Noble]

http://www.pprune.org/atc-issues/338294-radio-use.html

It may interest some to see the replies to the small thread re radio use I posted earlier this month on the ATC forum.
Long before this tragic accident!
Lister:)

[VFE]

I personally think transponder far more likely to reduce the risk of mid air collisions than radio. Radio relies on correct and accurate pilot usage to pin point their location whereas a xponder is doing the job far more accurately. Obviously this is only of relevance in certain airspace at the moment but in 2008 I think it about time we made moves to make a xponder mandatory in any part of UK airspace and to start tracing people who fail repeatedly to switch the thing on, as it's equates to suicidal laziness IMHO. Laugh if you will but there're more and more aircraft appearing on the GA market equiped with TCAS nowadays but what use is that when people don't use their xponder?

Just a few thoughts on the subject, now I shall stand back and get shot down by the farmstrip diehards who are more interested in getting away with a spot of Rule 5 breaking than avoiding the potential for a collision... cuz let's face it - they're the usual suspects when it comes to not switching their xponder on. There - I've said it!

VFE.

.

[S-Works]

WOW VFE! And I thought I was the contentious one!!

[gasax]

I'll rise to the bait VFE.

Every year we kill over 3000 people on the roads - year in year out.

One unfortunate incident - the causes of which we are only speculating upon and you decide it is necessary to ground something approaching half the aircraft in the country. ('cos they cannot fit transponders).

My!

There are many words that could be used but rational and sensible are not amongst them.

[PPRuNe Radar]

For those who are using TCAS and its less functional poor cousins, are you solely using it to determine traffic in a vertical plane, or do you think it's some kind of pseudo radar giving you accurate horizontal awareness as well ?

It's a great piece of kit, but you need to understand the philosophy behind its design and the inherent innaccuracies if you use it in a different way from that intended by the manufacturers and those who specify the industry standard for ACAS devices.

[VFE]

A mere pup Bose-X me ole.... ;)

Ok, slight wind up aside, xponder usage and in particular the requirement to squark Mode C (if fitted) has featured in quite a few industry safety awareness publications for quite some time now yet many PPL holders can't even be bothered to switch the thing to standby and we all know why - they have this ridiculous mistaken idea that if they bust controlled airspace they won't be caught if their xponder is switched off.

VFE.

[windriver]

they have this ridiculous mistaken idea that if they bust controlled airspace they won't be caught if their xponder is switched off.


That's a worrying statement? :confused: :eek:

[VP959]

Says the bloke who admitted flying non-radio 'a fair bit of the time'.
What exactly is this 'dodgy' bit your talking about. It's Class G airspace, you don't have to be equipped with a radio. If the CAA started telling the flying fraternity that they had to be radio equipped regardless of a/c type and airspace used, the noise would be deafening, it'd sound like a slaughterhouse on porky pig day! Why don't you email that comment to the BGA and see what response you get.
The airspace round Cov isn't dodgy, it's just Class G, there's a difference.

The "dodgy" reference was with regard to all of the comments from those blithely flying ILS approaches through this bit of class G under the false assumption that they were, in some way, protected by ATC.

Good airmanship seems to me to be more than just following the law laid down in the ANO; it would be small comfort to be greeted at the pearly gates, asked how one came to meet ones' demise and reply that it was because you followed the letter of the law.

In my case it's more to do with cowardice. I've been around long enough to get seriously worried when flying in areas that I know may be populated with people who feel that have precedence over others, when legally they don't (as far as I can see). My safety mechanism is simply not to fly in those areas if I can possibly avoid it; maybe I'm wrong, but this is just self-preservation on my part.

VP

[Farrell]

For those who are using TCAS and its less functional poor cousins, are you solely using it to determine traffic in a vertical plane, or do you think it's some kind of pseudo radar giving you accurate horizontal awareness as well ?

It's a great piece of kit, but you need to understand the philosophy behind its design and the inherent innaccuracies if you use it in a different way from that intended by the manufacturers and those who specify the industry standard for ACAS devices.

It is truly astonishing to see how many people out there use TCAS as a panacea and who have no idea of how it really works or what it is there for.
One can even find certain "professionals" shrugging off bad practice with "He's got TCAS anyway."
Have had some very serious words with folks over here about it.

[Vino Collapso]

In my case it's more to do with cowardice. I've been around long enough to get seriously worried when flying in areas that I know may be populated with people who feel that have precedence over others, when legally they don't (as far as I can see).

This is the best argument I have seen for the mandatory imposition of controlled airspace around every instrument approach.

We have a direct conflict of interest in GA between those who quote the fact that Class G is uncontrolled so they may do what they want and to hell with ATC, and those who look at a map, see a marked approach and consider avoiding it (or at least talk to ATC).

As far as I can see the forthcoming change to ATSOCAS will do nothing but make the situation worse.

[DX Wombat]

That's a worrying statementUnfortunately it is also perfectly true. Just ask anyone from D&D. It's also not confined to PPLs, those earning their daily crust by flying have also been known to do it.

[NigelOnDraft]

For those who are using TCAS and its less functional poor cousins, are you solely using it to determine traffic in a vertical plane, or do you think it's some kind of pseudo radar giving you accurate horizontal awareness as well ?

It's a great piece of kit, but you need to understand the philosophy behind its design and the inherent innaccuracies if you use it in a different way from that intended by the manufacturers and those who specify the industry standard for ACAS devices.As stated here, there is an established system called "TCAS". I got slated above for a reference to it, and how it "did not apply to GA systems". Can we at least establish that "TCAS" is the "system" installed and used in large commercial aircraft, and differentiate from other systems that might assist in traffic awareness and potential collision avoidance.

As the poster above implies, TCAS is a "system" involving hardware + pilot & ATCO training and actions. It is not perfect - it has so far caused one mid-air with >100 fatalities (hardware fine, human factors and training not...) and one very near mid air (2 x widebody, all human factors fine, but 1 dodgy wire :{ ). Also for reasons various "TCAS" is not really applicable to the GA / VFR environment for many reasons.

We then come on to to various hardware solutions that do some things similar to TCAS hardware - albeit they seem to be on the TA side, not RA? It is fine for one or 2 systems (certified?) to express a "display" on where other aircraft may (or may not) be in relation to your aircraft. But if we start talking of mandating such systems? What training is required? They seem largely to revolve around Mode C? Are GA Mode C altitudes broadcast to the required accuracy for collision avoidance? As opposed to ATC separation requirements (far more tolerant). TCAS is an active system to determine range? Whereas I understand these systems largely passive? And as implied above, even though TCAS does a fair job at displaying "bearing", this is "info only" and TA/RA warnings based solely on the (accurate) range calculations? Are these systems, broadcasting "relative bearing", willing to be certitied (and accountable in a court of law) on that basis?

And if we do go down this route, what of training / the law? With TCAS, it is now 100% established that TCAS overrides ATC, and almost 100% pilot judgement as well... even if we see the "traffic", how do we really know it is the one the RA is based on? As such, we train regularly for TCAS... But in the GA environment? Is it legitimate to follow a "warning" and climb into CAS?

NoD

[flybymike]

VFE makes the point that not using a transponder is not going to save you from being identified in the event of an airspace bust. The fact of the matter is though, that, of the four infringers of the notorious red arrows TRA ( as it then was known) Elvington bust in 2003, the only one who was actually identified and prosecuted was the hapless and responsible pilot who was actually sqawking his position (and identity). The other non squawkers got away unidentified and scot free.
The use of safety related equipment to mount prosecutions of this type is completely inappropriate. It is no wonder that pilots are apprehensive about mode S and switching the damn things on in the first place....

[IO540]

NigelOnDraft

Firstly, I think that the accident you refer to was one where the crew ignored their TCAS advisory and acted on ATC orders instead (and hit the other plane). So this is hardly a case of TCAS "causing" a crash.

Secondly, the altitude information fed to the TCAS in your airliner is also from a barometric source. No different to the GA systems such as this one (http://www.avidyne.com/products/tas600/index.asp).

The system is informational only - you don't get resolution advisories. But it does tell you about where other traffic is in both azimuth and relative altitude, so the resolution is obvious. In a head-on situation, you turn to the right, etc.

[Farrell]

You're missing the point.

TCAS is not a box that causes things.
It is a system - involving displays, ATCOs and pilots.
TCAS did not fail during the DHL incident - the system did.
And if you re-read Nigel's post, he states that the system caused the accident - and he is correct about that.

But it does tell you about where other traffic is in both azimuth and relative altitude, so the resolution is obvious

It's not really that clean cut. And you are only quoting on a head-on situation. With no RA/TA commands, on your "TCAS" display - what would you do in a situation that was not head-on?

[IO540]

You would take avoiding action as you see best.

The alternative is to do nothing, which is silly. It is the "head in the sand" attitude so prevalent in GA - like the map+stopwatch being the "proper way" to navigate.

The inter-communicating TCAS systems used in airliners need to work that way because everybody has the system, and everybody is always (or nearly always) flying under ATC direction, which is assumed to be "right" (provide 100% guaranteed separation) so any traffic proximity is a dire situation where something in the system has already gone badly wrong, and is considered so serious - yet so rare - that a resolution based purely on a level change is considered sufficient.

In the GA OCAS context, excessive traffic proximity can and does occur during routine operations. Even if under a RIS/RAS, ATC will advise of traffic only according to workload. Therefore, traffic awareness increases safety and I cannot see a scenario where it is not worth having because it decreases safety.

One can certainly argue about the value for money. It is pretty poor. With ~ 1 midair per year in the UK, for some 20,000 GA pilots (the total # with valid medicals) that gives us some 400k annual hours flown. Nearly all of the mid-airs occur below 1000ft, so (unless one is into kerb crawling) the time window in which you might have one is exceedingly small.

[mm_flynn]

On TCAS, there seem to be two different points being muddled.

1 - An assertion by some posters that this incident supports a programme to mandate TCAS (as in the certified system in airlines) in all aircraft. - Nigel and Farrell make make important points that TCAS is not a panacea and would have massive issues as it is the whole system/process. It is not just a box of tricks - even though some may use it as such. (besides, mandating #50k and probably 200 lbs of kit and power into most GA aircraft would end the industry)

2 - IO540 (and others) point, is that having GA style traffic information can be a really helpful thing in helping to spot traffic the Mark 1 eyeball didn't. It isn't a system, all it is help in seeing and avoiding - and just like all the other parts of the see and avoid system, it is up to the pilot to work out a resolution and execute it.

[VP959]

It is the "head in the sand" attitude so prevalent in GA - like the map+stopwatch being the "proper way" to navigate.

There's more than an element of truth in that statement, IMHO.

Getting back to the "Private Flying" related topic (rather than a debate on the finer points of complex collision avoidance systems fitted to the big stuff), how do we address the broadening spectrum of GA?

There is no "one size fits all" any more, the majority of UK GA aircraft are paragliders, paramotors, hang gliders, powered hang gliders, microlights, gliders etc, yet we continue to think in terms of what might be best applicable to conventional light aircraft.

Like the road system, we have to get used to the fact that our airspace has to accommodate an extremely broad range of aircraft types. It seems we are struggling to determine how best to do that in Class G.

Some of the debate here has highlighted that we have a similar problem in this sort of airspace to we have on some rural A roads. We have heavy transport stuff vying with the equivalent of bicycles for use of the same bit of space. Some are, unfortunately, behaving a little like Mr Toad, assuming that they have a right to inconvenience or endanger others because they have a bigger/faster/heavier/more expensive machine. Both have widely varying views as to "rights" yet both are legally equals. No one would suggest making all rural A roads motorways, just to keep bicycles and horses off them, so we shouldn't try to do the same with Class G.

Until we accept that Class G is to be shared equably, without imposing burdens on one or more category of user that are unreasonable, then we will continue to have endless arguments and continue (regrettably) to fly into each other on (thankfully) rare occasions.

VP

[IO540]

The arguments will carry on, VP959, this is pprune after all :)

What will never happen is

a) mandatory transponders for powered VFR traffic in all Class G

and

b) a large % of GA owners fitting the GA TCAS systems (£10-20k and 10-20kg).

So, nothing is actually ever going to change.

Personally, I would like to see mandatory Mode C/S for all powered planes in all airspace. Then I could make the decision on whether the cost is worthwhile. but, as I say, this will never happen.

De facto, much powered traffic already carries a transponder. But many won't switch it on, on "civil liberties" grounds. They moan about the £2500 cost of replacing the ancient Mode A with a new Mode S, while spending £7000 on their Annual...

[TamedBill]

I worked with both Sophie and Jim only this last fortnight. Both excellent pilots and really nice individuals. This is too sad for words.

Thoughts go to the friends family and colleagues of all five involved in this accident.

Praise and respect to the Air Ambulance crew who first arrived at the scene. I know the media has been slated for showing footage of this but when I watched it I found it very reassuring to see the team was quickly on site trying to help my colleagues.

[PPRuNe Radar]

The system is informational only - you don't get resolution advisories. But it does tell you about where other traffic is in both azimuth and relative altitude, so the resolution is obvious. In a head-on situation, you turn to the right, etc.

IO540

You prove my point for me that some people are operating under a misconception. There are people out there who will use their ACAS system (which includes TCAS and everything else in the market) in the horizontal plane. The system is not designed for that and is not accurate enough in providing bearings. They could be up to 30 degrees out.

Turning to the right simply because your display says the traffic is head on could actually be turning you right in to the guy you are 'blindly' trying to avoid. ACAS is only accurate for vertical avoidance manouevres, that is how it is designed.

It is not an airborne radar or an accurate horizontal situation display. It can give you a clue as to where to look and you might sight the traffic involved (or you might not). You can then take appropriate horizontal avoiding action. If you don't sight the traffic and manouevre horizontally based on the picture being given to you by your kit, don't be too surprised if you get a nasty surprise on occasion.

[bookworm]

You prove my point for me that some people are operating under a misconception. There are people out there who will use their ACAS system (which includes TCAS and everything else in the market) in the horizontal plane. The system is not designed for that and is not accurate enough in providing bearings. They could be up to 30 degrees out.

I think you're also operating under a misconception, PPrune Radar, about the alternative to TCAS and TCAD. You're thinking like a controller.

There's no doubt that ACAS systems are unsuitable for traffic management. To have traffic jumping around the screen while trying to work a busy sector would be madness, and so the sorts of azimuthal accuracies that are obtainable with ACAS are orders of magntitude less than the requirements of radar.

But the pilot's situation is a little different. Imagine that, as usual, we're in a situation where, because of controller workload, traffic density, or both, a radar advisory service is unavailable or impractical. So some helpful controller is calling traffic under a RIS.

And he calls "G-CD, traffic 12 o'clock, 3 miles, opposite direction, height and type unknown". At a typical closing speed of 300 kt, we have a little over 30 seconds to the potential impact. So we look for a few seconds, in the 30 degree arc -- that's the resolution of the clock code too -- ahead of us. And we see nothing. "G-CD nothing seen, update please?" "G-CD say again please, I was on the landline..." "Update on the traffic you called for G-CD please?"

A number of possibilities now emerge:

"G-CD he's now in your 10 o'clock, half a mile, passing down your left hand side"
"G-CD he's now in your 2 o'clock, half a mile, passing down your right hand side"

In either of those, I hold course. I never saw the traffic and had no way to manoeuvre to increase separation. If I turn left in the first case, or right in the second case, I make matters worse.

"G-CD he's still in your 12 o'clock, half a mile, opposite direction"

Course of action now? Prayer, perhaps?

Now compare that to ACAS. I find an aircraft at 12 o'clock, 3 miles, no altitude indication. I look out, but see nothing. I look again at the display for a few seconds. The relative bearing is increasing, it's now at about 12.15, 2 miles.

What do I do? Turn to the guy next to me and say "well the azimuthal resolution of TCAS is only 30 degrees so let's just sit here and see what happens?" Of course I don't. I commence a gentle turn to the left to increase the separation, looking out all the time. And I do that because as a pilot I'm a safety manager, and for every occasion that the manoeuvre takes me closer to the other aircraft, there are 99 occasions when it really does increase the separation. Those are good odds. And without guaranteed separation from ATC, odds are all I have when the notoriously unreliable human eye fails me.

[PPRuNe Radar]

Compare

If you don't sight the traffic and manouevre horizontally based on the picture being given to you by your kit, don't be too surprised if you get a nasty surprise on occasion.


with

and for every occasion that the manoeuvre takes me closer to the other aircraft, there are 99 occasions when it really does increase the separation.

They are in effect the same thing, i.e sometimes the information will not be accurate in the horizontal plane, although you give a numerical value (backed up by a report somewhere I guess).

ACAS is nothing like a controller since they are trying to provide different things. A controller is trying to meet separation standards, which are large. ACAS is monitoring other traffic with a view to preventing a collision only. It won't care what your separation is, just as long as you manouevre out of the impending collision. It will also wait until an aircraft is potentially going to be much closer than a controller (in perfect circusmtances) would before giving a warning.

It is the last safety net you have left when ground based systems and your own eyes haven't worked. But it's still only designed for vertical resolutions. Being aware of the limitations is an essential part of the 'training' before using such kit in anger. But then no one insists on training apart from the large aircraft operators.

[bookworm]

Yes. I wouldn't for a moment argue with your point that pilots need to understand the limitations of ACAS, and that's particularly relevant to using it to manoeuvre in the horizontal plane.

I think there are three reasons why ACAS uses the vertical plane for resolution:

1) greater precision of the measured value (and trend) of level vs azimuth
2) easier 1-dimensional deconfliction problem in calculating an advisory
3) ATC tends to use horizontal deconfliction (vectors) so it's less likely to contradict ATC

All of those are reasons for preferring a vertical manoeuvre if possible, even as a human-initiated response to a TA. If it's not possible, using the azimuthal trend information to increase separation make sense.

[IO540]

But it's still only designed for vertical resolutions.

Do you have a reference?

Systems such as the Avidyne 600 give you a reasonable azimuth reading, from what I have seen. Way better than nothing which is all we get most of the time it is most needed. Way better than an RIS under which the controller is not obliged to give you every contact because it is subject to controller workload.

The majority of traffic is not spotted visually even when you have a bearing (from TCAS or from RIS) even if you have four people in the cockpit all "knowing" where to look. A 30 degree turn or a climb/descent is easy enough to implement.

Don't knock a piece of technology just because it isn't perfect. One day it might be much better - when everybody is emitting GPS lat/long over Mode S 1090ES, just like airliners do already. But the altitude value will still be baro derived (instead of a precise GPS value) so it will be +/- 200ft, so if flying at 2400ft under the LTMA the smart choice will be to turn rather than a level change.

[NigelOnDraft]

Interesting article TCAS Traffic Display (http://www.theairlinepilots.com/flight/tcastrafficdisplay.htm)

Of note: ICAO PANS-OPS, Doc 8168 states: "Pilots shall not manoeuvre their aircraft in response to traffic advisories (TAs) only". So if we go down the route above of a "TCAS type" system, but with TAs only, it will be hard to relate to TCAS where we are not allowed to manoeuvre based on a TA (only).

I am not 100% against such systems... but the implications of bringing such systems in would need to be very carefully evaluated / applied. As above, what do you do if your "system" advises you, or indicates such that you wish, to manouevre whilst under a Radar Service? Do you disobey ATC?

Even if you "relegate" the system to vertical avoidance only (as above, whilst TCAS is pretty good at bearing info, it is fallible, and can easily make a safe situation catastrophic if believed), without an RA "decision" process - it can again lead to problems... TCAS uses "crossing RAs", where an aircraft above you, but descending, might ask you to climb... so a GA system where a pilot seeing an aircraft "above" (but not appreciate / judge it's high RoD) might descend and now create a collision.

If the sole purpose of such devices is to "lead your eyes to the traffic", and then take action based on the resulting visual sighting, then it would seem a benefit (provided the accuracy is such that it does not have you looking in the wrong place :{ ). But a device that causes you to manoeuvre, based on it's information alone, is going to generate almost (?) as many problems as it solves IMHO...

NoD

[IO540]

Interesting article, NoD, but it relates to the pilot acting contrary to a radar control service such as one gets in CAS / airways.

The context here is GA, OCAS, where the only radar service under which the controller is legally permitted to suggest avoidance is a Radar Advisory Service. Very few pilots use RAS because ATC sends you all over the sky, often with 90/90/90 degree doglegs flown around nontransponding contacts which for anybody cares could be 5000ft below you. It's also not available most of the time you might want it, due to controller workload because the required separation is impossible to achieve in the actual traffic density OCAS.

So, with the kind of TCAS systems available to GA today, all one is going to get is other traffic azimuth/altitude information, and since ATC giving a Radar Information Service (the most common radar service one goes for, OCAS) aren't allowed to even suggest which way to turn, the pilot is never going to be acting in conflict with ATC.

I am afraid that in GA we are pretty well on our own and have to do our own "safety management".

When I fly airways, which I do occassionally, I fly FL100-FL190 and one doesn't need TCAS there because there ain't no traffic there anyway! CAT flies way above or way below, and the routings take one many miles away from any CAT climbing/descending in the busy terminal areas. Never flown a hold on ATC instructions, either. And other GA in the airways is rare as rocking horse s*** :)

[Rod1]

“The majority of traffic is not spotted visually even when you have a bearing (from TCAS or from RIS) even if you have four people in the cockpit all "knowing" where to look.”

Glorious day for flying today. Turned the GPS and the Radio off (but the transponder on C). Got the map out and did a tour of Wales. Hit the waypoints +/- 1 min, spotted lots of other aircraft enjoying the weather (had to dodge a few gliders).

Maybe we should take a really good look at the biannual flight review. We could include some really accurate nav using the map, and check people are using a proper scan/lookout. Any pilots not to up to the job would have to fly with a competent companion for 12 months, they might learn something.:rolleyes:

Rod1

[ShyTorque]

Rod1, but how close did you come to those other aircraft that you never saw today?

I suspect you don't fly with a TCAS/TAS because if you did you would understand that my question isn't borne out of sarcasm. You didn't spot all the other aircraft out there, because no-one does.

PPRuNe Radar, what you say is basically correct but the limitations of TCAS/TAS equipment are outlined in the instruction handbooks and the Flight Manual.

I have to agree with IO540, sometimes pilots are obliged to make a captaincy decision based on insufficient information.

[mm_flynn]

Even if you "relegate" the system to vertical avoidance only (as above, whilst TCAS is pretty good at bearing info, it is fallible, and can easily make a safe situation catastrophic if believed), without an RA "decision" process - it can again lead to problems... TCAS uses "crossing RAs", where an aircraft above you, but descending, might ask you to climb... so a GA system where a pilot seeing an aircraft "above" (but not appreciate / judge it's high RoD) might descend and now create a collision.

I understand the point in controlled airspace, but in class G following your TCAS procedures (which are being related as a rote set of prescribed actions) is even worse. You have no idea what the other aircraft is going to do, as without the other half of the system, the other pilot is just going to use his judgement on where he thinks you are and make some manoeuvre (or just hold his course relying on the big sky)

ACAS is nothing like a controller since they are trying to provide different things. A controller is trying to meet separation standards, which are large. In real life controllers seem to worry a lot about some separation but none about others. On a busy hazy Saturday in the South there are lots and lots of light GA aircraft, sandwiched into a thin slice of air being asked in some cases to navigate with positional accuracy similar to PRNAV (i.e. the gap between Biggin and Gatwick airspace - which at its tightest is only 3/4 mile wide on each side of the M25) with the warm words of comfort - 'limited information service only due to high traffic density and poor radar performance'. I am not complaining, only pointing out that the GA traffic advisory concept needs to be evaluated in a world of separation expectations much reduced to those of IFR in controlled airspace - and where high quality radar information is only provided on an adhoc basis.

There are numerous posts where some GA pilot says 'I was on a RIS and someone crossed me 50 feet above me', controllers respond with 'well it is only information and you are supposed to be looking out!' (which of course is true). Having a bleeping things saying 'traffic closer and closer same level' is a huge step up from 'Sorry, was busy'.

Most of the arguments I have heard against GA traffic detection systems have been based around a logic that most things out there to hit aren't visible to these systems anyhow and having one may give a false sense of security. The fact that it is not as good as having TCAS, turbines, and Class A from the ground up is true but is not a good reason not to take the first step. (It reminds me a bit of the logic that GPS approaches are not perfect so we should stay with NDBs ;) )

[Vino Collapso]

in some cases to navigate with PRNAV accuracy (i.e. the gap between Biggin and Gatwick airspace)

You are joking aren't you? Follow the M25, or is that PRNAV?

[bad bear]

here is a link to a low cost collision avoidance system
Flarm - Homepage (http://www.flarm.com/)
It is only £400 and needs no maintenance. Gliders have fitted these in large numbers and it does work in aeroplanes or helicopters too. This week alone I have had numerous warnings of traffic approaching from my blind spot or out of sun.
I remember an Australian flying school that fitted a similar system (ADSB) to all its training aeroplanes years ago, should UK flying clubs do the same?

The advantages are that you don't need expensive transponders, or radar, or ATC. A complete stand alone low cost life saving device.
FLARM will also warn pilots of obstructions (masts and ski cables etc) in many parts of Europe

[IO540]

FLARM does not appear to have a future in mainstream European GA because it has no ICAO and thus national CAA backing.

ADS-B is "coming" but it will be implemented using the Mode S data channel, known as 1090MHz Extended Squitter.

So if you have say a GTX330 Mode S transponder, and connect it to a GPS, it will radiate your lat/long. This already happens on airliners' Mode S installations but the resulting system is classified as Enhanced Mode S which is a certification issue for GA which currently uses Elementary Mode S (which AIUI is not permitted to radiate any parameter at all).

Then you need an ADS-B receiver and I don't know how that will be done. Maybe a GTX330 can do that bit too?

ADS-B would work well because it uses the GPS position which is ultra precise, and won't need the complicated direction-sensing multiple-antenna and very expensive installations which present-day TCAS systems need. In principle, a cheap PDA fed from a 1090ES receiver could act as your "TCAS".

But it is all many years away, in Europe, and as always there will be exemptions for VFR which will make it to a large degree worthless.

[bad bear]

With over 11,000 aircraft currently fitted with FLARM why should European GA wait for the local " Authorities on Civil Aviation" ?
It may not ( but probably could) meet certification, but it is here, now, working and saving lives.
If light aircraft pilots fit it this week end it could save them next week, not in 5 years time when full ADSB comes along. Light aeroplanes can use this now I believe and it does not need to be "certified".
Having said that, the risk of collision remains low. Over central UK yesterday there were hundreds of gliders and aeroplanes ( possibly 700+ and certainly 250 competition gliders alone) airborne within 50nm of Oxford between 1200 and 1700 amassing thousands of hours airborne without miss hap, and the vast majority without transponders or talking to ATC. How could that number of aircraft actually talk to one ATC centre and how could anyone separate all those contacts on radar? 700 aircraft 300 minutes! FLARM is actually designed to work in a high traffic density situation and could be the correct solution, but I am no expert. All I know is that it was worth me spending my hard earned money on.
I have given up on the light weight, low power transponder malarkey, I don't think it will ever happen.
bb

[NigelOnDraft]

The usefullness an success of devices like FLARM require a broad diffusion of compatible devicesJust to check, your FLARM thing will only work against other FLARM equipped aircraft? And what % of GA aircraft are so equipped, in say, the UK?

Obviously if it works, and it gets over say 50% of aircraft equipped... it becomes useful and worth having. But there's rather a chicken and egg before that?

Gliders I'd rather leave out of it - they are somewhat unique in "congregating" in areas risking collisions, and a close community where establishing the critical mass may work (or already has?).

[IO540]

With over 11,000 aircraft currently fitted with FLARM

Do you have a breakdown by aircraft type for that figure?

[NigelOnDraft]

IO540 So, with the kind of TCAS systems available to GA today, all one is going to get is other traffic azimuth/altitude information, and since ATC giving a Radar Information Service (the most common radar service one goes for, OCAS) aren't allowed to even suggest which way to turn, the pilot is never going to be acting in conflict with ATC.You somewhat miss the point I was trying to make (no doubt poorly). TCAS gives an "indication" of bearing, but it is sometimes poor, and variable (tragets hop about in bearing but are of course unerringly accurate in range).

The article makes the point it is very easy, either by poor interpretation of, or poor accuracy of, the "bearing" to actually reduce the separation by taking action on it.

Take a head on target at 1NM when you wish to start avoidance, and a 5 degree "uncertainty" in bearing. If you are on opposing tracks, and 0 degrees off, then you would hit each other. If you are 5 degrees off you would be 500' apart - close, but you live. Trouble is, if that accuracy is misinterpreted / wroingly displayed, you may take the lateral action and cause the 500' to become nothing :confused: As was being implied by some (inappropriate) action taken in the article.

TCAS in fact can be 30 degrees out... what sort of accuracy can the GA systems out there guarantee? As you say I am afraid that in GA we are pretty well on our own and have to do our own "safety management".
and on an individual basis I can agree. Trouble is, for a manufacturer, or regulator, or indeed anyone, to encourage or mandate such systems causes the big "liability" word to enter the equation... where the consequences of it creating a collision outweigh leaving people to look out and bear the responsibility.

NoD

[bad bear]

Do you have a breakdown by aircraft type for that figure?

sorry I am not able to give a current breakdown but there was some information on the FLARM website.

Just to check, your FLARM thing will only work against other FLARM equipped aircraft? And what % of GA aircraft are so equipped, in say, the UK?

Indeed FLARM only works against other FLARM equiped aircraft

But there's rather a chicken and egg before that?

Indeed, chicken and egg. What did the guy with the first phone do with it?

[DX Wombat]

What did the guy with the first phone do with it?Probably made a few more as gifts for friends and family. :) Whilst it might be a good idea, I can't see the manufacturers giving them away free just so that we will all be persuaded to use them in the future. :hmm:

[PPRuNe Radar]

Do you have a reference?

ICAO Annex 10 Volume IV is a good place to start. Surveillance and Collision Avoidance Systems Standards and Recommended Practices. My italic bolding added.

4.3.2.1.3.2

RECOMMENDATION

The errors in the relative bearings of the estimated positions of intruders should not exceed 10 degrees rms.

Note: This accuracy in the relative bearings of intruders is practicable and sufficient as an aid to the visual acquisition of potential threats. In addition, such relative bearing information has been found useful in threat detection, where it can indicate an intruder is a threat. However, this accuracy is not sufficient as a basis for horizontal resolution advisories, nor is it sufficient for reliable predictions of horizontal miss distances.

[vanHorck]

Never thought of FLARM, but if it s well under 1.000 Euros..., why would we not?

Are there GA plane in the UK that carry it? Such as one who frequently fly near glider sites? Experiences?

[PPRuNe Radar]

Nothing to stop anyone starting a condolences thread, which is the usual form if people want somewhere free from debate to record their rememberances and tributes.

No one has ... yet.

[vanHorck]

why the annoyance? I d never heard of FLARM and although it seems a one brand affair, if thousands have used it successfully in gliding, why should we not consider it?

Condolences is not what this forum is (only) about. It is about exchanging views in normal manner in the hope we can all learn from it.

I didn t know any of the crew(s), and i think it s sad. I feel for their families, but it seems pretty hollow to say that here. If i knew them i d have started a condolence register on an appropriate website.

To get back on subject: Any powered GA planes that use FLARM? Experiences?

[IO540]

Pprune Radar - that ICAO reference is again in CAT context, not GA.

Also nobody is suggesting making TCAS mandatory; for GA that would be silly. The only bit which could be mandatory is transponder usage, unless technically impossible.

[Rod1]

FLARM was pushed very hard by the BGA in the 1st Mode S consultation. The CAA’s response to the consultation formally rejects it as an acceptable solution for a number of reasons.

I know some of you would love to a nice black box which will guarantee your collision avoidance with no pilot effort but it just is not going to happen. The CAA has stated that it will not mandate any form of transponder and most flying machines do not and probably never will have one. The CAA took its current position because it became convinced that it was not technically feasible to fit a transponder to most flying machines. No transponder = no warning = work on your look out. The same is also true of radios, most do not have one.

Next time you are in good VMC make a note every time you spot another flying machine and make a guess as to weather it has a transponder or not. I assume traditional group a has, LAA types 25%, and micros, gliders, hang gliders etc 0%. I think you will find that a very large % of the things out there have no transponder and are not likely ever to have.

Rod1

[modelman]

Took a 45 min local flight out of Cov on Sat ( was due to go last Sun just before the tragic event).I have to say my lookout was keener than ever (sure my head rotated a full 360) and although Cov was giving it's usual excellent FIS I still never got visual with traffic mentioned:eek:.The most worrying aspect for me was the amount of 'heights unknown' I was getting about traffic.
I took matters into my own hands and gave regular position/height reports more for the benefit of other pilots than ATC.

Guess if this sad incident has provoked people into thinking harder about their flying ( me included) then their loss has not been totally in vain.

MM

[PPRuNe Radar]

Pprune Radar - that ICAO reference is again in CAT context, not GA.

Sorry, but you're wrong. The ICAO standards don't specify that they only apply to CAT, otherwise as a GA pilot you could ignore all the airspace classifications, rules of the air, RT phraseology, equipment specifications, international licencing rules, etc, etc. The standards are published so that States may meet an international standard and so that industries throughout the world can provide equipment which meets a common standard and not one which operates in isolation. States may file differences to ICAO reccomendations, but they should then appear in their AIP. I can't find one which says that Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) standards only apply to CAT in the UK ... but then that's because they don't.

Bear in mind ICAO does not say that TCAS is the only show in town for collision avoidance systems (generically known as ACAS). Any company could produce a collision avoidance system which is not TCAS, but if they want it certificated for airworthiness purposes, then they'll almost certainly have to meet the ICAO Standards since this is what most States in the world base their requirements on.

TCAS standards take the generic ICAO ones and apply more detail to specify a common standard for people who build the TCAS equipment and operate collision avoidance systems using TCAS as their tool. A group called the RTCA publish those but they will still meet the ICAO specifications as a minimum, and do. These standards don't say they apply to CAT only. Why would they ??

As others have said, there are other systems out there such as FLARM and TCAD. Others are on the way too, like ADS-B. They still all find their specifications coming down from ICAO, and then being further detailed in RTCA or EUROCAE documentation, regardless of what type of aircraft they will be fitted in.


Also nobody is suggesting making TCAS mandatory; for GA that would be silly. The only bit which could be mandatory is transponder usage, unless technically impossible.

I don't believe anyone here did say make TCAS mandatory ... or maybe I missed it.

Mandatory Mode S is currently the European administrators answer to everything. Many are still to be convinced, me included.

[IO540]

The CAA has stated that it will not mandate any form of transponder and most flying machines do not and probably never will have one. The CAA took its current position because it became convinced that it was not technically feasible to fit a transponder to most flying machines. No transponder = no warning = work on your look out. The same is also true of radios, most do not have one.

Rod, you keep banging on about this, but when you say "most" you are obviously counting all those parachutists with a lawn mower strapped on their back.

The vast majority of "flying machines" which actually pose a risk to what I would call a normal GA pilot (flying a powered plane at normal non kerb crawling levels, making proper use of available vertical space) can most certainly be transponder equipped.

Gliders pose a risk to normal GA but statistics suggest it is extremely small - even smaller than then very tiny risk of a GA-on-GA midair.

[robin]

IO540

Ever flown near to the Malverns on a thermic day? or try flying west to east when Popham or Sandown have a microlight day?

For my type of flying, these are the big risks - that and pilots who don't look out the window. This summer I've lost count of the times I have had right of way and have had to change course and put on my landing lights to avoid a dozy pilot who never made the slightest attempt to change course as required under the Rules of the Air.

Obviously I can't know why they didn't see me, but lit up like a Christmas tree I would guess looking out wasn't their prime concern.

[Fuji Abound]

I cant help feeling there is some lack of understanding of TCAS in light aircraft.

I would like to set out my experience.

The last few days round trip was to and from the west country - a couple of hundred miles in each direction.

About 80% of the flight was with a RIS, 100% with TCAS on the MFD. The outbound route was all low level - not above 3,500 feet and coming back about half above FL75 and half low level.

TCAS was set to display all traffic - the options are above and below with or without a height buffer and unlimited. The traffic appears as the usual diamond on the moving map with altitude if the traffic is transponding mode C or S and an arrow to indicate the altitude trend.

Over the total route there was one primary contact identified by AT which was not transponding but presented a "threat". Of course it was not displayed by TCAS. The position and altitude of all other traffic, and there was a lot outbound, coincided with that reported by AT.

At GA speeds, (and in this case a cruising speed of around 175 knots) even with the traffic closing from ahead, it is simple to adjust the track and height to "ensure" separation. Moreover in almost every case it is reasonably straightforward to "work out" if the traffic is en route or manoeuvring.

The system may not be perfect but with the autopilot engaged and TCAS turned on your situational awareness of other aircraft and your ability to give them a wide berth is a million miles apart from working the same task visually. Moreover it enables your eyes to be outside hoping to pick up anything the "automatics" have missed.

What’s my point. Well TCAS is not a panacea anymore than FLARM. However both systems provide a very significant improvement on the mark 1 eyeball. Most en route traffic above 3,000 or 4,000 (on this trip at any rate) would seem to have been transponding and TCAS appeared to identify the traffic accurately 100% of the time. For me I am a great deal more comfortable having TCAS in the cockpit. I realise it is not a guarantee that I wont have a close encounter but it stacks the odds by another significant margin in my favour.

I felt I should make this post because I am not sure from some of the other posters whether they write from the perspective of having used TCAS in the cockpit. I recognise that I am privileged to fly an aircraft fitted with this system however as the price of modern avionics is driven down, glass cockpits become more common and less expensive alternatives become available (such as PCAS which I have found to be very reliable and already with the ability to link to a moving map display) I think we should not under estimate the safety enhancement these systems bring to general aviation. I made the decision some while back never to fly without a least a PCAS - it cost me a few hours flying but I reckon it was one of my best buys.

Finally, as I said before, I sense there is that brigade who are all too ready to chip away at TCAS or PCAS by inferring it is yet another excuse to fly the aircraft on instruments in VMC. If you allow it to be, then I guess they would be right. However, I flown with plenty of pilots who have a cockpit of steam gauges without a GPS in sight that fly on instruments in VMC. TCAS and PCAS do not encourage you to be head down any more than any other instrument and used properly they free up time to maintain an effective scan.

Sure, as another poster commented, there are plenty of aircraft not transponding but look at it this way, if I can identify all those that are, at least I have narrowed the odds in my favour. Maybe by a bigger margin that you might think because if it is fast its probably transponding and I reckon anything I am closing at 400 knots or more I am not going to do a very good job of spotting.

[robin]

The system may not be perfect but with the autopilot engaged and TCAS turned on your situational awareness of other aircraft and your ability to give them a wide berth is a million miles apart from working the same task visually.

Ahh - so that was why the b*st*rds didn't try to avoid me - they were probably on autopilot. Thanks

[IO540]

Ahh - so that was why the b*st*rds didn't try to avoid me - they were probably on autopilot

Objectively, how close did they actually get?

I don't take avoiding action unless required. Some pilots get nervous of a contact passing one mile away - pointless.

[NigelOnDraft]

Fuji...

Just to check, are you describing a full ICAO standard "TCAS" system?

it is simple to adjust the track and height to "ensure" separation. Please assure me you do not adjust your track based on the TCAS display, but only after you acquire the traffic visually? And if you fail to acquire the traffic visually, you maintain track and height (or V/S) as and until you get an RA? Please :ugh:

NoD

[robin]

Quote:
Ahh - so that was why the b*st*rds didn't try to avoid me - they were probably on autopilot

Objectively, how close did they actually get?

I don't take avoiding action unless required. Some pilots get nervous of a contact passing one mile away - pointless.

Objectively? Difficult to say but in one case I saw the approaching aircraft about 30 seconds away and watched it closing on me. It was clear he hadn't seen me even though I'd switched all the lights on and my aircraft is quite brightly coloured. Being a coward I'd started to move out of his way and there wasn't a problem in the end. However, if I had taken the view, that some express, that I had right of way, then who knows.

My general view now is that I don't trust anyone to see me - be it on TCAS or using Mk1 eyeball - so will move out of their way.

[Fuji Abound]

NigelOnDraft

Skywatch has some limitations.

It will issue a traffic alert but it will not provide an RA.

The operating manual warns that the sytem should be used to visually acquire the traffic and then adjust track and height to ensure seperation.

AOPA conclude that pilots are far more likely to be able to acquire traffic with TCAS, than without.

You raise an interesting question.

In the event it has not proved possible to acquire the traffic what should the pilot do? With a system that initiates an audible RA is it not the case the pilot is expected to recognise and enact the RA within 5 seconds whether or not he has acquired the traffic? Response to a further RA is expected within 2.5 seconds. Of course TCAS have been developed primarily around the needs of commercial operators in a CAS. Examples outside CAS therefore seem to be rare. I have read the report of the incident between a Boeing 737 and a Tobago outside CAS in 2003. In this case the Boeing had the advantage of dual crew. The co-pilot was the handling pilot. The commander was solely concerned with "see and avoid". TCAS indicated traffic below and the descent was arrested (although the traffic had not at that time been visually acquired). Subsequently TCAS issued an RA to climb. The commander took over and complied. At no time did either crew members visually acquire the traffic. The Tobago pilot saw the traffic which he said appeared to be crossing his track but he thought this was probably an illusion and did not take further action.

So given the limitations of the Skywatch system a fast contact is approaching you from directly behind. (you might just as well be descending with traffic below as in the example above). The only way you are going to visually acquire the traffic is to turn away from the traffic. What action would you suggest? If you do nothing at best a few seconds before the collision you will get "traffic, traffic, traffic" - you will never get an RA. If you turn away from the traffic you acted before visual acquisition. If you turned away and climbed or descended you have also acted without visually acquiring the traffic as did the boeing crew.

We can debate the risks involved in operating light aircraft in IMC outside CAS. The fact of the matter is that pilots do, and the law permits such operations. Often no RIS is available. Once again the pilot is never going to visually acquire the traffic but Skywatch will for sure paint the traffic on the MFD. As the risk of a collision increases in the event no avoiding action is taken no RA will be issued other than "traffic, traffic traffic". Please assure me in such circumstances you will do something to avoid the traffic before you visually acquire the traffic.

Systems such as Skywatch are being used in a far less controlled enviroment than I suspect their manufacturers in the States may have envisaged. It maybe I need to give a deal of thought to how such sytems are best used. In these examples I find it difficult to rationalise the traditional wisdom that no action should be taken until the target is visually acquired or an RA is issued when the sytem is incapable of providing an RA.

[englishal]

I don't know why anyone would argue against traffic info in the cockpit. The world would be a safer place if everyone had a transponder / some method of broadcasting their position, and then those that wanted to could have a system to display conflicting traffic?

The TIS systems I have used in the USA are NOT TCAS but they have brought to my attention numerous targets which I wouldn't have otherwise seen - as displayed here. If nothing else as long as your altitude is different, a collision won't occur. You can also see altitude trends so if they are climbing or descending.....

I believe FLARM costs aout £500. If everyone in the UK or indeed Euroland decided to fit FLARM the cost would probably drop by half. They already offer discounts of 20% I think to 15 units or more, which I'm sure could be negotiable if someone decided to order several hundred or thousand.....

http://www.digital-reality.co.uk/traffic.jpg
http://www.digital-reality.co.uk/traffic2.jpg

[VFE]

Hear hear Al.

You would think that your average PPL'r would be able to afford a £500 investment in flight safety, never mind a snip at £250 if more followed suit. But then again, we still see rich PPL'rs arriving at Guernsey on almost dry tanks just to save £30 on a fill up! :rolleyes:

VFE.

[gasax]

If the CAA were to give a real (non political, rational, sensible) recommendation to something like FLARM then we would see a real take up. And largely from the traffic types who need it. The problem is that these people (CAA) are part of the 'system' and unless it has a serious price tag and industry lobbying and all the expensive things which provide the gravvy train they have no interest.

I'd buy FLARM if 40% of other aircraft were likely to have it. I have Mode C - and the only real benefit I get is easier transits - which is a bit marginal.

Mode S - a complete and utter waste of money unless if comes with TIS. Mode C - well hopefully nothing over 5750 kgs will bump into me, something of an investment. Could I get something similar to alert the gray pointy things? Unfortunately not but maybe coming.

And yet tomorrow we could all go and buy FLARM - and with a bit of promotion I'm sure many of us would. But it offers no international conferences, no expenses paid jaunts and so the people who are supposed to have a real, rational view of risk management ignore it.........

[IO540]

My guess is that one problem with FLARM is that it is not available in a certified form, and there is a limit to how much velcro-attached electronics, powered from the cigar lighter, the owner of a nice plane is going to put in.

Even fitting proper aircraft power connectors for portable devices is a bit of a grey area...

The £1000+ ZAON unit which gives you some kind of directional information is a pretty tacky installation, with the cigar lighter lead running right across your instrument panel.

A saleable FLARM unit would need to interface to panel mounted MFDs or whatever. And then it wouldn't be £500 but £5000, plus aerials, plus installation, plus certification.........

[vanHorck]

i hope the CAA read this forum

[Robin400]

This site is well worth looking at.
Flarm - Product (http://www.flarm.com/product/index_en.html)

[NigelOnDraft]

Fuji.... Some thoughts / replies...

The operating manual warns that the sytem should be used to visually acquire the traffic and then adjust track and height to ensure seperation.Good :D

In the event it has not proved possible to acquire the traffic what should the pilot do?The $64M question ;) To begin to answer it, we could look at TCAS. Range, or rather Range + Rate of change in Range + Height Difference => Collision possibility assessment. As IO540- says above, a miss is OK - you do not need a large safety margin. I have had an RA, with 200+ people down the back, and the system demanded we "maintain V/S" (which was zero). We had the traffic visually (Biz Jet), and went very closely laterally to it, and 500' above it. It's not a lot, and a pilot might visually try and get more... but it was safe and all TCAS wanted ;)

TCAS assesses range VERY accurately (since it can actively demand and time returns), and Height quite accurately (to whatever the 2 x Mode C device work to - in some GA applications, or even commcercial non-RVSM, I would not want to trust it within a few hundred feet?) Other systems assess range on signal strength (?) - fairly dubious to assess range accurately, and very for rate of closure (this is TCAS' strong point). IMHO TCAS and other ACAS systems are nowhere near up to assessing bearing accurately enough for either automatic, or visually judged vis screen, lateral avoidance - as the article above stated, it is too easy too reduce separation...

The other factor on "what you do" depends on judging the "target" is/might be doing. He might actually have seen you, and judged (visually) he is going to miss you, when you take some inappropriate avoiding action and reduce or even eliminate the separation. Again, a TCAS strong point is that where possible, avoiding action is co-ordinated - hence the compulsory need to follow it. Ditto - it might be taking avoiding action based on an ATCO, who has a more accurate picure...

So given the limitations of the Skywatch system a fast contact is approaching you from directly behind. (you might just as well be descending with traffic below as in the example above). The only way you are going to visually acquire the traffic is to turn away from the traffic. What action would you suggest?You could run the argument that if you are concerned about your 6 o'c, you should always be weaving and looking behind you! What you do is again a difficult call... the traffic behind might have seen you and gets somewhat upset when you turn into his path.

Please assure me in such circumstances you will do something to avoid the traffic before you visually acquire the traffic.I would probably do "nothing", because my training is (military) to trust my life on my lookout, and accept that without the latter, I am in trouble, and in my later life that you do NOT avoid on a TA, and await an RA - even though that trained for environment is not applicable to GA. In practice it is academic, I do not have such a system... and whilst following this debate is interesting, will await buying anything until a lot of these questions are resolved.

What you do is up to you, and see best at the time. The "problem" we are discussing is what we as a community advise you do, both in actions, and in equipment terms... and that carries the liability of ensuring the advice is truly fact based and risk free. TCAS has had a tough learning curve, and nobody wants to repeat that in a far less trained for / regulatory environment.

NoD

[nav3]

IO540 - You make a good point about the Avdyine Ryan TAS 600 which IS a good system. I had a C172SP G1000 until a few weeks ago (upgrading to C182T) and I have to say a couple of things related to this thread which are a bit peripheral, but very relevant.

Somebody said Mode S is a waste......well, it was badly handled which we all know. If it was one rule for all then fine ...that I do agree with.There are big benefits to be had but we all have to sing from the same hymn sheet.

The TAS600 I had fitted to the 172 because I wanted extra security. NOT replacement for the Mk 1 eyeball and it is amazing how many other targets are spotted by it. Most new Cessnas have already got the TIS system inbuilt but as EASA can't agree (par for the course) on a common frequency to transmit the data, it means that we again have to pay over here for something that is fitted to the aircraft and stops working as soon as you leave mainland USA.

The second point I wish to make is that many pilots (even within my own club) do not like talking to big airports. For some reason they will transit one of the busiest corridors (from the CT /Nuneaton up to Tatenhill) without speaking to anyone. Absolute madness. All it needs is education from the instructor to begin with and confidence and pre-planning. My instructor had a job keeping me OUT of Birminghams area:). I enjoy talking to controllers and it is a two way thing. You inform them and they inform you. However, you would be amazed at the number of people transiting North right across the CT without a thought for anyone on approach to R/W 23. I have seen and heard it and it is obvious they are not on frequency or if they are, completely oblivious to what danger they could be causing. As it is Class G they feel it is theirs to do what they want with.

I am only a 150hr PPL but do take my flying and communication seriously and so should others. All discussions on this forum are very helpful as the threads often jog a memory or invoke a thought and if that one thought saves a life then well done PPruNe.

[IO540]

This site is well worth looking at.
Flarm - Product (http://www.flarm.com/product/index_en.html)

No approvals so not legally installable other than in a homebuilt/ML type, as far as I can see.

Some nice panel mounted versions :ok:

[ShyTorque]

Nav 3, sensible, balanced post, makes a change to see one on here. :ok:

Folks wandering about the skies with little appreciation of the big picture are a worry to us all, the instruction they aren't given must be one cause. Those who cross the approach path as you describe remind me of pedestrians who sometimes choose to walk across a busy dual carriageway from one side to the other and linger 'because they can'. Not illegal, but totally unsafe.

[Robin400]

We need a system that can be installed in a microlight to a 380.
Only then will everyone have a basic means of protection.
Transmitting one`s position and altitude for all to receive is the only way.
Mode "S"/ TCAS could then be left for the big boys toys.:mad:

[Fuji Abound]

What you do is up to you, and see best at the time. The "problem" we are discussing is what we as a community advise you do, both in actions, and in equipment terms... and that carries the liability of ensuring the advice is truly fact based and risk free. TCAS has had a tough learning curve, and nobody wants to repeat that in a far less trained for / regulatory environment.

I guess this encapsulates the point I was seeking to make. Your reaction was based on your ops manual and your training operating in a controlled enviroment using TCAS which provides a RA.

CAS typically used in GA does not provide an RA. Much of the time (given that most GA pilots spend most of their time outside CAS) the flight is neither at an asigned altitude or heading.

In short the pilot is "free" to do as he wishes.

To take the discussion a step further. With TA it is usually possible if you wish to establish vertical seperation of 1,000 feet and lateral seperation of 5 miles when the traffic first appears and well before any collision threat exists unless of course the system is vertically inaccurate by a least a 1,000 feet and inaccurate in distance by more than 5 miles and in bearing by more than 90 degrees. A miss is a miss but given the limitations of the system I am not sure on the desperate need to acquire the traffic given the very different constraints and speeds applicable in the enviroment we are discussing.

I agree, there may be an element of rewriting the manual but I would prefer to consider doing so rather than blind obedience to a procedure that has been inherited from a different enviroment.

I appreciate your comments about the way in which you would react. Your experience is interesting.

However I note that you have not responded to the specific example of two aircraft in open FIR in IMC. You will never acquire the traffic visually. The decision is simple. You avoid the traffic using the TAS before it remotely becomes a threat or you wait unitl you receive a traffic warning. I know whcih course I would prefer to follow.

[mad_jock]

And it has never been done by a VFR aircraft being told to hold on base to let a CAT aircraft go out bound on a pointless full procedure in CAVOK in class G to bobble up and set its TCAS off so it climbs so they can get in without waiting. Its happended to me a few times luckly my platform height out bound isn't the way oxford would teach it so we didn't have to react. It ain't the commercial pilots fault that ATC want to operate the airfield the way that they do. I have been MOR'd for canceling IFR in class G in CAVOK because they lost radar separation!!!!!!!!! It was the whole point of cancelling so we didn't have to do a 10 mile final and both of us could look out the sodding window.

Its one of these things thats going to happen if ATC continues to try and part the waves for CAT.

BTW Doncaster sounds ok at Dundee they use to star burst the VFR traffic as soon as the scot air had taken off out of City. Nothing could land once it had booked in with the scottish FIR.

[NigelOnDraft]

However I note that you have not responded to the specific example of two aircraft in open FIR in IMC. You will never acquire the traffic visuallySurely any aircraft in IMC is receiving a minimum of RAS? And so the question is not relevant - you have to rely on ATC for separation? Please don't tell me people fly in IMC without such a service :{ A RIS would for me, be risky, but anyway, the service provider should be giving the traffic information.

I do not tend to fly IMC outside CAS, and on the rare occasion I do, would always have a RAS - but that is my flying pattern. The thread to date I had treated as applying to VMC outside CAS..?

NoD

[gpn01]

When flying in OPEN FIR, presumably the Radar ADVISORY Service is such that they can only inform you about other traffic that the unit is either in contact with or which is painting a trace on their radar screen ? Therefore they can only give advice and not provide a completely controlled environment for any pilot who's IMC and requesting RAS ?

[S-Works]

I have a Zaon unit connected to my 496 that gives pretty good information and is compact.

I generally fly airways everywhere but I am based on a private strip so spend a lot of time transiting from CAS back and forth to the strip. On IMC days where I get a cloud break for a VFR landing I rarely see any returns. The clear VMC days it is a bloodbath and it is surprising the number of returns that I get and never eyeball.

Same problem as with TCAS etc. I need everyone to have a TXPDR and mode C so even with technology assisting me I still need to look out the window and be sharp on my lookout.

A question that perhaps should be debated is that are we letting our guards down with see and avoid when we are under ATC than for example when we are at a busy A/G airfield like Leicester or Popham etc. and expecting a bloodbath?