View Full Version : Fairchild Merlin twinprop disappeard off coast in Norway

Rick Studder
20th Jun 2008, 17:13
Coast guard aeroplane. Three persons persumed dead.


20th Jun 2008, 22:09
Aircraft owned by Helitrans and crew also hired by Helitrans.

21st Jun 2008, 14:56
The Norwegian AAIB has commissioned the salvage ship Polar Prince and has commenced search of the ocean floor using an ROV.

According to aftenposten.no, good radar plots of the accident is suspected to help in locating the wreckage. (There is a SSR at an hilltop of approx 1000ft on Sotra island just to the east of the suspected crash site. It should have clear view down to sfc) MOD coastal radars are in the vicinity as well.

The names of the crew was released today:

Knut Brunborg (45), captain

Jan Einarsen (60), captain.

Inge Marius Vågsberg (29), first officer

Rick Studder
22nd Jun 2008, 13:45
The wreckage has been found, a Norwegian newspaper reports (http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2008/06/22/538871.html).

Heavy damages indicates that the aircraft hit the water at high sink rate. The three crew memebers were found inside the wreckage. The CVR is also found.

22nd Jun 2008, 18:34
The wreckage was found at some 320m depth. It has been salvaged now, and is on its way to Bergen initially, then on to the Norwegian AAIB in Lillestrøm. Appearantly the aircraft disappeared from the radar screens as it was doing an F/O skilltest/typerating. The investigation will probably take some time, as it should to be thourough, and should porve to be interesting to read when it is released.

The Bartender
22nd Jun 2008, 18:54
The ship has been docked at Haakonsvern Naval Base for some time already. According to several media sources, the CVR was recovered with the wreck, and the aircraft did not have a FDR installed.

22nd Jun 2008, 21:05

22nd Jun 2008, 21:45
It doesn't always work, but if I'm not flying, I try to sit nearest the tail.

22nd Jun 2008, 23:36
Would not have worked there.

23rd Jun 2008, 12:44
I knew Inge when he was at flight school, he was a very dedicated pilot and a great lad, He will be missed. Very sad news.

6th Dec 2011, 14:01
The report is now ready and can be downloaded here: 2011/40 | sht (http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporter/2011-40)

(Click on "Last ned rapport"). It's in Norwegian but contains illustrations concerning the deep stall.

The flight was a skill-test for a candidate that was hired as a first officer on SA226-T(B) Merlins for
the operator Helitrans. He was one of two candidates that were employed by the company in early
2008. They underwent ground school and flight training in co-operation with the Swedish Type
Rating Training Organisation (TRTO) Trafikkhögskolan. Later it became clear that the Swedish
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) did not accept skill-tests limited to first officer duties on a single
pilot certified airplane, as the Norwegian CAA did. The candidates did not possess the skills to act
as commanders on the Merlin, and there was a period of uncertainty while the operator and the
Norwegian CAA discussed how to conduct the skill-tests, in particular whether to use a simulator or
an actual airplane. After several months the issues were resolved and an examiner was appointed.
There was a limited slot on a Thursday and a Friday where the examiner, the instructor/commander
and the aircraft was available at Bergen Airport Flesland.
The first candidate performed the skill-test on Thursday. The weather was not suited for flying skilltests.
It was low ceiling, rain showers and winds up to 40 kt and turbulence. Turbulence caused the
stick pusher to activate during the demonstration of slow flight. The commander decided to pull the
circuit breaker for the Stall Avoidance and Stability Augmentation System (SAS²) presumably to
avoid nuisance activations of the stick pusher. After the slow flight demonstration, the examiner
asked the candidate to demonstrate a stall. The candidate found this exercise frightening as she
experienced great difficulties, having to use all her available physical strength to regain normal
flight with the engines on full power and in IMC conditions.
The weather was similar on Friday with even stronger winds. The SAS² circuit breaker was not
reset. This was confirmed during the start-up check. The examiner requested a similar program
during this skill-test as he did the day before. However, when it came to demonstrating stalls, the
examiner asked for a slow flight up to first indication of stall, and not an actual stall. He asked for
call outs and a minimum loss of altitude recovery. The commander undertook the tasks of adding
power and retracting gear and flaps on the candidate’s request. It was IMC. During this exercise the
crew lost control of attitude and airspeed. The stall warning came on, but the airspeed decreased,
even with full power applied. Radar data show that the altitude increased 200 – 400 ft during the
period where control was lost. Airspeed decreased to about 30 kt and a sink rate of about 10 000
ft/min eventually developed. The airplane hit the sea in a near horizontal attitude about 37 sec. after
control was lost. All three on board were fatally injured.

The accident aircraft was used for coastguard duties and was modified with external sensors and
antennas. The AIBN made a Computational Fluid Dynamics analysis in order to determine whether
these installations influenced on stability and flight characteristics in the slow flight and pre-stall
regime. It was found that the modifications reduced the overall performance, but did not result in
any significant degradation of stability and control in this regime. There was no investigation as to
any influence on the characteristics of a fully developed stall.
The AIBN is of the opinion that this accident highlights the need for a change in the current training
on initial stall recovery techniques, especially the focus on minimum loss of altitude at the expense
of breaking the stall by lowering the nose and thus reducing the angle of attack.
The AIBN has issued two safety recommendations to the Norwegian CAA; one regarding the
conduct of skill-tests for pilots in a multi crew concept on single pilot airplanes, and one suggesting
increased focus on flight examiners tasks.

6th Dec 2011, 15:16
The AIBN is of the opinion that this accident highlights the need for a change in the current training on initial stall recovery techniques, especially the focus on minimum loss of altitude at the expense of breaking the stall by lowering the nose and thus reducing the angle of attack.

The UK CAA made the same point in a safety notice to instructors and examiners in only July this year.

How widespread is the teaching that minimising height loss is more important than actually recovery from a stall by reducing the AoA?

The Ancient Geek
6th Dec 2011, 16:16
Trying to recover from a stall by increasing power is just plain daft, the person who came up with the idea should be shot..
Adding power in many aircraft types may actually result in an increased AoA, especially low wing types with underslung engines.

I was always taught to get the nose down FIRST then consider adding power once the stall is broken.

This is probably a result of the mistaken teaching of "stalling speed", a wing stalls at an angle of attack, (usually around 15 degrees) not at some magic speed.

6th Dec 2011, 16:23
Pardon the ignorance of a long-retired pilot, but surely you don't practice stalling in IMC conditions?

6th Dec 2011, 17:10
Pardon the ignorance of a long-retired pilot, but surely you don't practice stalling in IMC conditions?

I would agree. And as for a training or check flight with a student, that seems to be even more of a strange practice.

Also, it's been at least two years since the FAA have been leaning away from the "min height loss in a stall" technique, and quite rightly so in my opinion.

Dream Land
6th Dec 2011, 17:11
Pulling the c/b on the SAS illegal, who are the geniuses that invent this type of training, this airframe requires the SAS system for a reason, what a waste of life.

6th Dec 2011, 17:37
Lowering the nose does not break the stall. Moving the control column forward to reduce the angle of attack does break the stall.

If you doubt this then re-read that CAA Notice.

His dudeness
6th Dec 2011, 17:42
The candidate found this exercise frightening as she
experienced great difficulties, having to use all her available physical strength to regain normalflight with the engines on full power and in IMC conditions

Staggering.I feel with the Kid, probably just out of training and not knowing what to do and how to stop the checker. :{

6th Dec 2011, 19:06
The commander decided to pull the c/b.............hopefully the Norwegian C.A.A. will now have an opinion and act on this now flight tested procedure!
I believe there were several other incidents where this pulling a c/b unauthorized has not worked out as expected.
I recall seeing a picture of a brand new A340 wrecked and it said it was because of pulling a c/b unauthorized.. by a delivery acceptance crew member.

6th Dec 2011, 20:28
Account of the accident itself (Google translate and som editing):

LN-SFT took off from runway 17 at. 1009. The flight began, commented
candidate 2 that it was windy. When the plane lifted off the runway (rotated) the stall warning came on, and the commander commented that the candidate 2 was a bit abrupt with a stick. After the departure step LN-SFT straight to 4 000 ft before it turned right and continued
rise in the west. LN-SFT was given clearance to operate in 6,000 ft, 10 - 20 NM west of the airport. The entire flight was recorded by radar. An altitude of 5900 ft was reached at.

10:13:40. The plane was about to cross the coastline on their way west.
1/1/13 Approx. 12 NM west of Flesland flew LN-SFT only a 360 ° turn (steep turn) 4 on the left. In the turn commented commander hill upon which candidate 2 replied: "Correcting. Wow. Correcting. It was violent. Correcting. "To this the commander commented:" It is not easy to fly it here, the plane is so short, "and added that it was difficult in the pitch plane.

Similar variations in height were commented on in the subsequent turn 360 ° to the right. The examiner, however, was satisfied with the results and requested that the candidate went on to demonstrate slow flight at 125 kt further west. When the rate was stabilized at 125 kt asked the examiner if the rate was reduced to 115 kt and flaps and undercarriage
should be lowered. The commander said he would take care of the flaps and undercarriage.

The plane started so in a gentle curve to the left. During the turn commented commander and candidate minor corrections for altitude and speed. Shortly before the plane was again on an easterly course
said the examiner: "When you get to 090 then - unless you have the height and 115 kt, take him out to stall, first Indication - and so with recovery and facilitate call-outs in connection with it. "

For this, said the commander: "Then I can take the throttle so you do not overtorque the engines, you just tell me max power - also gear up, flap up. " The commander added: "So just to stall warning. You do not have to stall out. Just say max power, gear up, flaps up "
Candidate 2 thought a moment that the exercise should be done on course 190 °, but this mistake was corrected and the aircraft continued to course 90 °.

Approx. at. 10:24:40 commented the commander: "OK, then you stall - you have the correct height - minimum altitude loss. "Three seconds later came the sound of" stall warning "and candidate 2 said: "OK, max power." 5 seconds after the "stall warning" came the sounds, an increase of
engine sound.

10 seconds after the "stall warning" came the shouted examiner "Check
speed! check the speed! check speed - gear up! "and later" What are you doing on "and "Get him out of it!" To this the commander replied: "It's hopeless. It can't be døne. "

"Stall warning" sound continuously for 51 seconds before the recording was broken in the plane hit the water. In the period sounds consistent sound from both engines. 16 seconds after the sound of "stall warning" came on, said the candidate 2 "gear up" followed by the sound of a handle
was served. Soon after came the sound signal "gear warning", and this sounds the rest of
the recording.

Radar data (see Fig. 1, 2 and 3) shows that the LN-SFT before the crash was an easterly course for about. 5800 ft and with a ground speed of 140 kt until noon. 10:24:40. Approx. 8 seconds later began the flight, so to rise. At 10:24:51 did a 25 ° shift to the right until it reached a maximum height of approx. 6,200 ft at. 10:24:56. Then, the plane lost altitude and made a 55 ° shift to the left. From the plane began losing altitude, until it disappeared from radar at approx. 700 ft elevation, it was 33 sec. By comparing the radar data with information from cvr shows that it was about. 14 seconds from the stall warning came on and to the plane began losing altitude.

After the last shift on the left continued LN-SFT in a north-easterly course of approx. 60 °. First, ground speed approx. 110 kt, but pretty quickly it went down to approx. 60 kt and further to 50 kt. The plane had a ground speed of 50 kt when it disappeared from radar.

Despite the commander's response to the examiner that it was hopeless (see Section 1.1.14), recordings from the cvr shows that the crew did not give up attempts to get the plane under control, for example, by raising the gear. There does not appear that they tried to take in the flaps in an attempt to restore control. Whether this had had a effect in the extreme position of the aircraft is not known.

7th Dec 2011, 00:17
Sounds similar in some aspects to the DC8 ABX ferry flight at night in icy weather

Somebody needs to be thinking ahead of the trainee before you get a significant altitude loss rate.

7th Dec 2011, 05:54
Someone needs to be (re) thinking about doing slow flight and/or approach to stalls in IMC.

The whole AOA thing is much easier in day VMC. :ugh: :{

de facto
7th Dec 2011, 09:53
Used to do all my lpcs on be 1900 and Sa227 on the actual airplane.
Slow flights,steep turns,approach to stall along with all other required maneuvers were done in VMC,sometimes at night.(single pilot ops).
NEVER did my check airman ever came close to mentionning some as stupid as pulling any CBs,and god knows i was working in a freight dogs ops....

7th Dec 2011, 22:14
Also, it's been at least two years since the FAA have been leaning away from the "min height loss in a stall" technique, and quite rightly so in my opinion.

It's still in there mindset though, the exact wording in the commercial PTS is Recognizes and recovers promptly as the stall occurs by
simultaneously reducing the angle of attack, increasing power to maximum allowable, and leveling the wings to return to a straight- and-level flight attitude with a minimum loss of altitude appropriate for the airplane. How training is conducted later during FAA type ratings (SIC-ratings) I don't know, but from early in there training the minimum altitude loss is still emphasized by many instructors.

7th Dec 2011, 22:46
40&80:I recall seeing a picture of a A340 wrecked because of this pulling a c/b unauthorized nonsense.
Are you referring to the Toulouse runup (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/300539-brand-new-etihad-a340-600-damaged-toulouse-several-wounded-20.html#post4583787) accident? I think the c/b rumor has been discarded as nonsense in this case.

7th Dec 2011, 22:51
Confusing. Much of this post concerns "Inge," a Scandinavian name that I always assumed to be female, yet one poster claims that he knew a man named Inge in flight school.

Then there are references to the candidate being flight checked not having the upper-body strength to handle the airplane in a stall recovery, again suggesting that it was a woman. The first accident report refers to "he," the second one "she."

7th Dec 2011, 23:51
Inge is a mans name in Norway. The day prior a female was tested, she was the one with the upper body strength issue. (Assuming that I still can read Norsk).

8th Dec 2011, 07:29
Inge is a mans name in Norway. The day prior a female was tested, she was the one with the upper body strength issue. (Assuming that I still can read Norsk).
That's how I read it too.

8th Dec 2011, 11:47
I used to operate the Metro III, it had a SAS (stall avoidance system) which consisted of a stalling warning horn, light and stick pusher.... there was a very good reason for having such a system on this type, it had nasty wing tip stall characteristics, placarded in front of my seat was the message 'Do not stall this aircraft'.
Now as it happens I have been in this aircraft in a stall and it wasn't pleasant. We carried out an airtest at 18000', all was well. Engineers had asked us to check the SAS operation in flight as spurious SAS fault lights had been seen. Very experienced Captain was handling, however as we approached the stall speed our speed crept back perhaps just a little quicker that the required 1kt/sec, just as we felt the first bit of buffet, the SAS fault light illuminated and a wing tip stalled, I remember it vividly as the nose dropped through the horizon and the wing dropped giving a bank angle of 90 to 100 degrees. Full opposite rudder was applied, the power left at idle, we eventually recovered wings level (rudder very ineffective for good few seconds) and eased out of about a 15 to 20 degree dive recovering by approx 13000' (if my memory serves me correctly, this was about 8 years ago).
That airtest scared the s**t out of me, I flew the aircraft for a few more years, but boy did I respect its characteristics!

The Real Pink Baron
8th Dec 2011, 14:02
Josh, I think you need to re-read your 227 manual.

Dream Land
8th Dec 2011, 15:20
Stall Augmantation System.

8th Dec 2011, 16:43
AUGMENTATION!!?? :eek: The last thing you want! I'd go with Joshua on that one - it is AVOIDANCE we want, not 'Augmentation', particularly in view of Metro Tech - Stall Avoidance System Manua (http://metrotechmanuals.com/sas.html)l , and Fatal Merlin crash puts spotlight back on stall recovery (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/fatal-merlin-crash-puts-spotlight-back-on-stall-recovery-365685/) who seem to agree with us. I imagine a translator has missed a trick here?

8th Dec 2011, 17:29
Now then chaps; I have been watching this disertation for a few days and I sadly feel that I need to correct some misunderstandings about stall recovery in transport aircraft.

For those of you out there who don't know me, I was still instructing and examining on 4 engined jet aircraft until two years ago.

There seems to be a growing argument that the technique of "powering out of a stall" in such aircraft is a crap idea and that the only answer is to stuff the nose down like you were taught in a Cessna 150.

I am extremely familiar with teaching and examining the license requirements and for obtaining a type rating on such aircraft.

Recovery from an approaching stall with either a clean wing or a wing with minimum flap was taught as "relax the back pressure on the control column and apply full power". If conducted properly, the loss of height was in the order of 200 ft.

If you stuffed the control column forward and carried out a Cessna 150 recovery, the loss of height would be about 1,000 ft.


Well, it is very simple. The parameters required by JARs etc were that the exercise began with the onset of the stickshaker. Now every MS Pilot who has decided to infect our website will be able to tell you that the stick shaker will activate at approximately 11 knots or so above the actual stall.

Therefore, the recovery from stick shake by applying full power and easing forward on the control column is perfectly valid for the aircraft has not actually got anywhere near stalling.

In other words, the aircraft was never stalled in the first place.

So when did the candidate actually have to deal with a proper stall?

The final stall on the type rating test consisted of turning on to base leg (for example) with 30 degrees of bank, the gear and land flap down and with the power set at approach setting but at the same time maintaining height (intead of descending) right through the stick shaker, to pulling and pulling and pulling until the stick push activated. The average height loss through this manoeuvre was 700 - 900 feet.

8th Dec 2011, 18:21
Airbus changed its stall recovery last year to lower the nose to get out of the stall, then add power, then wings level, then stow speed brakes. It also has a note stating that if below FL200 consider flap 1.
The stall recovery was changed as it was found that the addition of power on under slung engines could pitch the nose further into the stall (as happened on a 320). In the sim average altitude lost is between 300' to 500' (A330/340). Recovery is still started upon activation of the stall warning (JAR).

8th Dec 2011, 23:32

It was not just Airbus, but Boeing and the other manufacturers as well. Stall recovery has ALWAYS been lower the nose first to reduce AOA and it was NOT a NEW technique it was to emphasise STALL recovery. Training on the Airbus prior to that was for low speed recovery, in Normal law, NOT stall recovery. Big difference.

8th Dec 2011, 23:39
Maybe juust a little bit of the topic but i feel i have to let it out and shear it with you.

Many years ago i did my Metro III left seat training in the aeroplane before the CAA checkride ( did SIM at FS International ). However, after a normal ILS in simulated IMC ie blocked windscreen, just when full thrust/torque was applied at minima 200ft. And as the gear was rising my instructor pulled the right power lever down to flight idle, in normal conditions the NTS system would have kicked in and eased it a little bit before feather but he tought that i could manage flight idle then simulate feather. We never got to that point! Now things started to happen pretty quick. Remember minimum airspeed at 200ft.
Flightcontrols at full deflection the aircraft just wanted to flip over i slowly pushed the nose forward and shouted " give me my freaking engine back".
His hands was already there and pushed the right engine slowly back to max torque still with my my controls at full deflection and about 75 degrees of bank before i slowly managed to get it wings level again.

We climbed out of it and aborted session naturally with brown skidmarks in the throusers. On the way back to the base airport we tried the same manuvre at 12000ft with the exakt same result.

The problem was that right engine flight idle was set to low ( dont remember how much ) and simultanesly right gear took an eternety to go back up when selected, those two in combination with actual training in A/C at low AS and 200 ft is still my most horrifying near death experience. Just a few years before this incident same company we bought this Metro from did an almost exactly the same turned over during a pull up with devastating result ( no survivors ) oboy did i had that one in my mind during the trip back home.
I was fortunate that time, thats for sure.

Had to release my hart with this one

8th Dec 2011, 23:43
I can't comment on the technical aspects of differing stall recovery techniques, but I will comment on the human factors element of this accident.

It seems to be quite clear that the candidates were not comfortable with the test environment, whether that was due to IMC or the test regime we don't know, I'd suspect a touch of both. I would question the judgement of the commander and to a lessor extent, the examiner in this instance, it must have been obvious that the candidate was stressed, why push it further?

It stinks of either get it done-itis or macho flying imho. A needless accident.

9th Dec 2011, 11:46
Josh, I think you need to re-read your 227 manual.

Oh dear, some people need to get a life. Avoidance, augmentation is it really that important! I haven't flown this type for 8 years, so excuse me if I'm a little rusty on exact specs, I rarely post on here because of such crass comments by some but I figured that maybe someone who is currently operating this type may actually benefit from my experience stalling on this type.....

9th Dec 2011, 13:14
SAS=stall avoidance system..installed on all SA-226/227 aircraft..SAS2= a combination of a SAS and a Stability Augmentation System that was initially installed on the SA-227TT (merlinIII), (a similar system was installed on the Piper Cheyenne-2)..the SAS2 system was required for certain European authorities..SAS2 was standard in the SA-227BC the FAA/JAR part 23 certified SA-227..(Metro23)

If the aircraft in the accident is SA-226, then it is a "short-wing" Merlin/Metro, and take it from experience, has nasty wing drop when flown to a full aerodynamic stall...if the rudder was even slightly displaced one might find themselves inverted...The SA-227 in my experience..4K+hrs, exhibited relatively benign full stall characteristics, and no wing drop when the controls were pushed forward in a positive fashion to "unload" reduce the AOA..in any event, "push and roll" is the order of the day...

9th Dec 2011, 15:24
Avoidance, augmentation is it really that important!

Only if you wish to be understood. It's called language.

Dream Land
9th Dec 2011, 16:00
Joshua, I don't think any of us here that actually flew the machine could care less what you call it. As long as the system is calibrated and the CB is in, it works fine, occasionally annoying when you have a strong tail wind on the ground. :cool:

10th Dec 2011, 14:23
..that I have never read an accident report with such a combination of sadness, anger and despair. This sort of thing should not be happening in the 21st century.

10th Dec 2011, 18:14
I have to express the same sentiments as talkpedlar. When you look at this accident, the AA overrun and crash in Jamaica and the AF447 disaster you realise that lack of basic airmanship, flying skills and common sense judgment are not confined to airlines where corruption, lack of money, lack of training and nepotism are rife.

Dream Land
10th Dec 2011, 18:32
Well that's a pretty broad spectrum, not trying to argue with you, but this pretty much covers all accidents.

It was fairly well known that the Metro could break in either direction and lose up to 5000 ft in the process, :eek:

11th Dec 2011, 07:19
Pulling the c/b on the SAS illegal, who are the geniuses that invent this type of training, this airframe requires the SAS system for a reason, what a waste of life.

As recently as 18 months ago, Australian CASA Flying Operations Inspectors (FOI) were demanding pulling the SA Cb on SA 227 and pulling the aircraft into a full stall ----- despite the certification prohibitions --- clearly spelled out in the AFM, and placards.

The ability to put a Metro II/III/23 into a deep stall was rejected by said FOIs.

Fortunately, in this case, the company head of C&T had far more experience and knowledge than said CASA employees, and refused, subsequently a strongly worded letter from the Type Certificate holder reduced said FOIs desired to commit pre-planned suicide due lack of knowledge of the aircraft characteristics.

Tootle pip!!

The Wawa Zone
13th Dec 2011, 03:40
Not related to the Norwegian accident, but another great example of what undocumented home-grown ingenuity can lead to:

Investigation: 200404589 - Aircraft Loss of Control, Lake George, NSW; VH-TAG, SA227-AC Metro III (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2004/aair/aair200404589.aspx)

If a procedure or exercise is documented, then there is time to stop it before it gets misused in the air, and briefing an undocumented procedure is a warning sign !

13th Dec 2011, 04:48
Not only undocumented procedures, complete lack of aircraft systems knowledge....

13th Dec 2011, 04:53
"...and a wing tip stalled, I remember it vividly as the nose dropped through the horizon and the wing dropped giving a bank angle of 90 to 100 degrees. Full opposite rudder was applied"

You have been lucky. Applying rudder wouldn't have come to my mind as first action. Seriously, how many aircraft have been lost in the history of aviation, praticing engine shut-off, stall recoveries ... ? If no simulator, we have trainer aircraft, with benign flight characteristics, to get the basics. If the aircraft is a little bit less forgiving, well start by expecting that engines will not fail, and in the long term your company or country will gain...
I think the RAF came to that conclusion, regarding Canberra training : in 40+ years of service, more airframes were lost in training for engines failures, that it would have been by just allowing the engines to fail by themselves...

13th Dec 2011, 05:24
"Push and roll" .....rudder not advised due the high angle of attack, and the rudder still being highly effective...basic upset recovery technique in ANY airplane..

13th Dec 2011, 19:12
Full stall - metro III (sa227at) i.e with a bolt on wing extension: 12,000 ft to recover and thats when you do things correctly. Anyone looking to fly it needs to always consider an increase in the ref speeds due weight, temp, load and wind, and if practicing or training stalling go to the rumble, if you must the buffet, but not the break, and defo not the stall...... Day vfr. Geez in IMC these clowns murdered a perfectly innocent trainee. :(

Squealing Pig
13th Dec 2011, 19:26
12,000 ft to recover and thats when you do things correctly.

One must ask how did this type get certified with such poor stall characteristics?

what next
13th Dec 2011, 20:22
One must ask how did this type get certified with such poor stall characteristics?

By installing a stall avoidance system as described above! (I have had the pleasure, so to say, to fly this thing. Luckily, my TRI and TRE were smart enough to always start stall recovery when the stick shaker activated.)

14th Dec 2011, 13:26
One must ask how did this type get certified with such poor stall characteristics?

Squealing Pig,
Once you get beyond simple FAR 23 (or equivalent) singles, the certification requirements become quite different --- and stalling an aircraft becomes a Test Pilot only exercise, with test additions such as a anti-spin chute.
There are a few aircraft around, including the Metro, that can develop an unrecoverable deep stall.
Tootle pip!!

14th Dec 2011, 13:53
Perhaps something useful during training would also be a simple look at the wing shape from above....... How does this long thin wing behave with and without power over the surfaces? How does it compare to a King Air, Mu2 etc? What happens when the 12 knots of wind down the runway dissapears on short final? Do I ever need to get near a full flap ref approach to a short runway? Can I trust the shaker to warn me when I'm already in the descent phase.... Aoa is great if in my scan, If I have it..... If I'm climbing out and retracting flaps is it better to lower the nose a bit before going back to a climb profile.... Trainees please be thinking long and hard about this stuff. I got bitten, but I'm here to tell the tale. Be safe all.

14th Dec 2011, 14:46
[I]Can I trust the shaker to warn me when I'm already in the descent phase./I]

The stick pusher in the SA-226/227 aircraft is based on AOA vane input, and flap position...