Evacuation - with fire outside

[dogcharlietree]

Recently on a domestic flight I heard the F/A instructing passengers sitting in the overwing exit rows regarding the fact that if there were signs of fire outside the aircraft, do not open the overwing emergency exit. A valid instruction.
This got me thinking about the number of deaths attributed to smoke inhalation.
Personally, I think I would give some serious thought to taking my chances dashing through flames as opposed to dying of smoke inhalation.
I have heard of some passengers who take, wait for it, oven turkey roasting bags onboard with them. Reason? In a smoke environment place the bag over your head. The bag will initially withstand the heat, keep the smoke out of your eyes and probably enough oxygen for a couple of minutes. (Probably better than nothing). They are certainly cheaper than the commercially available smoke hoods.
Comments and thoughts appreciated.
I could say "don't flame me" ;)

[SNS3Guppy]

The most vulnerable part of the body in a fire is the airway. Lose that, and you lose your life.

If there's a fire outside the aircraft, opening the door and exiting through the fire is a bad idea. I don't know how much experience you have in burning environments, but it's a lot hotter than you might imagine (upwards of 1,200 to 2000 degrees F, enough to burn you very badly and and easily kill you; quickly.

What kind of clothing are you wearing on that flight? Something synthetic? Something that easily catches fire, burns easily, melts into your skin?

That turkey roasting bag over the head won't hold much atmosphere; you'll run out of air very quickly. I've been in a number of fires wearing Self Contained breathing Apparatus (SCBA) gear in which if I did my part to breath slowly and in a controlled manner, I would have 15 minutes of working air. I've seen people use it up in a few minutes, instead. That's a trained professional under stress. Take your average person on the street, put them in a burning airplane and stick a turkey roasting bag over their head while they race out the door into the flames wearing their synthetic clothing...you can perhaps imagine the result. Take your chances, you say?

When the rush to evacuate comes, people very often have a strong drive to return to the same exit they used to enter the airplane, rather than the closer one. If the structure is filling with smoke, how many have made it a point to count the number of seatbacks or compartmet dividers in order to find the nearest exits blind? When that exit won't open or has fire outside, are you aware of and do you have a second plan, and can you do it with your eyes shut?

In a crash the world turns around. There's confusion sometimes, noise, and add smoke, and you have pandemonium. A simple evacuation can be quite orderly; add fire and people tend to lose control. You may be upside down when the aircraft comes to a rest; you may be in a cabin filling with water, upside down; finding the exit isn't a matter of standing up and walking calmly to the one you remember; it may very well be a matter of counting seats, ceiling panels, seat tracks or braces, or some other viable means of finding that exit (and doing it without being able to see), while getting around or through the others who have their own ideas about where to go. The fastest method may not be the isle.

When all is said and done, your responsibility isn't just for yourself, but everyone around you. If you've been instructed not to open an exit, but take it upon yourself to do it anyway because you think you know better, then you're only contributing to the lack of order, and quite possibly leading others to their injury or death. Now it's all on you. You have more to think about than just your own preservation.

When the flight attendant tells you to refrain from inflating your vest in the airplane, there's a reason. Failure to follow his or her direction may cost not only your life, but that of others; perhaps everyone else on the airplane when you are inflated and unable to get clear of the airplane (and are blocking the way). The instructions are there for a reason. Opening that exit because you think you're willing to take your chances may cause or allow a flash fire in the cabin or quickly deplete the available air supply during the evacuation. You may well make it worse. If there's fire already in the cabin, that heat and that smoke is going to vent outwhatever opening you make; open the wrong door and you could take a fire at one end of the cabin and quickly drive it right through the cabin. Listen to the directions you're given and follow them. Don't do what you think is best simply because you feel you know a better way. The directionand leadership is given you for a reason. Listen.

[point8six]

Good post "Guppy" - I doubt if in the calm confines of a non-hazardous room, that an oven-roasting bag would give you 2 minutes breathing time and it should be remembered that in an 'incident' the breathing rate would be much faster. If anyone feels so strongly about smoke/fire survival on board an aircraft, why economise on the choice of perceived 'life-saving' equipment? How much is your life really worth, if you have to resort to carrying oven-roasting bags?:confused:

[IGh]

Problem posed in top slot:

"... the F/A instructing passengers sitting ... overwing exit rows ... if there were signs of fire outside the aircraft, do not open the overwing emergency exit.... got me thinking ... smoke inhalation...."

There are many cases to study (see reviews from Dick Hill and Dave Blake, at FAA's Atlantic City Research Center).

There's no correct answer that works well in all the earlier exemplar cases -- evac' is the usual response. Maybe ChinaAir B737 at Naha Aug07, is the latest exemplar in which evac was preferable.

Remember -- The pilot will likely have even less information than the passenger sitting next to a window in the aft cabin, as can be observed in review of cases where the pilot continued taxiing the aircraft while passengers agreed that they wished to evacuate:

Pacific Western Flt 501 / 22Mar84 , B737-200 C-GQPW, Calgary Alberta; aborted takeoff after engine failure at 75 Kts; Uncontained failure of the left engine's 13th stage compressor disc. Wing fuel cell penetrated by debris, MAJOR FUEL-FED EXTERIOR FIRE, pilot delayed evacuation even after confirmation of fire. Passengers initiated evacuation, all 119 sob's evac'd & survived.

T/O @ 0742 MST Rwy 34 from C-1. About 20 seconds into T/O roll pilots heard loud "bang" then aircraft had slight veer left. RTO. MISPERCEPTION: Pilots thought tire had burst. Slowed, taxied clear of rwy @ C-4; Pilots noted left N1 = 0%, and left generator failure.

Time from disc failure to evacuation finished was 4 or 5 minutes.
23 Seconds after RTO initiated, F/O called to Tower "Clear of Rwy."
45 Seconds after RTO initiated, Cockpit Door was opened in response to knocks, F/A entered and asked if they had blown a tire, and then F/A stated ". . . fire at rear of aircraft . . . back of left wing." CVR recorded brief sound of fire bell and Chimes from F/A to Cockpit Call System; F/O called Tower and asked confirmation of fire.
At One Minute +Two Seconds Twr called back confirming fire; F/A-Purser told pilots "whole left back-side [wing] is burning."
At One Minute +11 Seconds Captain told F/A to "prepare" for evacuation; discharged fire bottle to Left Engine; told Twr to send emergency equipment; Tower replied that crew best stop the aircraft at their present location.
At One Minute +33 Seconds Tower told crew that there were flames on the left side.
At One Minute +36 Seconds Fire Bell sounds continuous; F/A reports "bad at the back." Capt discharged second fire bottle, told F/A to again "prep" for evacuation.
At One Minute +40 Seconds Captain finally STOPPED the aircraft, pilots executed steps in their Evacuation checklist.
At One Minute +55 Seconds F/A's finally initiated their evacuation procedures; fire melted windows along left side and heat and smoke entered aircraft; smoke in aft cabin worst.

Fire consumed substantial portion of aircraft. Left Engine fire damaged, Engine Case and Nacelle perforated at the One O'clock (as viewed from rear) upper I/B position. Lower Wing perforated (I/B & in-line with hole in nacelle & 13th stage compressor), skin penetrated, fuel cell broken (Hole in under-surface of wing tank). A segment of engine's disc, 3" by 17", missing; found on Rwy 1300' from start of T/O roll. [Improper stator repair, not IAW PW overhaul manual; disc failure included fatigue cracking.]

Pieces of aircraft structure and left engine were later found on Rwy and Twy; TRAIL of raw and burnt fuel residues, & globules of melted aluminium had fallen from left wing; trail continued to final resting position of aircraft. "3-D Fire": elevated fuel source, a running (falling) fire, and ground pooling.

Problems with Emergency Equipment: nacelle and wing blocked access of foam cannons (positioned atop fire vehicles) to fire source (under I/B wing).

AGARD Discussion: (CWK) Manchester, Calgary, and Ryhad mishaps included an aircraft on fire which the pilots taxied off runway onto a taxiway, with detrimental results; delayed Pax evac, and reduced maneuvering space for emergency equipment (Calgary fire trucks stuck in mud just off taxiway). Hidden fires: external or internal (CVG)?? [Pac West, see also 22Aug85 at Manchester.] ["The Final Call" S BARLAY; 157. AGARD's "Aircraft Fire Safety".]

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Just another example of evac' with an EXTERNAL fire:

TWA, July 30, 1992. A TWA L-1011 aborted a takeoff, touched-down hard and ruptured a wing fuel tank (aft Spar fracture dumped fuel onto hot brakes) . A large fuel fire engulfed the aft portion of the aircraft. Fire and smoke entered the cabin through the aft doors during the evacuation. All 292 occupants exited through 3 forward exits in approximately 2 minutes.

= = ==
There are many other EXTERIOR fire cases to consider, usually prompt evac' was the best response (For a Tire/Brake fire a better plan would be to get the ARFF into the Wheel Well area and stop fire. But Pilots just can't verify that ARFF is actually inside the Wheel Well with their fire stopped, so UNCERTAINTY suggests evac'. External cameras might reduce the uncertainty.)