TACA aircraft crashed in Honduras

[mavila02]

TV news saying that a Taca aircraft crashed in Honduras a few minutes ago, 09:45 local (15:45 Zulu); flight 390 was going from El Salvador to Tegucigalpa was returning after aborted the landing due to the bad weather. More to come

[mavila02]

Se estrella un Airbus en el aeropuerto de Tegucigalpa (Honduras)12:18 pm | 30 May 2008 | 12 comentarios | 2,373 views

Un avión de la aerolínea TACA procedente de El Salvador se salió hoy de la pista tras aterrizar en el aeropuerto de Tegucigalpa, causando una cantidad no precisada de heridos y sin que se confirmen muertos, según los cuerpos de socorro.

Foto: David James Clelford - Airplane Pictures.Net

La aeronave es un Airbus, que cubría el vuelo 390, que terminó su recorrido en una vía muy transitada después de salirse del extremo norte de la pista de aterrizaje.

El gerente en Honduras de la línea aérea salvadoreña Transportes Aéreos del Continente Americano (TACA), Armando Fúnez, confirmó a periodistas que el avión procedía de San Salvador y cubría el vuelo 390.

Al parecer, la mayoría de los pasajeros se han salvado: hay varios heridos y bastantes ilesos que ya han sido rescatados. Sin embargo, hasta ahora se desconoce cuántas personas viajaban en el avión.

“En principio, no tenemos más que daños materiales”, afirmó Fúnez ante preguntas sobre si se han confirmado víctimas mortales.

[RingwaySam]

The above, but in English -

An Airbus crashed at the airport in Tegucigalpa (Honduras) 12:18 pm | 30 May 2008 | 12 reviews | 2373 views

A plane of the airline Taca from El Salvador today left of the runway after landing at the airport in Tegucigalpa, causing an unspecified number of wounded and refined without being confirmed dead, according to the relief corps.

Photo: David James Clelford - Airplane Pictures.Net

The aircraft was an Airbus, which covered flight 390, which completed its journey in a highly traveled after leaving the north end of the runway.

The manager of Honduras in the Salvadoran airline Air Transport in the Americas (TAC), Armando FUNEZ, confirmed to journalists that the plane came from San Salvador and covered flight 390.

Apparently, most of the passengers have been saved: there are several injured and many unharmed who have already been rescued. So far, however, is unknown how many people were travelling on the plane.

"In principle, we have no more than material damage," said Fúnez face questions about whether they have been confirmed fatalities.

[testpanel]

Check on www.cnn.com/live (http://www.cnn.com/live) for video from TVC Honduras......

[testpanel]

From CNN:

http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/05/30/honduras.crash.ap/index.html

[Sam-MAN]

Video can be seen here: http://www.photos.aero/safety/avion-homdu.wmv

(thanks to www.photos.aero for hosting)

Doesn't look good at all! Seems to have split in 2 :eek:

[armchairpilot94116]

thank God no fire. HOPe the pilots are ok. LOTs of damage to nose area it seems from the vid

edit: IT seems one of the pilots had died in this accident.

[sevenstrokeroll]

from wikipedia...while the runway is sufficient, it is on the short side:



Toncontín International Airport
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
**(Redirected from Toncontin International Airport)
Jump to: navigation, searchToncontín International Airport



IATA: TGU – ICAO: MHTG
Summary
Airport type Military/Public
Operator Military of Honduras
Location Tegucigalpa
Elevation*AMSL 3,294 ft / 1,004 m
Coordinates 14°03¢39<=N 087°13¢02<=W? / ?14.06083, -87.21722
Runways
Direction Length Surface
m ft
02/20 1,863 6,112 Asphalt

Toncontín International Airport (IATA: TGU,*ICAO: MHTG) is a civil and military airport that serves Tegucigalpa, Honduras. It is 6 km away from Tegucigalpa's center.



The airport's single runway is 1,863 m (6,112 feet) in length and is at an altitude of 1,004 m (3,294 feet). Boeing 757s are the largest aircraft that can land at Toncontín, as it is one of the shortest international runways in the world.

During the Football War of 1969, Toncontín was a major target for the Salvadoran Air Force, and it was bombed on several occasions.

In 2000, the airport handled 6,895,267 tonnes of cargo, 12,911 aircraft and 364,141 passengers.

Toncontín International Airport has 4 gates (2 in the new terminal), 2 baggage claim belts, 150 short term parking spaces, a post office, a bank, a bureau de change, many restaurants, several airline lounges, a duty free shop, car rental services and a first aid room. The old terminal is undergoing renovation, and will be used for domestic flights in the future. The new terminal is now used for international flights.

Toncontín is also the home of the Aeroclub de Honduras.

The origin of the name Toncontín is unknown. This airport has received much criticism for being one of the most dangerous in the world due to its proximity to the mountains and for years efforts have been made to replace it with Soto Cano airport in Comayagua, currently an airbase. Toncontín has been improved significantly by the work of CAT (the Airport Corporation of Tegucigalpa) and by INTERAIRPORTS, a company hired by the government of Honduras to administer the four airports of the country.


[edit] Airlines and Destinations

* American Airlines (Miami)
* Atlantic Airlines de Honduras (Roatan, La Ceiba, Puerto Lempira, San Pedro Sula, Útila, Guanaja, Belize City, Ahuas, Bluefields, Corn Island, Grand Cayman, Managua, Puerto Cabezas)
* Continental Airlines (Houston-Intercontinental)
* Copa Airlines (Panama City, San José (CR))
* TACA (Miami, San Salvador, Guatemala City, San Pedro Sula)
* Islena Airlines (La Ceiba, San Pedro Sula)
* Aerolineas Sosa (San Pedro Sula, La Ceiba, Roatan, Puerto Lempira)



[edit] Accidents and Incidents

May 30, 2008, Toncontín International Airport, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Airbus A320 EI-TAF: flight TA390, from San Salvador overan runway in approach to Tegucigalpa Airport, with bad weather conditions. At least 2 fatalties.
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toncont%C3%ADn_International_Airport"





This page was last modified on 30 May 2008, at 18:16. All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License. (See Copyrights for details.)
Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a U.S. registered 501(c)(3) tax-deductible nonprofit charity.
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[testpanel]

From the airline, their website, sorry, in spanish...

http://www.taca.com/esp/oth/oabo/oabohon.asp

[dueber]

In English....

http://www.taca.com/eng/oth/oabo/oabohon.asp (http://www.taca.com/eng/oth/oabo/oabohon.asp)

[srobarts]

From ASN

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20080530-0

[Sunfish]

Reuters reporting Three Dead...

http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN3029714820080530?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=22&sp=true

Plane skids off runway in Honduras, 3 dead
Fri May 30, 2008 2:31pm EDT

By Gustavo Palencia

TEGUCIGALPA (Reuters) - A passenger plane skidded off a runway at Tegucigalpa airport in Honduras on Friday on landing, veered onto a road and smashed into cars and a building, killing at least three people.

The TACA airlines Airbus, which had 142 people on board, lay broken in three parts and spewing fuel. Two people were still trapped in cars underneath the wreckage, an aviation official said.

The plane, arriving from San Salvador, circled the airport several times before attempting to land in heavy fog, survivor Mario Castillo told Honduran television.

"Suddenly we felt a big noise and we were all trying desperately to get out," he said. "The worst injured were the people in business class."

Local emergency services chief Carlos Cordero said three people were killed, two who were on board the plane and one who was driving a vehicle hit by the aircraft. Several others, including the pilot, were seriously injured, he told Reuters.

Some 20,000 gallons of fuel had leaked out of the wreckage, posing a serious fire hazard, Cordero said.

The plane zig-zagged off the runway and smacked into some cars, the local TACA manager, Armando Funez, told Honduran television.

One of the dead was Harry Brautigam, a Nicaraguan who headed the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Honduran President Manuel Zelaya said.

Tegucigalpa, nestled in hills, is one of the most treacherous airports for landing in Latin America due to its short runway and difficult approach.

"I am thanking God I am alive -- there are other passengers who are in a very bad way," survivor Roberto Sosa told Honduran radio.

The last time El Salvador's TACA was involved in an accident was in 1993 in Guatemala City when a Boeing 767 airliner overran the runway as it was landing and crashed into some houses. Nobody was killed.

(Additional reporting by Mica Rosenberg and Cyntia Barrera in Mexico City and Alberto Barrera in El Salvador; Writing by Catherine Bremer; Editing by Vicki Allen)

[sevenstrokeroll]

20,000 gallons? that would be about the whole weight of the plane...maybe 20k pounds? even that is alot.

[Panama Jack]

Seem to be different versions on the fate of the Captain. According to Costa Rican paper "La Nacion" fire fighters reported that the Captain died however this is not yet official.

http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/2008/mayo/30/mundo1558631.html

[PK-KAR]

Captain, and 1 pax died, plus 1 ground casualty it seems.

http://img147.imageshack.us/img147/1429/78747491aj1.jpg
Is it normal for the speedbrakes to retract in a situation like this? and I see 1 spoiler panel up?

8 more landings and this plane would have made 10,000 landings...

PK-KAR

[Panama Jack]

Perhaps due to loss of hydraulic pressure as a result of damage from the impact.

In any case, it is reported that the runway was wet as a result rains from Tropical Storm "Alma" which has been menacing the area.

Toncontin is probably the most difficult major airport in the region. My condolences to the families and friends of the victims.

[Broomstick Flier]

PK-KAR,

No spoilers on the left side either:

http://sbxp.info/photos/Taca.jpg

RIP to all ..

Cheers
BF

[sevenstrokeroll]

I know on the 737 we would retract the spoilers during an emergency evacuation, if possible. Is that the case in the airbus 320 series?


a subsequent report indicates it was 2000 gallons, not 20k gallons of fuel.

certainly checking position of reversers, spoilers and the like are quite important to the investigation.

[sevenstrokeroll]

short runway, overrun, airbus 320...a tiny bit like sao paolo

wonder what the status of the reversers was

wonder if this was an attempted go around after landing/?

[suncomesout]

are reported to be dead:

A320-233 EI-TAF from TACA (Transportes Aéreos del Continente Americano)
Crashed while landing in Tegucigalpa, overshooting runway
Pilot and co-pilot killed, also 2 passengers from 124 aboard
Many wounded, deadtoll likely to rise
Ended onto a road, crashing into cars

Indeed, circumstances seem to be somewhat similar to the Congonhas crash.

SCO:(

[M609]

http://gfx.dagbladet.no/pub/artikkel/5/53/536/536785/flybil2_1212175438.jpg

[kwick]

Click below for the video:
http://www.latribun a.hn/data/ webmaster/ multimedia/ videosnews/ index2.html (http://www.latribun%20a.hn/data/%20webmaster/%20multimedia/%20videosnews/%20index2.html)

[PEI_3721]

The aircraft appears to have overrun in the 01 direction, i.e. beyond the 19 threshold. If so, according to the reported wind the landing might have involved a tailwind component. In addition, it is most likely that the runway was wet.
Although the runway is listed as having an asphalt surface, here is no immediate information on its condition, grooving, or likelihood of rubber deposits. However, the conditions seem to indicate increasing risk when landing on a short (limiting?) runway.

Even if this speculative view proves to be incorrect, it would be timely to review some of the issues in accidents similar to this:-

Managing the threats during approach and landing. (http://www.flightsafety.org/ppt/managing_threat.ppt)
AC 91-79 Runway Overrun Prevention (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/b2a4ea852babd7b7862569f1006dc943/$FILE/AC121.195%28d%29-1A.pdf).
Running out of runway (http://www.nlr-atsi.com/downloads/NLR-TP-2005-498.pdf).
Safety aspects of aircraft performance on wet and contaminated runways (http://www.nlr-atsi.com/downloads/NLR-TP-2001-216.pdf).

[NotPilotAtALL]

Hi,

Pic in M609 post scare me
The plane had crushed aerial power lines...
They are so lucky it was not a fire start.
Sad end for some anyway.

RIP

Cheers.

[sevenstrokeroll]

PEI (prince edwards island?)

I think your observation about a tail wind landing is correct. thank you for helping us all with the runway orientation of this unusual airport.

An EMAS system would have helped here, as in Sao Paulo.

[CONF iture]

Not exactly an ILS in Schiphol ... here (http://video.google.ca/videosearch?q=toncontin&sitesearch=#)

[sevenstrokeroll]

what type of approaches are available to this runway?

[Broomstick Flier]

Non-precision only, VOR and NBD if memory serves me right

[kwick]

http://www.cocesna. org/aip_ca/ mhtg.htm (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/mhtg.htm)

MHTG - TONCONTÍN Internacional


AD 2.1 AERÓDROMOS / MHTG
MHTG AD 2.1 (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/ad/AD%202%20AERODROMOS/AD_2.1_MHTG.pdf)1.- Plano de Aeródromo (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG%20AD%202-19%20(PLANO%20DE%20AERODROMO).pdf)2.- Plano de Obstáculos de Aeródromo Tipo A (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG%20AD%202-25%20(PLANO%20DE%20OBSTACULOS%20DE%20AERODROMO%20TIPO%20A).p df)3.- Carta de Area TEGUCIGALPA (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG%20AD%202-29%20(CARTA%20DE%20AREA).pdf)4.- Carta de Aproximacion por Instrumentos VOR DME RWY 02 (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG_AD_2-37.2_CARTA_APROXIMACION_POR_INSTRUMENTOS_VOR-DME_RWY_02.pdf)5.- Carta de Aproximacion por Instrumentos VOR DME RWY 20 (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG_AD_2-37.3_CARTA_APROXIMACION_POR_INSTRUMENTOS_VOR-DME_RWY20_2.pdf)

[kwick]

The runway at Toncontin is surrounded by mountains, and is extremely short. Look at the TACA airplane crawling on the approach (left corner below in the photo), seems a steep descent, even when visual, imagine landing in the middle of the runway as has been expressed by witnesses.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/Toncont%C3%ADn.jpg

[broadreach]

With respect to those who have and will yet remind us of the Congonhas TAM crash, so far the similarities are only that both have a steep drop-off at either end, as do runways gradually lengthened in many other places to accommodate larger aircraft. Tegucigalpa has more in the way of terrain restrictions than Congonhas.

[kwick]

It is now confirmed that aircraft up to 42 passengers will be the only ones using Toncontin because of the short runway. From now on, heavier aircraft operations than those referred with destination/departure Tegucigalpa will be performed from Palmerola, where a military base is located.

Coronel Enrique Soto Cano AB (XPL) Honduras
Airport Code : XPL
Airport Name : Coronel Enrique Soto Cano AB
Runway Length : 8008 ft.
Runway Elevation : 2061 ft.
City : Comayagua
Country : Honduras
Country Abbrev. : HN
Airport Guide : Unavailable
Longitude : 87° 37’ 16” W
Latitude : 14° 22’ 57” N
World Area Code : 131
GMT Offset : -6.0
Telephone : Unknown
Fax : Unknown
Email : Unknown
Website : Unknown

http://www.elheraldo.hn/imgs/palmerola.jpg

[glhcarl]

Is it normal for the speedbrakes to retract in a situation like this? and I see 1 spoiler panel up?

With the engines off there is no hydraulic power, spoilers are deployed with hydraulic power, so they should be stowed. As for the one spoiler that is partially deployed there could be any number of reasions with damage to the input system the most likely.

[kwick]

Now back to analize the crash scene, these are the charts for MHTG - TONCONTÍN Internacional
1- Airport diagram, 2- Airport obstacles, 3- Tegucigalpa area chart, 4- VOR/DME Rwy 02, 5- VOR/DME Rwy 20.
Got them from http://www.cocesna. org/aip_ca/ mhtg.htm (http://www.cocesna)

MHTG - TONCONTÍN Internacional

AD 2.1 AERÓDROMOS / MHTG
MHTG AD 2.1 (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/ad/AD%202%20AERODROMOS/AD_2.1_MHTG.pdf)1.- Plano de Aeródromo (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG%20AD%202-19%20(PLANO%20DE%20AERODROMO).pdf)2.- Plano de Obstáculos de Aeródromo Tipo A (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG%20AD%202-25%20(PLANO%20DE%20OBSTACULOS%20DE%20AERODROMO%20TIPO%20A).p df)3.- Carta de Area TEGUCIGALPA (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG%20AD%202-29%20(CARTA%20DE%20AREA).pdf)4.- Carta de Aproximacion por Instrumentos VOR DME RWY 02 (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG_AD_2-37.2_CARTA_APROXIMACION_POR_INSTRUMENTOS_VOR-DME_RWY_02.pdf)5.- Carta de Aproximacion por Instrumentos VOR DME RWY 20 (http://www.cocesna.org/aip_ca/aip_ca_pdf/cartas_ad/HONDURAS/MHTG/MHTG_AD_2-37.3_CARTA_APROXIMACION_POR_INSTRUMENTOS_VOR-DME_RWY20_2.pdf)

[bubbers44]

This aircraft is landing the opposite direction on rwy 20. He looks fine considering it is a telephoto lense making it appear high. From the north landing on this runway you can do a normal 3 degree glide slope so it is a non event. The other way on 02 is much more challenging. Not that hard but little margin for error.

[bubbers44]

I hope closing TGU to large commercial aircraft is not true. The only airline that has had problems there in the last decade is Taca. They refuse to go around for some reason when they know they will land long. AA and Continental have strict rules on going around if they go beyond the 700 ft touchdown zone. Taca had an incident in another A320 about 9 years ago when they almost slid off that same cliff. When I landed my 757 there they were cocked 140 degrees to the left in the ditch between the runway and taxiway to not go off the cliff that time. Just close the TGU airport to Taca until they agree to touch down on the touchdown zone. The last report I read on the first mishap was the captain said he realized the autobrakes were not working about 500 meters from the end????? I found that in the accident files many years ago. I know Airbus pilots put a lot of faith in their automation but where does it end?

[kwick]

Really sorry for the bad news, but president Zelaya confirmed on an interview with CNN the move of bigger airplanes to Palmerola. That decision includes taking TACA, American and COPA there. How they will do it from one day to the other?, I do not know. Enclosed below is a copy of the news, in spanish, and this is a link to the approach under VFR, imagine that in IFR. http://youtube.com/watch?v=iAxAso8xSo0&feature=related


Presidente Zelaya anuncia uso de aeropuerto de Palmerola para aviación comercial
14:52 30 Mayo 2008




Autor del articulo: Proceso Digital

http://proceso.hn/bin/ImgShow.php?aid=6270 » Mas noticias
Gobierno anuncia que ocupará Palmerola para aviación comercial; EEUU dice que retirará su equipo de la base aérea http://proceso.hn/bin/ImgShow.php?aid=6288&type=Related (http://proceso.hn/2008/05/30/Nacionales/Gobierno.anuncia.que/6288.html)Tegucigalpa - El Gobierno el presidente Manuel Zelaya Rosales determinó ésta tarde utilizar la base aérea de Palmerola como principal aeropuerto en la zona central de Honduras mientras que el embajador estadounidense en Tegucigalpa, Charles Ford, dijo que su país retirará su equipo de inmediato sí esta determinación se materializa.
A cinco aumenta el número de víctimas por accidente de avión de TACA en Toncontín http://proceso.hn/bin/ImgShow.php?aid=6269&type=Related (http://proceso.hn/2008/05/30/Nacionales/A.cinco.aumenta/6269.html)Tegucigalpa - Al menos cinco personas, una de ellas el presidente del BCIE, Harry Brautigam, murieron hoy en el accidente del avión de Taca que se salió de la pista del aeropuerto internacional de Toncontín, en Tegucigalpa, informaron fuentes del Cuerpo de Bombero.



Tegucigalpa – El presidente de Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, anunció hoy el uso de las instalaciones del aeropuerto de Palmerola, en Comayagua, para uso de la aviación comercial.


El anuncio lo hizo en una entrevista con la cadena internacional de noticias CNN.
“Exactamente, estamos convocando a los ministros del ramo en este momento para tomar una decisión que hace muchos años se hubiera tomado en el país, pero que ahora se hace urgente por la calamidad que ha sucedido”, dijo tras lamentar el accidente en el que falleció el presidente del BCIE, Harry Brautigam.
“Hoy mismo se van a hacer todas las diligencias para que los aviones de gran tamaño que están aterrizando en Toncontin que se ven siempre en este tipo de situaciones difíciles que ocurren no por la ubicación ni el tamaño de la pista, sino porque Tegucigalpa está colocada en una cuenca hidrográfica llena de cerros y de montañas, el problema nunca ha sido la pista, el problema es la aproximación a la pista, siempre se hace con mucha pericia…”, declaró.
Cuando le preguntaron que si se trataba de sacar de Toncontín a todas las aerolíneas importantes incluyendo Taca, American Airlines y Copa, respondió que “así es”.
Dijo que es una decisión en la que “hay que involucrar a las personalidades que realmente están manejando las diferentes áreas, y el Gobierno de la república de Honduras va a tomar esa decisión en los próximos minutos”.
La idea de convertir Palmerola en aeropuerto comercial, no es nueva, pero tampoco ha logrado concretarse a pesar de las intenciones de las autoridades.
En Palmerola funciona desde hace años una base militar de los Estados Unidos.

[bubbers44]

I just emailed my friend managing our operation at TGU and he said the new captain landed in the touchdown zone so please take the long landing assumption I just made for what it was, careless assessment of an unknown cause. I have landed there over 500 times with no problem with runway length. If the pilot touched down, as my friend stated, in the touchdown zone then the Airbus autobrakes and spoilers should have brought it to a full stop with plenty of margin, even with the small tail wind. Why didn't it?

[Xeque]

I’m a bit confused. I just looked at the approach plates for both 02 and 20 at Toncontin (Jeppesen 2006 vintage). Both show straight-in approaches. 02 flies 198 from the VOR descending from 9000 to a procedure turn at 8,000 with an 8 mile final heading 018. Yet, if you look at the You Tube video’s they show aircraft making a 90 degree left turn to a very short final when using 02. Can those who have piloted aircraft into the airport clarify this for me please?

[PK-KAR]

http://gfx.dagbladet.no/pub/artikkel/5/53/536/536785/flybil2_1212175438.jpg
Reversers?

PK-KAR

[Clandestino]

Airbus autobrakes and spoilers should have brought it to a full stop with plenty of margin, even with the small tail wind. Why didn't it?

It's elementary, my dear Watson, but we need the FDR to tell its story first.

[Ricky1]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_z5HtME9n8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlMOo_jNSbE

Two shocking videos of planes landing at this airport.

I was talking to a friend of mine about his experience of approaches into different airports and he showed me these videos. It was only a month or two ago and I remember saying it was an accident waiting to happen.
Rest in peace to all those victims. This is never nice to hear.

[F4F]

Two shocking videos of planes landing at this airport...
Don't see anything shocking in those, just call them spectacular visual approaches, similar to a circling in Split, visual into Lugano 19, low circuit at St Tropez La Môle, the guided turns into 33 at Reggio de la Calabria or some other interesting approaches into some Greek islands...

Shocking is rather the other crash in itself, same deep inside feeling each time... RIP guys :(


live 2 fly 2 live

[Jetjock330]

Here is another video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAxAso8xSo0&feature=related), from the cockpit. Definitely not for the inexperienced or fainthearted.

The numbers must be right from the beginning, no room for error.

Just a pity that something had to happen!

[Rod Eddington]

Two shocking videos of planes landing at this airport.

I'd say they are fairly shocking. Perhaps it is a visual illusion but no-one seems to cross the threshold at 50 feet, in fact one of the AA757s appears to touchdown prior to the threshold. Where I work that would definitely involve tea and biscuits with the management! Obviously you wouldn't want to land long but the runway isn't that short, at a guess you could stop a 320series twice using autobrake medium - and with manual braking & max reverse I imagine you'd need about a third of the runway.

[HotDog]

F4F, you have beaten me to it. Nothing shocking at all in the two videos. OK, obviously not an easy field to approach and land but if you do the numbers, like thousands have done in the past, you are fine. TACA accident is the only thing shocking, lucky there were no more casualties.

[caulfield]

Don't see anything shocking in those, just call them spectacular visual approaches, similar to a circling in Split, visual into Lugano 19, low circuit at St Tropez La Môle, the guided turns into 33 at Reggio de la Calabria or some other interesting approaches into some Greek islands...



100% wrong.Give me an airport in Europe with these 3 combined:
a)short ungrooved rwy
b)surrounding terrain..not just distant mountains,but sloping hills right in close...big difference.
c)spectacularly short airport perimeter..no control of overrun..no clearance on app flightpath

The ones you mention pale in comparison.Reggio Calabria/Split,what a joke.Samos has (a) and a little bit of (b) and (c) but thats about it.Funchal has (a) and again a bit of (b) and (c).I would rate Samos/Funchal as 7/10 when considering stick/rudder skills(and judgement!).I would rate this one higher at 8.The spoiler call is mandatory prior reversers for sure.

[bubbers44]

The VOR DME 02 approach looks like a straight in arrival to land but because of the hill on final approach requires a circle to the left to land to stay left of the hill.
Flying directly over the hill would make the descent angle too steep. We had a pattern to overfly the runway and make the same downwind as doing the 20 approach.

[CONF iture]

100% wrong.Give me an airport in Europe with these 3 combined:
a)short ungrooved rwy
b)surrounding terrain..not just distant mountains,but sloping hills right in close...big difference.
c)spectacularly short airport perimeter..no control of overrun..no clearance on app flightpathd) Also Elevation AMSL 3,294 ft

[777300ER]

A classic risk management case. I don't think anyone would disagree that this is one of the more challenging approaches of the world. More challenges = more risk to manage. More risk to manage = more likelihood of an incident / accident. The real question is, where do we draw the line...

[RobertS975]

The youtube video of the AA 757 is obviously a visual approach, so the approach plates are immaterial.

[Panama Jack]

Here is another video, from the cockpit. Definitely not for the in experienced or fainthearted.

Strangely, seems like the video has just been pulled from U-Tube within the last few minutes. Not sure I understand why. :confused:

[armchairpilot94116]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAxAso8xSo0&feature=related

this clip as previously posted is pretty impressive

[Dysonsphere]

Intresting approach I assume they fly a VFR circuit as thats how it looked to me . (As a humble PPL)

[alf5071h]

More risk:-
In addition to any downwind component during the landing, runway 02 has a down-slope (-69ft).

My meagre translation of the warnings on the airport chart indicate that during June-Dec the touchdown zones are ‘extremely slippery’, presumable this applies in any wet weather.
NOTAMS advised caution in the rainy season w.e.f. 16 May. IIRC ‘Slippery when wet’ classifications (ICAO) indicate a runway friction in the order of 0.4, there is no indication of such a warning in this incident or of any maintenance check of the runway to indicate this condition, or is that the intent of the chart warning and NOTAM?
Judging from the photo (#30) there is a lot of rubber on the runway surface;– a poorly maintained runway?

The airport chart indicates that the threshold for 02 is displaced. Measuring the chart, the landing distance appears to indicate 6190 ft – the stated length of hard surface. However, the depicted PAPI location and photo (#30) support the notion of a shorter distance due to a displaced threshold.
From the type A obstacle chart the landing distance for 02 appears to be only 5410 ft (poor translation capability, Spanish experts please confirm). Also, that the clearway (02) is approximately 225 ft, presumably the tarmac/grass before the overrun down slope.
There is only one fixed distance marking, so that there is no clear indication of the touchdown zone.

The threshold displacement appears to be due to the higher (down sloping) terrain on the final approach. From the charts a straight in approach is not authorized from the VOR/DME, thus with a slightly steeper, circling approach, a higher obstacle clearance plane might enable greater landing distance.
From an operational aspect, circling to runway 20 from a 02 VOR approach (lower minima) might be easier (and into wind) although Captain would be on the outside of the turn - circle East only.

“The real question is, where do we draw the line...” (77300ER #51) … well … further away from the current edge as indicated by the norm in some parts of the industry. This would require that the boundary of operation be determined for all runways likely to be used. The boundary – the edge of a safe operation, is not defined by any fixed standard as there are many variables involved requiring individual judgment. At airports such as this, special attention is required to avoid unnecessary risk.

The operating crew can draw a line, but this is usually limited to the immediate circumstances and conditions – last chance.
An analysis such as above, should be undertaken by the operator (ops planning), the airport management, and the regulator – proactive safety.
If more people were involved in ‘drawing the line’ perhaps it would be thicker so then the crew could choose the safer edge as their boundary.

[Tree]

It's all about training, local knowledge and experience. Here is a 5300 footer that a 737 operator used several times daily for decades with no incidents or accidents. There were others in the route system almost as challenging and they all featured ice and snow in winter and frequent windshifts at any time. This one was daylight only but the others were used day and night.
The road in the foreground is used as a 3 degree "VASI" as you turn final from left base using 30 degree bank and rolling out just before the threshold.
CYCG.
http://www.ourbc.com/travel_bc/photos/airports/castlegar_airport_01_640.jpg

Runway in sight yet?
http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/6459/885/1024/IMG_6621.jpg

Here is an easier one except for night time circling in precipitation.
CYYF
http://www.ourbc.com/travel_bc/photos/airports/penticton_airport_01_640.jpg

[Robert Campbell]

The 737 let's the pilot fly the aircraft without having to outguess or fool the machine.

[C212-100]

Dear caulfield,

I couldn't disagree with you more on what you say abot Funchal... Sure it still is a difficult aerodrome to land on, but it it is far easier than it was on the 70's. Back then the runway had only 1400 meters, now it has more than 2700 and a wonderful pavement.

It still implies a whole lot of judgement, but it is far from being a short ungrooved runway...

Greetings.

P.S.: One thing I would like to see discussed from those who really know the thing. After the accident with the A346 of Iberia in Quito, the A320 of TAM in Congonhas and now this A320 of TACA in Tegucicalpa isn't sounding a bit alarming? Apart from the judgement errors that seem real on all three accidents doesn't it rings a bell on all the automations on the Buses? I know nothing about flying Buses and Boeings and really don't need a discussion of Airbus vs. Boeing, but for me as a pilot these accidents seem to have some things in common... Anyone cares to talk about this?

[airfoilmod]

As Robert says, and I will admit it is a personal intuition, not a fact, the Boeing flies consistent with a century of training and experience. That there is still a discussion about relative merit is more unsettling than relaxing. Moving a small stick, independently of the Other Pilot, and then letting it pop back to "neutral" seems like it would take more than a little adjustment. Measured control input for commanded control movement, in consonance with deflection, is just an intuitive gestalt. Having both yokes move in unison is a mechanical repetition of a communicative piloting effort, where the Airbus seems isolating and competitive. I can't easily erase the FP at Hamburg putting in 14 degrees left roll in a scary dicey rightxwind gusty landing. One would hope the FO (or Captain) in the Boeing would be on top of that blunder in a blink.

[2FLYEU]

I Have flown for TACA in the region and to the same airport on the 737 2/3.
The airplane performed very well. When the company Changed to an all Airbus fleet, pilots were concerned for the performance of the A320 on that particular airfield. Incidents have happened before at Toncontin on the A320.
No need to expand but the A320 is not suitable for that RWY. If you approach bit faster plus other factors the acft "floats" to much......
This one was tragic.

Hope they close that airport

RIP Cesare ! It was great to share good moments at TACA !!

A mourning friend.

[pweaver]

Another impressive video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1PY_7GNfIw

[Chris_medley]

I'm a massive fan of airbus but one of the things i would say about it is that it is quite easy to float it prior to touchdown (320). This is mostly alright, but on shorter runways with a tailwind and a wet runway things can become dodgy quite quickly. While i think the Airbus 320 is a great aircraft, I think other planes, like the 37 would be more suited for this particular airport.

[captjns]

Used to fly illegal aliens to TCU with the 727. Getting in wasn’t the problem as getting out was a challenge with the density altitude. I was a contract check airman for TACA in 94/95. Great group of guys. Is Ben Arcey AKA the Commandant, a real piece of work, still there? Miss the jambalaya on the MSY turns.

[flyinGuppy]

Here you can hear ATC coms just before the accident (in spanish) http://archive-server.liveatc.net/mhtg/MHTG-May-30-2008-1530Z.mp3

It seams they asked for rwy 02 due to reduced visibility which was worse for rwy 20 approach. On final the wind is reported form 190 with 10kts and the runway was wet.

Lots of the contributing factors for an overrun got together...

Overruns happen to every plane, don’t blame airbus on it, at least before we know what really happen, besides knowing some of the factor normally present on overruns where there we have no more information.

A320s fly on a daily basis to LPHR in the Azores, which has only 1585 meters available for landing. Sure not a lot of terrain around and its almost at sea level, but you can’t say airbuses can’t do short runways. You just have to follow the operations procedures.

[Dream Land]

Great group of guys.I agree with you, I know several of them and enjoy El Salvador a lot, I remember the famous TACA pilot that dead sticked the 737 onto the levee in New Orleans. :D

[Shore Guy]

At a glance, looks like a great place for the folks from Naverus to build an RNP/RNAV approach.......

http://www.naverus.com/

[kwick]

flyinGuppy, thanks for the link that you sent, is it possible to know in some way how official is that? http://archive-server.liveatc.net/mh...2008-1530Z.mp3 (http://archive-server.liveatc.net/mhtg/MHTG-May-30-2008-1530Z.mp3)
Because according to that recording the pilot made an IFR approach to runway 20, made visual contact, asked the particular 02 runway after that because of the conditions, circling to land, recived report of wind from 190 at 10 kts. and was specifically advised of the wet runway conditions.

I may recall the news that day, there were actual passengers on board that confirmed that the pilot made previously an approach attempt, and then the second one to land, with the consecuences we now know about.

[CONF iture]

Thanks for the link flyinGuppy, and as you say, whatever the aircraft technology, it does not look too good with a 10 knots in the tail on that specific WET WET WET runway ...



kwick Post #61 makes a good point about experience, however, I would have to disagree about the crew being made up of 2 in an Airbus. The NFP has no idea what is going on with the controls As a check airman on the Airbus I can tell you that your statement shows your complete lack of knowledge of the Airbus
???
So I need to learn something as well , and I'll be more than happy to !
Because to this day, except from the rudder pedals inputs, I know NOTHING from the PF flight control inputs ...
Dream Land ... you tell me !?

[kwick]

Sorry guys, was trying to get a copy of my post #61, does anyone have a copy? Also, some other previous posts in this same thread, please let me know how I could get them.
:confused:

[kwick]

Read in the news (Proceso Digital, Honduras) that Palmerola would be open to commercial flights in 60 days for airliners that used to land at Toncontin. The reason for the delay would be some work that has to be performed to get Palmerola ready for international operations. In the meantime, these flights would be sent to San Pedro Sula.

Does anyone know for sure if an airport can be changed from a military landing field configuration, and then fully certified to ICAO standards in just 60 days?

[PJ2]

C212-100
After the accident with the A346 of Iberia in Quito, the A320 of TAM in Congonhas and now this A320 of TACA in Tegucicalpa isn't sounding a bit alarming?
Not sure if "alarming" is the word to use in flight safety or investigation work, but "interesting" might do...:)

All 3 were on wet runways and the first two had difficulties with spoilers, reverse and braking. The TACA 320 appears to be in forward thrust and except for #5 on the starboard wing, the spoilers appear to be retracted.

Manufacturers resolve the problem of spoiler/reverse deployement in the air in different ways - for the DC8 it was the nose oleo compression that deployed spoilers, (reverse was always available). Not sure what it is for the Boeings.

The Lufthansa A320 accident at Warsaw was brought up in the Congonhas thread with regard to the availability of spoilers, reverse and braking. After the Warsaw accident, Airbus changed the software "on-ground" logic such that partial spoilers would be available with an initial compression of one main-gear oleo. Previously, until both oleos were "on-ground", the spoilers would not deploy and system logic prevented auotmatic-braking and reverse, (manual braking was always available). Config 3 landings were Airbus-"recommended" under these circumstances after the accident. In the data we examine however, we see very few Config 3 landings.

If I recall correctly, the Quito accident appears to have been caused by damage to the oleo position sensors which prevented the ground spoilers from deploying which in turn prevented the availability of reverse.

The DFDR will tell the investigators the usual things about touchdown speed, g-loads, oleo compression, spoiler/reverse positions, thrust-lever position, brake-pedal deflection, brake pressures, anti-skid operation etc etc. The initial interest will likely be around such systems and their performance.

PJ2

[bsieker]

If I recall correctly, the Quito accident appears to have been caused by damage to the oleo position sensors which prevented the ground spoilers from deploying which in turn prevented the availability of reverse.

Just a minor correction.

According to early Accident Information Telex by Airbus, the A340-600 in Quito did get spoiler deployment, but did not get autobrake or reverse thrust.

The sequence was as follows:

- Very hard touchdown (~1100ft/min)

- On-ground-Condition initially fulfilled -> Spoiler deployment. With the thrust levers in idle or reverse, spoilers remain deployed, even if WoW-signal is subsequently lost, e. g. during a bounce.)

- A wiring loom at both main landing gear bogies failed, severing the wires that transmit WoW signals

- Abrupt bogie derotation caused all four main gear front tyres to burst

- loss of WoW signals prevented reverse thrust activation.

- I'm not 100% certain what caused the autobrake failure. Autobrake is initially triggered by the same signal that is used for spoiler deployment, but, unlike spoilers, autobrake operation may depend on a continuous WoW signal. It may also turn off if tyre pressure is too low, although this is not mentioned as an arming condition in the FCOM.


Bernd

[Austrian Simon]

It seams they asked for rwy 02 due to reduced visibility which was worse for rwy 20 approach. On final the wind is reported form 190 with 10kts and the runway was wet.

An English translation of the exchange audible on liveatc (two recordings there) is now available at:

http://avherald.com/h?article=4077cedf/0016

Servus, Simon

[fac_2]

I believe Airmalta have similar approach into LICR reggio Calabria Italy

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cjc1plTvyHc&feature=related

[discountinvestigator]

Quito - look at the braking available after you have blown the front tyres, and the implied deceleration thereafter.

Congonhas - note the procedure changes introduced by Airbus via EASA into the FCOMs with regards to spoiler deployment or not after landing. Not seen the new knowledge requirements yet for groundschool training.

TGU - first impression (is that the right word when looking at the crumpled fuselage?) makes me think that the aircraft did not fall off the runway at particularly high speed. The spoilers may retract below a certain speed on the ground during landing roll out.

The AA touchdown "early" - please remember why the threshold is displaced and what for. The arrows are there to displace the threshold for obstacle clearance purposes associated with those hills a bit further up the approach. The use of arrows and not X and the runway's PCN number indicate that it is ok to touchdown prior to threshold, if you really want to. There may be other reasons why it is not a good idea. Oh, yes, I remember, a busy European airport had a 737 lined up and they gave another 737 landing clearance so it did over the top of the one on the runway. The investigation report's main conclusion was that displace thresholds were a good idea as they gave more vertical clearance in this situation.... another great investigation there then :ugh:

I have more to add, but that is all I am allowed to say for the moment.

Discount.

[CONF iture]

The spoilers may retract below a certain speed on the ground during landing roll out
No such thing.


Thanks for the translation Simon.
From what I can see, there is nothing like a ''direct'' approach in Tegucigalpa, except maybe in case of severe visual conditions
At 1527 the crew elected to discontinue (early in the procedure) the circling approach for Rwy 20 due to low clouds, decided to climb back to 8000ft to start again an approach with the idea to later circle for Rwy 02 this time.
Nevertheless, the crew looks concerned by tailwind component:
''We request approach to runway zero two and if possible, winds is five knots''
Could it be the 5kt tailwind a TACA operational limitation in TGU ?

[PJ2]

Bernd, thanks for the correction and input.

1100fpm...wow - was there any 'g' reading available from any preliminary report?

It's a wonder such a long fuselage didn't break over the wingbox/gear station...

The point is well taken regarding the stopping effectiveness of four flat tires. It's certainly a point of consideration in any high-speed reject.

[kwick]

This is a video of one TACA Airbus 320 landing at Toncontin.
(Please note THIS IS NOT actual flight 390 that crashed).
http://www.revistero.com.mx/videos/video/NSRdOBEvlA8

Do you see how flat and low he actually gets over the runway edge?
Do you see some dust cloud raised on the edge of the runway when he overflies the edge?
Do you see how long he lands maybe almost in front of the terminal?
Do you see tire smoke that signals actual tire contact?
Do you see the spoilers being deployed and since no sound is available how about reverse timing?

After all these questions, then another question comes to my mind for TACA flights arriving at Toncontin:
Could this be normal procedure on the Toncontin runway when dry, and even the same thing when it is wet?

[Dream Land]

So I need to learn something as well , and I'll be more than happy to !
Let's pray your not a trainer, no disrespect intended.

[DC9gti]

try with LESO, LEPP, LECO and GCLA

[kwick]

Sorry to bother, but just so everyone knows for sure and according to the requests made, please explain how the NFP gets to see the other crewmember flight control movements (or joystick inputs).

[DC9gti]

In the A320 you can only see it during the taxi and takeoff roll. There is a small cross that moves along the eadi in both pfd acording to the sidestick input.

[kwick]

Thanks DC9gti, that was fast, and made easy to understand !!!

To give an opportunity to everyone, please confirm, if possible, if there is any other time when you get a chance to see the other guys sidestick inputs, without moving your head or eyes more than a straight- forward panel scan. Thanks in advance.

[kwick]

"The Sidestick - practical
It takes most pilots 10 minutes (i.e. one traffic pattern) to get used to it. It enables the aircraft to be flown more precisely, and requires less effort.
The lack of “through-stick” feedback is a much more minor issue in practice than might be expected. Alternative feedback cues are abundant and are quickly substituted for the traditional feel.
The automatic trim function is a delight once experienced and further improves precision flying."

"As can be seen from these notes, changing to the A319/A320/A321 or A330 from other types (other than A340) will require some change of operational philosophy. These aircraft can be flown precisely and smoothly with little effort, and can, therefore, create a sense of considerable satisfaction. However, under extreme conditions when, for example, severe weather and abnormalities combine, it is most important to be aware of the differences. Under stress, reversion to certain well-ingrained pilot instincts, such as riding the controls, is not helpful in any fly-by-wire aircraft."

Questions????????

[PJ2]

kwick;

Fully agree with all your comments re Airbus - the points raised by non-AI's are non-issues. It is all a matter of what one is used to, and there are enough design/system issues to go around for both types.

[Strongresolve]

In flight is impossible to see what the other sidestick is doing.
You can only see what the control surfaces are doing if you have the Flight Controls page.

And one more hint, in the Gulf Air crash in Bahrein, do you think that the F/O was aware of the inputs of the Captain?
Was the F/O aware that was really the Captain who was pushing the plane downwards, or he was thinking that the captain was trying to recover from a pitch down?

In other plane is easy, if the Yoke goes foward and the nose down, the other pilot is driving it to the ground.
If the yoke goes aft and the nose down, the other guy is trying to recover.

It is easy right.

In the Airbus aint so easy, everything is more complicated, except the cruise, of course.

[alf5071h]

Has anyone been able to check the landing distance available on 02? My earlier indication (#55) of 5410ft has not been validated. A quick glance at the airport chart could easily mistake the landing distance for the higher value (6190 ft) in each direction. Any operators into this airport able to confirm what distances are used in their planning documents.

If the behavior shown in the videos is the norm then these operators are breaking the rules. The displaced threshold appears to originate from the requirements of the obstacle clearance plane (type A chart) - the terrain on short finals. Thus, operators should respect the displaced threshold crossing altitude in order to reduce the risk of encountering terrain.
If the performance calculations are correct then the aircraft should still be capable of stopping in the remaining runway distance. An important aspect of these calculations is a correct assessment of wind, meeting the requirements of approach / touchdown speed, and achieving the assumed touchdown position.
Thereafter correct application of the brakes is assumed, which is not necessarily use of autobrake if the runway very wet or technically ‘slippery when wet’. In the latter case, normal ‘wet’ landing performance might not be valid, and contaminated runway data should be checked.

[kwick]

alf5071h, here is something for you, information of Toncontin lenghts from World Aero data, really very close to the 5410 ft. you mentioned. As for runway contamination, I can bet a zillion dollars that it is full of streaks of rubber if not completely covered with it.
Also enclosed below is an article with a lot of truth for the future at that day in 2007 (no need to be a magician to think this would happen someday).

TONCONTIN INTL (http://worldaerodata.com/wad.cgi?id=HO73243)

Runway 02/20

6112 x 148 feet
1863 x 45 meters

Runway 02
Surface ASPHALT
True Heading 019.0
Latitude 14.052922 14° 03' 10.52" N
Longitude 87.220003 087° 13' 12.01" W
Elevation 3294.0 feet 1004 meters
Slope 1.0°
Landing Distance 5442 feet 1659 meters
Takeoff Distance 6312 feet 1924 meters
Displaced Threshold Length 670 feet 204 meters
Overrun Length 200 feet 61 meters
Overrun Surface ASPHALT
Lighting System MIRL REIL PAPI

Runway 20
Surface ASPHALT
True Heading 199.0
Latitude 14.068844 14° 04' 07.84" N
Longitude 87.214392 087° 12' 51.81" W
Elevation 3232.0 feet 985 meters
Slope 1.0°
Landing Distance 6112 feet 1863 meters
Takeoff Distance 6212 feet 1893 meters
Overrun Length 100 feet 30 meters
Overrun Surface ASPHALT
Lighting System MIRL REIL PAPI

............................................................ .................................
Landing at Toncontin International Airport
Written by Garry Conn on July 21st, 2007
The Toncontin International Airport is a crazy airport. According to Wikipedia, Ryan Bert who wrote an article about the airport in 2001 on Airliners.net and photographer named William L.B.J Dekker, the Toncontin International Airport has one of the smallest runways in the world. To make matters worse, the airport is located on a plateau within the city of Comayaguela which is orientated between tall mountains. But wait, it gets even better! The runway itself is only 6132 feet long; however, it has a “displaced threshold” leaving only 5,436 feet of actual useable landing length. Oh but wait… it gets even better! In addition to the extremely short length, it also has a slight downhill slope making it even more difficult to land and stop. Could things possibly get any worse? Yes! Here is the final stab in the heart! 100 feet past the end of the runway is a cliff. If an airplane can’t stop in time, it will plummet down the dreadful cliff and crash. That is of course, if the planes doesn’t crash into traffic traveling on a street that is separated by a rickety and old 4 foot fence.
............................................................ .....................................

[sevenstrokeroll]

one thing the 737 and the AB320 have in common is this:

the plane lands where the pilot tells it to land...unless of course doing an autoland...

a 737 will go off the end of a runway if the pilot lands long, doesn't reverse in time and is a bit unlucky

same thing for an airbus.


I recall that a commercial pilot (let alone an atp) has to demonstrate landing within 200 feet of a spot.

[White Knight]

strongresolve - easy answer re Gulf... Why didn't the F/O ASK? Or take control?

[CONF iture]

Let's pray your not a trainer, no disrespect intended
Do not worry ... I'm not and don't pretend to be.
But the 'check airman' you are would be welcome to finally explain his words
I would have to disagree about the crew being made up of 2 in an Airbus. The NFP has no idea what is going on with the controls
As a check airman on the Airbus I can tell you that your statement shows your complete lack of knowledge of the Airbus

[Dream Land]

I don't think this accident was an Airbus problem, we will see, if you want to start a discussion about the ability to monitor the FP, please start a thread.

[Strongresolve]

Probably is not an Airbus problem, but it is the 5th write off A320 that stops well behind the runway, and the 3rd that doesnt deploy a reverse.
May the aircraft doesnt have a problem, but do you know of the 19 hull losses how many have been due to technical problems?
Almost none, all losses had happen in normal operations.
Is it normal for a new generation aircraft?
19 losses in 20 years? I dont remember, but even the B737-100 didnt have such rate of crashes when were released, and that was 50 years ago or so.

I going to tell you that this aircraft really have a problem, and I´m going to tell you what it is.

The sciencetifics of Toulouse believe that is easier to adapt a human to a machine rather than a machine to a human, and 60 years ago, Chuck Yeagers discovered that was the human not de machine the essential part of the system.
We have gone backwards, and we have recovered a crash rate from the 60s.
Yeah, the plane is fine, not the stadistics and the common sense.

[Brian Abraham]

I don't think this accident was an Airbus problem
Too early to tell what the story might be. But as a bystander I'm becoming increasingly uneasy about the Airbus automation, how its implemented and interfaces with the crew. In days past the man/machine relationship was much more direct ie pull this handle and X happens right now. There seem to be so many interlocks and preconditions that have to be met before anything happens these days that I find it no surprise that crews are at times caught out and wondering WTFIH. There seem to have been far too many accidents and the chant is always "Follow SOP's" or "More/better training". What if a manufacturer was to introduce a throttle set up where by you push the lever forward to reduce power and pulled it back to increase power. Think it would take off (no pun intended)? I'm sure there would be accidents but the SOP's and training mantra would still hold good. Whats it matter which direction the throttle moves?
PS Prior to WWII at least one country had the forward for idle, back for full power throttle convention - France.

[OutOfRunWay]

As with the autobrake system. In the Boeing, you turn a switch, on the 'bus you press a button to set it.

If the pilots really did not notice that the autobrakes are not retarding until they were almost off the runway, meaning they were not activated in the first place or deactivated somehow, it wouldnt have made any difference if had been a bus or a boeing - not working is not working.

Pilots should notice these things.

That is why you have:
1.) speed trend vectors
2.) a call of decel green
3.) Your collective experience as a flight crew.
4.) a chance to go around (although I imagine this not being much fun here)

This should not be reduced to a bus or boeing problem - the causes will, as always be numerous and far more complicated.

rant over

[airfoilmod]

Brian raises valid concerns. We seem as an industry to be at a crossroads other businesses have dealt with. So far, the pressure has been to de-humanize the cockpit by adding machinery (sic) and computing power. Gone are Radioman, Navigator, Engineer; we are left with a single pilot flight deck with a second Human to Monitor the one flying. In future, will we have a single Human with electronic Monitoring? itself monitored by offsite monitoring, to be followed by offsite operation with Cabin Crew waiting to be replaced by robots? This may be speculative hyperbole. Maybe not. It may be as simple as back engineering a totally disclosive and partnered Flight Deck. This thread seems to have drifted off course, no information exists to suggest that AI/B comments pertain to this sad situation. I am saddened by this dreadful outcome. I am also in awe how pilots operate at this Runway. It is 400 feet longer than our small mountain strip which will serve Turbine S-2 A/C and the odd DC-3. 757? 320? Holy Smoke!!

[kwick]

(NOTE: Unofficial translation)

Fatal Flight 390
Aeronautics does not rule out failures
Airbus 320 of TACA acident could have been by mechanical failure or the humidity of the runway, say the authorities of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation
By: Peter Membreño

• The climate weather conditions in Honduras have decreased visibility in the terminal air Toncontín, a phenomenon that would have caused the accident Taca.

Tegucigalpa
For the authorities of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the crash of the Airbus-320 registered yesterday morning could have been due to a mechanical failure rather than weather generated by Hurricane Alma, which became a tropical depression. According to Boris Ferrera, deputy director of Civil Aviation, the plane landed on a routine basis at around 9:45 in the morning on the airport runway Toncontín arriving from the Comalapa airport in San Salvador.
Ferrera said that the Airbus-320 had enough space to maneuver on the runway, after ruling out that it had fallen erratically. According to the representative of Aeronautics, the control tower at Toncontin airport authorized the descent of the aircraft, as the flight progressed as usual.
"The flight was made in a normal way with over 100 passengers on board and the aircraft made his normal flight and had a perfect approach procedure to the runway, because no matter how long or short is the airport runway it has plenty runway at Toncontín to maneuver on land, but there are things that happen that are beyond the reach of humans," said Ferrera.
"The information we have from the staff at the control tower is that it made a perfect landing, but that's why we think that there could have been a mechanical fault, because it had spare runway and landed perfectly and could have made any maneuver on land, but there are things that are beyond the knowledge," he said.
Until yesterday it was handled that the accident reportedly killed at least five people, three travelling on the plane and two others who would have perished crushed. Among the dead is the chairman of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCI), Harry Brautigam.
Investigation
In the afternoon, the director of Civil Aeronautics, William Seaman, said the Toncontín airport would remain closed pending the development of a an investigation process through insurance companies, Taca and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. Seaman said that it should analyze the experience of the pilot, weather conditions and status of aircraft before issuing an opinion thereon. The head of Aeronautics stated that a few weeks ago the airlines were warned about the danger represented by the runway under rainy conditions. "I took the representatives of the airlines to see the status of the runway. We do not want to say that these were the conditions, but the wet runway is a danger, it is one of the factors involved, we must see experience, weather conditions, the airplane, see if it was a human failure, a number of factors should be considered." According to reports from Honduras National Weather Service, the visibility conditions were not the best due to persistent rain generated by the passage of Alma on the national territory.

[Dysag]

How short our memories are!

This is from an unverified internet source.

"There have been 130 737 hull-losses, including 4 hijackings/bombings and 7 ground accidents." For the early models:

Series: 737-1/200

Writeoff's: 100

No Built: 1144

[CONF iture]

I don't think this accident was an Airbus problemI don't think either, see my first comment on post #69 (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=4152277&postcount=69)

But I think you flee a bit too easily after posting such comment on that very same thread:
''As a check airman on the Airbus I can tell you that your statement shows your complete lack of knowledge of the Airbus''

[Dream Land]

CONF iture, an experienced pilot doesn't necessarily require a moving control yoke in their hand to be ahead of a new pilot provided you don't put that student in a situation over his or her head to begin with, I feel in complete control with my hand guarding the joystick and red button as you feel with your yoke, how do I know what the control inputs are, by years of experience.

Cheers, D.L.

[Strongresolve]

Ok, lets remember some numbers.

I going to take the first 20 years of service of the B737-100/200 and the B727-200.

The B737-100/200 suffered 39 hull losses in 20 years. From the 1968 to 1988, 4 of the were hijacks, 2 in flight bombings, 1 attacked on the ground.

B727-200 suffered 23 hull losses in 20 years, from 1970 to 1990.

This two models are 2º generation aircraft. The B727-200 has almost the same rate of the A320.

To compare with a 3º generation aircraft, I going to pick the B737-300/400/500

It suffered 15 hull losses from 1985 to 2005, now a rate lower than the A320, and this plane is one generation older.

I can also take the B757 but better not to compare.

And if I pick a 4º generation aircraft like B737NG to match the A320, the result is 3 hull loss in ten years. The A320 doubled that number in the same service period.

A study of the Gale Group in the year 2000, said:

Fatal accidents by 1 million departures.

A320.................... 0,53
B737-100/200.........0,73
B737-300/400/500...0,33
All B737(except NG).0,58

Almost the same rate of older aircraft. What a technology breakthrough!

Another 4º Generation like 717 has 0 hull losses.

Airbus investement in marketing is paying it´s results, everybody feels unable to say something bad about the aircraft, but sorry, I dont get it.
This plane is not better that some models of the 60s. In some ways, to go to places like Toncontin is worst.

[daikilo]

I am not convinced that generic statistics are relevant in accident investigation, analysis results probably are.

If there is a repetitive problem with the A320, the accident analysis should show it, and the issue will then be how Airbus responds.

[Fzz]

I have to agree with Daikilo.

Another thing to bear in mind is where the aircraft fly. There is sure to be a correlation between the country where the aircraft are maintained, where their pilots are trained, and the quality of the airfields the planes fly from.

In the '70s, the vast majority of 737s were likely flying in first-world countries. A fair fraction of the rest of the world was flying russian-built aircraft. As other nations have developed somewhat and the USSR disintigrated, we're seeing a lot more jets flying in less developed countries. So you can't simply compare total stats across 40 years - it's an apples to oranges comparison.

You might be able to compare stats for the same time period, but you'd only get a reasonable comparison if you normalized for other factors. For example, you might get a vaguely fair comparison if you compare aircraft flying for US-based airlines, because they will be flying more similar routes and have more similar maintenance procedures.

- Fzz

[alf5071h]

Thanks for the info kwick; are there any comments on runway grooving?

OutOfRunWay, re autobrake “it wouldn’t have made any difference if had been a bus or a boeing”.
I agree, but in you ‘criticism’ of pilot behaviour (pilots should notice these things #96) you may wish to consider the many aspects of human factors and for example, how a pilot’s perception might be effected by daily use of autobrake, particularly those systems which demand deceleration level.

First consider operations without autobrake. With experience pilots develop a relationship between deceleration and brake pedal foot force; this is modulated depending on runway length, surface condition, landing weight, etc. On long dry runways minimal braking is required, but with increasing wetness/contamination and/or reduced runway length more braking is required, requiring higher foot forces.
From this relationship a pilot develops a sense of how the landing deceleration is progressing (judgment); if the deceleration is not as expected more braking is applied; the pilot might conclude that the runway has less friction than expected. In extreme (erroneous) situations maximum braking and full reverse can be used to salvage a deteriorating situation.

With autobrake, pilots might not acquire (or refresh) their sense of braking as there is no relationship between foot force and the applied braking.
When autobrake is used in conjunction with reverse the pilot is further ‘detached’ from the aircraft. It is not possible to determine which of the retarding devices is providing the braking effort. In normal use on a dry or minimally wet runway, the autobrake may only provide a small component of the required deceleration, reverse contributes the larger amount. The sum of decelerations meets the required (selected) autobrake deceleration level. This is described in the first ref link.
Problems can occur with reducing runway friction. The autobrake provides a greater proportion of the braking so that in a limiting case the brakes and reverse only just meet the required level of deceleration. If an inappropriately low autobrake setting is used, a pilot might not detect the limiting situation until it is too late for any corrective action to be effective (max brake / full reverse). Pilots might perceive this condition as a failure in a retarding system, but actually the autobrake is working as set by the crew.

Similarly for an unexpected tailwind or a wet ‘contaminated’ runway (deep water, no grooves or rubber deposits, where the pilot misjudges it as only ‘wet’), the limiting retardation is quickly achieved and there is a significant risk of an overrun.
The ability of the pilot to detect the limiting deceleration requires exposure to such situations (experience); this must be supported by guidance materials (SOPs training), and an appropriate decision when the runway situation is assessed as marginal.

Pilots who only use autobrake require an in-depth understanding of autobrake operation and its interaction with reverse (know – what), and greater exposure to a range of deceleration situations to aid their judgement in the approach and landing decision (know – how).
However, these pilots may not get opportunity to gain experience in limiting situations, particularly as in normal operations we strive to avoid them. Thus the provision and use of guidance and procedures in limiting situations is of heightened importance. This in turn involves situation awareness/judgment training (operator responsibility) and supporting activities from airports and regulators.

Summary:
Manual Brakes, foot force demands deceleration – feed back
– Dry runway: Reversers are additive
– Slippery runway: Reversers are additive
Autobrake, little or no foot force feedback
– Dry runway: Reversers NOT additive
– Slippery runway: Reversers may be additive

Refs:-
Study the Boeing diagrams carefully; many place deceleration level on the x axis, which should not be confused with landing distance – deceleration is ‘more’ or ‘less’ stopping capability. Flight Ops - 'Landing on Slippery Runways'. (www.smartcockpit.com)

Also see the links in post # 23. (www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=4148920&postcount=23)

Avoiding an overrun: what should be trained? (www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=306748)

An unrelated video, but useful for training. (www.youtube.com/watch?v=AETav591iQ8)

[J.O.]

Apparently a small history lesson is in order. Please recall the following accidents:


B737 goes off end of runway on landing in Burbank, CA after the crew continued a very unstable aproach and ended up in a gas station. While no one was seriously injured, the potential was very high.
B737 crashes into the sea on departure out of Sharm el Sheik, Egypt. All on board lost due to an apparent loss of control by the Captain.
B737 goes off end of runway at Chicago Midway, striking a car and killing a young child. Crew attempted landing on a contaminated runway with very marginal performance available. Captain was distracted because it was his first use of autobrakes, and reverse was selected very late.Now can anyone recall any discussions on this or other forums, where Airbus proponents made accusations against the B737 technology, or making bold statements suggesting that this would never have happened in an Airbus? I certainly don't recall any such points being made. Maybe some people are better at realizing that bad things can happen to anyone than others ...

Obviously there is much yet to be learned as to the cause of the accident at Tegucigalpa. But based on the internet videos showing the challenge of flying a visual approach there, Tegucigalpa is (or at least should be) a fair weather airport only when it comes to large jet operations. Assuming that the indications about the landing conditions are correct, then it's highly likely that this accident could have happened to anyone flying any aircraft type. IMHO, believing that bad weather ops can be carried out successfully at Tegucigalpa is more normalization of deviance that, like so many times before, has led to an unnecessary loss of life.

[bubbers44]

Having flown the B727 and B757 into TGU since 1995 I have never needed the last 1,000 feet of runway 02 in over 500 landings. None of the approaches were marginal where I felt any concern of the outcome. In the last 10 years only two airliners have had a problem. Both were Airbuses, one about 9 years ago that slid off the runway into a ditch cocked 150 degrees to the left in a ditch at the very end before the cliff and the latest one. The other US carrier that flies in there is a B737 with no incidents. I am very sorry to see that no larger airliners will be allowed into TGU because of this crash. I believe the first one was a Taca A310. It will be interesting to see what automation had to do with this one. TGU was my favorite airport and am sorry it may be just a part of aviation history.

[RWA]

I feel in complete control with my hand guarding the joystick and red button as you feel with your yoke, how do I know what the control inputs are, by years of experience.

Dream Land, surely you would not know the 'control inputs,' since your sidestick would not move; you would only notice the effect of those inputs (e.g. in the case of the Hamburg A320 wingstrike incident, the aircraft starting to bank the wrong way, downwind?).

Secondly, you wouldn't know how much input the pupil had made until the aeroplane reached the full commanded bank, you'd be guessing; there'd be a distinct risk that you'd over-correct or under-correct?

Thirdly, to override the other sidestick, you'd have to press your 'red button' and keep it pressed for up to 40 seconds and make damn sure that the pupil didn't panic and press his/her red button and cause 'dual input'?

If all that's correct surely just seeing the yoke move the wrong way, grabbing it, and calling "I have control!" would be a lot simpler and quicker - not to say safer? Especially in a situation as urgent as the Hamburg one?

If I've got any of that wrong, please correct me. I got it from Eric Parkes' A320 Training Notes. Here's the (sorry, quite long and complicated) section he includes on the subject of sidesticks:-

"No feedback (feel) is given. Sidestick is spring loaded to neutral.

System algebraically sums the signals from both sticks if both are operated at the same time (dual input). However, the total input is no more than the max input from a single stick.

A red Takeover pb in the sidestick (also serving as autopilot disconnect) allows one pilot to override the other or to disable a damaged sidestick. If priority is taken an audio “PRIORITY LEFT (or RIGHT)” is sounded.

A red arrow light will illuminate in front of the pilot who has been deactivated when one pilot has taken priority over the other. A green CAPT or F/O light will illuminate in front of the pilot with priority if the other sidestick is out of neutral.

Last pilot to press Takeover pb has priority.

Pressing Takeover pb for 40 secs. will latch the priority condition (pilot does not have to continue to press Takeover pb). However, a deactivated sidestick can be reactivated by momentarily pressing the Takeover pb on either sidestick.

Green CAPT and F/O sidestick priority lights will flash during dual input and an audio “DUAL INPUT” will be sounded.

The Takeover pb and dual input warning system are commonly misunderstood. A green light in front of you means dual input or you have just taken priority in a dual input situation and a red arrow means your sidestick has been deactivated. These are two different things. Dual input is almost always unintentional and unwanted. The takeover priority may be something that needs to be done if a sidestick has gone bad or some other problem has occurred. However, if YOUR sidestick is bad the OTHER pilot must latch it out with their Takeover pb."

http://www.chipsplace.com/helpful/Airbus/Flight%20Controls.htm#FlightControls

[bubbers44]

RWA,

Thanks for verifying that. I have wondered how you could know what the other control input was if you couldn't see it easily like yoke movement. I have had FO's blame all of their unstable approaches on turbulence but can see with peripheral vision what the real problem is, PIO.

[ZAGORFLY]

I think that as in the B777 (FBY) also Airbus should have (not necessarily mechanic) link between the two Joysticks controls as well a stick shaker (like in my son Xbox control) when dual asymetric imput is apply above a certain force.

[bubbers44]

After Sao Paulo it will be interesting to see if there are any common automation difficulties like ground spoilers not activating and no auto brakes. Both reversers were operative on this landing but did they function? They shouldn't have needed reversers to stop but surely needed ground spoilers. I landed a 757 once and one reverser would not operate but still didn't need the last 1,000 feet. Wet runways reduce landing weight some but has never been a big problem. I have landed right before hurricanes and have been cleared to land on 02 but requested 20 because of a wet runway and preferring an upsloap runway with 600 ft extra runway with no wind advantage either way. 02 would have worked too but 20 was safer. I hope to hear from my friend in TGU to get the latest info.

[Rananim]

I'll tread carefully and not mention anything that might upset those with EADS shares.Dont want to get censored again....:cool:
The usual suspects are here ..the wet and the tailwind.. but maybe we as pilots arent focusing on the real killer...namely the reluctance of the pilot to perform a go-around from the deck(and some would say theres a general reluctance to perform any kind of GA).Why is that?Is it fair to say that a majority of pilots associate the GA maneuver with being airborne in the first place?In the sim we see 99% of them that way..so it becomes part of our mindset,once on the deck,we're committed.
But the runway GA is a perfectly valid and safe maneuver and should be trained more.Generally,the shorter the runway,the quicker those hands are to reach for the reversers...which is a natural reaction but also a shame as it narrrows the window for the runway GA option as well as jumps the gun before spoilers are confirmed...suppose the rwy report was way off and you started aquaplaning,you wouldnt get spoilers but youve already pulled the reversers,very dicey..
Some pilots will take it round again if they land on the wrong main gear first and only get flt spoilers instead of both flt and gnd..its that tight a decision...you pull the reversers when you're sure that everything is AOK and not until..ie you got the right touchdown point,and you've got the green light on all your spoilers..rev thrust makes a lot of noise but only contributes 10-20% to your stopping capabilities..why the hurry.When the time is right,by all means go for full GA rev thrust.

Dreamland,
Please dont dodge CONF iture's question.Its too important.

Strong Resolve,
I totally agree with you that they put the cart before the horse..machine before man..but they wont admit to that now will they twenty years on?Also I strongly support your view that the crash in Bahrain was "facilitated" by the Airbus design..not caused by it,just facilitated by it.

[RWA]

Generally,the shorter the runway,the quicker those hands are to reach for the reversers...which is a natural reaction but also a shame as it narrrows the window for the runway GA option as well as jumps the gun before spoilers are confirmed...

Good point - in the Congonhas crash the FDR/CVR clearly showed that reverse thrust was activated before the FO called 'no spoilers'....

Possibly 'instant reverse' is even more likely in the A320, with its 'one-piece' throttle levers? I recall seeing a video of a (very good) A320 landing on a short runway (the Azores, I think) where the captain pulled the levers back to the 'Idle' detent after the 'Retard' call, kept his hand on them as he flared and touched down, and then slammed them into reverse the moment the nosewheel was down.

PS - Doing the guy an injustice, found the video again and he DID wait for the spoilers call.....:)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-nYzVXoEYv4&feature=related

[nullpointer]

Taca 390 landing

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIolQOhB0xE

Is thrust reverse deployed at first frame?

[Dream Land]

Dream Land, surely you would not know the 'control inputs,' since your sidestick would not move; you would only notice the effect of those inputs (e.g. in the case of the Hamburg A320 wingstrike incident, the aircraft starting to bank the wrong way, downwind?).
IMO this incident is a failure of the PIC to make a safe decision, and effects as you put it is all I need to monitor to be on top of the situation safely.

A lot of people putting emphasis on the control inputs, I'm afraid this point isn't compromising flight safety in my opinion, when the aircraft is close to the ground, my focus of attention is simply the trajectory of the aircraft, I am fully following on the rudders for the simple reason that I am fully responsible for the outcome of the landing. I simply don't agree that the technology limits my ability for monitoring pilots, I haven't seen it.

[bubbers44]

We Boeing guys with a questionable FO would not want to be restricted to just rudder input feel to see what the other is doing in a wild approach. Taking an aircraft in an attempt to save a disaster is a lot easier if you saw the last input that put that aircraft in that situation and how much input was used. My flight instructor instinct would get me through fixing a Boeing upset, don't know about fixing a situation that up to my taking over have no clue what his last inputs were.

[kwick]

Doing some research, I found that by the end of this March the Toncontin runway repairs were finished by the airport authority, including a brand new layer of asphalt. It also included an additional of 300 feet of runway, but they were unable to get more lenght because of lack of government funding to buy the land from the owners.

While searching for that info, I read a statement made today by some engineer, saying that the runway repair personnel did not clean oil that is used while placing the asphalt layer, something as an emulsifier. Also read in another newspaper that the runway had to be vapor cleaned after the asphalt application, which they did not do.

I would not like to comment if the runway had grooves or not before I can confirm, but you know ...............

[bubbers44]

We Boeing pilots don't have to delay reversing for a ground spoilers call because we have a handle that the PNF verifies or pulls so ground spoilers don't go through computer logic. We can reverse at touchdown. It is a nice safety feature.

[bubbers44]

If anybody wants to watch my retirement flight at TGU in 03 go to www.flightlevel350.com and enter mhtg. My flight is the second one with the 757 cockpit view done by one of my check airmen friends. It looks wild but after a few landings there it is routine.

[77.shailesh]

AIRBUS regrets to confirm that an A320 aircraft operated by TACA International Airlines was
involved in an accident during landing at Tegucigalpa Toncontin Intl airport, Honduras at 09:45
am local time on May 30th 2008.
The aircraft was operating a scheduled flight TA0390 from El Salvador to Tegucigalpa.
The aircraft involved in the accident, registration number EI-TAF, bearing msn 1374, was
delivered to TACA International Airlines from the production line in January 2001 and had logged
around 21900 flight hours and 10000 flight cycles. It was powered by IAE V2500 engines.
According to available information, there were 129 passengers on board and 6 crew members.
Initial reports indicate several injuries and 3 fatalities on-board.
In line with ICAO Annex 13 International convention, the Authorities of El Salvador will lead the
investigation assisted by Accredited Representatives from the French BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et
d'Analyses) as State of aircraft manufacturer and from the US NTSB as State of engine
manufacturer. A go-team of 5 Airbus Technical Advisors has been dispatched to Tegucigalpa to
assist the Authorities.
Further update will be provided as soon as valuable information becomes available.
Airbus expresses its sympathy to the families and relatives affected by this event.
Yannick Malinge
Vice-president Flight Safety
Airbus
:=

[aussiepax]

i'm not a pilot , but look, well done on that landing and congratulations on the end of an obviously good job. Like the PNF said : "only thing comes close is a porn star !

[the_hawk]

@Strongresolve

http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf

fatal hull loss rate for 731/732 as 0.79
fatal hull loss rate for A320 family 0.23

so your 0.53 is way off, even if you consider the two new accidents in 2007 and the TACA one

[Strongresolve]

Please, read again the begining of the line of my post.

It said:

Fatal accidents by 1 million departures, not faltal hull rate

And another thing, you posted hull rate loss, not fatal hull rate loss.

The correct number for fatal hull rate loss for the A320 0,37.

And I picked fatal accidents per million departures, because de B737 fleet is bigger and does more flights than the A320 fleet, so is normal to expect a higher rate in the big numbers.
Faltal accidents per million departures is more objetive.

But again we are trying to compare an almost 40 year old 2º generation aircraft with a 4º generation aircraft. Why you dont compare it with the B737NG or the B717?

And the thing that most worry me about, is that most A320 accidents are due piloting errors or man-machine misunderstood comunications, not technical failures.

Ok, we have to open our minds, as the bus lovers say, we dont know the plane enough and we need to study it more, but this thing have been flying for 20 years, and do you think that it´s normal that we be still here talking about the same problem time after time.
It is a 4º generation high tech plane. We are having the same discursion since 15 years ago, and the problem is still here. Most pilots should get used to the A320, but the thruth is that they dont get used, and they are acussed of lack of knowledge of the plane.
Probably in 10 years we will be talking about the same, if the craft is not made for the man the problem will prevail.

[RWA]

when the aircraft is close to the ground, my focus of attention is simply the trajectory of the aircraft, I am fully following on the rudders for the simple reason that I am fully responsible for the outcome of the landing.

A bit mystified by that, Dream Land. According to a mate of mine - who, in connection with the Hamburg incident, emailed me a section of the A320 FCOM - Airbus' advice is not to use the rudder at all on the approach - 'crabbing' only - because the 'autotrim' automatically assumes that rudder application is evidence that you want to turn, and therefore applies roll as WELL?

"Before flare height, heading corrections should only be made with roll. As small bank angles are possible and acceptable close to the ground, only small heading changes can be envisaged. Otherwise, a go-around should be initiated.

"Use of rudder, combined with roll inputs, should be avoided, since this may significantly increase the pilot's lateral handling tasks. Rudder use should be limited to the "de-crab" maneuver in case of crosswind, while maintaining the wings level, with the sidestick in the roll axis."

Must admit that that passage gave me a touch of the horrors. I'm being presumptious - I've only flown gliders and singles and the odd twin - but I'm one of those lucky people who got the hang of crossing the controls in crosswind conditions very quickly. Telling me not to use the rudder as WELL as the ailerons on a crosswind approach would have been like telling me not to lean a bicycle over when turning a corner.......so would telling me to 'keep the wings level' instead of dropping one slightly into the crosswind........

So why monitor the rudder pedals? - when the 'book' clearly says that you shouldn't use the rudder at all in a crosswind approach in an Airbus, except at the last moment before touchdown, to 'decrab'?

Because it "..may significantly increase the pilot's lateral handling tasks."
Which I interpret as 'handbook-ese' for "Send you sideways into the deck at high speed."

As appears to have come within literally a few inches of happening at Hamburg?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAl1IJYx0C8

[iceman50]

The Airbus bashers are out in force again.:rolleyes:

Strongresolve has already done the AIB work and decided that it is the same cause as the other A320 accidents.:ugh::ugh:

Why can't all the Monday morning quarter backs just shut the **** up until we hear from the AIB.

Bubbers44 - we airbus pilots don't have a delay before selecting the reversers, the call is to confirm they have deployed automatically. If I remember correctly thats what happened on the 757 as well, when they were armed - so they did go through a logic! The call is normally "spoilers - REV green - decel".


As forTaking an aircraft in an attempt to save a disaster is a lot easier if you saw the last input that put that aircraft in that situation and how much input was used. My flight instructor instinct would get me through fixing a Boeing upset, don't know about fixing a situation that up to my taking over have no clue what his last inputs were.

Surely with your superior skills, as a pilot, you would know instinctively what input to put in order to control the aircraft, you surely do not need to know what inputs were made before. Plus if the situation was that dire close to the ground a GA is the only option!! Saving "pink bottom" over "pride" any day.

[CONF iture]

Yes Doug: ''Text Book'' and probably emotional too ...
Congrats for such a career, obviously you might be entitled to talk about ... Experience !

[airfoilmod]

Mr. Iceman- I take it to mean saving "Pink Bottom over Pride" to mean a presence of Ego in your cockpit. If your Head is in to face saving at all, you are fatally (perhaps) Behind the A/C. You cannot always save face and ass concurrently.

You can instantly interpret what input is critical by a snapshot of A/C posture? You are not talking out of your face.

Airfoil

[bubbers44]

Four star, not porn star. My flight attendant wife was also in the jumpseat. My regular FO on that flight was the fellow in the tower who cleared me to land. He has property there and happened to be there on that flight. The video shows how important it is to land in that 700 ft touchdown zone just past the displaced threshold. Clearing the runway you can see the cliff they went off. The 1,000 ft you should never need for stopping is past that taxiway before the last one at the end. Rolling to the end keeps the brakes cooler.

[scarebus03]

Again we have arrived at bashing one manufacturer over the other.

It is impossible to compare A320 losses with early B737 losses. For a start we would have to take into account the improvements in all aspects of commercial aviation that have been introduced over a 40 year period.

It would be more correct to compare the B727 to the A320 as the AB was designed to replace the 3 holer but again, we must look at 40 years of improvements before making any judgements/comparisons.

Once the data has been collected and analysed we will know exactly what happened.

I wonder was a GA initiated when they realised they didn't have enough runway as it may explain flap and t/rev position. Judging by the slat position at the crash site it looks like 1+F.

I am not a pilot but an engineer on both types AB/B, don't want to pi$$ on anyones chips

Brgds
SB03

[the_hawk]

@Strongresolve

The correct number for fatal hull rate loss for the A320 0,37.


negative, look again plz

fatal hull rate loss for the A320 0.23
hull rate loss for the A320 0.37

fatal hull rate loss for the 731/2 0.79
hull rate loss for the 731/2 1.55

all per 1 million departures of course, so what are you getting at? making a difference between a fatal accident and a fatal hull loss doesn't get us anywhere, I believe (= marginal, if any) ;)

[RWA]

Again we have arrived at bashing one manufacturer over the other.

I don't see a problem there, scarebus03? Both companies are commercial entities, and they are in competition with each other. Boeing is largely sticking to 'traditional' design principles, Airbus has opted for radical change in the whole area of flying controls.

Surely, since all of us are consumers, we are as free to exercise choice as we are in any other service field? Even more so since we are all aviation enthusiasts, and most of us are pilots or ex-pilots of one sort of another?

I don't happen to like the idea of Airbuses - the design differences are too radical for my taste. So far I have managed to avoid them when booking flights, and I advise my (grown-up) sons and daughter to do the same.

Isn't that my (and their, if they choose to accept my advice?) choice as consumers? If only because we're paying a ****load of dollars to fly in the things?

Certainly, in face of two serious landing accidents within a year (and one 'incident,' Hamburg, which came close to being the most serious accident of the lot, namely a 'cartwheel') I'm in no sort of hurry ever to set foot on an A320. :)

[PEI_3721]

Having a recently laid new asphalt surface (#115) is an aspect which has been in previous accidents / incidents. IIRC events at Bristol, and a BAe146 overrun at Puerto Williams many years ago.
The possibility of an oily film / greasy surface should be considered by operators / airport authorities.
There are links to this subject in previous threads. Also see the technical paper on runway surface texture and risk of hydroplaning. (http://hdl.handle.net/2060/19830019708)

[Strongresolve]

Sorry hawk, I not readed well the numbers, but anyway A320 performance in safety is not very brillant for a 4º gen aircraft.

In reference to the runway status.
The controler said in spanish to the pilots of taca flight 390 "The runway is damp (humeda)" not wet (mojada o contaminada.)

Big numbers are important because tells how well an aircraft is performing in safety matters.

I´m not advancing any AIB, but having in mind all last events that have not ended in a hull loss, wing tip strikes, hard landings, overruns, I dont expect any surpise from Airbus. They always find a scapegoat.

The real problem is the essence of the aircraft, it is a money making machine, not a real plane, so it never will perform like a real plane in dificult fields or strong weather conditions.
Others will do it better. (Always working inside plane limitations)

In this situations always is better going around that risk your theeth.

[Dream Land]

Re According to a mate of mine by RWAActually I do use a rudder to de-crab the aircraft in cross wind conditions, a nice increasing pressure during the flare works well, it's the bit that the students have a hard time learning, I believe Airbus says no more than 5 degrees crab at touchdown (could be wrong).

[NARVAL]

Sad accident. Very interesting exchanges on the subject, it seems, as often, without thinking of course it is the only cause for the crash, that the pilots underestimated the slipperiness (??? english?) of this runway, recently re-asphalted.
Concerning the A320 which I have flown for a few years, I was never afraid of it, but I certainly found it the most exacting plane to fly in a rather long aviation life:
Although serious and curious, I can tell that I never really understood how it worked.I knew what was in the books, but that was really little, compared to previous generation aircraft. I found that it was very easy to make mistakes, using the automatisms, and that a go-around, for example, with both engines working, a light plane (like the A318) and a level-off at two thousand feet can, will, be a sobering experience. When you have someone in the jumpseat, he is a little surprised! The variometre (climb rate indicator) is a sad joke, and when associated with a T-cas alert, the small needle disappearing you don't know where, aerobatics are in sight...
But all that said, if you are not over-confident and treat it with the respect you show to a depressive pitbull, it serves you well.
And I forgot...it can be fitted with a Head Up Display. We had it for some years before gradually it disappeared (cost versus un demonstrated efficiency: the management only saw the seldom used possibility of taking off with very low RVR, but we saw a wonderful tool for visual approaches).I see that my company has become wise and will have the HUD on the A380. If you have a HUD, as a captain, you will know without any doubt wether the landing is feasible or not...and take the decision.

[Flight Safety]

Apparently a security camera caught the Taca A320 on the runway right after touchdown.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIolQOhB0xE

No reversers and no spoilers that I can see.

Deja vue all over again.

[CONF iture]

I would not dare to pronounce on spoilers and reverse ... ?
But speed looks very impressive so late on that wet runway ...

[Flight Safety]

CONF iture, I agree, that's why I said "that I can see".

[Flight Safety]

I'm not sure how far past the end of the runway the accident site is, but it doesn't look too far from the end of the runway, thus this doesn't appear to be a high speed runoff. The security camera seems fairly close to the touchdown area and thus higher speed might be expected there. Since this runoff might be a lower speed runoff, they might have had some braking during the rollout.

All subject to correction and some more facts of course.

[bubbers44]

The location of the camera appears to be at a point on the terminal building about half way down the runway. They just recently installed those jet bridges. Guess they won't be needing them any longer.

[172driver]

But speed looks very impressive so late on that wet runway ...

Not necessarily. Don't forget, you are looking at an optical illusion here: the camera pans to the right, whereas the object (A320 in this case) moves to the left. This is an old cinematographic trick to enhance the impression of speed. Pure coincidence here, of course.

[ZAGORFLY]

video have been remouved...why?

[fleigle]

The video is still there... !!!!

[Tree]

We Boeing pilots don't have to delay reversing for a ground spoilers call because we have a handle that the PNF verifies or pulls so ground spoilers don't go through computer logic. We can reverse at touchdown. It is a nice safety feature.


I agree bubbers 44. Not being able to manually select ground spoilers with Config full is a deal breaker. Using Config 3 on short and slippery runways was to me an unsafe "workaround" due to increased speed and increased tendency to float.
My record: 10,000 + on short and slippery/icy runways in 732, about 1,000 in the 320. Caveat emptor.

[RWA]

Actually I do use a rudder to de-crab the aircraft in cross wind conditions, a nice increasing pressure during the flare works well, it's the bit that the students have a hard time learning

Slight misunderstanding, Dream Land. As I understand the Airbus recommended procedures, you can use EITHER ailerons OR rudder, but not both at once.

First of all, that would seem to rule out crossing the controls (banking into wind balanced by a touch of opposite rudder) to reduce the amount of crabbing required to stay in line ("Before flare height, heading corrections should only be made with roll").


Secondly, the procedure appears to rule out use of ailerons during the 'decrab' ("Use of rudder, combined with roll inputs, should be avoided, since this may significantly increase the pilot's lateral handling tasks. Rudder use should be limited to the "de-crab" maneuver in case of crosswind, while maintaining the wings level with the sidestick in the roll axis.").


Don't fancy having to do it that way one bit. Apart from anything else, I was always told, besides using the rudder to de-crab,' to drop a wing slightly into a strong crosswind, to make sure that the wind didn't get under the wing and also that, if anything, the upwind wheel got 'planted' first? According to the quoted procedures, you can't do that in an Airbus?

[iceman50]

AIRFOILMOD

Suggest you re-read the post!!:ugh::ugh: You are the one that seems to have the problem.
Mr. Iceman- I take it to mean saving "Pink Bottom over Pride" to mean a presence of Ego in your cockpit. If your Head is in to face saving at all, you are fatally (perhaps) Behind the A/C. You cannot always save face and ass concurrently.

You can instantly interpret what input is critical by a snapshot of A/C posture? You are not talking out of your face.My comment about "pink bottom over Pride" in simple terms for you means that MY and everyone else's bottom on the aircraft is MORE important than MY pride and it should be for every pilot. If you do not know what inputs to make to correct the aircrafts attitude without seeing what the "yoke" is doing I suggest you get another job.

RWA

Slight misunderstanding, Dream Land. As I understand the Airbus recommended procedures, you can use EITHER ailerons OR rudder, but not both at once.

First of all, that would seem to rule out crossing the controls (banking into wind balanced by a touch of opposite rudder) to reduce the amount of crabbing required to stay in line ("Before flare height, heading corrections should only be made with roll").


Secondly, the procedure appears to rule out use of ailerons during the 'decrab' ("Use of rudder, combined with roll inputs, should be avoided, since this may significantly increase the pilot's lateral handling tasks. Rudder use should be limited to the "de-crab" maneuver in case of crosswind, while maintaining the wings level with the sidestick in the roll axis.").


Don't fancy having to do it that way one bit. Apart from anything else, I was always told, besides using the rudder to de-crab,' to drop a wing slightly into a strong crosswind, to make sure that the wind didn't get under the wing and also that, if anything, the upwind wheel got 'planted' first? According to the quoted procedures, you can't do that in an Airbus?Unfortunately you do not know what you are talking about!! A lot of you guys are failing to understand that this is an aircraft and funny old thing you actually have to fly it sometimes. What do you think Rudder use should be limited to the "de-crab" maneuver in case of crosswind, while maintaining the wings level with the sidestick in the roll axis.").
means?? Using rudder with aileron!!!:ugh::ugh::ugh: We are in the flare here RWA. Boeing say you can use wing down or crab technique on the approach, Airbus just suggest crab technique to reduce possible PIO's with wing down.

[Dream Land]

RWA, In a crosswind condition, I fly this airplane as if it were a DHC-2 on floats, a little rudder pressure and lower the wing, the upwind MLG gently touching down, all well under control, where one must be careful is landing in extreme and gusty crosswinds as often seen in Funchael, Madeira Island, it's easy to get a wingtip and or donk this situation, better served to use a runway more in line with the wind or divert.

[CONF iture]

An experienced pilot doesn't necessarily require a moving control yoke in their hand to be ahead of a new pilot provided you don't put that student in a situation over his or her head to begin with, I feel in complete control with my hand guarding the joystick and red button as you feel with your yoke, how do I know what the control inputs are, by years of experience.

A lot of people putting emphasis on the control inputs, I'm afraid this point isn't compromising flight safety in my opinion, when the aircraft is close to the ground, my focus of attention is simply the trajectory of the aircraft, I am fully following on the rudders for the simple reason that I am fully responsible for the outcome of the landing.

Do you know that trajectory is usually a result of earlier control input and / or external interferences ?
So why not stay one step ahead ?
Why a new technology should deprive us from such live and vital information ?
Because Bernard Ziegler thought it was not necessary ?

But you pretend that ‘years of experience’ provide you with the FP control inputs knowledge … I really don’t see how and you remain pretty secretive on that but if you’re ready to share … PLEASE DO !
I’m afraid I’ll have to retire before I discover that enigma on my own.

Put the HAM case in a Airbus 310 and there was no restriction as long as CAPT was able to confirm that the adjustment was done at the proper time in the proper direction and with the appropriate amplitude.
Monitoring and supervision at their best

But your only cure is: “the captain (or most experienced) should be the handling pilot”
You put here your finger on the point and indirectly acknowledge the following:
FBW Airbus pilots must know supervision is restricted compared to all other technologies, therefore, the Pilot in COMMAND should act in consequence ...

It does not mean FBW Airbus tech is crap, VERY far from that, it just means it does not allow the same level of crew interaction therefore the same level of supervision.

No change to this earlier post (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=3975264&postcount=452)

Have a look also to that one (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=3959074&postcount=319)

I simply don't agree that the technology limits my ability for monitoring pilots, I haven't seen it
Dream Land, could it simply be you haven’t seen it … YET !?


Many airliners are born since the eighties and none of them has yet replicated the Airbus sidestick architecture and / or philosophy … maybe the next Bombardier, let’s wait and see ?

[airfoilmod]

I merely meant that a snapshot of attitude doesn't inform the non-flying Pilot of the most recent History of the Flight Path. Basically you may be called on to recover from an unusual attitude not knowing if a Roll was gust driven or pilot induced (input). If, as A/C is Rolling left, you assume a crosswind, your Roll right (after taking control, again, without knowing the immediate cause), your continued input is based on what you guess is the cause, you may overcorrect. What if the Roll was control induced and the crosswind is calm? If you make corrections based on a delay you are close to PIO in my opinion. With an A/C that "thinks" you have a third "Pilot" to consider. Why induce an additional "thought Path" into a dicey mash? Why not fly a "dumb" A/C that responds instantly and mechanically to input? Yoke movement is a redundant call out; instantaneous, un-biased, and free of "interpretation" and software. It is precisely, exactly, "communication", an aspect of CRM that some don't or won't acknowledge. "Rolling Right", nose Down, Back, End Roll, Nose Up, etc. As an AB Pilot, you must wait for the A/C to notify you of its "condition" rather than know ahead of time by seeing the "command".

If my post offended you, I do Apologize, but I stand by my conclusions about moving redundant Flight Controls.

Airfoil

[bubbers44]

I just communicated with my friend at TGU and got an update of the accident. The wind was 190 at 10 knots or a direct tailwind when they landed. The tower told them the active runway was 20 and the runway was wet. Taca said they would land on 02 because they didn't think they could keep the runway in sight if they circled on 20. He said the flaps were not in landing position and the left gear was not locked down when they crashed so speculation is they may have attempted a go around. Also they touched down about 100 ft past the taxiway 700 ft past the displaced threshold which was our go around spot if we were not on the ground. The FDR will tell the story when it is examined. I asked if they had attempted a straight in landing on 02 over the hill on final but haven't got a reply yet. That would be a total no no for us.

[NARVAL]

DREAMLAND:RWA, In a crosswind condition, I fly this airplane as if it were a DHC-2 on floats, a little rudder pressure and lower the wing, the upwind MLG gently touching down, all well under control, where one must be careful is landing in extreme and gusty crosswinds as often seen in Funchael, Madeira Island, it's easy to get a wingtip and or donk this situation, better served to use a runway more in line with the wind or divert.
I could not agree more! And the A320 family (with a little extra caution for the A321 which I found sometimes unpredictable during the flare) has a characteristic: the less you touch the stick, the better the approach. At the beginning we have an urge to "overpilot it" if that is the right word. But in gusty weather, don't touch it, a wing lifted by turbulence will settle back exactly where it was before, only slight corrections to keep the axis are needed, do not look at the stupid speed trend(oversensitive) jumping all over the place and it will be a gentle approach. If you look at the videos (Airbus, crosswind etc...on Utube) of the demonstration flights including the A380 in Iceland, with 40 knots crosswind, the test pilot keeps the crab with horizontal wings until the very last moment, than just pushes the rudder...No fighting with the plane...

[bubbers44]

Just got the reply from TGU. Taca did overfly the airport and make left traffic for 02. For some reason Taca didn't feel they could keep the runway in sight landing on 20. Sometimes arriving from that direction clouds are on the downwind side west of the airport requiring a descent to get below them. With 2,000 broken clouds he could maneuver easier overflying the runway and descending below the clouds landing on 02. I have pushed a high approach to 20 with a last minute runway change because the captain is on the outside of the circle and has a difficult time seeing the airport in a low visibility approach. Minimums there are 5km, 3miles and typically they show multiple visibilities above and below minimums in several directions. If any visibility was 5km I did the approach even though some directions, as in this case, were below. We use prevailing visibility in the US for limiting. Down there the prevailing visibility is meaningless terminology. Nobody, including the FAA, could say what visibility was limiting. Everybody down there thinks it was pilot error landing long with a 10 knot tailwind on a wet runway so hopefully they will eventually open TGU again for jets.

[Pablo26]

Bubbers44: "He said the flaps were not in landing position and the left gear was not locked down when they crashed so speculation is they may have attempted a go around."

Does the speculation that they were trying to go around make sense given the (relatively) minor damage to the airplane?

[bubbers44]

My thoughts too. Just repeating what my friend in TGU said. Why didn't they have landing flaps if they were landing? Maybe circling they forgot? Landing with a 10 knot tailwind on a wet runway there is not an option.

[Lemurian]

I am quite surprised that no one has thought of making some basic computations on this flight :
At an - estimated - OEW of 42,000 kg
- an estimated traffic load of 12,000 kg (124 passengers plus some freight )
- a reported 6,000 kg of fuel remaining (2,000 USG )
The landing weight is in the vicinity of 60,000 kg

At that value, the required wet runway length - from the *in flight performance* charts would be 2100 meters

The final approach IAS would be 130 kt which translates into 138 kt TAS and a ground speed of 148 kt with the 10 kt tailwind.

With the above in mind and considering the available runway length, the displaced threshold, the reported *slippery* surface, and a challenging circling approach with marginal visibility, I would say that in order to remain inside the runway length, every aspect of that landing had to be perfectly right and the margin for error close to NIL.
I might add that the influence of operating reversers is worth some 8% of the required landing distance, i.e some 150 meters.

Conclusions ?

[Dream Land]

Thanks Bubbers44 for the information, and for getting back to the thread, we had an over run where I work not too long ago, shorter, wet runway with a 20 KT tailwind :eek:, floated and touched down halfway down the runway and a long delay for reverser's. :ugh:

[CONF iture]

At that value, the required wet runway length - from the *in flight performance* charts would be 2100 meters
To me your number is a bit exaggerated ... I agree with your weight estimate but I would stop it at 1500M ... NO MARGIN ... even better with thrust reversers.
Now I may have miscalculate something ... (?)

bubbers44, for comparison do you know what would be the number for a 757 ?

Dream Land, a bit disappointing you attack someone but you're not able to back up your statement. Apology does not hurt either ... especially from a 'check airman' and your guys will appreciate.

[RWA]

He said the flaps were not in landing position and the left gear was not locked down when they crashed

Can't understand that - surely the post-crash photographs showed the flaps deployed? Do you think he could have meant the spoilers; another of the photographs showed the starboard wing with only the outboard spoiler panel deployed (which I believe is the in-flight spoiler)?

asked if they had attempted a straight in landing on 02 over the hill on final but haven't got a reply yet. That would be a total no no for us.

English translation of ATC communications here:-

http://avherald.com/h?article=4077cedf/0016

Not conclusive - but captain clearly says, "Tower, TACA three niner zero. We have the runway in sight. Circling runway zero two."

PS Found that phtograph on Page 1 of the thread - Post 15. Flaps down, outboard spoiler panel only deployed.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=329140

[Clandestino]

Good estimation CONFiture! My perf manual shows ALD for 60t A320, on wet rwy, conf full, 10kt tailwind, at 3000 ft amsl to be 1600m. However I operate under JARs and RLD for me in this case would be 1.92xALDdry and that's 2120m.

I cannot comment on TACA's required margins, though.

Also 60t is an estimate. At the time being, we don't know if it was the real weight. We don't know what was the speed over the fence. We don't know where was the touchdown point. We don't know when the braking was started and if it were manual or autobrake. we don't know wheteher spoilers were deployed. We don't know if thrust reversers were activated. So untill FDR and CVR are read out, at least 85% of this thread will be pure speculation.

[Dream Land]

Why a new technology should deprive us from such live and vital information ?Vital to some, obviously not to others, taking into account all of the safe operations throughout the world on the Airbus.

[j32wreck]

RWA,
I think the word choice in the description is not as clear as it could be. Flaps not in landing configuration does not necessarily mean stowed. From a flaps full landing configuration to go-around would mean repositioning to flaps 3. From flaps 3 landing configuration to flaps 2 for go-around. Flaps full and 3 are considered normal landing configurations.

The spoiler panel deployed appears to be panel 5. Panels 2-5 are used in flight to varying degrees. It is difficult to tell if the position of the left aileron is consistent with slight roll being commanded or just normal aileron droop with flaps deployed.

[Roy Bouchier]

As an old timer, It's refreshing to read Bubbers44 essentially practical comments on this topic rather than the airy fairy nonsense we hear so often.The remark that I feel so telling was that 'in the circling, perhaps they forgot.'
Now there speaks the voice of experience!

[Dream Land]

'in the circling, perhaps they forgot.'Experience not on the Airbus I'm afraid, forgetting final flap is possible but not likely due to the display.

[Lemurian]

My perf manual shows ALD for 60t A320, on wet rwy, conf full, 10kt tailwind, at 3000 ft amsl to be 1600m. However I operate under JARs and RLD for me in this case would be 1.92xALDdry and that's 2120m.


Agreed !
Also 60t is an estimate. At the time being, we don't know if it was the real weight.
Of course not, but that is about the minimum weight I could imagine, not willing to go into intricate calculations based on pax weights, estimated cargo or so. I didn't even consider the weight of the deadheading crew.
All the performance derive from that - estimated - baseline value.
The perf margins I took went further as I took the touch-down Vref = Vls and the Vref speed will only vary by 1 kt / ton.
I have to say here that there is absolutely no value judgement on the crew from me. I am just saying that the margins for mishandling were narrow. Very narrow.

As for the -very popular on Prune - theory of a desperate attempt at a late go-around, the maths don't bear it out :
Estimated landing speed : 148 kts
Estimated speed abeam the camera : 100 kt
Estimated speed at the crash site : less than 40 kt
All point to a continuous, albeit insufficient deceleration, and use of brakes (smoking hot as per one of the initial videos, did they start a fire ?).

Now the theory that they had not full flaps. It is very possible, in a HF sense as the procedures on a circling approach call for config 2 / Gear down at the straight-in approach break and final selection of full flaps on base / final turn. Some airlines, though, call for full flaps throughout the circling. Need to knowe TACA's SOPs on this.
Bubbers theory could well be possible here (I don't believe I would ever see the day I'd agree with him ).

[DingerX]

Estimated speed abeam the camera : 100 kt
To those who would suggest that the movement of the camera would exaggerate the speed, or that the perspective of the runway (going from abeam to moving away) would make it appear to be slowing down, here's how that figure is arrived at: in the 4 seconds it's on camera, the aircraft travels 5 plane lengths. Length of an A320 is 37 meters and change, so back-of-the-envelope gives 170 kph, or approximately 100 kt.

[Austrian Simon]

Estimated speed abeam the camera : 100 kt
To those who would suggest that the movement of the camera would exaggerate the speed, or that the perspective of the runway (going from abeam to moving away) would make it appear to be slowing down, here's how that figure is arrived at: in the 4 seconds it's on camera, the aircraft travels 5 plane lengths. Length of an A320 is 37 meters and change, so back-of-the-envelope gives 170 kph, or approximately 100 kt.

We strongly disagree with the assessment by Flight Global, that the airplane was travelling at 100 knots at that point. If that was true, the airplane would definitely have stopped before the runway end, given that the airplane had already slowed down from their touch down speed of around about 150 knots (tailwind 10 knots plus reduced IAS due to density altitude taken into account). If those 100 knots were true, the airplane would have slowed down at a rate of 2.4 meters/second/second at minimum (touch down at the threshold) up to 4.5 meters/second/second in maximum (touch down at the aiming markers, 4.5 m/s/s or 9 knots/s being quite some more than maximum autobrakes) since touch down, suggesting that the airplane would have stopped between 450 to 700 meters before the runway end with that (continued and constant) deceleration.

See the computations and considerations here:

http://avherald.com/h?article=4077cedf/0022

If speed was indeed a factor, the airplane must have been quite a lot faster than 100 knots at that point 650 meters past the threshold and 1000 meters before the runway end.

I would rather wait for the data off the FDR ...

Servus, Simon

[RWA]

The spoiler panel deployed appears to be panel 5. Panels 2-5 are used in flight to varying degrees.

Thanks. Can someone help me with this quotation for Eric Parkes' 'A320 Notes'?

Spoilers – Five spoilers are installed on each wing. From the wing root to wing tip they are numbered 1 through 5. All are used as ground spoilers. Numbers 2 through 5 (the 4 outboard spoilers) provide roll control. The middle three (2 – 4) provide in-flight speed brakes. If a SEC fails the spoiler(s) it controls is automatically retracted (if extended) and that spoiler(s) deactivated. There is no reversion to other computers.

Spoiler priorities:

Spoilers 1 & 2 - SEC 3, Yellow and Green
Spoilers 3 & 4 - SEC 1, Yellow and Blue
Spoiler 5 - SEC 2, Green


http://www.chipsplace.com/helpful/Airbus/Flight%20Controls.htm#FlightControls

My main problem is that, as an old-time, strictly amateur aviator, I haven't the faintest idea what an 'SEC' is. :)

But the implication of the passage is that there is some sort of possible systems failure that can result in only Spoiler 5 being extended? As appears to have happened in this case?

[bubbers44]

Our procedure was to be fully configured on speed downwind for rwy 02. We rarely did the VorDme 02 approach because we arrived from the north. Occasionally we had to do as they did and go around and fly the 02 approach to descend to 5700 ft instead of 6000 to get below the cloud bases. I don't have any B757 charts since retirement but we landed there at max landing weight a lot when runways were dry because of the high fuel charge there. The wet landing weights were the same on 02 with a 5 knot headwind as landing on 20 with a 5 knot tailwind. I always landed on 20 with any tailwind on 02 because the wind changed a lot at TGU. We routinely taxied to 02 for take off with a 15 knot tailwind and waited for it to drop to what we needed that day depending on weight and temperature. It always worked out fine and 5 or 10 minutes was all it took. I appreciate the transcript of ATC communications. It clears up a lot of unknowns.

We used position 4 autobrakes on every landing there. It works the same as Airbus autobrakes and sets a desceleration rate. However that desceleration rate only applies if the runway conditions allow it to without activating the antiskid system. Reports of braking problems there since resurfacing the runway may play a part in the investigation. Thanks Lemurian. I always appreciated your input even when we didn't agree.

[J.O.]

It's highly unlikely that only one spoiler was deployed during the landing, unless they were facing a significant defect which should have precluded a landing on such a short runway, particularly when it was wet. It's more likely that the one deployed spoiler as seen in the pictures has just not drifted out of the extended position as hydraulic pressure bled off. It's also possible that the accident caused damage which blocked the hydraulic lines to that spoiler, thus negating the possibility for the fluid pressure to bleed off.

As for the speculation that they did not have full flaps for landing, as was mentioned above, "Flap 3" and "Flap Full" are the normal landing configurations for the A320. Prior to doing a Flap 3 landing, we are required to select LDG FLAP 3 on the EGPWS panel. If one doesn't make that selection, the EGPWS will be screaming "TOO LOW FLAPS" rather loudly on final approach. The crew would have to be in a coma to miss this call.

[Strongresolve]

Again I must say, that the exact translation of the word that the controler used to alert of runway condition is Damp, he said "pista humeda."
He didnt said wet. "Mojada." o "Contaminada."
I think that this is important because makes the diference between Required Landing Distance in Dry and Wet coditions, and it makes the diference between normal operation and pilot error in calculations of Required Landing Distance.

I dont know if he landed long or short, but the fact is that he pased the camera with three landing gears on the ground, and the reverses didnt were deployed. I´m anoyed about that.

I suppose that everybody affected by TGU closure and Airbus are going to blame the pilot for the accident based in his evaluation of landing runway conditions. Always is easier to blame the usual suspect to calm down the economical repercussions of an airplane crash.
Firsts declarations of the honduran Civil Aviation Authoroties said that the problable cause was a failure of the plane, when the notice about Toncontín closure was know they started to blame the pilot for landing in a wet runway with a lot of tail wind.

In this airport pilots usually prefer to land on the runway 02. For the runway 20 you need a very high rate of descent, and with a MDA of 2700 feet above the runway you dont have a good chance to go in if the day is cloudy. In Circling things are not much better, the turn is to the captains bad side, and you fly closer to the mountains. Another fact is that recomended rate of descents are not published in the VOR/DME App chart for runway 20. The exceed the margin for a stabilished approach.
Runway 02 is safer always, instead of tail wind.

[Dysag]

Since no-one replied to your question, here goes:

SEC is the Spoiler Elevator Computer. Since these moving surfaces are not connected physically to the sidestick, it's the SEC which controls which surfaces will deflect, and by how much, depending on the conditions. So it's best to have lots of active SECs!

You probably worked out that yellow, green and blue are the three hydraulic sytems.

[Austrian Simon]

Again I must say, that the exact translation of the word that the controler used to alert of runway condition is Damp, he said "pista humeda."


Thanks, I have put your remark in a comments in the translation. Was this already your second remark - didn't see your first!

in the 4 seconds it's on camera, the aircraft travels 5 plane lengths. Length of an A320 is 37 meters and change, so back-of-the-envelope gives 170 kph, or approximately 100 kt.

That approach is seriously, seriously flawed!

Let's make this clear in an assumed picture: the camera looks in a right angle to the runway, is fixed and the lens system makes sure, that all angles in the pictures are depicted correct from corner to corner. The camera looks from 30 degrees right to 30 degrees left, the camera is say 150 meters off the runway.

As the airplane comes into the view at the right hand corner of the picture, it is therefore at a distance to the camera of 150/cos(30 degrees)=173 meters, and it has to travel a distance of 150*sin(30 degrees)=75 meters to reach the center of the picture. Because of the larger distance the airplane appears smaller than it would be in the center due to the perspective, and because of the angle the distance of 37 meters in reality appears on the picture as 37*sin(30 degrees)=18.5 meters. The same applies for the left hand corner of the picture. The total distance on the runway centerline from right to left corner would be 150 meters or 8.1 times the airplane length measured at the corner or roughly 4 times the airplane length measured in the center of the picture.

Now, let's put the camera at an angle to the runway, say 30 degrees to the left. The center line of the runway at the middle of the picture would now be 173 meters away (the camera still 150 meters off the runway in the same position, just rotated). The airplane appears in the picture at its closest position to the camera, 150 meters distance and departs the picture at an angle of 60 degrees (as we have another right angle in the triangle, this time not in the center but at the right hand corner of the picture, we can use Pythagoras without any doubt), the airplane travels therefore 86.5 (173*sin(30)) meters until it hits the center of the picture. The distance of the runway center line at the left hand corner of the picture would appear at 300 meters (150/cos(60)), the total distance travelled from right to left hand corner of the picture would therefore be 260 meters (compare 86.5 meters from right corner to center point!). You can not apply any linear measurement in this view at all.

One can not simply say therefore, the airplane could be put 5 times into the picture from appearance to disappearance, 4 seconds, the airplane is 37 meters long and thus we see at a speed of 5*37/4 meters/second or 166 kph. The perspective of the picture and the angles of even a still camera (not to mention a panning one!) introduce gross errors to that approach.

Now, we aren't even able to determine the angles between the camera and the runway centerline with any degree of certainty in this scenario, but we would need to do so for every single frame of the video to be able to use those frames for the measurements. So the panning introduces a lot of additional difficulty into that determination.

All of this with an optimal camera, which a surveillance camera usually isn't (that aims to view a broader angle than would appear on the pic). You'll note, that the exact distance to the airplane is needed and the exact angles to be able to compute the actual distances covered. And we need to know the exact time stamps of the pictures to be able to really compute the time - that video doesn't provide times at all. We don't know, whether frames have been inserted or removed for a "smooth video", what time intervals were between the various pictures of the camera (maybe it was indeed 1 picture per second as it may look like).

There is a reason, why photogrammetry is a science!

Servus, Simon

[bubbers44]

To land straight in on 20 it was necessary to descend as soon and as rapidly as conditions allowed. At 15 DME descend to 7,000 ft and call the airport in sight or before 15 DME if able to get visual contact. Then get established so at 3miles, about 8 DME you are at 4300 ft. Sometimes S turning to a right base entry helped if you were a bit high. Otherwise you had to overfly the airport and make right traffic to 20 which was difficult from the left seat if you weren't familiar with the valley. 20 is an upslope runway so it is easy to get low if you just judge your descent by runway appearance alone. On really hot days you were weight restricted landing on 20 because of go around climb gradient restrictions because of terrain. Landing on 20 is like landing at any other airport if you start your visual approach early. Check airmen didn't count landing on 20 as meeting the requirements of a TGU check out so either they had to land on 02 with a legal tailwind or do another qualification flight.

[PJ2]

Post #144, Tree, Bubbers 44;

Quote:
We Boeing pilots don't have to delay reversing for a ground spoilers call because we have a handle that the PNF verifies or pulls so ground spoilers don't go through computer logic. We can reverse at touchdown. It is a nice safety feature.
I agree bubbers 44. Not being able to manually select ground spoilers with Config full is a deal breaker. Using Config 3 on short and slippery runways was to me an unsafe "workaround" due to increased speed and increased tendency to float.
My record: 10,000 + on short and slippery/icy runways in 732, about 1,000 in the 320. Caveat emptor.

It is a nice safety feature but there are also accidents which have resulted from manual selections of both systems on the 732 (reverse) and the DC8, (spoilers - more than one accident). It can be assumed that Airbus' intentions were to deal with the possibility of inadvertent deployment while ensuring their availability once the a/c was solidly on the ground and they used the technology around which the design concept was created to do so rather than defaulting to cable & pulley systems with associated mechanical interlocks.

I'm not trying to compare the two as such a discussion is profoundly pointless and a waste of time given the success of both models/types but merely trying to clarify why the design might be as it is on the Airbus.

I discussed the work-around here during the TAM accident discussion last year. The technique was discussed in terms of bringing the flap lever up one step after touchdown, (ie, Conf Full to Conf 3) to enable spoilers/brakes then reverse. Those that disagreed I don't think were aware or had not flown the 727 in which a one-step-up flap re-configuration was done routinely after touchdown. I agree it ought not to be a work-around but a manufacturer-sanctioned and available technique for crews faced with short, contaminated runways. I agree that there may be more politics and operational or technical risk involved and that the design was a point raised in the Lufthansa Warsaw overrun accident, (Conf 3 vs Conf Full on contaminated runways). I believe that Lufthansa (and others) went to Conf 3 as a standard flap configuration for landing shortly after. Config 3 is the "recommended" flap setting but we rarely see it in the data.

[RWA]

Since no-one replied to your question, here goes.

Many thanks, Dysag.

You probably worked out that yellow, green and blue are the three hydraulic sytems.

No chance, mate. :) Thanks to getting married early in life, I could only afford gliding for most of my flying 'career.'

So most often I didn't even have a bloody ENGINE to work with, leave alone hydraulics! Spoilers, yes - vital, landing a glider..........

[DingerX]

Dear Simon,

I was merely giving the methodology for "how" those numbers were arrived at, not making any statement about their veracity; indeed I did note the problems with moving cameras and angular speed.
For the record, the "plane-lenth" measurement involved counting those lengths traveled with reference to the ground, in each frame, not taking a general measurement.
I also agree that as the aircraft moves away from the camera, it will look slower than what it suggests.
I do not find your initial arguments conclusive, namely that if it were going at 100 kts at that point, it would not have overrun. That's putting the horse in front of the carriage, or using analysis to drive the facts.
You did, however, inspire me to go back and take a close look at the data.

First, you are factually wrong. The tape is time-stamped to the thousandth of a second. Second, the camera's perspective is good enough that, even with the panning, you can overlay two images without noticeable problems from distortion, which I've done. Third, you are intuitively correct: at the point it comes on the screen, it is going notably faster than 100 kts.

I took the first and third frames where the aircraft appears. The time-stamp of the first frame ends with 18.928; the third frame is stamped 20.421, so the interval is .593 seconds. Matching the vertical section of the first image that contains the aircraft with the scene in the second image, it is clear that the aircraft has traveled on the runway over a plane-length.
Assuming conservatively that's forty meters, that would come out 243 kph or 131 kts. I'm sure greater precision (and perhaps an even higher ground speed) can be had.
If you'd like to play with the image, and make the necessary angular motion calculations, or just see for yourself or post for others, drop me a line and I'll mail it to you.

So: 1) camera motion can be compensated for, 2) The image gives us precise time measurements, and 3) you'd still need to calculate angular effects, but back-of-the-envelope shows it's at least 130 kts.

[j32wreck]

As for the -very popular on Prune - theory of a desperate attempt at a late go-around, the maths don't bear it out :
Estimated landing speed : 148 kts
Estimated speed abeam the camera : 100 kt
Estimated speed at the crash site : less than 40 kt
All point to a continuous, albeit insufficient deceleration, and use of brakes (smoking hot as per one of the initial videos, did they start a fire ?).

Only one board deployed and engine 1 nowhere near full reverse.

[Austrian Simon]

I was merely giving the methodology for "how" those numbers were arrived at, not making any statement about their veracity; indeed I did note the problems with moving cameras and angular speed.

Alright, taken note of, and we are in agreement here.


I do not find your initial arguments conclusive, namely that if it were going at 100 kts at that point, it would not have overrun.


Not quite ;-)

If the airplane had slowed down to 100 knots already, from an approximate 148 knots or so, it would have exercised quite some braking already. If that braking action continued for some time, it would not have overrun. In fact, even on an ungrooved wet runway a deceleration of 1.5 meters/second/second (3 knots/s) is well normal, and I used that deceleration rate.

First, you are factually wrong. The tape is time-stamped to the thousandth of a second. Second, the camera's perspective is good enough that, even with the panning, you can overlay two images without noticeable problems from distortion, which I've done. Third, you are intuitively correct: at the point it comes on the screen, it is going notably faster than 100 kts.

Yep, absolutely - we are in agreement of the speed being higher than 100 knots.

And you are right, that there are timestamps overlaid by the copyright notice of the TV station that obviously broadcast it. I hadn't seen those until your remarks.

Can you recheck your time stamps, especially as you write 18.928 and then compute 0.593 seconds to 20.421, please?

The timestamps are hard to decipher, but the airplane is not visible at ...19.421, is fully visible at ...20.028, is last visible at ...22.031 and is entirely out of the picture at ... 22.431, so that makes it maximum 3 seconds visible.

Now add the angle between runway and camera to that scenario ...

If I however use 130 knots as a speed at that point 650 meters past the runway threshold with 1000 meters to go, a deceleration rate of 1.5 m/s/s would be insufficient to stop, stopping distance would be 1500 meters (departing the runway end at a speed of 38 meters/second=74 knots). A deceleration rate of 2.2 meters/second/second (~4.4 knots/s) would be necessary to stop at the runway end (which may not be available on a wet runway).

Assuming conservatively that's forty meters, that would come out 243 kph or 131 kts. I'm sure greater precision (and perhaps an even higher ground speed) can be had.

Photogrammetry can certainly clear that up. That was my main point.

So: 1) camera motion can be compensated for

No doubt about that.

2) The image gives us precise time measurements, and 3) you'd still need to calculate angular effects, but back-of-the-envelope shows it's at least 130 kts.

Agreed.

Servus, Simon

[Doors to Automatic]

What deceleration rates do Autobrake "low" and "medium" give on an A320 just out of interest (assuming dry runway; typical landing weight) and what sort of ground run distances do these translate to?

[DingerX]

In calculating the speed, I initially read the stamp as 19.928. In working it up, I looked at it closer, and I saw 19.828. Sorry, that's the source of the problem. I think we can put it at "at least" 130 kts.

[Austrian Simon]

Austrian Simon, why is it that the Spanish ATC clearly talks about runway "cero dos" but your translation says "two zero"? Some Spanish language quirk?

Thanks for pointing that out, I'll need to check with the Spanish source, as it is clear from the later discussion, that they were going for "dos cero", e.g.

15:26:02Z......
[TA390] TONCONTIN TORRE. TACA TRES NUEVE CERO. SOBREVOLANDO EL CAMPO.
PARA CINCO MIL QUINIENTOS.
[TGU TOWER] TACA TRES NUEVE CERO. CONTINUE APROXIMACION PISTA DOS CERO.
VIENTO DOS CERO CERO GRADOS. SEIS NUDOS. NOTIFIQUE EN FINAL.
[TA390] NOTIFICAREMOS EN FINAL PARA LA DOS CERO. TACA TRES NUEVE CERO.
GRACIAS.

and only switched to "cero dos" for their second approach after the missed approach procedure.

Servus, Simon

[glad rag]

Particularly unpleasant to see U Tube plummeting to the lowest depths.....

[Austrian Simon]

I've listened to the ATC, the Spanish transcript sounds correct to me. ... Easy error to make, I guess.

I confirm that, I have listened to the tape myself, with the transcript before me I was able to follow the words and understand them. They are talking about zero two indeed at 23:50 and two zero later at 26:02.

I am just about to correct the translation accordingly.

Servus, Simon

[David K-M]

Mea culpa Simon: the Flight Global article was written to reflect the emergence of the security video rather than to analyse the accident. The low-end 100kt figure, derived in a few minutes, was based on very basic assumptions, and only intended to give a sense of proportion. Having since had the time for a more thorough assessment - from which we've also come up with a speed of 120-130kt - I'll be updating the figure in the story.

Ultimately the question isn't whether the A320 was travelling too fast - the overrun itself settles that - but rather why. Either it was decelerating normally but late, or it couldn't decelerate, or it was deliberately not decelerating.

[Austrian Simon]

Ultimately the question isn't whether the A320 was travelling too fast - the overrun itself settles that - but rather why. Either it was decelerating normally but late, or it couldn't decelerate, or it was deliberately not decelerating.

David,

I think, that question is best answered by the facts derived from flight data recorders and other evidence available, correctly interpreted by the accident investigation team.

Right now we are making an assumption again, namely that the video is not manipulated and the timestamps are correct. I'd certainly concede, that this may be a reasonable assumption, but it remains an assumption nonetheless and is not established fact.

Thanks for jumping in - my respect for your statement!

Servus, Simon

[Robert Campbell]

The speed of the A/C can easily be computed once the frame count per second of the camera is known. The fact that the camera is panning right while the 320 is speeding left in the frames is irrelevant.

If one wanted to give the illusion of increased speed, the frames would have to be free of any stationary objects. Find a stationary object and use it as a reference.

Normal NTSC video runs at 30 frames or 60 fields per second. Surveillance video can run at any frame rate set by the operator.

So, talk to the guy who set the system up first. Then do the math.

[bubbers44]

The first approach was to 20, the second to 02. They decided it was easier to land on 02 with cloud conditions. Either way it is a visual approach over the runway if you go to MAP. You can then land either way if you can stay VMC. Clouds were marginal around 2,000 feet that day so they probably were trying to make it work and found 02 easier to land on. Unfortunately that put them landing downhill on a wet 5400 ft runway with a 10 knot tailwind with a 70 ft cliff at the end. We had strict rules on landing weights and tailwinds so would not have landed. Over 5 knots on a dry runway of tailwind prohibited us from landing.

[Lemurian]

the first approach was to 20, the second to 02. They decided it was easier to land on 02 with cloud conditions. Either way it is a visual approach over the runway if you go to MAP. You can then land either way if you can stay VMC. Clouds were marginal around 2,000 feet that day so they probably were trying to make it work and found 02 easier to land on. Unfortunately that put them landing downhill on a wet 5400 ft runway with a 10 knot tailwind with a 70 ft cliff at the end. We had strict rules on landing weights and tailwinds so would not have landed. Over 5 knots on a dry runway of tailwind prohibited us from landing.

Sounds fair and safe to me.
A few questions, though :

1/- Were your minima 2700 ft / 3 sm (= 4800 m) ?
If yes, would you have attempted a circling approach on RWY 02 with this METAR :MHTG 301500Z 19004KT 2000S -DZ FEW008 BKN020 OCV080 21/19 Q1016 2KM S SW WSW D/C 8KM PCPN CL HZ ? ( reading it, I have the feeling that all quadrants leading to the final 02 (w, SW, S ) were below vis min and the broken ceiling 700 ft below minimum.

2/- On RWY 02, there is a 5.3° PAPI restricted to A and B cat aircraft. Is that descent path angle a reflection of the actual trajectory you'd find yourself at on short final ?
3/-Corollary : How were speed control and respect of a landing trajectory ?

[bubbers44]

5 km was controlling for initiating the approach. We never could get an answer from FAA or anybody how they report multiple visibilities in different directions and what was controlling. In the US it is prevailing visibility controlling approach legality which means over half of the directions visibility is 5 km. We would have and have in the past initiated the approach with 2,000 broken conditions as long as we had 5 km reported in at least one direction. TGU had certain landmarks they used to determine visibility but they did not have anything to do with prevailing visibility. The cloud bases were not controlling. You just couldn't continue to a landing unless you had the airport visually in sight reaching MDA.

The only time I couldn't land there and ended up at San Pedro Sula the ceiling was 2300 overcast and never saw the ground. Noone landed that day because of the weather. That day they would not allow any 02 approaches to get below 2700 ft AGL. I complained so the next day they notamed all 02 approaches OTS. My complaint was if they publish an approach they should let you perform it.

[bubbers44]

The reason visibility to the s sw was 2 km was that was about as far as you could see with the hills there on a clear day with any clouds hanging around the distant hills. We had no glide angle info for landing. We had reference altitudes crossing some tanks then just maintained about a 1200 fpm descent to flair turning final below 100 ft. Yes we got yelled at sink rate, sink rate a lot from the gpws. Unless you had about a 15 knot headwind to reduce below 1200 fpm descent it usually was going off below 100 ft. We would get fired for doing an approach like that anywhere else but to land in that 700 ft touchdown zone that was required.

[Lemurian]

Thanks for all these informations.
I had a feeling that those visibility and ceilings values would somehow have been based on aspect of the local terrain.
Thanks for clearing that out.
The part that is still bothering me is : We had strict rules on landing weights and tailwinds so would not have landed. Over 5 knots on a dry runway of tailwind prohibited us from landing.
I presume that all operators there would have the same criteria.
Do they ?

[bubbers44]

The 5 knot tailwind was our ops. I don't think Taca had that restriction. We also had a 10 knot max tailwind for all airports we landed at except San Jose, Costa Rica, which was in the valley at 3,000 feet so one day I landed with a 15 knot tailwind there because the clouds were too low to circle but when I got back to Miami with weather coming in with a 13,000 foot runway at sea level the 15 knot tailwind exceeded our ops. We were the only operation limited so sometimes to try to make things safer it just gets more complicated. Of course the reason they changed to 15 knots at Costa Rica was too many flights couldn't circle because of those typical low clouds so flight were diverting.

[NARVAL]

What deceleration rates do Autobrake "low" and "medium" give on an A320 just out of interest (assuming dry runway; typical landing weight) and what sort of ground run distances do these translate to?
You select Max at take-off (if rejected) and it becomes active when ground spoilers are deployed. You use low and medium for landing:
LO waits 4 seconds (!!!) after ground spoilers are deployed and gives 1,7 m/s/s deceleration (5,6 feet/s/s)
MED waits 2 seconds only and gives 3 m/s/s (or 9,8 feet/s/s)
If the antiskid is active (slippery surface) you will not get those deceleration rates.
From experience and without saying it is what should be done, if I felt that even although the computed landing distance for very wet runway was available, the braking might be a serious concern, I would not use the autobrake, but slam both brake pedals "to the floor" as soon as on the ground and let the antiskid do its best with that.You can even brake as hard as you can before touching the ground.You will not block the wheels.

[Flight Safety]

Photogrammetry is quite limited with only a single camera, so I attempted to analyze the Security Camera images frame by frame, measuring the distance the fuselage (and only the fuselage) traveled from frame to frame. Since the aircraft is basically traversing a straight line (down the runway), I used fixed points in both the foreground and background as references. My technique was to draw 2 straight lines (through foreground and background reference points) on the images, one marking the position of the nose of the aircraft on each image, and one marking the position of the nose from the previous image. I could then determine how far the fuselage had moved forward from the previous image.

This technique seemed to work for the first few frames, but then seemed to fail in the later frames as the aircraft's speed begin to skew towards 160 knots in the later frames (161 being the highest I measured). I assumed this might be due to greater pixilation, greater view angles or some other artifacting in the images, as the aircraft got further away from the camera. I also assume there's no way this aircraft could have been accelerating towards 160 knots after touchdown.

The results also seem to indicate that the time stamps on the images are quite accurate.

Some portion of the aircraft is recorded in 9 images. I'm only posting the results for the first 3 measured frames because they are consistent and the following frames start the skewing towards 160 knots.

I used the following formula in Excel to calculate speed. I'm an American so I like to measure in feet :)

ESN = 1/TD*DTF*3600/FNM

Where:

Assumed Aircraft Length = 123ft 3in
ESN = Estimated speed in knots/hour
TD = Time Difference from previous frame to current frame
DTF = Distance Traveled in Feet
FNM = Feet per Nautical Mile = 6076.1155

Frame 19.828 - First reference frame, marked nose position only
Frame 20.031 - TD = .203 sec, DTF=53.4ft, ESN = 155.9 knots
Frame 20.421 - TD = .390 sec, DTF=102.7ft, ESN = 156.0 knots
Frame 20.828 - TD = .407 sec, DTF = 106.8ft, ESN = 155.5 knots

Again the speeds begin to skew towards 160 knots after this, which can't possibly be right.

Now if someone else knows where the camera is, has access to an accurate scale drawing of the airport (and immediate surroundings), and can reference structures in the background, they should be able to determine where the aircraft was located on the runway in each frame. But I leave this task to someone else. :O

[Austrian Simon]

I attempted to analyze the Security Camera images frame by frame, measuring the distance the fuselage (and only the fuselage) traveled from frame to frame.

Hello, Flight Safety,

thanks a lot for your effort indeed! Great post!

Servus, Simon

[bubbers44]

I calculated a B757 at mglw landing under those conditions and came up with a 155 knot ground speed at touchdown. The camera view is about 2500 ft down the runway so your calculations would show no desceleration.

[TO MEMO]

Caulfield

Try LPHR :)

frightening!

[CONF iture]

We had strict rules on landing weights and tailwinds so would not have landed. Over 5 knots on a dry runway of tailwind prohibited us from landing
For planning purpose, I could imagine TACA dispatch had also computed the figures for RWY02 DRY 5kt TAILWIND 62 tonnes giving a Required Landing Distance of 1600 meters (factored distance)
The same figures but for a WET surface would have limited the weight at 58 tonnes.

Crew and ATC look both aware of that 5kt ''limitation'' (?)
TA390 "EH SI SEÑOR. Proceeding directly to the VOR. We request approach to runway 02 and if possible, winds is five knots, landing on runway 02, because there are very low clouds in the circling to 20"
TGU "TACA three niner zero. Confirm you request runway zero two. Winds are at two zero zero with one zero knots. Over"

Once airborne, the crew can eventually discard the factored distance.
RWY02 WET 10kt TAILWIND 62 tonnes giving an Actual Landing Distance of 1400 meters (unfactored distance)
To obey this figure, the crew knows he has, in this especially challenging environment, to proceed to a text book landing and deceleration. It provides only 250 "extra" meters …

But thanks to Simon Dinger and FS effort, I would say that the text book was a lot to put in practice. I could not have used their scientific methods but kept it simple and fully agree with that estimated 130 knots and something. It’s an average speed which means the 320 would probably still be around 140 kt or more when it appears on tape, which could mean a VERY late touchdown … (?)

If it is confirmed that the flaps on the crash site were at a different setting than FULL, I would also opt for PJ2 explanation, even if it’s not an Airbus procedure.
I just hope the guy, in the rush, does not mix the handles … and retract the speed brakes in the same time !?

Vital to some, obviously not to others, taking into account all of the safe operations throughout the world on the Airbus
A final word for Dream Land, I won’t bother you any longer with this stuff in this specific thread after that. There is a multitude of incident reports available dealing directly or not so directly to the Airbus sidestick philosophy, maybe I pay too much attention to them, but maybe you ignore them too much (?)
My personal message and do whatever you like with it: Don’t be surprised one day … to be surprised
Have a safe flight !

[NARVAL]

Of course the reason they changed to 15 knots at Costa Rica was too many flights couldn't circle because of those typical low clouds so flight were diverting.

The maximum tailwind acceptable for the A320 is, to my knowledge, 10 knots. That comes from the Airbus FCOM, and it has been demonstrated and approved. One must remember that it can be with normal flight controls or with the so-called "direct law". The flare on this type of aircraft is a very computed matter with electric flight controls, aside from the increased landing distance due to tailwinds. If a company choses to exceed those limitations with that type of aircraft I do not think Airbus would approve, if asked...After that of course, the captain may decide to do what he thinks best in a difficult situation, but it crtainly should not be allowed on a day to day basis. The A320 is not a 737...

[Lemurian]

You don't know what you're talking about, either about the 'Bus flight controls or on the wind limitations.
15 kt is indeed an Airbus-com-DGAC approved tailwind limit used by Air France for airplanes serving the Corsican airports. Enough said on that.
As you wrote, the 737 is no A320.

[alf5071h]

CONF iture Re “To obey this figure, the crew knows he has, in this especially challenging environment, to proceed to a text book landing and deceleration. It provides only 250 "extra" meters …”
If you mean that there is some other approved landing technique which can improve the landing performance then you are mistaken.
A ‘text book’ landing is what should always be aimed for on every landing and it would not require any special tricks; it provides an average ‘performance’ landing. Attempting to land from a low threshold crossing height, landing ‘short’ or at low speed will inevitable break the rules and increase risk.

Re “Once airborne, the crew can eventually discard the factored distance.”
No, why should they. Factored distances are a requirement for good purpose – to maintain the required level of safety – the additions are safety factors not multiples of distance to be traded or ignored.
A wet landing distance (factored or unfactored) is based on ‘standard’ data. There are assumptions about runway friction, which in this instance appear to be much less due to recent heavy rain and/or a ‘slippery’ surface from newly laid asphalt. In addition, landing data takes account of the wind; in a tailwind this is factored by 150%. If wind measurement or assessment is incorrect, or there are sudden wind changes then the data is in error – 150% error; thus tailwind operations have greater risk.

Don’t forget that the speed estimates from the video relate to ground speed; so far there is no public information on either airspeed or wind speed, thus an apparent ‘fast’ landing could be due to either aircraft handling or wind speed.

[bubbers44]

Landing with a 10 knot tailwind on 02 at TGU is fine if your landing performance says you can. We had a company imposed 5 knot restriction. I know we couldn't have landed that day on 02 with a 5 knot tailwind w
et. We probably couldn't have landed with a 5 knot headwind wet. One day at Miami the agents were denying boarding to passengers and a jump seater when I got to the gate. They said the runway was wet so 25 passengers were not going to get on th

[bubbers44]

the flight. I talked to dispatch and it was a typical day of chance of showers so changed it to dry landing and got everybody on and all was fine. Everybody treated TGU differently because it required experience with the operation to know how it normally worked. As I said before I never had a bad experience flying in there hundreds of times but they all were different.
Do not know what made the first message glitch.

[Dream Land]

A final word for Dream Land Have a safe flight ! Thanks CONF iture, happy landings.

Have looked at the video several times, hard to really tell, but it looks to me like the nose wheel is just starting to touch down in the beginning. :confused:

[NARVAL]

Lemurian try to be civilized in your posts. Aibus does not approve 15 knots. As for Corsican airports it is Calvi only, for take-off, not landing. You are peremptory but sadly out of knowledge (for your information I flew Calvi for years with the 320 and I worked with Airbus very closely too).

[bubbers44]

Lemurian,

I think you asked about landing weights wet. I just downloaded the chart we used. For rwy 02 wet max landing wt was 182,800 with zero wind, 162,800with a 5 knot tailwind. Our typical landing weight there was 185,000 to 198,000 depending on pax and fuel. 198 K was structural mlw. You can see a 10 knot tailwind wet would not be possible. Landing on 20 wet with a 5 knot tailwind was about 184,000 pounds. No restrictions with zero wind.

[J.O.]

Narval:

Just because your particluar FCOM says that 10 kts is the maximum tailwind doesn't make it so for all. Airbus does indeed approve 15 kt tailwinds for some A320s. We recently operated some leased A320s that had the 15 kt limit in the Airbus-provided FCOM Vol 3. Two of them were approved for 15 kts for both takeoff and landing, and one of them was approved for 15 kts for takeoff only.

[Uber05]

Narval,

I know that a local italian airline has a special performance on A319s which allows to land in Florence ( LIRQ ) with 15kt tailwind. If I remeber it has something to do with a modification on flight controls software regarding both ailerons raising up several degrees after touch down, partially acting as spoilers.

Uber

[CONF iture]

No Alf, I didn’t mean or suggest using any "special tricks" to shorten a landing distance.
My choice of words was maybe not appropriate, my apology.

The idea was: If you want to meet that figure of 1400 meters Actual Landing Distance extracted from the performance chart (considering the parameters are accurate), you need to be by the book in every aspect, for example crossing the threshold at 50 feet not 100, also being at VLS not VLS + 5 and all the remaining …

I’ve seen you’re interested in that subject, so you know very well that such landing requires first a good preparation and second a stabilized approach.
But to be able to produce a stabilized approach in TUG in these conditions of visibility and tailwind is probably (I think) impossible.

Factored distances are a requirement for good purpose
Absolutely correct !

But … (you know all that but maybe some will be interested to read …) Factored distances Required Landing Distance which include a supplemental 60% factor over Actual Landing Distance exist first for planning purpose (during pre flight preparation), even better if you can still benefit from them once airborne but you don't have that luxury all the time.
That’s why, in flight, we use some In Flight Performance Chart which produce only Actual Landing Distance (No factor No margin NADA just pure performance) That distance is a MINIMUM below which you don’t expect to stop. You can reach that minimum figure only if you’re able to follow the procedure by the book. You’re legal to attempt the landing but in any doubt during the process … just go-around !

For TA390, considering the given parameters as well as the estimated ones, the supplemental factor was below … 20% and that’s without counting the negative slope and the CAUTION "touchdown zones extremely slippery when wet"
It still does not mean it was the reason for the overrun but to me the crew was a bit "optimistic"

Alf, Airbus agrees with all your considerations:
A slippery Rwy is the most common reason for overrun at landing.
The combination of a slippery Rwy and a factor such as tailwind or an increase in approach speed should be avoided
You’re just going a bit strongly on the tailwind factor. The perf chart I have in hand says a correction factor of +20% per 10 kt tailwind on a wet Rwy.

[NARVAL]

JO and Uber05 thank you for that (new for me ) information. As I tried to explain, the tailwind not only adds to the landing or take-off distance but it "interferes" with the flight laws which deal with flare. If 15 wind is allowed then as you say the aircraft has been modified. This does not I think make it a safe process. One should be very thoughtful when considering a landing with that tailwind as the limitation has been upgraded only to please the company...but after leaving the runway in a catastrophic manner it is the captain who deals with the justice...

[alf5071h]

Thanks for the clarification CONF iture.

Re good preparation and second a stabilized approach; I agree the need, but as to achieving a stabilized approach at TUG in a tailwind, this should be possible - if the aircraft cannot be stabilised in the conditions then perhaps the approach should not be flown.

Re landing distances. I have not used actual landing distance in the way that you state; I only used factored distances, which in my interpretation of (old) JAR-OPS applied at all times except in an emergency.
The problem of promoting (using) unfactored distances in flight is that the need to add a factor before landing opens opportunity for error. Crews may only add a minimum factor without full consideration of all of the conditions, i.e. how wet is wet (damp – 2.9 mm), is the runway highly porous / grooved, or slick / rubber contaminated. At the low friction end of performance, a factor of 2.2 -2.4 might be required to achieve an equivalent safety level as dry operations (TC Research).

Re Tailwinds; the formulation of the landing distance requires 150% - see CS 25 / FAR 25.

One of the problems in this accident, and in previous, is exactly ‘what do we teach plots?’ This question could be extended to operator’s and airport managements. Lack of knowledge, both that originating from prior training and at the time of the event, are reappearing factors.

[Expressflight]

CONF iture

Surely it is incorrect to say that unfactored LDAs can be used within JAR-OPS legislated operations?

In an emergency, perhaps, but not in the course of normal line flying which is what you seem to be suggesting.

[kwick]

Checking on some previous information from Flight Global, http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/06/02/224383/pictures.html, I can see that the captain had accumulated over 11,000 hours flight time. For some reason, I assume that these hours were not all accumulated moving a sidestick. I recall post nbr. 85., which mentions the following:

"As can be seen from these notes, changing to the A319/A320/A321 or A330 from other types (other than A340) will require some change of operational philosophy. These aircraft can be flown precisely and smoothly with little effort, and can, therefore, create a sense of considerable satisfaction. However, under extreme conditions when, for example, severe weather and abnormalities combine, it is most important to be aware of the differences. Under stress, reversion to certain well-ingrained pilot instincts, such as riding the controls, is not helpful in any fly-by-wire aircraft."

I agree with all coments that say it will be very important to receive the actual information from the FDRs and CVRs for a correct analysis, but in the meantime we all can think of things that could happen to that particular flight and suppose our own what ifs.

Just read on a newspaper from Honduras that the orange black boxes readouts would be available next week, who knows if that is right.

Also found the following, they say a recreation of the TACA 390 landing:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdQDxuJHifc

[CONF iture]

Surely it is incorrect to say that unfactored LDAs can be used within JAR-OPS legislated operations?
In an emergency, perhaps, but not in the course of normal line flying which is what you seem to be suggesting
You and Alf bring up an interesting point.

I must admit I’m not able to positively confirm my position and don’t have at hand all the necessary documentation.
JAR-OPS as I believe any other country or joint countries regulation follow ICAO directives included in Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft
But "ICAO Standards do not preclude the development of national standards which may be more stringent than those contained in the Annex" So, differences may exist.

For sure, as both of you mentioned, in case of an emergency, the concept of Required Landing Distance no longer applies, but it’s also the case "for an aircraft system failure occurring in flight and affecting the landing performance" ref. FCOM, and many aircraft system failures occurring in flight are not emergencies.

Now, if I refer to the normal operation, it’s not exceptional especially during winter that a runway condition deteriorates. The procedure is simply to assess the landing distance based on the actual conditions. The charts used in flight provide only Actual Landing Distance and don’t make mention of any rule to add a percentage factor.
The only notes are:
The provided distances are given for use in flight
No margin is included in this distance
So, the BIG factor is … Pilot Judgment – Correct Assessment of the Situation – Decision Making !

But I agree, don’t push your luck.
Even there, whatever your percentage factor, from nil to 100%, if you overrun, your FDR CVR will be … Analyzed !

Re good preparation and second a stabilized approach; I agree the need, but as to achieving a stabilized approach at TUG in a tailwind, this should be possible - if the aircraft cannot be stabilised in the conditions then perhaps the approach should not be flown
Thanks to Utube I’ve seen now a few approaches there from the flight deck, and it seems to be a regular occurrence to hear the "SINK RATE" GPWS CAUTION in very short final.
I don’t know what kind of rate of descent it can represent especially with a tailwind, but anywhere else it would be a criteria of unstabilized approach and probable associated GA, but in TGU it’s almost like a requirement.

I had a look at your reference "CS 25 / FAR 25" and all I could see was:
The landing distance data must include correction factors for not more than 50 percent of the nominal wind components along the landing path opposite to the direction of landing, and not less than 150 percent of the nominal wind components along the landing path in the direction of landing
To be honest, I’m not sure what it means … Regulations are sometimes obscures not to say most of the time, at least for me.
But from the ICAO documentation, I’ve found the following reference, which makes more sense:
When calculating the landing weight in accordance with paragraph (b), the certificate holder shall take account of not more than 50% of the reported headwind component or not less than 150% of the reported tailwind component
The way I understand it is:
If the forecast tailwind for arrival time is 10kt the dispatch should calculate the Requested Landing Distance with a tailwind of 15kt …

[bubbers44]

I haven't been able to download an A320 landing distance chart. What is the landing distance at 3300 ft elevation, wet and 1% downslope at 62 and 60 tons? I think 22 celsius was the temp. Thanks. They had 5410 ft on 02.

[kwick]

Bubbers, this is what I received for Toncontin weather information:

MHTG 301500Z 19004KT 2000S -DZ FEW008 BKN020 OCV080 21/19 Q1016 2KM S SW WSW D/C 8KM PCPN CL HZ

MHTG 301600Z 20009KT 3000SW -DZ FEW006 BKN020 OVC080 22/20 Q1017 3KM SW WSW W 8KM CTE E PCPN CL D/C UNL HZ

[bubbers44]

Thanks qwick. At 22 C and the tower reported 10 knot tailwind would someone kindly please look up the actual and required landing distance? Our B757 charts are very conservative so must be required landing distance and only go to a 5 knot tailwind. I think the downslope of 1% is an important factor.

[Lemurian]

Here is the FCOM extract :

"LDA = Landing distance available : 1650 m

Baseline calculation : LW = 60 T ; RWY wet ; 5 kt tailwind : 1,352 m
(1110m + 10% altitude correction, 10.5% tailwind correction and -3% for operating reversers ).
According to these figures, the aircraft dispatch was legal.

Now I calculated the maximum allowable weight in these conditions and I found 68 T, quite a hefty margin, it seems.

It is now time to look into the influence of the 10 kt tailwind : a whopping 21 % ! and in this case a landing weight of 66 t was allowed.

Our landing distance at 60 t and 10 kt tailwind now comes to 1,472 m"
There is no correction for runway slope (which really surprised me ! ).

But now, out of the QRH, this is the in Flight performance for required runway length. still at 60T:
"In-Flight performance tables,
Considering an airport elevation of 3,300 ft and a wet runway. And a landing weight of 60 tons.
Base line : Landing runway length required : 1640 m
to which the following corrections apply :
Altitude : 3% per 1000 ft ---> 10%
Tailwind : 21%
Operating reversers : - 8%
Vapp = Vls : - 3%

Total correction : 20% ---> 328 m

So the *required runway length* for these conditions is 1640 + 328 = 1,968 m


Touch-down speed
Still from the tables and at LW = 60,000 kg...---> 130 kt which translates into a 140 kt TAS or 258 km/hr a ten knot tailwind makes it a groundspeed of 276 km/h.


Approach conditions :
Weather conditions : Ceiling (broken) reported at 2,000 ft over the field, few clouds as low as 6 to 800 ft.
Visibility is 2,000 m, which is regarded as poor.
Wind is 190° at ten knots, straight down runway 02.
The *circling* approach on 02 consists on a descent on the Runway 19 VOR approach, gear and flaps down (config 2 or full depending on airline SOP) down to 6,000 ft, then then open some 45° right in order to join the visual circuit for RWY 02 west of the airport.
The least we could say is that the *circling* (equivalent Spanish is "circular" ) conditions at that moment were marginal, both in terms of visibility and ceiling.


Approach visual geometry from the cockpit : Info from both the videos available on the net and some thoughts from pilots with experience on TGU :
They will give you a pretty good idea of a tunnel vision in low visibility . One thing is doing this approach in CAVOK conditions when a general vista of the relief and the landscape is given to you, another is just being able - and concentrating on - seeing just about 20 seconds worth of flight in front of you. The notion of horizontal and vertical become rather academic and even more so when your final path follows a downward slope toward the runway. The tendency to be high is fierce.


Some picture interpretation
The speed at which the airplane came to the road and the embankment, especially considering that it had first to drop some 20 m down that cliff at the end of the runway shouldn't have been very high. The TAM 320 was completely destroyed at an estimated ground speed of 90 kt.
The port smoking brakes seem to bear the indications of some wheel braking (did it start the fire we see in the first video ? )


Some aspects of FH
That crew was very aware of the conditions and the initial decision to try for Runway 02 had the wind been less than 10 kt is reasonable. Some twenty minutes later, a 10 kt tailwind becomes acceptable but they were at that time beginning to pile the odds against them. My question is " Why ?". On the ATC tape, the pilot sounded very sure and sharp."

Your thoughts, now Bubbers !

[bubbers44]

Lemurian

No adjustment for a 1% downslope really surprises me. Our charts as I said before allow us to land wet runway on 20 at max landing weight uphill. We have 700 feet more usable with no wind and at 187,000 with a 5 knot tailwind. Landing on 02 we are down to 162,800 with a 5 knot tailwind. Yes, 20 has 700 ft more usable than 02 but airplanes are just airplanes. Airbus must have slope charts.

Even without the 1% slope correction they couldn't land on 02 with a 10 knot tailwind legally using your calculations. I landed at TGU, one day from when hurricane Mitch hit Honduras. The runway was wet and they cleared me to land on 02 with a direct crosswind. I elected to change to 20 because of the upslope and extra 700 feet. They will let you land on any runway you want to if you ask. I know Taca had trouble maneuvering to 20 on the first approach so got pressured into landing downwind to get the job done. Our company has a transcript of the ATC tapes and both approaches were to 02, not like the transcript here saying the first was to 20. Coming from San Salvador I couldn't figure out why they would fly north of the field to start the approach.

My take is they wanted to land with a 5 knot tailwind on 02 to get in and pressed it too hard when it went to 10 knots. It is easy to do.

[Hiflyer1757]

Question was asked upthread.....basically you have to get security, communications, navaids, facilities, and ground equipment in there. 60 days will be pushing it. Yes it is a current air base but that does not mean terminals. claim areas, customs, and all the rest.... Suspect at one point moving the ground equipment from one to the other will be an interesting parade.

[bubbers44]

They have already started the process. I don't see any additional flights into San Pedro Sula. What a shame they are closing TGU down to major airlines. It was the only fun airport left.

[airfoilmod]

You show a landing speed of 130 knots, if that is ground speed shouldn't their AS be 120 knots (With a ten knot tailwind?)

[bubbers44]

Approach speeds are IAS. He said the TAS was 140 knots. Ground speed with tailwind was probably 150 knots.

[CONF iture]

No adjustment for a 1% downslope really surprises me
Lemurian is correct, and that's kind of bizarre, a few serial numbers though, show a correction for slope (per 1% downhill add 8% - per 1% uphill substract 3%) but most don't show anything ... Could it be a special request from some Operators or Regulators ... ?

kwick, by any chance would you have the available forecast at the time the crew received its pre-flight briefing from dispatch ?
That document would tell us what was the possible plan for the arrival time according to wind and runway condition ?


"LDA = Landing distance available : 1650 m

Baseline calculation : LW = 60 T ; RWY wet ; 5 kt tailwind : 1,352 m
(1110m + 10% altitude correction, 10.5% tailwind correction and -3% for operating reversers ).
According to these figures, the aircraft dispatch was legal.

Now I calculated the maximum allowable weight in these conditions and I found 68 T, quite a hefty margin, it seems.

It is now time to look into the influence of the 10 kt tailwind : a whopping 21 % ! and in this case a landing weight of 66 t was allowed.

Our landing distance at 60 t and 10 kt tailwind now comes to 1,472 m"
There is no correction for runway slope (which really surprised me ! ).

But now, out of the QRH, this is the in Flight performance for required runway length. still at 60T:
"In-Flight performance tables,
Considering an airport elevation of 3,300 ft and a wet runway. And a landing weight of 60 tons.
Base line : Landing runway length required : 1640 m
to which the following corrections apply :
Altitude : 3% per 1000 ft ---> 10%
Tailwind : 21%
Operating reversers : - 8%
Vapp = Vls : - 3%

Total correction : 20% ---> 328 m

So the *required runway length* for these conditions is 1640 + 328 = 1,968 m

To me, it seems to be a bit of confusion here ... I don't know what you calculate and how you do it (?) but it was certaily not legal to dispatch that 320 at 60 tonnes for Rwy 02 wet and 5kt tailwind.
Would it be possible for you to attach the perf charts you're using ? (does not matter if they're not for V2500 engines)

[bubbers44]

With the aircraft with the 1% downslope charts the landing distance that day was then 2,125 m. Available was 1640 m. Same airplane, different charts, right? I know we could not have attempted this landing in the B757. That is why I have been asking how can the A320 do it.

[bubbers44]

Thank you Lemurian and CONF iture for the data. It makes more sense now. I loved flying into TGU and hope it opens up again to major airlines. It required paying attention to details. It wasn't for everybody but I loved it.

[CONF iture]

To resume:
For a 320 at an estimated 60 tonnes landing weight on a WET Rwy 02

- In terms of dispatch Required Landing Distance zero wind was the limit.
- In terms of realisation Actual Landing Distance 10kt tailwind was still ... "attemptable" even with an 8% downhill penalty, but with virtually NO MARGIN !

Strongreslve rightfully made mention of the DAMP comment by ATC. That could have had an influence on the crew decision making as for Airbus, in terms of performance factor, DAMP is in the same category as DRY.
BUT, to me, that comment came very late in the Rwy02 approach process and the crew had probably already made its mind for a WET runway (?)
According to the video, that comment will be very much questionable …

bubbers44, what is the downhill correction for 757 ?

[bubbers44]

My flight bag got underwater in hurricane Wilma so I have no access to any charts since I retired. Our 02 landing data was very conservative and had to have the 1% downslope included. The lowest number for runway length charts was exactly what 02 was from the displaced threshold. We couldn't throw in 5 knots for the children because then you could not land some days. My earlier post about the 25,000 pound advantage shows slope made a difference. 700 ft additional runway on 20 would not get you that much additional weight alone. We flew a safe approach into TGU using these charts and never had a problem. If Taca can justify landing under these conditions then TGU was unsafe. If they can't TGU was safe only if you followed company procedures.

[kwick]

Something interesting, from El Heraldo newspaper:
http://www.heraldohn.com/ez/index.php/plain_site_user/ediciones/2008/06/14/la_pista_de_toncontin_no_fue_la_responsable (http://www.heraldohn.com/ez/index.php/plain_site_user/ediciones/2008/06/14/la_pista_de_toncontin_no_fue_la_responsable)
Toncontin runway was not responsible
International experts in the field of pavement find that asphalt is in optimal conditions and ruled out that it provoked the accident

In the article it mentions that Toncontin runway is O.K. They made various friction tests with a vehicle equipped with special equipment certified by the FAA that has additional tires and water pumps to simulate an aircraft landing on a wet runway for adherence. It was found that the runway is in optimum conditions and much better than some other runways in the area.

As always, hope the transcripts will provide some light at the end of the tunnel. It is dark yet, and I would like to reserve my comments on this runway report.

[rc330jj]

Dear RWA,


An extract from the A320's FCTM, complementing your info from the FCOM:

FLARE
The objectives of the lateral and directional control of the aircraft during the flare
are:
-- To land on the centerline
-- And, to minimize the loads on the main landing gear.
During the flare, rudder should be applied as required to align the aircraft with
the runway heading. Any tendency to drift downwind should be counteracted by
an appropriate input on the sidestick.
In the case of a very strong cross wind, the aircraft may be landed with a
residual drift (maximum 5°) to prevent an excessive bank (maximum 5°).
Consequently, combination of the partial de-crab and wing down techniques may
be required.


Just like any other aircraft...

Greetings!

[RWA]

Hi, rc330jj, welcome to the forum.

In the case of a very strong cross wind, the aircraft may be landed with a residual drift (maximum 5°) to prevent an excessive bank (maximum 5°).


I've made no secret of the fact that most of my flying has been very much of the 'seat of the pants' variety. But please educate me as to how (at the critical flaring stage) I could make certain sure that I had only applied a maximum bank angle of 5 degrees? Especially in an A320, that provides no 'feedback' on the sidestick? And PLEASE don't say 'by looking at the indicator on the panel'.......... in my limited experience you simply can't afford to spend time doing that in the flare in any sort of difficult landing, and anyway there's a 'lag' in the instruments?

Just like any other aircraft...

Not in any aeroplane that I've ever had the privilege of flying. In my own experience (admittedly limited) you apply as much bank and rudder as your eyes and ears and instincts and judgement (and your 'backside') 'tell' you to apply? You certainly don't have somehow to ensure that you don't exceed a bank angle of 5%?

Not, IMHO, in any properly-designed aeroplane, anyway..... :)

[bubbers44]

Toncontin airport can not let airliners land with 10 knot tailwinds on runway 02. It is unsafe as has been proven. If the charts for that 02 approach with 1 % downslope wet is correct they needed 500 more meters of runway. Why US carriers were restricted and Taca was not is a big question. I think Honduras must be embarassed not letting any commercial major airliners land there at their capital because their own airline had two incidents in the last 10 years and we haven't had any accidents. We can't land with tailwinds unless the runway is dry and never more than 5 knots.

[rc330jj]

Hi RWA,
First of all, all I intended with the previous post was to demystify a little bit of what is widely said about the airbus' flight controls.
I believe your experience is right, at that stage of the flight(Flare),I do too just look outside and use the same "backside feel" that you do.To watch the instruments at that point,and make "Standard Calls" to alert you ,is a PNF duty.In any case,the limits that extract was "talking" about, regard strong crosswinds,that , according to another text from airbus, are x-winds in excess of 20 kt,i.e. pretty close to the aircraft limitation.

Note [Airbus recommended technique]:
During the flare, rudder should be applied as required to align the aircraft with the runway heading. Any tendency to roll downwind should be counteracted by an appropriate input on the sidestick (or control column, as applicable).

With higher crosswind (typically above 15 kt to 20 kt crosswind component), a safe crosswind landing requires:
A crabbed-approach, and
A partial decrab prior to touchdown, using a combination of bank angle and crab angle (achieved by applying cross-controls).
On most Airbus models, this requires touching down with:
Maximum 5 degrees of crab angle, and
Maximum 5 degrees of bank angle.

Cutting to the point, since I don't want to bore you guys with these details,I believe the airbus can be flown just like any other aircraft(At least I have always used these same flying techniques),respecting its published limits.
I believe that the problem resides on what Bubbers44(I couldn't agree more) pointed out in his last post:
Restrictions should be applied by operators and regulators in certain extreme conditions,mainly in critical airports(e.g.:no landing allowed on a short wet rwy with any tailwind).I guess ,IMHO, this was the main factor on the A320's accidents/incidents we've been talking about on this thread.A safety-minded Company policy and strict adherence to it can prevent the accidents, it's not about the aircraft type!

P.S. :sorry for the long post!

[kwick]

This was extracted from the FAA, SAFO (Safety Alert for Operators) number 07007, dated 9/17/2007, applicable to Airbus 318, 319, 320, 321 series airplanes.

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2007/SAFO07007.pdf (http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2007/SAFO07007.pdf)
(recommended reading, maybe for discussion)

"Pilots should select an appropriate autobrake level for landing in accordance with operator-specific procedures".

Per bubbers44 last post, finally someone should be responsible if landing under some "non-normal" conditions was approved at any time. As we can see, and it reinforces the idea of not overruling or putting extreme pressure on the operator in such a way that the authority runs the business, the authorities leave some part of the homework to the operator, in order to develop procedures according to their organization and other matters (experience and safety included)

[Lemurian]

But please educate me as to how (at the critical flaring stage) I could make certain sure that I had only applied a maximum bank angle of 5 degrees?
On an airliner, except the very few which have a very flat instrument cap - a la Tristar -, it is wise to give the PFD and especially the artificial horizon a quick look in order to make sure one's wings are level.
Seat-of-the-pants flying doesn't apply any more here.
Especially in an A320, that provides no 'feedback' on the sidestick? And PLEASE don't say 'by looking at the indicator on the panel'.
You are confusing a lot of things here : your controls position, be they a yoke, a stick or an FBW sidestick will not give you ANY indication on your aircraft attitude : it will come only from a glance at your PFD.
in my limited experience you simply can't afford to spend time doing that in the flare in any sort of difficult landing, and anyway there's a 'lag' in the instruments?

Oh yes, but you do ! And there is no time lag that you could measure in tenths of a second (moden instruments depend on electrons...which are faster than your neurons / synaptic connections !
Face it, flying a jet has very little to do with visual cub piloting...We are as a matter of fact always on instruments at diverse degrees...we've replaced the *relative nose / horizon* position of the light aircraft with a more accurate re-construction of the outside world... Part of being a jet pilot, I would guess and actually, the PFD is always in our line of vision and scanning it is an acquired technique...A second nature.
You certainly don't have somehow to ensure that you don't exceed a bank angle of 5%?

On most jets, these 5° are about the limits you'll have to respect if you value the bars on your shoulders...they represent your protection from a pod strike, hence the important value of a final glance at the flare.

[kwick]

Here we can see an Airbus 319 doing a touch and go in Toncontin. Sure, it is hard to tell if it has passengers or cargo or nothing inside, but anyway it can do it, getting back in the air from the asphalt in that short runway.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRoms_Ivedk

[bubbers44]

Why would anybody attempt a touch and go landing at TGU in an Airbus? They obviously planned it because the touchdown was right on the threshold. Maybe their attitude about this critical airport had something to do with the crash. If they practiced touch and go landings a 10 knot tailwind wet full stop landing should be a piece of cake.

[bubbers44]

Lemurian,

Once again we disagree. RWA said on a difficult landing you don't have time to look at your panel for bank angle. I agree with him. I only glance at airspeed because bank angle is most accurate looking out the window. You only have so many brain cells to tell you what to do so I try not to waste any looking at secondary information that is already there. I have never looked at my panel once in landing to see what my bank angle was. No dinged wingtips or pods yet. I can't try your system because they made me retire at 60.

[Lemurian]

It will be boring to see the day we'd agree on everything :).
As I said, especially on a x-wind landing and places where you don't have a clear "horizon", a quick glance at your attitrude (how long does it take ? A blink ) to make sure your wings are level is the wise move.
On a 747 for instance, it's really important, as a wing flex on the always possible hard landing will get that outside engine pod that closer to the runway surface. The top of the instrument panel , again exception of a very few airplanes like the L-1011 are not a reliable reference.
Sorry that's how I've been flying, taught and practised...and I don't believe in seat-of-the-pants jet flying...on any airliner (and I've flown a few...)

On an other subject, the FCOM tables do not include runway slope...but the performance book for each airport, runway, obstacle, one-engine failure trajectory, etc... include all the data. The procedure is to ask for the print-out whether by fax from the station or via ACARS.

[RWA]

You are confusing a lot of things here : your controls position, be they a yoke, a stick or an FBW sidestick will not give you ANY indication on your aircraft attitude : it will come only from a glance at your PFD.

Of course I'm 'confused,' Lemurian. I've never flown an airliner, leave alone a jet. And nowadays (eye injury) I'm the lowest form of aviation life - a mere fare-paying passenger. :)

But as far as I know, there is a pretty fundamental difference between Airbuses and any other sort of aeroplane.

Describing in words how you fly an aeroplane is notoriously difficult. It's like trying to describe in words how you ride a bicycle. But in the sort of aircraft I was used to, to bank slightly into wind, I'd have applied pressure to the yoke (mere 'stick' sometimes) and also a touch of opposite rudder until my eyes - and the seat of my pants - told me that I'd managed to eliminate all or most of any drift.

Then I'd have increased or decreased the pressure on the controls as necessary to hold that attitude and direction as accurately as I possibly could until I heard that lovely rumbling sound.....ideally achieving one of those (for me. rarer than I'd have liked :)) landings with no bounce at all. Or a nice continuous reassuring 'scrape and bump' if I happened to be flying a sailplane... :)

As I understand the Airbus systems, moving the sidestick commands not a control surface position but a 'roll rate.' So, flying one of those, I'd have had to learn a totally-different technique. As far as I know, from reading, it's necessary to 'bump in' some bank, and then centre the sidestick. If that's enough, fine - but if it's NOT enough, I'd have to 'bump' the stick a bit more. If it's too much, I'd have to 'bump' the stick a bit in the opposite direction, to reduce the commanded 'roll rate.'

As to the risk of 'engine strike,' that possibility had occurred to me. But I concluded that, if a mere 5 degrees of bank was enough to cause an engine strike, all Airbuses would be spending more time in the hangar getting engine changes than they did in service. There HAS to be another reason for the 5-degree limit......

And, as Bubbers44 said, my priority when landing was ALWAYS airspeed. Especially when gliding. In my experience (right or wrong) the wrong airspeed (either way) is more 'life-threatening' than attitude will ever be.

OK - 'Fire when ready.' But please don't just keep saying that I'm 'getting it wrong.' I admit that I'm almost certainly 'getting it wrong' - some of it, at the least. But that's why I'm asking the people who actually do the job......

[JuniorMan]

This may have been posted already; but if not, it will give you an idea of what the approach into TGU entails.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_z5HtME9n8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QNb8x1_vKc

1) American 757
2) Continental 737

[Lemurian]

Of course I'm 'confused,' Lemurian.
That was in response to your :But please educate me as to how (at the critical flaring stage) I could make certain sure that I had only applied a maximum bank angle of 5 degrees? Especially in an A320, that provides no 'feedback' on the sidestick? And PLEASE don't say 'by looking at the indicator on the panel'..........
The feedback you seem to be talking about could well be on a perfectly ball-centered flying having your yoke put in the direction opposite to your turn.
So, in fact the *feedback* you'd be looking for is the position you'd want your aircraft to be at compared to where it is now. Correct ?
In all these cases, you'd just move your controls, be they yoke, stick or sidestick in order to achieve the desired result and you do not need to be a genius to fly a 'Bus. And forget all the shat about roll rates and so on...just pilot the damn thing and keep things simple.
Try and find a 737 landing vid from the cockpit and put the volume on full : you'd hear the click-clicks of the yoke that has a rather large neutral point (and CWS engagement, too, if IIRC). Would you still base your attitude estimation on those very poor references ?
As for the 5° limitation, they are quite all-encompassing of every airliner I have flown, the one where it was the most important was the 744 and it has to do with the geometry of the airplanes. Don't look for extraterrrestrial gremlins here.
my priority when landing was ALWAYS airspeed. Especially when gliding. In my experience (right or wrong) the wrong airspeed (either way) is more 'life-threatening' than attitude will ever be.

So, you have time to read your ASI but not your PFD, right ? Especially on a glass instrument panel, I find that rather strange (unless of course, you can determine your airspeed by the sound of the airstream in your wires...).

What really annoys me is people who have a bias, for or against and as a corollary, an agenda.
Prejudice is no argument .

[airfoilmod]

In each exchange re: AB & B, I've noticed a lean. It is generally subtle, though not always, and involves, I think a slightly different "approach" to flying. Bus adherents seem to be planted in a circle that tends toward automated, equipment dependent aviating. Boeing pilots, Stick and Rudder. The tipoff in the Bus argument is that peeping at the panel on very short final is preferable to peeking at the wingtip, or Horizon. One is left with the impression that Bus pilots think the trend is better when it favors CATIII autoland, Boeing pilots, see and react. There is no doubt in my mind that Piloting each type requires a different style.

Airfoil

[DozyWannabe]

Funny, 'cos my experience of the posters on here is that there are automation fans and stick-and-rudder folk flying both manufacturer's aircraft. It's true that some pilots prefer the less cluttered AB flight deck arrangement and choose to fly AB as a result and others who prefer the denser, more hands on B design, but to say that the former are automation junkies (and indirectly knocking their stick and rudder skills as a result), or that the latter are more hands-on stick-and-rudder guys (and possibly implying an old-fashioned mindset in the process) is a gross overgeneralisation and a disservice to pilots of both.

Case in point, one of the most stalwart of the old guard on here (to the extent that he sometimes rubs people the wrong way) was flying the most technologically advanced aircraft of his generation and still has a great affection for it to this day. I bet he'd have something to say if you reckoned he was an automation junkie.

[CONF iture]

Face it, flying a jet has very little to do with visual cub piloting...
Part of being a jet pilot, I would guess and actually, the PFD is always in our line of vision and scanning it is an acquired technique...A second nature

Lemurian, I was a bit intrigued by your way to handle your performance books … but I must say you put yourself in a very special category here …

Are you flying single pilot Lemurian ?
Because the guy on your side is a Monitoring Pilot, his job is to monitor you and as part of your Standard Operation Procedures he should call you if your BANK or PITCH are approaching the limits.

During flare, I'm afraid, it is not time to look anywhere else … than outside !

Is there really a need to add anything to here (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=4185345&postcount=240) ... or to the following:
But in the sort of aircraft I was used to, to bank slightly into wind, I'd have applied pressure to the yoke (mere 'stick' sometimes) and also a touch of opposite rudder until my eyes - and the seat of my pants - told me that I'd managed to eliminate all or most of any drift


Lemurian, would you recognize these words ?
In order to assess the rate of descent in the flare, and the aircraft position relative to the ground, look well ahead of the aircraft

During the flare, the pilot should not concentrate on the airspeed, but only on the attitude with external cues
Specific PM call outs have been reinforced for excessive pitch attitude at landing
They are part of your Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual ...

[DozyWannabe]

But CONF, the monitoring pilot should be able to tell you that either via external cue or the instrument panel without needing to feel the stick or yoke. And indeed, with your second paragraph, the Airbus manual is corroborating Lemurian's point, regarding airspeed at any rate.

[Lemurian]

Things would be wonderfully simpler if they were that way.
Unfortunately, they are not and you still see the stick-and-rudder pilot on a 'Bus -and with a very accurate flying at that. and you can also see the *operator* (vs handler) in other types.
That sort of vocabulary was in effect long before the 320 first flight.
What is at stake here is plain biased thinking, as if to be a pilot one needed to keep the flight controls the pioneers used on their Ford Trimotor....
It's easy to see that it is just a load of buffalo crap : when B introduces new features, you wouldn't hear a pip (best example is the anti tail strike twitching on the 777, have you heard anyone on this forum protesting that it took his flying skills away ?)
As for looking at the wing tips, you're quite welcome to try that technique on a swept-wing jet...and the top of instrument panels are not reliable for giving you an horizontal reference...and when you do not have a horizon, like in a mountanous area, or in fog or against a misty sunrise/sunset, what will be your reference for wings level ?
That's why a long time ago I was instructed to watch horizon, airspeed and ball-and-needle during the flare (that was on a DC-4, mind you...) and I've kept that technique through all my later airplanes, of which the 'Bus is only the latest in a long line and it is no different.
But it is in the minds of a lot of haters, so they yell words like *roll rate* like a magical spell...Had they just stopped to think of it, the amount of lateral yoke you'd input is just that :how fast the airplane is going to roll, then, because physics take over,a turn is initiated...the beauty of it is that you won't be normally using your rudder...
Now I ask you, where is the difference ?

[airfoilmod]

I think the responses prove my point. Within each of my statements I allowed a wide range of possible conclusions; I don't think I changed any minds, nor was I intending to. I've yet to see a truly objective position, and it cannot be because the two "types' are just too identical, and the partiality depends solely on training, or Company equipment.

Bottom line: The Hamburg incident where Captain doesn't "see" FP input a 14 degree left roll until the very best he could salvage was sparks on the runway and a shed winglet. With duplicative controls, moving in unison, same result? My feeling is no need to visit the shop. And if that is correct (it may well be wrong), one type is at least some of the time, a single seat A/C.

[DozyWannabe]

Airfoilmod - at the risk of going off topic (that incident's in another thread), as I understood it we weren't 100% sure of what caused that incident yet - I was given to understand that a considerable component of that roll was in fact a heavy gust that augmented the left roll that was input. Though in any case the question there was whether the Captain should have allowed the FO to continue that approach given the unfavourable weather.

[airfoilmod]

Point well taken. However, if the Luft Kapitan hadn't given the landing to FO, why shouldn't he? Is he concerned it's beyond her skill level? Fair enough, but if it's because he's uneasy about his ability to "I have it" instantly, we're back to the original question. And if that is the case, does that A/C not need four bars per side?

Airfoil

[DozyWannabe]

That's what the override switch on the stick is for, and if he didn't feel the need to use it before the upset occurred, it's a question only he can answer.

Should really take this discussion to the relevant thread though.