Short runway landing practice in the simulator.

[A37575]

According to the aviation correspondent of the "The Australian" newspaper, the Indonesian plane crash that left five Australians and 16 others dead last year was among 48 percent of jet aircraft accidents that took place during landing and a big percentage that involved leaving the runway. An annual safety report released by the International Air Transport Association also suggests that many of these accidents could have been prevented by a "timely go-around."

Assuming jet crews undergo regular simulator checks then it brings up the question of should simulator training specifically address factors causing overruns. From personal experience in the simulator training industry I have observed countless cases of landing long and if the "runway" had been on the limiting length dry or wet for the aircraft configuration, an overrun would certainly have been on the cards.

It is difficult not to generalise in these cases. But it is probable that most simulator sessions on type rating or recurrent training, centre around full use of automation in accordance with perceived manufacturer's recommendations for the aircraft type. Landings in the simulator are at airports selected by the airline and in most cases the runways are far in excess of the limiting length.

There is no shortage of engine failures on take off and long winded radar vectors including holding patterns preceding an engine-out landing or maybe go-around. All these no sweat with autopilot engaged and 8-10,000 ft length sealed surfaces. No problem if the surface is slippery either. LOFT exercises go for a couple of hours and may include lots of taxiing, Vnav and Lnav air-route flying accompanied by head-scratching scenarios involving poring through manuals in-flight, coupled with CRM and inter-active discussions with imagined cabin crew, ATC, company people. All very fine stuff of course. But accidents continue to happen caused by overuns on short wet runways and people get killed. And rarely are these addressed in simulator sessions.

Surely, if operators are to seriously address the overrun problem there should be greater accent given to having regular training in the simulator using a relatively short wet runway in order to fine-tune basic handling skills. This means actual hands-on flying - not an interminable automatic approach to 200 ft to a 10,000 ft runway where gross speed errors rarely cause a raised eyebrow because there is no danger of an overrun.

Landing on a runway limiting length in a strong crosswind is a good test of pilot pure flying skill. While some simulators can be programmed for a generic short runway, others may have many airports in their data base but mostly with runways far in excess of that needed for a real test of piloting skill. It should not be too hard to programme a simulator with one short runway for adverse weather landing practice.

It never ceases to amaze me that there are operators whose simulator training philosophy is to tick the boxes to meet minimum regulatory requirements, then steer clear of any sequence that smacks of something different to full use of automatics - then shake their heads in wonderment at the perceived stupidity of a crew where people get killed as a result of a poorly executed approach and landing. Simulators are wonderful tools that can provide crews with manipulative skills at no risk. No wonder an injured fore-finger is considered a no-go MEL item where automatics are concerned. :D

[barit1]

When I'm flying a light (2 tonne) aircraft, I make it a regular thing to practice short field landings. Why shouldn't the pros do likewise, if only in the sim?

[GlueBall]

But when compared to the many thousands of landings made everyday, including landings on contaminated pavements, overruns, statistically, are still rare. . . no?

Where I work, I haven't heard of anyone having left the pavement. The B74 has superlative stopping cabability. . . . even for a crew that uses less than optimum landing technique! In an emergency, for example, with max auto brake [3000psi], auto spoilers and reversers deployed, the airplane can in fact be stopped within 3500' from the point of touchdown. :ok:

[8che]

For the "pro's" there is no such thing as a short field landing technique.

There is the right technique or the wrong technique and performance issues are absolutely central in the conversion training process particularly with airline jets.

The so called short field landing discussion is prevelant in light avaition much to the surprise of authorities/professionals. The correct landing technique should always use the minimum amount of distance required.

At airline level no one should ever intentionally land long.

[exeng]

Stable approaches followed by a landing in the correct place at the correct speed will assure a safe outcome providing the runway is within the landing performance limit for the aircraft.

If the approach is not stable by the point defined in any particular airline's SOP's then a go-around must be executed. Those Pilots who persist in continuing an approach when 'unstable' are behaving irresponsibly.


Regards
Exeng

[Dualcouple]

During my 4 conversion courses and many proficiency checks in level C and D ZFTT approved simulators I think I've made only a handful of landings I'm personally satisfied with. Strangely enough I've never experienced such issues in real aircraft.

Simulator time, precious as it is, is best used for what it is most useful for. Perfecting landing technique is best learned in actual flight operations.

[Dani]

Short field landing techniques are in fact regularly exercised, planed and executed everyday in airliner's lives: You are close to your required landing length, so you choose maximum flaps, minimum speed increments and use the most useful type of approach. If you still cannot make it, you have done something wrong before and shouldn't have departed anyway.

The short runway problem anyway is rather a problem in some countries, of which Indonesia and Australia seem to be suffering more than others, something I realized after having flown there for years. In other parts of the world, especially in the western world, runways are normally pretty long, 3 to 4 km, which is enough for every type of aircraft.

It still doesn't get into my head why in these countries they use so short runways. It's clearly a lack of public infrastructure, and it would be much cheaper to have long runways than accidents. Those countries shouldn't also have problems with land ressources, something in Europe is the biggest problem with airport extensions.

Dani

[barit1]

per 8che:The so called short field landing discussion is prevelant in light avaition much to the surprise of authorities/professionals. The correct landing technique should always use the minimum amount of distance required.

Not so sure about that; I've been on final for a 8000' rw and ATC asks me to "expedite" - and the first turnoff is 3000' beyond the numbers, and I'm in a taildragger in which high-speed turnoffs have a risk all their own. In that case I'll probably use half flaps and carry a bit of power to 1000' beyond the numbers - getting me down to a reasonable taxi speed about the time I make the turnoff. Is "correct landing technique" per your definition, or per mine?

I want to satisfy ATC's request (8che's right behind me in an A380, and he'll be awful mad :ugh: if he has to go around!), but I respect my own aeroplane's limitations.

Alternate scenario: Same 8000' rw, but no close traffic, and the FBO is at the far end of the field. Why shouldn't I keep power on and fly the first 5000' at 100' altitude, then throttle back to land in the final 3000'? I'm paying for my tires & brakes, and ATC has no objection.

It's all about good judgement, eh? :ok:

[World of Tweed]

Not sure exactly to which Indonesian landing the original post is referring to but if it was the the Garuda approach into yogakarta in March 07 I think you'll find it was more his non-standard approach and excess speed leading to an unstable approach to a wet runway that caused the exit from the runway surface. Rather than any lack of so-called 'short field landing' technique!!

If I remember rightly in G.A. short field landings are to land on the numbers... do that in a 757 and you'll drag the gear through the approach lighting system!

[Dream Land]

For the "pro's" there is no such thing as a short field landing technique.

There is the right technique or the wrong technique and performance issues are absolutely central in the conversion training process particularly with airline jets.

The so called short field landing discussion is prevelant in light avaition much to the surprise of authorities/professionals. The correct landing technique should always use the minimum amount of distance required.

At airline level no one should ever intentionally land long. By 8che You have my vote, was taught many years ago to do all landings using standard procedures for best results. :ok:

[Tee Emm]

Stable approaches followed by a landing in the correct place at the correct speed will assure a safe outcome providing the runway is within the landing performance limit for the aircraft.

If the approach is not stable by the point defined in any particular airline's SOP's then a go-around must be executed. Those Pilots who persist in continuing an approach when 'unstable' are behaving irresponsibly.



In the perfect world of aviation of course no one would ever crash or overun the runway if they followed your advice and there would be no need for Pprune.

A37575 made the point that a significant number of landing accidents are overuns and how best address the problem. In the scheme of things, the total number of engine failures at V1 or, for example emergency descents, are statistically insignificant in terms of causes of accidents. Yet there is evidence these are fully addressed in simulator training.

ICAO published accident reports reveal that overuns on landing are a greater threat to safety than an engine failure at V1. Seems logical therefore that operators should include landing training on limiting runways more realistically in simulator training. Accident reports where the cause was excess speed and unstable approaches clearly indicate training is lacking. A37575 was correct to highlight this point

[point8six]

Barit1 - got it perfectly, except far too many pilots think that the judgement is about "smooth touchdowns" rather than "appropriate touchdowns".:hmm:
DANI - quite agree with you -Australia offers the short runway because of noise rather than safety- see what happens when you decline the 'offer' of the short one , for the sensible one.:ouch:

[FougaMagister]

Some do practice short-field landings on the actual aircraft: http://www.airliners.net/photo/Atlantic-Airlines/ATR-ATR-42-300(QC)/0476580&tbl=photo_info&photo_nr=1&prev_id=&next_id=NEXTID Btw, that runway is 917x23m (balanced field length)...

I too would rather do a "firm" landing in the right spot, than a smooth one way past the thouch-down zone. Then again, I have no PAX to upset ;) I can, however, think of two cases in which we land long (with tower's approval):

1/ to "expedite" landing so as to vacate the runway for departing traffic on the reciprocal (HAM 15/33 in the morning, due noise abatement)
2/ to vacate at the end, when there is no traffic behind (FCO 16L).

We flare (just), then overfly half the runway at 5ft RA :ok:

Cheers :cool:

[Centaurus]

Among other manfacturers, Boeing provide recommended support calls during approch and landing. It is a good bet that the company has received advice from its legal people before recommending these support calls in the FCTM or other sister publications. Before committing to print its is also certain that Boeing Operations or Flight Standards people would have looked closely at the relevance of each call and decided it was important to use them.

Most operators then add their own version of "support" calls, almost always far in excess of the Boeing recommendations. Situational Awareness is the usual reason offered for what some may argue as superfluous calls.

One such superfluous call mentioned in some operators manuals is "500 feet - Stabilised." during short final. Another call noted is that of acceleration altitude for clean up after take off. "EFFRA" or engine failure flap retraction altitude" is sung out by the PNF on reaching.
On levelling out at cruise altitude is heard "Flight Level 350 one, two three..." in relation to three altimeters reading the same altitude.

Boeing recommend a call of "500 feet" above airfield elevation on final in VMC. However what is the point of then adding "stabilised" when standard operating procedures already recommend that the aircraft be stabilised by 500 feet. Situational Awareness is a buzz word used to excuse all sorts of superfluous "support" calls. Comment invited.

[Blip]

A37575. Thanks for raising the issue. I think you raise a very valid point.

For all the shortcomings of the modern day simulator, I think it can at least show up those pilots who abandon their aiming point on the runway too early, and find themselves reducing the rate of descent without really being aware of it, waiting for some visual cue that they can't consciously describe. All the better if the runway is limiting.

Centurious.

However what is the point of then adding "stabilised" when standard operating procedures already recommend that the aircraft be stabilised by 500 feet.

It forces both pilots to acknowledge the elephant that has just entered the room.

[World of Tweed]

I would disagree Blip - Saying "500ft - stabilised" would in my opinion cause an ill-advised automatic, motor response-association with the five hundred foot call.

Most standard calls become second nature and on dark late night sometimes automatic. The 500 call is mandatory and driven from single parametric cue, ones altitude and in any case is actually given to aid the detection of incapacitation of either crew member. The "Stablilised" call is clearly more conditional and in my opinion pointless.

With such a call I would fear that we train ourselves at 500AGL to say "500 - Stablised" whether we are or not. If we are talking about meeting Ops Man requirements well let me say that if by the Five hundred call you are not stablised then according to my companies OM (and I'm guessing yours) you should already be initiating a go-around and "Go-Around" then becomes the appropriate call from your PM/PNF.

Simply put the Stability Call seems redundant.

[Dream Land]

Boeing recommend a call of "500 feet" above airfield elevation on final in VMC. However what is the point of then adding "stabilised" when standard operating procedures already recommend that the aircraft be stabilised by 500 feet. Situational Awareness is a buzz word used to excuse all sorts of superfluous "support" calls. Comment invitedAgree fully.

[AtoBsafely]

Landing a simulator is very different from landing the real aircraft, so there is no point in using sim time for this.

The way to protect from the errors that cause overruns is to have SOPs for being stabilized on approach, and mandatory missed approach if not stablized. Then you need the company culture to actually follow the SOPs in place, and for copilots to speak up and captains to listen to copilot inputs. Changing the company culture takes a lot more than a few hours in the sim, and sadly that is where the real problems lie.

[Blip]

Landing a simulator is very different from landing the real aircraft, so there is no point in using sim time for this.

If it is so different, how is it that a trainee B737/B767/B747/A330 F/O can make his/her very first landing in the real aeroplane while flying a regular scheduled service with a full load of passengers on board?? I doubt very much that a trainee that exhibited the tendency to lose the aiming point early and land long in the simulator would be allowed to progress to the next stage of training (i.e. line training).

What better way to show the consequences of a long landing than to observe the end of the runway moving into the foreground. The point being made by A37575 is that this simply won't happen unless the runway is length limited.


The 500 call is mandatory and driven from single parametric cue, ones altitude and in any case is actually given to aid the detection of incapacitation of either crew member.

Are you serious?. Wouldn't they have just seconds earlier:

Intercepted the final approach path,
Called the tower,
Armed the speedbrakes,
Put the gear down,
Progressively extended the flaps,
Set the correct MCP Speed,
Called for the check list,
Responded to the checklist items correctly,
Probably already acknowledged the landing clearance.

All pretty hard to do if you are incapacitated!

[AtoBsafely]

Blip,

I see what you are saying; I was just saying there IS a difference between sim & aircraft behaviour in the last 50' which trainees learn and adapt to in the first few landings.

My main point is that the real problem is caused by pilot attitudes and what the company allows them to do. You could practise a go round from the flare in the sim, but that is wasted training if the pilot won't do it when he is running out of runway. You can have a policy of being configured and stabilized by 1500' or 1000' or 500', but that means nothing if pilots don't actually go round when they are not stabilized. The best way to fix this is to change attitudes and to monitor flight data. The crash happened because the pilots involved kept pressing on, not because they mishandled the manoueuvre.

[alf5071h]

A37575, yes crews should have regular training in the simulator using a relatively short wet runway, but not necessarily to fine-tune basic handling skills.
If crews aim to fly every approach and landing accurately (professionally) then there would be little need for special ‘short landing’ skills training, as every normal landing would provide the practice. There would be some exceptions for ‘difficult’ airports or situations where there is little opportunity for practice.
What current training appears to lack is the provision of background knowledge and thinking skill for assessing situations and subsequent decision making during the approach and landing.

Many overrun accidents identify poor awareness of runway conditions or weather. Crews should be taught about the limitations of the measurement and reporting of runway conditions and wind, the potential inaccuracies, and the assumptions about the operation. In many instances, critical information is unavailable or not communicated; crews must consider this.
Regulations have hidden assumptions about crew judgement, which is expected to maintain the required level of safety where ambiguity exists.
An example of this is wet runway performance. A factored landing distance is based on a particular (unpublished) level of friction, thus where conditions are worse it is assumed that crews will adjust their behavior to maintain the required level of safety, e.g. not accept such a wide margin of error – altitude, speed, touchdown position, etc. These assumptions depend on the existance and knowledge of the adverse conditions, and the recall and use previous knowledge or experience for good judgement in these conditions. In turn, this requires understanding and adaptation of human behavior, which is assumed to be taught via CRM.

The problem originates from the industry ‘norm’; what is expected vs what is done or condoned.
Data shows that ‘pilots’ are lazy; we routinely tend to land long, fast, not brake earlier enough etc, etc; mainly due to over adequate runway length / conditions.
Thus to reduce the probability of a landing overrun we should improve the quality of normal approach and landings – technical and non technical skills. In this way, we reduce the exposure to those conditions which might catch us out due to poor information or weak judgement.

Centaurus as you will probably acknowledge, ill conceived calls are potential opportunities for error. Many calls are just band aids for industry-wide deteriorations in levels of experience and behaviour; areas in which training can help.
Calls, if used, should state (describe) the unusual, out of limit, or hazardous contribution to the situation and not focus on a normal operation.

Refs:
Managing the threats during approach and landing. (www.flightsafety.org/ppt/managing_threat.ppt)
Safety aspects of aircraft operations in crosswind. (www.nlr-atsi.com/downloads/NLR-TP-2001-217.pdf)
Running out of runway. (www.nlr-atsi.com/publications.php)
Safety aspects of aircraft performance on wet and contaminated runways. ( http://www.nlr-atsi.com/downloads/NLR-TP-2001-216.pdf)
Pprune - Avoiding an overrun: what should be trained? (www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=306748 )
Runway Overrun Prevention (AC 121.195). (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/b2a4ea852babd7b7862569f1006dc943/$FILE/AC121.195(d)-1A.pdf)

[8che]

Push onitis is another matter and probably going off thread.

If I may make one last point. There are at least 2 posters perhaps giving the impression that ATC are in command of the aeroplane.

If ATC request any form of expedite it should be treated as just that ! a request ! Absolutely nothing different should be done with regards to landing technique. Only the amount of braking then becomes the judgement call.

If someone else may have to go-around behind you then that frankly has nothing to do with you. Your safe landing should be your one and only priority.

[A37575]

Data shows that ‘pilots’ are lazy; we routinely tend to land long, fast, not brake earlier enough etc, etc; mainly due to over adequate runway length / conditions.
Thus to reduce the probability of a landing overrun we should improve the quality of normal approach and landings – technical and non technical skills

Agree with all points you make. Which is precisely why the accent on training should be towards learning to fly the aeroplane again and I don't mean button pressing ad nauseum which is the current thinking. The relatively high threshold speeds of jet transports make limiting runway length landings more critical than the propeller transport days of yesteryear. The amount and quality of technical study undertaken by pilots to counter the problems with wet and limiting runways is probably about the same as that for studying technical aspects of weather radar for storm avoidance - for some pilots it ain't never gonna happen, man....

So trainers should ensure the technical reading slack is taken up by solid practice in the simulator at accurate speed control and landing technique on computer generated short runways.

[john_tullamarine]

So trainers should ensure ...

Many, if not necessarily most, do .. but it depends a lot on how tightly the organisation controls/limits the flexibility/initiative shown by individual instructors.

I'm just glad I went through the mill in the days when "over-training" was the norm

[barit1]

8che, I'll be the first to agree the Air Traffic Control does not "Control" me. When I was in university, a good friend was killed because he let ATC overrule his own good judgement. :uhoh:

[Dream Land]

Barit1,in fairness to all the great ATC folks out there, you may want to share the details. :cool:

[ZFT]

A37575


From personal experience in the simulator training industry I have observed countless cases of landing long and if the "runway" had been on the limiting length dry or wet for the aircraft configuration, an overrun would certainly have been on the cards.

This would suggest that particular simulator has a problem?

JAA-STD-1A.30 (m) or equivalent defines the requirements for both dry and contaminated runways for level C & D FFSs.

Modern visual databases ‘should’ reflect the real world for runway lengths at least. If all other parameters are correct then it should be very representative of the flight test aircraft data.

(It would be pretty pointless training this on a generic database).

[barit1]

Dream Land & others - my friend had the intended field in sight, but the local declared wx was below vfr minimums. He was intimidated by this and tried to divert to better conditions, but ran out of fuel and luck.

The rest of the class thus received an object lesson: never pass up a known safe course of action simply because ... :ugh:

[World of Tweed]

Blip,

In Europe co-pilot trainees with less than 800hrs TT (still very common) are not permitted to use Zero Flight Time training as you suggest. Aircraft Base Training (ie. circuits) are flown as it is felt that the Level D sims simply do not have the fidelity of the aircraft to enable students with low experience to gain the necessary skills before line training.

I'm not arguing the technique for recognition of a long landing and I agree that on a shorter runway provides the best demonstration of this. I'm just not sure that this so-called "short-field" technique exists for large jets.

To respond to you previous post about the 500ft call being there for incapacitation purposes.

You asked am I serious?.... err yes.

Listing the following actions you mentioned with a direct response.

Intercepted the final approach path, > LOC/APP/VOR autopilot modes.
Called the tower, > the PM/PNF does all RT not the PF, the recipient of the 500ft call.
Armed the speedbrakes, > at Gear Down, to be stable done at 4nm 1300ft.
Put the gear down, > as above
Progressively extended the flaps, > by definition of a stable approach this should be completed.
Set the correct MCP Speed, > again completed with final flap selection.
Called for the check list, > surely done earlier than 2miles
Responded to the checklist items correctly, > done earlier than 2miles out!
Probably already acknowledged the landing clearance. > PM/PNF does that.

My point is and rather more the point a TRE made to me about the 500FT call is that providing you are operating to the SOP on a stabilised approach - in theory its the last call before Minimums that will be made that requires a response from the PF. Therefore the last chance to gauge any incipient incapacitation.

You can argue the toss about when and if you'd notice. Does a meak "check" mean something is wrong etc... but according to the Boeing trainers thats where it came from!