Need some advice

[WhiteKnight]

Well, this is what happened.
I`m a rather new junior FO. I was PF, on downwind leg ATC asks us if we are able to proceed for a base turn. Captain looks at me for a second, I`m still thinking about it, because I was still doing 250kts, so quite a bit high and fast.
Then without further discussing he acknowledged, and we turned for a base turn.

Of cource way to high and fast, dropped the gear, flaps, speed brakes etc.
I was approaching the 1000` gate and told him, that it doesn`t look good, and that I intend to do a go around. At about 900`, we were totally unstabilized, Flaps 15 not on speed, too high, no landing checklist completed.

I said: "Go around, pushed the TOGA buttons" Captain responded: "My controls" Put his hand on the Thrust levers, switched of the AP and AT, and continued. I decided to do nothing about it, because I didn`t want to fight for the controls at this low altitude. We were stabilized at about 300` if at all. Weather was perfectly fine, CAVOK.

During the debriefing he told me, that I shouldn`t have flown with 250kts in downwind leg and that I also can use the speedbrakes with flaps 30 (737NG) etc.

I told him that his decision to continue was not right, and that we were totally unstabilized. He responded with:" Yeah, but if I take over the controls, than it's not your responsibility anymore"


What do you think? Should I have done something else, it was not my first issue with this captain, I could tell you a lot more stories.

[parabellum]

Well, he is right that you shouldn't have been doing 250kts down wind, max clean would still have been very fast for this situation but the big question is why were you doing 250kts down wind and why hadn't he told you to slow down sooner?

After that I don't think he did very well at all and your decision was the correct one, if he regularly flys like a maverick then your management need to know before there is an accident.

[SNS3Guppy]

I agree with the Parabellum, and will also add that you were correct in not "fighting for the controls." When the captain says he has the controls, it's not your place to "fight" for them because you don't have a right to them.

If the flight is entering an unsafe condition with the outcome of the flight jeopardized, then speaking up is warranted,and if the captain is unresponsive, then taking control is an option. But when you're already unstabilized and have entered the approach with poor airspeed control, lack of configuration, and it's only getting worse, at some point the captain has a right and a responsibility to take it away.

Sounds like you were far behind the airplane, it wasn't helped by the captain accepting a base leg (perhaps he could have made it work out, but you weren't ready...that's a communication issue). Sounds like the captain was farther ahead of the airplane than you, and elected to leave you behind the airplane while seeking to make the approach work.

While his actions go against the grain of the traditional stabilized approach, he was stable to 300' per your description, having salvaged a bad approach. A go-around is usually the best thing, but perhaps his biggest mistake was failing to take the airplane away a little sooner.

You could say the captain made big mistakes, but one of them may have been placing too much faith in you. Again, a communication issue; next time, be sure to tell him you need more distance and time, and next time, slow down sooner.

[Admiral346]

Doesn't sound at all like the Captain was ahead of the aircraft, or else he would not have been established at 300'. That is completeley unacceptable, at least in my book (and my companies).

I won't comment on you doing 250kts on downwind, but looks like CRM has failed completeley.

Once a goaround has been initiated, it should be flown. To take the decision back at 900' is dangerous, nothing else. The 1000' gate has been bought with lots of blood and sorrow, and must be respected, no matter how many hours you've got under your belt.

Very poor course of action of the Captain, sounds like a case of "I'll show the boy how it is really done". The sim is the place to play that kind of game, not the real deal loaded with pax.

I am always happy, that my companies procedures state that the call out "go around" must always lead to the manouver when below 1000' AGL if uttered by any competent crew member on the flight deck. No report is required afterwards.

He responded with:" Yeah, but if I take over the controls, than it's not your responsibility anymore"
Wrong, it is the FO's responsibility to do his/her utmost to maintain a safe conduct of the flight - however fighting for the controls is not an option (at least not in this case). Pointing out the breach of regulations was the right thing to do.

If, whiteknight, you've had several occurences like this with the same captain, speak to someone from the flightsafety department. Maybe speak to the head of fleet, if you think further action should be taken. If you have the feeling you can't, because it might fall back on you resulting in disciplinary action against yourself, find a new job. This one might be too dangerous.



All based on the above description of the events, it would be quite interessting to hear the other side...

Nic

[GlueBall]

Your approach planning and execution was poor. You were exceeding the speed limit in a downwind traffic pattern, which means that you were way behind the airplane. Either you were still overwhelmed by the airplane or your reaction time was too slow because you were not correcting in a timely manner to slow the airplane upon entering downwind. Because of your probable inexperience on type you were "leaning" on the A/P and A/T, . . . and the airplane was flying you!

You were cleared for a "close-in" visual approach in which case it would have been prudent for you to have immediately disengaged A/P and A/T and aggressively taken manual control by retarding throttles, lowering the nose, deploying speedbrakes, calling for flaps and gear. But you didn't do that, so the captain did it for you and your ego was bruised.

As a junior F/O with limited experience you should welcome every impromptu opportunity as such to get a real feel of handling the airplane and to become familiar with its maneuvering limitations. In this particular instance you could have accepted a short approach and tight base leg as a challenge and worked with the captain. He obviously had more operational depth than you and he was of the opinion that this landing could still be done, and he did it.

You don't specify the runway length, nor your touchdown point, nor whether stopping the airplane on the pavement was a violent maneuver. There is a lot of maneuvering latitude during a visual approach before it may be classified as "unstable."

Most SOPs stipulate that a stabilized approach in VMC can be as late as 500 feet; 1000 feet in IMC.

[WhiteKnight]

I have to clarify one point. We were not on a visual. We were on a transition cleared at a specific altitude( on a "downwind") , and I didn`t expect to get a turn to base that early, according the traffic situation. We were still cleared for an ILS approach, runway length was more than enough, landing was in touchdown zone, but our SOP`s don`t have a 500' gate for visuals anyway.

[parabellum]

Something else to remember White Knight, whereas it does wonders for a pilot's ego to arrive fast down wind, shut the throttles, dump gear and flaps whilst using speed brake, lose all your excess speed in a turn to finals so that you can sit there fat, dumb and happy, on centreline and slope at 500 feet, Vref +5 etc. it may not please your pax and cabin crew in quite the same way! When asked if you can accept an early turn in or similar you also have to consider if you can do it without any discomfort to the pax and also give the CC a fair chance to get the cabin secure, because you can't land without it secure unless it is an emergency.

[Dream Land]

Of course as the flying pilot, you should be tuned up to the current situation and possibility of ATC giving you the option to turn in but that's not really the issue here, many accidents were caused by actions you describe when the captain tries to save the day, I would request a debrief with him and if he doesn't admit that he was in the wrong, I would consider reporting this to management. Make sure you get what you need on the tape too, sink rate, unstabilized, go around! :ok:

[Stall Inducer]

Poor judgement and awareness of your abilities by the Capt. I have flown with many new FO's and a large part of CRM is ensuring both crew members are happy with the approach or whichever part of flight your in. As a Capt the chances are he is very comfortable in his surroundings you however may not be. You were clearly not happy with the situation and those concerns should have been addressed. You may have made the mistake of entering downwind a bit fast and being pushed into an un stabilized approach but you recognised that and took corrective action in the form of a go around. There are no medals for rushing. If that means allowing a newer FO extra track miles instead of opting for the hero option then so be it. He should have used it to demonstrate the distance it would have take you to complete a safe and stabilized approach instead of showing you that a safe and stabilized approach was no longer an option. You were obviously expecting more track miles and should have at least been given the option to have them. If it were to happen again I would politely decline the tight turn even if the Capt has already accepted tell him you require extra track miles. If he still insists hand over control so he can 'show you how it's done' Your not his autopilot ! 300 ft stabilization in an NG is not a safe and stabilized approach. Good call for a go around and well done for recognising the need for one. A shame the Capt chose not to take the safer course of action.:D

[Visual Calls]

There is nothing wrong with 250kts downwind if you expect to go far enough downwind to generate enough track miles to slow down and go down in good time. There are numerous factors to take into account when judging the appropriate speed and altitude for any given position of the aeroplane, be it downwind or anywhere else (except of course below 1000ft when you're either on profile and speed or else in a go-around). We don't know how many miles this FO expected to have (except that it was clearly more than transpired), so we don't know whether he was right or wrong to be 250kts downwind.
He may well have been too fast and too high for the expected track mileage, in which case the skipper should have intervened earlier. But he didn't, and as no pilot is immune to the laws of physics, he should have realised that you play the cards you are dealt and refused the base turn until sufficiently slowed down and lower. End result: a stable approach and a discussion on the ground about an appropriate downwind speed for the conditions of the day.
The rest of it was a balls-up. Ignoring the mandatory stabilised gate of 1000', particularly as your company doesn't have a 500' vmc gate, is unforgivable. The go-around attempt by the FO was the correct decision. Some approaches just don't work out, it's no shame to GA, try again and discuss it all on terra firma.
Stabilised at 300' is not stabilised. Any captain that allowed the aeroplane to get into the situation it was in (regardless of who was flying) is negligent. The buck stops in the left seat, which gives a skipper the obligation to fly out of trouble, not the discretion to fly into it.

Flaps 15 not on speed, too high, no landing checklist completed.
This is unstabilised, pure and simple so

You don't specify the runway length, nor your touchdown point, nor whether stopping the airplane on the pavement was a violent maneuver. There is a lot of maneuvering latitude during a visual approach before it may be classified as "unstable."

is irrelevant. Unstabilised at 1000' (if that's the company SOP), GA, try again and do it right second time. Going below in the hope of recovering the situation is not an option, at which altitude do you decide, enough is enough?

[kwachon]

What happened to the "in range" and "approach" checks, surely they would have started the process of getting the aircraft configured and slowed down, it was after all your leg and landing. Things should have been happening much earlier than late downwind. Were you told to keep the speed up by ATC?.

No excuse though for the captains behaviour.

[GlueBall]

WhiteKnight . . .someday you may learn that not every approach to every runway at every airport will afford you the full 7+ straight miles final ILS stabilized profile that is so soothing to junior F/Os as you. You may also learn that you are not the only airplane in the sky, and that at busy airports your well planned, FMS programmed, and briefed, STAR will be ammended, and your lofty expectations as a junior F/O will be challenged.

As in your case, you had quickly fallen further behind the power curve when the controller had offered you a short approach. We haven't heard the captain's story, only your story. But these are fast paced situations where a junior F/O as you would be well to do to accept the captain's judgement in accepting an abbreviated approach profile without getting your inexperienced feathers ruffled and seeking sympathy from PPRuNers in bashing your captain.

The transport category airplane isn't exactly a primary trainer in which a junior F/O in training would make the judgement call in abandoning the approach. In your case, the captain had rightfully taken over the controls because you were fast, you were still on A/P and A/T and you were way behind the airplane.

You say that your company's SOPs do not allow you to become stable on a visual approach as late as 500 feet. That means that you wouldn't be allowed to make more than 5 or maybe 10 degrees of bank angle and heading changes below 1000 feet AGL. . . ?

For many moons pilots were having to do just that at HKG: Executing a 47 degree right turn just 600 feet over rooftops on a 2 mile base to land on the former Kai Tek Rwy-13.

If ever you'd have a charter flight to Quito, Ecuador [SEGU/UIO] and are having to do the circling approach to Rwy-17, you'd be having to do a full 90 degree left turn at 800AGL on a 2 mile base due to high terrain!

Obviously, these are not the type of approaches that should be flown by junior F/Os in training; that's the reason why you need to shut up, watch and learn technique. :ooh:

[low n' slow]

Glue Ball, go easy!
You can't compare this to the Kai Tak approach, it is a special airport and a very special approach that requires specific training. Your mentioning it as something that is possible to do is irellevant. WhiteKnight is in the process of learning what's right and wrong and not the limits of what is possible to do with a 737. Being professional is about maintaining a margin to that limit and this is usually done by following the SOP. Some of the suggestions I've seen on this thread coming from what I understand as being the jurassic type captain, are appalling.

Whiteknight - It's been suggested that you were perhaps too high and too fast for the approach. I'm not going to comment on this as I don't know your type.
Your issue is quite common and it's happened to me a few times aswell so I feel I can relate. You've set yourself up to a profile of your choice. You had your plan. Suddenly the Captain is given a choice, to shorten the approach or to continue. In his world, with his level of experience, it is doable. In your world and with your level of experience it is not and furthermore, it isn't a part of your plan, thus screwing up your approach. What he has done is to indirectly control your profile by accepting a clearance. This is a prime example of poor CRM. He has the choice and you're flying the plane. If he in that case does not take your wish into consideration - all it takes is for him to look at you and for you to give him a nod or a headshake before he answers ATC - he might aswell be flying the plane (which he eventually did).

If you decide to take it up with him, first of all base your whole reasoning on the fact that you are inexperienced. Apparantly he hasn't understood that part... Then open up by admitting that you perhaps were to fast and a little high, but also explain that your learning curve would have benefitted from being able to solve that situation yourself by not accepting the shortcut. Either he believes himself that he has good CRM, and in that case, he'll try to understand what the heck you're saying, or he's of the jurassic type and he'll just not give a s&%t. Either way, you will have learnt his viewpoint and that will help you to deal with him in the future...

/LnS

[BOAC]

In your excitement to prove how much 'better' you are than this F/O you are all beginning to miss the whole point.

Yes, the F/O could have been better prepared for the 'shortening'.

No, the Captain did not handle this properly. This should be the point. He breached company stabilisation rules, ignored a g/a call from his F/O and heaven knows what else.

Ask yourselves what did the F/O learn from all this? I am the Captain, I take control from you and I screw it up.

Could the points have been better and more correctly and safely 'made'? I suspect this F/O regards this Captain as a 'cowboy' - job done?

I say well done WK, you handled a difficult situation well. You will, no doubt, be better prepared for an 'early' turn-in next time. I suggest you think about Admiral's advice

[parabellum]

I can tell you this..that capt knows what he's doing..because he wasn't behind or he wouldn't have saved a bad approach at the last second..


But the Capt. didn't know what he was doing and didn't save a bad approach, he was unstable and didn't achieve stability within the required, (SOP), framework - how good is that?

[BOAC]

Oh dear! Do I detect 'it' has arrived on this forum now?

Did it say the Captain 'saved' the approach??? Indeed not, he screwed it up! It would have been fine, if 'long-winded', but safe.

Is this the same ssg who thinks airline pilots are robots and can only read from a checklist? Who (when I WAS seeing the posts:ok:) said

"If you guys just hope that all the problems in a plane are in the Sops manual...well that would be nice wouldnt it...how comforting...
Maybe you guys are trained to do what makes sense 80% of the time, they don't want you guys to think..."

and

"First of all we are asking opinions of guys that were hired to read a checklist and follow the SOPS that someone else gave them...we might as well debate this with thier chief pilots because these guys will spew the same blather over and over to keep thier jobs.. These guys weren't hired for thier experience, but to what the company wanted and to be trained the way they wanted. If you want thier opinion, they go to the SOPS manual..."

but in 2006 asked

"Eating in the cockpit, single pilot
Anyone have any SOPS eating in the cockpit for single pilot ops?"

and a year earlier asked for opinions about breast feeding in the cockpit...................I rest my case

Hmm! Anyone else sense a troll? Do I gather it has to fly alone in the cockpit?

It is either running that "how to manage an airline" game and a Flt Sim programme or is in serious need of help. Also has probably NEVER taken the Flt Sim aircraft off a runway which is JUST long enough for the twin afterburner take-off technique.

Could someone please keep it OFF this forum which is about safety and CRM? If not, for the sake of this forum, use the ignore function.

[john_tullamarine]

ssg/trickle is having a rest for a while ...

[Rananim]

PC brigade out in force..firstly,can we distinguish between SOP violation and unsafe..please...one doesnt automatically entail the other.Secondly,the co-pilots right to command a go-around.Protected by SOP but must be balanced by FAR 91.1 or equivalent.The skipper IS the "final authority".

Having said that........I would say that the stabilization rules are an important SOP and the skipper set a poor example to his co-pilot by ignoring the 500' gate.Somebody said being stabilized at 300' was unsafe..no,thats not correct.Not being stabilized at touchdown is unsafe..unstable at 500' is a SOP violation,but not inherently unsafe.However,not all pilots are test pilots so the powers-that-be draw up guidelines that protect the average pilot from slow spool-up and the danger of not being focused 100% on fp control in the last couple of miles.

The real crime here was not the SOP violations however but the missed opportunity by the skipper to impart some knowledge to his inexperienced copilot.He should have "talked" him down and shown him just how easy it really is.Speed,configure,checklist,ignore profile initially.Recapture profile by 500'.From close-in,it is the only way.No need to take control as this destroys self-confidence.If the poor guy freezes,then you take control and give it back to him when things are more under control.

Airmanship(or CRM for the PC brigade) requires the Captain to help a co-pilot who is floundering.The way in which he does this reveals very neatly his own level of airmanship.

[Right Way Up]

IMHO it was a poor show by the skipper to say yes to the base turn without the f/os involvement, and then not to help him when he was struggling.
There also seems to be an increasing amount of Captains who use the f/o as a kind of human autopilot. Typical complaints are refusal to configure the aircraft when the f/o asks, then to force changes when they are not required. This tends to show a lack of confidence on the capts part. Its amazing that when you leave an f/o to his/her own devices without breathing down their neck, what a good job they can do!

[Angels 60]

I agree Right Way...but in this case, the Capt, just sat there and let the FO handle it all by himself, only to come in late, fix it and land the plane.

[parabellum]

"fix it and land the plane." But he didn't 'fix it' did he? Go back and read the original post, stabilisation, flap speeds etc. etc. :rolleyes:

[Angels 60]

Para...your assuming the capt flew an unstabilized approach, so much so that he should have gone around based on the 600 hr FO making that call. We know that captain landed the plane, how bad could the approach have been?

Not trying to disparage the FO, but I tend to agree with other posters on this forum that I tend to side with the 20,000 hour captain before I would the 600 hr FO when it comes to judging the difference between a stabilized approach or not.

[BOAC]

Angels - I take it from your post that you are not from the multi-crew/airline world - and I give you the benefit of the doubt on your actual identity.

[Did I mention, by the way everybody, that I was 'approved' as single crew on a corporate aircraft and in fact flew single crew for 17 years before that? Just to get my 'credibility' established here on multi-crew ops..................:)]

Joking aside, Rananim's post at #21 says it all. There is no 'difficulty' in landing a big jet from an unstable approach on a reasonably long runway. It is just NOT RIGHT. That is where this guy (as reported) got it badly wrong. I regularly used to 'horse' swept wing fighters onto the 'numbers' from tight curved approaches from a run and break (pitch for our fellows) at Vref with the throttles closed - and aced it every time. (Did I mention that?:)). I'd quite rightly be sacked if I did it now.

PLEASE re-read Rananim's para 3. PLEASE also review airline SOPs on monitoring and stable approaches and the 'terms of reference' laid down by most operators for their crews and in particular their captains.

I know 20,000 hour aces can probably 'do it'. The second crew member is also there for that occasion when the ace's abilities do not exceed the task. The ones who blatantly and automatically disregard the 600 hour pilot's 'anxiety' because they know better are the potential killers.

[Angels 60]

Boac, I don't need to be an airline pilot to understand that the story clearly puts the capt in the wrong.. and that he's a cowboy..per airline standards...

As stated I would like to hear the captains story as well, before we all rush to judgement, round him up, grab some rope and Hang 'em High.

[BOAC]

Angels - my post was in response to your:

Para...your assuming the capt flew an unstabilized approach, so much so that he should have gone around based on the 600 hr FO making that call. We know that captain landed the plane, how bad could the approach have been?

Not trying to disparage the FO, but I tend to agree with other posters on this forum that I tend to side with the 20,000 hour captain before I would the 600 hr FO when it comes to judging the difference between a stabilized approach or not.

Note my bolding. I too would like to hear the 'Captain's story' although I doubt very much we will. We have to judge the 'story' as told - this is a forum, not a court of law. It does, however, bring out some illuminating facets to some people's attitudes.

I assume that like the others who have hit the forums en masse lately, you are a 'single crew approved' pilot? No, you do not NEED to be 'airlines' but you DO need to at least understand how multi-crew works to comment here. Like another before you, no airline will touch someone with the 'I'm on my own and I'm great' attitude.

To put another crew member so far out of the comfort zone is not on. To push that member out of the comfort zone likewise, UNLESS you are going to help, and finally to breach your employers 'rules' and ignore the comment on such from the other member is totally wrong. the approach sounded very 'bad'.

It is worth remembering that this '600 hour' co-pilot is well-versed in the rules and requirements of the company regarding a/c operation - probably fresher/better than the 20,000 hour Captain. The definition of a 'stabilised' approach is so clear that the odds are extremley high that the co-pilot was ABSOLUTELY right in the call and the 'story' as told supports that. Flap exceedance is also not 'rocket science' to see, is it?

[Right Way Up]

I tend to side with the 20,000 hour captain

Ever heard of a chap called Captain Van Zanten?

[SNS3Guppy]

You guys are slitting your own throats thinking otherwise...give the FO the power to trash a capts carreer on his say so...then only 600 FOs would be flying...


Who has said anything about "trashing" a captain's career, or relying upon the word of the First Officer?

Why only 600 First Officer's left flying?

You've never flown in this environment, have you?

[Ashling]

I have to agree with BOAC here.

We do not know the Captains version of events and probably never will. I'm not sure how you intend to get his version Angels. So we have to take the original story at face value. It may be accurate it may not but it does enable us to discuss some usefull CRM points.

In my view the Capt was badly at fault.

Its all very well saying the F/O was flying a poor profile but then he's a junior F/O. What do you expect? perfection. Clearly he had not anticipated the shortcut but then if his vastly experienced Captain had anticipated he should have intervened to ensure the profile flown would place them in an appropriate position to deal with the shortcut.

He should not have accepted the shortcut without gaining the F/0s consent. It is a lamentable breakdown in communication that he did and led directly to what then occurred as his F/O did not have the experience to deal with the new situation. He did not give his F/O the chance to respond to ATC's request and that is wrong.

If there was a good reason for accepting the shortcut if his F/O wasn't happy to fly it then he could have taken control himself and flown it or offered to talk him through it.

What was he doing allowing his F/O to use speedbrake with Flap 30 on a 737 NG ?! Boeings limit is Flap 10 and some companies limit it further to Flap 5. In any case they've both bust an airframe limit so why the hell did he just let it happen? Rushing too much? That alone is an ASR and an entry in the Tech Log requireing maintenance action before the aircraft flies again

Once his F/O voiced his intention to go around as they approached 1000' he could have taken control. Waiting for TOGA to be pressed is too late and at that point they should have continued the go around.

Stable at 300' is too late. If the company has hard gates and you miss them you go around unless you have a very good reason not to. E G burning final reserve or a significant emergency that threatens your safety of flight.

A word for the F/O. If your Captain is unstable at your companies hard gate you must tell him to go around and if he refuses consider takeing control from him to do so but do not get involved in a fight for the controls unless you believe you are about to die.

This Captain allowed an inexperienced F/O to be put in a situation outside his ability and experience. He is the Captain so blameing his F/O for his flying just mirrors back onto himself.

My advice to the F/O would be to file an ASR due to an unstable approach. This will protect you should your company look at the FLIDRAS and look for an explanation as to this shambles. Your always better to fess up as not doing so will appear as if you have tried to hide the event or hope no one notices. Ideally it is best to be up front and tell your Captain you are doing this after the debrief. If your company want to look at it further then it will provide an ideal oppertunity for learning and training if both sides approach it constructively. If you were halfway through a day then if you are not happy with your Captains response you can refuse to operate with him further but it has to be v serious before you do this. This was v serious though.

Chat to your mates, he may be a good bloke and this was an abberation, however if this Captain regularly behaves in this fashion your management need to know ASAP before the company has a major incident.

Sorry, no time for Captains who behave like this and then try to blame the F/O.

[Ashling]

I like to think of things as working together to achieve a set goal. Sure the Captain has the final say but he should rarely have to use that authority if he has led wisely.

To answer your question.

In normal circumstances Yes the Captain should go around rather than question the call provided that does not place the flight in parlous danger. People can and do become target/task/goal fixated and can miss all manner of obvious things and it may be that this is what the Captain has done so normaly it would be best to go around and then discuss why afterwards. It may be you have an emergency of some sort/lack of fuel and in these circumstances then the Captain may need to exercise discretion in order to continue. Most if not all major companies monitor FLIDRAS and stable approach's are a big thing so by listening to your F/O and going around you may well be saveing yourself from a world of hurt.

I'm a Captain but my experience as an F/O is that the vast majority of Captains behave professionaly and do not take silly risks or push their luck. They follow company SOP. The exception to that was one contract pilot we had who seemed to have to push every limit there was. To my mind he came under the cowboy label. A number of F/Os complained to management about him and he was removed at the first oppertunity.

Any F/O trying to use the regs to trap someone or play oneupmanship will get a very one sided educational conversation. FLIDRAS works very nicely to protect you in these cases.

There will always be a debate about the authority gradient on the flight deck. In times gone by it was way too biased towards the Captain but there may now well be a case for saying the gradient has become too flat.

[TheChitterneFlyer]

The original thread was... 'Need some advice'!

Welcome to the world of PPrune, where 'advice' comes by the bucket-load; whether you need it or not!

As the young fella said; he expected a normal pattern, yet when ATC offered him a shortcut the captain accepted it and NOT the FO; not even a short discussion; just a sidelong glance, but it was the skipper who put the FO into a very poor position... and then enjoyed putting the FO in his place by rebukeing him. Not ny idea of good CRM skills.

Come on guys; give him a break.

TCF

[Romeo India Xray]

I originally trained in an old school environment. Now I am (amongst other things) involved in implementation of some of the very latest facets of CRM and TEM. Part of these concepts are that we are all in a learning environment, and will all learn (with varying standards and quality) from each other. The learning value of this incident was obviously greatly limited and this would appear to be soley the fault of the commander. It would seem that some "old school" pilots are STILL either resistant to reasonable change (why have they been allowed to continue flying so long), or are of such super-human qualities that they are impervious to error (again why are they still flying).

For all of you who are the 'right stuff' I have to ask when you stopped learning, and why you didn't stop flying at the same time?

Remeber - It's a licence/rating to LEARN! 600hrs or 30 000hrs no matter.

[411A]

Judging from the original post, it can clearly be noticed that 'blame' can be spread in several ways.

F/O.
Had no business charging on an extend downwind at 250 knots.
Far better to actually slow down well before, leaving far more time for proper configuration changes, stabilized approach.
I suspect he now knows better (one would hope).

Now, lets look at the Captain's actions.
He doesn't ask the F/O if the base turn is OK (apparently), just goes ahead and says...yes.
Opps, now he's stuck his foot in it, right and properly.
Far better would be a little more communication between crew members, don't you think?

Something similar years ago, with a junior First Officer in a TriStar.
Approaching FRA, ATC has kept us rather high, and now wants high speed, to ten miles.
The First Officer looks very concerned, and askes for help.
I take control, extend full spoilers, and keep the speed at 340 knots indicated until the proper level is reached...the speedy dirty dive.
Stow spoilers and hand the airplane back to the F/O.
He smiles from ear to ear, starts slowing further, flaps at the proper speeds, nice and stable by five miles/1500 agl...makes a very smooth landing...could hardly feel you were on the ground.

Forget all the fancy terms...CRM, 'team building' etc.
In days gone past it was called crew co-ordination.
Worked then, and it still does, if applied properly.

NB.
A note to Captains.
Never ever rush your First Officer into anything, as you might not like the results.

[BOAC]

Never ever rush your First Officer into anything, as you might not like the results. - what about a bar?

[411A]

- what about a bar?

They're usually too cheap (or broke) to offer unless you, as their Commander, have engaged in prior 'crew co-ordination'...then, all is well.
Further, even better is a Captains party at HOTAC, cheaper and far more effective....especially for the junior F/O who is feeling (in the broadest sense of the term) his way.