Super Seasprites – who is responsible?

[Dick Smith]

I am fascinated (as I think many others are) about the Super Seasprite debacle, where over $1 billion of taxpayers’ money has been written off.

What interests me more than anything else is how journalists have not mentioned who is responsible. Was it a committee that actually made the decision, or was it an individual? Who was the Chief of Defence at the time the decision was made? Was this person considered a capable person and was he misled? Who was the responsible Minister at the time?

I would imagine one of the prime reasons that the mistake was made was because those in decision making positions did not ask for advice from people who had expertise - i.e. if they had asked if it was sensible to purchase helicopters which relied on 30 year old airframes that were sitting in the Arizona Desert, they may have made a different decision.

The most important issue is not to make the mistake again, however I can see it being repeated – probably with the Joint Strike Fighter.

I will look forward to some of the more knowledgeable posters on PPRuNe advising on why they believe this error was made, and if they believe anything was learnt from it. After all, $1 billion is a lot of money that could have been used effectively somewhere else. I would imagine that most of the money ended up in the United States, which is already the wealthiest country in the world.

[Arm out the window]

It was probably some of those DSE electronic components what done it!

[Dick Smith]

Pass-A-Frozo, they are all very good points, but can someone answer my second paragraph? I quote it again here:

What interests me more than anything else is how journalists have not mentioned who is responsible. Was it a committee that actually made the decision, or was it an individual? Who was the Chief of Defence at the time the decision was made? Was this person considered a capable person and was he misled? Who was the responsible Minister at the time?

[Ultralights]

The sea sprite decision is totally a political one..
talking to a few people in 805 today, the Sprites have been airworthy for 5 yrs! and the 30 yr old airframe business is just an excuse thought up by the beaurocracy (govt) Just look a the Hercules! Orions, Sea Kings, even the F18 is 20 yrs old!

the decision to ground the aircraft was from the darkness of the beaurocrats in Canberra, whee they get their advice from who knows, DMO?
Kayman have been suffering the same old Navy contract system as every other contractor faces, the navy will not settle on tight contracts, and constantly change contracts to suit themselves and make the job of the contractor as difficult as they can, i know, i have been working in the system now for 12 months! and in that time, our contracts has been changed 2 times. and continually amended, the Navy just wont come to the table to agree to a solid long term contract. where this comes from i dont know, but this is what has been causing the majority of the delays for kayman.
its like being told to start work building a house, then told to not pour a slab, then get half way through, and told to move the slab, then not put up walls, then the walls are changed, etc etc etc. so of course, the delays quickly blow out to years!

eg, the latest update to our contract stipulates that every qualified tradesperson has to be directly supervised, and now the supervisor has to be directly supervised by an independent inspector, so for a simple 1 person job, there are 2 supervisors...remember, all this supervision is for a certified and fully qualified tradesperson!!!... im sure you can all imagine the cost changes and delays caused by this alone when it comes to getting work out the door!

so why have we wasted Millions?? ask Canberra! and good luck with that..

[Dick Smith]

Yair! But who made the origional decision to accept such a contract?

[Creampuff]

But PAF, your ostensibly sensible logic has lead precisely to where the project got.

Your whole argument is based on the validity of the assumption that, with just a little more money – only another $150 million or so – and just a little more time – only another 2 years or so - they’d have got there.

Would they?

What would you advocate if, in a year’s time, having spent another $125 million (sunk costs well in excess of $1.2billion), the news is that they just need another $75 million and 18 months? You decide, as a consequence of all those ‘sunk costs’, to commit another $75 million and wait another 18 months. And a year later, lo and behold, surprise surprise, the news is that they just need another $50 million and another year to get there.

As the sunk costs increase, so you must continue to spend money and wait.

How long and how much, PAF?

If you give me a price or a date, you’ve merely done what the new government has done. If you don’t provide a price or a date, I commend to you a career as a DMO project manager.

Dick:

(1) No one is responsible. That’s why these messes happen.

(2) A journalist’s job is to produce cheap pap for daily consumption by unsophisticated punters. Any detailed analysis of the cause of these messes, and any resulting story, is far too expensive and far too complicated.

[Ultralights]

Your whole argument is based on the validity of the assumption that, with just a little more money – only another $150 million or so – and just a little more time – only another 2 years or so - they’d have got there.

They are already there! they have been for some time. They are still Airworthy and ready to fly.. the final piece to be completed was converting an analogue ASI signal to a digital signal for the mission computer... apart from that its 100% airworthy.

the decisions to keep them grounded, and delay the programs, have come from the bureaucracy

[Creampuff]

Ultralights: You obviously know more about the particular aircraft and the particular technical issues than I do, so I won’t argue with your point. However, I note that there’s a difference between airworthiness and fightworthiness. The Australian taxpayer was paying for both, not just the first.

PAF: I only referred to ‘sunk costs’ because you did.

But let us never refer to ‘sunk costs’ again, if that is now your wont.

So you’d commit to the extra $150 million and, presumably, the extra 2 years.

How much more and how much longer after that, PAF?

The flaw in your logic is that you compare the costs of a fact with the costs of an assumption that may never be valid.

Fact: an-off-the shelf Cessna 152 can do the things described in the POH, and can be maintained in accordance with, and at the costs arising from the procedures described in, the maintenance and pilot’s operating manual

Assumption: we can build a Super Cessna 152, that will detect and kill submarines, at X price in Z years.

If you were a Project Manager and applied your logic Creampuff you'd probably cancel everything and we'd have no Defence Force.
Errmmm, no, not quite. I’m hoping there are lots of contracts in which Defence sets time and cost limits and is smart enough to stick to them, and has contingency plans in the event that they aren't.

[Creampuff]

the project team were in the situation where they had near 100% certainty on their budgetary requirement and schedule (quality has not changed).If that’s correct PAF (I have no way of knowing, and I have no reason to doubt Ultralights), I concede your point.

[Captain Sand Dune]

It's really a waste of time and effort trying to apportion blame. People have long since moved on. However I guess it could be a the subject of one those typically hysterical and poorly researched articles one reads in the complete waste of paper that passes for the weekend papers in this country!:hmm:

What Defence must do is learn the lessons from this debacle and apply them to future contracts.

[Mr Bomb]

Dick, what CSD said is spot on. It is "impossible" to apportion blame to a faceless public service. This is the whole reason a bureaucracy exists so that no one person is to blame.

I have to disagree with PAF somewhat in that he said there are lots of projects that deliver capability on time and budget. This may be the case for very very simple systems and capabilities, however anything more complicated invariably cost more money. Where is this line in the sand draw? Well that is a very very easy question to answer. If something is off the shelf and NOT changed ie not "Australianised" then it more often than not runs pretty much to schedule and budget. Where Australia decides to change ANYTHING then invariably the risk of the project blowing out (either time or money) increases exponentially with that "Australianisation".

PAF was spot on where he said if we buy off the shelf then the capability we get is only off the shelf capability that essentially anyone can by and so we never get the "edge". The C17 is a case in point. probably the poster child in procurement of how to do something right as Australia changed nothing but the country markings. However the reason this was also successful is because essentially it was of a very short timeframe and driven by the govt and we had a defence Minister that just said "this is what we re doing" (Obviously after various briefs etc). There is more to this, but it largely irrelevant. The other reason this was successful is that we are not trying to "beat" anyone in the region, we simply have our requirements for airlift and we do not need to maintain an edge over anyone in airlift in the region, it is solely an intrinsic "edge" we need to maintain.

Now compare this to the Wedgtail project. The Wedgtail is extremely high risk. Whilst the airframe is largely low risk the airframe is irrelevant in the scheme of things, it is the electronics, the radar, the link system etc which is important. NONE OF THIS EXISTED before Australia ordered it. Issues with integration, different systems talking to one another etc. This is where the risk lies and so we currently have a four year blow out in this capability being delivered as the risk was so much greater. but the point here is, the ADF is willing to wear this risk as the edge in capability it gives us is so far ahead of the next competitor that it is worth it.

Now take the JSF for example. This is also a very risky program, but in order for us to maintain the "edge" in capability in the region we MUST take this course. Due to the increase in risk, because the aircraft is only developmental, then there will be delays, there will be cost increases. But this is the risk we have of getting the best capability we possibly can. The JSF is not a white elephant, it does suit what Australia needs. I am not saying that a mix with F22's would not be nice, but Australia cannot afford F22's. Various people in the media love talking about the F22 cost has come down and the JSF is increasing, but the difference between the airframes is still US$100M each and will remain so. Plus the F22 simply does not do what we as Australia need an aircraft to do. That is put bombs on target on time. The JSF does this through stealth and various other systems that network and integrate with various other systems we have in all three services to provide a total capability across the board. This gets lost when various discredited, so called analysts talk of keeping the pig going etc. They simply have no idea how modern warfare is fought and are thinking of each platform as a standalone capability. To consider the JSF or any of our future systems as a standalone piece is wrong, it must be considered in how it integrates into the whole capability of the entire ADF.

Anyway to answer your question, as I said at the beginning, no one is responsible. As PAF said the only person that can be responsible right now is the current govt and Mr Rudd is ultimately responsible there.

The funny thing is the original reason the Sea Sprites were procured has largely gone away as we are procuring larger ships with larger landing areas on them than what was thought when the contract was originally signed. PAF’s question about what is replacing them and how much will it cost? Well I believe nothing will replace them so perhaps the govt did save $150m?

Cheers
Mr B

[Ultralights]

i know the difference between airworthiness status and mission ready status, even with the few things left to sort out, the sprites were mission capable. of the armament they can carry, all but one system was 100% ready. being public forum, im not going to discuss mission capabilities or the issues for that side of things with anyone.

as for the F22, its not a case of not being able to afford the capability, but a case of you cannot buy what is Not for sale.

regardless of who was responsible, the decision has sadly been made...
what will be replacing the Sprites is 10 more Seahawks and a rumored increase in the order of the MRH90

[jumpuFOKKERjump]

I have no first-hand knowledge here, but my Navy sources tell me there was never a requirement for the Kaman, the Anzac frigates were capable of running the Seahawk with minor changes, but the bean counters would rather buy a new helicopter that do it. There was another reason to do with the Kiwi frigates, but I forget the details.

I'm sure it's shortcomings as a weapon could be overcome if enough money was thrown at it, but I have heard it is already too heavy for it's undercarriage, bending same in sea trials. It is just a dog.

The most important issue is not to make the mistake again, however I can see it being repeated – probably with the Joint Strike Fighter.Yep, it was a mistake to paint a bunch of surplus F-105's grey and rebrand them as the F-35...

Completely on a tangent, I get the idea that the ship-driving part of the Navy, while grudgingly appreciating the capabilities of helicopters, basically despise having the things on ships and really enjoy the indoor barbeques and indoor workouts that result from the Wokka not being quite right yet :}

On another tangent, I know they have had a lot of problems with cracks on the airframe: http://img127.exs.cx/img127/271/anewsalertpic188129xt.jpg

[Buster Hyman]

I just love the polly spin on this.

"I saved you all $150 million" not "I have just written off $1 billion in order to save $150 million."

If I cancelled my lay by at Target with 10% to go, am I really ahead?:confused:

[VH-XXX]

When I did a Prince II project management course several years ago, one of the important things taught was to not necessarily keep throwing money and at the project in order to successfully finish it. It's not always the best solution and method of achieving a successful result.

Some times it's best for each party to mutually withdraw from the project.

For them to have canned the project it probably meant that a good ending was not obtainable in the forseeable future!

As much as I don't like to say it, the Liberals are solely to blame, whilst indirect responsibility would ultimately lie with the working committee of which the Defence Minister would be a part.

[Buster Hyman]

And you are right XXX, it all happened "on their watch", so thats where it all started. We can only assume that the advice to can the project was right, & that it wasn't from the same source who advised to go ahead in the first place.

[bush pelican]

Dick, as a business man you must know the answer to your own question from experience.

1. Navy, D of Defense not defining the requirement in absolutes at a given date/ time.

2. Government not over-sighting /defining the requirements in absolutes complete with late delivery/ failure to deliver penalties.

3.Tradition of 'mates' between Aust & US defense organisations and the ease and gullibility of the Aust. side in defense contracts procurement. (Political interferance and no 'guts'.)

4.As mentioned by others, many faceless people with no experience in business, handling millions/billions of dollars with no real accountability. What we have to understand here is that when the relationship of cause-effect is broken, then stuffing a billion dollar deal is no different to stuffing a one hundred dollar deal. We see this played out day after day by the CEOs of corporate Australia and other public and political figures. Take Peter Beaty and the Queensland Government as a political example and the corporate examples are everywhere.

5.So, no real accountability. ie No REAL consequences for failure. By real consequences I mean bankruptcy, gaol, destitution, or death.

6. Precedent-happens all the time.

So, as you know, the answer is simple and there is nothing you and I can do about it. Its a tragedy of democracy.

Care to come up with another system?

BP

[Brian Abraham]

Old thread at http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=316574

the Liberals are solely to blame

The Seasprites were originally a Labor initiative under Keating that were meant for a new class of Patrol Boat to be built with Malaysia who backed out of the boat project - and left the Seasprites without a platform. The negotiations for the Seasprites continued and the Howard government, who came to power in 1996, signed the contract in 1997. The only question is, without a platform why did Keating continue negotiations and the contract go ahead under Howard with the change in government?

From http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/16/1023864378971.html
By Mark Forbes
June 17 2002
"We should never have bought them in the first place," said Aldo Borgu, an adviser to former defence ministers John Moore and Peter Reith and now a director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The plan to build a unique helicopter was unrealistic and poorly executed, and was designed for a proposed Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) to be built jointly with Malaysia. The patrol vessel never got off the ground.

"Once the OPV didn't go ahead, the rationale for buying a smaller helicopter disappeared," Mr Borgu said.

The patrol vessel project was a favourite of the Keating government, proposed by major ALP donor Transfield (now Tenix). The Defence Force hierarchy was always wary of a project it believed was driven by a desire for export dollars, and its fears increased after the Coalition's election in March, 1996.

Put simply, said one senior official, the boat was "neither fish nor fowl", too big for a conventional patrol boat, too small to combat a frigate. To expand its range and firepower it needed a helicopter, but the vessel was too small to carry the Seahawks already planned for the Anzac frigates.

Tenders were called for a small, state-of-the-art helicopter. The former chief of navy, Don Chalmers, confirmed that the Seasprites were acquired for the patrol vessels, OPV, although it was also planned to place some on the Anzacs. Despite this, Defence and the government failed to formally link the Seasprite and patrol vessel projects.

In Senate estimates hearings this month, Air Vice-Marshal Ray Conroy attempted to fudge over when the patrol vessel project was dropped. "That was effectively abandoned in February, 1998, when Malaysia selected a German tender over the one submitted by the Australian company," he said.

At that point, the argument for buying the Seasprite instead of more of the larger Seahawk collapsed, Air Vice-Marshal Conroy admitted. But he said the argument was hypothetical as the Seasprite contract was signed earlier, in June, 1997.

In fact, Malaysia announced the patrol vessel decision in October, 1997, but earlier that year in March the Howard cabinet was told the deal would not go ahead and the vessel was unsuitable for the Australian Navy.

At a cabinet meeting in Pakenham on March 11, former defence minister Ian McLachlan presented a call from the then Defence Force chief, General John Baker, to suspend the patrol vessel proposal.

"I don't want to embarrass anybody, but we felt the thing was heading south," Mr McLachlan said this week.

"As well, we were in a position of having to buy some vessels that were not appropriate for replacing either the Fremantle patrol boats or warships and we didn't want to do that.

"All the information I could glean was the Malaysians were cooling off on the whole deal. It was a big order but got smaller as the months went on and we thought it might never come to pass and it didn't."

Government sources confirmed that the cabinet had effectively decided to suspend the patrol vessel project, but no decision was announced after strenuous objections by Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer and fears that an announcement would be portrayed as scuttling Transfield's Malaysian tender.

"There was a problem with not connecting the helicopter purchase to the OPV purchase," Mr Borgu said. "When cabinet decided to kill off the OPV nobody thought about the Seasprites. It's adding an additional helicopter platform to the ADF unnecessarily as the Anzacs could take the Seahawks."

A senior member of the Seasprite project agrees the deal should have been scrapped. "It's smarter to get 27 Seahawks rather than 16 Seahawks and 11 Seasprites," he said.

Mr McLachlan said he has no recollection of the Defence Force ever telling him of the pivotal link between the patrol vessel project and the Seasprites.

One of Defence's most senior officials at the time also did not "recall a lot of discussion about cancelling the Seasprite when the OPV hit the fence. I don't think it was looked at carefully and that's perhaps where we made a mistake."

Despite the belief that the patrol vessel the Seasprites were designed for would never be built, Defence - never keen to reject already-committed funds - went ahead and signed the $660 million helicopter contract with Kaman.

That contract contained the seeds of today's fiasco, Defence insiders admit. Ever ambitious, Defence wanted to build a high-tech helicopter at a bargain price. The number of helicopters ordered had shrunk to fit under the price cap and it was determined to go for an option that would cut costs further, rebuilding surplus US navy helicopters up to 40 years old.

Mr McLachlan said: "I do remember a long series of discussions about the problem that now appears to have arisen, and that is: if you buy something with old frames, will everybody say they are old aircraft?"

The second-hand helicopter purchase has been pilloried, but those involved in the project are adamant the issue is overblown. A team of 10 has supervised the selection of helicopters from their shrink-wrapped storage in the Arizona desert and overseen the removal of corrosion from the frames.

Expecting Kaman to install a new, sophisticated weapons and avionics system into these "old birds" is where the project came to grief, insiders said.

Too much was expected of Kaman in too short a time. The Seasprite deal was Kaman's biggest ever and the company was no big-time defence player. Founded by eccentric inventor Charlie Kaman, who also designed the Ovation electric guitar, it has made more in recent years from musical instrument sales than aerospace. "The Commonwealth has signed up to an unachievable contract at an unachievable price," said one senior member of the project team. "The whole thing was set up for failure."

It was unfair to blame Kaman, said one official who played a key role in the contract. "Defence has to realise you can't lay all the risk and blame on this little company," he said.

The official said the contract had no damages clauses because liquidated damages on a deal this size would put Kaman out of business.

The head of the Defence Materiel Organisation, Mick Roche, has said the contract is "not the sort of contract we would wish to draw up these days". In a speech to a Defence seminar earlier this year he said Defence's project management should have ensured effective penalty clauses and prevented a key software contractor walking away, resulting in seven helicopters being delivered without a mission-control system.

Installing this sophisticated control system had been subcontracted to US firm Litton, a major military company that dwarfed Kaman. Soon after accepting the contract, Litton won a much bigger US deal and moved many key staff from the Seasprite project.

In 1999 Litton decided to walk away from the complex task, and under its contract won a settlement that cost Kaman $32 million. Australian firm CSC has now been contracted for the task, but the project is already more than three years' late.

Defence is trying to redraft Kaman's contract, despite having already paid out $960 million of the $1 billion budget. Last month Mr Roche told a Senate hearing the government was examining suing Kaman for breach of contract and could possibly recover that money, but then "we will not end up with the helicopters and will have to start again, that is the dilemma we are in".

Another dilemma remains for the navy. Even if it does receive working helicopters, the boats they were designed for do not exist. Putting the Seasprites on the existing Anzac frigates makes less sense. The Seasprites carry an anti-surface missile, the Penguin, originally intended to cover for the patrol vessel's lack of such a weapon, but the Anzacs already carry the Harpoon anti-surface missile.

A former defence official said the Seasprites created profound logistics and maintenance problems for the navy, with it having five different helicopters for five different uses. Air force chief Angus Houston has overall responsibility for air capability but pointedly refused to endorse the Seasprite purchase when interviewed. Asked if the Seahawk would have been a better choice with the patrol vessel off the scene and if the Seasprite was one helicopter too many for the military, Air Marshal Houston replied: "I'd prefer not to make a judgment on that, you can draw your own conclusions. I think we do have too many helicopter types."

"You can't dispute it's the wrong helicopter," Mr Borgu said. "There are obvious question marks over the Penguin anti-ship missile as opposed to the Harpoon, and the anti-sub capability isn't as good as the Seahawks. We should have got the Seahawks. On balance the ADF would have been better off."

[Heavy Cargo]

Just call the yanks and they will deliver some working helicopters next month.Why were the Aussies TRYING to build another NOMAD in chopper version we do not have the ability.:ugh:

[Flyingblind]

Correct Heavy Cargo, although I'd properly get a price from the Poms for there New Lynx just for the sake of propriety.

The idiots that came up with and then implemented this plan are all long gone and you can bet most are sheltered by the old boys network.

What should have happened at the Kev fest 2020 is someone standing up and pointing out this country's extremely poor track record on defense procurement and analise ways to streamline defense procurement and finally cut out uneducated pollies medaling and interference in said procurement......yeah right!

[spanner90]

Without stretching this thread to the ridiculous level...

There are many constraints on DMO purchasing, beyond buying the best piece of kit for the job (unfotunate, but true).

Consider the following:

1. Australian content (protecting AS jobs, commendable)
2. Capability (can't argue with that one)
3. Coherence with existing platforms (OK, Sea Sprite was designed to go with a platform envisaged/conceptualised/NOT ordered by the previous Labor govt, which was cancelled by the following Liberal govt, so why did we sign on for the Sea Sprite???)
4. Political favours (this is where final decisions are made, in the house on the hill, not in the offices at R2)

Therefore, it is easy to get one small decision, based on point 4, which snowballs to a massive procurement, based on point 2, which satisfies neither point 2 or point 1....:{

Yes, I do have personal experience regarding the machinations of the DMO, and the cr:mad:ap that flows from the house with the biggest flagpole.

Happy to discuss specifics, particularly relevant to engineering specs, but not here...

Spanner

[slice]

The performance of Kaman and CSC has been lamentable through the whole debacle. Whilst poorly administered by the Navy and DMO, Litton pulled out because they, as an experienced defense contractor, saw the the minefield ahead. Having personal knowledge of CSCs recent past performances in technically demanding contracts I am not surprised at the end result.

[Dark Knight]

Well; that didn't go to well, did it Dick?

Still penguins, ice floes melting & reforming and increasing numbers of polar bears to be counted at the North Pole.

DK

ps>>take David Hicks with you (we assume he has now learnt to count)

[Dick Smith]

Dark Knight, What do you mean? I believe the posts and explanations are generally top class.

The key to the problem is those involved didn't ask advice from those who may have experience and a few clues.

I see this problem in our Aviation industry- don't ask advice or copy the success of proven systems overseas as it may look as if you don't know everything.

Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.

One day a big one will go in and then the changes will be forced on us.

[Quokka]

Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.

Incorrect.

[bush pelican]

Spot on Dick, that and the fact that most of the people making the decisions have never had to sign the cheques.

However those changes that may be forced on us will be 'more of the same', business as usual' etc. etc.

SAD.

BP

[Dick Smith]

Quokka, what do you mean by “incorrect”?

In North America – that is, the USA and Canada, an IFR aircraft in radar covered airspace is not permitted to go below the lowest safe or minimum safe altitude until the pilot has “cancelled IFR” or it is clear that the pilot is on the correct and legal approach path.

In Australia, because we are still using the old “Flight Service” rules in low level radar covered airspace, there is no requirement to report when visual.

I have a feeling that you have a closed mind in relation to this. Have you ever personally flown in North America or acted as an air traffic controller there? Those who have will know that all IFR flights are conducted in controlled airspace and the air traffic controller has a responsibility to the pilot – which is not there when an aircraft is in uncontrolled airspace.

[Heavy Cargo]

Ah HA same answer I gave for the helicopter replacement.

Simple =

CALL THE YANKS THEY WILL FIX UP THE REGS AND AIRSPACE HAVE THEM START NEXT MONTH ?:cool:

[Quokka]

Six people were killed at Benalla because...

Dick, I know someone who is very close to the people who died in that CFIT... and that person knows you. At the time of the event, I had no knowledge and, although requested to do so, provided no advice to that person other than to strongly advise them to source and read the full report upon completion of the ATSB investigation. They have not done so. Instead, they have listened to you.

It is normal for a person who is faced with the loss of people they love and respect to look for someone to blame for that loss, someone other than those whom they love and respect. In this case, the person seems to have focused the blame on, not just the controller on duty at the time of the incident, but all Air Traffic Controllers.

Situational Attribution Error (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attribution_theory)


Six people were killed at Benalla because...

Dick, please, be very careful what you say...

[Dick Smith]

Quokka, I have spoken to a number of people who are close to those involved in the Benalla accident, and not one of those people blames air traffic controllers for the accident. They blame the “archaic airspace and procedures that were designed before radar was introduced.” They also blame “those responsible for change that never ask how it can be done better.”

I know many air traffic controllers who would like to see proper procedures introduced for radar covered airspace that is presently uncontrolled. It is just that the “bosses” at Airservices and CASA are almost completely useless and can’t bring in any change at all.

By the way, who in their right mind would bother to wait for the ATSB investigation? Instead of making any comment about using proper procedures or changing the airspace at Benalla, its only recommendation was for the introduction of some type of flight data recorder for aircraft of that size.

Their final report completely ignored my Unsafe Skies publication (see here (http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/the_book.php)). It is obvious that the ex-air traffic controllers involved in writing the report simply couldn’t think laterally and see – as many controllers can – that there are better ways of handling the airspace at Benalla that could have prevented the needless loss of life.

[jumpuFOKKERjump]

Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.Incorrect.

Do you ever read reports or just always blart out whatever crap suits your political stance of the time? You got it wrong then, you are still wrong.

If you don't like it, then maybe the Seasprite isn't so bad after all...

[Dick Smith]

jumpuFOKKERjump, are you suggesting that the airspace design and procedures remain the same at Benalla? I would imagine you are – seeing that nothing has changed there.

I can assure you that at Benalla (or a comparable airport) a similar accident will happen in the future because those in the position to make changes and improvements haven’t looked at the accident and worked out that by following proven safe overseas procedures, the chance of a similar accident can all but be eliminated.

Why have a $350+ million radar system if it is not used to help to prevent controlled flight into terrain accidents, as well as midair collisions?

[jumpuFOKKERjump]

If you want to terminally drift your own thread you xxxxxx, so be it:p:p:p

As previously posted by one of my colleagues:
I mistakenly thought that after this terrible accident that there would be a quick move to utilise the radar properly in this area – i.e. introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Of course, this has not happened.Prior to this crash not all RNAV approach points were available to ATC to insert into flight plans, so if a flight was cleared direct to such a point in E airspace or a pilot advised he was doing so in G airspace we would just expect him to be up to 15 NM away from his planned route.

Now the points have been defined and it has been indicated to ATC that we must monitor tracking and advise discrepancies, regardless of the class of airspace.Of course, this has not happened.Of course, you have got it wrong again.

The ATSB report makes it quite clear the controller WAS monitoring the track of the aircraft, he was just confused about which point the flight was heading for. Despite the points not being defined the discrepancy WAS noted, but the when the ATC weighed the probabilities of he or the GPS being wrong he decided he must have got it wrong. We all know better now.

Except you apparently. By the way, while you are barking at the base of you NAS tree, the Seasprite is getting away over there...

[Agony]

Getting away from Benalla..............

Some people here are close to the issues, some are way off the mark.

To apend blame here is pointless, most have moved on............

To investigate the policies and protocols that allowed the poor decisions is what is needed to assist in those poor decisions never happening again, or in the real world being minimised to an acceptable level. From where I sit that learning is in place now to a certain extent, which is good news.

There are a squillion reasons why this happened. There was a whole pile of holes in the cheese lining up, from ADF, DMO, Kaman, CSC etc that would have made Nias look small.............(no disrespect to what happened there).

The comments saying that the aircraft are "airworthy" and "ready to go and have been for years" are way off the mark, as is the comment on converting output from the ADC into digital. That is spin from Kaman, it always need at least 3 ADC's for a start. That issue, isn't even a pimple on other issues that were, (as a result of an evolving airworthiness environment) going to have a far greater affect on the operation of the aircraft.

Airworthiness, operational capability and risk management have never before been used to the extent that they were in this decision to cancel the program. Not for $150 Mil or even triple that, were we ever going to get a capability close to what we wanted, with any acceptable level of risk..............period.

Thank god it is gone. Money in this cancellation should never have been a player. But as a taxpayer I am angry at the waste as well, move on and learn and vow never to let it happen again.

Better to feel bad over lost dollars than more lost personnel............:(

[Dick Smith]

jumpuFOKKERjump, the fact that the points were not defined in the ATC database is unbelievable shocking neglect. However, even now that they are defined it might solve a future tracking problem, but it would not solve the problem if a pilot had unintentionally descended below the lowest safe or minimum safe altitude when on track.

No doubt we will have to have an accident like that (say, killing 50 or 100 people) and then we will introduce Class E airspace, or some other system, so the pilot reports when visual, and the air traffic controller has a responsibility to not allow the pilot to go below the legal safe altitude until receiving the visual report.

[jumpuFOKKERjump]

Your premise was:Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.Yet the only people that say this roll in the ground where you wee. The procedures HAVE been changed. ...the fact that the points were not defined in the ATC database is unbelievable shocking neglect. Why is that? Who called for the points to put into the Eurocats data? Individual groups who thought it was a good idea put it in, while not really being sure they should. There is not a single VOR or NDB approach defined in the data, is it a shocking neglect that they haven't been? What about missed approaches???

On the other hand, if the airspace is defined as you want it such airspace will revert to 'one-in-one-out', when the Seasprite wants to go IFR. Is that REALLY what you are after?

[Creampuff]

Moving right along..... Agony said:The comments saying that the aircraft are "airworthy" and "ready to go and have been for years" are way off the mark, as is the comment on converting output from the ADC into digital. That is spin from Kaman, it always need at least 3 ADC's for a start. That issue, isn't even a pimple on other issues that were, (as a result of an evolving airworthiness environment) going to have a far greater affect on the operation of the aircraft.

Airworthiness, operational capability and risk management have never before been used to the extent that they were in this decision to cancel the program. Not for $150 Mil or even triple that, were we ever going to get a capability close to what we wanted, with any acceptable level of risk..............period.Any response, PAF or Ultralights?

[Dick Smith]

jumpuFOKKERjump, the chance of two IFR aircraft wanting to operate at the same time at Benalla is pretty slim, and if it is going to save lives, yes it is what I want.

Your mind seems to be fixed in what was done in the past. If professional pilots can operate in Class G airspace in cloud without it being “one in, one out”, then why can’t air traffic controllers operate in this airspace with the same rules?

If professional pilots have decided that this is a safe way to operate (for the last 50 years) there is no reason why air traffic controllers can’t be given the same “standards.”

I’ll say it again. We are a sovereign country and our only obligation is to notify a difference with ICAO if we need to. The US and Canadian system is certainly not “one in, one out” – even in non-radar procedural Class E airspace. They have a number of enlightened procedures which result in the airspace being used in a very similar way to the way we operate now – but with the advantage of air traffic control actually “controlling.”

[Agony]

The $150 mill to fix the ADC ,the AFCS and other issues was not all that was needed IMHO. There were plenty more issues that were not included in that figure that would have well and truly surfaced in due course. This in no shape included iTAS which was still not out of the SIL....... (at least not in AUS)

After that was spent we would have had to continue with more bandaids as the program continued.

The eventual number of bandaids and delays would have resulted in gaining a capability, not to the level of that originally intended. This delay then ensures that newer platforms with later technology would have left the SH2G a generation behind.

Not sure what the flying pig is intended for unless you are closer to the program than I am guessing.........

[komac2]

Not sure what the flying pig is intended for


NZ Police Air Support unit use to have one decaled on the nose of their AS355s like the one pictured may be it's a salute to them :rolleyes:.

[Agony]

Not all the big ticket issues were on the table. That's my point, there were far more that weren't necessarily on the big table in Canberra, but they were there in reality.

My politics 101 comes from the other side of the fence, but rather than to try and be a politician, I am saying it for what it is as someone who was there, not someone who thinks he has all the issues on it.

I stand by my word, $150 Mil was not going to do it, and if anyone thinks only $1 bill was "wasted" they are dreamng as well. The real monetary figure would have had to have been far more than that. There was a lot more than just the Project costs flushed away here...lots more. Things have gone quiet for a very good reason, because if the real figure of waste was ever determined it would be very ugly.

As I said, I was there, plenty left, and not many were willing to fly it. It was a monumental stuff up from every angle and best dumped, regardless of your distant interpretation of what the Minister could have said.

[Creampuff]

But PAF, I read Agony's email as saying that it was never going to get there, for any money. If he's right, the Minister passed up the political opportunity to say he saved infinite millions. That sounds a little silly to me.

Perhaps the provenance of the number is more prosaic. Perhaps the number represents the number the previous government, very late in its life, announced it had approved for further work, plus what little was left in the previously approved funds for the project? You appear to have inside knowledge of the technical details. Do you have inside knowledge of what funds were approved for the project?

[jumpuFOKKERjump]

If professional pilots can operate in Class G airspace in cloud without it being “one in, one out”, then why can’t air traffic controllers operate in this airspace with the same rules?Because they are not required to apply procedural separation standards until the aircraft is identified, ATC are. I don't believe you understand how restrictive they are. I hear (heard, I'm not RGS) pilots nose to nose, and negotiate a rate of climb/rate of descent they are happy with to separate their profiles, ATC only have 10 minute before time of passing. Which is not practical, so 'one-in-one-out', when you're taxying and the Seasprite is inbound...

[Dick Smith]

JFJ, You don't appear to be able to open your mind to fact that we can change our 1950's procedural standards to those that have been proven safe in other modern aviation countries.

All instrument approaches in the USA are in a minimum of class E controlled airspace yet over 50% of those approaches commence below radar coverage. The system works superbly so why can't we at least try it at one airport in Australia?

We will one day and it will work well! In fact Airservices have told me they intend to trial low level class E at Ballina

But don't hold your breath- there are not many people at AA who can actually manage change!

[Brian Abraham]

Pray tell, what is this thread REALLY about? :confused:

[FlyingFrogg]

All we had to do was install another towel rail and some Christmas lights and the chopper would have been finished as promised.:ok::ok::ok:

J.P.Crapinstuff

[Dick Smith]

Following my first post of 18 April, some 9 weeks ago, and virtually nothing coming forward on how the error was made, I repeat this line:

The most important issue is not to make the mistake again, however I can see it being repeated – probably with the Joint Strike Fighter.

I have decided to go ahead with offering a $50,000 award for the best investigative article or documentary on this fiasco (see here (http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/Seasprite_offer.php)).

By the way, I have recently heard that another businessman will be offering $50,000 as well, so the award will be $100,000.

Wouldn’t it be great if some of the better writers on PPRuNe could prepare a full investigative article and have it published? Not only will they be adequately rewarded, but hopefully the mistakes shown will not be repeated in the Joint Strike Fighter project.

[Buster Hyman]

Don't know about the article Dick, but I'd be happy to provide the cartoons! (What are they fetching???);)

[Teal]

From today's edition of crikey.com.au

$100,000 prize for whoever cracks the Seasprite story. Gary Johnston, Sydney businessman and owner of electronics chain Jaycar, thinks $50,000 is not enough of an incentive for journalists to look into the bungled Seasprite helicopter deal. That was the reward being offered by entrepreneur Dick Smith for the best investigative story covering the issue – as reported in The Age (http://redirect.cmailer.com.au/LinkRedirector.aspx?clid=98db6f32-b923-4781-9ee5-5cd4547de7c5&rid=70ac6a9f-9f82-4748-a87c-e55bbfe757f1). Crikey can now reveal that Johnston has decided to add $50,000 to make the reward a substantial $100,000. Johnston told Crikey today he wants to make "all those so-called bureaucrats who make dopey decisions" accountable for their actions. The Government spent over $1 billion on the deal over eleven years before cancelling the contract this year. None of the helicopters were delivered. The project constantly ran into trouble, passing between different contractors and running well behind schedule. Defence insiders were critical of the deal, suggesting the Seasprite helicopters were the wrong choice to begin with and that other models would have been far more useful. "No one's going to get the blame for it. If they worked for a corporation they'd get fired, but these people have probably been promoted," says Johnston. The winner of the competition will be decided by a panel of three judges chosen by Smith.

[Flyingblind]

Love to be a fly on the wall of various offices when the story of this offer came out.

:ok:


I wonder if PM Rudd is this serious about open Government? even opening up the can of worms that is the Australian Seasprite fiasco.

Either way the book should be a fascinating read.

[Sunfish]

The "problems " with the Seasprite and other defence projects arise, from what I've seen, from the difficult interface between public servants, who are necessarily risk averse to survive, and the military, who are prepared to take risks, and have to, in order to survive.

Throw into this mix the Treasury - who is against everyone and anyone spending public money, a few grandstanding politicians like Blowhard Beazley, and a few corporate shills and you have a recipe for very poor decisionmaking.

Case in point the Wamira basic trainer. The RAAF swore blind they wanted something that was among other things, airconditioned (from a PT6!) and whose undercarriage could survive a drop from umpteen metres. They briefed the Minister that they wanted the Wamira in preference to the PC7 and they definitely didn't want the PC9 since flying it turned some of their most promising pilot candidates white as a sheet.

Guess what they got? Beazley said "you are getting the PC9" - the Bankstown boyz had the fix in.

As for the Seasprite, I'm not totally up to speed, but my understanding is that they basically wanted to fit an Australian defence IT architecture into it, when it was designed in the US for an entirely different architecture where the computing power resided in the ship and the chopper was relatively "Dumb", and of course we wanted it the other way around - at great cost. I'm buggered if I know whether it would ever work.

As for who was responsible? We will never know because of what is known as "diffusion of responsibility".

If you want to see this process in action, read the Coroners report into the "Westralia" fire. The moron who didn't understand why Sulzer diesels have double walled steel injection lines (the outer one has a pressure gauge attached to let you know when the inner one has finally cracked) should be in jail.

Then of course there is always the allure of an overseas posting for the lucky officer supervising the purchase of some lovely bit of kit from France or America - perhaps another reason that certain stuff gets bought.

The only thing sure in Defence is that within a few years of taking delivery of the JSF, there will be proposals to fit it with a Swedish cannon, or a Spanish radar, and the whole silly process of integrating chalk with cheese will begin over again.

[Sunfish]

Dawg, that was the word around CAC anyway. Who wants to get posted to Fisherman's Bend? Sunny Switzerland or St. Louis, much more fun.

Ever worked with Defence on a project? Seen the politics at work?

BTW, the stuff about the PC9 comes from someone present at the meeting, and the saga of the Wamira is CAC corporate history. Airforce swore blind that they wanted a purpose built, unique Australian design Then CAC and RAAF got F***ed over and got the PC9 foisted on them.

[Chimbu chuckles]

What is it about the PC9 that would turn any red blooded boy or girl 'white as a sheet'?

[Roller Merlin]

The excellent article posted by Brian earlier had the kicker line:

"Defence - never keen to reject already-committed funds - went ahead and signed the $660 million helicopter contract with Kaman."

A couple of decades in Defence exposed me to the general idea that committed funds nearly always got used for the 'approved purpose' (usually approved after arduous, lengthy and involved process and signoff), or the funds would be snaffled for another project. The trick in Defence is to get any project enough momentum and support by key staff to bubble up into the realm of consideration, then see where is goes. Once all the politics and approval is achieved (often years), the easy part is to start it off! However if the funds get gobbled up in development costs and there is not enough left for the final job, the politics of face-saving make cancellation (or downsizing) are far less risky than grovelling for more money (especially close to an election!)

The PC9 fleet avionics upgrade was a case in point....the system was developed and prototype flown, then the money not enough, an election was looming, so the project was amended to just do a couple of airframes and the fleet forgotten. Oh and all the parts were bought and are sitting on the shelves!

[Sunfish]

Chimbu that was the advice of one of the RAAF people involved in the whole affair who related the saga to me at a mess night. They apparently took some student from the plastic parrot and gave him a drive and he was somewhat "surprised" by the PC9.

My limited understanding of the PC9 is that it was positioned as a lead in to jets and is was not designed to be a particularly docile and forgiving aircraft, in fact mirroring jet behaviour as I was told.

[T28D]

PC 9 it is called torque, the aircraft is wonderfully overpowered, any aircraft that can kill you on base is a handfull, torque rolls are not fun if not planned.

[djpil]

Please don't get me started on Wamira. (It was AAC, Australian Aircaft Consortium, not just CAC) I mentioned it in a presentation to defence and industry recently as an example of the lessons still not learnt.

One view back in the '80's was that working with Defence was like playing Chinese baseball for which the rules were the same as American baseball except that at any time the ball is in the air, any player may move any base to any position.

Interesting that an early concept was based on a turbine CT-4. (It turned out to be a nice aeroplane.) Once they piled on any MIL spec they could find, Wamira needed something like a PT-6 and it became bigger and heavier.

I recall discussing horsepower over a red wine with a high ranking RAAF officer back then - when I said that we needed to go up from 550 to 750 he said it "would be too overpowered". We needed it to meet their specs.

[Sunfish]

DjPil, when I was at CAC/HdH there were quite a few people (both CAC and RAAF) still sobbing about Wamira to anyone who would listen. I didn't know about the consortium thing.

Away for a couple of weeks up North soon, then back to try and make sense out of the stall turn in the A160. Haven't yet got used to exactly what happens after kicking the rudder hard. Barrel rolls and loops now a lot of fun.

I hope the Decathlon and your good self are well.

[Sunfish]

No one is saying that the PC9 is not a good aircraft, what we are saying is that the RAAF asked for one thing and then was forced to buy something else that was nothing like what they promised us that they really wanted.

....But I still look in wonderment at how these things are designed and cobbled together compared to Mr. Boeing's products, but I guess having an ejector seat and three seconds warning to get out is enough safety margin for some people.

[Flyingblind]

Agreed Sunfish, PC-9 probably is a good aircraft, however it will be interesting to hear what the RAAF gentlemen at Pearce think if our friendly Singaporean Air Force peers let them have a yippee in the PC-21 when they get it.

That thing makes the '9 look like its standing still.

[Roller Merlin]

Agreed the PC9 is not a good advanced trainer. Unpressurized, unjet-like performance, heaps of yaw on any power application, poorly harmonized controls with high control forces to satisfy FAR regulations, bumpy lowspeed wing, poor sitting posture..list goes on. Energy management is just not a consideration like a true jet. As an advanced trainer, the MB326 was far superior despite it's aged design.

The RAAF really need a jet trainer with jet characteristics. In future only some transport aircraft will be prop-driven, and it will take much longer for graduates to get to a command level on Wedgetail, C17, Poseidon (737 P3 replacement), VIP types, MRTT (A330 tanker) ...list goes on.

But here we go again...RSAF has bought the PC21, to be based at Pearce and the industrial synergies and politics for buying the PC21 as our PC9 replacement will be overwhelming. The same old story unfolds, like seasprite and PC9, Defence will end up with what the bureaucrats think is a good idea and the repercussions will continue for years to come.

[Spodman]

Back to the topic, nice idea Dick. If somebody can prove they come by the required information by psychic means is the megabuck still on offer? That would make a total of $1,100,000 to some lucky (and deeply spritual) investigator.

[bush pelican]

Dick,
Why don't you do the same thing for the Collin's Class Submarine project? It was a huge fiasco that wasted billions of dollars also. If it weren't for the scale of the losses it could have just as easily gone the same way as the Kaman. People I know that were involved in the project could barely grasp the magnitude of the ineptitude, waste and incompetence that occurred, and they are about to do it again. God help us.

Then there is the present spending of the Brisbane City Council and State Government who are throwing billions of dollars into tunnels and huge inner city road networks when a blind newt can see that this is a recipe for urban and environmental disaster, not to mention the huge waste of public money. One day soon it will become a bike track. It may be significant that one of the key drivers for these projects is ex military.

It is in every level of government and bureaucracy. Take a look at this comment from the Cessna Pilots Association, that is relevant to CASA. and effects us personally as aviators.

Cessna 340 Wing Spar

Tech Support,

Please give me the details on the recent service bulletin concerning the wing center section (I think it is also called the stub wing). I understand that CPA is talking to the FAA about this as you did with the previous exhaust AD. I think it is based on airframe time in service. My aircraft now has 3250 hours on it. I bought it new.

Thanks for your help.

Bill L.

Bill,

I am unaware that CPA is talking to the FAA about this, because since it's only a service bulletin, there's no need to comply with it. Generally, CPA only gets involved if the FAA issues an NPRM (notice of proposed rulemaking for a proposed AD) or an ACS (Airworthiness Concern Sheet stating that the FAA is considering an NPRM).

I believe that the SB you're talking about is part of the Cessna SID (Special Inspection Document) program. The SID inspections are punitively expensive, and almost nobody is doing them except for poor folks in Australia and other countries where compliance is required by the national CAA, and operators of 400-series aircraft affected by the spar-strap AD. Fortunately, the FAA is not requiring compliance for 300-series aircraft, even for most Part 135 operators and certainly not for Part 91 operators.

FYI, there's absolutely no safety concern here in my opinion. There has never been any kind of spar or attach fitting problem in any 300-series Cessna. The only aircraft that have exhibited problems are very high-time Cessna 402s that were operated in commercial service with very heavy passenger loads and very light fuel loads (thereby putting extreme loads on the lower spar caps). I've seen no indication that the FAA is contemplating any regulatory action on 300-series Cessnas. I can't guarantee that they won't change their mind about this someday, but I'm pretty sure that if the FAA were contemplating something, we'd know about it.

My recommendation would be not to worry about this unless and until the FAA forces you to. If you want to worry about something, worry about your exhaust system, not your wing spar.

Mike Busch, CPA Tech Rep.

Lets face it Dick, We can't change the situation. Its part of democracy and still infinitely better than any other political system.

The best thing I have heard you say recently is that you will do all you can to legally minimize the tax you pay. You could then use some of what you save to make the world a better place at an individual level (which I know you do). and bring some of these bureaucrats and politicians to account through the courts and public exposure.

I hope someone takes up your challenge.

BP

[Ian Corrigible]

Thought you folks might be interested in this quote from Asia Pacific Defence Reporter magazine (www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com).

"The settlement between the DMO and Kaman for the divestment of the RAN's SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopters contains clauses preventing Australia from talking down the aircraft in the marketplace. DMO's helicopter systems division head Maj Gen Anthony Frasier has told the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade that "part of the deed of negotiation [that] we have agreed - and this is in our interests - is that we will not talk down the aircraft unnecessarily."

I can picture it now. "Why did we cancel the Seasprite contract? Well, it was a fine aircraft but we...err...decided that its lines just didn't gel well with the Anzac class. We wanted something less, um, ugly..."

I/C

[Dick Smith]

Yes, the $100,000 offer is still open, however it looks as if the money will be donated to the charities as per the statement on my website (see here (http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/cat_index_50.php)). I have a feeling that there is not one investigative reporter left in this country who has the time to do such an important article.

What a pity. Remember the old days when the Fairfax family owned the newspaper and investigative journalism was at the forefront?

[Jabawocky]

I have a feeling that there is not one investigative reporter left in this country who has the time to do such an important article.


Nobody will debate you on that point!:ok:

J

[Gnadenburg]

I hear that recently graduated 2FTS navy pilots are trying to get out of the service as there isn't any operational flying on the horizon.

Don't know if its true. If it is and there are guys let go, someone should be shot at dawn!

[Gnadenburg]

Looks as though it's true.

How much does it cost to train an ADF pilot? One million? Two million considering three years of zero productive employment and ancillary training?

Recently graduated navy pilots are being offered release due training bungling. Devastating for the lads involved- and another expensive casualty of the Sea Sprite.

But guess what? This weekend they will still be advertising for military pilots in the national newspapers.

Taliban- religious indoctrination in Pakistani madrass, age 14 to 16, funded by Saudis. A few hundred USD. AK47 & a few goes at an RPG- another few hundred USD. IED training...... 1000USD per combat soldier?

Australia-..............:ugh:

[oldm8]

Yes many are transferring to the RAAF. There are a few going through the fast jet training system at the moment.

[Captain Sand Dune]

How much does it cost to train an ADF pilot? $1.3M when the RAAF/RAN pilots get their wings pinned on them at Pearce.
Army...........ah, who cares!:}
Taliban- religious indoctrination in Pakistani madrass, age 14 to 16, funded by Saudis. A few hundred USD. AK47 & a few goes at an RPG- another few hundred USD. IED training...... 1000USD per combat soldier?

Australia-.............. WTF?!:confused: Hardly relevant mate.
Yes many are transferring to the RAAF. There are a few going through the fast jet training system at the moment. Confirmed. Those that want to stay in Navy uniform have been advised that they will probably be sent to sea as seaman officers i.e. ship drivers.:eek:
Reckon these kids would have a good case to contest their ROSO and get a job outside.:E

[Crosshair]

Have there been any applications for the prize?

[FriendlySkyFlier]

Ah. Clearly you don't know that much about the Collins class.

Best boats in the world actually now.

I suppose the Australian Navy is just a little bit smarter than you give them credit for.

[FriendlySkyFlier]

It isn't about there being no journalists with the time or the interest, it's about it being a sensitive military subject to which their editors will say 'lol' 'no'.

Don't forget that the government actually does censor a lot of Australian media and you are essentially asking people to look for classified information which they are not going to be able to get.

There is a different approach, but it requires a different strategy than the one you propose as you are in essence asking people to spend a lot of time to get fired and never work again.

[BeechD18S]

It is always easy in retrospect to pick holes through a failed project in retrospect.

ADF capabilities are acquired against a set of requirements that ultimately have their roots in the Defence White Paper. And as has been hinted at in another reply to this thread, the length of time from project inception up until actually delivery is significant. Taking account of technology advances through project life so that you don't deliver something in 8 years time that is obsolete is not easy. And it is not just the ADF who have problems..... the list is endless. In fact the ADF probably has a better record than the US DOD.

Quite simply it is not an easy thing to do. And in the real world political considerations are thrown in as well...for example let's build submarines in Adelaide so that we can help the SA economy etc.

In summary, at the inception of each of these projects you will almost always find a team of reasonable people who think they are doing the right thing, making decisions that a lot of us would also have made in the same situation under the circumstances that were prevalent at the time.

But that was XX years ago and we now know different things than they did.

[wish2bflying]

Some shiny new green flight suits around with eye-watering-clean berets and Navy-style wings attached ... good to see ... :D