PJ2
4th Apr 2008, 21:04
FAA admits breakdown in safety regulation, oversight of Southwest
11:05 AM CDT on Friday, April 4, 2008
By DAVE MICHAELS / The Dallas Morning News
[email protected] ([email protected])
WASHINGTON – Under tough questioning from Congress, top federal regulators admitted Thursday to an embarrassing, years-long breakdown in their oversight of Southwest Airlines.
FAA inspectors, officials testify on airline safety
04/03/2008
The Federal Aviation Administration's top safety officer, Nicholas A. Sabatini, acknowledged that "we didn't know the gravity of what was going on" in the Irving office supervising Southwest. One FAA manager fought with other supervisors and repeatedly blocked his inspectors' investigations of the airline.
That pattern came to a head last year, when the manager allowed Southwest to continue flying planes after it disclosed a failure to completely inspect dozens of planes. The manager permitted Southwest to escape penalty by self-reporting the error, even though his inspectors had questioned the airline's internal controls for preventing such failures.
"It is misfeasance, malfeasance, bordering on corruption," said Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, which held the hearing. "If this were a grand jury proceeding, I think it would result in an indictment."
The FAA admitted to serious lapses only a day after asserting that its oversight model was strong and saying that Mr. Oberstar's investigation was irrelevant to reforms it announced Wednesday. Dallas-based Southwest faces a $10.2 million fine for its role in the controversy.
Also Online
Timeline of the breakdown (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/040408dnbusairsafety.39ea648.html#TIMELINE)
Southwest Airlines could face another big fine over inspections (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/040408dnbussouthwestfine.2a292898.html)
Man in charge of Southwest Airlines probe finds long-standing problems (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/040308dnbusfoushee.3ac95e3.html)
"What has happened here was egregious, and we will apply the full measure of the law," said Mr. Sabatini, associate administrator for air safety.
Herb Kelleher, the airline's executive chairman and co-founder, apologized for the airline's lapse but said the company never risked the safety of passengers.
"While there was clearly a mistake with our regulatory compliance, we wanted to assure ourselves that safety of flight was not an issue, and we have done that," Mr. Kelleher said.
The stars of Thursday's hearing were clearly two FAA maintenance inspectors who blew the whistle on problems at Southwest, Charalambe "Bobby" Boutris and Douglas E. Peters.
Mr. Boutris said he raised questions for years about the airline's internal controls before supervisors removed him from his job based on anonymous allegations that a federal watchdog later called "baseless." Mr. Boutris later reported a death threat that is being investigated by the FBI. On Thursday, Mr. Sabatini called him a "hero."
"There is no accountability through the ranks in the FAA," Mr. Boutris told the lawmakers.
Mr. Peters said an FAA manager tried to discourage him from filing a complaint about the treatment Southwest received and "unethical actions" by inspectors.
He said the manager pointed to a photo of Mr. Peters' wife and children and suggested that an attempt to push the issue could "jeopardize yours and her career trying to take down a couple of losers."
Mr. Peters filed his complaint anyway, and later alerted congressional investigators to the problems. He said Thursday that "senior FAA management knew about the issues within the Southwest" oversight office for years and didn't do anything about them.
The inspectors' allegations were mostly supported by independent investigations by the U.S. Department of Transportation's inspector general and the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.
Calvin L. Scovel III, the inspector general, told lawmakers that the FAA's Irving office was in turmoil.
"A bigger struggle was being waged for the heart and soul of that organization," Mr. Scovel said. "Not much, if anything, was coming up to [FAA] headquarters."
One inspector who requested a transfer from the Southwest office reported seeing his manager "giving the middle finger" to another supervisor and complained about "militant attitudes" that undermined the group's work.
Mr. Scovel's review also raised questions about the FAA's approach to oversight. He highlighted abuses of the FAA's regulatory partnership programs, which allow airlines and air crews to escape punishment by self-reporting errors.
The inspector general's review found that the FAA allowed Southwest to self-disclose errors without making sure that previous problems were fixed.
"A partnership program that does not ensure underlying problems are corrected is less likely to achieve the objective of improving the margin of safety," Mr. Scovel said.
The former top manager in Mr. Boutris' office, Michael C. Mills, blamed Mr. Boutris' former supervisor, Douglas T. Gawadzinski, for abusing the partnership programs.
Mr. Gawadzinski was "unusually lenient with the carrier in several areas, especially in investigating and documenting violations of the federal aviation regulations," Mr. Mills said.
The inspector general found that Mr. Mills ordered reviews of Mr. Gawadzinski's decisions as early as 2005. Those reviews found problems, but the FAA didn't remove Mr. Gawadzinski until last year, when he was transferred during an investigation of the Southwest issues.
Mr. Gawadzinski was not called to testify and has declined to comment.
Several lawmakers appeared nonplussed by how the FAA's top leaders in Washington couldn't have known about the problems roiling the Irving office.
"What do you have to do to get fired there?" asked Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson, D-Dallas.
Mr. Kelleher and Gary Kelly, the airline's chief executive, both said they were unaware until this week of widespread problems in the FAA office that monitored Southwest.
Recognizing how the controversy has shaken the airline, Mr. Kelleher began his remarks by reminding lawmakers of its "superlative, 37-year" safety record, and the impact of its business model in reducing airline fares over the years.
Mr. Kelleher criticized reports that his airline failed to inspect the jets. The problem was much smaller, he said.
Because of a record-keeping error, Southwest has said the airline failed to survey a piece of fuselage that amounted to less than 1 percent of the area that needed to be checked.
"That was our mistake, but nobody realized it for quite some time," Mr. Kelleher said. The carrier wasn't just "rumbling around the skies ... not having inspected cracks on its airplanes."
Mr. Kelleher also said Southwest's Boeing 737 jets were manufactured so that small cracks would not become large ones.
In a briefing with reporters, Mr. Boutris suggested that it wasn't clear how serious the risk was.
"I would be concerned, especially when the airplane has cracks in it," he said. "There is no data that shows how long an airplane can fly with cracks in the fuselage."
Speaking to reporters after the hearing, Mr. Kelleher suggested that lawmakers had used Southwest's mistakes to raise larger questions about the FAA's oversight model.
"This of course, with respect to Southwest, happened to pop up at an appropriate time to raise that issue," he said.
The witnesses appeared split about whether the problems in the Irving office demanded a wider look at oversight offices. Several inspectors said that office was unique in terms of the atmosphere that prevented inspectors from doing their work.
"What I have been told is that it could potentially be systemic, and I take that very seriously," Mr. Sabatini said.
TIMELINE
Federal investigations traced a four-year period during which regulatory supervision of Southwest Airlines in North Texas broke down. Investigations by Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation's inspector general and the Federal Aviation Administration found:
Dec. 2003 –An FAA maintenance inspector who supervised Southwest, Charalambe "Bobby" Boutris, informed his boss that he found discrepancies in Southwest's system for tracking its compliance with federal aviation regulations. He pushed for an investigation, but his manager didn't approve one.
Early 2005 –Mr. Boutris found that his manager, Douglas T. Gawadzinski, allowed Southwest to change its maintenance practices without formal FAA approval. A higher-ranking supervisor later confirmed it.
Sept. 2005 –A new manager in the oversight office, Michael Mills, raised questions about Mr. Gawadzinski's decision to let Southwest escape penalties for regulatory lapses.
Dec. 2005 –An internal FAA review found that Mr. Gawadzinski misclassified five Southwest violations as "carrier notifications," which don't require the airline to fix the problem.
Jan. 2006 –Mr. Gawadzinski again prevented Mr. Boutris from starting an investigation of Southwest's compliance with airworthiness directives.
June 2006 –An FAA regional team found personnel conflicts in the office. One employee reported to federal investigators that "Southwest was using these relationship tensions to its advantage."
Jan. 2007 –Mr. Gawadzinski assigned Mr. Boutris to an audit of Southwest's procedures for following airworthiness directives. Southwest asked for him to be removed, but Mr. Boutris remained on the task.
March 15, 2007 –Southwest told Mr. Gawadzinski that some of its Boeing 737 fleet may have missed a federally required inspection. The airline found the error while preparing for Mr. Boutris' review.
March 19, 2007 –Mr. Gawadzinski allowed the airline to escape punishment for the violation. Southwest scheduled inspections for 46 jets but didn't stop flying them – a violation of federal rules.
March 23, 2007 –The inspections found cracks in the skin of six planes.
March 28, 2007 –Based on an anonymous complaint, Mr. Boutris was removed from his job and put under investigation. He was later cleared.
April 2007 –Another FAA regional team returned to the Irving office and found that "the office environment had actually worsened" over concerns about the way Southwest's problems were handled. The FAA began an investigation of Mr. Gawadzinski's handling of the case.
June 2007 –Another inspector, Douglas E. Peters, went to congressional investigators about problems with oversight of Southwest.
Feb. 2008 –Rep. James Oberstar, chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, announced a hearing expected to be critical of FAA oversight.
March 6, 2008 –The FAA announced a $10.2 million fine against Southwest for flying planes that missed some fuselage checks.
April 2, 2008 –The FAA announced reforms to address the safety lapses, including a rule to prevent inspectors from going to work immediately for airlines they supervised.
April 3, 2008 –Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters testified at a hearing led by Mr. Oberstar.
11:05 AM CDT on Friday, April 4, 2008
By DAVE MICHAELS / The Dallas Morning News
[email protected] ([email protected])
WASHINGTON – Under tough questioning from Congress, top federal regulators admitted Thursday to an embarrassing, years-long breakdown in their oversight of Southwest Airlines.
FAA inspectors, officials testify on airline safety
04/03/2008
The Federal Aviation Administration's top safety officer, Nicholas A. Sabatini, acknowledged that "we didn't know the gravity of what was going on" in the Irving office supervising Southwest. One FAA manager fought with other supervisors and repeatedly blocked his inspectors' investigations of the airline.
That pattern came to a head last year, when the manager allowed Southwest to continue flying planes after it disclosed a failure to completely inspect dozens of planes. The manager permitted Southwest to escape penalty by self-reporting the error, even though his inspectors had questioned the airline's internal controls for preventing such failures.
"It is misfeasance, malfeasance, bordering on corruption," said Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, which held the hearing. "If this were a grand jury proceeding, I think it would result in an indictment."
The FAA admitted to serious lapses only a day after asserting that its oversight model was strong and saying that Mr. Oberstar's investigation was irrelevant to reforms it announced Wednesday. Dallas-based Southwest faces a $10.2 million fine for its role in the controversy.
Also Online
Timeline of the breakdown (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/040408dnbusairsafety.39ea648.html#TIMELINE)
Southwest Airlines could face another big fine over inspections (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/040408dnbussouthwestfine.2a292898.html)
Man in charge of Southwest Airlines probe finds long-standing problems (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/040308dnbusfoushee.3ac95e3.html)
"What has happened here was egregious, and we will apply the full measure of the law," said Mr. Sabatini, associate administrator for air safety.
Herb Kelleher, the airline's executive chairman and co-founder, apologized for the airline's lapse but said the company never risked the safety of passengers.
"While there was clearly a mistake with our regulatory compliance, we wanted to assure ourselves that safety of flight was not an issue, and we have done that," Mr. Kelleher said.
The stars of Thursday's hearing were clearly two FAA maintenance inspectors who blew the whistle on problems at Southwest, Charalambe "Bobby" Boutris and Douglas E. Peters.
Mr. Boutris said he raised questions for years about the airline's internal controls before supervisors removed him from his job based on anonymous allegations that a federal watchdog later called "baseless." Mr. Boutris later reported a death threat that is being investigated by the FBI. On Thursday, Mr. Sabatini called him a "hero."
"There is no accountability through the ranks in the FAA," Mr. Boutris told the lawmakers.
Mr. Peters said an FAA manager tried to discourage him from filing a complaint about the treatment Southwest received and "unethical actions" by inspectors.
He said the manager pointed to a photo of Mr. Peters' wife and children and suggested that an attempt to push the issue could "jeopardize yours and her career trying to take down a couple of losers."
Mr. Peters filed his complaint anyway, and later alerted congressional investigators to the problems. He said Thursday that "senior FAA management knew about the issues within the Southwest" oversight office for years and didn't do anything about them.
The inspectors' allegations were mostly supported by independent investigations by the U.S. Department of Transportation's inspector general and the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.
Calvin L. Scovel III, the inspector general, told lawmakers that the FAA's Irving office was in turmoil.
"A bigger struggle was being waged for the heart and soul of that organization," Mr. Scovel said. "Not much, if anything, was coming up to [FAA] headquarters."
One inspector who requested a transfer from the Southwest office reported seeing his manager "giving the middle finger" to another supervisor and complained about "militant attitudes" that undermined the group's work.
Mr. Scovel's review also raised questions about the FAA's approach to oversight. He highlighted abuses of the FAA's regulatory partnership programs, which allow airlines and air crews to escape punishment by self-reporting errors.
The inspector general's review found that the FAA allowed Southwest to self-disclose errors without making sure that previous problems were fixed.
"A partnership program that does not ensure underlying problems are corrected is less likely to achieve the objective of improving the margin of safety," Mr. Scovel said.
The former top manager in Mr. Boutris' office, Michael C. Mills, blamed Mr. Boutris' former supervisor, Douglas T. Gawadzinski, for abusing the partnership programs.
Mr. Gawadzinski was "unusually lenient with the carrier in several areas, especially in investigating and documenting violations of the federal aviation regulations," Mr. Mills said.
The inspector general found that Mr. Mills ordered reviews of Mr. Gawadzinski's decisions as early as 2005. Those reviews found problems, but the FAA didn't remove Mr. Gawadzinski until last year, when he was transferred during an investigation of the Southwest issues.
Mr. Gawadzinski was not called to testify and has declined to comment.
Several lawmakers appeared nonplussed by how the FAA's top leaders in Washington couldn't have known about the problems roiling the Irving office.
"What do you have to do to get fired there?" asked Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson, D-Dallas.
Mr. Kelleher and Gary Kelly, the airline's chief executive, both said they were unaware until this week of widespread problems in the FAA office that monitored Southwest.
Recognizing how the controversy has shaken the airline, Mr. Kelleher began his remarks by reminding lawmakers of its "superlative, 37-year" safety record, and the impact of its business model in reducing airline fares over the years.
Mr. Kelleher criticized reports that his airline failed to inspect the jets. The problem was much smaller, he said.
Because of a record-keeping error, Southwest has said the airline failed to survey a piece of fuselage that amounted to less than 1 percent of the area that needed to be checked.
"That was our mistake, but nobody realized it for quite some time," Mr. Kelleher said. The carrier wasn't just "rumbling around the skies ... not having inspected cracks on its airplanes."
Mr. Kelleher also said Southwest's Boeing 737 jets were manufactured so that small cracks would not become large ones.
In a briefing with reporters, Mr. Boutris suggested that it wasn't clear how serious the risk was.
"I would be concerned, especially when the airplane has cracks in it," he said. "There is no data that shows how long an airplane can fly with cracks in the fuselage."
Speaking to reporters after the hearing, Mr. Kelleher suggested that lawmakers had used Southwest's mistakes to raise larger questions about the FAA's oversight model.
"This of course, with respect to Southwest, happened to pop up at an appropriate time to raise that issue," he said.
The witnesses appeared split about whether the problems in the Irving office demanded a wider look at oversight offices. Several inspectors said that office was unique in terms of the atmosphere that prevented inspectors from doing their work.
"What I have been told is that it could potentially be systemic, and I take that very seriously," Mr. Sabatini said.
TIMELINE
Federal investigations traced a four-year period during which regulatory supervision of Southwest Airlines in North Texas broke down. Investigations by Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation's inspector general and the Federal Aviation Administration found:
Dec. 2003 –An FAA maintenance inspector who supervised Southwest, Charalambe "Bobby" Boutris, informed his boss that he found discrepancies in Southwest's system for tracking its compliance with federal aviation regulations. He pushed for an investigation, but his manager didn't approve one.
Early 2005 –Mr. Boutris found that his manager, Douglas T. Gawadzinski, allowed Southwest to change its maintenance practices without formal FAA approval. A higher-ranking supervisor later confirmed it.
Sept. 2005 –A new manager in the oversight office, Michael Mills, raised questions about Mr. Gawadzinski's decision to let Southwest escape penalties for regulatory lapses.
Dec. 2005 –An internal FAA review found that Mr. Gawadzinski misclassified five Southwest violations as "carrier notifications," which don't require the airline to fix the problem.
Jan. 2006 –Mr. Gawadzinski again prevented Mr. Boutris from starting an investigation of Southwest's compliance with airworthiness directives.
June 2006 –An FAA regional team found personnel conflicts in the office. One employee reported to federal investigators that "Southwest was using these relationship tensions to its advantage."
Jan. 2007 –Mr. Gawadzinski assigned Mr. Boutris to an audit of Southwest's procedures for following airworthiness directives. Southwest asked for him to be removed, but Mr. Boutris remained on the task.
March 15, 2007 –Southwest told Mr. Gawadzinski that some of its Boeing 737 fleet may have missed a federally required inspection. The airline found the error while preparing for Mr. Boutris' review.
March 19, 2007 –Mr. Gawadzinski allowed the airline to escape punishment for the violation. Southwest scheduled inspections for 46 jets but didn't stop flying them – a violation of federal rules.
March 23, 2007 –The inspections found cracks in the skin of six planes.
March 28, 2007 –Based on an anonymous complaint, Mr. Boutris was removed from his job and put under investigation. He was later cleared.
April 2007 –Another FAA regional team returned to the Irving office and found that "the office environment had actually worsened" over concerns about the way Southwest's problems were handled. The FAA began an investigation of Mr. Gawadzinski's handling of the case.
June 2007 –Another inspector, Douglas E. Peters, went to congressional investigators about problems with oversight of Southwest.
Feb. 2008 –Rep. James Oberstar, chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, announced a hearing expected to be critical of FAA oversight.
March 6, 2008 –The FAA announced a $10.2 million fine against Southwest for flying planes that missed some fuselage checks.
April 2, 2008 –The FAA announced reforms to address the safety lapses, including a rule to prevent inspectors from going to work immediately for airlines they supervised.
April 3, 2008 –Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters testified at a hearing led by Mr. Oberstar.