HMS Coventry - May 1982

[Edmund Spencer]

I am researching the attack on HMS Coventry during the Falklands conflict of 1982.
Can anyone assist me in making contact with Lt Cdr Neil Thomas who was flying sea harriers based in HMS Hermes?
Thank you
ES

[airborne_artist]

Check yr PMs

[Edmund Spencer]

Many thnaks AA
ES

[airborne_artist]

I can get you David H-D's contact info if you need it.

[Navaleye]

Dick Lane was the AWO and still has PTSD as a result. I may still have his contact details, I was part of the de-brief team. Happy to discuss in an open forum otherwise please PM me.

[Edmund Spencer]

Thanks, Navaleye.
I am researching this on behalf of Allan White who runs the Pebble Island Lodge in the Falklands. He has a particular interest in the incident as it happened more or less on his doorstep. (Also for personal reasons as I was Neil Thomas' wingman when we were hauled off the attacking raid. Regrettably my memory is rather hazy about the specifics.)
Do you have information on where we were on CAP in relation to HMS Coventry prior to the attack? What was the attack direction and what were our radar vectors?
For some reason I can remember the previous day's attack on three Daggers with Andy Auld with great clarity but I cannot remember the datails of the attack on HMS Coventry at all.
Your help will be much appreciated
ES

[Navaleye]

ES,

You and Neil T were holding the northern CAP station approx 10nm due west of Coventry and Broadsword when you were vectored on to the second A4 pair which was approaching over Pebble Island headed due north. That would give your position at approximately 51° 5'2.10"S, 59°58'50.78"W. Visident was achieved before the local air warfare controller in Coventry hauled you off. This means that they were about 16nm SSE of you when detected by Broadsword. I can't give you any help on the exact vectors I'm afraid.

Coventry sank at 51 03.6S, 59 42.2W. That places her 34nm from the entrance to San Carlos water within the extreme limit of Sea Dart range, but only 12.5 miles from the nearest land on Pebble Island.

One of the major revisions to come out of this incident was that if CAP is available it should be used. Only if the probability of interception is marginal should the CAP be hauled off and only if the incoming raid is locked up by Sea Dart. In this case neither of the above were true. A bad call by Coventry's ops team who were too eager to add two more kills to their tally.

[Edmund Spencer]

A million thanks, Navaleye.
If you have no objection I will forward this to Allan White. I know he will be fascinated.
Best regards
ES

[Navaleye]

Dave, No objection at all, very happy to help. Looking back at this after nearly 26 years, I think it would be more than fair for you and Neil to say "We woz robbed!". You were after all ideally placed for an intercept, those A4s would have been toast and 19 lives and one of Her Majesty's war canoes would not have been lost.

[Cornerstone958]

I am sure that I read a book about 18 months ago written by the Skipper.
Sorry can't remember the title but someone out there will.

[airborne_artist]

http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/fourweeksinmaycoverbig.jpg

[Navaleye]

Its a very good read and I recommend it. It doesn't go into the detail that ES was looking for but it does explain the reasons why the Shar pair was hauled off.

He also went on to say what a nightmare its was keeping a 3 year old type 42 going. Imagine what they are like at 30!