Heathrow separation

[G-CPTN]

A 'retired' ATC operator (known as Andrew) has been 'holding forth' about the critical situation for controllers at Heathrow.
It has been reported on BBC Radio Five Live.

[Shunter]

The work of Mr Shoesmith.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7307354.stm

[shoey1976]

indeed, as well as Tom Symonds, the BBC's transport correspondent. Am nervously awaiting your reaction...

[shoey1976]

the BBC website only has enough room for a certain length of story. here is the full version:

by Ian Shoesmith & Tom Symonds
BBC News has been told that air traffic controllers are under so much pressure to maximise the number of landings at Heathrow airport that they are putting passenger safety at risk.
A recently-retired air traffic controller -- who spent more than half of his 27 years' service working on the Heathrow operation -- described what he said were serious safety incidents caused by "an errant culture focussing away from safety towards service provision". He claims one incident in particular involved the "reckless endangerment of the travelling public".
The controller has asked to remain anonymous, but his identity is well known to National Air Traffic Services (NATS). In the months before he retired in February of this year, NATS asked him to write a report examining potentially dangerous safety breaches which had occurred on approach into Heathrow.
He showed us a copy of that 33-page confidential document, which included detailed analyses of 12 "Loss of Separation" incidents occurring during the year to October 2007.
The report was acknowledged, in writing, by his manager as being "of the highest standard". It contained "not only a very accurate commentary on the Heathrow operation but also several recommendations that we are currently considering."
Heathrow's runways are currently handling 98 percent of their total capacity, and the controller wrote in his report: "a premium on optimum Air Traffic Control performance ... has encouraged controllers to implement inappropriate plans of action and continue with them after it has become clear that (they) cannot be satisfactorily executed".
He told BBC News: "In some areas we are throwing away some of the safeguards because it is the easiest way of moving the aeroplanes. I believe you call that cutting corners."
He points to one incident over Reading early on 28 September 2007. The official NATS Investigation Report concluded that an air traffic controller deliberately turned one plane directly into the path of another passenger jet at the same altitude. By the time avoiding action took effect, the aircraft were just 1.8 nautical miles and 100 feet vertically apart. The legal minimum in this situation is 2.5 miles.
He says this incident -- which involved a British Midland flight from Aberdeen and an incoming Air France plane from Paris -- involved a "greater risk than I have ever seen in 27 years of air traffic control. The controller quite deliberately, although not maliciously, put aeroplanes in a fail-dangerous situation, in order that he could maintain the runway service rate. And in so doing he endangered the travelling public."
<insert URL for "Reading incident" sidebar in here>
The NATS Investigation Report, also obtained by the BBC, did indeed conclude that the controller "set up a fail-dangerous situation wherein further and timely Air Traffic Control intervention was necessary to prevent the tracks crossing at similar altitudes ... failure of the second turn to take effect, for any reason, will likely lead to a close encounter".
A senior NATS manager has privately acknowledged that this incident was an example of extremely poor air traffic control technique, but NATS insists this and the other incidents were not serious because aircraft were turned in good time. None were classified as a near-miss -- or 'airproxes' in the official jargon.
Alex Bristol, general manager of the Swanwick NATS unit in Hampshire, the site responsible for flights approaching Heathrow, insisted that safety was the "primary concern, at all times".
"We have hugely skilled controllers who have been trained over many years. We have systems and procedures in place which ensure safety. We have a reporting system and culture which I believe to be second-to-none in Europe, certainly, and probably in the world. I think we are on top of our safety in a way that gives me complete reassurance that (it) is a safe operation."
So are controllers being put under undue pressure to maximise the flow of aircraft?
"Absolutely not, " said Mr Bristol. He added that his priority was to ensure "safety above absolutely anything else. Safety above service delivery. I am confident about that and I consistently review the procedures that we run to assure myself that that continues to be the case."
NATS also point to technological safety nets. Controllers have a system that alerts them to potential collisions, and airliners have the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System -- which tells pilots what avoiding action to take.
Nonetheless, this system should never be used as the main method of keeping aircraft apart.
However the BBC's source is also concerned about the spacing of aircraft as they come in to land at Heathrow. A set minimum distance must legally apply between pairs of aircraft. Typically it is three miles, but when a large plane like a Boeing 777 is in front, a bigger gap must be left behind it. This is because larger planes create something called "wake vortex" -- heavy turbulence which can be highly dangerous to the following aircraft. NATS' own figures suggest minimum spacing is regularly being breached on the final approach -- typically 20 percent each month.
Should individual controllers be blamed? No, says the source, who specifically praises his former workmates: "Heathrow is only able to achieve what it achieves because of the skill of these very professional and dedicated people, but I believe they have been pushed too far. I believe the culture has become errant and I believe that is a danger to the public."
To illustrate his claim that Heathrow controllers' workload is excessive, he points to the fact that "whereas most other sectors try and keep aeroplanes apart, we actually try and put them as close together as we really dare within the limits of the law. That is the only way we can actually service Heathrow at the (required) demand.
"When human beings make mistakes, if they're always aiming for minima, there is no scope, there is no room left to cater for those errors. And that exposes us."
He believes safety standards could be improved, without sacrificing capacity, by introducing rules to guarantee aircraft are at different heights when they turn to make their final approaches.
"Traffic could easily be given a vertical differential, a vertical separation, a vertical safeguard that means that when the traffic does turn in towards each other, should there be an error ... All we've lost is our pride."
"It is something that they could actually do overnight -- it's not something that requires a change of airspace or anything like that. It effectively requires a change of government policy."
But NATS managers have told the BBC this would be a major change to the air traffic control system, affecting approaches to other airports aside from Heathrow. They insist it's not needed because of the skill of the controllers working on the Heathrow Approach -- seen as some of the organisation's best.
Introducing vertical safeguards would also make it more difficult to use Continuous Descent Approach, a technique where aircraft descend steadily, rather than in steps. The government prefer this technique on environmental grounds, because it involves less fuel being burned, and makes life quieter for those living under the flightpath.
NATS has been dismayed by the controller's decision to make his concerns public. But it does admit that there have been instances of poor technique in the handling of Heathrow-bound aircraft, and the CAA has confirmed to the BBC there has been an increase in incidents.
NATS says it has now given individual controllers extra training and advice. It believes the problem has now been resolved.
Mr Bristol added: "Where there are occasions when bad techniques are employed we will deal with those to improve safety on a day-by-day basis, as we have done in this case."
The BBC source actually supports the building of a third runway at Heathrow -- to reduce pressure on the existing pair, and the air traffic controllers that oversee them. But he hopes the government will not allow such high frequencies of aircraft to land -- and NATS managers agree this is unthinkable.
And our source agrees that aviation remains one of the safest forms of transport -- partly because individuals like him are encouraged to report their concerns. But he insists with regard to Heathrow: "there are a number of significant areas where we are not as secure on safety as we should be. Some of our strategies for operation are not watertight. And therefore I believe that in some areas, and I stress the some areas, the public is at greater risk than it should be or needs to be."

[shoey1976]

The Air France aircraft was heading north, while the British Midland was heading south. Despite being second in the sequence, the Air France pilot was ordered by Air Traffic Control to turn in towards Heathrow's final approach before the British Midland. This meant that this plane was turning directly across the path of the British Midland. The controller gave this order on the basis that immediately afterwards he would order the British Midland pilot to turn in front of the Air France jet.
But what if the controller could not immediately get through to the British Midland pilot? The BBC's whistle-blower says that happens on a relatively common basis. Sometimes he says the radio system is used to 90 percent of its capacity, a claim rejected by NATS Swanwick general manager. In lay terms, it's the equivalent of getting through at the first attempt when making a mobile phone call at a crowded event like a football match. Whilst you hope this happens, sometimes it takes two or more tries.
The recently retired controller said: "The radio sometimes becomes blocked, pilots are slow to take the turn, the air traffic controller may have got distracted by something else. Had that turn not taken place then extrapolation of the radar picture demonstrates that the aeroplane from the north would have passed very close indeed -- probably less than a quarter of a mile -- straight across the front of the one from the south. That is extraordinarily close. That is a shocking incident".
In terms of timings, he estimates from the radar that collision could have been as little as 20 seconds away: "Whether they actually would have hit -- very, very difficult to judge but they got extremely close and way past the point, way, way past the point, at which the regulator should be getting involved with this type of operational culture."

[zkdli]

How is "Andrew", who by the way has a very distictive voice and will be recognised by all his colleagues, a whistleblower? He showed you a NATS report that they commisioned to give more information in to a trend that they had noticed and were doing things about. They have continued to do things to improve the safety environment and this news item is in effect along the lines of "NATS safety were doing their job and have continued to do their job in maintaining the safety around Heathrow."

And just how many incidents were AIRPROX?

[PAXboy]

SLF speaking.
Good work by the BBC.

Whilst presuming that all controllers are doing their very best, I presume that most major airfields around the world have this problem.

I have presumed for some ten years that these problems are higher at EGLL and EGKK due to the reduced level of interest that the CAA takes in the running of operations since the changes introduced by the Thatcher govt.

The CAA have consistently allowed more rotations to be booked into EGLL than it can reasonably (that lovely English word) handle. NATS have, in my personal opinion, consistently accepted more traffic movements in the London area than can reasonably be handled. I presume that, at some time, two a/c will meet over London. I presume that the chance of this happening is slight but GREATER in London that it might be or should be.

I see the actions of the CAA and NATS as being entirely typical of modern govt in the UK, as instigated by the Conservatives and enthusiastically continued by the neo-Tories, otherwise known as New/Labour.

Can anything be done? Yes, cut back on traffic movements until new runway capacity is available. That will not happen. And, if more runway capacity IS provided, then the numbers will be increased further. This will be done because the lack of prangs will 'prove' that what they are doing is safe, so they can have more movements with another runway. Rather than the keep the numbers the same and increase distances and timings.

The only other thing to do is have more ATC staff and reduce their workload and time at the screen. Again, this won't happen and because of the commercial pressures. Which ... is where the problem started!

[Point Seven]

We have to accept that, every once in a while, errors will inevitably be made. We, in the aviation community, are humans. This was, unfortunately, one such incident.

I would like to thank "Andrew" for spreading confusion and unnecessary panic throughout the passenger world because he has got a bee in his bonnet. One incident, investigated, action taken, end of story.

Perhaps he'll pop up on here and say why he has decided to discredit his former colleagues in such a crass and public way....

P7

[The Obvious Choice]

Anyone know who this 'Andrew' is then?

[BusyB]

ATC pressures
"we actually try and put them as close together as we really dare within the limits of the law"

not dissimilar to the rostering of pilots to the limits of FTL's

Put both together and what will we get?!!!:(

[shoey1976]

we highlighted one incident. In the 33 page report written by "Andrew" there were a dozen LOS incidents. The Reading one was the most serious.

None were airproxes -- although a couple were very borderline cases.

The CAA have spotted a trend of increased LOS's because they automatically generate MORs. They have spoken to NATS and ordered remedial action. in some cases extra training.

As I said on air and have made clear, "Andrew" goes out of his way to praise the professionalism and skill of his former colleagues. What concerns him though is the pressure on them to be at 100% all of the time. when you have little "wriggle room", the consequences of even small mistakes can be magnified.

Yes I know there is STCA and TCAS, but would you be confident about relying on them to get you out of a hole, or would you prefer never to be put in that situation?

"Andrew" cares deeply about his former colleagues -- I've been speaking to him for many weeks, and he strikes me as being highly conscientous.

The fact that his immediate boss praised his work in that report was telling, in our view.

Please excuse my slight stream of consciousness -- I've been in the office since 6.30 and was here until nineish last night.

I've made every effort to be as thorough as possible in compiling these reports -- it's taken quite a few weeks of research.

Best wishes

Ian Shoesmith
BBC News
07769 977665

PS this is the second major story broken as a result of help from ppruners -- thanks to one and all for your (almost) universal support and patience. if anybody has any other aviation concerns -- you know where to find me.

PPS as for anonymity, "Andrew" is aware his former bosses and colleagues will recognise him. having just retired on medical grounds, he now wants to create a new life for himself with his family.

[PAXboy]

Point Seven Whilst he may have a question to answer from his former colleagues, I doubt that the public will give this two seconds thought.

Those that are nervous will be slightly more nervous and those that presume this happens all the time will shrug their shoulders. The continuing high safety record of the industry is one that continues to prevent people from seeing the risks.

Unless people die, nothing will change. I regret to say for the man who has risked so much, as far as the greatest majority of the public and the politicians are concerned, I expect that this news will evaporate.

[slip and turn]

zkdli

I think this story is about NATS getting it wrong, not getting it right.

Unsafe sex is akin to Russian roulette.

I think all would agree that unsafe ATC is akin to Russian roulette.

Perhaps someone could indicate some good links to Airprox, SSE's, Level Busts, Runway Incursions etc. so we can have a look? Are Airprox figures a good measure of safety trends anyway?

I stumbled on this the other day - a discussion paper by Peter Brooker that might give us a better idea of the problem of establishing ways to measure safety performance meaningfully in 'very safe systems', ... or not ...

http://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk:8080/bitstream/1826/1462/1/ATM%20Safety%20Indicators.pdf

[Roffa]

Anyone know who this 'Andrew' is then?

He is a fairly regular poster on PPRuNe but I don't suppose it would be polite to give away his pseudonym.

[schoolkid]

shoey, to echo zkdli , you did not exactly do a great job of covering the controllers identity.

And secondly, if this piece is concerned with the safety of the travelling public in the world's busiest airspace, then why did ye send the BBC chopper up into the mix....
Havent the ATC guys n' gals in that part of the world got enough to be doing without a Beeb helicopter at low level, looking for pretty shots of Heathrow:ugh:


Just my 2 cents (excluding taxes, fees and charges)

[Point Seven]

Paxboy

Forgive me, but I've been a controller for a while now and everytime you mention to people what you do, a good lot reply with "Ooooh, is is true what the BBC said on blah,blah,blah.."

They do notice and it won't help to implement any changes that may need putting in place.

P7

[zkdli]

Shoey - what is the definition of an airprox?

[757_Driver]

typical bbc sensationalist hatchet job - none of them were airproxes?
well, nothing to write about then is it!
Controllers put aircraft as close as they are allowed?! - er well isn't that maximising the efficient use of airspace.
I use as little thrust as i'm allowed and often take as little fuel as i'm allowed in order to have efficient use of my resources - oh my god maybe I always should put 34 tones of fuel on and use full thrust - you know, just in case. :rolleyes:

of course the remedy to all this is more runways and more airports. Now who is the most vocal opponent to that in the UK.
Well smack me with a wet kipper if it ain't the BBC.
Bunch of self-opinionated, self-important, self-appointed *$*S*(S($

[Roffa]

PPS as for anonymity, "Andrew" is aware his former bosses and colleagues will recognise him. having just retired on medical grounds, he now wants to create a new life for himself with his family.

Interesting way of going about it :rolleyes:

[floydie]

@757 driver, more runways and airports may sound good but not without more people to run them. And that is where the problem lies, the only real solution is a reduction of controller's workload in whatever way. And that is not likely to happen in the near future I'm afraid, certainly not by building more tarmac to put the tin on.

[Admiral346]

Not having flown into Heathrow for many years, I don't want to comment on the subject.

I simply want to say that I do approve of how the article is written, it seems well researched and the writer seems to have dug into the subject, without the usual lot of mistakes. Of course it raises some emotions, otherwise it probably would not be worth reporting it, would it?

I would give a "well done" to Shoey...

Nic

[slip and turn]

zkdli, why are you, someone who seems to post a fair bit about ATC issues from an apparently informed viewpoint, asking shoey, a journalist, for a definition of an airprox?

... and Roffa, why shouldn't 'Andrew' be able to enjoy a new life for himself and his family in retirement? The only people beyond his usual social circle who can identify him are the small group of people like you he worked with. Is that likely to be a problem he hasn't weighed?

I too would say well done to Mr Shoesmith.

[anotherthing]

Paxboy.

an awful lot of presumption in your first post!!

NATS have, in my personal opinion, consistently accepted more traffic movements in the London area than can reasonably be handled..

As a controller in the LTMA, I strongly disagree. We have several layers of actions that can be taken before it gets to that stage, it is busy but not to a dangerous extent.

NATS is leading the way in initiatives to make things even safer (notice I say even safer)... NATS has one of the best safety records of any ANSP, despite being responsible for some of the most complex and busy airspace in the world and some of the busiest airports.

By the way, I am not some management lackey when I say the above... far from it, but as a professional with high standards working with a bunch of people with the same mindset, it really gets on my nerves when someone 'presumes' to know better when in fact they do not.

So, the incident that has been highlighted... the controller - a human - made an error of judgement... by all accounts a fairly bad lapse, yet he still did not have an airprox.

NATS investigated, as it always does, and corrective action has taken place. Should be end of 'non story'.

The only other thing to do is have more ATC staff and reduce their workload and time at the screen. Again, this won't happen and because of the commercial pressures. Which ... is where the problem started!
A very poor understanding of how ATC works with that statement I'm afraid. There all hard and fast rules as to how long a controller may work at a particular position. The time that people are most susceptible to making mistakes are when they first take over a position... you need to get a feel for the traffic... yet you, in your wisdom, are advocating that what we in fact do is increase the number of times we do this!!!

Controllers work for longer (still within the timeframe) when it is busy, as more sectors are open. However there are many studies which prove that the human brain is less likely to screw up when it is stimulated i.e. busy, but not too busy... certainly not quiet!

Now, where's the story?

[Point Seven]

Well said that man.:ok:

Or woman, never met you...

P7

[anotherthing]

Man, last time I checked... but cant see past my belly nowadays :(

[GT3]

Or woman

Fear it if you are!

[skiesfull]

This loss of separation implies that it is the controller(s) sole fault. Yet many incidents of reduced separation originate from pilots not responding quickly enough to speed reductions, heading changes and altitude changes. Air traffic control is a service to pilots - the ultimate responsibility for the safety of each individual aircraft belongs to the Captain. If he or she deems the separation to be unsatisfactory, then he/she should immediately seek alternative action.
This is one incident in thousands of routine approaches in a terminal area serving very busy international airports. Don't sensationalise it -and why did "Andrew" not voice his concerns as an active controller?

[Del Prado]

I don't want to debate the nitty gritty here but I find it very telling that the LTMA/LL controllers on this thread are quick to step to the defence of the Heathrow operation whereas many of the posters who think it's a great piece of investigative journalism know very little about the subject.


Is Mr Shoesmith a good thing for PPRUNE?

[shoey1976]

leaving aside Del Prado's comments -- an airprox, so far as i understand it from the CAA (and yes, I did check) is any incident where a pilot, controller etc believes there was a risk of an accident. in journalese "a near miss". a LOS = MOR = a near, near miss.
The CAA also told me that airproxes are down to the relevant professional's judgement. They told me there had been no airproxes in, i think, 2006.
But given a rising trend in LOS's, is it unreasonable to think that, unless checked, more serious incidents (even airproxes) could arise?
MORs, as the name implies, are legally required.

[Roffa]

s and t,

... and Roffa, why shouldn't 'Andrew' be able to enjoy a new life for himself and his family in retirement? The only people beyond his usual social circle who can identify him are the small group of people like you he worked with. Is that likely to be a problem he hasn't weighed?

Well, not the best way to start off a quiet retirement but no, no problem bar one of considerable lost respect for the way he has taken this to the media after no doubt feeling he was ignored (this was his favourite subject) whilst working for NATS... but the rest of us can't all be wrong can we?

I also consider him saying the (safety) culture is errant as very insulting and some of the commentary on the BBC video inaccurate.

[autothrottle]

Heathrow 16 years. Best controllers and ATC staff in the world.

Safe.

Nuff said.:D

[TheOddOne]

Aircraft/Controller comms use a method whose basic concept dates back to the 2nd World War. The separation minima discussed here date back several generations of Radar technology ago. I amazes me that whilst many technologies have advanced by leaps and bounds, we are incredibly conservative in our approach to sequencing inbound and outbound aircraft. By now we should have in place an entirely automatic system where pilots and controllers perform an overview and monitoring function and separation is based upon physical constraints such as wake vortex and runway occupancy times, not the limitations of 1950's Radar technology and 1940's radio telephony. We finally managed to get vertical separation across the Atlantic and other non-Radar areas halved. Isn't it about time that we looked at separation in areas with the benefit of both Radar and GPS reporting?

Those of you who have had an opportunity to look at the trackkeeping accuracy achievable by aircraft during the recent P-RNAV trials will I hope be impressed by how accurate the tracks are - a single line on the plot covers dozens of flights.

We're prepared to invest billions (choose your own major currency) in new aircraft design but aren't prepared to invest in the technology to maintain and improve the safe, orderly and expeditious movement of these aircraft.

Someone mentioned CDAs (Continuous Descent Arrivals). The Holy Grail for these is selection of flight idle at top of descent, the next time the power is required is to taxy off the runway - all achievable but many years away, it seems.

TheOddOne

[anotherthing]

shoey,

I have lots of respect for the way you are up front on PPrune... I have said so on other threads before.

However, there is a robust system in place when things go awry or even when a controller displays a poor controlling technique. We have a good series of checking systems in place, from LCE upwards. Every incident, whether it is an airprox or not, gets investigated.

I'm all for an open upfront system... we have one of the best, if not the best in the world right here in the UK. What peeves my colleagues and I is the fact that a controller who was involved in the writing of this report at the request of NATS decides to pi:mad::mad: all over his former colleagues.

Thats what is annoying.. we are talking about professionalism and judgement here in respect of the controllers actions... two things sadly sadly lacking in 'Andrews' actions.

Autothrottle - I think my colleagues on the area side of TC might take you to task for that statement!! Suffice to say that NATS and UK controllers in general are very professional and very well regulated.

And LTMA area(TC) controllers are the best of the best :E

[Over+Out]

Question for 'TheOddOne' in post 32.
When there is WX, almost a daily occurance, or so it seems, how do aircraft on P-RNAV routes avoid the clouds?

[slip and turn]

Yes Roffa you can be wrong. NATS ATCOs are a minority group and you are not self regulating. I know you are individually some great guys in achieving things that keep the people under your surveillance safe, but that's not enough. The worrying thing is that as a company you are excrutiatingly exposed on a formalised regular basis to external commercial pressures via the same organisation which is supposed to be your safety regulator. I do not understand how ERG ('E' is for Economic) and SRG can protect the public interest whilst this blatant conflict is allowed to continue. You are not in a war zone, so you should not be so stretched on a regular basis.

The PPP arrangement was supposed to obviate the need for a decade of taxpayer investment at the rate of £100M+ per year. Instead I read that after much bigger numbers were supposed to have been injected, that half your company was effectively 'sold' for a piffling £50M to the Airline Group (a consortium of airlines including Virgin, BA and Easyjet) and your main performance targets (subject to mulyi-million pound penalties) are measured in seconds (not even minutes) of delay. Need I remind you that your company almost went bust in 2002 and since then you have been restructured, retargeted, prices recapped, loans refinanced, and goodness knows what else.

Any reader of the public documents and transcripts might be forgiven for concluding that as a company you might be overstretched, undermanned and underfunded for the capital and people investments required to make you state of the art.

Or am I wrong?

[Capt H Peacock]

That's the reason we have human pilots, Shoey.

The last line of defence. After the automatics and the computers have had their say, the experienced pilot is the one (mercifully two) on the flight deck who have the ultimate sanction to fly the aircraft as he(she) sees fit to perform their ultimate duty - to preserve the safety of the aircraft and its occupants.

Pilots who've been doing this job for long enough maintain a mental model of the world around them. Even when you can't see the other traffic in cloud, a pilot builds a picture of his environment by listening to the radio traffic in a sort of 'pseudo lookout' if you will.

This situational awareness has saved many lives in the past. For example the acute awareness of a Lufthansa pilot at Milan Linate in 2001 made one of the soundest decisions in this business in a generation. In thick fog, he refused a take-off clearance because he was not convinced the previous aircraft was airborne - a decision that saved hundreds of lives, and came from thinking outside of his routine 'box'.

How fortunate we are that this industry is full of professionals like him? Pilots and controllers too, who are capable of perceiving threat when all of the clever trickery of technology, and the commercial imperative says that there is none.

Your quest, Mr Shoey, should be to expose the people who would abandon these expensive professionals and replace them with cheap new-hire for their own selfish gain. Now that IS an accident waiting to happen.

[autothrottle]

Well the discussion was about Heathrow!

Seriously the ATCO's in the UK are widely aknowledged as THE BEST...Area TC Guys and Gals included!!!!!!!;)

[zkdli]

Thank you shoey for your answer.
How can you say the following in your post? "None were airproxes -- although a couple were very borderline cases."

Did you interview all the controllers or pilots involved to allow you to make that statement? The definition is - "a situation in which, in the opinion of the pilot or a controller, the distance and relative positions and speeds have been such that the safety of the aircraft has been or may have been compromised."

The only people who can decide if an incident is an AIRPROX are the pilots and/or the controllers involved at the time of the incident. "Andrew" does not have a right to make that call unless he was talking about an incident that he was involved in.:)

[Roffa]

s and t,

Any reader of the public documents and transcripts might be forgiven for concluding that as a company you might be overstretched, undermanned and underfunded for the capital and people investments required to make you state of the art.

Or am I wrong?

I'm not going to get in to a prolonged debate with you (again), suffice to say from someone on the inside in my opinion yes, you are wrong.

[Contacttower]

Would operating in 'mixed mode' (which I understand is occasionally done anyway) and/or having a third runway ease this 'problem' that 'Andrew' has raised?

Any ATCOs care to comment...?

I'm 'just' a PPL but I have had the privilege to sit in with one of the Heathrow Directors in TC at Swanwick for a morning and I was very impressed. :ok:

[TheOddOne]

Question for 'TheOddOne' in post 32.
When there is WX, almost a daily occurance, or so it seems, how do aircraft on P-RNAV routes avoid the clouds?

Why would they want to?

I heard a pilot say the other day:

'Provided the IRVR is >125M, the rest of the weather is irrelevant'.

Not strictly true the whole time, but the case for 99% of his ops.

Don't get me started on Low Visibility Procedures (LVP's). Another shocking case of underinvestment and failure by the regulator to grasp new technologies causing chaos every time it gets foggy.

TOO

[shoey1976]

at least we've provoked debate....
just one point about "andrew" -- throughout all of my dealings with him, he has been very quick to praise the skill, professionalism and dedication of his former colleagues.
He doesn't blame individuals for the incidents he wrote up in that 33page report - rather it's the system he thinks has become errant.
in a nutshell, he thinks that expecting atcos to be working to their best possible performance level, at every moment of every shift, is unrealistic and unfair.
One point he mentioned on 5 Live Drive (www.bbc.co.uk/fivelive (http://www.bbc.co.uk/fivelive)) about 1705 is the fact that NATS own figures suggest 20% or more of WV pairings are underspaced. that's surely worthy of debate?
IS

[slip and turn]

I think zkdli has just argued a point which if true would seem to mean you are wrong, Roffa.

In 2008 it should be possible for a third party pilot or controller analyst to exactly replay the scenario using the original data recorded in the state of the art systems. Evidently insufficient data is infact recorded to achieve this. I am sure that revelation surprises people. maybe NATS is short on diskspace too, or is it more problematic than that?

[Not Long Now]

TOO, perhaps you could pass on your in-depth knowledge of weather avoidance and aircraft to the pilots who routinely ask or indeed just turn on their own initiative to avoid flying through wx. They are obviously not as switched on as your good self, and it would make my job a lot easier if nobody wanted to avoid anything. 1% of the time, try probably 20% of days on average I'd guess throughout the year, or indeed weeks on end depending on the season.

[flower]

The safety systems in place within NATS have been formulated over years and are continuously under review, not by managers controlling desks but by the coalface workers themselves. ATCOs regularly report themselves if they feel there was a fault or a system that wasn't necessarily working as well as it could.

What this report to me seemed to do was bring into question the professionalism and safety culture which belongs with NATS operational staff. Safety first is a mantra so often repeated, knowing the operational staff I have encountered there is nothing that would get in the way of that. One only has to look at the uproar when Mr Barron made the comment of how ATCOs were more loyal to their licence than to NATS to show just how important we believe that licence is to us and no commercial pressures i doubt will ever change the professional way in which operational staff view safety.

Individuals make errors what a shame that a former colleague feels fit to air those errors to a national broadcaster when any errors will have been dealt with internally anyway. It isn't as if they are brushed under the carpet and ignored.

[TheOddOne]

and it would make my job a lot easier if nobody wanted to avoid anything. 1% of the time, try probably 20% of days on average I'd guess throughout the year, or indeed weeks on end depending on the season.

Not Long Now,

I apologise if my post seemed flippant and I do recognise that there are limitations to the automation of the system. I do find the figure of 20% a bit suprising. In a previous life one of my tasks was to liaise with ATC regarding any departures from planned tracks due to weather, so that we could respond to enquiries from the public and passengers, so I do have a little feel for the situation.

The data and presentations that I saw from the P-RNAV trial didn't seem to suggest that weather avoidance was a major stumbling block to the introduction of such a system. The only weather-related issue I recall was to do with out-of-limits w/v.

I still maintain that not nearly enough investment has been made in improvements to procedures through automation both in the TMA and most especially in the treatment of aircraft spacing during periods of low visibility. Please consider how improved automation of railway signalling over the past 150 years has made that system vastly safer. The Docklands Light Railway is entirely automated - no drivers at all and I don't recall having heard of a single signalling-induced accident.

TOO

[Roffa]

s and t,

I think zkdli has just argued a point which if true would seem to mean you are wrong, Roffa.

In 2008 it should be possible for a third party pilot or controller analyst to exactly replay the scenario using the original data recorded in the state of the art systems. Evidently insufficient data is infact recorded to achieve this. I am sure that revelation surprises people. maybe NATS is short on diskspace too, or is it more problematic than that?

I don't know which of zkdli's points you are referring to but any "incident" can be replayed, viewed and the analysis started within minutes of its occurrence using more than adequate systems/software that records all relevant (including information downlinked from the aircraft) parameters.

As I said, I'm not getting into circuitous debates with you again. I'll correct anything you get blatantly factually wrong such as the above, but that's all.

[Smilin_Ed]

No mention here of whether any of these incidents were under VMC or IMC. It makes a difference because under VMC it's the pilot(s) who have the ultimate responsibility for aircraft separation.

[slip and turn]

flower, you miss the point.

This isn't about individuals. It is about corporate commercial interests versus safety. And the safety cannot easily be measured because it is notionally a 'very safe system' where predictions of the next bad thing are difficult.

It was a system borne out of years of steady incremental change overseen by what was primarily a safety regulator. Now it is a system in private hands with an economic regulator who wears at least two hats in this scenario, neither of which are noticeably respected in such a low cost driven market environment.

Individually, you long term ATCOs haven't changed with the low cost market except in crude terms of survival of the fittest. You continue to enjoy a defined benefit pension still embedded in the CAA's scheme which costs well in excess of 30% of your salaries, much of which is still 'passed through' to the taxpayer I think for NERL at least, or is it the airlines which pick up the tab - I haven't quite got my head round it - but I can see that AG don't much go a bundle on it! You have good union representation (which is a good thing) but your union is your protector, not your regulator.

The majority of the pilots flying the aircraft in your care now enjoy no such high cost employment benefits, no pensions in many cases, even no union.

So you feel special. You feel loyal to what you perceive essentially to be a good employment package and a great job. You are special. You feel special enough to have the power as a group not to be pushed around. But how do you as a group decide when it is safe to accept erosion of separation standards without conspicuous extra support in terms of technological investment and proper manning and continuation training? Your union is usually the last to respond not the first.

Why is one of the biggest departments in your company called the Human Factors department? There's more of them now than of you operational guys I think? Perhaps they got the human risk down to such a fine art that you dare pit your skill against the next erosion of separation or manning levels on their say so after a questionnaire session or two?

And whose idea was that prop on the rocks outside your new front door at Swanwick? I don't like the look of it :hmm:

PS Glad to here that replays aren't a problem Roffa :ok: That means if you have the data, you don't have to be involved to have a valid hindsight opinion I take it?

[1985]

Please consider how improved automation of railway signalling over the past 150 years has made that system vastly safer. The Docklands Light Railway is entirely automated - no drivers at all and I don't recall having heard of a single signalling-induced accident.



Trains can stop though, aeroplanes can't.


Someone mentioned CDAs (Continuous Descent Arrivals). The Holy Grail for these is selection of flight idle at top of descent, the next time the power is required is to taxy off the runway


The problem with that is lots of aircraft being at TOD at the same time they can't all do what they want. They have to be streamed and put into a landing order, some might get a continuous idle descent but most won't.

As a controller, for me safety is my primary concern before anything else, I try to be safe at all times, unfortunately i make mistakes occasionally, thats human nature. If something happens that i deem unsafe or could do with improving, i report it. Nats for all its faults actively encourages this, so for "Andrew" to knock this is wrong.

[Point Seven]

S and T

But Nats is a company with one commodity - SAFETY. Yes we have other expertise we can sell but if, as a business, we are to prosper in the future, then everything we do has to be underpinned by safety. If it is not, we will get found out and taken over by some outside ANSP. We have to be safe first, so it makes no sense to begin operating in a generally unsafe fashion most of the time.

In addition safety can be measured, perhaps it is just that you do not have the expertise to do so? Nats employs a large number of specialists to do just this and predict where our target areas should be - and pretty successfully I may say.

So by all means have your say, but please, a bit of fact to back them up next time eh?

P7

[slip and turn]

Point Seven
I have read enough facts to make my head spin. The word that is conspicuous by its absence in the documented regulation of NATS thesedays is 'safety'.

Pick any document from the CAA website with the word NATS in it and do a word search. Yeah 'safety' and 'safe' do usually get a mention, but the real nitty gritty of what's discussed more often uses other words sometimes much more often than feels healthy, and I am not talking 'the', 'air' or 'traffic' or 'control' or 'service'. Instead you'll find CP2 (the second five years since PPP = 2006-2010), and 'capex' and 'opex' and 'pension' and 'savings' and 'customer' and 'cost' and 'reduction'. I even saw a slide from your HR Director where he depicted NATS as a little tug boat awash, and CAAPS as a bloody great smiling thing following behind on the end of a rope. Not sure if he was making the point that the giant CAAPS was a good thing or a bad thing at that point in the proceedings...

It's true I am no expert on measuring safety, I am more an engineer who was taught to first think of a number and then double it, not think of a number and then think again of a lower one for CP2.

[zkdli]

Turn and slip,
I am not sure that you have got the important bit about the definition and shoey's comment. The only people who can state categorically that a loss of separation is an AIRPROX are the pilots or controllers invovled in the incident. The replays and investigations can say what happened, why it happened and how it happened BUT it cannot say that the pilot should have reported the incident as an AIRPROX because in the investigator's opinion it was - the defintion is specific in that it is only the pilot or controller at the time of the incident who can say that.

There are numerous instances in aviation, and other industries, where an incident in one circumstance is not considered unsafe but may have been considered completely differently in other circumstances (e.g occurance in VMC, same occurance in IMC - in one the pilots were always visual with the other aircraft - no incident , in the other they were never visual - incident.)

[NormaStitz]

Having just seen the BBC news version - I'll echo those that have said the story has shown a misunderstanding of ATC procedures. LL Approach have operated with a high safety record for years at all three locations of its life, and the vertical and lateral separations used throughout the approach phase are highly efficient WITH SAFETY AS THE PRIORITY. None of us would've done the job day in, day out otherwise.

A shame a 'whistleblower' who now wants "a quiet life" has to part with a shot in this way - and achieves what exactly apart from something towards his 'Warhol quota'? Let's scare the chavs watching the news?

As one senior NATS manager said once (tongue in cheek) reacting to some newspaper report after an AIRMISS/AIRPROX report had made the papers with the inevitable headlines: "...let's face it, all jets ARE seconds from disaster - that's why we're there."

[slip and turn]

I think you are splitting hairs, zkdli.

What is to be gained by arguing about opinions and individuals?

If the replays are as accurate and accessible as Roffa suggests then there should be standards monitoring which could be completely automated, no humans involved in the initial analysis - just computerised warning reports. If you can obligingly as a company set yourselves official average delay target maxima of 32 seconds per flight, you can sure as hell fine-tune separation minima at a number greater than Andrew's "20 seconds to collision" or something is not right!

But too much of that might wobble pilots and controllers, eh? Everyday having to explain why your automatically analysed incident list is longer than the norm? You'd end up with more paperwork than policemen do!

We all know that a incorrectly tuned movement detector in a car alarm is a nuiscance. So fork out for a good one and tune it properly or ring fence your vehicle with people or hardware so nothing untoward can get near it :p

I know it isn't easy, but just arguing that the system is the best and it ain't broke is not good.

[Roffa]

s and t,

I assume you don't know what the acronyms STCA (the first in the world in Terminal Airspace) and SMF relate to.

Someone else can explain :rolleyes:

[slip and turn]

Roffa so you are saying you already have the automated monitoring - well that's good then. The public don't want acronyms. They want assurance that it's all completely under control and that if 20 seconds is the time to collision that an automatic system will in fact have told everyone what to do at least 12 seconds earlier, so it can't be true. I.e they'd like to know that in actual fact the suggestion of 20 secs to collision at closing speeds of 500kts is a figment of someone's over-active imagination. But that didn't happen, and it was 20 secs.

And what did these two fine new tools show in relation to what Andrew so accurately reported?

[Roffa]

s and t,

NATS' statement (http://www.nats.co.uk/article/122/131/nats_statement_on_bbc_report_into_claims_by_anonymous_ex_con troller.html) on BBC report into claims by anonymous ex-controller

NATS controllers safely handled 240,000 landings at Heathrow last year. We identified 16 incidents where the standard separation was not maintained - none of them were reported as airproxes. There has been only one incident so far this year.

Safety is NATS first priority and we use all the means at our disposal to continue to improve our safety performance. This includes collecting data on all incidents, including these 16, which we analyse for any apparent trends which may help us to improve our standards still further.

In the UK, we have a comprehensive Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme, which provides for independent investigation of serious incidents in UK airspace. Pilots, air traffic controllers and engineers are all required to report in to the MOR scheme.

The review of Heathrow Approach operations is part of our on-going safety improvement process. It looked at a number of incidents, but these were all low-level severity: none of the pilots involved in these incidents believed that their safety had been compromised. We have acted upon the review’s recommendations and kept our regulator fully informed.

Heathrow Approach controllers are not pressurised to deliver continuously maximum landing rate – no ‘pressure’ reports were filed by Heathrow Approach controllers in 2007

Is effectively what they say.

At this point you'll probably say I/we are complacent or something because of my perceived attitude. Fortunately I and my atco and pilot colleagues know we're not and my saying any more than that is probably pointless.

[TheOddOne]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No mention here of whether any of these incidents were under VMC or IMC. It makes a difference because under VMC it's the pilot(s) who have the ultimate responsibility for aircraft separation.

Smilin Ed,

We're talking about the UK version of Class 'A' airspace here, where traffic is all IFR. Separation is maintained between aircraft by ATC, whether or not the pilots can see out (OK, there's Special VFR available, but that isn't applicable in the discussion here).

TheOddOne

[slip and turn]

Roffa, you now as well as I do that pilots sit in an aluminium cigar tube with a bank of instruments obscuring most of their view and their awareness is limited to what they get from their instruments and computer and what they hear on the radio or exceptionally get told by TCAS. Is it so difficult to understand why they do not easily believe that their safety was compromised unless they are actually knocked off their perch at the time or are at the very least shaken or stirred by what they discover later?

So that mostly leaves it to you guys and girls to call - and "It's no big deal" isn't the kind of call that reassures us all.

[chiglet]

zkdli

The only people who can state categorically that a loss of separation is an AIRPROX are the pilots or controllers invovled in the incident. The replays and investigations can say what happened, why it happened and how it happened BUT it cannot say that the pilot should have reported the incident as an AIRPROX because in the investigator's opinion it was - the defintion is specific in that it is only the pilot or controller at the time of the incident who can say that

Bolleaux!

Every and I do mean every reported LOS/Airprox is investgated by a panel of "Professionals" drawn from CAA....BALPA...AOPA...BGA...RAF...et al. You get my drift?
If it's a Hawk overflying a Microlight site...or 2xB737s getting close...in the opinion of the Pilot or ATCO...there will be an investigation
OOI [off the top of my head] An AIRPROX has occurred if there was less than 5nm/1000ft sep or 3nm/1000 in app mode.
watpiktch

[Smilin_Ed]

TheOddOne said, "We're talking about the UK version of Class 'A' airspace here, where traffic is all IFR. Separation is maintained between aircraft by ATC, whether or not the pilots can see out (OK, there's Special VFR available, but that isn't applicable in the discussion here)."

I fully understand that these aircraft are on an IFR flight plan but when they are in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) it's the pilots who must look out for other aircraft and not run into them. Time and again I've had to remind controllers not to panic when I'm in VMC.

[Flap 5]

Well thank God someone has the guts to speak up when they see something wrong. Should he have kept it 'in house'? Yeah right. Then something gets done about it only after a major incident happens. :rolleyes:

I also can not understand why some of you are so annoyed that this 'Andrew' has grassed on your colleagues. Eh? If anything he has helped his colleagues by ensuring something is done about it by top management. Senior management will have to make sure something is done now or they know that if an incident happens and nothing has been done then then they know who the finger would be pointed at. Senior management would have no excuses if they had been made aware beforehand. Of course if it had been kept 'in house' they could always deny any knowledge of such a report. How many times has the government done that in recent times? :=

[Southernboy]

I think your point hits the nail on the head. If more pilots were willing to put their heads above the parapet then issues like fatigue would hit the headlines more.

It is the opposite of disloyal to report systemic faults as only public pressure will get results. We've all seen how effective "regulation" is.

[Lurking123]

I've been a controller for a few years (25 to be precise) although have never worked the LTMA.

My reading of Andrew's report is that controllers are being expected to sequence aircraft to the required minina (3nm/2.5nm/1000ft - take your pick). When I was taught how to keep blips apart it was beaten into us that these minima were precisely that, minima. There are lots of occasions where barely achieving that standard is about the only thing you should do. But, if the system relies upon a controller to constantly achieve the minima (ie no less and no more than) then it is inevitable that there will be losses of separation.

i heard an anecdotal story a few years back (don't know whether it was true of not) about a London controller (single runway south of HRW) who failed to validate in ADC because she only achieved a runway utilisation rate of 41 ac/hr as opposed to the 43 required. As I said, I don't know how true this was. However, the point is that the system required the controller to work, without and leeway, to two sets of criteria. On the one hand was the regulation, n the other hand was the commercial imperative. This is a similar scenario to airlines pushing crew scheduling to the absolute limit whilst staying within the law.

Somebody else has already said it. HRW has an outstanding reputation but one would think that 21st century technology could solve a lot of these issues.

[PBL]

Some input from someone who analyses the safety of critical systems for a living.

slip and turn has made a crucial intervention, early on, by pointing to a paper of Peter Brooker of Cranfield on how to assess the safety of very safe sociotechnical systems. This is implicitly what most correspondents here are debating ("we're the safest"; "yes, but you're getting closer to some limit", and so on).

So has anybody else here read the paper?

Let me quote:
"Is the system safe?" .... getting a good answer to this simple-formed question is not easy.

Debating that, rather than the morals of individual actors, would be worthwhile. I would add something else. There is no "safe/not safe" dichotomy which it makes sense to employ. Safety can be better thought of as a continuum and the question is better phrased as assessing the level of safety.

What has happened here is fairly straightforward. A controller apparently was concerned that the level of safety in certain operations had been reduced, and that this reduction did not necessarily show up in the statistics on currently-sampled events (airproxes, MORs and so on). He expressed his concern in a report which looked at those events and others. The report was apparently well-written. NATS management apparently wanted to keep the report internal. The author and the BBC obviously thought it was worthwhile to put the information in the public domain.

Now, I don't see anything wrong with any of that, and I certainly don't see any reason for anyone to be upset at any aspect of it. If I were working in NATS management, I would likely want to keep it internal, for the usual political reasons; and if I were not working in NATS management, I would want to know the information anyway because this is a public system with a public level of safety. So there is an obvious conflict there, but it is not clear that anyone can judge which side is "right".

I work with a group of colleagues who are prominent in system safety. Many of us feel that safety information should generally be public domain. There are a number of reasons for it. One is that one major applicable standard, for functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) systems, IEC 61508, requires one explicitly to assess the publically-acceptable level of safe operations in order to determine the so-called "Safety Integrity Level" to which a system or subsystem must be demonstrated to conform. Now, obviously you cannot determine the publically-acceptable level of safe operations unless the public has the details. Which are often kept out of the public domain by those who have them. So there is a political problem there which hinders the application of an international standard. The easiest solution is to put that info in the public domain.

A second reason is this. The so-called safety case is a written argument that a system achieves a certain level of safety. The UK pioneered the use of safety cases, and the requirement for safety cases is now spreading throughout the world. Most of the safety cases which I have seen, however, have included very poor arguments which do not necessarily establish the conclusion (that the required level of safety has been reached). One set of exceptions to that general observation on poor safety cases are, I believe, the safety cases for U.K. nuclear plants, which are exemplary in their arguments for a given level of safety and on which my colleague Bev Littlewood is a principal consultant. Many of us feel that an obvious way to improve the quality of safety cases, and thereby to assure that the level of safety achieved by a system is well-established, is to require safety cases to be public, and thus potentially subject to open peer review by anyone who cares to do so.

It does seem clear that, if the trend is for the public to be required to determined a level of acceptable safety for systems which involve public safety, then that information must be made publically available.

PBL

[Contacttower]

Does anyone remember that BBC programme from 2003 The Day Britain Stopped? Which featured gridlock on the country's roads and chaos at Heathrow after an aircraft going around collides with another aircraft on climb-out.

It was prompted (among other things) by a report which:

"calculated there would be one collision following a missed approach at Heathrow, on average, every 20 years"

NATS' response (quite rightly I think) was that it could not endorse the findings of the report (conducted in 1993) considering that "Heathrow has been operating for more than fifty years without a single collision."

My understanding of is that Heathrow runs very safely, but occasionally, like when a plane shuts a runway by strewing burst tyre all over it safety can be compromised.

[Flap 5]

'Operating for 50 years without a collision'. Yes but the numbers of aircraft using Heathrow has increased significantly in that time. One collision in 20 years is merely a mathematical probability. It doesn't have to actually happen.

Not having happened in the last 50 years is good but it doesn't invalidate the statistical probability. I would say it hasn't happened because of the professionalism of controllers. Management and government have relied on that for too long.

[Gonzo]

My understanding of is that Heathrow runs very safely, but occasionally, like when a plane shuts a runway by strewing burst tyre all over it safety can be compromised.

Er, not really. All we do is send one (maybe two) around, and then land on the other runway.

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

I'm not impressed with contactower's remarks. Safety is never "compromised".

Perhaps he would explain further..?

[KC135777]

This loss of separation implies that it is the controller(s) sole fault....Don't sensationalise it -and why did "Andrew" not voice his concerns as an active controller?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SkiesFull,
All pilots and air traffic controllers are first concerned with safety. Although, I think we all know of incidents/accidents where systemic and/or corporate culture/pressure lead to close calls and fatalities. The "culture" (pressure) is handled differently by everyone. Don't forget about fatigue, either. Many "sole" faults have occurred as direct result of fatigue. And, the fatigue could also be a result of not handling the corporate/management culture (pressure) very well. (ie...they can be interrelated)

IMO, this isn't sensationalism, but another "wake up call" to those (pilots & controllers) who might otherwise, possibly NOT handle the "pressure" the appropriate way. With this in mind, this reporting can only help make the skies more safe.

Oh yeah, as far as not voicing those concerns while an active controller...well, the culture & pressure applies to this too.

KC135777

[slip and turn]

I don't want to put words in Contacttower's mouth, HD, but surely if you remove contingency time (opposite of engineers' 'take a number and double it') you are already into a compromise rather like the red wire?/blue wire? conundrum of a bomb disposal expert in the last few seconds against the timer.

I know some of you ATC types like to compare your skills to those of competition chess players against the clock, and that officianado chess players call time trouble zeitnot.

A quick look at the alternative methodologies described at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitnot might make for uncomfortable reading ... I think ERG may already have been there in developing their yardsticks for NATS :{

[TheOddOne]

One collision in 20 years is merely a mathematical probability. It doesn't have to actually happen.


So how is that probability calculated with NO data to go on?

My previous career (30+years) was out on the airfield at large London aerodromes. We had our own separation criteria for aircraft from fixed objects, buildings and so on. It took all of those 30 years to witness sufficient incidents to be able to demonstrate that these distances, laid down many years ago, are adequate or a little conservative. 3 come to mind, an American carrier with a 747 coming close to the South Terminal at Gatwick and again a 757 leaving the paved surface and running along the grass adjacent, again at Gatwick. You could also include the 747 at LHR who forgot to straighten its nosewheel steering and went charging off to the side on takeoff (27R, remember that one, HD?). Thus we have a small amount of data upon which to base decisions about whether or not to change these criteria. Where is your database for airborne collisions between public transport aircraft in the vicinity of an aerodrome? The PT mid-airs I can recall (4) were all in the en-route phase. There's one PT/GA midair that I can recall in the States, but we're not discussing that issue here.

As has already been said in posts above, all you can do in the absence of meaningful data is to take an educated guess and say that millions and millions of incident-free movements have shown the system to work. It may well be that you could now reduce these separation minima as has already been done over the Atlantic etc. We're allowed 500' vertical separation outside controlled airspace on a purely procedural basis without incident (Quadrantal Rule), why not with Radar cover?

TheOddOne

[Contacttower]

I'm not impressed with contactower's remarks. Safety is never "compromised".



Sorry Heathrow Director, I did not mean to imply that go-arounds were unsafe, Heathrow runs a very, very safe operation indeed...I don't doubt that for a minute.


Perhaps he would explain further..?


My comment, "when a plane shuts a runway by strewing burst tyre all over it safety can be compromised" was merely a reference to this incident:

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_501135.pdf

It was more than ten years ago and I'm sure it wouldn't be allowed to happen now. I'm just really interested to hear what people have to say on this 'issue' (if indeed there is an issue at all).

[Visual Calls]

I heard a pilot say the other day:

'Provided the IRVR is >125M, the rest of the weather is irrelevant'.

Not strictly true the whole time, but the case for 99% of his ops.


What utter garbage. Obviously this individual isn't bothered by such phenomena as wind and all its related consequences, CB activity, rain, snow, ice, etc, etc, etc. Wx is a consideration on every sector of every day; more often than not it's a significant factor.
Back to flying his Microsoft-built flying machine I think.

[slip and turn]

I've been on the UK Airprox Board ... well not on it :p, but dippng into their published reports ... http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/default.aspx?catid=423&pagetype=90&pageid=5638

Fascinating language some of it ... e.g. one report involving a couple of Airbuses:

'All other things being equal, Members considered that best practice is to reduce the v/s to a much lower rate to reduce the chances of TCAS and STCA generating alerts'

'Both ac had been cleared to separated levels which had been correctly read back, therefore there are no ATC errors disclosed'

So, for Mission Impossible fans, if I read that correctly, your mission, should you choose to accept it and read it back, is to stick to what you are told and be careful not to upset the movement detectors, and a quiet life with a mission completed is your reward? :hmm:

[Walnut]

Earlier at thread 40 someone asked if mixed mode operation at LHR would increase the movement rate. The rational being at LGW, mixed mode, when the w/x gets adverse, strong H/Ws or low vis. proceedures, they have less delays because the extra separation is partially built in. Clearly at LHR with the current tight separation and non mixed mode, everything goes pearshaped fairly quickly. I suspect the ground movement problems would be a nightmare and could lead to gridlock. Would anyone in the know care to comment, at least it would quash this proposal which BAA seem to trot out from time to time.

[TheOddOne]

Walnut,

Unfortunately 'mixed mode' doesn't do much to cure the Low Viz bugbear. It is still a requirement that no aircraft be within the Localizer Sensitive Area for landing clearance to be issued at 2 miles, whether the a/c in front is another arrival (as at LHR) or a departing a/c. During LVPs, the landing rate at LGW is effectively reduced to 12 an hour, down from 25-30 feasable in normal Ops.

This is a funadamental limitation of the current Localizer technology which is basically unsolveable so long as you're transmitting a VHF phased signal. The much-heralded Microwave Landing System (MLS) which may well have solved this problem wasn't taken up because insufficient airports and airlines were prepared to invest in it. I believe the only operational installation in the UK is on 27R at LHR. British Airways did fit the appropriate kit at considerable expense to much of their fleet but unless everyone else has it too and all the procedures are re-written, then the reduced spacing possible in LVPs can't be used.

The future lies with GPS technology, already deployed in several airports in the US, but our regulator is very conservative when it comes to implementation of new technology. We may have to wait for the European satellite constellation to be operational before EASA/UKCAA will accept these approaches.

Meanwhile, we will continue to have disruption to services in extended periods of LVP. Thankfully they are pretty few and far between. Most vis below 600M only lasts for an hour or so. Procedures are in place now, certainly at LGW, to take advantage of even momentary improvements of IRVR above 550M to increase the movement rate.

It's not too many years ago that an airport would come to a halt in LVPs, despite being CATIII equipped as many aircraft/crews weren't. Now practically all a/c are, people are justifiably irritated by delays.


TheOddOne

[Point Seven]

slip and turn

What are you on about? That reference is about selection of Vertical Speed - and it is a bloody good practice in busy airspace not to select a high climb/descent speed as TCAS picks it up as a prospective target, regardless of the level that you have assigned, and could cause an RA - which in the LTMA certainly ain't much appreciated.

And for the chap who posted about challenging safety, I absolutely agree with you. Nats and their controllers should not be afraid of challenge - and they are not. But let's do it through the right channels, not by running with hysterical stories to a broadcasting corporation who love kicking Nats anyway (yes you do) and accuse your former colleagues of "errant" practice.

P7

[slip and turn]

Exactly Point Seven, just like alarms in my neighbourhood go off for all manner of bad practice reasons and ain't much appreciated ... so much so that they're ALL bloody useless now, and if the police do turn up, they're often missing something more important.


And as for the right channels, well some of us are becoming rather impatient with those ... look at 777 fuel ...

Call it a demonstration of protest if you like. The banners read something like

____________
| Better Safe |
| than Sorry..|
|......:ok:......|
___________

and not
______________
|Better no Delay|
| than Penalty.. |
| ....... :} .......|
______________

[zkdli]

A lot of speculation and discussion on this! Where is 120.4 when you need him???:):)

[Del Prado]

Perhaps you could just do a search for his previous posts and work out what his views might be?





"Andrew" was right about that 90% RT saturation - at least it was when he did it.:E

[Navy_Adversary]

I have had a note from the mods saying that I have not posted for some time, so here goes:)

I think that ATC around London do a wonderful job:D

I flew as SLF into LHR with BR on a flight from BKK a couple of weeks ago, I had a window seat and it was a cloudless evening.

The views were fantastic, from entering the UK near to Clacton to touching down on 27L at LHR. What I couldn't get over was the amount of traffic in the air in the greater London area, it was a Sunday as well.
On turning off 27L I looked back and sure enough there are another 4 or 5 sets of landing lights descending behind us.

Well done guys, you do a great job.

[Zorax]

ZKDLI

I doubt that "Andrew" and 120.4 would agree with each other.

This is the view of 120.4 from a previous post.

"Minimising the loss of spacing is absolutely essential when the airport is being scheduled at 98% of its available capacity. Just half a mile lost on each gap is multiplied by the number of aircraft waiting and adds up to a huge amount of wasted fuel over a day"

So if trying to achieve this results in "errant controlling" according to Andrew, it wouldn't be something that 120.4 would condone.;)

[anotherthing]

slip and turn

your arguments show a huge flaw in your knowledge of what ATCOS do and how they do it... your comment about reducing v/s being a bad thing just amplifies exactly how little you know about what you are talking about.

As for mentioning pay and terms and conditions earlier on... they have absolutely no bearing on this subject... Whether we have a good pension or not means nothing.

Safety is the number one issue with ATCOS and with NATS. The fact that it is not mentioned in every sentence of every press relese NATS makes does not mean they have forgotten about it. Rather it shows that because of all the good things NATS are achieving in safety and performance, they can concentrate more on the business plan.

ATCOS who have incidents absolutely crap themselves... SAFETY IS OUR NUMBER ONE CONCERN... how difficult is that for you to understand?

There will always be instances of poor technique... we are only super humans after all, not immortals. There is a very good check system in place to cover these instances - there are numerous ATCOs out there who have had a period of re-training to iron out bad habits... our professionalism is probably the biggest contribution to policing standards.

[slip and turn]

anotherthing, I think you misunderstand me - maybe I didn't make myself clear - if so I apologise - I was just smiling at the whole sentence from UKAB which seemed to suggest that the name of the game was to prevent TCAS and STCA alerts ... and that NATS had done their bit (end of).

Of course I wasn't recommending that maintaining 4000fpm v/s within 1000ft of cleared level was a good thing :eek:

And as for wordcounts in press releases, I wasn't talking about press releases. I was talking about all documents published by your regulator which actually if interested parties were to Google with more cunning than alacrity might soon put a lot of your company's management under more effective public scrutiny (a good thing). We are able to do it thanks mostly to the Freedom Of Information Act - a statute from which NATS is probably exempt, but thank goodness your regulator is not.

I am sure very few reading this thread are interested in discussing the merits of individuals' performances, individuals' poor technique, human frailties, or even individuals' hurt feelings. I certainly am not interested in any of them in the context of this thread. Why are you? Beyond the slightly worrying ease with which NATS employees jump to take offense, all those things are wholly insignificant to the matter under question which is primarily how you measure safety in a very safe system, and especially given that insiders rather sadly default to "it's very safe / leave us alone".

You really shouldn't take these discussions of the system you work with so personally, nor for that matter claim so much credit for the lack of incidents in what is so obviously a very safe system i.e. it is largely a characteristic of the system you inherited and the training given to you, and planning done by your predecessors that incidents are scarce. Sure, you are continually developing an even better system ... But with all said and done, scarce doesn't automatically equal safe - that's the proposition under debate.

'Andrew' wasn't tarring you and your colleagues. He was pointing at no-one other than the system itself, which simply meant that some as yet unbounded flaw in the system seems to have permitted "errant" behaviour that risked compromising the safety of aircraft to slip through into "general acceptance" further than he as an expert observer thinks was good for your culture, or is good for us as the general public.

You may well as a group be skilled at catching dropping knives without drawing blood, but your business isn't a circus act, is it?

I have said before: Your business is our business.

And incidentally your management doesn't agree with you about the significance of your employment package including pension. They were worried sick at the thought of you working to rule when there was concern expressed by your airline customers about how on earth it made economic sense to keep your pension scheme afloat, when the rest of the working population has to bite the bullet with something far inferior thesedays. Your management thought they'd lose you, and the business would implode.

You are a highly strung group of people. As a group you are elitist. As a group you are particularly defensive against requests for information about the hows and whys.

Some of us want to know the extent of some of the feats you think you should daily undertake in our name, and what new systems you think you have working properly that support your ever more developed separation tactics.

I perfectly understand how close you guys get to risking your licences and livelihoods when other's eyes come off the ball and you have to pick up the pieces, but that might be a signal that things can't go on as they have been lately. Cue 'Andrew' and his decision to 'out' his report.

Perhaps things have already changed so much that a change in UKAIP is necessary to redraw the lines of legal accountability (liability) with regard to maintaining separation, for example? I don't think you are as accountable in law for the safe conduct of individual flights as US ATCOs, for example?

A change there might concentrate a few minds into real thought, instead of tripping off capital letter emphasis of all the old aviation cliches, ... oh and polishing the life out of that vastly over-subscribed 'p' club badge.

Please stop deflecting the debate with your implication that no safety debate is valid unless it is between insiders. Dare I say that is surely bordering on the arrogant, and at the very least might be misjudged in the open forum?

[Shed-on-a-Pole]

Dear Slip and Turn,

As one humble example of NATS "elitist" and "highly strung" workforce [26 years in] whose militancy apparently leaves our management "worried sick" that they will "lose us" to a work-to-rule which would "make the company implode" I would like to point out two inconvenient facts.

Firstly, in 26 years I have never been involved in any kind of industrial action be it strikes, work-to-rules or anything else. To the best of my knowledge neither have any of my colleagues barring the possibility of small-scale regional disputes which may have escaped my notice. We have in fact been a very tranquil and compliant workforce which has given our management very few headaches when compared with employees of other similar agencies.

Secondly, whilst the NATS pension scheme is indeed a good one, the employer has just enjoyed a very substantial pensions holiday (five years I believe but would accept being corrected on this). During this time, the employees have paid in and the employer has not. Despite this, our pension scheme remains in SURPLUS. Some burden we are!

So we are not quite the unyielding worrisome problem you like to make out, are we? What exactly is your issue with us? Maybe you have had a rough deal with your own pension somewhere down the line but that is hardly our fault is it?

Now lets just cut out the unpleasantness and stick to the facts, OK?

Cheers, SHED.

[anotherthing]

Slip and turn

you totally miss the point. The package we receive has nothing, not one iota, to do with how safe we will be. We do not walk into work and think "I've not had an incident for a few years... I think I will have one today for the hell of it". As ATCOS we are not elitist, we jus know that we have to be on th eball all the time.

We make mistakes, same as anyone else... however we are trained, over many years, to recognise those mistakes and rectify them very swiftly.

We are trained to work as a team and to point out mistakes made by colleagues as they happen, in a bid to prevent there being any nasties.

I do take slights on the system I work within personally... because I alongside every other ATCO/ATSA and ATCE make that system what it is. We are the ones who provide feedback, file reports etc that makes the process evolve. It may sound elitist to you, but it is only people who are at the coal face who can do this... not some person sitting in an office. Anyone sitting on their backside polishing their seat can come up with ideas on how to enhance safety... it is the operators who will prove or disprove any new procedures. If thats what you call elitist, then you need to re-visit the dictionary.

As for working to rule etc... the management should be worried. We are farily well paid... but consider the fact that we are responsible for the control of hundreds of aircraft per working week, involving thousands of lives. Sounds a bit melodramatic, but its basically true. Management want to change our pension... 99% of us consider the pension as payment in lieu... i.e. even though we are fairly well paid, any perceived lack of pay is made up for by the pension.

Working to rule means just that... we could drop the extra sectors that we are not required (contractually) to maintain. We could refuse to do overtime for a month. The company, the airlines and UK Industry and economy would suffer big time. Is that elitist - no, it's fact.

What you need to get through to your brain is that working to rule does not mean working unsafely... it means doing the minimum required to fulfil our contract. Safety will never be compromised.

Pensions are probably the one issue that would make a normally benign workforce stand up... however it would not have any implictions on safety.

The closing of ranks you think you see here is nothing like that. So, in this one instance (out of no doubt a few) that we are talking about, a Heathrow Director made a very bad judgement of error. It was noticed, reported and dealt with. What more do you want? Even 'Andrew' himself admits that that was th eworst incident he had seen in all his career... seem like a pretty damn good advertisemtn for the system to me.

The incident has come to light because 'Andrew' has decided, for whatever reason (especially as he claims he wants to have a quiet retirement), to go public about a report he collated at the request of NATS.

The report was probably restricted (a standard procedure for large companies)... therefore 'Andrew' has broken his agreement when he signed up to the Official Secrets Act. Sound far fetched? Well it isn't, its fact.

NATS commissioned this report... if as you claim they are so blinkered to safety, why would they bother?:ugh::ugh:

[Roffa]

If slip and turn wishes to continue holding the anonymous opinion of a disgruntled former controller with a personal agenda and a bit of a grudge over and above those of us that were doing the positions in question long before 'Andrew" first arrived and will be doing so long after 'Andrew' has left us then so be it, his increasingly rambling posts on the subject become ever more irrelevant.

Like Gonzo, I commend the ignore function to the house.

[slip and turn]

Thank you for explaining how you feel, but seriously, why are we still reducing the system to individuals, and 'Andrew' to the status of a loose cannon? No-one is criticising individuals. Individuals inhabit the system, and individuals pay& benefits is maybe 70% of the system operational expenditure, but individuals are NOT the system.

PS Surely no final salary pension scheme which has taken an employers contribution holiday in the last 5 years is in surplus especially after the last couple of weeks :\. Have you people taken your eye off that ball?? Fascinating.

Your HR boss Phil James told you a while ago that the pension scheme was costing well over 30% of your salaries - so if they haven't been paying in their whack since the very wobbly days of 2002, where's the salary 'in lieu' in it now?

The reason they haven't been paying in is because your customers (some that own half of NATS and some that don't, but who do regularly get to influence your budget via ERG) said they didn't want to, just like they don't want to pay to their own schemes or indeed for anything much thesedays. They just want you to push more tin and deliver sub-one minute average delays and NATS pays multi-million pound penalties if it fails to do so.

Is all that all broadly not so?

When the government finally decided that PPP was the way to go, they said then that NATS needed £100M+ pa capital investment per annum for at least a decade, and that was based on estimates now 10 years old. I think they expected at one point to get around £850M for the bit they sold. But some say they only actually got £50M in the end. How much private money has actually been invested in NATS? Has it really been enough to keep you state of the art?

...and again Roffa, don't take my position so personally - I am arguing one of many sides to what I am sure could be a useful debate. Debates involve opposing points of view. It's healthy, they told us so at school :ok: Tell you what though, yours and HD's ill-disguised pointers to another PPRuNe member are surely not Queensberry :suspect:. Fisticuffs were for PE :ouch:, but seems you now want to duff him behind the bikesheds :=

[Roffa]

I'n not looking to duff anyone up I'd just like to know why one of my former colleagues felt justified in taking the course of action he has done and making the comments he has, which I as a current operational Heathrow approach controller happen to strongly disagree with.

Also, anyone searching back through various threads can put two and two together and work out who 'Andrew' is on here.

I am also more than happy to debate with my peers, those that are able to understand and comprehend the relevant subject matter but not those that willfully ignore when patient explanations are put to them or who also seem to wander off topic such they apparently must have an agenda of their own.

Over and out.

[slip and turn]

Indeed, and it was a good 18 months ago when a certain Heathrow controller said "I don't try and do 2.5nm, or even 3nm spacing, for fun. I do it because that is what is required to to keep the airlines happy at a capacity constrained airport."

...and then things got steadily worse?

[Roffa]

That is what I am paid to do and in a safe, orderly and expeditious manner. Note the order there.

Over and really out.

[Lurking123]

The incident has come to light because 'Andrew' has decided, for whatever reason (especially as he claims he wants to have a quiet retirement), to go public about a report he collated at the request of NATS.

The report was probably restricted (a standard procedure for large companies)... therefore 'Andrew' has broken his agreement when he signed up to the Official Secrets Act. Sound far fetched? Well it isn't, its fact.

Another fact is that the Public are the single biggest shareholder in NATS and the issue is of public interest. By all means, scurry away and have a secretive huddle in the corner but that isn't exactly in keeping with the open and honest culture you are trying to portray.

[fmgc]

I fully understand that these aircraft are on an IFR flight plan but when they are in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) it's the pilots who must look out for other aircraft and not run into them. Time and again I've had to remind controllers not to panic when I'm in VMC.

That may be the case in the USA, but whether you are IMC or VMC in the UK and pretty much the rest of the world if you are IFR you look at the instruments.

In fact I think that even in the USA even in VMC the requirement to look out for other traffic is only there once cleared to go visual by ATC. That is based on my limited experience of flying a very big jet into SFB, with all those light aircraft around I think that you would be off your rocker to accept a visual clearance in a 360 seater aeroplane!

None of the above detracts from the fact that the Captain is responsible and if he/she feels the need to look out of the window then he can.

[Del Prado]

I found this article in last week's Times (http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/books/book_extracts/article3558633.ece) by David Owen on Tony Blair's psyche in the run up to the Iraq war very interesting. The last few paragraphs talk of strong religious beliefs and the single mindedness that can come about when you believe you are on the side of 'good' and only have God to answer to for your actions then you can convince yourself you are taking the righteous path even though every one of your colleagues disagrees with you.

After experiencing "Andrew's" many, many crusades on safety related issues over the last decade, I can see parallels between the article and this latest error of judgement.




Also, I'd like to sincerely thank "Andrew" for not using any incidents of mine during his 15 minutes of fame. I'd have been very upset if he had.

[zkdli]

How many of those 20% under spaced vortex wake encounters happened in VMC when the IFR pilot was continuing a visual approach under the control of the Aerodrome controller when the spacing is only a recommendation? And how many occurred on the intermediate approach?

[slip and turn]

NATS own documentation (not mine) shows that since Nov 2006, on average about 20% of wake-vortex pairs are under-spaced and this is consistent with rates measured before that time.Does 'wake-vortex pairs' = 'wake-vortex encounters'? Or is 'wake-vortex pairs all observed pairs where wake-vortex separation monitoring is critical factor ?

Then .4 says
Also, just under 1% of all arrivals cross the threshold before the preceding has vacated the runway. Most landings that roll 2,500m down are heavy and so have increased spacing behind. Therefore, as we have only about 2 go arounds on average per day, it is probable that most of this 0.8% of arrivals are in breach of legal minima. which seems to use the assertion that 20% of all observed pairs are underspaced.

The introduction of VMC to the analysis does what? Wake vortex is for all intents invisible, Mark I eyeballs have limitations, and I thought TCAS wasn't designed for maintaining separation in the last stages of approach, so are we just highlighting another anomaly where blame shifts but the primary means of monitoring and controlling the separation doesn't, zkdli?

Humour us - what's the intermediate approach angle you are getting at?

[Zorax]

120.4, "Andrew" or whoever you are calling yourself today, it's a real pity that you are only prepared to make one post on this topic. In the past you have been such a vocal and prolific poster and it appears now that only the BBC is a good enough outlet for your opinions. As Andy Warhol once said ........

However, in the unlikely event that you will put your quiet retirement to one side for an hour or so, perhaps you could answer the following.

"I was about to walk out of the door for the last time, after which I would not be able to observe progress in this area".

How much time between walking out the door and going to the BBC did you allow for any progress to be made?

"My greater error was my tardiness in resolving that, which was down to a combination of “it’ll probably be alright” in my mind and no spare r/t capacity with which to do it".

I can't help but think that having made an error yourself, with procedures that you were obvioulsy happy to follow, you have now decided that this was due to an errant culture, rather than just a human misjudgement on your part.

Finally, why the anonimity? Was this the BBC's idea to add a little drama, or yours? If you are really so convinced by your own opinions - why hide?

To my knowledge, NATS hasn't even got enough controllers let alone a hit squad !!

[eyeinthesky]

Why does everyone think we don't already 'work to rule'? Ours is one of the most rule-based professions around. Let's have a look at some of the things we would apparently stop doing if we worked to rule:

Anotherthing posted:
Working to rule means just that... we could drop the extra sectors that we are not required (contractually) to maintain. We could refuse to do overtime for a month. The company, the airlines and UK Industry and economy would suffer big time. Is that elitist - no, it's fact.
What you need to get through to your brain is that working to rule does not mean working unsafely... it means doing the minimum required to fulfil our contract. Safety will never be compromised.

1) Extra sectors: Voluntary (not denying they help in flexibility, but they are voluntary)

2) Overtime: Voluntary

3) Working 1 hour (or less, sometimes) on and half an hour off: less than the 90 mins we are supposed to at a busy unit and still less than the legal maximum of 2 hours on 30 mins off: not 'to rule'

4) Early goes: working less than our contractual hours: not 'to rule'

5) Half day's leave at short notice: not required to be allowed after roster publication but occurs regularly: not 'to rule'

6) Flexible shifts: not required if a business need can be shown for people to be in at normal shift times (and a 'work to rule' would probably create such a business need): not 'to rule'

I'm not denying that staff flexibility allows the operation to be run safely and in a slick manner, but be careful what you wish for if you talk about strict rule implementation of working practices. Noses and faces should not be separated to spite each other!:=

[zkdli]

S and T
I will try to explain some things.
Wake vortex spacing in the context that Andrew 120.4 was describing is only applied in the Final Approach phase. That is from the Final approach fix to (in the UK at Heathrow) 4 DME from touch down.

The spacing is only to be applied to aircraft that are flying an instrument approach. However, if an aircraft is making an IFR approach and is operating visually under the reduced separation in the vicintiy of the aeiodrome rules, the spacing becomes a recommendation. Some of the spacing at Heathrow is done under the reduced separation criteria. So the question was how many of the 20% were operating under the reduced separation in the vicinity of the aerodrome criteria. But I am sure that 120.4 would know about that rule so I didn't elaborate.
As for the question on intermediate approach, it is well known that 120.4 believes that vortex wake separations should be applied outside of the requirements of MATS pt1 to an area of the intermediate approach. Final approach is considered to be from the Final approach fix where specified, or from the completion of the base leg turn to final where one is not.

The final part of his post on legal minima for the landing is an interesting one and I am not sure if he is saying that the aircraft have not got a landing clearance prior to touchdown or not. If he is then the Heathrow tower controllers would be better able to answer that as that is a completly different area to the one of 120.4's current expertise.

[Sallyann1234]

Not surprisingly this 'going public' has touched some raw nerves within the ATC community.
But if the intention was to cause public and/or political controversy then it has signally failed. After the immediate splash on the BBC the subject seems to have sunk virtually without trace.

[Flap 5]

Far from it for me to intrude on controllers private grief on this one - but hang on a minute I am a pilot and frequently a passenger aswell on these aircraft. It is a public service you are providing. Why shoudn't we know about it?

Furthermore David Owen's book on hubris was about the arrogance of certain politicians who justify their actions using false pretexts. This disease has filtered down to the upper echelons of various organisations in our society. A report of this sort has to be passed to the relevant authorities as they are the guardians of public safety. By not doing so the person was making a decision that he was not entitled to make.

You should support Andrew in what he has done. If you don't I would suggest you are either someone with a guilty concience of having been part of the problem in the report or you are part of the management trying to cover it up.

Anyone for weapons of mass destruction?

[slip and turn]

zkdli, thanks for troubling to provide that explanation.

The threshold crossed before the runway is clear at the other end is something discussed many times on PPRuNe of course. Has 120.4 perhaps put a slightly different light on the normal observations by looking at the bigger picture that includes the tendency to 'shrink' or 'stretch' separation in the whole approach, and the knock-on effects, rather analysing just bits of it, do you think? Begins to sound more and more like the M4 fast lane concertina played out simultaneously below the approach on many mornings! Many of the worst emergency skid marks are out near Reading on that approach too ... no two are the same of course, and without impacts none are thought more of except for five minutes perhaps by a minority of the drivers who scared themselves, ... yet we all know what causes it - a general lack of two chevron type separation, perhaps mixed with slick lane changes by the 'clever' operators.

As for failing signally, Sallyann, Andrew 120.4's actions have certainly got a much broader audience thinking properly about it the last few days than the few that got to discuss his report originally, and from what he's told us, that's what Andrew 120.4 strongly felt was required. He was talking about this kind of stuff in PPRuNe 18 months ago and getting a good hearing, but evidently it didn't lead to the type of serious force for improvement he was hoping for.

Now at least NATS Group Exec and the regulators will have to revisit it afresh. I can't imagine it otherwise, can you?

Any public and/or political controversy might be a bi-product of further thinking not yet completed, but surely that won't be required to effect improvement?

[Gonzo]

120.4 and I discussed this........

Also, just under 1% of all arrivals cross the threshold before the preceding has vacated the runway. Most landings that roll 2,500m down are heavy and so have increased spacing behind. Therefore, as we have only about 2 go arounds on average per day, it is probable that most of this 0.8% of arrivals are in breach of legal minima.

.....a few months ago.

I was skeptical at the time. Who compiled this report? What definition of 'vacated the runway' was being used? Was the fact that on some runways we have displaced threshold taken into account? Which legal minima are we talking about?

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

<<How many of those 20% under spaced vortex wake encounters happened in VMC when the IFR pilot was continuing a visual approach under the control of the Aerodrome controller when the spacing is only a recommendation? And how many occurred on the intermediate approach?>>

ZKDLI.. The answer is just about none. At Heathrow radar control is employed about 99.9999% of the time. Visual approaches are quite rare and if vortex separation is required the controllers will usually maintain control to ensure the correct spacing. Never in all my time at Heathrow did I ever "recommend" spacing to a pilot and I don't recall it ever happening. At smaller airports with fewer movements it may be common, but not at Heathrow.

You further wrote: <<Some of the spacing at Heathrow is done under the reduced separation criteria.>>

When does that occur?? Are you referring to the time from which speed control ceases. ie 4DME? Otherwise I know of no other time.

[slip and turn]

Take heart, zkdli

What you posted in response to HD about 'how many of the 20% were operating under the reduced separation in the vicinity of the aerodrome criteria' was I think of interest to us all - have you withdrawn it to redraft it, or is it lost now?

In the meantime might I quote what some kind person has posted on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_(Air_Traffic_Control (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_%28Air_Traffic_Control))

QUOTE
In the vicinity of an aerodrome
... aircraft in the vicinity of an aerodrome tend to be flying at lower speeds. Therefore, if the aerodrome controller can see both aircraft, or both aircraft report that they can see each other, or a following aircraft reports that it can see the preceding one, controllers may reduce the standard separation to whatever is adequate to prevent a collision.
UNQUOTE

What part of UK AIP deals with 'vicinity of the aerodrome criteria' in HD's 99.9% under LHR radar control case?

Edit: Is it purely MATS part 1, Section 1, Chapter 3 (see http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP493Part1.pdf) or is it cross-referenced with something else, in MATS part 2 for example?

This isn't the prime case aired by the BBC, but would it be fair to suggest that accepted cultural use of it as a facility to minimise final spacing even further than might otherwise apply could well be one of the factors that encourage spurious knock-on upsets like the one as far out as Reading?

[Sallyann1234]

s&t
As for failing signally, Sallyann, Andrew 120.4's actions have certainly got a much broader audience thinking properly about it the last few days than the few that got to discuss his report originally, and from what he's told us, that's what Andrew 120.4 strongly felt was required. He was talking about this kind of stuff in PPRuNe 18 months ago and getting a good hearing, but evidently it didn't lead to the type of serious force for improvement he was hoping for.

Now at least NATS Group Exec and the regulators will have to revisit it afresh. I can't imagine it otherwise, can you?

I'm not qualified to judge what reaction the publicity will have within the regulators. As someone who both earns an income and spends much of it within aviation I can only trust that they are doing the right thing whatever that may be.
My observation was simply that in the wider world outside, the topic has come and gone very rapidly and I was slightly surprised at this. Even the anti-airport-expansion brigade has been quiet on the issue so far.

[slip and turn]

I think it's just because a large swathe of the general public only easily understand the concepts of delay or sudden-death in aviation, Sallyann, with precious little in between other than their basic feelings about being shaken or stirred, or whether 'it was a close one' as implied in this BBC story.

Probably even those of us that do understand good chunks of it still have families who whilst very capable in their own field, just trust to God or some other belief perhaps based on extremely basic knowledge of statistics, when they enter an aircraft.

Let's face it, from a layman's viewpoint most of us don't even understand how to build a paper aeroplane that flies well, let alone explain to ourselves why it is safe to sit in an aluminium cigar tube and let someone light the blue touch paper. Best we manage is that it is self-evidently "very safe", but that's not really a valid rationalisation, it's a state of mind we all revert to easily.

Thankfully, the concern raised in the BBC Report, however short-lived amongst a wide audience, has become a concise matter of public record, and therefore it must surely be reviewed again in depth by the proper authorities for risk of "we told you so" reports later, if for no other reason.

[1985]

A report of this sort has to be passed to the relevant authorities as they are the guardians of public safety. By not doing so the person was making a decision that he was not entitled to make.

You should support Andrew in what he has done. If you don't I would suggest you are either someone with a guilty concience of having been part of the problem in the report or you are part of the management trying to cover it up


Ummmm i though the report was commissioned by NATS and was being passed to the CAA? At what point did the BBC become the "guardians of public safety"?

I'm not management (thank god) but its the way its come about, if have problems with the way my sector is run i go to the appropriate people and talk about and/or put in a report, not run to the media because people won't listen to me.

[Roffa]

Quote:
I can't but help believe that this plan of action was in your mind long before you left

Before God, I tell you that is not true.

.4

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't I hear you being interviewed anonymously on BBC radio some weeks ago, before you'd officially retired and left us?

If that interview was actually after you'd left the timescale was very very short between leaving and the first, or at least the first I heard, of your BBC appearances to date.

So perhaps not surprisingly I'm a little curious, did you approach or have contact with the BBC, or did they approach you, while you were still employed by NATS? Either way would be a bit naughty.

[fivegreenlight]

Shoey, ..

" if anybody has any other aviation concerns -- you know where to find me."

How about the ridiculous industry called airport security. Why do we as professionals have to put up with people who are no different to night club bouncers, making our working day so unpleasant?
I realise the travelling public aren't interested, so it doesn't make a good story.

In other words by "aviation concerns" you mean.....anyone got a good story ?

[anotherthing]

Lurking123, Slip and Turn, Flap 5 et al;


Indeed, and it was a good 18 months ago when a certain Heathrow controller said "I don't try and do 2.5nm, or even 3nm spacing, for fun. I do it because that is what is required to keep the airlines happy at a capacity constrained airport."

Firstly – the above from S&T is a silly, pointless statement… the above is the job specification. It is not dangerous or otherwise. I work TC Area where I am allowed to use 3 miles spacing instead of the usual 5 miles that area controller’s use, partly because of the constraints of my airspace… or are you (and by default ‘Andrew’) claiming that practice is dangerous too?

From Lurking123:

Another fact is that the Public are the single biggest shareholder in NATS and the issue is of public interest. By all means, scurry away and have a secretive huddle in the corner but that isn't exactly in keeping with the open and honest culture you are trying to portray.

Coupled with

Far from it for me to intrude on controllers private grief on this one - but hang on a minute I am a pilot and frequently a passenger as well on these aircraft. It is a public service you are providing. Why shouldn’t we know about it?

Posted by Flap 5

Lurking123 and flap 5, you would both have valid points if there was any collusion to hide in this particular, or any other incidents, from the public

However… Lurking123… just because NATS is a part Public owned company does not mean that Joe Public should be allowed to be privy to commercially confidential reports. Or does the public want NATS to lose out to competitors by giving away all its development ideas before it can market them?

Flap 5 – yes it is a public service… the incidents are all investigated and are in the public domain already… A confidential report into those same incidents (that are already in the public domain) – collated by NATS in a bid to improve its understanding of shortfalls operationally and thus potentially as a business have no place in the public domain.
These incidents have already been reported, investigated and dealt with.

NATS is one of the leaders in Flight Safety… This can be seen with projects such as the introduction of MODE S, CAIT, www.flyontrack.co.uk (http://www.flyontrack.co.uk/), level bust awareness and workshops, etc etc.

The writing of this report by ‘Andrew’ is another tool to improve flight safety… We have a huge Human Factors department that does actually do some good stuff with cutting edge technology at times. One way in which it works is by checking constantly for trends.
If a bad trend is identified, steps are taken to understand the reasoning behind it (poor airspace design, poor documentation etc etc) and then a fix is made.

All ‘Andrew’ was doing – at the request of NATS, who S&T seems to think does not take safety seriously – was writing one of many reports done over the years when it is felt that improvements can be made in a particular area.

How often does it need to be said before some people will understand… These incidents are in the public domain if you look for them. They have already been investigated and dealt with, but each incident goes through the process individually. It is by being responsible and asking for facts and figures to be collated that further improvements can be made.

It’s a shame that a controller who was happy to take the money from NATS when they were not unfit to control has to wait until they retire before they ‘blow the whistle’. I personally do not know the chap, but I would be mightily pi:mad::mad:ed off if I found out that I worked alongside someone who harboured such doubts about safety but who had neither the balls nor the integrity to do anything about it until they left the company.


Finally, as S&T seems to be fixated by cash…This thread is not about money, however as you mentioned that our customers do not want to pay for our pension I might as well dispel that myth by asking you this… why shouldn’t they?

Every single company that sells or provides a service, for example NATS, indirectly makes their customer pay for the staff pension scheme… That’s how business is run. Companies make a gross profit, they pay overheads (including Pension), and then they end up with a net profit. It’s basic business FFS!

For someone who in post number 112 states I think it's just because a large swathe of the general public only easily understand the concepts of delay or sudden-death in aviation then claims even those of us that do understand good chunks you show a lot of naivety S&T :ugh:

[slip and turn]

OK well lets put that silly pointless statement in its full context ... that was Roffa 18 months ago retorting to 120.4 Andrew about his view of working to the rule of his latest job description at that time. And one other well-heeled protagonist (thx someone for that word - !) was Gonzo whose contribution was quoted inside Roffa's very same post in November 2006:

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2963220&postcount=66

[Roffa]

s and t I really and honestly don't know why I bother replying to you but if you're going to quote me at least be good enough to get the context correct, not warped to suit your own skewed point of view.

The reply you quote was partly a reply to Gonzo and partly a general comment on some posts from my flight deck colleagues who mentioned tail wagging dog. It was neither a reply to nor a retort to P4. Go and read it all again. (My user name was Porco Rosso back then, had to change it as it was too similar to another users.)

Quite what the relevance of it all is to this thread escapes me and your apology, which I'm sure will be forthcoming, is accepted.

[Gonzo]

Oh, s and t is talking about me, eh?

Shame I can't see what he or she writes.

Terrible shame.:cool:

[slip and turn]

Yes my sincerest apologies, Roffa, I must have completely misunderstood your position 18 months ago and again recently :ok:

[PBL]

Some of the rhetoric on this thread is astonishingly myopic.

the incidents are all investigated and are in the public domain already

If that is so, then it follows that no one can have any real objection to anyone discussing them in whatever manner heshe chooses.

However,

I personally do not know the chap, but I would be mightily pied off if I found out that I worked alongside someone who harboured such doubts about safety but who had neither the balls nor the integrity to do anything about it until they left the company.


which does seem like a condemnation of someone exercising their democratic right to discuss events in the public domain anywhichway heshe wants.

PBL

[anotherthing]

PBL,

This is my last post on this subject as some people just cannot seem to get it through their skulls the actual salient points raised by this subject.

I mentioned that the incidents are in the public domain because the likes of slip and turn and lurking123 (and to a much lesser extent Flaps5 who asked in a mature and understandable way instad of being melodramatic) are claiming that NATS (and by inference the NATS employees who have posted on this thread) are trying to hide things.

The fact is, there is nothing to hide, and another fact is the details are already in the public domain. There is nothing to stop people from discussing what is in the public domain on this site, as long as when they do, they respect the anonymity of those involved.

PBL, I do not know what the safety culture is like in Germany (where your profile says you are located), I would expect it to be pretty good.

However the UK has for a long time led the way in 'open reporting'. Incidents are regularly replayed during annual emergency training... those who made the mistakes have to give their permission as they may be recognised during the playback of the tapes transcripts.

No one on here is saying that discussing an event is a bad thing - it oftnen stops others from falling into the same trap and it helps prevent incidents.


However,

Quote:
Originally Posted by anotherthing
I personally do not know the chap, but I would be mightily pied off if I found out that I worked alongside someone who harboured such doubts about safety but who had neither the balls nor the integrity to do anything about it until they left the company.

which does seem like a condemnation of someone exercising their democratic right to discuss events in the public domain anywhichway heshe wants.


I'm afraid you have totally lost the whole point of this thread and in particular my statement which you quoted. My statement said clearly and categorically that I thought that 'Andrew' has got little or no integrity or backbone because of what he has done and what he has, in his own paraphrased words, turned a blind eye to. This is an experienced controller who claims to be worried about the way that NATS approaches safety in ATC.

Yet this controller did not have the balls to do something about it until he retired. How much would you trust someone like that? Where is the teamwork there? I don't mean lack of teamwork in the fact that he ran to the press, but the lack of teamwork that meant he waited until he retired before making any real noises... he was happy to sit and watch people make mistakes (and probably make them himself) whilst he was being paid by NATS.

This report was a collation of incidents that are already in the public domain. A report written at the request of NATS... probably using 'Andrew' as he was no longer fit to control. The purpose behind the report was to look for and identify trends in an effort to put a stop to them either by re-education or by changing procedures. It's the sort of report that companies around the world do when they strive to maintain a high class service. It has no place in the newspapers.

I'm signing off from this thread now because some conspiracy theorists are to dull or too ignorant to realise the above points in their bid to condemn NATS :ugh:

[PBL]

I'm afraid you have totally lost the whole point of this thread and in particular my statement which you quoted. My statement said clearly and categorically that I thought that 'Andrew' has got little or no integrity or backbone

Yes, well, if that's the point of this thread, then its title would more properly be "Character Assassination", and I am not really interested.

Instead, I was rather hoping there might be some discussion of the pros and cons of LHR separation practice and whether it promotes or might indeed diminish the allowed margins for error. I find such themes interesting, and some think I am expert on them.

PBL

[rob_ginger]

After reading this thread I registered with pprune specifically so I could voice my support for "Andrew"s actions in making his report public. You only have to read some of the vitriolic comments and personal attacks here to see how whistleblowers are treated - I don't blame him one bit for waiting until he had retired. You can see from this thread how he would have been treated if he'd spoken out publically while still employed !

I have read all the posts in this thread, but I am still not clear on how the ATC system is financed in Britain - one poster mentioned penalties if air traffic was delayed. Perhaps someone could enlighten me (sounds like a certain recipe for chiselling away at safety margins if it's true).

Regards to all, Rob.

[eyeinthesky]

Penalties for delays:

The CAA, under the auspices of the Economic Regulation Group, sets limits on NATS with regard to how much it can charge for its services, how much delay per flight it can impose to allow it to fit everyone in SAFELY, and other limits. At present, NATS has to perform to a reducing cost to tthe user year on year, at inflation less a certain percentage (I can't remember the exact numbers). It has to do this in the face of air traffic growing at between 4% and 6% per year and a requirement to provide equal access for all in UK airspace. How many other companies have to this type of arrangement?

Because everybody wants to take off at 0900 and come home again at 1700, some delays are inevitable for this to happen safely. Therefore, the ERG agrees an acceptable level of delay (in average seconds per flight) for NATS to do this. If they exceed this figure (and I'm not going to say here what it is but I'm sure if you're determined enough you could find out from public information), then a financial penalty system comes into force.

You might think that this and safety are mutually exclusive, but you should know that the actual delay performance in last year's (safe) operation was not much more than half the penalty threshold level.

Hope this helps.

[1985]

You only have to read some of the vitriolic comments and personal attacks here to see how whistleblowers are treated - I don't blame him one bit for waiting until he had retired. You can see from this thread how he would have been treated if he'd spoken out publically while still employed !



Rubbish. If he had spoken out while he was employed then he would have done as he was expected to do by both management and his fellow controllers. I have no problem speaking out if i feel saftey has been comprimised and this is encouraged. If no-one speaks out then saftey will never improve.

What people are objecting to is the way he has taken the companies money, whilst quite happily using the procedures that he feels are so unsafe. Its not like he developed these opinions after he left the company, they had to be there while he was with NATS. If he'd spoken out, put reports in, while in the company they would have been investigated. He chose not to, and then ran to the BBC as a "whistleblower".

[slip and turn]

...I am still not clear on how the ATC system is financed in Britain - one poster mentioned penalties if air traffic was delayed. Perhaps someone could enlighten me ...

I'm still not clear either, and I've also found myself looking at what seem to be recipes :hmm:

ERG is one such...but luckily it is Freedom of Information Act accessible and so is largely already published if you know where to look ...

Try Google for site:caa.co.uk ERG (NATS OR NERL OR NSL)


Because everybody wants to take off at 0900 and come home again at 1700 Common misconception. Let's think big picture, not just Heathrow as it stands, and the knock-on effect of the Oceanic one way overnight toggle system ... This is the new millennium. Ryanair have long ago already told ERG that they don't want NATS propounding this out at breakfast home for tea nonsense :rolleyes:

What people are objecting to is the way he has taken the companies money... ... as in Judas and thirty shillings? Or as in soldier taking just one? What about NATS and the taxpayer? That's a few bob gone west ....

[rob_ginger]

eyeinthesky - Thank you for an informative an courteous response.

However, I am afraid that after over 35 years of working for both government and private industry I have grown cynical watching teflon-coated greasy pole climbers and assiduous bean-counters working to trim a little bit here and a little bit there. It requires continuous and thankless effort to resist their salami-slicing tactics. While safety may not have been compromised yet in this case, I am afraid it will only be a matter of time.

You might think that this and safety are mutually exclusive, but you should know that the actual delay performance in last year's (safe) operation was not much more than half the penalty threshold level.

I believe that problems will always arise when dollar-based performance criteria are mixed with safety considerations. The current political mantra is that we need to corporatise and privatise (and don't blame me for those bastardised words!) services so that "market forces" keep them efficent - well I'd rather spend a few extra dollars/pounds on an air ticket than risk being killed by a system with a world-beating efficiency rating and safety margins shaved razor-thin.

[Lurking123]

Anotherthing, just to clarify.

I am not a conspiracy theorist nor do I have any axes to grind with NATS. My observation was raised at two specific comments. Firstly, your observations regarding "Restricted reports and Official Secrets Act". A report which examines and comments upon flight safety issues should not be restricted and I'm having some difficulty in understanding how any element would be covered by the Act. Secondly, a previous comment where someone suggested something along the lines that this discussion should be continued on the NATS part of the forum.

I don't know why Andrew chose to do what he did; he's not the first nor will be the last. Surely a far more interesting discussion would be about how accurate the report was and the subsequent action that NATS has/is taking to address any concerns. Please tell me why you feel such a report has no place in the public (ie the 49% shareholder) domain.

PS. I don't think I've ever been described as melodramatic. Thanks.:O

[Gonzo]

MORs and AIRPROXs are public domain, and rightly so.The more 'speculative' safety reports, which might identify trends, postulate future developments, are not pure facts and official investigation. The writer's opinion now comes into it.

Describing 'Andrew' as a whistleblower is false. He has not blown the whistle on anything. All the incidents were investigated and if AIRPROXs or MORs, would have been published in the respective digests. If lessons had to be learned, CAA SRG ATSD would have worked with TC's safety department to ensure that they were disseminated appropriately.

I do a lot of work within the area of safety. Most of what I help to create is 'commercial in confidence', because it is speculative, and has commercially sensitive information in it. The regulator, CAA SRG, does of course see and examine it, it just isn't available to order from their website by the general public.

A line has to be drawn somewhere as to what is allowed into the public domain. Incidents which fall under certain definitions have to be reported and published, by law. Public domain, and all ATCOs would agree with that.

What about others? I can file a 'safety observation', which might detail a mistake I felt I was about to make, in an effort to highlight it to other ATCOs. Safety wasn't compromised. I didn't actually make a mistake, but thought that I might, given different circumstances. Should that be public domain? It still gets logged into our Safety Tracking and Reporting database, and CAA SRG are informed if deemed appropriate by the reporter or unit safety dept., so any lessons learned are again disseminated across the unit and UK ATC as a whole.

NATS has a very open safety culture, people speak out about safety all the time. If someone doesn't feel able to, for whatever reason, there is always the excellent CHIRP.

If every little thing was open to the general public, then I'd venture that the safety culture would actually be less open than it is now.

[Contacttower]

It has no place in the newspapers.



I don't want to drag you back into the thread anotherthing, so don't answer if you don't want to, but where would you draw the line in terms of what gets released to the media and what doesn't?

I notice that while I was typing Gonzo gave a very reasonable sounding answer...

[slip and turn]

there is always the excellent CHIRP. Behind the behind the bikesheds bit at Qinetiq? :p

Actually, there is also the very excellent University of Bielefeld's RVS research group, whose presence is not unknown here from time to time.

I wouldn't be surprised to learn that special clearances are awarded into private forums on PPRuNe by the more enlightened insiders.

[IrritatedofSwanwick]

This thread has been near the top of the flight deck forum for a few days now, and yet there does not appear to be much comment from the Heathrow based pilot community.


I find this perplexing. Could this be because pilots in and out of Heathrow are not concerned by any apparent reduction in safety standards? I would not have thought so. Could it therefore be because they do not perceive any change in safety standards? I would like to know, and would welcome more posts from the pilot community. Sadly, I fear by now most will have become so bored by the bitching and internal bickering on display here that they will have ceased to take an interest and I will never know.


I have known 'Andrew' for a number of years. I am a Heathrow Approach controller. I would like to think that I am better placed than some to pass comment on his opinions and actions. To berate him (as many have) for keeping quiet whilst he worked for NATS is totally unjust. Those of us who worked with him have known for years about his disquiet regarding our procedures. He passionately believed that his concerns were valid and was very vocal on the subject.


However, I do not share his opinion that the Heathrow Approach operation is unduly skewed towards service delivery at the expense of safety, nor do I know of a single colleague who agrees with his opinion. The way we vector aircraft onto the ILS is as safe now as it has ever been. The truth is that 'Andrew's' very specific viewpoint about the Heathrow operation was at odds with all of those around him.


I believe this powerful conviction in his erroneous beliefs, allied to his perception that nobody else was listening led him to speak to the BBC - a spectacularly ill-conceived act.


However, I believe the vitriolic responses from some quarters on this thread are totally out of proportion and do more harm to the reputation of the ATCO community as a whole than any of the 'revelations' on last weeks' news.


Post 120 I find particularly unpleasant. Having just joined this forum, I've just read the rules for posting. Post 120 is in contravention of them. Why is it still here?

[point8six]

Pilots are always concerned about apparent lowering of safety standards-anywhere. Ask yourself this question. Will "Andrew"'s revelations lead to an increase in separation and a subsequent reduction in movements at Heathrow (or any other busy airfield)? No, of course it won't.
"Andrew"'s concerns sound more like the anger of a man who is experiencing shock after his perceived career has been brought cruelly to an early end. He is hitting out at his former employer and colleagues. Perhaps in time, he will modify his opinions.
Pilots and the travelling public are maybe losing interest, as the incident referred to was not the first nor the last of its' kind and we all expect the safety precautions in place will prevent such an incident becoming a tragic accident. As the media have lost interest, then perhaps so should we.

[Roffa]

s and t,

Yes my sincerest apologies, Roffa, I must have completely misunderstood your position 18 months ago and again recently

Fair enough I suppose as misunderstanding, willfully or otherwise, appears to be your default setting!

I think I'll join anotherthing and finally bow out of this one as well.

[EmergingCyclogenesis]

I could not sit and allow some of the issues, mostly raised by Slip and Slide to go unchallenged. I do not, nor never have worked for NATS but I have worked at both HMP West Drayton and The English Riviera!

There is no problem with the safety culture within NATS. Many of the managers are themselves controllers, with many decades of safety culture imprinted on their brains. The Safety Management system within NATS is very mature and I would argue, cutting edge. There is no culture of covering things up, reports are filed when required and investigated completely. There are automatic systems to improve safety and monitor safety performance and NATS are proactive on developing future tools to further advance the safe and efficient operation of their business. It would make no sense for them to do otherwise, as the implications of a major incident are unthinkable. The Safety Culture is entirely in tune and in concert with other ANSPs and the CAA.

There are indeed targets and NATS recently had it's own "Destinations" targets programme. Safety of the operation was at the TOP...the top 5 IIRC.

I think what has irritated most NATS posters on here, is that the release to the media, of what was a safety survey was not considered, it was uncontrolled and all it has done, is to fuel speculation and feed media frenzy. The release to the BBC has done NOTHING to improve safety.

I do not know the controller concerned, but I do know many others and I share their feelings. There was, is and will always be, a very good system to highlight issues to management and get things resolved. Regardless of what pressures S&M thinks that NATS controllers are under, the facts are that they do a cracking job, to the best of their ability and always have safety at the forefront of their mind. If things get a little busy, they have many tools at their disposal to deal with those situations. Even computer mouse failure rates are recorded and monitored.

I can understand why Mr Shoesmith is interested....he wants a story and what better one than to talk about danger to the travelling public...good for ratings and keeps him in a job/bonus and he can always argue the case that he is doing the public a favour with his investigative journalism. I cannot understand however, what G&T's beef is?

I speak with FIRST HAND knowledge of the NATS operation.

[eyeinthesky]

S&T

QUOTE
Quote:
Originally Posted by eyeinthesky
Because everybody wants to take off at 0900 and come home again at 1700

Common misconception. Let's think big picture, not just Heathrow as it stands, and the knock-on effect of the Oceanic one way overnight toggle system ... This is the new millennium. Ryanair have long ago already told ERG that they don't want NATS propounding this out at breakfast home for tea nonsense
UNQUOTE

No, let's take Heathrow as an example, seeing as this is where it all started. A quick scan through Heathrow's Departures website this morning shows the following scheduled (i.e. tickets sold for this time) departures:
0830 2 flights
0835 4 flights
0840 6 flights
0845 2 flights
0850 5 flights
0855 8 flights
0900 3 flights
That's 30 in 30 mins, which is beyond the achievable airport movement rate, even for some of the more 'inventive' of controllers. Some of these flights will therefore get a delay (and did this morning), and the picture is repeated across Europe. You can't tell me Ryanair has no departures scheduled at that time, either!

The point is that ATC has to manage the peaks and troughs safely with minimum delay. That is what we do. Last year's traffic volumes were another record, and still the average delay per flight caused during this safe operation was just over half the ERG limit. Of course the relationship between the two needs careful management.

Here's an idea: next time aircrew or airport information announce an ATC delay in that bored and critical voice they generally use, perhaps they should add: "This flight has been delayed to ensure your safety". Then people might not moan so much.;)

[slip and turn]

I agree it is probably the nature of the current pickle at Heathrow, and because I am not on an open-ended expense account, I have never been stuck in the middle of it. All my (few) LHR flights have been 'cheap' slots. I suppose there is some kind of informal 'market' between airlines with differential pricing for the 0900ish and 1700ish slots versus the rest? Does NATS get the lion's share of the premium paid? Because perhaps NATS should, and perhaps NATS should have set that premium. Or maybe they do already and the demand is still overwhelming? You'll perhaps forgive me if I have a feeling the simple matter is that NATS do not have a say because BA call most of the shots at Heathrow on a legacy basis?

And seriously, I can't remember the last time I managed anything better than a "grabbit and run" yesterday's Radisson croissant before a Ryanair flight or anything much beyond an 0100 Horlicks before falling into bed afterwards :p

Actually, I am sure there must be graphs of passenger runway throughput numbers versus airborne time somewhere, perhaps overlaid with the Oceanic Departures, and Arrivals 'spread', and any other 'immovables'. That might be interesting.

Can we see it, anyone?

[Lurking123]

Probably "Commercial in Confidence".:ok:

[TheOddOne]

I suppose there is some kind of informal 'market' between airlines with differential pricing for the 0900ish and 1700ish slots versus the rest? Does NATS get the lion's share of the premium paid? Because perhaps NATS should, and perhaps NATS should have set that premium. Or maybe they do already and the demand is still overwhelming? You'll perhaps forgive me if I have a feeling the simple matter is that NATS do not have a say because BA call most of the shots at Heathrow on a legacy basis?


Unfortunately neither NATS nor the BAA receive any kind of financial benefit from the allocation of runway slots at Heathrow, nor indeed are they involved in any way shape or form in their allocation. This is carried out by an independent company called Airport Coordination Ltd who administer runway slots for all the UK co-ordinated airports. Allocation of slots happens at inrernational conferences ahead of each season. Certainly airlines buy and sell slots amongst themselves but the airport and air traffic providers are at 'arm's length' from the slot process. Grandfather rights is the proper term for your phrase 'legacy basis. These are tightly controlled on the basis of 'use it or lose it'.

Now, some might agree with you that these slots OUGHT to be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with BAA & NATS recouping the gains to pay for service provision, an interesting debate.

TheOddOne

[Gridnorth]

Lets remember a couple of things:
1) Airlines want pilots to use as little fuel as possible (always with the cynical caveat that nothing they say precludes good airmanship dah, dah,)
2) ATCOs have to get as many aircraft in/out as they can cope with.
3) If it was left to pilots and ATCOs to get the job done, all would be dandy, as each has a vested interest in a safe outcome.:ugh:

When I was instructing, one of my students was an ATCO and i have to say i would not want your job for anything. I have the greatest respect for the fact that someone felt this story had to be told. I have yet to approach LHR without a 'proximate traffic' call due to traffic on TCAS, but have always concluded you guys on the ground know what you are doing:D- if I did'nt, i would not go on the flightdeck. This is re-inforced by the fact that up to know, we have got away with it.:sad:
We pilots probably tend to second-guess Air Traffic as we have a TCAS display and very rarely are we right.
Lets respect the man's right to voice his concerns.

As for LHR- I'm with Boris, buldoze the s#*thole and put it somewhere else!