V2-OMG!
29th Feb 2008, 19:55
I am fascinated by the dynamics of CRM or "the psychology of crisis" as I call it.
I think one of the worst examples of the principles of CRM not being applied, resulting in a catastrophic airline crash is the 1977 runway collsion in Tenerife between the KLM and Pan Am jumbos.
To condense the CRM aspect of this crash, it has been suggested many times that had the KLM F/O and/or F/E taken a more confident stance as to whether or not the Pan Am had cleared the runway before the captain began his take-off roll, the collision may have been averted. The halting query of the KLM F/E, "Did he not clear the runway - that Pan American?" cannot help but elicit another question: What was really going on in the minds of the KLM crew that day?
A couple of years I was privy to a NOVA documentary which indicted that deficiency in CRM as being the major cause of this disaster. This was further borne out by another KLM pilot who spoke of the kind of company revernence that was felt towards the KLM captain, Jacob Van Zanten. "Van Zanten was the type of senior captain that all of us, as airline pilots, eventually wanted to be. I mean, this was the top of the food chain. This was the guy who was not only a family man—well respected, well loved—at KLM he was at the top of the management chain as a pilot. He was the head of safety; he was an individual who everybody at that airline looked up to. This was a fellow whose face was on most of the advertising about KLM all over the world. I mean this was the best and the brightest."
Unfortunately, this was to become a kind of fatal reverence which will forevermore tarnish the memory and reputation of Van Zanten as being one of "the best and the brightest."
I think one of the worst examples of the principles of CRM not being applied, resulting in a catastrophic airline crash is the 1977 runway collsion in Tenerife between the KLM and Pan Am jumbos.
To condense the CRM aspect of this crash, it has been suggested many times that had the KLM F/O and/or F/E taken a more confident stance as to whether or not the Pan Am had cleared the runway before the captain began his take-off roll, the collision may have been averted. The halting query of the KLM F/E, "Did he not clear the runway - that Pan American?" cannot help but elicit another question: What was really going on in the minds of the KLM crew that day?
A couple of years I was privy to a NOVA documentary which indicted that deficiency in CRM as being the major cause of this disaster. This was further borne out by another KLM pilot who spoke of the kind of company revernence that was felt towards the KLM captain, Jacob Van Zanten. "Van Zanten was the type of senior captain that all of us, as airline pilots, eventually wanted to be. I mean, this was the top of the food chain. This was the guy who was not only a family man—well respected, well loved—at KLM he was at the top of the management chain as a pilot. He was the head of safety; he was an individual who everybody at that airline looked up to. This was a fellow whose face was on most of the advertising about KLM all over the world. I mean this was the best and the brightest."
Unfortunately, this was to become a kind of fatal reverence which will forevermore tarnish the memory and reputation of Van Zanten as being one of "the best and the brightest."