How did Britain loose the lead in aviation ?

[diddy1234]

I am just intrigued as to why Britain could make decent aircraft and then it loose the lead in aviation, take for example the successfull BAC-111.

Other great aircraft like the VC-10 (scrapped because of economics yet passengers enjoyed flying on this aircraft).

Comet 4 was a great aircraft, yet not many sold even though all of the problems were ironed out by this stage.

From my understanding (if I am wrong please correct me), Britian were in the lead with aviation with the comet 1. Then the comet disasters happened and this gave the chance for boeing to catch up.

Four years later the comet 4 is for sale but not many companies want to buy the comet 4.

So was the lead in aviation lost after the comet 1 disasters ?

Since Boeing and De-havilland were pushing the boundaries of technology at the time how comes Boeing never ran into the same problems ?

I wonder how much info (testing / design) was passed back to Boeing freely (or not), Since Boeing seem to have an unblemished record with pressurization.

[Feather #3]

Disparate design teams with too many companies designing for the local market and relying on selling to their colonial subjects while others looked further afield promoting larger markets. BOAC & BEA doth not a world market make!

G'day ;)

[Teal]

From a technical perspective once the Americans were in possession of German swept-wing data, as well as working examples of German and British jet engines, there was no looking back. The sheer scale of the economic and technical resources of the big American companies (backed by Government orders/contracts) was far greater than what any British company could expect. Boeing in particular benefited from military orders for the majestic swept-wing B-47 jet bomber that flew a full 18 months before the Comet, and by then it had already commenced design of the eight-engine B-52 jet bomber. The knowledge learned from these two projects alone would have been invaluable to the design and development of the 707. (Famed Boeing test pilot ‘Tex’ Johnston flew all three types, not to mention travelling in the cockpit of an early Russian attempt at a civilian jet airliner (Tu-104) that he described as rubbish compared to the 707).

Comparing the subsequent 707 with the Comet, the former was bigger, more powerful, faster, and could fly greater distances and at higher altitudes. Of course Comet struggled to regain its shattered reputation after the series of disastrous crashes, and although the Comet 4 was vastly superior to all the previous Comets, it was too little, too late.

As Feather mentioned, the marketing of the American jets was also far superior to the British marketing of its own aircraft, and of course, America’s own domestic market was significant in itself. Boeing used Tex Johnston himself with great success to showcase the 707 to the world

[LGS6753]

...and in the forties and fifties, Britain was still recovering from the ravages of war. The Labour Government of the late forties nationalised (= destroyed) everything in sight, smashing any hopes we had of capitalising on our innovations.

Of course, our small home market (and the domination of Government-owned BEA & BOAC in that market) was also critical.

In comparison with the US, Britain was poor, with far fewer people flying or having the means to. So our airline industry remained feeble until the advent of the inclusive holiday in the late sixties. By then, most of the airframe manufacturing industry had gone.

Also, in comparison with the US, we were poor salesmen, only managing to sell a few export orders. I remember that MEA purchased 707s in preference to VC10s because the Boeing salesmen did a deal involving Lebanese oranges!

[Capot]

As suggested already, the civil industry was killed by its slavish obedience to the demands of the two national airlines BOAC and BEA, which in turn reflected the incredibly short-sighted view of their place in the world; BOAC in particular thought, even in the early 70's, that its cabotage rights would continue until the end of time.

And, of course, both the civil and military manufacturers were at the whim of idiots in Goverment holding R&D purse strings; British civil servants with their notion that languid incompetence was and remains the best approach for an easy life; and British politicians who were always, then as now, stupid, only concerned with the next elections and frequently open to bribery from one or more interested parties to support or kill a project.

[twochai]

The issue was greater than just the British aircraft industry. The demise of the UK aircraft industry paralleled the gradual failure of the British automobile and shipbuilding industries, etc, etc.

[smuff2000]

"Since Boeing and De-havilland were pushing the boundaries of technology at the time how comes Boeing never ran into the same problems ?"

I believe that all the data from the pressure tank tests on the Comet 1 were given to the Americans to ensure they did not suffer the same fatigue problem, although as in the case of the Bell X2 all flying tailplane they will no doubt claim they new it anyway!

[effortless]

We did rather have the habit of making for prestige rather than the mass market. Thus we made Concord and the spams made the 747.

[diddy1234]

smuff 2000, are you saying that Britain knew about the all flying tailplane before the USA ?

I was always led to believe that this came from captured WW2 german aircraft and data that the USA had.

BTW, thanks for the feedback from everyone else, so its not just me that is slightly cynical then regarding bad decisions, lack of foresight and terrible planning by the powers that be......

[Krystal n chips]

We do aerodynamics and structures rather well...and we are pretty good at R n D and avionic development ...so far so good.....but we never built aircraft with one rather essential detail..well a couple actually..in mind....maintainability and accessability...why struggle for 3 hrs to remove / refit a component when, with a bit of design, the time can be reduced considerably....as Mr Boeing showed.

A few weeks ago, I met some very nice and very clever people from Loughborough...and let them take a few spare parts of a dead aircraft...they had never done this before despite being well qualified in their fields...at the end of the day, one opined that, " we don't build aircraft for ease of access do we"...and freely admitted they had no idea as to how a design, which looks superb on CAD etc..could be a nightmare when fitted.

Then there were the production techniques / processes which hardly helped matters.

In short, the good old British class culture served to hasten the demise, sadly, of the UK aviation sector.

[tartare]

Read this trilogy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlli_Barnett#The_Pride_and_Fall_Trilogy
It will answer all of your questions about why Britain is now just a shadow of herself... the aviation industry's post war decline is just one symptom of this much broader story.
Teals comments are right on the money.

[Viola]

Bankrupting ourselves fighting (rightly so!) the 2nd World War
Sharing technology - jet engine, all moving tailplane (rightly so - we were fighting on the same side as the USA, obviously)
Sharing technology - metal fatigue after the Comet 1 problems (rightly so - it was a moral issue which saved lives)
Concentrating on the development of bombers in the 2nd World War; we bought most of our transport aircraft from the USA so they had a lead after the War
Developing airliners which would land at the 'hot and high' airfields of the Empire/Commonwealth which were really too small whilst the USA assumed runways would be lengthened for larger aircraft such as the 747 (Boeing took an enormous risk with the 747, so designed it as a freight aircraft too - very sensible)
Government assuming missiles were the way forward in the late 1950s rather than aircraft
Prestige developments such as Concorde rather than mass market such as 747
Too complicated specifications - TSR2
Sir Stanley Hooker says the aircraft industry from 1955 - 1965 was mismanaged
Too many competing small aircraft manufacturers

[jindabyne]

Robert Gardner's biography of Sir George Edwards is a cracking read and contributes enormously to this debate. IMHO

[tonker]

It's quite simple, but very hard for some British people to swallow.

You have to make an airplane that people want to BUY, and peferably BUY lots of them.

You have to SELL them at a reasonable rate and make a .........PROFIT.

It's no good us going on about power jets, vertical lift, autoland and Concorde when whats wanted is efficiency and reliability.

[gas path]

Actually we (Brits!) were all too handy at handing over technology and secrets to all and sundry and getting nothing back in return.
Early jet engine technology.
The all moving tailplane. (Miles M52)
Structural fatigue.

[smuff2000]

As gas path states the all flying tailplane was designed for the Miles M52, the information was passed to Bell who were having control problems with the X2, fitting this device solved their problem. When Miles and the Air Ministry asked for data about the tailplane they were told they couldn't have it because it was "top secret".

If you have been following the JSF story at all you will see a similar thing happening, BAe are a major partner in the program, the British military a major customer, and we are supposed to have a "special relationship" with our friends in the USA but we have had to fight tooth and nail to get sufficient information out of "our partners" to be able to carry out any necessary routine and battlefield repairs on the aircraft!

Tonker you are quite right we did spend a lot of time developing aircraft for our domestic companies which had limited appeal to others. We do get a little fed up though with a certain US company crying foul every time Airbus gain some governmental support to develope new and exciting aeroplanes when that certain US companies success was based on the US Government funding the total development costs of the 707 through the C135 aerial tanker contract in the 60's, a long time ago but!

We British do not have financial institutions which support innovation, British industry started to decline massively when accountants started to get into positions of influence on the boards of companies and eventually to run those same companies, most of which are now long gone!

Sorry about the rant I am just a very patriotic grumpy old man!

[tonker]

I'm patriotic too, but it infuriates me when we invent something and then don't invest or market the product properly, and then blame jonny foreigner for doing the job right.

It's simply not good enough to keep bringing up we invented this that and the other, as if its our god given right to thus profit from all future applications.

[Mike7777777]

In terms of civil aviation, the 707 was mass produced on a production line, the Comet was essentially handbuilt. Didn't Boeing reps visit the De Havilland factory during the manufacture of the Comet and declare that they were astounded that anything could be built in such an environment, let alone a jet aircraft?

The British have never been capable of genuine mass production, that's why we innovate.

WW2 did tilt the scales a bit, 1945 = a wrecked Europe and an un-bombed US factory-based economy in full production.

In terms of military aviation, we ran out of money, hence the Phantom, Tornado and the Mk2 Typhoon.

[parabellum]

Viola - I was under the impression that the B747 was originally Boeing's competitor for the military freighter, the C5A Galaxy won the contest so Boeing then fitted seats and developed the pax version, is that not the case?

[Teal]

"Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy" might be a good read for those interested ($28.70 from Amazon, etc).

The author (Jeffrey Engel) notes that Britain has never been able to overcome the disadvantage that its domestic market is pathetically small in comparison with America. Between 1945 and 1957 the US military purchased over 2,000 transport aircraft from its manufacturers. During the same period, the RAF bought 46 from British manufacturers. He goes on to say that the British Government provided direct cash subsidies - usually wasted - to its aircraft manufacturers, whilst the US Government's huge military purchasing programs provided a funding lifeline for US plane builders. It is almost impossible for a relatively small country to complete with another that possesses an overwhelminly powerful domestic sales base. (Also consider Japan in that context with its automobile and electronics manufacturing). It became entirely so when various US-imposed draconian contraints were imposed on British foreign sales.

[Dr Jekyll]

The Boeing competitor for the C5A contract looked much like Lockheeds. It was mainly the know how in pressurising such a large aircraft that was carried over to the 747.

Incidentally, they didn't develop the 747 instead of an SST, but as well. The SST was only cancelled after almost as much money had been spent as the UK spent on Concorde, and they didn't even have a prototype to show for it.

The real tragedy was the Trident, instead of being built for the world market it was built for BEA, so the 727 had the world market. There is a suggestion Boeing only developed the 727 after they heard United Airlines where interested in Trident. If they had built Trident the way the market wanted it BEA would have bought it anyway. They would probably have insisted on calling it the 'super Trident' and reversing the light switches or some such.

[ORAC]

Boeing CX-HLS competitor to the C-5A.

http://widebodyaircraft.nl/boecshlx.jpg

[proteus6]

We are still designing the best aircraft in the world, there is a clear line of aircraft with British designed wings, its just that we are called Airbus now and we share design work with others.

[HarryMann]

The real tragedy was the Trident, instead of being built for the world market it was built for BEA, so the 727 had the world market. There is a suggestion Boeing only developed the 727 after they heard United Airlines where interested in Trident. If they had built Trident the way the market wanted it BEA would have bought it anyway. They would probably have insisted on calling it the 'super Trident' and reversing the light switches or some such.

This true, the one last chance for de Havilands to make a telling comeback.. BEA market analysts refused to accept that it should be sized as de Havillands wanted (circa 120 for the first series) and the Govt. of the day wouldn't support it without downsizing to something rather pathetic (90 seats?)...

Re-designed, with smaller Speys (so even RR suffered a lack of market too), and cheaper l.e. droop devices rather than proper slats, BEA immediately wanted a larger one... and so did the rest of the world :ugh:

Too late, Boeing had seen the sense in a 3-engined short/medium haul and set the scale accordingly. Years later the Trident had been stretched as far as it could in the 3b with extra boost engine... not much more than the original design had specified.

de Havilland sold 120? Boeing more than ten times as many...

Thankyou BEA !

The story as I heard it from insiders at de Havillands...

[HarryMann]

Oh!

The Hatfield designed 146 was also halted at a critical stage as governments changed... the knock-on effect being that engine supply at seriously competitive prices was lost, as well as a good foothold in the target market...

Hatfield also didn't have a large erecting shop, one factor in AI assembly going to Tolouse... been nice if govt. had done what the French did, helped with a loan to build a massive one just in case... to help sway the argument..

A famous airfield is now a housing estate and a Uni campus... you choose!

[norwich]

Harry, Good points, Your last comment, "you choose" I have to assume we do via the ballot box, but do we ?
I have lived through several governments, watched so much going on (or not as the case may be ) and always arrive at the same conclusion ! We do not have any say in these things, we are only aware of the results after the descision is made ! But hey thats democracy ! I assume !
Looking forward to the next major cancellation ! lets all try to guess what that may be ..... Keith.

[S'land]

Reading this thread (and others like it) it is obvious that the UK was very provincial in its outlook towards build aircraft for world markets. Perhaps a leftover from having had an empire and thinking that we impose our (read "our governments") thinking on the rest of the world.

We just did not understand marketing and giving the customer what he wanted.

[tornadoken]

G/P: we were all too handy at handing over technology and secrets to all and sundry and getting nothing back in return. A barnacle of a myth.
Lend/Lease, an Act for the Defense of US, ended upon defeat of US' Enemy. Its continuation for USSR, 8 May-8 August 1945 had already been illegal (USSR neutral v.Japan), and to protract it after Japan's capitulation would have siphoned voters' taxes to competitors taking their jobs. So, UK asked Keynes to negotiate a Reconstruction $ Loan, as we were skint.

He did, and settled Lend/Lease obligations within it, July,1946 after scratching for Reverse to net them down. All Tizard's October,1940 goodies (e.g:cavity magnetron) were thrown into this pot. So were Trinidad and Abadan £ fuel, and spark plugs, and good British grub for USAAFE. Not well-measured - how could it be, we were fighting, not counting; we settled on (?$600Mn. net outstanding, from ?$30Bn. provided to the King's Forces), and paid in drips to December,2006 at 1.9% p.a. From April,1948 US provided (Marshall Aid), from December,1950 Mutual Defense Assistance, both as grants.
?getting nothing back in return.

Between end of Lend/Lease, September,1945, and start of Cold War R&D Collaboration (such as Burns/Templar GW Agreement, February,1950), commercial issues were present, as we tussled for market. If there was anything of benefit to Bell X-1 in Miles M.52, and if it was ripped off...then naughty, but thanks for 438 free F-86, fellas, and, gee we didn't think you would mind us giving Korean War materials supply Super-Priority to Comet 3 so we could make a nice bid to Pan Am in 1953 (and Capital Viscounts, and TWA Britannias). (That provoked Ike to complain to Churchill).

We sold designs in Derwent/Nene to USSR in September,1946, for money and goods (we were cold, hungry and $-sparse; USSR was our friend). Their, and Goblin, licences to US were within Reverse Lend/Lease; money changed hands for the later Sapphire (and other) licences.

I'm with Viola, root and branch. C.Barnett has made an academic career from declinism. We grumpies can wallow in missed chances, but we had only ourselves - and the power of scale economy - to blame, if blame there be. Much better profitably to make chunks of many Airbuses (or Swindon Hondas) than to lose much on all of few Britannias (or Austin All Aggros).

[TURIN]

How did Britain loose the lead in aviation ?

I blame bad spelling! :ugh:;)

[Dr_Oddlust]

This is a most interesting thread.

Whatever the manifold reasons for Britain's decline and fall in the aircraft manufacturing business, the question remains:

How do we, learning from our bitter mistakes of the past, get back in the business of manufacturing commercial aircraft?:8

The Brazilians have been successfully producing regional airliners for years; the E170-E190 series have gained large orders with US carriers.

Eclipse have gone from a start-up to, in a decade, having a $3billion order book for their VLJ.

There is no reason why we in the UK are not able to achieve similar results.

The UK has a large trade deficit, exporting value-added engineered goods is in our best interest.

We do share design work with Airbus, but only as a sub-contractor. Most of the profits are pocketed in France and Germany and wing production could easily be farmed out to the far-east if it is politically expedient. :ugh::{

[Mudfoot]

I'm proud to say that I worked for BAe/RR in Herndon, VA (USA) back in the days of the BAC1-11, HS748/ATP, HS125-series, etc. We also supported Shorts 330/360, Jetstream 31/41 and another obscure a/c called Airbus who had 2 customers in the US. In the early 80s, the HS125 biz jet seemed to be THE biz jet, unfortunately the RR Viper 522/622 engines were rather thirsty. When I left for another related EU company, the legacy was in decline and I made the jump just in time. BAC1-11s were also gas-thirsty and fell out of grace due to age and fuel costs mostly, but the RomBAC was still in production. Ah, those British a/c were good'n's...

Cheers, y'all.

[Skipness One Echo]

Isn't the 125 still being built in the US? Why was it not continued in the UK?

[proteus6]

Airbus design in the UK is not sub contracted , they are British employees of a UK company (Airbus UK LTD) producing world leading designs, you guys do not give the UK employees enough credit, as I said before there is direct evolution from HS to A300 and then through to A380, and the HS125 is still made in North Wales:D

[Jetex Jim]

I wonder at what point in the past Britain was considered to have been preeminent in aviation?

Structurally
Regarding the Comet, as every schoolboy (once knew) the Comet hull failures were caused by fatigue fractures starting at the corners of square cabin windows. Given that another part of British Industry had been safely making pressure vessels for years,- and knew enough to always make access ports with rounded corners - its astonishing that the clever boys at DH would not have looked to the boiler industry to see how a pressure vessel could be safely made.

It was nice of Britain to pass the results of their pressure chamber testing to the USA, but since Boeing had been succesfully building pressurised aircraft since 1943 one wonders how much they could learn from it.

Quality
It's been mentioned elsewhere how British aircraft of the fifties each tended to handle differently, because of inconsistent build dimensions and rigging angles, and at the time the original Nimrod hulls were being produced these kind of inconsistencies were still being built in - as we are regularly reminded by BAE whenever they need to exercise their excuses regarding MRA4 lateness.

Aerodynamics
Regarding the TSR2; a comparison with the NA Vigilante is interesting. This highly advanced aircraft made its first flight in 1958, the same year as the TSR2 proposal was tendered. The Vigilante specification is very close to that of the TSR2.

Vigilante/TSR2
Length ft 76/89
Wing area sqft 754/702
Payload Kg 13,000/9,000

Max speed Mach 2.0/2.15
Range, miles 1290/1150
Ceiling feet 52000/54000
Rate of climb ft/min8000/50000

Engines 2 x J79/2 x Olympus
Thrust Dry lbf 10900 each/19610 each
Thrust A/B 17000 each/30000each

Its also worth remembering that the Vigilante was a carrier capable aircraft.

A look at the numbers reveals that the TSR2 is only slightly superior in speed and ceiling. And inferior in payload and range. The only major advantage being in much increased rate of climb, 8000ft/min v 50,00ft/min. But this seems a dubious distinction in an aircraft intended for nap of the earth operation.

Regarding the engines, the Vigilante used the J79, as per the standard model F4 while TSR2 would have used Olympus, almost twice the thrust in both wet and dry modes. Just what had they done with all that extra power? - not much - so much for superior aerodynamics.

It's traditional at this point to trot out the argument about unwanted government interference in engineering matters, and indeed Sir George Edwards does have a grumble about this in his biography, they would have preferred to use the Medway, but were obliged to use the Olympus in order to make work for Bristol's. This is generally the nature of government interference, steering work to a particular section of the industry in response to lobbying from within that industry.

The Spey engined Phantom; a huge amount spent installing Speys in what had previously been one of the worlds greatest fighter aircraft.

F4J (J79 engines)/F4M (Spey)
Speed Mach 2.4/2.07
Initial ROC, ft/min 41250/32000
Ceiling ft 70000/60000
Maximum range miles 1956/1750

Despite the extra power, all performance numbers are reduced. (This is normally the point where Spey apologists cough and start muttering about clean burning exhaust and reduced visual signature)

Requirements Analysis
To turn to the airline side of things, it was traditional (as described in earlier posts) for British industry to latch onto a launch customer, and let them write a specification for them. Boeing, by contrast, would do a world wide market analysis and then produce a generic type, nobodys ideal case but still worth buying.
Britain, meanwhile, having built the aircraft around its launch customers specification, then whines because it ends up with an aircraft that is only ideally suited to that one customer, and further away from what the rest of the world wants than Boeing design derived from analysis.


In retrospect, in numerous coffee table books and the biographies of retired British planemakers the British aircraft industry is always the victim,- it never got a fair shake.

Perhaps, but for me it's always talked a better game than it ever played.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

dH had a design known as the dH 121, about 120 seats, to be powered by RR Medways. They were in competition with Vickers (who had on paper the VC11) for the BEA contract. Word is that when BEA said 'give us a 90 seater' if dH had said no, the contract would have gone to the rival.

So the Trident 1 was bult to BEA spec with RR Speys, and the RR Medway didn't get developed. Almost immediately BEA realised the inadequacies of the Trident 1, and asked for a Trident with more range and more capacity. dH made the Trident 2 - same fuselage but bigger wings, slats instead of droops, and uprated Speys.

But that wasn't big enough either, so dH built the 3B. Stretched fuselage, but the Spey was not capable of further development so this heavier aeroplane was underpowered. To give it 'hot and high' take off capability, it had a 4th engine, a 'boost' engine mounted in the base of the fin, just above no. 2 Spey.

If you include the APU, the Trident 3B had 5 engines, all mounted in the tail! No wonder the wing is positioned so far back on the fuselage!

SSD

[smuff2000]

"The Spey engined Phantom; a huge amount spent installing Speys in what had previously been one of the worlds greatest fighter aircraft.

F4J (J79 engines)/F4M (Spey)
Speed Mach 2.4/2.07
Initial ROC, ft/min 41250/32000
Ceiling ft 70000/60000
Maximum range miles 1956/1750"

I was told by a USAF Phantom pilot on a visit to RAF Alconbury that Phantom endurance in a combat high power situation was limited to 15 - 20 mins, he also said that when in reheat they had about 20 mins max total endurance.

Can anyone provide the equivalent figures for the Spey Phantom, I was always under the impression from past reading that the low bypass ratio Speys had improved the aircrafts loiter time and overall endurance!

[Brewster Buffalo]

Can anyone provide the equivalent figures for the Spey Phantom, I was always under the impression from past reading that the low bypass ratio Speys had improved the aircrafts loiter time and overall endurance!

From another discussion board at

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/4514/t/Britain-joins-in-Vietnam-War-which-carriers-and-aircraft.html?page=3

"Can you point me to something that explains how, with the Spey turbofans (Specific Fuel Consumption .63 lbs fuel per pound of thrust per hour [1.95 in afterburner]) the F-4K (FG.1) had a shorter range than the F-4B/J with J79 turbojets (SFC .85-.86 [1.93-1.97])?

While the enlarged intake ducts for the greater airflow of the Spey could have caused a reduction in the capacity of the centre-fuselage tanks, I have not seen anything to indicate a great enough reduction to exceed the 35% improvement in fuel economy the Spey provided.

Can you enlighten me?

For certain, the F4K is roughly 3,000lb heavier than a F4 C, D, J, or N. It was 2,000lb more than a F4E, F and RF.

The mach1.9 figure is reasonably certain. J79 gave a rough figure of 1,500mph, the Spey 1,386 at high altitude (probably 36,000ft), at low level the Spey gave 10mph greater speed.
Ceiling was upto 60,000ft with Spey, J79 took it over that figure.
Climb figure was superior, presumably the Spey giving it the edge in the initial stages and making up for inferior performance at the laster stages.

Cost was rather more than the projected 1.2 million per plane at something close to 3 million. "

[Mike7777777]

I wonder at what point in the past Britain was considered to have been preeminent in aviation?Spitfire, Mossie, Lanc, Short Sunderland, Tempest, Mk1 Typhoon, LIGHTNING :ugh::ugh:, Buccaneer, TSR2 (intercepted by what?), Harrier et al. If airpower was the game then BritAeroEng Ltd offered a winning combination, as long as the opposition didn't have too many second rate 'planes of course.

The reality is that British Engineering Ltd has been on a long downward slope since the late 1940s, if not before. But engineering is yesterday's industry, British Finance Ltd is the future and it makes oodles of dosh (yes, I know most of it is smoke and mirrors, but that's not the point)

[barit1]

Other great aircraft like the VC-10 (scrapped because of economics yet passengers enjoyed flying on this aircraft).

I once heard a lecture (Dr. Douglas H. Robinson, IIRC) comparing the flying boats of the late 30s, and he quoted a British writer of the day commenting on the Sikorsky S-42; in a nutshell, he found it surprising the American design could be so efficient or productive "in spite of its great speed". In the 30s, the British paradigm for productivity (passenger miles per day) seemed to ignore the speed factor, now recognized as intrinsic to producivity.

And the British airliners of the 40s through 70s were generally designed to a single specification dictated by London, leaving little room for tailoring a family of models for foreign customers. Boeing and Douglas, by contrast, offered a great deal of customization of fuselage lengths, engine choices, etc. The British offered almost a "take it or leave it" airplane.

And it was the great flexibility offered to the customer that eventually proved what combination was most productive and most reliable. It was the Darwinian free market at work.

I'm sure someone will take exception to these observations, but in many or most cases they valid.

[goudie]

Never understood why British designers prefered either, engines buried in the wing, or rear mounted, as opposed to pylon mounted engines.

[FormerFlake]

Jetex Jim,

Comparing figures is only a small part of looking at combat aircraft. It is not like Top Trumps. Important factors are take off and landing performance, operational/combat range. Sadly as the TSR2 never entred service we will never know.

[Jetex Jim]

Sadly as the TSR2 never entred service we will never know.

Indeed, that's why the legend of the TSR2 will be forever bright:zzz:

[diddy1234]

goudie wrote :-
Never understood why British designers prefered either, engines buried in the wing, or rear mounted, as opposed to pylon mounted engines.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I would imagine that's why Britiain was so different, because of our deisgn's.

Aircraft today are all the same layout and boring.

In terms of looks, what looks better an A320 or a VC-10 ?

Id go for the VC-10 as the layout looks 'clean'.

[barit1]

Id go for the VC-10 as the layout looks 'clean'.
And we all know that sells a lot of airliners. :rolleyes:

[Out Of Trim]

Never understood why British designers preferred either, engines buried in the wing, or rear mounted, as opposed to pylon mounted engines.



The VC-10 was designed to operate in Hot and High airports in Africa. Hence, the aircraft had a short but sturdy undercarriage to deal with rougher runways. Placing the powerful engines high-up at the rear. kept them away from any FOD kicked up. Also of course, the undercarriage would have to be longer to have a podded under-wing mounted engine. Or have a high mounted wing instead.

You should compare the take-off performance of a VC-10, compared to a B-707 at say JNB, South Africa. a Hot and High Altitude Airport and I would say the B-707 would struggle and need a much longer runway.

[tornadoken]

#36/37, Smuff/BB: RN's selection of Spey/F-4K in 1963, to bale out of BS100 (single-motor)/P.1154 (single seat in primary, RAF version), was driven by bolter case. Perception that J79 could not respond to slam as quickly as Spey. Granted BB's drawbacks, but RR it was, or no RN F-4.

Oct.64, Jenkins as Minister of Aviation, explored putting Tyne on RAF's desired C-130K (failed, due RR's silly Bid), reheated Spey in F-111K (and was to go in 40 S.2 versions), and F-4E: RAF wanted 178 with J79. He, himself, alone, opposed by other Ministers and Treasury, imposed 118 Spey/F-4M. We paid upfront cash to RR, where J79 would have been on the drip, like all $-content. RAF made up the numbers by, begrudgingly, taking 60 P.1127(RAF), which in 1965 had no payload. All that business put RR in the position to buy BSEL in Oct.66, dump their workshare on JT9D, and launch RB211.

All BB's negatives influenced Greece to decline surplus F-4Ms in 1992, free, preferring to pay for F-4E. But effectiveness of RAFG would have been little greater with F-4E: I suggest this is a case where procurement business-politics did make sense in the bigger picture. Not a candidate for a declinist thread.

[HarryMann]

Regarding the Comet, as every schoolboy (once knew) the Comet hull failures were caused by fatigue fractures starting at the corners of square cabin windows. Given that another part of British Industry had been safely making pressure vessels for years,- and knew enough to always make access ports with rounded corners - its astonishing that the clever boys at DH would not have looked to the boiler industry to see how a pressure vessel could be safely made.


There was quite a lot more to it than that... they were the overhead ADF windows, that whilst square obviously had generously rounded corners and substantial reinforcing frames. The main reason was an underestimate of the local stresses, resulting in the use of a fuse skin thickness at least one gauge too thin. Riveting techniques also came under scruntiny... They did however do substantial pressure tests on the fuselage, having pressurised to 16,000 cycles by the time of the Yoke Peter crash (which failed at about 1,000 flight cycles). It was found that earlier tests taking the same same specimen to 2 and 2.5 P may have actually strengthened the specimen by stretching and re-distributing loads around those hatches. Additionally, gust response wing-loads also increased the fuselage 'nodding' loads and hence stresses in tha area.

It was nice of Britain to pass the results of their pressure chamber testing to the USA, but since Boeing had been succesfully building pressurised aircraft since 1943 one wonders how much they could learn from it.

It was the water tank immersion test methods developed at RAE during the investigation that was the main gift to the world. And de Havillands were pressurising to what is normal today (8.25 psi) not what Boeing was then!

Despite this, other aircraft have had pressure hull failures since... de Havillands were indeed pioneering high altitude civil transports.

They also pioneered Redux bonding techniques for wing and fuselage stringers that became extremely succesful as well as many other early composite structural applicatons. One could say, with its sandwich wing and fuselage skins, that the Mosquito was a composite construction pioneer.

Well Jim, I don't see the comparison between the Vigilante and TSR-2. Whatever those figures are supposed the show, they were very different aircraft. A proper bomb bay for one, something the Lanc also had and the B-17 didn't - not that it needed one!

[HarryMann]

Never understood why British designers preferred either, engines buried in the wing, or rear mounted, as opposed to pylon mounted engines.What you will find is form follows function... eventually all cars serving the same pupose will look substantially the same, all F-1 cars will, and most civil transports already do (as function is prime goal)...

Podded engines reduce wing bending loads in the gust-case... less fatigue considerations, > lighter wing.

Anyone else noticed how modern twin-jet airliners look so much like the ME 262 Swallow in rear view as they fly off to the sun-washed beaches we all worship?

Straight out of the box Messershmidt came up with a classic design.... was even built in modular form (like the Lanc).

[barit1]

Jetex Jim says:It was nice of Britain to pass the results of their pressure chamber testing to the USA, but since Boeing had been succesfully building pressurised aircraft since 1943 one wonders how much they could learn from it.

Actually, it was five years earlier: http://www.aviation-history.com/boeing/307.html

And Lockheed had a testbed XC-35 (http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/aero/aircraft/lockheed_xc35.htm)flying a year or two before that.

[Jetex Jim]

My reasons for making the Vigilante/TSR2 and J79/Spey Phantom comparisons were to illustrate that the British aircraft industry does seem to be rather pre-disposed to do less with more. As ‘tornadoken’ puts it, the Spey F4M was perhaps not THAT much worse than the standard model. Given the work it created for British industry the RAF didn’t have too much to complain about.

‘Brewster Buffalo’ points out that the Spey Phantoms cost £3m apiece rather than £1.2m for the standard model, but perhaps even this can be justified as a job creation scheme, not unusual in the Wilson/Callaghan era.

It’s easy enough to say that the Vigilante/TSR2 were quite different aircraft, yet their capabilities do seem to be very similar, and the payload figure shows the Vigilante payload WAS larger.

The curious thing is; why was the RAF calling for such a huge thing? The TSR2 was intended for delivering tactical nuclear weapons, which by the early sixties had got to be much smaller. The WE177 that the TSR2 was intended to carry weighed in at (270kg) the B43 types carried by the Vigilante - about 950kg - to put that in perspective, a WE177 could be carried by a Sea Harrier!

However, as with the later AEW Nimrod, loads of work was done, paid for and many skilled workers were employed, and eventually the RAF got aircraft that could do the job, (E3A and Buccaneer).

So why worry, everybody’s happy, except possibly the taxpayer?

[Viola]

We were ahead of the game in some respects around the 2nd World War - Spitfire, Comet (jet) are obvious examples.

However, think about the London to Australia Air Race. Alright, the UK won with the Comet Racer, but it was a specially designed 2 seater 'racing' aircraft.

The USA came second with a DC2 - in effect a commercial passenger aircraft!

The writing was on the wall then, I think.

It's very surprising that we were still designing for the 'hot and high' airfields of the Commonwealth/Empire in the 1950s (as I've said before). It was obvious that the UK was moving out of Africa and the East - Ghana gained its independence in 1957, India/Pakistan/Burma had done so 10 years earlier, and the others would soon follow.

Why we didn't look to the future, I don't know.

[Feather #3]

Cough! Cough!

I think Viola that the Dutch would have seen themselves as coming second, albeit in an American aircraft.

G'day ;)

[barit1]

And Roscoe Turner a close third, in a Boeing 247-D, an already-aging airliner.

Strange in retrospect that nobody entered a Lockheed 10 Electra in the MacRobertson Race (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacRobertson_Air_Race), but no matter - British Airways bought a fleet of them anyway.

[Jetex Jim]

tornadoken Smuff/BB: RN's selection of Spey/F-4K in 1963, to bale out of BS100 (single-motor)/P.1154 (single seat in primary, RAF version), was driven by bolter case. Perception that J79 could not respond to slam as quickly as Spey. Granted BB's drawbacks, but RR it was, or no RN F-4.],
tornadoken writes that the Spey Phantom was predicated by the ‘Bolter’ performance of the Phantom, (Bolter – missed arrester wire go-around). The decks of HMS Eagle and HMS Ark Royal being smaller than the US carriers that the USN were operating Phantoms from. (In fact USN F4s were flown on and off the 1970 era Ark Royal). However it does appear that the F-4C would have been compatible with the larger CVA01 class, but these boats were cancelled, estimated cost at time of cancellation £100m each.

52 F4K were ordered, for Ark Royal and for Eagle. In the event only the Ark got the F4K, the rest of the navy order went straight to equip 43 Squadron at Leuchars.

Cost of std, F4 say £1.2m apiece, Spey Phantom £3m each.
52 Std model at £3m minus 52 at £1.2m (156 –62.4 = 93.6) the UK paid £93.6m more for 52 Spey F4K

Just a little short of the CVA01 cost.

If we take in to account the 1965 Defence White paper which states that the RAF Phantoms were to be swing role and would operate from land and the RN carriers!!! :uhoh:
See: http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cva01.htm (http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cva01.htm)

For the same numbers with the F4M we see for: 118 aircraft 354-141.6 = 212
UK paid £212m extra for its 118 Spey F4M. Or two more carriers and lots of ship yard jobs.

So has the UK aircraft industry been feather bedded by government defence spending (at the expense of other areas) or what?

[Viola]

I would say the USA aircraft industry has also been feather bedded by defence spending too!

But unlike the UK it hasn't been at the expense of more sensible economic projects.

It's understandable that we were developing seaplanes in the 1930's for the 'Empire' routes, but to carry on developing long distance aircraft SPECIFICALLY for the Commonwealth routes in the 1950's for a world that was passing is very suprising.

The USA really had the lead in passenger aircraft by the early 1930's because they were building aircraft for ordinary, every day use - such as the mail!

(Yes, I know it was a KLM DC2 that came 2nd, but it was an American aircraft.)

Going back to Airbus - the European countries' governments decided to get involved. Our government in the 1980's would not.

BAE (with all its faults) did get involved and although they have now sold out, at least some parts of Airbus are manufactured here.

[tornadoken]

HM, #47. Do you have a view on the (alternative? additional?) issue of inadequate surface preparation to ensure bond longevity? P.King, Knights of the Air,1989 is explicit that within weeks of publication of Cohen/RAE Report, metal fatigue at cutouts, RAE identified disbonding as (a) cause. B.Gunston, Back to the Drawing Board,1998 appears to allude to this,saying of one DH catastrophe, it was "the first of many DH designs to come 'unglued' ".

[HarryMann]

HM, #47. Do you have a view on the (alternative? additional?) issue of inadequate surface preparation to ensure bond longevity?No, other than the following...

There were some who raised the issue of bonded stringers during the inquiry which if you read it all, seem to have been dismissed comprehensively at the time, with no references in the final conclusions. Peeling or partial failure after a surrounding failure or a crash can fairly obviously be expected, but I have never come across references of the bonding being suspect in normal service...

I expect de Havilland further developed the Redux bonding systems and quality control afterwards, as almost every aspect of production was re-assessed... When I saw on a daily basis, wing skins being chemically cleaned, treated, and bonded for the DH 121 Trident years later, I never heard nor suspected anything about this system being other than a n excellent development, with loads being transferred from skin to stringer in an ideal manner (continuously). Everything always looked spotless. The most important thing to note were the anti-peeling bolted fasteners at each end, which I presume the Comet had too.
Test samples were taken of every batch being processed.

IMHO, they just relied slightly too much on testing, rather than belt 'n braces 'what-if' design analyses backed up with strain gauge spot checks.. Testing was very thorough, though in retrospect not thought through fully maybe, one dubious area being using test samples of the fuse, rather than the whole thing in one piece.
I think they just went one skin gauge too thin, but weight and engine power and hence payload were fairly critical at that time... though I've always been one to point out to those fussing over going up a few thou on a critical component - that an ounce or two here and there is not the end of the world when the pilot might have had a full english breakfast and also with the crap that often accumulates on board an aircraft - and always thought carrying duty-free booze around the skies in airliners was verging on criminal!!

References to things becoming 'unstuck' are either purely metaphorical or refer directly to the Mossie in the far East, when it took a DH representative sawing right through a wing chordwise to prove they weren'tall coming apart at the seams! But after a while in those hot and humid climes, the glues did start to suffer but have always believed they were being replaced by better adhesives in production almost at that same time... Some also warped a bit, allegedly. From what I've read also, pilots never lost faith in the Mossie out there, surprising when flying over dense jungle for 8 or more hours at a time. Indeed, quite a few long range records were set (3,000 miles?)
One was lost due to suspected structural failure, but not sure of the details, we're talking tropical weather, routine max take-off weights, etc. etc.

[tornadoken]

HM Thank you. All I can add is that early A300B had a belly laminate issue. Orion's (ex-LH). Fixed with rivets.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

The talk of Redux bonding pioneered by de Havilland reminds me of the similarly pioneering work by AVRO on Araldite bonded aluminium alloy honeycomb construction. DTD900 4703A still remains as a reminder.

Much of the research is Shackleton and Vulcan vintage and, if I remember correctly the only Aluminium honeycomb in the Vulcan was the flight deck floor. The technology was shared with AVRO Canada and found its way into the Arrow.

If I may quote from Flight, 1954 Farnborough edition:


Avro. At Manchester,
considerable research has gone into the development
of efficient structural honeycomb materials,
and—according to an overseas journal—
they will find an important application
in the forthcoming light delta-winged
ground attack machine which has been
designed to the requirements laid down by
NATO. Be that as it may, Avro showed

at Farnborough that they have a great

knowledge of honeycombs, and most of
these are built up of 0.003in honeycomb
sandwiched between any gauge of skins.
Araldite bonding, sometimes aluminium- 4
filled, is employed.
For machining the honeycombs to the
required thickness, the hexagonal interstices
are filled with soft wax, so producing
a core sufficiendy rigid to prevent buckling
of the individual "three-thou" walls; after
cutting away, the wax is simply melted
out. The result of the technique is that
honeycombs can be used for really sharpedged
aerofoils; this was exhibited, as was
the use of the method in shear attachments,
test specimens and other forms. Most of
the honeycombs were of half-inch thickness.
Two basic forms can be made: the
standard hexagon, which can only be bent
into two planes, and the staggered honeycomb,
rather like a brick wall in form,
which can be bent in all three planes. An
example of the latter showed the core
alone used as reinforcing for a hemispherical
bottle.






After the first flight of an aircraft with
a honeycomb skin, some form of test is
necessary to determine whether any parting
of the skin from the core has occurred.

Avro have developed a very simple

pneumatic suction-cup device, which is
allowed to adhere to the portion of the skin
under investigation. Powered electrical
probes then descend on to the skin with
a known force and, depending on whether
the honeycomb is still sound or not, green
or red lights flash. The equipment can
work on plane or curved surfaces without
re-setting, and the sensitivity is such that a
fault of lin diameter can be detected on
12-gauge skinning. The chief advantage
is, however, the speed with which it can
cover big areas—even the wing of the




Vulcan would not be too much to tackle.



When I think back, a lot of our houshold ornaments and my toys were very expertly repaired with Araldite 121 N. Things never broke in the same place twice!

PS

Sorry for the totally mong quote formatting. Bloody Acrobat.

[HarryMann]

.. and certainly in the late 60's de Havillands were using similar honeycomb structures, as well as phenolic honeycombs as filling in the sandwich, presumably for radar hatches and domes.

Phenolic microballons incorporated into cold-set resins is a common technique used today when laying up low production composite components, as in the light and ultra-light private sector. Add a lot and you get a lightweight but compatible filler.

[Jetex Jim]

Phenolic microballons incorporated into cold-set resins is a common technique used today when laying up low production composite components, as in the light and ultra-light private sector

Specified by Bert Rutan for Varieze, Longeze construction I believe.

[Jetex Jim]

This link from the Sea Harrier thread makes rather depressing reading

http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2003/national-reporting/works/national1.html

One issue, the time for a Harrier engine change: 550 man hours as against 10 man hours for a F16 speaks volumes to the title of this thread.

Now admittedly the Harrier is no ordainary machine, and the wing has to come off for an engine change, and while this is a unique Harrier issue the modular connections employed on the F16 are still very much quicker to disengage/engage than the numerous discrete connections on the Harrier.

Elsewhere the article relates that every Harrier flying hour 'costs' 25 maintenance hours, 2 to 5 times the cost of an F18. The need to 'carry' snags, rather than fixing them is one aspect blamed for the high accident rate.

Older readers may recall the Lightning, another wonderful plane when in the air but oh so rarely seen there. We about fell over with delight, one afternoon on 5 Squadron at Binbrook when 5 Lightnings were seen in the air simultaneously.

Access to all avionics was diabolical and changing the upper engine was a nightmare, involving a crane and numerous engine fitters with all tools on cords for the eventuallity of dropped articles falling down past the newly installed engine - which neccessitated engine back out again.

But just try and tell the kids today though, they just won't believe you.

[HarryMann]

Depressing indeed...

Some tales of an awful maintenance situation in some of those heartrending stories in that link though...

A very special aircraft and engine, that doesn't really seem to fit with their needs - we go more for small, quick, get-in and out tactics. The US, even their marines, do seem not to have really found that role yet... whilst we did, with smaller carriers and at least once, a greater need!

Yet another reason why we shouldn't always follow their lead, we just don't always talk the same language and they rarely understand our tactics... look who's doing the serious fighting on the ground in Afghanistan. You just can't win all the battles remotely from afar, sometimes you just have to get your hands dirty, close up...

When they have loads of A-10s, does seem a bit daft to put a Gatling gun in the Harrier.

[John Farley]

Sorry chaps you've been had.

I little research would show that the original RAF Harrier spec called for an engine change to be carried out in a field (as in grassy thing owned by a farmer) in 8 hours with everything (all necessary tools and men plus the replacement engine) being ferried in using one trip each with two Wessex choppers.

When this spec point was demonstrated (before CA release in 1969) the crew did the actual change in 4.5 hours and after the necessary tied down runs etc (again using special tie downs that could be wound down into the ground) had some 30 mins to spare. Everything for making the crane was built up from components joined with pip-pins and no bit could weigh more than 200lb so that two guys could manhandle it). The box that the engine came in was specialled designed so that the lid formed the trestle for the old engine while you lifted the new one in.

The wing is held on with 6 bolts and once you lift it off you have the biggest hole in a fuse that you could wish for. So after the first few hours to do the job have gone by any more is down to the team wanting it to take longer for whatever reason.

There is only one problem in practice and that is on board ship if it is pitching or rolling much. Dangling things on the hoist is not on then.

I could go on but there is no point - the world is full of duff gen and ever will be I guess.

JF

[Jetex Jim]

So much for the Pulitzer Prize Winners then.

Thanks for a correction from the man who knows.

[Brian Abraham]

Jetex - Careful, he could have his salesman hat on. Sorry John. :p

[Jetex Jim]

You are right to urge caution Brian, and of course it hardly needs to be said that 550 man hours is still compatible with a 5 hour engine change if 110 blokes are used....

[Bus429]

How did Britain loose the lead in aviation ?

Spelling may have been one of the reasons.:hmm:

[Brewster Buffalo]

Just coming back on the thread as aircraft became more complex and more expensive should not the British Aircraft Industry have gone down the line of the simpler cheaper aircraft. e.g Folland Midge

In other words instead of developing a F-15 type go for a F-16 type.

OK the F-15 is more capable but just think about the exports!!

Foreign operators F-15 2; F-16 24


BB

[John Farley]

The spec limited the team to 8 fitters and an NCO

JF

[HarryMann]

Just coming back on the thread as aircraft became more complex and more expensive should not the British Aircraft Industry have gone down the line of the simpler cheaper aircraft. e.g Folland MidgeYes, and lots of GA aircraft as well... and their engines. A lot is down to needing a big home market, as in the days of the de Havilland Moths.

The Jetstream and HS146 were two last ditch efforts, the Jetstream interrupted by HP's insolvency (and a bit overweight to start, allegedly) and the 146 interrupted by a change of govt. as well as a concept maybe a shade too clever + Great undercarriage, shame about the air conditioing

A early followup to the HS 125 wouldn't have been a bad idea too...

Jet, I think John has you at a slight disadvantage on the Harrier ;)

[Teal]

Bus429 - you're 13 days too late - see post #29

[Jetex Jim]

Jet, I think John has you at a slight disadvantage on the Harrier ;)
Yep

In an attempt to - tactically paper over my embarrassment, - and in the absence of the thread originator - currently helping the spelling police with their enquires - I shall call the thread to order and suggest that:

1) Britain didn’t ever loose the lead in aviation - but did lose it sometime between the pre-war London to Oz air race and now.

2) The TSR2, had it been produced, would still be in service today, if not production. And its cancellation, can be blamed for the failure of every subsequent British aircraft project, including Nimrod AWACS.

3) Interference from the Wilson/Callaghan governments, in providing several hundred million pounds of make work to the airframes and engines industry, did distract the nations plane makers from their traditional pursuits of magnanimously fostering engineering excellence and promoting innovation.

4) JF is a top bloke and it’s best not to bandy words with him regarding the Harrier.

5)The Harrier is a top plane, except perhaps when used by the USMC or in the case of the Sea Harrier version if required to land back on deck with unfired AMRAAM?

[larssnowpharter]

I suppose the last really commercially successful (over 400 built) British commercial aircraft was the Viscount in its various guises.

After that.............................

[Viola]

Jetex Jim - I agree with you on some things, but not others.

That John Farley knows lots about Harriers - well, yes, obviously!!

The Harrier is brill - well, yes, obviously!! (I love all aircraft, but I notice the harrier is the only aircraft that other women are interested in at airshows.)

That we had a lead at the London to Australia air race - as I've said before it wasn't the outright lead it seemed. We won with a specially designed wooden racer (out of 3 which were entered remember) - true. However, the aircraft which came second was a metal passenger aircraft which was in ordinary passenger service!

The TSR2 had potential no doubt, but the specification was over the top and so made it far too complicated and expensive to produce. For example it had a specified range of 1000 miles, when 900 miles would have been much cheaper and just as useful. (Look back at the earlier threads from people who know a lot more than me.)

And as the previous poster has said we designed the commercially successful Viscount and then????? The BAC1 11 maybe, but nothing else which sold worldwide.

We kept on designing aircraft, maybe beautiful, maybe technologically advanced, that no-one else wanted to buy.

[Brewster Buffalo]

We kept on designing aircraft, maybe beautiful, maybe technologically advanced, that no-one else wanted to buy.

Spot on. When Government is your main client then you very influenced by what they want. Post war the British aircraft industry had two military aircraft in the Canberra and the Hunter that sold well but very little after that.

The major powers want their all singing all dancing high tech planes but plenty of other nations are happy with something a little less expensive e.g F-16. Why didn't the aircraft industry go for that market or if they did why did they fail?

[Dr Jekyll]

How difficult would it have been to make a bizjet, based on Bac 111, to rival the Gulfstream but with better economies of scale?

[dixi188]

DR. JEKYLL.
Quite a few BAC 1-11's were used as Biz Jets.
I think about 6 or 7 were built as Biz Jets and about 20 ex American Airlines 400 srs. were converted. They had assorted VIP interiors and long range tanks in the belly holds. The range was about 3500 miles with max tanks, so didn't do a bad job.

[larssnowpharter]

And as the previous poster has said we designed the commercially successful Viscount and then????? The BAC1 11 maybe, but nothing else which sold worldwide.


My recollection is that the 1-11 was conceived as a replacement for the Viscount. I doubt if it was a commercial success with only a couple of hundred built. Wasn't there plans to sell all the production to Romania?

On the military side, one would be tempted to say that the Hawk has been a great success with nearly 1000 sales in its various guises and it's still in production.



It's also a pleasure to fly:)

In fact, one could argue that the British Aviation Industry is still alive and well and relatively healthy.

Engines: RR is still producing World beating engines. Perhaps an example of good government intervention when they were bailed out on the 211 development costs.

Commercial: BAE Systems still does most of the design work and manufacturing of Airbus wings, after the engine the most high tech and complex part of an aircraft (other in the in flight entertainment system)

Military: Hawk sales are still strong. Tornado (OK not totally Brit but) sold well and the Typhoon seems to have found a market niche.

Something radical for the future.

1. The world’s military seems to have fixated on rotary wing for support operations. What about a modern Beverley. Simple rugged aircraft that can lift, say, 30,000 lbs over 300 miles and land and take off on a 250 metre strip?

2. A cheap rugged COIN

[CNH]

No one's mentioned the BAE 146. Doesn't that count as a commercial success?

[Bus429]

Bus429 - you're 13 days too late - see post #29

Thanks, Teal - that'll learn me for being arrogant:\

[Brian Abraham]

The last chapter of test pilot Bill Waterton's book "The Quick and the Dead" is devoted entirely to the ills of British aviation, and written in 1955. David Beaty in "The Story of Transatlantic Flight" relates Lord Thomas's (Chairman BOAC 1949 - 56) view when trying to organise production of a British aircraft to compete with the Americans,

"Buggin's Turn. This practice, which is bred out of Civil Service fairness and the Treasury view that employment and the nation's economy as a whole should always be considered before commercial interests and technical specification, continued throughout the history of British aviation, reaching its crowning achievement in the late 1950s, when three small orders for three V-bombers of similar performance were given to three different aircraft manufacturers.... manufacturers were regarded rather like ironmongers. Between them and the users of their wares, the airlines, was the screen of the Civil Service. Since the British government was almost the sole buyer of their products, for too long a time the manufacturers were forced into the role of men knocking at the door of the tradesman's entrance, pencil in hand, waiting M'Lady's pleasure. They could not argue - the customer is always right especially if she is almost your only customer. No one would wish to criticise. In return for such obeisance, they all got a share of the orders and no one is left out in the cold. At the same time, no one is allowed to get too many orders. That wouldn't be fair to the next man. It should be Buggin's Turn

It may seem to be a problem of the Westminster style of government. Australia had problems with GAF Nomad aircraft, the production of which was controlled by the civil service. They would not buy material for production until a buyer had signed up, and I presume paid a non refundable deposit.

[Jetex Jim]

At the same time, no one is allowed to get too many orders. That wouldn't be fair to the next man. It should be Buggin's Turn


An interesting view.

But no one every stopped them chasing after foreign orders, maybe they couldn't be bothered, because they didn't need to?

Maybe they didn't know how and they needed a customer to write a set or requirements for them?

Maybe they always expected to be baled out by the UK taxpayer?

The small size of the home market argument never stopped the Japanese car/bike industry - oops somebody remind me now, did Britain once compete in that area too? - any lessons to be learned from that?

[HarryMann]

"Buggin's Turn. This practice, which is bred out of Civil Service fairness and the Treasury view that employment and the nation's economy as a whole should always be considered before commercial interests and technical specification, continued throughout the history of British aviation, reaching its crowning achievement in the late 1950s, when three small orders for three V-bombers of similar performance were given to three different aircraft manufacturers.... manufacturers were regarded rather like ironmongers. Between them and the users of their wares, the airlines, was the screen of the Civil Service. Since the British government was almost the sole buyer of their products, for too long a time the manufacturers were forced into the role of men knocking at the door of the tradesman's entrance, pencil in hand, waiting M'Lady's pleasure. They could not argue - the customer is always right especially if she is almost your only customer. No one would wish to criticise. In return for such obeisance, they all got a share of the orders and no one is left out in the cold. At the same time, no one is allowed to get too many orders. That wouldn't be fair to the next man. It should be Buggin's TurnYes Brian, that quote is pretty near to the DH/HSA Trident situation I'd say... certainly without govt. insistence to follow BEA's dumbed down spec. it would have garnered 'some' foreign orders I'm sure. The ultimate stretch, the 3B version, was about back to where it would have started out, but with a silly RB199 extra engine to carry about. The wing was also by then getting to its root BM fatigue limit, although it was said this was due to the better than estimated spanwise lift distribution (those lovely Kuchemann tips) - not dissimilar to some of the wingletless tips we see today, way back then.

And all that Autoland research investment, at least Bae and Airbus picked up some of the pieces, and some of that design team.

Ah! de Havilland - what a loss...

[Teal]

Author and historian Max Hastings recently summed up some of the underlying and relevant issues:

The British and Americans perceived commercial aviation as a vital field of competition. Each anticipated a boom, and set about chasing markets. Britain had designed and produced some of the most notable planes of World War II -- the Spitfire, Lancaster, and Mosquito. Its aircraft manufacturers employed 1.7 million people, including subcontractors. Above all, the nation led the world in jet engine technology, with the Meteor and Vampire combat jet aircraft in service, and the Comet airliner on the drawing board. In this industry, the US lagged. The British saw a great opportunity. Other circumstances, however, were vastly more favourable to the Americans. Before the war, the British pursued what proved to be a design blind alley, adopting flying boats for the long-haul civil aviation market. In 1939, the American-built Douglas DC-3 carried a staggering 93 percent of the world's passengers. When the US entered the war, the British recognized that they possessed no transport aircraft of comparable quality to those built in America. A transatlantic deal was struck, whereby the British continued to focus production on fighters and bombers and relied upon the US for transports. Late in 1944, as the British government contemplated the post-war implications of this arrangement, it begged the Americans at least to agree that Britain should start building some transport planes of its own as soon as the German war was won, and before Japan was defeated. This request was rejected. The US government envisaged Britain using the American funding on which its ally was totally dependent to gain a competitive edge against it in the commercial market. The Air Ministry in London reported gloomily: "It is out of the question for Great Britain to compete in civil aviation for at least five years after the war."

With peace came worse - much worse, for the British - the new reality of the cold war. The US was implacably hostile to supplying high technology of any description to the East Bloc. In 1946, an Anglo-American dispute developed, which persisted through the decades that followed. Broke Britain was desperate to sell almost anything it had to anyone who would buy it. Rich America was determined to prevent such sales..…

[tornadoken]

I've not met the A.M "5 years" quote, but that would be a fair lead-time for UK's pressurised and/or turbine-powered projects underway by 1944. 3/41 Lend/Lease Act - "for the Defense of the US" - constrained recipients from competing with US - say by putting gift ALCOA aluminium sheet into export civil products, or by lifting design data. (Fair, yes?) Priorities for supply of all strategic materials were co-ordinated, US/UK, for the duration. Blessed with this, and shoals of C-47s, UK Chiefs+PM agreed 2/5/1942 "it would be unsound to initiate plans for the production of transport aircraft in GB at this stage" (TNA file AIR 2/7882). That, alone, gave rise to the myth of US thwart. But whatever our sailors could bring through U-boat packs was needed for Heavy Bombers NOW! In February,1943, Stalingrad and elAlamein 2 safe, UK Cabinet moved on, funding Bristol T.167 Brabazon I on 11/3/1943.

By April,1944 more design/prototype ITPs were out; Avro York C.I, HP Halifax C.VIII and Short Stirling C.V in volume production. In November 1944 at the Chicago Civil Aviation Conference US presented ideas of "Open Skies" that infuriated UK/Canada/Oz/S.A, so we accelerated more projects.

On 17/5/45 (NB: European Theatre, Mission Accomplished) US War Production Board authorised civil aircraft production "as long as this will not interfere with production to higher-rated orders" (i.e Pacific Theatre). On 4/7/45, as virtually the last act of Govt. before the General Election, UK did the same. (TNA files AVIA 15/2138 and 2139). In 1946 Westland negotiated access to B-29 pressurisation (the NormalAir-Garrett licence); Bristol explored an L-749 licence. There was no Aero-centric Truman policy of Protection: there was a general US wish to trade "fairly", which they interpreted (then as now) in an odd way. But who, really, believes that DC-6, L-749 entering service in 1947 feared competition from Tudor, Hermes...As for our follow-on turbine schemes, US was happy with its impending giants (C-74, C-97, C-99) to spawn civil variants to swamp limey (and French) weirdos.

This perpetual whingeing that our Brabazon suite (funded into urgent R&D by late-1944, prototypes' materials diverted when no Lend/Lease Administrator was looking) was dished by Uncle Sam is just not so. Avro (Tudors, to Brabazon Type III), Bristol (T.167, Type I), DH (Comet 1, Type IV), (DH/)Airspeed (Ambassador, Type II), HP (Hermes, Type III), Miles (Marathon, Type V), Vickers-Armstrong (Windsor variants, to Type III) did it all on their ownsomes.

[Jetex Jim]

The 1957 Duncan Sandys Defence White paper, in which the upcoming demise of the manned military aircraft was predicted, is often cited as being the beginning of the end of Britain’s aviation lead.

Sandys, was the Minister of Defence for the MacMillan Conservative government, and perhaps had every right to suppose that military aircraft where a thing of the past. During the war years, he’d been, - assigned by Churchill, his father in law- the chair of the committee for the defence against flying bombs and rockets.

He’d seen that the V2s were invulnerable to all but a pre-launch strike. Even today, post Regan’s Star Wars, this is the case.

Wartime Bomber Command had consumed enormous manufacturing and manpower resources and had, arguably done little to diminish Germany’s ability to continue the war. But post war, the RAF was reluctant to give up its strategic role.

Now Roy Dommett’s, paper:
www.brohp.org.uk/downloads/prospero2_article.pdf (http://www.brohp.org.uk/downloads/prospero2_article.pdf)
provides a fascinating look at some little known aspects of post war defence thinking.

Blue Streak, like TSR2, was another famous cancellation. Blue Streak was to have been a British built, RAF operated, land based ICBM, with a British made nuclear warhead.

Rolls Royce made the engines for Blue Streak, but the design was from North American Aviation, the engine having been used in the Redstone missile - courtesy of von Braun’s migration to the USA and was, Dommett says, a direct descendant of the V2 engine. DH built the Blue Streak airframe.

The American built Thor missile was deployed in Eastern England, between 1958 and 63, so for a few years the RAF were ICBM operators. Thor was based above ground and was vulnerable to a first strike attacks. Blue Streak would have been similar in size to Thor but deployed in underground silos, the silos were supposed to withstand a one megaton strike 1000 yards away.

The silo technology, Dommett says, was devised in Britain, and subsequently copied by the USA, but it was not sufficient to prevent cancellation. RAF thinking, eventually, was that first strike collateral damage would have been huge and that the UK had no effective means of maintaining command and control, post first strike.

For a while the RAF continued to flirt with the ICBM, in the form of Skybolt. But eventually, control of the strategic nuclear deterrent was given to the Navy, when solid fuel submarine launched missiles and missile-carrying submarines became possible. To this day, although enourmously expensive, it remains credible.

The RAF fought long and hard to maintain its strategic role despite, historically, not being effective in it.

[Kieron Kirk]

Sandys, was the Minister of Defence for the MacMillan Conservative government, and perhaps had every right to suppose that military aircraft where a thing of the past. During the war years, he’d been, - assigned by Churchill, his father in law- the chair of the committee for the defence against flying bombs and rockets.

The Chiefs of Staff requested a single investigator to be appointed to call on such Scientific and Intelligence advisors as appropriate, and suggested the name of Mr. Duncan Sandys.

For a very considered view of the "Sandys" affair try Most Secret War- British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945/ R.V. Jones. Hamish Hamilton 1978 ISBN 0 241 89746 7.

Sandys had a bee in his bonnet about missiles, as a result of his amateurish attempts to frighten the government as to the likely huge civilian casualties which he said would be caused by the V-1 and V-2.

The 1957 Defence White Paper was flawed in its judgement of the technology available at the time, Sandys judgement of the threat from the V-1 and V-2 was similarly suspect.

He was not fit to hold high office in government, so I return to the question at the top of this post - " In defence of Duncan Sandys - WHY?

[Jetex Jim]

He was not fit to hold high office in government, so I return to the question at the top of this post - " In defence of Duncan Sandys - WHY?


Because Sandys was prescient in correctly predicting the superiority of the missile over aircraft, for delivering the strategic nuclear detterent. As in my previous post, only the sub launched ICBM today remains a credible delivery system.

That he forced the numerous aircraft companies to merge, correctly predicing a future composed only of aviation giants, even in the USA.

That he correctly predicted that aircraft would be vulnerable to missiles: As was proven in 1960 when Powers U2 was shot down.

He cancelled the high altitude rocket powered interceptors that would have been useless against ICBMs.


Perhaps he was paniced over the damage that was actually inflicted by the V2, but in the long run in he was right about the technology.

[Jetex Jim]

It is sometimes stated that Sandy’s, Defence review of 1957, was too premature technically for the ‘no more manned aircraft’ position to have been feasible.

Anyone looking, immediatly after the end of WW2 - at German missile projects might have reasonably assumed that 10 years later the technology would be well mature.

Dr Carlo Kopp has produced a summary, of the genesis of the SAM
www.ausairpower.net/DT-MS-1006.pdf (http://www.ausairpower.net/DT-MS-1006.pdf)

The performance and technology of the missiles that were actually test flown by Germany clearly show that the demise of the high altitude bomber was on the cards.

To quote Kopp, achieved performance varies with sources, however the Wasserfall W-5 is usually credited with a top speed of over 1700mph, ceiling 60000ft, range about 14 nm. Not too shabby, considering that, at the time, the main force of RAF Bomber Command was struggling to get above 25000ft. Such technology makes the heavy bombers with their absurd and ineffectual hydraulic gun turrets look (correctly) like a hang over from a bygone age.

Missile guidance was also highly advanced, with a fully automatic ‘beam-riding’ version, being the most prescient. Infrared guidance, active radar homing and TV guidance were all well advanced.


People seem to take it, that because the British aircraft industry didn’t do anything to develop these possibilities, that they were too advanced for the time. But the British aircraft industry can rarely bring itself to do anything without a firm government order in the bag, (and ideally at Cost Plus).

Their chief customer, the RAF, always wants to go flying. So the more expensive, but less technically advanced manned aircraft were favoured- hence the rocket powered interceptors. And the Lightning, a latter day manifestation of an Me 163, albeit with extended duration.

Sandys, with his enforced mergers of the aircraft industry, and his view of missile technology, - correctly predicted the pre-eminence of the ICBM. He was right more times than he was wrong. He may even have been correctly cautious regarding the threat of the V2. During the Gulf War we were asked to believe that Hussein’s developed SCUDs could be flown with chemical weapons, it’s rather naïve to imagine that WW2 Germany could not have managed the same threat.

[Fareastdriver]

Duncan Sandy’s problem was that he put all his eggs in one basket, I.e. war between the Communist Bloc and the West. At the time the UK was having minor punch-ups in the Far and Middle East, as were the French. By emasculating the Royal Air Force in the conventional role he removed all possibilities that come the crunch, nuclear war was avoidable. History has shown, nearly seventy years later, that he was wrong. I believe that should WW III nave broken out that if both sides had had strong conventional forces the result would have been a form of stalemate with neither side daring to use their nuclear arsenal because of the inevitable consequences.
That, of course, can never be proven, but it is still a vague but possible threat. Very unlikely though, as the new economies of both Russia and China are not going to be sacrificed by their leaders. The same for India, Pakistan and possibly Iran.
Way back in 1962 as young Pilot Officer on my first squadron I was grandly informed by a Technical Command Air Commodore that I was wasting my time as a pilot because the RAF would be all missiles in ten years time.
Obviously a Duncan Sandys fan, and just as wrong.

[Jetex Jim]

Not quite sure what you are driving at fareast, if you are saying Sandys' was obviously wrong because you were a pilot longer than predicted - with that point one can only agree.

The threat that Sandys chose to address was the major one, towards which Britain bought, eventually, and at great expense, a sub launched nuclear deterent to counter the Soviet threat. He thought that Britain had no chance of matching the Soviet Union in terms of conventional forces.

India, Pakistan (Iran?) have bought into the nuclear club, but would never use their nukes. - you believe because their leaders would not want to suffer the economic consequences of using them? It's a similar argument for them for buying into nuclear as it was for the UK, it's a cheaper way of standing up to intimidation than spending massivly on conventional forces.

For years the RAF kept itself busy chasing after Bear D's, it still does - so what? Russia has enough ICBM assets to turn the UK to dust if it should chose to face the consequences of retaliation from sub launched nuclear ICBM.

Sandys was trying to take a sensible course, to satisfy the anounced policy of the day - withdrawal from East of Suez etc - and to focus on what was perceived as a highly critical ongoing threat from the Eastern Bloc.

[FAStoat]

The BBC did an excellent series of interviews of Manufacturers Test Pilots,which was reshown on Sky.Roly Beamont gave a very interesting view of the lack of interest in furthering the Lightning program,and was apoplectic regarding the demise of the TSR2.Sandys had even told him as far back as 1944,when on a visit to 609 at Manston,that Rockets were the way to go,not manned fighters.The possible collapse in Civilian morale from impossible to stop V2,was his reasoning.When his Sandystorm finally hit the Brit Aviation Industry in 58,and destroyed the Reserve Squadrons as well,the Lightning was to be the last piloted fighter.Derek Wood wrote a book "Phoenix from the Ashes",I think it was called.This was a description of the cancelling of TSR2,ending up with all sorts of conspiracy theories ,regarding LBJ and the American Military Defense Industry paying off the then Labour Leaders to finish off TSR2 in its entirity,leaving nothing from which it could be resurrected.However in 78,Red Flag and Maple Flag Buccaneer failures meant 66% of the airframes were scrapped,leaving a gap in Low level Maritime strike capability.An OR was written for a replacement.The Chief of HS(George Edwards),was said to have told Callaghan that a fully singing and dancing TSR2,with Tornado Avionics,could be produced at Warton.There was said to be a 13th Airframe(Indeed photos were around showing the assembly of not 12 but 13 airframes,including the 3 completed(2 Nearly)-this was said to have been kept at various HS establisments.Also at that time,a Senior Staff member at the RAF Museum stated that they had just acquired a 320R Olympus,but that it had been part of a Rolls Bristol private developement,nothing to do with the Concorde project.This engine had been labelled"Finger Tight",and had come from an establishment no one had heard of-Seven Hats.The assumption being that some one had instigated the continuance of the 320R Olympus developement.There were a deal of coming and going of HS staff and RAF/Navy Buc Officers between Dunsfold,Warton,Honnington.Unfortunately the revised project was permenantly curtailed by the Conservatives after the mar 79 election,but this made excellent conversation at the time.I wonder if the Excellent John Farley can put any light on this time of struggles between the Aviation Industry and the Government of the time?

[Jetex Jim]

A government study into the feasibility of resurrecting the TSR-2 project was carried out during the early 1980s when Margaret Thatcher (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Thatcher) was Prime Minister (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister).[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] There was, briefly, some speculation that TSR-2 might yet see the light of day in an updated form.[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] But after the study concluded that it would be far too expensive (the previous destruction requiring a complete start from scratch), and that the technology was no longer cutting edge, the TSR-2 was cancelled forever.


The above from Wikipedia..

[Brewster Buffalo]

It would interesting to know whose idea it was to resurrect TSR2 - the industry, the RAF or the politicians...

[HarryMann]

This was a description of the cancelling of TSR2,ending up with all sorts of conspiracy theories ,regarding LBJ and the American Military Defense Industry paying off the then Labour Leaders to finish off TSR2 in its entirity,leaving nothing from which it could be resurrected.

Nobody has to this day shown quite where in Govt. the order to destroy all TSR2 prototypes, blueprints and jigs/tools came from. George Edwards himslef seemed not to know, Dennis Healey denied it point blank...

Surely there must be someone who knows from whence it came, and why it was considered so important that it was actually carried out... (to all intents and purposes). Obviously the govt. owned the designs and aircraft, so it can only have come from them... but by whom and at what level was that decision made and passed down Ostensibly a secrecy/security issue to prevent it passing into other's hands?

NB. The French, having acquired the Fairey Delta's wing research data, went on to make a shedload of money out of Mirages over the years...

[Jetex Jim]

The National Archives offer a plethera of papers on the subject, if anyone wants to go and trawl through 'em


Cancellation of TSR2 airplane:

Department of Scientific and Industrial Research: Aeronautical Research Council: Reports and Papers DSIR 23/32791 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=3143527)
Cancellation of TSR2: letters . Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files (all Ministers') DEFE 13/285 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=222884)
Cancellation of TSR2 aircraft programme .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3073 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=3436701)
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): measures to be taken to deal with discharged workers .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3079 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=3436707)
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): possible study on the re-employment of labour .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3072 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=3436700)
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): correspondence with regions .
Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1964-1970 PREM 13/433 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=5407094)
Future of UK aircraft industry: manpower implications following cancellation of TSR2 project .
Treasury: Defence Policy and Materiel Division: Registered Files (DM and 2DM Series) T 225/3946 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=8745121)
Claims arising from the cancellation of the TSR2 strike aircraft .
Ministry of Aviation and successors: Air A Division and successors: Registered Files (TS Series) FV 2/271 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=1808754)
Effect on costs if TSR2 were to be cancelled . Effect on costs if TSR2 were to be cancelled Ministry of Aviation and successors: Air A Division and successors: Registered Files (TS Series)Date range: 1964 - 1966.

My confinment, still, in Colditz Young Offenders Centre prevents a trip to Kew any time soon, to look at any of these, but the first one: DSIR 23/32791, (opened in 1995) could be worth a look.

[FAStoat]

In 1938 Fairey designed a 4 engine Airliner,which we lost to the US which became the Constellation.After the War ,having already given the US the Jet engine,the Atlee government gave away the Nene to the Russians.The Miles 52 was aborted,not before some designs off it were apparently used in the US X program.The French turned it into the Leduc.The French also used the Fairey Delta for their Mirage program,via South Africa.The TSR2 and the Canadian Arrow project were terminated to oblivion.Even top people concerned with the project,and the Low level Marine Bucc Outfit Bosses had odd things happen to them(Neil W and Pete S)Sir Neil Cameron,CIGS,became the only one to die in harness,and a TSR2 supporter.Quite later the Nimrod AWACS was cancelled,with the Brits the ONLY guys to have developed a Forward Seeking Radar,to identify Front End On Heat Signatures.Racal and GEC were doing this and had achieved a working stage of their program,when 11 pax were killed in a Navajo at Detling,on a low viz approach to Rochester(Home of GEC).I believe no one has managed to replicate this even now.The project was cancelled,and the Sentry was purchased.There was a terrible time in the early 80s ,when Dynamics were running tests with Racal at Hatfield.One by one,all the Aircraft involved,Hunters,Buccs,were withdrawn fromavailability,and 125s had to be used,against Airborne Radars mounted in a Twin Pin,and Wessex,which were hardly suitable.The noise for Welwyn Garden City must have been awful,but at least it was not done all day.Anyway,there was a survivor from the Racal Team,who was sick at the time,doing a Flying Course at Leavesden.He became Turboprop Chief Pilot at Air Uk and now I believe is Chief Pilot of GB Airways.All good conspiracy stuff,or plain coincidence.And I forgot to mention,thinking of John Farley again,we lost the Harrier to the US,without the 1154 even being built and the thin wing variant well and truly a US Aeroplane now.Not even a FAA Fighter anymore,for Fleet defense.What Effing fleet I hear you ask???????We only have the GR7and 9,used by Dark and Light Blue!!!!!!!!I feel a Book is in the offing!!!!!!:bored:

[Jetex Jim]

FASToat - I don’t know what you mean by:

Forward Seeking Radar,to identify Front End On Heat Signatures
But if you mean IRS&T, Infra Red Search and Track, that goes back years and, according to Dr Kopp over on Australian Aerospace, was first seen on USAF Voodoos and Delta Darts. - Its main benifit being the ability to track a target passively - not much of a advantage on an aircraft with two howling great radars blasting out RF in all directions.

The AEW Nimrod comes across as another defence budget funded job creation scheme for industry, why make your own AWACS when an American product is available cheaper? But much like the Spey Phantoms, the RAF were obliged to wait and wait while GEC faffed around, on Cost Plus for years.

According, again to Dr Kopp, one of AEW Nimrods many woes was a predilection for saturating its processing system, which was trying to track fast moving air targets overland, by detecting and tracking slow moving vehicles instead. This, if correct, represents an extraordinary system architecture – a clutter notch would normally eliminate ground and slow moving returns before they ever got into the tracking chain.

While this abortive development was going on, the RAF were forced to carry on flying, for AEW purposes, Shackletons with APS-20 Radar salvaged from ex-RN Gannetts, and that Radar was actually first used on Douglas Skyraiders.

However, unlike the Spey Phantoms, at the end GEC never managed to deliver the goods.

I don’t know about a book, but the IEEE has a case study on Nimrod AEW - The Nimrod AEW flies again; a procurement case study. by D. Dalcher Summary:… The Nimrod programme represents the largest development effort of its time. In the context of forensic ECBS, it represents a classical catalogue of failures.

ECBS - Engineering of Computer-Based Systems

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

FAStoat, I'd quite forgotten about Fairey's civil efforts before the War. As a reminder, I looked at http://www.freewebs.com/faireyaviation/aviation.htm. It opened a whole new tract of personal ignorance for me! I never knew that Fairey's had designed and developed engines; and my Dad started his craft apprenticeship at Heaton Chapel.

Back directly to Thread and relating to the FD2:

As Marcel Dassault, the founder of the company, said in the book 'Mirage, Warplane of the World', "If it were not for the clumsy way in which you tackle things in Britain, you could have made the Mirage yourselves". The next series of overseas low-level research flights took place in Norway with observers from the United States in attendance. Remember the Convair Delta Dagger? The FD.2 was never allowed to be developed into a fighter. The Dassault Mirage went on to become the best-selling fighter aircraft range of all time.

[Jetex Jim]

The next series of overseas low-level research flights took place in Norway with observers from the United States in attendance. Remember the Convair Delta Dagger?Its easy to picture those cunning yanks running a furtive tape measure over the FD2 and then dashing home to knock out a few hundred Delta Daggers. - In fact the Dagger linage goes back to 1948, and Convair had gone back to the source - Dr Lippisch - one the Operation Paperclip scientists, and developed the line through the XF92, to the F102 Delta Dagger which first flew in 1953, which by my reckoning is a year before the FD2 first flew. As with so many other ‘British’ developments, the delta was derived from wartime German research.

Twiss set the speed record in March 1956 but by the end of the same year the F106 had flown. In Britain EE were starting to put together Lightnings with minimal mission equipment, multi pointer altimeters and the like, as would have not looked out of place in a Spitfire. Meantime the F106 had a fit, which included: The Hughes MA-1 fire control system incorporated the first digital computer to be built into a fire control system. A datalink with NORAD's SAGE system meant that radio silence could be maintained throughout the intercept, while an autopilot allowed the ground controllers to "fly" the aircraft during the final approach to the target. A Tactical Situation Display (TSD) between the pilot's feet showed a moving map of the route across the ground during the intercept.It would be quite some time before a British aircraft, F3 Lightning with OR946 equipment, started to address even part of this capability.

Breaking records is one thing, but it was years before Britain caught on to the issue of building integrated systems: airframe, engines AND avionics. When the British planemakers did finally go down that route, with the first Tornadoes, development suddenly became very protracted, what Roy Dommett politely refers to as the ‘engineering culture’ of British planemaking didn’t at first, lend itself to avionics development. - It's been noted that 50's era British aircraft tended to handle differently and have notable dimensional differences - the craft tradition of British planemaking expected less from the detail design draughtsman, but more from the skilled aircraft fitter.

This approach will not do for avionics development, and now its common practice to invest heavily in development test rigs and formal design methods.

But tooling, test rigs, investment - seems to have been an anathema to the post war British planemakers.

[FAStoat]

Racal and GEC were trying to find a way of identifying Heat signatures from an Aircraft head on instead of the Rear.In the early 80s this was being tested at Hatfield with Dynamics on the North side.We did low runs down the runway at a stabilised JPT and different speeds and temps,so find out what was achievable.This progressed to Airborne attempts against a radar box set up in the door of a Twin Pin and then the same in a Wessex.I believe at the time,no one else had achieved anything like this,and it was meant to be a major factor in promoting the Nimrod as an AWACS.We lost the Buccs and then the Hunter and finally had to use 125s,but at least they were Vipers and not Garretts,so we had a chance of producing some form of heat signature,although the speeds could not be replicated.It seemed there were stumbling blocks put in the way ,when a definite advance had been made.As I stated the whole department at Racal were decimated in the Navajo accident ,along with most of the GEC guys.What was particularly strange was that on the Flights to and from Woodford/Northolt/Rochester/Leavesden,it was SOP to use more than one Aircraft if there were more than 4 pax .I believe 11 were killed along with the Oxaero Pilot,so not only were all 10 pax seats used ,but it was single crew,and a Pax in the right hand seat.The usual 2 Aircraft for this trip was to be out of Leavesden with 2 Kingairs,but that was fogbound,so it was deemed too expensive to position to Luton empty,with limos taking the pax seperately.It was blamed on a QNH/QFE error between the Pilots setting and what ATC gave him.Again coincidence or what?I was only doing some of the flying,so my detailed knowledge of the program was purely related to JPT temps and what was produced on the equipment,having been told it was vitally important for the Nimrod AWACS.There was general doom and gloom when it was terminated.

[barry lloyd]

Very little mention of the 748 in these posts. Almost 400 were built, and sold to eighty operators in fifty countries around the world.
The 146 would have been more successful had it not been the victim of politics. For example, attempts to sell the 146 to Varig for the Ponte Aerea (Air Bridge) between Rio and Sao Paulo, for which it was pefectly suited, were thwarted by US political pressure to buy the 737, which even today cannot land at Santos Dumont (Rio) when it has been raining heavily.
The 125 had sold more than 900 units into 45 different countries when the division was sold to Raytheon. During the same period, 492 Falcon 20s and 485 Sabreliners were sold. In the early nineties, 125s were selling at the rate of one every ten days.

Just the other side of the coin from someone whose job was selling them!

[FAStoat]

I think we were despairing of the Aviation Marvels produced by the British Aviation Industry over the last 50 years that were wasted by lack of Government interest!The 125 and 748 were successes,with the Whisper Jet as a possible other,if it had got decent engines.I never flew the 748 but flew many hours in its competitor,the F27,also with Darts and "i see 6 lights" for the prop control.However the Advanced Technical Problem ,or stretched 748,was what it was called earlier!The 125 was the first executive jet,I think,where the pax could walk up and down without bending,also it was a joy to fly,especially a 400 with Garretts,but until the 800 and now 1000 let down by range.the Jetstar might have had a roomy cabin,but I never experienced it ,so I reckon the 125 especially when it was called the Jet Dragon and still DeHavilland,was the first to accomodate the Standing Man.If you were sales,what happened to C2 in Australia?

[barry lloyd]

I think we were despairing of the Aviation Marvels produced by the British Aviation Industry over the last 50 years that were wasted by lack of Government interest!

Quite; which emphasises the point further. All the aircraft I mentioned were developed and built using private funding:ok:

Yes, the clever use of the 'well' as it was known, meant that 6-footers like me could walk around without looking like Quasimodo! The 1000 did make the aircraft transatlantic (eastbound at least!), but no funds were made available to further its design, and suitable engines could not be found at the time.
Not sure about the C2. Oz wasn't one of my territories (unfortunately!). I've just checked Bill Gunston's book, and there's no mention in there either.
I confess to deliberately avoiding mention of the ATP - less said the better!

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Its easy to picture those cunning yanks running a furtive tape measure over the FD2 and then dashing home to knock out a few hundred Delta Daggers. - In fact the Dagger linage goes back to 1948, and Convair had gone back to the source - Dr Lippisch - one the Operation Paperclip scientists, and developed the line through the XF92, to the F102 Delta Dagger which first flew in 1953, which by my reckoning is a year before the FD2 first flew. As with so many other ‘British’ developments, the delta was derived from wartime German research.

I believe the author wasn't suggesting that Convair copied the FD2 but that the FD2 wasn't allowed to develop into a fighter. All that money invested in a research A/C (albeit a record breaking one) without the chance of recouping it from a practical operational Type. Hence, no doubt, Marcel Dassault's observation. I understand that Messrs A V Roe were happy to develop the 707 into a trainer but were never invited.

[Jetex Jim]

I believe the author wasn't suggesting that Convair copied the FD2 but that the FD2 wasn't allowed to develop into a fighter.

An interesting observation, but does 'not allowed to develop into a fighter' - mean the same as, 'Fairey were not permitted to develop the FD2 as a fighter -even as a private venture'?

Or does it really mean:

UK MoD did not feel inclined to fund another manufacturer to turn yet another development aircraft into a supersonic fighter when they were already paying for the Lightning?

[FAStoat]

Csquared (C2) was John Canning Cook,ex FAA Pilot who was in 125 sales,and went out to Oz for Sales and died!!!!I never knew how or exactly when?I went out to Nigeria with Des Penrose,for a Big Ogga,until the Coup in 83,and went back 85.Sorry to drift off the subject.You could not quite make the FL of a G2 or a Lear,but you could fly the 125 like a fighter,and the Descent from 410 overhead Zarsatine,to land was mind blowing.Happy Days

[Brian Abraham]

I confess to deliberately avoiding mention of the ATP - less said the better

barry, would I be out of place in inviting you to elaborate? Seems to me they had a jump on the ATR and the dash eights in the market (timing), and the market is reviving with the price of oil as it is.

[barry lloyd]

FAStoat

Ah, that C2! And there was I thinking that there was a typo, and I had in mind the C2s, (technically CC2s if course) which were orginally supplied to the RAF! Sadly, I know no more than you, and have lost contact with many of my former colleagues. I remember him well though, and he was fondly regarded by all of us.
Yes, the 125 certainly had a fighter-like performance. I remember taking off from Hatfield for Moscow once, and under the guidance of eastern radar we were at FL 410 by the east coast of the UK!
Happy days indeed!

Brian

The ATR 72 was of course a major competitor, as the Dash 8-400 eventually became. When I left that division of BAe in 1988, they (P&W) had still not found a way to significantly increase engine power, and BAe (perhaps sensing/knowing by that time that they would not stay in the civil aircraft business for too much longer), decided it was not worth investing in improvements to it, and of course production was moved to Prestwick, possibly for political reasons.
Many people within BAe at the time thought that a better option would have been to put the P&W 124 onto an improved 748 airframe (as Fokker did with the F50), but a decison had been taken to go ahead with the ATP. The rest, as they say, is history.

[Jetex Jim]

FAStoat
Racal and GEC were trying to find a way of identifying Heat signatures from an Aircraft head on instead of the Rear

This sounds like what's now usually called FLIR:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLIR
A way of imaging with non-visible, infra red light.

I wasn't aware that it was a feature of Nimrod AEW but various pod mounted systems have been produced as add ons for other aircraft. Now Typhoon has it as a part of the sensor system, where its information can be 'fused' with other inputs to optimise accuracy.
http://www.eurofighter.com/et_as_sf_ir.asp

[FAStoat]

Thanks for that about C2,but it seems the same story ,a blank.I will try elsewhere,since I knew him quite well at one time.They were happy days indeed.The delights of people like "Foul Weather Mac",and the" Bugger it "factor!!!Many intrepid across the Pond deliveries were made with superb judgement is all I can say!!.When I was signed off P1 across,it was another piece of pure luck ,that I feel some one up there looks after you.The 125 world,was real fun!Even in Nigeria,with the Bushman(Bob Ogden,now departed),and ACN with chief Pilot Arthur Chea,known as Cato for his random Karate techniques,Erik the Red with the longest single engined flight from Algiers to Kano,because his F/O would no go back into Morocco.I could go on ,but it brings tears to the eyes!!!!!!