Boeing "new" procedures

[mrjet]

Boeing introduced new procedures a few years back that were supposed to increase the commonality in procedures between all Seattle models.

My airline never introduced them but I’d be interested to find out how many airlines did the change to the new procedures and what pilots think of them compared to their old ones.

I fly the 737NG so I’d be interested to hear from 737 pilots primarily, but also from pilots flying the other models.

Mrjet

[Feather #3]

Did a fair spot of training mostly B767 Capt & F/O with a few B737 to the B744 last year.

Most felt comfortable with their roles and common procedures and felt they were better able to concentrate on the aircraft differences.

G'day ;)

[Flight Detent]

Feather #3...

I was really familiar with the original procedures, (737NG)

I've now been exposed to both the phase 1 and phase 2 'updates'' to these procedures,

I'm still holding a strong preference for the original ones, for both the format changes and the content changes,

I'm a believer in doing the job right...not cutting corners, as these new procedures look to have done!

There are just tooo many items cut out, and therefore to much reliance on the automatics, and that's just not me...that's how I've survived around 14K hours without an incident/accident of any sort!

I would much prefer to go with the originals...the words I love to hear inflight are "check and set"

Cheers...FD :ok:

[mrjet]

Thanks for the replies.

As I’ve stated before I don’t have any operational experience of the new procedures (apart from QRH phase I), but they do seem very stripped down.

I know a lot of pilots think of the checklist as the third crewmember or the final safety net, however the first time you check the pressurization system is correctly set up is on the after takeoff checklist (it is done by scan-flow before but not on the checklist). That to me does not seem like such a good idea, especially not on a 737 with a very questionable pressurization system design where the only way to know if the system is working normally is by directly looking at the switch and needle positions on the overhead panel outside of your normal scan in flight.

[A and C]

I would not go making such sweeping statements about aircraft systems with your limmited experience.

Yes the procedures are weak in some areas but even with a much more strict "do List" you should take a look at the cabin pressure just after take off, after all it might have malfunctioned dipite you putting all the switches in the right place!

[LeftHeadingNorth]

Going to revive this thread with a couple of questions since our company just made the switch to the Boeing "new" procedures. What is the reason that you keep the fuel and elec hyd pumps off just until pushback? Also, you turn off these switches on each turn around. Is this necessary? Another thing I'm slightly concerned about is the fact that the F/O is not suppose to reset neither trim nor the MCP panel on the after ldg flow. Why in the world has this been removed? Last fight we almost missed to set a proper V2 speed since a very similar Vref was set from the previous flight....

Cheers,
LHN

[de facto]

Boeing is not responsible for company SOPs,however if requested they can give an airline its opinion.
The stab trim setting is on the before take off checklist.My sops dictate to set it when the trim is crosschecked with the loadsheet and fmc.
The v2 is set in the same way,as the speed are entered into the fmc,and just before engaging the autothrottle.

Both pilot will perform these duties together in order to avoid any finger troubles..
Sops vary from airline to airline.

Concerning the air system, indeed the only after start check is to ensure the isolation valve is set to auto.
It is however good practice to follow the pm during his after start procedures.
The after take off checklist(boeing) ensures pilots check bleeds and packs are in the proper postion.
Obviously pilots should not wait for altitudes above 10000 ft (in case of a high transition altitude) to perform the checklist.
A check of slightly cabin climb rate is a good idea and could be some airlines sop.

[Todders]

The pumps are simply turned off to prolong the part life span. Though many don't like it because they are doing a walk around with unpressurised systems.

As for the Speeds and the Trim can only imagine it's to reduce the work load in an other critical phase of flight: Taxi. You an I know it's not gonna make much difference but in a board room deciding these things it was prob. one guys little thing. I must admit I still did it when I was still flying standard boeing sop's.

:=

[de facto]

Concerning the hydr pumps,
Eng hydr pumps stay on to prolonge their life.
Fuel pumps:why would you set all pumps on long time before pushback?
Your airline may have some problems in sops or you may not be familiar with them.

Trim only reset if landed requiring supplemental procedures.(icing conditions)

[A37575]

While it is not politically correct (?) to say so but I for one dislike the "new" Boeing 737 procedures. I can never see the logic push for commonality between Boeing types. After all, each require a specific type rating and the chances of a 737 pilot going on in later years to fly a 777 is in the lap of the Gods.

The original 737 procedures I was taught in 1976 from a Boeing instructor pilot (whose signature was on the original flight crew training manual) had the captain conducting the greater part of the pre-flight, and after start procedures. The first officer's task was to read the checklist using the long established challenge and response method. The first officer read the item (challenge) and awaited the captain's reply (response).

The current policy where the first officer does the majority of the scans and actions for pre-flight, before start and after start, has the less ideal result where he not only challenges but also responds to himself. Where is the double check of the past? The captain looks on as an interested observer to the first officer's hands flashing over switches then waits patiently while the first officer drags out the printed checklist and challenges himself and answers himself.

It was this sort of convoluted SOP that could have led to a serious incident a few years ago in a 737-400 where the captain conducted the preflight scans because the first officer was busy on cockpit administration and the flight was running late. There was ample fuel in the centre tank but the captain forgot to switch on the centre tank pumps. Three hours later it was noticed that the wing tanks contents were down to 100 kgs either side. It was only then that the centre tank pumps were hurriedly switched on.

At the tea and bikkies session with management, the story was the captain took full blame. The first officer protested his own innocence by saying that the captain had usurped the first officers area of responsibility (which was to turn on the appropriate fuel pumps during before start) and that he (the first officer) would not have missed the centre tank pump selection had he been permitted to conduct HIS area of responsibility scan instead of the captain pinching his job. Et tu, Brute...

It could be argued that the so called `new` procedures was primarily to give the first officer something to do with his hands rather than be just a reader of checklists. Now the situation is the first officer is flat out once he enters the flight deck as a multi-fingered switch flicker ripping through numerous switches in his `area of responsibility` - as well as then challenging and responding to his own checks. Talk about a one-arm paper hanger.

One potentially lethal flaw in either method is where the PNF actions the after take off items without reference to the other pilot and then challenges and responds himself. At no stage does the current Boeing procedure require either pilot to check the pressurisation instruments - only the switch positions. It could be argued that is left to commonsense. Well, maybe. But in the simulator a significant number of crews fail to check these vital pressurisation instruments simply because they are not published in the after takeoff checklist. The Helios Airlines B737 accident may have been prevented if the after take off check list had contained the item "Aircon and Pressurization.....checked." This was in the original 737 checklist in 1976 but was later removed.

A previous poster on this thread asks the point of turning on the fuel pumps during a preflight when this merely leads to extra wear and tear and the pumps are not needed then. The same principle applies to the switching of the start switches to CONT or ON after engine start when they are not needed except under icing conditions. But the `new` procedures require these switches to be actuated after start regardless of the time before take off. On the B737-200 the Pratt and Whitney engine manual exhorted crews not to use the starter switches unnecessarily (unless for icing) because it decreases ignition system life. Does this principle not apply to the other B737 variants?

The so called "Areas of responsibility" have led to occasional tiffs on the flight deck where someone says "Hey! Don't touch that switch - that's in my area of responsibility." This scribe prefers the original Boeing policy where the captain ran the show in terms of switch operation and the first officer supported him rather than as now there is a complete role reversal called PF and PM. And both change their areas of responsibility depending who is flying the plane.
It is hard to teach an old dog new tricks of course.:ok:.

[cosmo kramer]

There was ample fuel in the centre tank but the captain forgot to switch on the centre tank pumps. Three hours later it was noticed that the wing tanks contents were down to 100 kgs either side.
Rather than blaming the procedures, I would be wondering why no one did a proper fuel check in those 3 hours?

[ReverseFlight]

why no one did a proper fuel check in those 3 hours?
Maybe it was deliberate, so that the F/O can knife the Capt in the back. :E

[porch monkey]

The real issue for the tea and biccies was the fact that the "captain" decided to try to get the engineer to transfer the remaining fuel into the wings after landing, so the little "problem" wouldn't be discovered.