Latest LAX ATC Error Reported on 29 Dec

[Two's in]

Reported that a Mexicana 319 was cleared for Take Off after an arrived AA MD-80 had (incorrectly) read back they were about to cross the active while taxi-ing back in.

http://apnews.myway.com/article/20071229/D8TR16UO0.html


...The runway incursion Wednesday night involved an American Airlines plane arriving from Mexico and a Mexicana Airlines plane preparing for takeoff. The arriving plane, an MD-80 from San Jose del Cabo, had just landed on the outer runway and was about to cross the inner runway, where an Airbus A319 was about to take off for Morelia, Mexico, according to Federal Aviation Administration spokesman Ian Gregor.

The traffic controller told the American Airlines pilot to stop before crossing the inner runway, Gregor said. The pilot apparently misheard the direction and read back that he would go ahead and cross the runway. The controller did not catch the pilot's statement and cleared the Mexicana flight for takeoff before realizing that the American Airlines jetliner was about to roll onto the runway, the FAA said.

The controller immediately told both pilots to stop. No injuries were reported...

[ChristiaanJ]

Wasn't this sort of thing sorted out close to a century ago at the average crossroad by means of traffic lights?

Sure, people ignore traffic lights.

But in this case it would seem there weren't any......
Apart from a missed R/T call.

[noblues]

No an excuse ... BUT ... It doesn't help that LAX will not tell you your landing runway until very close in, often evolving a complex RNAV step descent over high terrain from the east (that's is different for each runway), and they often change the landing runway once on the STAR ..

Makes briefing taxiing almost impossible, and confusion will inevitably occur ...

[sevenstrokeroll]

you said it...LAX...give me a break...tell me which runway I get before I leave 10,000' so I can brief it and the taxi route

below 10,000 I want to be heads up looking for traffic, established on the localizer and at safe altitudes.


I think the FAA should monitor this website.

[Dream Land]

What difference does knowing which runway you will receive in regard to a runway incursion? :confused:

[sevenstrokeroll]

it allows you to refresh your knowledge of the airport, expecting a certain turnoff is easier if you know which runway you will land upon...knowledge is power

I've seen many pilots do a great landing in difficult conditions and then go blank at the idea of finding a taxi route that is unexpected.

[portquartercv67]

Never was a big believer in spending much time briefing expected taxi routes, especially at LAX where it's always different. Causes one to go "blank" if you don't get what you briefed. Look at your chart and just do what the tower tells you to do. Regards getting the runway assignment early in LAX, how will that prevent incurrsions? Why not just brief that when landing on the outer, stop before crossing the inner unless both are absolutely sure they heard the command to cross. Better to get yelled at for stopping than the alternative.

[Huck]

Why not just brief that when landing on the outer, stop before crossing the inner unless both are absolutely sure they heard the command to cross. Better to get yelled at for stopping than the alternative.

Exactly.

And the Mark I eyeball needs to scan to the left prior to crossing. Problem is - it's on an angle so the first officer is blind in that direction.

[DingerX]

If the information supplied is correct, then the coverage of the event is not, at least from our favorite sources. Assuming we are talking about something happening at LAX 27 Dec 07 at ca. 0442Z, the exchange might have gone something like this:
(I make no claims as to the accuracy of this transcription. It certainly isn't complete, since two tower frequencies step on each other, and I don't include the other traffic, except for the fun with Alaska. So the critical read at the start is fragmentary)Anyway, knock yourselves out. You know where to find the recording.
12:46 TWR: ... cross runway 25right, remain on this frequency
12:48 AA260: Cross runway (mumbles 25) right, remain on this frequency (this whole call has been reduced to a handful of syllables) American 260
12:58 TWR: Mexicana 129 wind 340 to 12 gusts 23, caution wake turbulence departing heavy MD10, runway 25R cleared for takeoff.
13:05 MX128: cleared for takeoff 25R Mexicana 129
13:08 TWR: alaska 225 *(say again?)
13:10 ALaska225: Alaska 225 still with you
13:13 TWR: Alaska 225 wind now 340 to 11 gusts 23
13:16 225:Alaska 225 cleared to land, correct?
13:18 TWR: Affirmative cleared to land runway ... run... 25 Left Alaska 225
13:34 TWR: Mexicana 129 cancel takeoff clearance
13:36 MX129: Stopping Mexicana 129
13:38 AA260: American 260 we're crossing right?
13:43 mx129:TWR: American 260 you can cross runway 25 right now, contact ground .75
13:45 AA260 Ground .75
14:24 TWR: Mexicana 129 wind 340 to 11 gust 22 runway 25R cleared for takeoff
14:28 MX128: cleared for takeoff 25R Mexicana 129
15:31 TWR: Mexicana 129 thanks for the help good job contact SoCal departure so long sir
15:34 contact departure Mexicana 129 good day

[PBL]

Dinger,

Brilliant intervention! Thanks.

PBL

[Dream Land]

Yes, an apparent non event, still don't understand why stop bars wouldn't work for the FAA in certain areas such as the high speed between 24 L and R. :confused:

[threemiles]

Issuing a crossing clearance to an active runway and a take-off clearance for the same runway, all within 10 seconds - I wouldn't call this a non-event, albeit from a different perspective than originally posted

[PPRuNeUser0211]

And bear in mind that the t/o clearance had been issued for 25 odd seconds before it was canx.... quite a lot of time!

[MrApproach]

Interesting that this thread is titled Latest LAX ATC error....my reading of the text is that the Mexicana pilot failed to comply with an ATC clearance. Why ATC should have to take a fall for a pilot that cannot understand English would keep my local "kerosene corner" bar going all night!

OK it's about the read-back but I would contend that relying on read backs for clearance compliance in the runway/taxiway environment at airports such as LAX belongs with the DC4's it grew up with...on the scrap heap. If we are to rely on radio then pilots have to first listen (For Wilbur's sake this is LAX!!) and secondly be able to understand what they are being told.

On the constructive side, as someone points out, we solved this problem years ago at rail/road crossings and road intersections. Barriers and lights at these high risk areas (hotspots?) have the same effect that stop lights would have at LAX, they slow operations down! They leave the car driver and the train driver in no doubt about who has right of way. LAX runway crossings are no different to your local really busy crossroad when all the Mums are taking the kids to school. (We all know one.) Would you be happy if the local laws allowed a policemen to control the intersection by radio, relying only on read backs to ensure safety?

On paper the controllers are motivated solely by safety, in practice they are the keepers of the airport movement rate, mess with that and you will quickly find yourself back on clearance delivery. Once upon a time powerful ATC and Pilot Unions backed their members up but since R.Raygun, western governments have turned us all in to profit centres, where the needs of the consumer, airline AND airport are paramount.

Take the bus!

[Avman]

MrApproach, how the heck do you figure that the MXA had failed to comply with an ATC clearance or that the pilot had failed to understand the clearance? Or have I missed something?

[Yossarian]

What am I missing here? All I see are two conflicting clearances.

[PBL]

Yossarian,

I can't see that you're missing anything.

I guess someone took a little longer than the controller was expecting at a particular point in time, so the controller amended a clearance to resolve the conflict. Isn't this just what controllers do every day at work? No right, no wrong, 100% routine.

PBL

[Yossarian]

PBL, glad to hear it. Amazing that so much can be made of so little. Almost as bad as the newspapers,.

Hope no-one dropped their I-phone when they braked.

[Point Seven]

As a controller, I find it quite worrying that there are so many replies to this thread saying that there was nothing wrong here and that it should be considered routine.

If that were to happen in the UK, then it would be considered far more seriously - and i say that not in a "We're superior" way but as a comment on how to improve runway safety. There are a lot of elements that lead to an incident like this, no single one being attributable to either side, but there are learning points here that could prevent it escalating into something far more serious - and to write it off as a routine event is, for me, the most disturbing part of this thread.

P7

[PBL]

Point Seven,

I'm happy to stand corrected; you're there, I'm not. On the other hand I flew for over a decade in the U.S. West (but not into LAX, Runway-Incursion Capital of the World), so I likely have some experience which you don't.

Would you care to elaborate on your view of what went on and what would happen if this happened in the U.K.?

PBL

[criss]

So can Mr Approach, or anyone else for that matter, clarify in what way is it pilot's error and not the controller's?

[MrApproach]

Apologies to Mexicana I mis-read the post. It was American Airlines that taxied onto an active runway in contravention of the ATC instruction. (I assume the pilots checked the runway before entering and did not see the Mexicana aircraft?) The controller then either mis-heard or did not hear the read back but fortunately saw what was happening. I remember an earlier incident when a Gulfstream crossed in front of a departing Embraer, the E-jet pilots could be heard hyperventilating on the cockpit recorder.

In my part of the world what occurred would be a reportable incident, the controller would have been relieved from duty pending an investigation and the two airlines would be advised through the ATSB. Without adequate facts my guess is that the controller would have been found to have erred by not obtaining a correct read back, however this has nothing to do with guilt. The causes of the incident are many, starting with the "aviation unfriendly" design of LAX and including the American pilots apparent failure to comprehend the clearance. (Once again, if they are reading this post it is not your fault, it is the way the "system" works and it is the system that has to be changed. The days of pilot error and now controller error should be way behind us but regrettably in a lot of places in the world they are not)

To conclude, an investigation of this incident, coupled to the others that have happened before it, could theoretically lead to a recommendation, among others, from the NTSB that stop bars be introduced at LAX and operated in conjunction with radio instructions.

If everyone accepts incidents such as these as routine affairs then eventually the inevitable will occur. Pontification over...it's all about fixing the system!

[PBL]

It was American Airlines that taxied onto an active runway in contravention of the ATC instruction.

Sorry, I am missing something here. How do you conclude that?

PBL

[4potflyer]

It seems obvious from the transcript that the tower made a mistake in clearing a runway crossing and take-off at the same time.
5 years ago before I stopped learning to fly I was taught it was ok to begin take off as soon as clearance was received and acknowledge while rolling, so it seems through situational awareness or not being ready to roll right away the MEX plane averted a potential disaster. Perhaps the AA plane also hung around short of 25R for similar reasons which prompted the Alaskan plane to clarify if the 25L runway was available for it which acted as a wake up call to ATC.
Anyway definately not a non event but perhaps a few sharp eyes were on top of it. Now back to lurking...

[misd-agin]

Another unknown is where was the Mexicana A319 when it was given takeoff clearance?

If they're using full length the hold short line is not at the departure end so it would take a short amount of time for the A319 to taxi onto the runway.

If you zoom in on the runway I believe it's the perpendicular line, not the 45 degree angled line, where you typically hold short. The perpendicular line is about a plane's length short of the hold short line and the black marks on the taxiway are the deposits from the idling engines sitting at the hold short line.

So instead of just doing a 90 turn onto the runway it requires a slight forward taxi followed by a long, sweeping, 180 degree turn. All of which takes time.

[Dream Land]

Yawn, :hmm:

[Point Seven]

Point Seven,

I'm happy to stand corrected; you're there, I'm not. On the other hand I flew for over a decade in the U.S. West (but not into LAX, Runway-Incursion Capital of the World), so I likely have some experience which you don't.

Would you care to elaborate on your view of what went on and what would happen if this happened in the U.K.?

PBL

PBL

You are quite right in that you have much, much more experience of US airport operation that me. However, I am not prepared to elaborate on what happened, though, as all I have is what has been read on here. However, the facts of what happened ARE out there if the right people are asked the right questions: to the controller, what was the workload like, time in position, why do you think it happened, extraneous factors. To the crews, same sort of questions but all asked not with the intention of pinning blame on either crew or ATC, but to clearly define why this happened and what measures can be put in place to stop it happening again.

By all of this I don't mean stop landing planes, this is not an option faced by increasingly busy airports, but when a trained professional describes an airport as "Runway Incursion Central" (and PBL, I do not doubt you are right from what I hear), I have to wonder whether the strategy at LAX for dealing with the problem is successful.

And the overriding point of my post is that I can't see a proactive approach towards dealing with, what is most probably, the biggest single safety issue facing busy aerodrome operations today - and being proactive is the only way that as a community we are going to solve the runway incursion problem.

P7

[MrApproach]

PBL, I am only reading the post I don't know what really happened and I am not trying to blame anybody, however I quote:

"The traffic controller told the American Airlines pilot to stop before crossing the inner runway"

On the information supplied, they did not stop, hence, regardless of the incorrect read back not picked up by the controller, it was non-compliance.

As I (and Point Seven) also wrote, who was in the "wrong" is not the point, arguably lots of people have made mistakes here, including those that allowed the airport to develop the way it has. From memory there is even a label on the Jepperson charts that warns pilots that lots of incursions occur? What kind of cop out is that?

The only point of my post is that an investigation would try to discover such things as:


Why the pilots did not hear the clearance properly
Why the pilots did not see the Mexicana aircraft on the runway
If they did why did they not query it
(in Australia traffic lined up but holding has to be given as traffic information to aircraft cleared to cross the runway in front)
Why the controller did not hear the read back
Has this happened before on this taxiway
If so what are the common elements
Are there outstanding recommendations from the NTSB concerning such incidents and/or this location in particular


I won't go on but the aim of the investigation under ICAO Annex 13 (I think) is not to apportion blame but to prevent the incident happening again.

[criss]

But from the transcript provided in this topic it seems that someone (c/s missing) actually did receive a crossing clearance.

[DingerX]

Again, point of information: a partial recording of the radio traffic is available, and it provides a different picture of the event than the summary of the same radio traffic given in the press.

12:46 (~0442:16Z) TWR: ... cross runway 25right, remain on this frequency
12:48 AA260: Cross runway (mumbles 25) right, remain on this frequency (this whole call has been reduced to a handful of syllables) American 260

The only way the account given in the press could be correct is if the first part of tower's call was preceded by "DO NOT". Then you'll be free to descend into the realm of debating what constitutes unambiguous phraseology when transmissions may be stepped on. In any case, the controller most certainly didn't tell them to stop.

The readback was largely a mumbled, pro forma affair. That is, in order to understand the words as pronounced, you had to be expecting them. So even if he had issued a "correct" clearance, it would have been difficult for the controller to rely on such a readback.

A cultural trait shared by Americans when encountering an obvious error is not to question directly, but to state the situation clearly in a question.

The same press source put the aircraft at 8000 feet from each other, at other ends of the runway. The Mexicana aircraft was not holding in position, so the AA crew would not have seen it on the runway.
There's no evidence either way to suggest what both crews did before clearance was canceled. There could have been something (when the scanner hops back to frequency, it sounds like MX129 just keyed their mics), or not.

[WAIF-er]

Mr Approach,
I am astonished that you have obviously read this transcript a few times now and still cannot see the glaring facts!!! :ugh:
12:46 TWR: ... cross runway 25right, remain on this frequency
12:48 AA260: Cross runway (mumbles 25) right, remain on this frequency (this whole call has been reduced to a handful of syllables) American 260
12:58 TWR: Mexicana 129 wind 340 to 12 gusts 23, caution wake turbulence departing heavy MD10, runway 25R cleared for takeoff.
13:05 MX128: cleared for takeoff 25R Mexicana 129
(another side point that bugs me is "caution wake turbulence". How does a departing a/c caution wake turbulence!)
Anyway, thats another thread.

Without knowing the exact circumstances of this incident, I am not judging anyone involved, but in general terms;

there is a simple rule in the UK - you dont clear an a/c for takeoff until the runway is clear. How on earth can you absolutely guarantee that no conflict will occur if the previous a/c has not yet vacated?
I would be hung out to dry if I used the above method. Yes, LAX is busy, but if you stay just ahead of the game and assert "control", you should not need to use such dangerous reliances on pilots getting it right. I agree that to be completely safe, you would have to limit movements to 1 at a time and therefore you have to draw the line somewhere with regards to trusting pilots, but clearing 1 for takeoff whilst another is crossing... expedition? Not on your nelly!
I work on the principle that even if you only have 2 movements, the law of sod dictates that they will probably conflict!

[MrApproach]

WAIFer --I am aware of the "glaring" facts as they have been presented on this thread, I am not aware of what the real facts are and, I say again, I am not trying to blame anybody. I am concerned that the apparent result of the investigation is that the controller failed to obtain a correct read back and will be retrained.

Pilot error plus retraining was the stock standard response to all aviation incidents until human factors experts woke everyone up to the swiss cheese model, amongst other things. There are reasons why pilots and, in this case, the controller made an error. No-one seems to be interested, once again, based on the contents of this thread, in fixing the problem.

As part of the traveling public can I now safely assume that the authorities believe that there is nothing wrong with the airport and nothing wrong with the procedures? A controller simply made an error will be retrained therefore it won't happen again!

[PaperTiger]

As part of the traveling public can I now safely assume that the authorities believe that there is nothing wrong with the airport and nothing wrong with the procedures? A controller simply made an error will be retrained therefore it won't happen again!Based on the transcript supplied in post #9, I'm not even convinced there was a controller error; or if there was it was a very mild one. The MX wasn't even lined up (AIUI) when the AA was given clearance to cross, and when the controller saw the conflict he cancelled the MX takeoff.

Those who work at rather more leisurely airports may decry the tight operations at LAX, but they are both normal and necessary given the volume. When you are given an instruction at LAX etc. the expectation is you do it right now to keep things moving and not take your sweet time about it. Controller expected AA to have crossed and be clear before MX could have physically started his roll. When that didn't happen, he made the adjustment.

There is a LOT wrong with LAX, most of it related to the layout, but without a significant reduction in traffic these minor incidents are bound to happen. I no longer fly for a living, but I'm quite happy to ride the cushions into LAX relying on the professionalism of my (ex-)colleagues.
Bottom line: NBD.

[WAIF-er]

I believe there is possibly a fundamental difference in the way clearances are issued in the US compared to UK. The only concern I have is that should the controller become distracted with another call or who knows what else, then he or she may not be able to cancel the take-off clearance eg.
- someone's transmit switch may get stuck
- partial failure of comms prevents message being transmitted/received
- etc etc.

At the end of the day, whatever opinions people have, the fact remains that aircraft are not colliding with each other on a daily or even weekly basis in the US as a result of ATC ways. The current methods DO work. I have flown into many US destinations on vacation and will not hesitate to do so in future. :ok:

[4potflyer]

ok I promised to pipe down but I can't help myself.

Since the controller was sent for some retraining it is clear that something out of the ordinary happened and should not have happened. It is not clear that the controller actually issued conflicting clearances however he/she ended up with a conflict on his/her hands.

To those imlpying it is normal (or legal) in the US to issue potentially conflicting clearances and then cancel one if a crunch looks likely - I have to disagree for the reasons stated; comms failure etc.

[WAIF-er]

The whole issue of what is safe or unsafe is a very complex one. ATC documents are full of procedures that cover the "what if" situations and as thorough as they are, there will always be new situations popping up that necessitate the writing of yet another procedure.

Some of the golden generation of controllers would argue that the manual of air traffic services should be just one page, which reads in bold USE COMMON SENSE!

What is common practise in one country will be alien to another, but at the end of the day we are all professionals and we rely on the skill, judgement and intelligence of everybody in the chain to not do anything stupid!