Pilots safer than ever - Study

[preset]

Congratulations :)

A new study has found that you're less likely to be involved in a aircraft mishap due to pilot error than two decades ago.
The study, conducted by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in the United States, found that the proportion of mishaps involving pilot error over a 20 year period had reduced by 40 per cent.
The researchers attribute the decline to better training and improvements in technology that aid pilot decision making.
"A 40 per cent decline in pilot error-related mishaps is very impressive," lead author and John Hopkins University professor, Susan P Baker, said.
"Trends indicate that great progress has been made to improve the decision making of pilots and coordination between the aircraft's crew members."
The study, which was published in the journal Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, examined 558 airline mishaps between 1983 and 2002.
Other key findings included, mishaps relating to bad weather dropped 76 per cent, mishandling of wind or runway conditions declined 78 per cent, and accidents caused by poor crew interaction declined 68 per cent.
It found the most common time for pilot error was during taxiing, takeoff, final approach and landing of the aircraft.
Despite this, the study revealed an increase in the number of mishaps involving errors by air traffic control or ground crews.
It also revealed a jump in the number of mishaps occurring when the aircraft was standing still or being pushed back from the gate, more than doubling from a rate of 2.5 to 6 mishaps per 10 million flights.

[airsupport]

The researchers attribute the decline to better training and improvements in technology that aid pilot decision making.
Is this because computers now make most of the decisions? ;)

[TopBunk]

It found the most common time for pilot error was during taxiing, takeoff, final approach and landing of the aircraft.

No sh1t ...... pure genius was needed to work that one out:ugh:

[sevenstrokeroll]

I've never seen a computer decide when to takeoff...it might move the throttles, but a person decides, a computer assists.

[gengis]

"Is this because computers now make most of the decisions?"

Lemme see..... those great computers wanted to fly us right through that big red return about 40 miles in front last week. And yeah.... all three of them great autopilots flying together in LAND3 mode would make the decision to keep on going even when the wind shears at 50 ft? Don't you just love 'em... :rolleyes:

[AirwayBlocker]

Airsupport


Is this because computers now make most of the decisions?


While I realise that this comment was made with tongue partly in cheek (I refer to the ;)), I would like to ask you to name a single decision that a computer makes on board an aircraft. They follow directions and do assigned tasks pretty well but I've yet to see one decide anything on an aircraft.

[gengis]

"I would like to ask you to name a single decision that a computer makes on board an aircraft. They follow directions and do assigned tasks pretty well but I've yet to see one decide anything on an aircraft. "

You're right. They follow directions and still require supervision. One time we were to maintain runway heading, cleared for takeoff. HDG SEL was engaged on the runway prior to hitting TO/GA. After we got airborne and were pulling the gear up, the roll bar commanded a full right turn even with the Heading bug set to the runway heading. At 50' agl!!! If there ever was an automatic takeoff, the automatics WOULD HAVE commenced a turn at 50ft! This was a 777.

"To err is human, to to completely f@*k up takes a computer."

[twistedenginestarter]

I couldn't find any details of this on the John Hopkins web site but a GA study on there reported Older pilots (ages 55-63) made fewer errors than younger pilots (40-49);Just be careful, you young 'uns!

[PJ2]

twistedenginestarter;

No, I couldn't find any reference to the article either, (it was supposed to have been published in the January, 2007 edition of Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine. I think the date cited by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health must have meant January 2008, not 2007.

I would certainly like to know how the conclusions were reached...

[Baccalaris]

Studies less reliable than ever - According to pilots


:E

[PBL]

the proportion of mishaps involving pilot error over a 20 year period had reduced by 40 per cent.

If I remember tradition rightly, pilot error was attributed as probable cause in roughly 7 out of 10 commercial aviation accidents. So what exactly is meant by a "40% reduction" of "7 out of 10"?

PBL

[graviton]

I think the clue is in the word 'roughly'

[L337]

Training has improved. Human factors, CRM are all far better understood. Aircraft are more reliable and automation has improved.

The black cloud on the horizon is the accountant. The correct balance between profit and safety is the new challenge.

The view from my seat is that we are all working flat out up to the legal limit. Training has taken a back seat, and the simulator reduced to a "box ticking exercise" with little or no real training input. The aircraft are working flat out with minimum time on the ground everywhere. So are never fixed.

Margins are constantly being eroded by the needs of the shareholder and the accountant. It will not stop until people die.

all imho ofc.

[Avman]

Strange that I feel somewhat less safe flying today (as pax) than I did 20 years ago! This is not based on any scientific study on my part, simply a gut feeling that if the excrement hits the fan I'm no longer so confident that the young pups up front will have sufficient real stick & rudder experience to draw from to fly me out of it. Pilots (and ATCOs too by the way) today are cushioned by the support of and reliance on automation and now perhaps possess only somewhat limited skills. There may be no justification but that's honestly how I feel.

[airsupport]

Airsupport
Quote:
Is this because computers now make most of the decisions?
While I realise that this comment was made with tongue partly in cheek (I refer to the ;))
NO it was not made with tongue partly in cheek, it was TOTALLY in cheek. ;)
Personally I do not like these newer Aircraft at all, with lots of computers (and composites), give me a good old DC9 or 727 any day. :ok:
By the way, you have of course heard the joke about what makes a perfect cockpit crew? :E

[llondel]

Of course, 83.2945% of all statistics are made up.

[slip and turn]

I would like to ask you to name a single decision that a computer makes on board an aircraft. They follow directions and do assigned tasks pretty well but I've yet to see one decide anything on an aircraft. Ehm ... I have a feeling this comment was NOT made tongue in cheek :\

[Spooky 2]

Does anybody have a link to this document!

[Oh that's super!]

The question would be whether they used the same criteria as used in previous studies...

[PAXboy]

Non pilot speaking, nor am I a statistician or mathematician but ... any number about anything that improves by that percentage of such a short time scale, has to be suspect! If a company improved their profits by such an amount, then I would not believe it either.

Whilst I am prepared to believe that things are better than they were, I am also of the view that the airline biz continues to take too much for granted. They rattle off the 'Safety is our number one concern' but I don't believe all of them (some, not all). It is surveys like this that promote the idea that we are moving steadily into a better world. That is the usually the moment of the greatest danger.

[sevenstrokeroll]

Paxboy...Cassandra in disguise?

I think you are right Paxboy...maybe the statistics will change in the new year...I hope not, but...

[llanfairpg]

without us an aircraft is no more than an overly elaborate bus shelter.

Christ, the buses must be good where you live

[PJ2]

Spooky 2;

According to information from an original link (http://www.newswise.com/articles/view/536459/), the document should be released after today:

From the Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine (http://www.asma.org/journal/) site, click on "The Journal Online" and you'll see the table of contents for the upcoming January 2008 edition. All other articles that this Journal has published are available online so this one should be shortly. Here's the relevant section from the TOC:

Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine
Volume 79, Number 1
January 2008
EDITORIAL
Encouraging More Submissions
S. A. Nunneley
1
RESEARCH ARTICLES
Pilot Error in Air Carrier Mishaps: Longitudinal Trends Among 558 Reports, 1983-2002
S. P. Baker, Y. Qiang, G. W. Rebok, and G. Li
2

[Two's in]

OTS has asked the right question;

The question would be whether they used the same criteria as used in previous studies...

The criteria for Pilot Error to be written up on an accident report have changed significantly with the inclusion of Human Factors and CRM studies. It would be interesting to see how those data points have changed in 20 years before anyone hangs their hat on this report.

[PBL]

Given that the majority of accident reports I have read have some degree of mistaken causal reasoning in Section 3, and that the statistics are directly derived from uncritical acceptance of the assertions in this section, differences are as likely to reflect what is currently "in" to say and what "out", as they are to reflect objective differences in flying airplanes.

Those mistakes can be trivial or they can be profound, and I know of no way of controlling for this confounding factor. That said, however, I'll certainly read the article at some point for the insight any such well-performed longitudinal study must provide.

PBL

[Loose rivets]

Avman says

simply a gut feeling that if the excrement hits the fan I'm no longer so confident that the young pups up front will have sufficient real stick & rudder experience to draw from to fly me out of it.

I think this is quite true, it's just that the CRMs SOPs and nice clean new pilots are stopping the excrement well before it hits the fan. As an oldie, I didn't think they would...but they are studies show.

It seems that some weeks ago Mrs LR read out some comment that went something like this. "We are worried that the numbers are so good because we have no Idea why, and this is puzzling us."

This rough gist was from a serious journal. Sci Am / Mind / Wired or the like.

That's a funny concept. There's a danger in things being really good, when you don't know why they are.

[PBL]

If the total number of aeronautical incidents/accidents decreased during the same period of the same amount it is good news.

Well, it did, apart from a couple of blips, one of which is 2007. You are right that this is good news.

What is not so good news is what IATA are saying. I got my Dec 17 copy of AvWeek only yesterday and I refer to page 39, "Strengthening Safety". I didn't find the article on the free part of their WWW site.

Summary. IATA sees "worrying trends ...particularly a move be some carriers to lower qualification requirements as they struggle to fill pilot seats. The demand for 17,000 pilots per yera is 3,000-3,500 above what training programs can accomodate, says Juergen Haacker, IATA's director of operations safety. The first signs of trouble from that shortfall are emerging as some airlines are offering captain positions with flight time requirements 50% below accepted minimum levels, he says."

Hull losses in 2007 have increased to 0.83 permillion flights, the worst in four years (although I think that could well be just the usual blip). Last year was 0.65 per million, a record low.

Bisignani says Brazil, Africa and Indonesia were this year's particular trouble spots. Africa is up to 4.94 per million from 4.31 last year; Asia-Pacific went up to 2.68 from 0.67 (!); Latin America to 2.06 from 1.80. But the former Soviet states were most improved, with 0.00 (!) this year after 8.60 last. US: 0.22 this, 0.49 last. Europe: 0.36 this, 0.32 last.

IATA is anticipating kicking out some members at the end of 2008 that have not yet undergone IOSA; specifically, 6-9 of them.

I can't tell if there are many meaningful trends here or if these are within the standard deviation or the expected frequency of the occasional outlier. Let's hope a bit of both.

PBL

[fireflybob]

There again I recall a comment I read years ago that its not so much the numbers of accidents but the reasons behind the accidents that do occur.

[wobble2plank]

I LOVE the computers in the 'bus! The other day, approach to the LLZ/DME in Tegel, Berlin, we had to fly through a squall front on the approach, the AP's rolled to about 50 degrees AOB and 20 degrees nose down and the cavalry charge came up as the AP decided they'd had enough and it was my turn.

Thanks for the warning chips ;)

more bl**dy paper work :mad:

Keeps me on my toes tho.

W2P

[rivalino]

Calm before the storm.
Captain;
speeds low <into the VLS>
FO;
the autothrust is in.
Captain;
I have control
Yes into the VLS and reducing. One day the FO will be the captain.
Situational awareness is lost nowadays at the expense of pushing buttons.
Modern a/c are good, but we must remember they are there for us to
control.
REMEMBER IF IT IS NOT DOING WHAT YOU WANT IT TO DO,YOU HAVE 2 DISCONNECT BUTTONS.
YOU CAN ALWAYS RECONNECT THE A/P AND A/T WHEN THE PROBLEM IS SOLVED.

[skiesfull]

Very true, Rivalino, but if we don't train the inexperienced pilots in how to recognise when they are about to release the excrement towards the fan, that survey will be meaningless in the near future. MPL pilots will attain line status with minimum skills and only reacting by verifying the autoflight status, rather than take immediate action, has to be a priority for training.
Airline bosses want their pilots to keep to rigid SOP's and make maximum use of the autoflight systems - that will not change in the future, indeed it will get worse as CPDLC/RNP/ADS-B becomes more widespread and the button pushing increases to the detriment of monitoring and handling skills. 35 years ago I was given this piece of advice " if you want to improve your handling, then take it out and play with it!" ( I assumed he meant the autopilot)!!
As far as computerisation goes, this is my third attempt at posting on a relatively new all-singing computer - the first attempt ended with it crashing and giving me a page of gobbledygook technical stuff, the second ended with it freezing and having to be re-booted. I hope messrs Boeing and Airbus use better computer bits!

[TWN PPL]

Safer better TCAS, windshear warning and enhanced ground prox. sys that made this happen. better airport facility all around the world. better ground based radar and on the aircraft. Non-precision approach not often used in busy airports. Eventhough the computer don't decide; but it does give us pilots heads up before the problem occurs. So we may take action to avert an unsafe situation. Pilots safer now then Pilots before us?:} Why is the airlines are so willing and feeling confident employing low experenced pilots? FDIS and FOQA? Perhaps... I don't know.

[The777dream]

Computers are there to help us pilots in the world and at times assist us and give us a little more time in making a better decision, though a computer dose need some one to drive it ! But i still think there has to be a balance between computer and pilots ! CRM and SOP being followed correctly makes a world of diffrence and eliminates a whole lot of confusion !!

It dosnt mean that the pilots today are any better than pilots 30 years ago were !! lots has changed in aviation in 30 years !

Safty first make all the diffrence

[odb]

Safe and awake is a good thing as the Airbus has a mind of its own....The NTSB is finally poking into the schedules of pilots and the hours of wakefullness... Maybe ALPA will finally get some thing done...

http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/480165/flying_through_the_night_a_cockpit.html

[The777dream]

odb if that is true then it is a good thing !!! I stand to be corected but isnt the FAA duty periode is 16 hrs and sectors have no effect on this time !!! to me that asking for a little trouble..... if you signing on at 1 am in the morning 16hrs later wakefulness has long gone out the window !!
Many other countries duty periode are governed by the local time of sign on and he amount of sectors that are to be completed !

[Pugilistic Animus]

compare a basic GI-II:eek: checklist with that of a G-V see where you'd most likely---forget an item first!

[Ignition Override]

Gengis:
Excellent response.

Paxboy:
True.

And the media (even academia?) often is ignorant of so many things. For example, a safe arrival does not mean that the flight was operated in a safe manner, or that the out-sourced maintenance was done correctly.
As for those 'experts' who performed the evaluation, how about those of us who fly 100-115 passengers in planes with no computers? We only have an altitude-hold autopilot. It can neither change to another VOR frequency/radial/course (i.e. the YYZ [112.15] 314 radial on V-36), navigate on its own, level-off nor move the throttles. But it can intercept a radial and a localizer/gs.
There is no 'progress' page to estimate fuel at eta! :uhoh:

The former glass-c0ckpit pilots will have to learn again how to fly raw data in the simulator. One IP very recently 'froze the simulator' and asked a new-hire, trying to fly an arc to a localizer, whether he knew where he was (using the fat VOR needle on the RMI). He said "I have no idea".
We might join an arc once or twice a year at MOT or LSE. And the ATC towers are shutdown.
Even Air Force base RAPCONs are closed late at night.
You vector yourself a bit, in order to intercept the localizer outside of the glideslope and you always question whether the braking action is almost as good as the last time it was reported (by a jet) about an hour ago before the Tower closed.

And some of us have had real problems in the past trying to learn a glass-c0ckpit or two, and are not always successful.
In many of our planes, "no real automatics"! :ooh:
Two FOs with whom I just flew told me that they will not allow any of their family to fly on any affiliate airline which hires pilots with less than 300 total hours. The Captains often are flying mostly solo.
When the plane arrives in one piece, we can assume that it is a safe operation?

[PBL]

I recall a comment I read years ago that its not so much the numbers of accidents but the reasons behind the accidents that do occur.

Focusing on reasons can be equally misleading as focusing on numbers. Consider: 70% of accidents with probable cause "pilot error", as it was. Solution: eliminate error-prone pilots, then you have eliminated the cause.

Hence the so-called "Airbus philosophy" of twenty years ago: every pilot can fly this plane as well as a test pilot.

Then the catch became apparent: if pilots don't make errors on your airplanes, then all your crashes must be the fault of the airplane. And if all crashes are the fault of the airplane, why would anybody buy the airplane?

The "philosophy" seems to have been carefully deemphasised sometime around 1993-4.

PBL

[ssg]

I think before we all think the pilots are safer we might want to consider what type of equipment that we have now.

- Computerized Flight planning / Wt and Balance
- Computerized Maint. Tracking
- TAWS / Ground Prox
- TCAS
- EFIS
- More reliance on autopilots

While I would have never believed it, the manufacturers were probably right in trying to 'get the pilot out of the cockpit' in the last 20 years. Lower time pilots are much more prevelant these days, children of the Magenta is what the guys said at Simuflite. They might not be able to troubleshoot, or fly IFR, but if the TCAS or ground prox says to climb and turn, guys are doing it. I am sure that's saved some lives.

[Nichibei Aviation]

Guys, this is the truth behind the study:


The criteria for Pilot Error to be written up on an accident report have changed significantly with the inclusion of Human Factors and CRM studies. It would be interesting to see how those data points have changed in 20 years before anyone hangs their hat on this report.


The study compares statistics of 1983 with those of 2002.
Back in those days, there was still a kind of corruption that said: "blame the dead, save the live ones". They blamed anyone who was most convenient to blame, mostly the pilots if they happened to be dead.

In those days, there were no advanced computer systems as we have nowadays, and therefore it was very difficult to find the real cause behind an incident/accident.
Parameters measured by Flight Data Recorders were not as numerous, certainly in the analog pre-Fly-by-wire era. Therefore, reports were based on wide speculations.

Also the method of investigations has changed: now investigators look at the chain of events that brings to the crash and reconstructs the whole flight, down to the pre flight events. This has proven to be very helpful in reducing accident factors.

Improved media coverage has played an important role in pushing investigators to undertake full investigations to determine the real causes of crashes.
A good example is the Bijlmerramp case, an EL-AL B747 that crashed after take-off in Amsterdam. Journalists found out that investigators were seeding their reports with false information and criticized them widely.

About hull-losses statistics, it is unfortunately something one can not compare from one year to the other unless the differences are very pronounced.
Most hull-losses occured in the last years happened in emerging countries that have aviation standards that developped countries had 20 years ago.
That is mainly because they can't afford to have the same, modern equipment, and to have the same maintenance standards.

Also, I would like to add that though the modern computer systems do not make any decisions, they take over many tasks from the pilots so that these can concentrate more on the decisions they need to make. Add to that, they assist pilots in decision-making by giving them precise data through faster, more precise calculations.

[DingerX]

I must have ranted too long, and my response got eaten. Here's the short version:

I don't think anyone's read the study just yet. All we've got is an abstract from a journal with an editorial seeking submissions.
We can certainly all poke holes in the idea of it. IO might want to point out all the things that don't result in an accident or incident report, and we can concede that; the problem is, if they don't result in something measurable, we can't measure it.
More seriously, as PBL suggests, it's a zero-sum game. Just as everyone dies from something, so the the change in one cause of death will be marked by another. If we cure cancer, we'll see articles decrying the "worsening epidemic of heart disease." If half the population gets wiped out by plague next year, we'll see boasting of how we're winning the battle against AIDS, cancer and heart disease (rather than just the battle against Old Age). So, if one of the factors decreases or increases, the others are affected.
The third problem comes from NA's suggestion that the criteria have changed. Now, his particular statements strike me as being completely false:
Back in those days, there was still a kind of corruption that said: "blame the dead, save the live ones". They blamed anyone who was most convenient to blame, mostly the pilots if they happened to be dead.
I'm not sure that's any more true then than it is now. In societies sufficiently secular where Acts of God are relegated to a sideshow, most of the players in an accident are legally well represented. Individual screwups by pilots are the exception, and they're also an exception to the payout. But they play differently around the world. Some cultures and governments resist the belief that their pilots could make mistakes or commit airborne murder-suicides. And others see a payout from a foreign airline or manufacturer as a good thing.
The pressures on the investigations that produce the report vary by time, culture and government, and they vary considerably. They don't "even out in the wash", and quantitative analyses cannot control for them very well. That's why quantitative analysis of historical data needs to be viewed with suspicion.

As for the other claims:
Also the method of investigations has changed: now investigators look at the chain of events that brings to the crash and reconstructs the whole flight, down to the pre flight events. This has proven to be very helpful in reducing accident factors.
I think you'll find this is the case before 1983 too, where the handling of ground crews who were unable to read the instructions on how to close cargo doors was looked at, the maintenance record scrutinized, even the arguments in Ops duly noted and considered.

Improved media coverage has played an important role in pushing investigators to undertake full investigations to determine the real causes of crashes.
A good example is the Bijlmerramp case, an EL-AL B747 that crashed after take-off in Amsterdam. Journalists found out that investigators were seeding their reports with false information and criticized them widely.
Again, many would disagree. What about a TWA B747 that crashed after take-off in New York? Journalists seeded their reports with false information and criticized investigators widely.
Even leaving apart the questionable notion that media coverage has "improved", that "improvement" does not necessarily imply that it's more accurate.

Most hull-losses occured in the last years happened in emerging countries that have aviation standards that developped countries had 20 years ago.
That is mainly because they can't afford to have the same, modern equipment, and to have the same maintenance standards.
This is just ludicrous. 20 years ago in developed countries, flying "standby" did not mean flying "Standing Room"

Also, I would like to add that though the modern computer systems do not make any decisions, they take over many tasks from the pilots so that these can concentrate more on the decisions they need to make. Add to that, they assist pilots in decision-making by giving them precise data through faster, more precise calculations.

Technological progress does not mean improved conditions. EGPWS and TCAS may help, but the same cockpit automation removed the FE. More precise data and calculations might help, but the same computers allow for peak efficiency of duty rosters, load factors and equipment. And minimum rest cycles were not originally designed to be regular work conditions.

Oh, and speaking of which, ODB: your article needs some sources to it. I also question some of the figures. While it's not disputed that someone operating fatigued can function like someone with a BAC of .05%, nobody functions with a BAC of .8%. Nice cat, though.

[Ignition Override]

Those are excellent points made by you guys (and gals).

As DingerX pointed out, the so-called authorities only understand and care about (?) what can be measured, quantified, and avoiding blame, especially if the metal tube carries live passengers instead of freight.

In the corporate sense, this has led to unacceptable outsourcing of maintenance and de-icing services. Never mind the constant 20-minute delays after departure time in order to load bags (no higher rate/overtime pay-people go home).

Happy New Year. Enjoy the salty Spaetzl and warm Gluhwein :). Ade.

[sidtheesexist]

I refer to L337's post on page 1 - I couldn't agree more - spot on IMHO. Increased 'productivity' on the part of flightcrew is undoubtedly leading to increased pilot fatigue. This problem is going to bite someone in the arse very hard, v soon..........Many of the excellent posts have alluded to all the positive changes (both technological and human-related) that have affected the 'industry' over recent years - I think the 'fatigue' issue will more and more act as counterbalance to all these other undoubted improvements which have contributed to increased flight safety.A Happy and SAFE New Year to you all! :ok:

PS Got home last night around 6pm after 6 days on. In bed at 10pm, woke this morning at 11am! Fatigue a problem? You decide!

[PBL]

I think the 'fatigue' issue will more and more act as counterbalance to all these other undoubted improvements which have contributed to increased flight safety

On the other hand, fatigue, biorhythmical effects, and related phenomena are gaining increased attention from investigators and regulators, at least in certain influential parts of the world.

I understand (from the colleague who did it) that the first serious attention to these physical human factors issues in incidents was paid in the NTSB investigation into the 1985 China Air Lines upset over the Pacific off the coast of California. You can read the report on the Compendium on my WWW site (and a lot of other places now).

It took a long time to get going, though. There was of course some research, indeed some very good work, going on at places such as the DLR aerospace medicine place in Cologne, and NASA Ames. But getting it "on the radar" was another issue.

Then I was asked about what I knew by the chief safety pilot of a major European carrier about a decade ago, whom I had encountered on a Viennese television talk show (answer: nothing, but I will try to find out). So it was on at least some people's radar at that time.

Then came Little Rock. Now, it's on everybody's radar. Duty time limits, as you are likely now aware, are a significant regulatory issue. Fatigue was already No.2 on the NTSB "Most Wanted" list 5 years ago.

So I don't necessarily agree that it is going to take over as the party pooper. Objects with big blips on the radar screen tend to get meticulously vectored. Not necessarily solved, but held within limits.

We could just solve that whole problem, as well as other "pilot error" causes, by moving to passenger UAVs. Anyone here go for that?

PBL

[lomapaseo]

Having worked on a number of similar studies I can only tell you that the most important lesson is to define the taxonomy or data collection definitions in such a way that they lead from an input to a useful output.

It does no good to place raw undefined data in front of people whose vision is only of the clouds in the sky without the experience to define the weather.

The first thing that comes to mind is questions about objectiveness of the data collection boundaries and how much subjectiveness is included i.e. by sampling opinions rather than defined definitions of on-off switches in the data.

Having no particular insight into the subject report I only have a question mark here and not yet an opinion.

On the other hand I deplore the premature release of data that has not been analyized by professional safety experts to the level of pointing at updating wide ranging recommendations for improvement in the bottom line which is less accidents/incidents.

If this study doesn't meet the criteria for advancing safety recommendations and at the same time leaves both the public and the professionals confused then NASA may have difficulty in getting funding in the future.

[PBL]

lomapaseo,

I think the study being talked about on the thread is something to be published in the journal Aviation, Space and Enviromental Medicine 79(1) in Jan 2008.

It seems to me as if your comment is directed to the previously-suppressed NASA study of pilot experience that Administrator Griffin was recently asked by Congress to make available.

Am I right?

PBL

[PJ2]

Duty time limits, as you are likely now aware, are a significant regulatory issue. Fatigue was already No.2 on the NTSB "Most Wanted" list 5 years ago.

So I don't necessarily agree that it is going to take over as the party pooper. Objects with big blips on the radar screen tend to get meticulously vectored. Not necessarily solved, but held within limits

I think it will be have to become a party pooper before change occurs. Perhaps it may be true in some places, but I offer the comment that duty time limits are not a significant regulatory issue in Canada and further, having just been involved with others in a change process to the Aeronautics Act regarding protection of safety information and seen the process first-hand, there is no taste for, or interest in change either there or in the CARs. The CARAC (change) process is absolutely glacial. Whether it is responsive to "studies" or not, is an open question.

An airline crew in a Canadian-registered airliner can legally be on duty for up to 23 hours. It's actually twenty hours but an "unforseen circumstances" definition in the regs permits crews to "decide for themselves" if they wish to continue. You may guess what airlines do with that freedom.

The twenty-hour limit is permitted if the aircraft is fitted with an SAE-specified bunk (most are not therefore legal), and prone rest is possible, and there is a third crew member. There is no regulatory mention or requirement of a fourth crew member.

While lobbying parliaments and congress has some effect, airline pilots have been forced into changing flight time and duty regs principally through collective agreements, spending negotiating dollars on coming to terms with lax duty day regulation in Canada. Under the heading of "regulatory impact", the CARs (Canadian Air Regs) duty day limits are what the ATAC, with the support of IATA, were able to lobby (negotiate) for and implement on behalf of the airlines during the initial move to the CARs in 1996, (a time, incidentally, when a great deal was already understood regarding human performance and fatigue levels).

Regardless of length of duty day and keeping the above regulatory provision for a third crew member on long-haul operations, a fourth crew-member is only the result of a private, collective agreement between airline and association and where it has occurred was extremely difficult and contentious.

Crews are left improving safety not through lobbied regulatory reform but through collective agreements, an entirely inappropriate arena for such limitations. Duty days for most airline pilots in Canada are lower than these CARs limits because pilots' associations, not airline managements, comprehend the safety risks in high fatigue levels. Long Haul Operations are not dealt with in the CARs except as described.

"Fatigue" issues may be on the radar of some and are the subject of many studies and papers, (I've seen Drew Dawson's work and discussed with him during presentations the notions of using FDA information to assist in studies - much would have to be done to design/facilitate such a study), the subject remains like talking about the weather - nothing is done about it. While it may be polemical to state that Canada is the Monrovia of the flight time - duty day regulatory world, there is no sign whatsoever that Canada's flight time/duty day regulations are to change any time soon - the ATAC lobby is too strong.

Even though we know differently (and I have done enough Hong Kong - Vancouver's with only 3 crew members to know), the difficulty in most cases is, before the accident, "fatigue" is not a demonstrable impediment to safe flight regardless of individual pre-flight details. There is no causal link which can demonstrate with the same strength of an MEL item, higher risk and the clear need for mitigation. Such support must come from knowledge already gained and, as lomapaseo states correctly, turned into a meaningful outcome. There is always the "unforseen circumstances" escape clause and there is always pressure to use it.

Unlike FDA Programs which may point to trends of increasing risk, no such "program" or technology (despite some promising entries) exists which may indicate that a pilot or a crew is sufficiently fatigued that action is required - it is a nebulous "human factor" and remains in the kicking-tin area rather than in pre-emptive areas of flight safety work. "Successful" approaches to commercial viability and fatigue risk management mean that crews keep flying until there is an incident or accident - the only measure of "proof" even today.

So yes, it is taking a long time to recognize fatigue as a real factor in accidents and government regulatory bodies and industry are becoming "more aware" but from where I sit, there is not the slightest sign of steps towards practical recognition and subsequent mitigation in terms of regulatory support and change.

[frontlefthamster]

...and without being able to download the crash-protected 'individual fatigue recorder' fitted inside the craniumn of every pilot involved in an incident or accident, there's no reason to expect a change. :mad:

[PBL]

frontlefthamster,

Actually, I think there is reason. 20 years ago, people knew nothing about fatigue as a psychophysical phenomenon, which it is, and treated it as a matter of pilot self-discipline, which it is not.

Any realisation of reality makes it much harder for anyone (airlines, regulators, investigators) to persist with the old habits based on illusion.

PBL

[frontlefthamster]

Peter, it's impossible to test for human fatigue in the meaningful way in which fatigue in structures was researched after the Comet crashes, so I hold much less hope than you do in this regard.

Given the designed-in weaknesses in modern aircraft (eg the B737-NG flight deck alerting systems), I think there are worlds to cover before human fatigue is properly addressed, especially as the costs (to operators) of addressing it are astronomical. Pilotless aircraft will, of course, solve the problem, but only if there is fuel to run them on.

[PBL]

flh,

it's impossible to test for human fatigue in the meaningful way in which fatigue in structures was researched after the Comet crashes, so I hold much less hope than you do in this regard.

That is a good and well-phrased point, and you may very well be right.

Pilotless aircraft will, of course, solve the problem

I suddenly feel nervous. I was joking, and I find myself hoping that you are. Caught at my own game!

PBL

[alf5071h]

I am sceptical that pilots per se are ‘safer’; yet the industry by common standards is safer – with fewer fatalities and generally a positive public perception.
If the industry is to continue its progress to safer operations – a necessity based on public perception and traffic growth then a pilotless aircraft might be a viable solution, particularly if we are approaching a practical limit in constraining human error, the dominant contribution to accidents.

At least one manufacturer considered - what if - a fully automated aircraft could be ‘operated’ by just one crew, which with a high level of visual technology would also enable a windowless craft enabling weight saving in addition to reduced operating cost.
The limiting factor was judged to be the public perception of safety. However, given that this consideration was made some 10 years ago and that the management of human error is approaching the limit of cost effectiveness, then a windowless single crew, 'automatic' aircraft might be a viable solution and a stepping stone towards a pilotless aircraft.

Accident analyses focus on what pilots do not do very well. But if we look at the industry from an alternative view, can we identify what pilots do well – what is so essential in a future automated operation that they, pilots, could not be removed from an aircraft.
We should not be constrained by today’s technology, think 10-15 years hence with the use of highly reliable autonomous systems, operating to the current ‘human’ regulatory limits.
Why would we need pilots in such a future scenario?

[Nichibei Aviation]

BAAA has just released 2007 figures:

2007 has been the year with the least aviation accidents since ... 1963.

Here's the press release, only available in French:


Le nombre d'accidents d'avions survenus dans le monde en 2007 se monte à 136, soit 28 de moins qu'en 2006. Ce taux d'accidents s'avère être le plus faible depuis 1963 ! Au niveau du nombre de victimes, il baisse de 25% par rapport à 2006 et demeure le taux le plus faible depuis 2004 avec 965 décès. 2007 demeure ainsi parmi les plus sécuritaires de ces 50 dernières années. Quelques incidents n'ayant entraîné aucune perte humaine sont encore dans l'attente des décisions des opérateurs et assureurs.
32% des accidents se sont produits en Amérique du Nord contre 23% en Asie, 14% en Afrique, 10% en Amérique du Sud, 10% en Europe, 9% en Amérique centrale et 1% en Océanie.
En 2007, on a enregistré 34 accidents aux Etats-Unis contre 10 au Canada, 8 en République Démocratique du Congo, 5 en Colombie et en Indonésie.

En ce qui concerne les types de vol, on a relevé 33 accidents survenus lors de vols de ligne, 25 accidents lors de vols cargo, 17 accidents lors de vols charters ainsi que 14 accidents lors de vols de positionnement. Ont également été relevés des accidents lors de vols sanitaires, de surveillance, d'essai, gouvernementaux et humanitaires..

Parmi les 136 avions perdus, 100 (74%) étaient de type turbopropulseur ou à pistons contre 36 (26%) de type jet. Le constructeur européen Airbus a enregistré la perte de 4 appareils (un A300, deux A320 et un A340) contre 8 pour Boeing (huit 737). On enregistre également la perte de 12 Antonov, 17 Beechcraft, 6 Canadair, 24 Cessna (19 turbopropulseurs et 5 jet), 9 De Havilland Canada, 3 Douglas, 4 Embraer, 2 Learjet, 2 Illiouchine, 6 Let, 2 Lockheed, 3 McDonnell Douglas, 6 Piper, 5 Rockwell, un Tupolev et un Yakovlev.

Aucun accident majeur n'a été relevé en Europe en 2007, ce qui tend à confirmer que ce continent demeure parmi les plus sécuritaires.

En 2007, 3 accidents ont entraîné la mort de plus de 100 personnes, 2 accidents ont fait entre 50 et 100 morts, 5 accidents ont fait entre 20 et 50 morts, 5 accidents ont fait entre 10 et 19 morts, 10 accidents ont fait entre 6 et 10 morts, 55 accidents ont fait entre 1 et 5 morts et 56 accidents n'ont fait aucune victime.
La chute d'un Airbus A320 de TAM Brasil à Sao Paulo le 17 juillet s'avère être l'accident le plus meurtrier survenu dans le monde en 2007 avec un bilan de 199 morts. Viennent ensuite la chute d'un Boeing 737-800 des Kenya Airways à Douala le 5 mai avec 114 morts et la chute d'un Boeing 737-400 d'Adamair le 1er janvier au large d'Ujung Pandang avec 102 morts.

[Nichibei Aviation]

The Flightglobal version: http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/01/02/220560/fatal-airline-accidents-hit-an-all-time-low-in-2007.html


This is just ludicrous. 20 years ago in developed countries, flying "standby" did not mean flying "Standing Room"


I am not going to discuss all theories you have posted (and you did have some good points), but this is an example illustrating one of my points:

The worst accident of the year was the TAM Linhas Aereas Airbus A320 landing disaster at Sao Paulo Congonhas airport (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/07/19/215591/video-tam-a320-speeding-on-runway-as-it-lands-in-sao-paulo.html)which killed 187 on board and 12 on the ground.
Apart from that crash and a Tu-134landing accident at Samara airport, Russia that killed six of its 57 passengers, all the accidents involving passenger aircraft took place in third-world economies or aircraft registered in them.