A340 of Iberia skids off runway in Quito

[Glonass]

Many links available ... here's one:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21714854/

[AN2 Driver]

Looks pretty bad, the plane is quite beaten up, possible write off?

http://www.elperiodico.cat/default.asp?idpublicacio_PK=46&idioma=CAT&idnoticia_PK=457454&idseccio_PK=1007

Pictures:
http://www.elperiodico.cat/info/galeriasv2/galeria.asp?idioma=CAS&idgaleria=969

Looking at these, both right engines seem to have torn from the wing or at least severely bent. Only one slide deployed, may suggest they only evacuated after a while, so that may explain why nobody was hurt (according to the sources).

Looking at the situation, they seem to have been quite lucky to stop where they did. There is quite a drop a few planelengts further on.

AN2 Driver.

[akerosid]

They're very lucky they stopped when they did. The fuselage doesn't seem to be damaged or bent at all; the No2 pylon is presumably repairable, so I would be surprised if it's a write-off.

UIO's altitude is about 9,000', hence a significantly higher landing speed - and a greater chance of tyrebursts.

[TopBunk]

The number 1 engine looks at a strange angle too!

[ManaAdaSystem]

How many hours did it take to evacuate this aircraft???? The evacuation started in daylight and continued into the night?

[babemagnet]

Here is another clear picture a lot off damage if you ask me!


http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=6104979

[OsPi]

Quote from the Jetphotos.net photographer:

The airplane landed at 17:15 with light rain and wet RWY. According to people who saw the airplane land, the aircraft it skid out of control, and over shot the RWY into the grass area. As it hit the grass one of the main landing gears tore off, the aircraft sank into the grass hitting part of the underground tunnel structure, ripping and blowing up other tires making the plane stop. Then engines 1 and 2 hit the ground causing them to rip off the wing. Certainly a terrible incident, thankfully no fatalities! Airport will be closed for about 1 day.

[alexmcfire]

More pics here "aircraftfire" http://www.airdisaster.com/forums/showthread.php?p=524208&posted=1#post524208

[Danny]

In order to try and keep some sense of relativity to the theme of this forum, I have moved a copy of this thread to another forum (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=299772) where the armchair experts can willy-wave to their delight about their expertise in insurance damage assessment. If one more person posts on THIS thread, the one in R & N, with their 'expert' opinion on insurance write-off's then they are inviting a forum ban for making me have to go in and move even more posts around.

The same applies to the Neanderthals who feel it is necessary to point out that one or more of the pilots may be a female. It is fairly obvious by their posts that they have no experience of operating airline flights as they would have known that, even though it is not a factor in itself, they don't even know who was the handling pilots. Knuckle draggers of this sort are not welcome on this forum and will soon find themselves relegated to Jet Blast forum where they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they are indeed descended from the missing link! :*

This thread is for discussing operational factors and analysis of what happened here. Neanderthals, PC flight sim 'experts' and other 'wannabethoughtofasarealpilot' types can click here (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=299772) where they can get all moist at their leisure. :rolleyes:

[akerosid]

More photos:

http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=16394278&postcount=515

[Papa2Charlie]

Well, I think we can all agree you wouldn't want to be the one paying the bill for it!

Any info on what happened yet? What was the weather like at the time?

[Broomstick Flier]

Here is the wx:

SEQU 092300Z 00000KT 4000N 6000S RA VCFG FEW005 BKN016 OVC100 12/11 Q 1025 NOSIG

SEQU 092209Z 17004KT 3000S 4000N RA VCFG FEW005 BKN023 OVC100 12/11 Q1024 BECMG AT2230 4000

SEQU 092200Z 17008KT 3000S 6000N RA VCFG FEW005 BKN023 OVC100 12/10 Q1024 BECMG AT2230 4000

SEQU 092100Z 33008KT 4000S 9999N -RA VCFG FEW005 BKN023 BKN100 14/10 Q1023 TEMPO 3000

The accident happened at 2206Z (1706LT)

Cheers
BF

[Daysleeper]

Tough call to make on the non-evacuation. Its a lot of damage to be looking out of the window at without running away.

[Profit Max]

How many hours did it take to evacuate this aircraft???? The evacuation started in daylight and continued into the night?Have a look at the video here:
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/avion/Iberia/sale/pista/Quito/elpepuint/20071110elpepuint_1/Tes
They weren't evacuating at the same speed as they would have if there would have been a risk of fire (more like one person every 15 seconds).
PM

[RogerTangoFoxtrotIndigo]

Two points from the photographs:

1) Thrust reversers seem to be stowed, would they retract automatically on a 346 at a set speed

2) A lot of the carcon fibre (or GLARE) bit from underneath the aircraft seem to have cracked and / or broken rather than bent like aluminium would, should this give us pause when thinking about full CF fusalages

[Busbert]

A lot of the carcon fibre (or GLARE) bit from underneath the aircraft seem to have cracked and / or broken rather than bent like aluminium would, should this give us pause when thinking about full CF fusalages

That's the remains of the belly fairing. It's not primary structure, and is just there for aerodynamic purposes - fairing the wing to the fuselage and containing the landing gear, packs and much of the hydraulics systems.

[Re-Heat]

A lot of the carcon fibre (or GLARE) bit from underneath the aircraft seem to have cracked and / or broken rather than bent like aluminium would, should this give us pause when thinking about full CF fusalages
No, as composite structure absorb so much more energy, that while their final appearance may be more damaged than aluminium / metals, their ability to protect life is far, far greater.

[Papa2Charlie]

Hi RTFI,

The thrust reverse would only deploy on command from the throttle, i.e. independent of speed. On the pictures I've seen so far, looks like the T/R's were stowed. Maybe a tire burst distracted the crew from deploying the thrust reversers? Would (could??) a tire burst result in the crew being distracted from deploying the thrust reversers? Does a tire burst result in significant asymmetry to the A/C roll down the runway? Although hard (impossible) to know at this stage, was the burst reported on the nose or main landing gear??

I wouldn't be surprised at seeing CFRP debris. I'd imagine most of the gear doors (& belly fairing??) are CFRP and would be expected considering the damage we've already seen to the main landing gear.

Regards,

P2C

[alexmcfire]

Some interesting comments at this photo, http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=5624603
"5th landing ever of the A346 at Quito, probably the highest airport that recieve this aircraft" date 15th of october 2005. Anyone knows how many
cycles as been made to Quito with the A346?
Seem like 300-400 cycles are a good estimate, with 4 accidents including this one.

[alf5071h]

This accident again, appears to raise the issue of runway safety areas. Whilst the distance of the aircraft from the runway end is not clear, the terrain in overrun area appears less than ideal – downhill slope towards a road (?) and a brick/concrete wall.
On the positive side, soft grass is a good stopping medium. Although this cannot always be relied on, the instances of overrun on wet runways might correlate well with a wet/soft overrun area.

Ref: Landing Threats. (www.flightsafety.org/ppt/managing_threat.ppt)

[lomapaseo]

...No, as composite structure absorb so much more energy, that while their final appearance may be more damaged than aluminium / metals, their ability to protect life is far, far greater.

well with all things being equal...they never are..

so let's not go there in this thread :)

[RogerTangoFoxtrotIndigo]

Hi RTFI,
The thrust reverse would only deploy on command from the throttle, i.e. independent of speed. On the pictures I've seen so far, looks like the T/R's were stowed. Maybe a tire burst distracted the crew from deploying the thrust reversers? Would (could??) a tire burst result in the crew being distracted from deploying the thrust reversers? Does a tire burst result in significant asymmetry to the A/C roll down the runway? Although hard (impossible) to know at this stage, was the burst reported on the nose or main landing gear??
I guess that was my way of saying that the thrust reversers dont seem to be deployed without turning this into a spotters thread

I wouldn't be surprised at seeing CFRP debris. I'd imagine most of the gear doors (& belly fairing??) are CFRP and would be expected considering the damage we've already seen to the main landing gear.
Regards,
P2C
Im not surprised at CFRP debries, or its failure mode (shattering) on unstressed sections just wondering if you would get the same effect on stressed sections.

[MikeAlphaTangoTango]

Does the damage pattern to the No 1 & 2 engine pods not suggest the engines hit the ground during the latter stage of the reversers being stowed? (ie mid way down the pod, as the reverser cowl has been dragged forward, it has hit the ground).

Doesn't really look like a high speed overrun either does it? Will be interesting to find out how close it was to being a close shave rather than a very expensive day at the office :uhoh:

[Shore Guy]

Another advertisement for EMAS......

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engineered_materials_arrestor_system

[Dream Land]

Anyone experienced in this field, does it appear to be a landing on RW35? Possible tailwind at that time? SEQU 092200Z 17008KT
Any estimates for a ground speed? Elevation 9228

[Fatfish]

Only one escape slide, right into the number 3 meat grinder? Jeez :eek:

[Innaflap]

They seem to be almost reluctant to leave. Wonder if there was something special on the menu for dinner?

[southern duel]

Another A340-600 landed at Quito on 31st August 2007and burst a couple of tyres with the pax deplaned on the runway !!

Twice in a short space of time !!

http://www.airliners.net/discussions/general_aviation/print.main?id=3595457

link to first incident and pics

Any other A340-600 operators flying into Quito ?

[bluefalcon]

Any estimates for a ground speed? Elevation 9228

As the TAS increases +- 5kts for every 1000 ft; considering TAS=GS with 0 wind. (5*9)=45, so add the correction to a normal app speed; say 140 kts. This would result in a TAS=185 kts on final approach, add or subtract the wind and ull get the ground speed. So I would say pretty damm fast. Note: were talking of GS and TAS here, IAS would still be similar as other landing elevations.

[28L]

Bluefalcon,
I think that's a bit of an overguess. Isn't the ballpark formula to add around 1.5% per 1000ft? I.e. an IAS of 140kt would give a TAS of around 160kt at 9000ft. Ish!

[Carnage Matey!]

Don't forget that with a temperature of 12C at 9000ft it's well above ISA. From my experiences into Mexico City I don't think 180kts TAS is too wide of the mark.

[The Bartender]

Carnage Matey! wrote:
Don't forget that with a temperature of 12C at 9000ft it's well above ISA. From my experiences into Mexico City I don't think 180kts TAS is too wide of the mark.


Well...

- 9.000 ft
- 12 C
- 1024 hPa
- 140 kts IAS

Right?

That equals:
- 164 kts TAS
- 10.345 ft of Density Altitude

[alexmcfire]

Latest rumor is that Iberia is banned from Ecuador until they sort out the
A346 accident.

[MoodyBlue]

Depending on a/c type (and, therefore, approach speed), weight and the amount of head/tailwind (often a bit of tailwind on rwy 35), the groundspeed can be very close to 200kts in my experience.

MoodyBlue

[kingair9]

Latest rumor is that Iberia is banned from Ecuador until they sort out the
A346 accident.


Only partially correct - they have been banned from Quito but not from Ecuador in general. They may continue to fly to Guyaquil.

Source (in Spanish): http://www.univision.com/contentroot/wirefeeds/lat/7327430.html

[FullWings]

Looking at the photos on the link Aeroskid provided:

www.skyscrapercity.com (http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=16394278&postcount=515)

It would appear that the tyres on the detached bogey show damage resulting from severe aquaplaning and/or antiskid failure, with the tread layers worn through to the point of failure. Hmmm...

[IFixPlanes]

...It would appear that the tyres on the detached bogey show damage resulting from severe aquaplaning and/or antiskid failure, with the tread layers worn through to the point of failure. Hmmm...
I don´t think that it was aquaplaning.
Aquaplaning (Hydroplaning) looks like:
http://img75.imageshack.us/img75/4300/hydroplaningvd7.th.jpg (http://img75.imageshack.us/my.php?image=hydroplaningvd7.jpg)
I suppose it was a problem with anti skid (Braking Flats):
http://img409.imageshack.us/img409/8342/brakingflatsyb4.th.jpg (http://img409.imageshack.us/my.php?image=brakingflatsyb4.jpg)
But i only guess....

[Slats One]

This aircraft has significant damage to its carbon fibre hull and that's the bits we can see....


Notice the scarring to the inner hull not just the floppy panels around the wing torsion box and undercart area - which fly off very easily- especially in -flight as the A380 test team can atest to..

How on earth are the repair team going to get the thing mended to the state it can fly to France for heavy fixing?

And I agrre, those tyres indicate locked wheels not aquaplaning

[bluefalcon]

28L wrote:
I think that's a bit of an overguess. Isn't the ballpark formula to add around 1.5% per 1000ft? I.e. an IAS of 140kt would give a TAS of around 160kt at 9000ft. Ish!
ok,, then you mean that when you fly say at 39000, .78 mach, an IAS of 240 kts, your TAS is going to be 380 TAS? Where and What do you fly?:rolleyes:
I dont have the exact formulas here and it depends on many factors including density and pressure altitude, but without braking into formulas and using a simple rule of thumb of 5kts per 1000 ft u get pretty close. Im not talking of exact figures here. I also have a good friend flying the A330 to Quito atleast twice a month and he has confirmed me that TAS 180 kts is more like it.
Cheers.

[lomapaseo]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FullWings
...It would appear that the tyres on the detached bogey show damage resulting from severe aquaplaning and/or antiskid failure, with the tread layers worn through to the point of failure. Hmmm...

I don´t think that it was aquaplaning.
Aquaplaning (Hydroplaning) looks like:

I suppose it was a problem with anti skid (Braking Flats):

But i only guess....

Good pictures in your post showing the difference. However in this event the damage to the tires does not look like either one.... so the investigation continues

[PJ2]

bluefalcon;

When I set "140" (kts) against "9000" (PA), the trusty Jeppesen CR2 shows "163" (kts) against a +12C temperature. Add eight knots or so for the 17008 wind and the groundspeed becomes 171kts, so "180" is close in a tailwind condition.

That said, is landing downwind at this airport done frequently, (in the sense that for other reasons, 35 is favoured over 17)? I would have thought at Quito, a downwind landing would actually be prohibited by operators, given the TAS alone.

PJ2

[IFixPlanes]

Good pictures in your post showing the difference. However in this event the damage to the tires does not look like either one.... so the investigation continues
You get the same look of my posted photo, if only one tire had problems with A/S because the 2nd tire on the axis prevent the damaged one of dropping completely down.

The 2nd photo here www.skyscrapercity.com (www.skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=16394278&postcount=515) shows Braking Flat signs when there is no "backup-tire".

http://img402.imageshack.us/img402/1271/tire01iw9.th.jpg (http://img402.imageshack.us/my.php?image=tire01iw9.jpg)

But the damage on the other tire confuse me :confused:

Investigation report will show if my guess is right or not.

edit= photo-link corrected

[Hunter58]

Just to clarify some misconceptions mentioned by various posters above:

- Daylight and night: Quito is still well into the tropics, so the dawn-time is something like 15 minutes in winter. It gets dark awfully fast. So during a 'slow' evacuation it is very well possible that you start during the day and end up at night.

- The A340 is build in good, trusty, proven aluminium. There is NO carbon fibre fuselage to damage. There are, however, a diverse number of fairings that are of non-metallic materials (mostly composites) which have shed off during the incident.

- The A340-600 is only operated into Quito by IBERIA. This is one of the cases you prefer to have a quad than an twin...

[28L]

bluefalcon,
I'm definitely not qualified to argue the toss on IAS/EAS/RAS/CAS/TAS etc, but my guess is that your 5kts per 1000ft is for 250kts indicated. That's 2% per 1000ft, which is probably closer to the truth than my 1.5%, but will lead to a serious overestimate for 140ks IAS.
I'm just conjuring up the image of a hangglider leaping off a 10,000ft cliff and hitting 50kts in a nanosecond :eek:
Anyway, as I say, I'm not qualified & ain't going to argue!

[Bearcat]

Hunter 58 says- The A340-600 is only operated into Quito by IBERIA. This is one of the cases you prefer to have a quad than an twin..

Hunter...enlighten us all with your profound theory of the quad and its pro's going in Quito

[Miraculix]

It's probably more the going out of Quito (or go around), were the quad is preferable.

[Bearcat]

I dont think so, me thinks the 777 has sunk that argueement. Sorry we are getting off the topic.

[Miraculix]

Yes it is off topic, but its the one engine out performance I think hunter 58 is refering to.

[lomapaseo]

But the damage on the other tire confuse me



Yes, it should test your assumption. Perhaps because the tire damage is akin to running into a curb with your car and there is tearing of the tread as well as bead dislodgement

best

[Hunter58]

Well, yes, sorry, it's more the going OUT case (take-off performance) that I was referring to. But since you tend not to operate INTO somewhere without having some possibility of poerating OUT, I usually don't make a difference...

There are no 777s operating into UIO, there are however A340s that do it.

Hot and High (of which UIO is certainly one of the absolute top references) is still pretty much a quad affair for the heavier examples of the aircraft population.

[polea]

did you know...

the aircraft damaged the rwy 35 ILS (the only one in Quito airport)

the airport resumed its operations without ILS, with the damaged aircraft still at the end of the runway and without knowing for sure the causes of the accident

:bored:



also, they are considering reducing the maximum takeoff/landing weight allowed in this airport

[Lychee]

I have heard a rumour that the underground structure that the aircraft has found itself on may not be able to take the weight for a significant period of time. Couple that with the weight of any moving/lifting equiment, is this the end of any further damage that this aircraft will suffer?

[John Farley]

Hunter58.

Don't feel the need to apologise. Going out of Quito I feel that most pilots would prefer to loose 25% of their thrust rather than 50%. I have only operated the Harrier from there (for a week or so) but watching the airliners of the day (707s) rush along the ground at those hills gave me the willies.

JF

[springbok449]

Air Madrid used to operate A330s out of quito.

Out of interest, what is the maximum airfield altitude that modern Boeing jets can operate up to these days?

[bluefalcon]

PJ2; I agree with your statement, but by using an accurate device and having also checked other formulas.
I use the 5kt/1000ft or 2%KIAS *1000ft rule which although a bit inaccurate for these cases, they serve me well for more general cases involving higher flight levels.
Be aware though that having checked with a CR-2 and other formulas ( a good one which does it all for you;
http://www.paragonair.com/public/aircraft/calc_TAS.html
isnt always accurate, as I have calculated in both ways for another case:
Say at FL 390, M.78,240KIAS,-56º, QNE. using that formula which someone else I think used before it comes out to 473KTAS. Using the 5kt*1000ft rule comes out to KTAS435kts, and the 2% of KIAS to even less. Well the real good answer is a near KTAS of 450, and that is with a B738 plane.
Then again its all a bit unprecise, In this case I would trust more in what someone who flies quite alot there has to say about the TAS on final app.
Regarding RWY 35 used with tailwind, as polea said bfore, It could be because its the only one with an ILS.
BlueFalcon.

[skywalking]

Afraid the 777 can't operate out of UIO as its too high...

[TopBunk]

I suspect that Boeing would happily certify the 777 to operate into Quito of anywhere else for that matter subject to the payment of an inordinate amount of greenbacks.:}

[Human Factor]

We used to operate the 777 into Bogota (8400 ft) without a problem. It reduced the MTOW by about 80 tonnes but otherwise performance was pretty respectable. The emergency turn (escape route) was quite entertaining on one engine though. :cool:

I've been into La Paz on a 757 belonging to AA and that's about as high as it gets, although I understand they're modified somehow or other.

[GlueBall]

B742 freighters have operated into UIO for many years.

[springbok449]

Glueball,

Thats why I said modern boeing jets...;)

Seriously though, I didnt think that the 777 was certified to those airfield altitudes even though I am sure that its only a matter of certification especially with the A340-300 operating out of Quito.

[alexmcfire]

Another A340-600 landed at Quito on 31st August 2007and burst a couple of tyres with the pax deplaned on the runway !!

Twice in a short space of time !!

http://www.airliners.net/discussions...ain?id=3595457

link to first incident and pics

Any other A340-600 operators flying into Quito ?'[Quote]
Seem like Iberia are the only one, 4 accidents in 200-300 cycles with the A346 at Quito since 2005
is a lot, including the last one.

[Bearcat]

re looking at the u tube video.....nightmare stuff. An immediate evacuation one would have thought..............

[apaddyinuk]

Well not necessarily Bearcat!

For a crew member to initiate an evacuation (well in my airlines SOP's anyway...dont know about Iberias but assume they are similiar) it must appear clearly catastrophic...ie, cabin broken up, fire, anything with an immediate danger to life onboard etc. Now an aircraft at an unusual attitude does not essential mean "catastrophic" and in a situation like this it would not be unheard of to remain alert but await further contact from the flight crew which is essentially what appears to have happened here.

Infact the cabin crew should be applauded for not going gun-ho into an evacuation as you can clearly tell from the video that an urgent evacuation was not required meaning that it was all very orderly, passengers had time to prepare, the crew were able to assist instead of just push and emergency personnel were onhand at the bottom of the slide to assist passengers off and away from the aircraft. Who knows how many unnecessary injury's were avoided as a result of this!

You guys may get a lot of stick but on this occasion.... well done Ibera Cabin Crew!!!! :D

[J.O.]

I wasn't there and it's probably not fair to second guess from the comfort of my easy chair, but a missing landing gear and bent engine cowlings spell a possible fuel leak and fire to me. I think I'd have called for an evacuation.

[WhatsaLizad?]

I fly a AA 757 into UIO more than a few times a year. Our 767's cannot fly into UIO, but are certified high enough for Bogota. I believe the 777 has a similar limit as the 767.

KLM (or Martinair?) had a morning MD11 arrival as we departed many times. More than a few DC-10 and DC-8 freighters have been present as well. Most of the outbound cargo is flowers so one might expect there should be plenty of power for those crews.

If IB did knock out the 35 ILS, it may only affect the non-RNAV approved operators. I believe the RW35 RNAV approach minimums are about <100 lower than the ILS.

[polea]

B767s do operate in Quito.. there is one LAN 767 landing as I write this reply :)

..and remember that the runway length is now 200 ft shorter because of the accident

[fox niner]

B777 maximum takeoff and landing altitude is 9800 feet. It says so in my FCOM, Limitations. So operationally there is no problem for B777's to fly to Quito.

[WhatsaLizad?]

"B777 maximum takeoff and landing altitude is 9800 feet. It says so in my FCOM, Limitations. So operationally there is no problem for B777's to fly to Quito. "

fox niner,

I guess airport altitude limits are a "custom" item for Boeing. Our 777's and 767's have a 8400' foot limit. The 757's top out at 14500' for La Paz.

From experience, I know the 777 would rocket out of UIO at most weights. I witnessed a 3000' takeoff roll starting a 9 hour flight once :ok:

[OsPi]

Some video footage available here: http://www.ecuavisa.com/Desktop.aspx?Id=958&e=826.

Can't see any opened TR there, but on the other hand the quality isn't the best.

[OsPi]

http://img101.imageshack.us/img101/5681/iberiagv7.jpg

[hetfield]

@OsPi

- no reverse
- where are the spoilers?

Oooooops

[Bearcat]

paddyintheuk.....your ideas re evacuations....well I hope i don't fly with you guys. The deal is a dire situation where one evacuates....well the pylons were smashed.....potential fuel leaks.....they are lucky the thing didnt go up in flames. The theory of a slow evacuation is cods wallop. please god it never happens me or any of us...but i would have fired out them immediately and then retire with immediate effect.

[Daysleeper]

OsPi.

Nice screen grabs, what is the source for them?

[OsPi]

Daysleeper: Thanks, they are from the Ecuavisa video.

[Daysleeper]

Right cheers, will watch it all the way through....kinda got bored and stopped when they were explaining aquaplaning in Spanish. :}

[denkraai]

KLM and Martinair operate the Mad Dog (MD11) to Quito almost daily.With its high approach speed it's quite a challenging approach for a MD11.Every pilot needs a yearly check to Quito with an instructor.Recently KLM headoffice informed if there could be a regular runway cleaning of all the rubber deposit in the two touchdown zones, since 35/17 is "slippery when wet" to say the least.But without spoiler deployment........:uhoh:

[Dream Land]

http://i63.photobucket.com/albums/h159/180MPH/1282673.jpg

Compare this photo with spoiler deployment to the video screen shots, due to the low angle and poor quality, tough to really determine if there was spoiler deployment or not, any comments? :confused:

[akerosid]

Also, compare it to the middle left and bottom right photos above and there does seem to be spoiler deployment. This would be automatic anyway, although I understand that on the Airbus FBW, the spoiler lever doesn't actually move on landing (even if spoilers are armed).

[juniour jetset]

well, I just checked out the Ecuavisa video and there is some good footage of the A340 travelling down the runway from a variety of different cameras (probably CCV) and there does seem to be an abscense of moevement on the side of the engines and thus lack of reverse thrust?? for slowing down on what looks like a very wet runway.

I can't understand the hypothesis that the chaps are talking about as my lack of Spanish - any Spanish translaters out there who wish to enlighten the forum?

what do others think of the lack of reverse thrust idea? also the pics of the resting aircraft show engines in non-reverse thrust position- maybe on the engines on the startboard side, the pilots could of changed this on shutdown, but on the portside with the engines crumpled on the ground- would they/could they have done this?

I'm no air accident investigator.. but some of the evidence would point to lack of reverse thrust initiated.

Now waiting for some forum abuse to come my way... bring it on:ok: just my second post by the way!

[Huck]

I operated an MD-11 into Quito many times, from both seats, day and night, for Gemini Air Cargo a few years ago.

A big factor to consider: at ~600 feet on final you have to transition to the VASIs. This will take you 1 to 1.5 dots below glideslope. Saw an Air France 747 not do this once while I was on the ramp - they almost didn't stop....

Flying that approach at night, with ground speeds of over 200 kts, will stick in my mind forever. The departure was about as exciting.

[Dream Land]

Yes I agree, spoilers appear to be deployed.

[broadreach]

Re the clip. The only really relevant part was the first interview, of an Ecuarorean pilot whose comments appeared to me, at least, to be very very much in the direction of "let's wait for more information". The interviewer asked about aquaplaning and said that local pilots, with "greater local knowlege therefore more caution" tended to fly under the GS; the interviewee promptly said that if they did so they'd be in breach of SOPs. He also said the very rapid fire truck response was reassuring.

The rest of the clip, with other interviewees, concerns Iberia's supposed lack of proper attention to distraught passengers, and a to-and-fro regarding the location/changes to the concession details of a new Quito airport; I switched off.

[thirtysomething]

I had a chat with somebody who works in Ib. Im told that the runway is tight for a A340 at the best of times with many landings being " rough " . On previous occassions in the last months there have been long delays for IB with tests conducted on undercarraige.

I am a PPL so dont know what the shortfield approach procedure is in that plane . But it sounded to me like it was plonk it onto the runway as early and slow as possible. I am told that many of the landings there are a bit " bumpy " and thats not SLF bumpy but crew bumpy.

If the runways is tight in terms of LDA and they blew a few tires on a wet surface its easy to imagine how it all went pear shaped. Im not sure how one factor effects the other.

The plane is a write off with the airframe badly twisted.

[Admiral346]

thirtysomething,

there is no such thing as a shortfield procedure on big airliners.

You are always expected to put it on the touchdown markers at Vref.

Of course, landing on a 4000m RWY at Sealevel gives you some distance to play with, and I tend to prolong the flare to achieve a smoother touchdown, but that is actually not in the book (meaning no SOP).

You never fly slower because of a shortfield, you should always be on your precalculated speed. My speedcontrol will get more focus on short RWY, but I will never fly deliberatly slower (my FO would call a goaround, if I did).

Same is true for contaminated RWYs.

Nic

[Bearcat]

so that's two A340's in the bin within 2 weeks.

[Dream Land]

You are always expected to put it on the touchdown markers at Vref. I may be doing it wrong but Vref is what I cross the fence at, not the speed at the touchdown. :confused:

[thirtysomething]

Hi, Thanks. I wonder what the landing distance required is versus LDA and if this was a factor in the "arrival". I dont have the skill to work that out but if it is tight as i was told , it appeared to me in the video that the plane landed beyond the touchdown markers ?

[PK-KAR]

Check the middle left frame just above the rear half of engine 4... spoiler deployment. It's "consistent" with the photo of spoiler deployment on the Virgin 346 shot (see the upper part of the wing and window line above the aft half of engine #1.

As to lack of reverse, again check engine #3 on the middle left frame... looks like partial deployment/stow.

PK-KAR...

[armchairpilot94116]

30something:

try telling rainboe that !

[broadreach]

There's been very little on the removal of the aircraft. However, there is a new clip on YouTube with footage I hadn't seen before and showing that it went straight off the end, not via the side. Look for:
LLEGA EQUIPO PARA RECUPERAR AVION DE IBERIA

[Huck]

Footage from inside the fuselage. (http://youtube.com/watch?v=CTcjJoIWJQ4&feature=related)

[Benny Lin]

Surely not? The end section of the video, when they are off the slides, shows:
1. A beautiful sunny day (wasn't it pouring with rain)
2. The aircraft on the runway

Doesn't seem to fit the other pictures at all (or am I missing something?)

Edit - I have just looked at the comments - this is a video from 2002, NOT the recent Quito event.

[Busbert]

It's clearly a B747, and even the blurb under the video indicates that it refers to an evac after engine fire on a JFK-MAD flight.

:)

[llondel]

Looking at the video, clearly the passengers weren't terrified enough by events in the air and the flight crew obviously did a smooth job of landing it, otherwise they'd have been out a lot faster. To keep up the A340 theme, think of the AF A340 at Toronto - no one stuck around once that stopped moving, and I suspect at Quito they had every incentive to get out pronto.

[Huck]

Wrong accident. Much loss of face. Sorry.

[stilton]

As previously mentioned, you do not stay on the glideslope operating into Quito.

Our procedure is to transition to the PAPI at 9900 feet, deliberately flying beneath the slope (this is an approved procedure)

That is if you want to stop on the runway..

[Dream Land]

Our procedure is to transition to the PAPI at 9900 feet, deliberately flying beneath the slope (this is an approved procedure) Correct me if I'm wrong but isn't this always true when referring to a CAT 1 ILS?

[FlightDetent]

Hi, Thanks. I wonder what the landing distance required is versus LDA and if this was a factor in the "arrival".
Iberia operates under the provisions of JAR OPS which states (1.515) that for jet aircraft the LD available must be at least 1,666.. times the LD required(dry) and for wet runways multiply by 1,15 on top of that - generally speaking.

I may be doing it wrong but Vref is what I cross the fence at, not the speed at the touchdown. I am quite sure that Vref to Vref -5 was the correct TD speed with that terminology. Now on the other hand, I, tough may have been trained poorly, attempt to cross fence at Vapp and flare to Vls, landing at Vls to Vls-7 :) Surely that is what you ment as well.

[slam_dunk]

Quote:
Our procedure is to transition to the PAPI at 9900 feet, deliberately flying beneath the slope (this is an approved procedure)

Correct me if I'm wrong but isn't this always true when referring to a CAT 1 ILS?

No, correct procedure is to follow the glidepath all the way to the runway.

For some aircraft ( like 747) papi is giving wrong info ( below a certain height) due to the distance between glidepath antenna and cockpit.

[MoodyBlue]

Sorry slam_dunk, but stilton is right. For the approach to rwy 35 at Quito you do not stay on the glideslope. If you do that, you will touch down way too far, leaving you with insufficient runway to comfortably stop a widebody. After safely crossing over the last bit of granite that's in front of the runway (and you do that at approx. 9900ft on the GS), you leave the glideslope and "dive" towards the PAPI. This enables you to touch down at the normal touchdown point and hopefully stop the bugger in time - the word "comfortably" still not being applicable on a wet runway :bored:.
The correct visual glideslope for your 744 on the PAPI may well be 3 white/1 red - but that's a different story.

[slam_dunk]

My answer was to this question:
Correct me if I'm wrong but isn't this always true when referring to a CAT 1 ILS?

That answer still stands : NO !

sorry for the confusion

[MoodyBlue]

My answer was to this question:
Quote:
Correct me if I'm wrong but isn't this always true when referring to a CAT 1 ILS?
That answer still stands : NO !Ah... yes, ofcourse... and in that case, you are absolutely right! :)

[BOAC]

So the PAPIs and the GP are not aligned? You are 'diving' a widebody and aiming at what? 2 reds/2 whites, or 3 reds/1 white? What are the TCH's at Quito for the PAPIS/GP?..............and lastly - who 'approved' this?

[Dream Land]

The G/S on a CAT1 ILS is only accurate to the DH. Anyone dispute this view? :confused:

[MoodyBlue]

So the PAPIs and the GP are not aligned?Correct - PAPI is at the "normal" position, ILS GP antenna is much further down the rwy than normal to provide adequate terrain clearance over the ridge in front of the rwy.

You are 'diving' a widebody and aiming at what? 2 reds/2 whites, or 3 reds/1 white?Yes, with "diving" meaning leaving the 3-deg GP at about a 4-deg flight path angle to pick up the 3-deg visual glidepath (2 white/2 red or 3 white/1 red, whatever's appropriate for your a/c type). If done correctly, the whole thing can be done without sinkrate-warnings and you'll be nicely established - even at groundspeeds in the 180-200kt region. It's kinda fun actually. By the way, all this obviously means that the minima for this approach are quite high.

What are the TCH's at Quito for the PAPIS/GP?Haven't got the charts handy, but TCH for the PAPI is "normal", for the GP would be quite high.

..............and lastly - who 'approved' this?Hmmm, who knows. But it's in the books and it's what "everybody" does.

[alf5071h]

Dream Land, the accuracy of the ILS is not dictated by DH. The system installation requirements will require some margin of accuracy below any operational use height.

Ref landing dist / PAPI; refer to the airport chart (www.airliners.net/uf/view.file?id=536886102&filename=1188716234RuegxR.jpg). The ILS threshold is displaced; this gives a LDA of 2610 m vs the runway length of 3120m. If an operator is authorised for IFR operations into Quito then the landing performance on runway 35 should match this reduced value, enabling a stabilised instrument approach and transition to the same stabilised visual approach path.
The standard requirements (ICAO?) for lighting on an instrument runway is that PAPI matches the ILS GS; if not, this deviation should be identified on the chart. I see no evidence of this. Even if the PAPI and ILS were not aligned, then the landing performance aspects should not require any duck under manoeuvre.
The ILS GS is 3.1 deg, nothing unusual; thus with appropriate performance calculations (noting tailwind) and accurate flying, then landing from a stabilised approach should not present any greater difficulty or risk than in other operations – perhaps excepting the higher grnd speed / reaction time. i.e. the margin for error in airspeed, TCH, touchdown position, spoiler / reverser deployment, is reduced.

Certificated landing performance is normally limited to 8000ft amsl. This can be extended by extrapolation usually with additional margins. Whilst most manufacturers can extrapolate for their aircraft types, the resulting performance might be uneconomic. However, IIRC Airbus conducted actual landing tests at Quito, thus normal certification rules would be expected to apply.

[MoodyBlue]

The standard requirements (ICAO?) for lighting on an instrument runway is that PAPI matches the ILS GS; if not, this deviation should be identified on the chart. I see no evidence of this.On the chart you link to, no PAPI is shown at all. But I can tell you that the PAPI is there, and it is not aligned with the ILS GS.

The ILS threshold is displaced; this gives a LDA of 2610 mWell, 2610m is not too much with the groundspeeds you get at an elevation of ~9200ft... runway behind you, and all that.

I guess what it all means, is that with the described technique you can use the entire runway, which is nice, but it is no longer an ILS approach. It is an ILS-letdown to a circling approach, and circling minima are used.

[alf5071h]

MB Re no PAPI indicated on the chart. I decode the “P/3.1” in the runway box, right hand column – Visual Slope, as indicating that PAPI is installed on runway 35 with an approach slope of 3.1 deg. In addition, I assume that the ‘non standard’ 3.1 deg is due to an alignment with the ILS, which previous posts indicted was above 3 deg due to distant obstacles.

Your observations and experience on-site are interesting, particularly as there is no information on the chart for crews. Is your experience with a ‘long body’ aircraft (MD11?) where a single PAPI installation may appear to be non-aligned with the ILS?
Other possibilities are that the specific PAPI installation uses a ‘tight’ beam setting and thus is very susceptible to aircraft size/configuration, or as intimated previously, less than ideal ILS GS accuracy well below DH.

The displaced ILS threshold is an interesting compromise particularly in a location where runway length is a premium. A possible alternative would have been to use an even higher GS angle ~ 3.3 deg to regain landing distance. Even at the high altitude, the steeper slope should not create any landing problems, furthermore the steeper angle would provide more precision and thus less scatter in the touchdown point; whereas the duck under / shallow approach does not.

I do not think that you should automatically assume that aiming to land short of the ILS threshold prohibits an ILS. Special techniques can be authorised for ‘difficult’ runways (post #96), but in these instances there are usually limitations or briefings to cover any additional risk. At Quito, I would expect the authority (Spain) / operator to consider the risks of deviating from the ILS approach (unstabilized), and even though this is to acquire a ‘stable’ visual approach, the speed / energy / time aspects of the higher altitude might move this to an unacceptable high risk operation. Also, - particularly; consider the effect of any tailwind.
I would expect higher ILS minima to aid the visual transition, and probably a tailwind restriction.

Ref: “Safety aspects of tailwind operations”, (2001). (www.nlr-atsi.com/publications.php) Also see “Running out of runway” (2005).

[TowerDog]

I operated an MD-11 into Quito many times, from both seats, day and night, for Gemini Air Cargo a few years ago.



Yeah, done the same but with 747-200s at max landing weight.
Went in there first time at night with rain and thunderstorm.
Asked the company to get a check-airman along to show me around.
They declined so I got to sort it out on my own.
(Not much of a safety culture with that lot:rolleyes:)

The problem on the turn to final is that ya usually get the glide slope before the localizer..Doing the right thing and waiting for loc will run ya high on the g/s initially, then ya have to dive down to get it, stablilize on the g/s untill mins, right around 650 feet, then leave the g/s to dive again to catch up with the VASI or PAPI lights (forgot which), then be right on speed and in the t/d zone, grab a handful of reverse and get it stopped without cooking them brakes.
Fairly easy operation on the B-747 as it is a stable machine and really flies like a big super-cub. Never flown the MD-11 or a 340, would imagine the speeds being about the same.

It could have been some mechanical failure with the brakes or anti-skid system.....?

[Dream Land]

Thanks for info Alf.

[BOAC]

I can only hope that our experts have these sort of issues on their 'W-B' graphs for Quito and CGH, and my primary concern, like Alf, is that although I am well used to operating with PAPIs/VASIs NOT aligned with GPs, my understanding also is that IFR performance should normally be predicated on ILS touchdown point unless clearly differentiated to crews, and I am worried by the apparent 'throw-away' lines of "Oh yes, if you don't duck under and land short at CGH in a heavy 737 on a wet runway OR at Quito in a 340 you will have trouble stopping" and what this might do to the mind-set of other pilots looking at shortish runways. The analysis of these incidents/accidents MUST include the responsibility for instituting correct operating procedures and for the responsibility of crews and management to be alert to these issues and not to turn a blind eye to them for expediency and 'a bit of fun'. Does everyone have a clean sheet here?

It may be 'quite fun' and as long as it is clearly published and approved there really is no issue, but, as at CGH............................

Apart from our own skins, we accept responsibility for lots of others, and safety margins are there for a reason.

I will be relieved if I hear from any QUITO operators who have this published as SOP with warnings about LDA. It is obviously a 'special brief' airfield and I would hope at least 'Cat B' if that exists in Spain? My charts (which may well be out of date) show a 3.2deg GP and 3 deg PAPIs and a LDA of 2290m (not 2610) for (displaced) ILS touchdown with a TCH (ILS) of 59', but the quoted ILS displacement on these Jepps is only 320m so obviously there have been some changes or errors since it measures out at 510m as per the linked chart. Also obviously some sort of deviation from ILS will be required. Should this not be on the charts, rather than relying on 'visitors' having to make up their own procedure at 650'? As Alf says, why not make it a 3.5deg GP or whatever is necessary to cross the ridge at 5 safely?

MB - if, as you post, you are treating this as a 'circle-to-land', are you using 10,500/8km minima?

[bsieker]

BOAC, alf, Dream Land, TowerDog, MoodyBlue, others,

A very interesting discussion, I enjoy the tone and the kind of background information that professional pilots can supply.

Re these issues in a WB-Analysis: In CGH we did not find that "ducking under" the glide slope was a causal factor for that particular accident, although we found it interesting to note, and have been wondering how common it is/was.

The Quito/Iberia case is different in that hardly any substantial data is publicly available. When and if it becomes available we might do another analysis, and also compare it to other runway overruns, be they by A, B, MD, or F aircraft.


Cheers,
Bernd

[BOAC]

In CGH we did not find that "ducking under" the glide slope was a causal factor for that particular accident - to correct a misunderstanding - no-one is suggesting it would be a causal factor in that accident, but a preventative factor in a lot of other successful landings! Hence the need to include it.

[GearDown&Locked]

UIO 35 photo 1 (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=0480934&WxsIERv=Obrvat%20767-3...&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=YNA%20Puvyr&QtODMg=Dhvgb%20-%20Znevfpny%20Fhper%20%28HVB%20%2F%20FRDH%29&ERDLTkt=Rphnqbe&ktODMp=Qrprzore%202003&BP=0&WNEb25u=Raevdhr%20Ebqevthrm%20Y.&xsIERvdWdsY=&MgTUQtODMgKE=Bcrengvat%20nf%20Yna%20Rphnqbe.%20Ab%20reebe%20 znetva%20va%20guvf%20nccebnpu%20gb%20Ejl%2035.&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=6977&NEb25uZWxs=2003-12-29%2000%3A00%3A00&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=&static=yes&width=1024&height=692&sok=JURER%20%20%28ZNGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cnveyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccu bgb_qngr%2Cpbhagel%2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencure%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2C ert%2Cnvepensg_trarevp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20NTNVAFG%20%28%27%2B% 22nccebnpu%22%20%2B%22dhvgb%22%27%20VA%20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%2 9%20%20beqre%20ol%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=5&prev_id=0565424&next_id=0209235&size=L)
UIO 35 photo 2 (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=1149677&WxsIERv=Obrvat%20737-236%2FNqi&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=VPNEB&QtODMg=Dhvgb%20-%20Znevfpny%20Fhper%20%28HVB%20%2F%20FRDH%29&ERDLTkt=Rphnqbe&ktODMp=Abirzore%206%2C%202006&BP=0&WNEb25u=Fnz%20Puhv&xsIERvdWdsY=UP-PSY&MgTUQtODMgKE=Dhvgb%20nccebnpu%20vf%20bar%20bs%20gur%20zhfg%2 0sbe%20gur%20cnffvbangr%20nivngvba%20raguhfvnfg%21%20%5BAvxb a%20Q2k%2C%20Avxxbe%2010.5zz%20Svfurlr%5D&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=33475&NEb25uZWxs=2006-12-07%2012%3A02%3A58&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=22026%2F644&static=yes&width=1000&height=678&sok=JURER%20%20%28ZNGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cnveyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccu bgb_qngr%2Cpbhagel%2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencure%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2C ert%2Cnvepensg_trarevp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20NTNVAFG%20%28%27%2B% 22nccebnpu%22%20%2B%22dhvgb%22%27%20VA%20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%2 9%20%20beqre%20ol%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=1&prev_id=&next_id=0717404&size=L)

[bsieker]

BOAC,

thanks for the reply.

The nature of the Why-Because-Analysis is that it only includes necessary causal factors. For analysing all the environment and conext of an accident this is a known shortcoming of the method. The other shortcoming is that it does not include dangerous situations/actions, that were not causal to the accident, although they were present, and should by all means be rectified (an example for this is the incorrectly assembled main landing gear bogie in the Concorde accident).

I'm curious about how Quito/Iberia turns out to have happened. And, of course, also Toulouse/Airbus.

[Globally]

Do we even know whether this incident was the result of a rejected takeoff, or an attempt to land? If the pictures show the reversers aren't deployed, maybe the airplane is in the takeoff roll prior to a rejected attempt.
As far as landing on runway 35. I fly 747-400s into Quito on a fairly regular basis. As part of our safety audit of this airport, I spent 3 hours in the control tower watching the overall operation. In that time period of heavy arrivals, not one airplane- big or small - landed at the ILS glideslope intercept point. All airplanes landed in the first 3,000 feet. I understand the overall need to stay on the ILS glideslope all the way to touchdown, but there are some problems with this particular runway in doing so: There is a fairly steep crown in the runway just after the ILS touchdown point, sloping downwards after the crown; All of the paint, representing the touchdown zone markings -starts on the first brick of the runway surface through the first 3,000 feet. Therefore, if you stay on the ILS glideslope, as you start your flare, the paint will disappear behind the airplane and you will have difficulty determining how much runway you're using in the flare. If you float, it would be difficult to tell when you've used so much runway in the flare that you need to go around. Furthermore, the last 3,000 feet of the runway is coated with rubber deposits and paint, becoming slick in rain, exacerbated by volcanic dust deposits on the runway. It's definitely safer to land the airplane in the first 3,000 feet as far as stopping distances are concerned. But we need to publish a procedure or techinique that allows us to perform a normal landing in the first 3,000 feet that doesn't in effect result in a "duck under" maneuver.

[supersean]

Globally,

The cockpit to tower recording played here in Quito clearly indicates that this was an accident that occurred during landing at UIO

[Globally]

Supersean. Thanks for the info.

[alf5071h]

Globally, you provide another interesting viewpoint of operations at Quito.
Viewing the situation with a wider perspective wouldn’t it be better to fix the problems at their root as opposed to finding a risky work-around, which not everyone would know of or be able to fly.
For example, remove the rubber deposits, provide a warning about volcanic ash, and if required declare the runway ‘slippery when wet’.
A more extensive solution would be to move the ILS GS origin and increase the angle.
If hazards are encountered it is everyone’s duty to report them; I suggest starting with a company safety report, then ASRS or equivalent (copy to your ops liaison at Quito and/or email this thread to them).

bsieker you explain the reasons why a ‘W-B analysis’ is limited – thanks. This is similar to a formal accident report where the absence of fact limits the conclusions as to cause and contributing aspects. An alternative approach is pure speculation; TowerDog proposes mechanical failure, but without supporting fact.
However, there is often great value in risk or hazard based speculation for preventing similar accidents; as BOAC states, providing preventative factors.
Mechanical failure is unlikely on a statistical basis (low probability but not impossible), whereas risk from human error would be high. This is not to focus on the crew; HF considerations would include all humans in the operational system, e.g. who provides and/or checks the chart information – LDA, PAPI alignment?

An example of risk based speculation might consider operational reasons for the long landing distance. We do not know where the aircraft touched down, but the discussion on duck under / unstable approach identifies with considerable risk. If operators duck under we could consider if they (operators/authority) have fully understood the risks in the manoeuvre particularly at high altitude – high GS. Or if crews duck under do they understand the risks; it is not an individual’s error (PF) it is a crew issue. Do monitoring pilots (PNF) concur with the error or do they even detect it. We could then investigate why the crew exhibit these behaviours – knowledge of the risk, training, SOPs, human issues in the organisation.
Do crews brief the specific differences in this type of operation? E.g. it is more likely that the landing weight is near limiting performance, particularly with a wet runway / tailwind. Do crew consciously decide to change the way they decelerate the aircraft or just rely on the standard Auto Brake setting accepting that they will to stop further down the runway? The risk here is that although a safe landing should still be achieved, the safety margins are reduced – perhaps just to the point where a slick, wet, rubber coated, portion of the runway is the difference between tarmac and grass. Perhaps a change of brief for the use of brakes or heightened awareness would be valuable.
Thus from a small selective risk based speculation, there could be many avenues of research or opportunities for operators to check their understanding of the issues; providing preventative factors and improving safety – reducing their risk of an overrun.

[Globally]

Alf. Many thanks for the insightful information and questions you pose. From my experience flying B747s around the world for the past 15 years and 22 years in the USAF flying C-141s, I have often seen airports that are very marginally capable of supporting big airplanes. Quito is one of them. The runway should be made longer, the ILS glideslope issue resolved somehow so that crews can stay on a constant glideslope all the way to touchdown in the first 3,000 feet, where the traditional runway markings are indicated. Other airports include Mexico City, where a very tight VOR approach and final turn to the runway 05R is sometimes required - at night during cargo operations. Very little time to get stable on final approach, with ground speeds approaching 200 knots. El Doret, Kenya - unreliable ILS signals, a very small, marginally satisfactory turnaround area at the end of the runway, with a steep dropoff and no margin for error. Norfolk NAS, where I first flew into and out of in 1975 in C-141s, still has a totally unsatisfactorily short runway for big B747 type of airplane operations, some 30 years later. Lagos, Kinshasha, Cairo West, Kathmandu, even JFK in New York on the Canarsie approach. Don't forget Runway 4R at JFK, a Cat 11/III runway only 8400 feet long. How many big airplanes have overrun this runway in the past? Several. Midway is the most recent US example of an airliner overrun. Teterboro comes to mind also. For all of these operations, the crew is "briefed" to be aware and be cautious, etc... But what it all boils down to is the crew is told that the airport is difficult and the burden is on them. There is no room for error. In all of these cases, the airline can point to the fact that the data "shows" that the airplane is capable of performing on these runways, both for takeoff and landing. That is true. All of these operations are capable and legal. However, in my opinion, the question in aviation is not how much runway is necessary to take off and land an airplane on a particular runway . The question is how much runway is necessary to make that operation safe? The data no doubt shows that an Airbus A340-600 is capable of stopping on a wet Rwy 35 at Quito after landing at the ILS intercept point with a given autobrake setting. The margin of safety, however, is probably not that great. Everything had to work almost perfectly, including wheel spinup necessary for thrust reverser activation, etc...

[barit1]

Globally asks - The question is how much runway is necessary to make that operation safe?

I don't know any way to make a "safe" vs "unsafe" binary distinction. To the professional, safety is a numerical quantity - measured perhaps in events per 100,000 operations. Such statistics should be generally available from the insurance industry - and I'd be surprised if an operator's route structure (compared to the requirements of his constituent fleet) didn't help determine the annual insurance premium.

And thus, the insurers and the operators would seem to have some leverage to bring about airfield improvements.

[TowerDog]

TowerDog proposes mechanical failure, but without supporting fact.


Well, not sure I am proposing anything (As in proposing, or suggesting a marriage)

Just bringing up the possibility of a brake or anti-skid failure.

Too easy to hang the crew or Iberia or Airbus at this stage.
Lets look at all the possible scenarios since we are here yakking away.

Even Chuck Yeager would run off the end if his brakes (or reversers) failed in Quito.

No supporting facts though, just looking at this from other angles.

Landing long at high speed would of course trigger a no-fault go-around.
Surely the Iberia crews are trained to think that way.

[supersean]

Globally,

I do not believe that this accident is an indicator of UIO's safety. While the threshold for error is smaller than an airport with a longer runway, there is a clear and established procedure for landing at UIO... pilots who follow procedure do not experience a runway over run, at most they execute a go-around for another landing attempt.

As there has been no volcanic activity for some time here with the local volcano's I do not see how ash is a factor??!!

[supersean]

TowerDog,

Video evidence indicates that this incident was long landing at most likely high speed. We still do not know the reason that a go-around was not initiated.

http://www.ecuavisa.com/NewsGallery/Video.aspx?e=826&f=6780

[MoodyBlue]

Alf: Re no PAPI indicated on the chart. I guess the photos posted by GearDown&Locked settle the PAPI-thing. Should have thought of that myself (photos).

Is your experience with a ‘long body’ aircraft (MD11?) where a single PAPI installation may appear to be non-aligned with the ILS?Yes, MD11. But the whole thing has nothing to do with the size of the a/c, or accuracy, or tight beams or whatever. The PAPI is simply set up for a different touchdownpoint than the GS. As the photos show, the PAPI is in a "normal" position at the physical threshold. The GS-antenna is hundreds of meters further down the rwy. Been there, seen it, done that.

BOAC: MB - if, as you post, you are treating this as a 'circle-to-land', are you using 10,500/8km minima?Still haven't got the charts handy, but I'm pretty sure those are the limits we use. Obviously, if you're gonna leave the ILS GP you will have to be visual at that point - it really goes without saying! The circling limits allow that. What this also means, is that we are using higher limits (with the potential, and real consequences for punctuality etc.!) to be able to use the whole runway. Weather below these limits, we do NOT fly the approach. We do NOT want to land at the ILS TD-point with only 2610m (let alone 2290m...) remaining. (see also post #116 by Globally!) In my eyes this clearly means a choice by the airline for SAFETY instead of schedule and that's the way it should be.

It may be 'quite fun' ....Please, do NOT misinterpretate me on this! Yes, I enjoy this operation because of the challenge it presents. But neither me, nor any of my colleagues is doing anything here because it would be fun. (We only do that after we get back to the beach after this rotation :ok:)

Apart from our own skins, we accept responsibility for lots of others, and safety margins are there for a reason.We are very, very aware of that and the whole operation is treated very seriously - see below:

It is obviously a 'special brief' airfield and I would hope at least 'Cat B'Where I come from, it is a Cat C-airport. It means a minimum experience on type for both pilots, briefings, special procedures, a checkride with an instructor and go there at least once a year or do everything again. I have no idea how things are at Iberia and I have no desire to speculate.

relying on 'visitors' having to make up their own procedure at 650'?That would not be a good idea, no. That's why it's all on our charts, briefed, and practiced (in the simulator, just to be perfectly clear).

All in all, I feel perfectly safe with this operation. But yes, you will be paying attention.

Finally:

Viewing the situation with a wider perspective wouldn’t it be better to fix the problems at their rootOfcourse, you're right on that - and I guess that's one of the reasons why a new airport is being built, due to open in 2009. http://www.luxner.com/cgi-bin/view_article.cgi?articleID=1417
(http://www.luxner.com/cgi-bin/view_article.cgi?articleID=1417)

[Magplug]

It is very difficult to judge from the video stills but the very last frame is the only one where it looks as if the spoilers MIGHT be deployed.

There is no evidence of the spray caused by reverse thrust until a couple of frames before the a/c goes out of sight..... Having said that the landing performance is not reliant upon the use of reverse thrust, it does however require spoilers deployed.

Let me guess.... yet another deep landing onto a limiting runway with late selection of reverse ?

"Baldrick... Make up the spare room.....Mr. Cockup is paying a visit"

Perhaps Iberia are chasing Air France for the title of 'Most HF Related Hull Losses"

[polea]

while any explanations for the accident right now are speculations (until the official accident report is released) I've heard from a local pilot and aeronautic authorities that the plane landed after the first 1/3 of the runway (pilot error) .. anyway, still speculations

one important thing is the steep crown globally said.. the last part of the rwy is downhill

also, gobally mentioned volcanic ash as a possible problem. Although I can still find volcanic ash in my home (yes, I live in Quito) I wonder if it is still a problem after about 8 years of normal operations in UIO

improvements in the current Quito airport will not happen .. as you can notice, there is no room for making the runway longer, and also they are waiting for the new quito airport (called NQIA) to open instead of fixing the current airport

the new airport construction has been delayed for many years. Its plans were done in the 70s and it was expected to be finally built in the 90s .. it is 2007 and we have no new airport yet .. the cause of the delay is political problems. Even now, the current president of Ecuador objects the construction of the new airport because of its 'unfair' contract to the government .....will we ever have a new airport?

some suggest moving some operations from Quito SEQU to Latacunga SELT, just about 40 miles south of Quito .. pros: the runway is longer than Quito's and approach is much easier .. cons: there is no taxiway, terminal building is too small, political problems (again!)

[BOAC]

Considering the pics from GD&L are in a 737-200, they are even 'ducking under' the 'duck-under'! Food for thought?

[Globally]

Supersean. I may have overstated the effect of volcanic dust as it interacts with rain on an already slick runway. But I do recall that after the first takeoff we made out of Quito last year in our 747-400, we looked back during the SID and saw a cloud of dust lingering over the runway, even though there was no reported volcanic activity. A firetruck hosed down some of the shoulder area of the runway before and after we made our first landing there. I have also watched some 747s during takeoff roll and the dust cloud behind the airplane was fairly thick, even though there was no visible dust on the surface to the naked eye. In any event, we consider the effect of rain mixed with dust and other factors causing a slick surface when we discuss braking technique during the approach briefing. I don't know if dust mixed with rain technically makes the runway slicker, but I'd rather plan for it and land in the first 3,000 feet with a higher brake setting than ignore it.

[polea]

more news: they will tow the aircraft back to the airport hangars and they are already bringing airbus equipment to analyse the damaged aircraft .. they do not want it to be a write-off so they will check if they can repair it and make it leave Quito flying by its own

[alf5071h]

This is a valuable thread enabling opportunity to think about safety issues and learn from them; thanks to all of the contributors.

TowerDog no criticism of your view on mechanical failure; although unlikely, this is not totally dismissed particularly in an operation where the tyres, brakes / gear might be at the top end of their performance spec – high energy (speed altitude), tyre speed/temp.
Re” Landing long at high speed would of course trigger a no-fault go-around. - Surely the Iberia crews are trained to think that way.”
Yes, but such assumptions are often found to be inaccurate due to the limitations of human performance; we (all of us) forget, we are distracted, we press-on because we ’think’ that it safe or not knowing the risk, or we do not know how close to the edge of a safe operation the particular landing is.

MoodyBlue, re PAPI not aligned with ILS GS. I agree with your deduction. Not forgetting that the ILS GS is a reflected beam from the ground some distance in front of the aerial (at 3 deg down then up), there appears to be a discrepancy which is not identified in the charts – thus an opportunity for error.
One such error is to duck under the ILS GS and follow the PAPI visual slope; this could be a particular hazard in long body aircraft (large eye/wheel height, long eye/wheel dist) where the resultant TCH could be extremely low. Comparing the A340-600 with a smaller aircraft aiming for TCH 50ft +/- 10ft, the A340 following the same visual path may only have 20ft +/- 10ft wheel clearance. [eye-wheel ht ~ 18ft, + attitude correction 12ft (6deg @ 120ft eye wheel dist – from Airbus ebriefing 2006)]. A further consideration may be that apart from the risk of the manoeuvre, a duck under at higher GS (higher energy/inertia) might result in an overshoot of the desired visual path giving even less TCH clearance. Then consider the lack of a paved undershoot area before the threshold (see pics #114).

polea, “the plane landed after the first 1/3 of the runway (pilot error) … ”. This statement follows the old view of error – pilot error.
Consider an IFR operation with the planned touchdown aim-point based on the ILS origin, then a small change in the tailwind or the ‘standard’ error in reporting the wind (see link from #108), could cause the aircraft to float down the runway, even further if it were ‘over the first hump’ beyond the touchdown markings. Alternatively, consider the possibility of a visual illusion with the up-sloping runway or a relatively narrow runway for its extra length, or poor light/visibility (dusk?), any of these factors makes the landing a demanding task in a large aircraft. Then consider any differences between management operational assumptions vs what the crew assumed; what landing distance is assumed; full length, 2610m, or even less (it would be nice to establish what value operators’ use in their planning charts or perf computers – cf 737 Midway accident - data in computer).
Thus the ‘long landing’ could be within the normal distribution of touchdown position when compared with a landing on a non limiting runway. What we don’t know are the assumptions in the operation, I hope the crew knew.

Considering the plans for a new airport, then improvements at UIO appear unlikely and with financial constraint even runway maintenance cleaning/removal of rubber deposits may be overlooked. Thus the operator / crew will have to accommodate any additional risk during landing. Add to the above a wet runway which had less friction than normal – greater depth of water, or residual dust in the runway pores (there doesn’t have to be an active volcano), blocked grooves (is the runway grooved?), and increasing rubber deposits, then the risk of an overrun increases.
Crews may rarely encounter truly limiting runways, thus they acquire and present a perception of apparent safety (“737 land safely so why can everyone else”). Whereas landing performance provides a safety margin for normal flying tolerances, the margin cannot accommodate a combination of extremes or any false assumptions carried over from less demanding operations.
A routine, ‘normal’ landing might consume 50% of the safety margin due to deviations from the ideal in approach speed, TCH, flare time, touchdown position, spoiler/rev deployment, and use of brakes. The crew’s perception, particularly on a non limiting runway could be of a large residual safety margin based on the runway remaining; what they may fail to appreciate is where they where expected to stop by the certification and operational assumptions. Thus it is possible to form a biased view of the margins of safety based on normal operations, …. but UIO is not normal.
JAR-OPS performance is based on a ‘standard’ wet runway (only found in certification?), in practice there is a range of reducing levels of friction between wet and some magic changeover point of flooded/contaminated – what the crew do not know is how slippery a wet runway is (excluding ‘slippery when wet’ which is separate, but important additional risk). So for a crew who for good reason conduct a difficult landing at UIO as perhaps they have done before, suddenly find that that the margin of safety rapidly disappears and alternative action is required – more reverse or more brakes – just at the point where the runway is wet, slippery, and contaminated with rubber!
Some research suggests that it is necessary to increase existing safety factor from 1.92 up to 2.2/2.4 on wet runway in order to maintain the same level of safety on a dry runway.

For those who use a w - b analysis it might be interesting to take a speculative view of this scenario and ‘pencil-in’ opportunities for error and thus preventative measures, e.g.
why at UIO aircraft should not duck under:
because an unstable approach may offset any gain in landing distance, possible reduced TCH, no undershoot.
why max braking should be considered:
because the point of touchdown may vary more than normal, prevalence of tailwind landings, potentially slippery runway (wet and dry - dusty?), non standard overrun area.
This proactive assessment could be the basis of a special briefing or SOP, which of course should include a GA if the TD position appears to be long (specify a fixed point on the runway).
Refs:
Runway Slipperiness Research. (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19890068908_1989068908.pdf)
Safety Factor on Wet Concrete Runway. (www.tc.gc.ca/tdc/publication/pdf/14200/14273e.pdf)

[broadreach]

TV clip with the aircraft in the background:

http://www.ecuavisa.com/NewsGallery/Video.aspx?e=942&f=7011

Commentator says removal now planned for Tuesday 27th; delayed due inclement weather. Pneumatic cushions and heavy earthmoving machinery visible; hard tracks are being laid for towing back to the runway. Another news site said a new port gear assembly had been brought in and was being attached in situ. If that's correct (and it's not a cushioned bogie just for support during tow) it would seem to indicate less damage to the wing structure than was originally presumed to have occurred. Rainboe, was that a smirk?

After a brief suspension, Iberia are now back to Quito but apparently not with the -600.

[supersean]

aircraft recover has just begun.. am running to UIO to take photos

[el_visigodo]

It is today in Ecuadorian TV news. EC-JOH has a new undercarriage and they are pulling it slowly to the apron. So it is no hull loss.

Does anyone know what caused a similar incident with an Iberia Airbus in SEQU on August 31th 2007?

[Globally]

BOAC. I'm not sure we are "ducking under" with such a high DH height above touchdown. For a Cat 1 with the usual height of above touchdown of 200 feet, ducking under should never be carried out. But what about a situation like Quito, where there is more than adequate time from DH to adjust the glideslope to land in the first 3,000 feet, which is where the instrument markings are located in the first place? From all my experience flying into Quito, including an observation period in the tower, I never saw any airplane land in conjunction with the ILS glideslope. Everyone landed in the first 3,000 feet.

[BOAC]

Not sure which 'duck under' you refer to, but my last was a comment on the number of red papis (on a 737-200). As Alf says, the whole ethos of the approach needs looking at IMO wrt landing performance calcs.

[polea]

does anyone know which type of aircraft is Iberia currently using to fly to UIO :confused:

[el_visigodo]

They are flying again aircrafts of the A340 family, it is in their press release on the IBERIA web site (Sala de Prensa -> Noticia). But they do not mention if the use any A340-600 for IB6463. A week before I went with an A340-300 EC-GPB TERESA DE AVILA on this flight number. Now Iberia has again its regular schedule for the MAD UIO GYE MAD route.

[supersean]

According to El Comercio they are again flying the a346. I'll verify and upload pics later

http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=99896&anio=2007&mes=11&dia=24

[Globally]

BOAC. Agreed. The approach needs to be reviewed. We do all our weight planning based on the touchdown at the ILS displaced threshold. Flying the approach and landing as a practical matter, however, needs further review.

[agusaleale]

I spoke with some passenger of that flight, and they told me that they remained for half an hour inside the plane before the evacuation.

Do you think it´s normal, considering the circumstances of the accident?

Regards

[GZip]

QED it was a safe outcome in terms of orderly disembarcation without steps available!

[broadreach]

Re half an hour before evacuation

Would it not be that the first concern on the flight deck is to ascertain whether there is any indication of fire, and where? In one of the Ecuavisa clips a pilot mentioned the fire trucks were on the spot very quickly. They would, presumably, have relayed what they saw, including any indications of fire or fuel fumes, to the tower and thence to the aircraft. They could have shouted up to an open cockpit window. There would be no language difficulty so it’s safe to assume the flight deck were able to assess damage and risk within a few minutes of stopping.

That said, they’d have to decide what the best way to get the passengers off. No chance of airstairs, nose too low, tail too high. Forward slides might not have the necessary angle for sliding; overwing exits much more risk of fractures and cuts. Getting everyone off via the rear slides or slide in an orderly way seems to me at least to have been the safest, most sensible decision.

[yakmadrid]

We have to be careful when we question the decissions of other colleagues. First we should ask ourselves, do I have all the information that the crew was handling at the moment? certainly not, unless you are part of the investigation comission. At any rate, no injuries after evacuating 350+ souls? Good job!!

[broadreach]

Good clip on YouTube showing the aircraft once again on all four legs and about to be towed back to the apron for on-site repairs expected to last 60dd. In YouTube look for "IBERIA RETIRA AVION DE QUITO".

[armchairpilot94116]

Be great if they got it back in service. I would have to send Rainboe a check for five bucks tho.

[Buzz Control]

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[thirtysomething]

Hi,

Spoke to the same source within IB tonight. They say its emerged that windshear contributed to a float and there was a "reverse thrust problem " on 2 engines. Still maintains they reckon it will be a write off and efforts are at insurance companies request. As this is a rumour forum , im just reporting what has come down a chain.

[Tediek]

Good morning, does anybody know the latest status of the plane? Are they repairing the a/c?

[el_visigodo]

They have repaired the antennas of the ILS in SEQU that were damaged by the Iberia crash. A King Air made flights with test equipment to get it certified. There was a TV report on Tele Amazonas about this on December 17th.

[WhatsaLizad?]

Windshear? Was that with or without the stationary mist visible on the video?

I also might inquire as to IB performance numbers for SEQU. Are TR's required for their stopping computations?

I will add my best wishes for the crew involved. I've been operating in there for 12+ years. Challenging place, I can imagine even more so after a 8-9 hour flight.

[Bearcat]

from airbus
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
TO : ALL AIRBUS OPERATORS / ATTN. : FLIGHT SAFETY
SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT N°1 dated 12 November 2007
This AIT is an update of AIT IB6463 N°1 regarding the A340-600 accident during landing on runway 35 at Quito, Ecuador, on the 09th of November 2007 at 17:10 local time.
The data which follows has been approved for release by the commission of investigation led by the Ecuador Investigation Authorities.
The analysis of available data, including the accident recorderas (DFDR & CVR),
indicates the following sequence of events.
IB6463 was approaching on ILS 35 to Quito airport. Latest reported information to the crew during the final approach were:
- wind 170/06;
- visibility 3000m;
- wet runway.
The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF).
Quito runway 35 altitude is 9198ft. The total runway length is 3120 m. The Landing Distance Available (LDA) is 3120 m. The runway is equipped with a PAPI. However this runway has an ILS displaced threshold of 510 m (remaining LDA for ILS approach is then 2610 m).
The CVR records confirm the crew intent was initially to follow the ILS until sufficient visual references were available, then to leave the Glide Slope to visually capture and follow the PAPI path and use the full runway for landing.
The approach was performed with both AP1&2 engaged in LOC and GLIDE track
modes, A/THR engaged in managed speed mode. Till touchdown, A/THR maintained the VAPP. For final approach, the aircraft was configured to land (gear down, auto-brake set to HIGH, ground spoilers armed, flaps fully extended). Landing weight was 249t, Vapp 151 kt. Given the altitude and the tailwind, the True Air Speed was 181kt and the Ground Speed 189kt.
While AP 1+2 were engaged, the aircraft remained stabilized on the LOC and GLIDE.
Runway 35 was in sight just prior to minimum, DA(H) being 9850ft(652ft).
AP 1+2 were disconnected at the minimum. The PF applied nose-down stick inputs to reach the PAPI flight path. This resulted into an increased rate of descent above 1400ft/mn between 450ft and 150ft radio-altitude. The GPWS "SINK RATE" warning was triggered at 270ft radio-altitude, it was followed by transient nose-up inputs from the PF.
The "SINK RATE" warning was triggered again below 50ft AGL.
The touch-down occurred at about 200m after the full runway threshold (remaining distance was 2920 m).
The landing was extremely hard (more than 3g vertical acceleration, about 19ft/sec 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
- Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
- Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
- Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
- And damage of the wiring looms of RH and LH boogie proximity sensors that are used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers deployment.
As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
TO : ALL AIRBUS OPERATORS / ATTN. : FLIGHT SAFETY
SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT N°1 dated 12 November 2007
At touchdown, engine throttles were retarded to idle thus A/THR disengaged, and the ground spoilers deployed immediately.
The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
Full manual braking was applied 5 seconds after touchdown for the whole rollout. The average deceleration achieved during this landing phase was 0.15g. It was consistent with:
- the wet condition of runway;
- the 4 MLG front wheel tyre burst;
- the non-deployment of the engine thrust reversers.
The runway overrun occurred at 85kt in a right turn sideslip attitude resulting from right rudder pedal inputs. The aircraft finally came to a rest at about 200m from the runway end. All passengers and crew members were safely evacuated.
At this stage of the investigation, Airbus reminds operators to comply with Standard Operating Procedure to achieve stabilized approach conditions. Go-around must be initiated if the stabilized conditions are not met at defined altitudes.[/SIZE][/FONT][/FONT][/CENTER][/COLOR][/COLOR][/LEFT][/COLOR][/COLOR]

[Alternate Law]

Says a lot.....:hmm:

[Taildragger67]

FWIW QFA B744 VH-OJH overrun onto the golf course at VTBD (Bangkok Don Muang) in 1999... once the crew had determined there was no immediate fire, there was no evac until the crew had more info on the status of the aircraft. At least you know where the SLF all are then. But, the cabin crew remained by their exits in case an immediate evac became necessary.

There's a fair bit of discussion about evac vs. precautionary disembarkation in the final ATSB report (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/1999/AAIR/pdf/aair199904538_001.pdf).

[FullWings]

The landing was extremely hard (more than 3g vertical acceleration, about 19ft/sec 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
- Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
- Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
- Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
- And damage of the wiring looms of RH and LH boogie proximity sensors that are used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers deployment.
As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
So, looks like the aircraft actually crashed near the runway threshold, then slid all the way to the other end and came off. :ouch: Some similarity with the Britannia accident at Gerona...

[wingview]

stabilized conditions are not met at defined altitudes
Brrrrrrrrr

The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
BRRRRRRRRRRRRR :eek:

[J.O.]

Says a lot.....:hmm:

Yes it certainly does, but I suspect not everyone will agree on what exactly it says. IMHO, the narrow view will say that this crew messed it up and the analysis should end there. The broader view will recognize that an approach in those conditions in a transport jet aircraft is a setup for disaster. Frankly, it's a wonder it hasn't happened until now, and it's nothing but providence that has kept it from killing a plane load of people. In this case the swiss cheese has so many holes in it, its a wonder there's any cheese left at all.

Jeff

[Taildragger67]

J.O.,

I suspect the comment from Alternate Law - which wingview then highlighted - is with respect to the aircraft's computers apparently seeming to think it was still flying when the PIC was standing on the brakes and had manually selected reverse-thrust. :eek:

[Hand Solo]

I'm sure somebody will be along shortly to say that it must have been Airbus design at fault and it couldn't happen in a Boeing. If I remember correctly in the aforementioned Gerona incident the 757s engines did something weird due to the control lines being damaged in the impact, which just goes to show that if you crash any aircraft into the ground hard enough you can break it.

[BEagle]

Nevertheless, computers which prevent the manual selection of reverse thrust (or even ground idle) because they won't be told that the (damaged) aircraft is actually on the ground......

Hmmm

[GearDown&Locked]

I know this is not the same situation, but again, the same doubts raised by that ill fated TAM Airbus ... this time around the spoilers have deployed, but not the reversers... if this runway was similar to CGN we would be talking about a great number of fatalities here. I've also noted that the runway overrun ocurred at similar speeds.

The lack of manual override of fully computerised systems is a bit worrying.

[Hand Solo]

Nevertheless, computers which prevent the manual selection of reverse thrust (or even ground idle) because they won't be told that the (damaged) aircraft is actually on the ground......

If you smash up the input system then any computer will give you an unpredictable output. Did not the Brittannia 757 not do strange things with its engines after they managed to break the fuselage, and that was only with a 3.1G touchdown.

Even if the reversers had activated I doubt it would have made a significant difference to the outcome given the high groundspeed, relatively short runway and the absence of at least 33% of the braking capacity.

[EDML]

Two things to consider:

- Reversers will only give you another 100-200m - And the plane only
needed 200m to stop from 85kt because the gear was ripped off.

- Wasn't there a Lauda 767 that did a roll and crashed after one reverser
was deployed in flight ... - Every thing has to sides: The Airbus
logic might have prevented the accident 767 while Boeing logic (= able to reverse
manually) might not have prevented this overrun but might have helped
to decelerate a bit more. Same for the LH A320 Crash in Warsaw.

EDML

[blackwidow]

Tediek - Good morning, does anybody know the latest status of the plane? Are they repairing the a/c?

She's out of the mud now and parked on GA ramp with no 3 & 4 engines removed... Pic here: http://www.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=153974&id_seccion=11

Great cctv video of landing & recovery at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7AnV24-RLQ

Further info: http://www.airdisaster.com/forums/showthread.php?t=86690&page=5&pp=25

[alexmcfire]

Any A346 experts out there, who´s the subcontractor that make the landing gear, Goodrich, http://www.wheelsandbrakes.goodrich.com/commercial/products/a340.shtml seem to make the wheels and brakes not the landing gear, http://www.lgd.goodrich.com/product_apps.shtml
What are the specs that Airbus give to them which g-force tolerance are specified?
How heavy was the aircraft when it landed, fuel left?

[alexmcfire]

So heard some rumors from Spain that it is a write-off, anyone can confirm that?

[akerosid]

It appears so; a Spanish poster on A.net said that the decision has been taken to write it off; presumably IB doesn't want to say anything publicly.

[Tediek]

Is there any news on this aircraft? Is it a write off? The a/c scrapped already or still waiting in a corner?

[akerosid]

Regrettably, but not surprisingly, it has been decided that EC-JOH has been written off.

Parting-out is expected to commence at Quito within the next few days and should take about three weeks.

[Pinkman]

Maybe a Friday night glass of Rioja has made me sentimental but there is something indefinably sad about a virtually new aircraft being written off.
I flew MAD-UIO last summer on another Iberia -600. They're equipped with a real - time camera in the vert stab and it is breathtaking to watch the approach. What a shame.

Pinkman

[testpanel]

pinkman....
What a shame

Its a shame they (IB) f...ed-up!

[Hot Rod]

testpanel: maybe you´re right, maybe not...

I´ve been to Quito and I surely dont want to go there in bad weather with wet runway in a very heavy aircraft.

Maybe that aircraft is too big for that airport?

[joernstu]

Busbert, very interesting information there.

Just one small correction:

Result: no autobrake, no spoilers, no reverse thrust.

The Quito A340 did deploy spoilers after - touchdown would be the wrong wording, woudn't it? - as the conditions for this were met (for a very short time).

[atakacs]

The Quito A340 did deploy spoilers after - touchdown would be the wrong wording, woudn't it? - as the conditions for this were met (for a very short time).

Could you elaborate on this ? I was under the impression that this was a non reversible condition.

[bsieker]

The Quito A340 did deploy spoilers after - touchdown would be the wrong wording, woudn't it? - as the conditions for this were met (for a very short time).
Could you elaborate on this ? I was under the impression that this was a non reversible condition.

At touchdown, engine throttles were retarded to idle [...] and the ground spoilers deployed immediately.

Although apparently the wiring transmitting the wheight-on-wheels signal was severed, it seems that it just came through on touchdown, thus satisfying the ground spoiler extension condition: they deployed.

Reverse Thrust, as per SOP, was probably only selected after touchdown, when the WoW-signal was no longer available, and since this is one of the conditions for RT deployment, RT was unavailable. So was autobrake, apparently. Although to my knowledge AB is triggered by the same signal as the Ground Spoilers, its continuing operation may depend on other conditions, which were lost.


GROUND SPOILERS CONTROL
[...]
Extension
- Full extension
The ground spoilers automatically extend [...] at landing, when both main landing gear have touched down, and:
. All thrust levers are set to idle, provided ground spoilers are armed, or
. Reverse is selected on at least two symmetrical engines (reminaing engines at idle).
The spoiler roll function is inhibited when spoilers are used for the ground spoiler function.

[...]

Retraction:

The ground spoilers retract when
- one thrust lever is above idle
- or, all thrust levers are at forward idle and the speedbrakes control lever is pushed down.

[...] after an aircraft bounce (aircraft airborne) if the spoilers are extended:
- They remain extended with thrust lever at idle
[...]


I conclude from this, if it is accurate for the -600 model, that once the ground spoiler extension condition has been satisfied, they stay extended, until the retraction conditions are met, independent of the WoW condition, to avoid spoiler retraction during a bounce.

Conversely, Reverse Thrust actuation depends on continuous aircraft-on-ground-signal from at least one LGCIU, so in its absense, RT will not activate, and a deployed reverser would be stowed.


Bernd

[atakacs]

I conclude from this, if it is accurate for the -600 model, that once the ground spoiler extension condition has been satisfied, they stay extended, until the retraction conditions are met, independent of the WoW condition, to avoid spoiler retraction during a bounce.

Conversely, Reverse Thrust actuation depends on continuous aircraft-on-ground-signal from at least one LGCIU, so in its absense, RT will not activate, and a deployed reverser would be stowed.

In view of the above and the tragic TAM accident I am still believing that a "panic stop" button (or more to the point some sort of procedure to get maximal breaking performance from the automation systems regardless of what they "think" of the pilot intentions or actual plane condition) could be a welcome enhancement.

Granted such a system would generate it's own problems (such as possible unwanted activation) but I can't help but shudder about those AB pilots sitting in front of their glass cockpit and just watching the end of the runaway approaching in panic while desperately trying to obtain some breaking ! In both cases there where "good" reasons for the systems refusing reverser / spoiler / auto break but the lack of manual override is unnerving.

Just my 2c

[CONF iture]

In view of the above and the tragic TAM accident I am still believing that a "panic stop" button ... could be a welcome enhancement

Automatism play tricks on us, I agree ... but the "panic stop" button you mention may well be standard equipment already: TOGA ... especially when Thrust REV did not yet deploy.
It won't end the ride though, but still, a nice alternative.

[atakacs]

Automatism play tricks on us, I agree ... but the "panic stop" button you mention may well be standard equipment already: TOGA ... especially when Thrust REV did not yet deploy.
It won't end the ride though, but still, a nice alternative.

Good point, although in Quito I'm not sure anyone would have wanted to go airborne again... :rolleyes:

[OutOfRunWay]

The whole thing is sadly reminiscent of the Lufty 2904 accident in Warsaw.

They landed in a strong tailwind on a wet runway on one leg. Reverse and Spoiler only became available when the second gear landed, by which time it was too late.. Some sort of manual override would have been helpful here too.

To be sure, the right descision would have been to put the throttles to TOGA.

OORW

[bsieker]

OutOfRunWay,

The accident at Warsaw prompted a design change, namely to deploy spoilers partially with only one MLG on the ground to dump some lift and assist in getting the second MLG down as soon as possible to get Full Ground Spoilers and Reverse Thrust.


Bernd

[Dream Land]

Slight correction. especially when Thrust REV did not yet deploy.
Especially when spoilers do not deploy.

[atakacs]

The accident at Warsaw prompted a design change, namely to deploy spoilers partially with only one MLG on the ground to dump some lift and assist in getting the second MLG down as soon as possible to get Full Ground Spoilers and Reverse Thrust.

Was that a mandatory change or just optional ?

Relevant only to the 320 or all FBW Airbuses ?

[ppppilot]

IMMO the accident begun, when IB decided to disregard the company pilots continuous recommendations to maintain the 343 and not to fly the 346 to Quito. First incident ago/07, 4 right MLG tire burst. More pilot recommendations to the company. The relationship between the company and the pilots was very hard at that moment. The company treated all that recommendations as another pilots stupid demand. Behind the scene; the typical chain of human, environment, mechanical factors and the not so typical Quito :(
Tailwinds

[Chris Scott]

Quote from atakacs:
I am still believing that a "panic stop" button (or more to the point some sort of procedure to get maximal breaking performance from the automation systems regardless of what they "think" of the pilot intentions or actual plane condition) could be a welcome enhancement.
Granted such a system would generate it's own problems (such as possible unwanted activation)…


CONF iture is right to point out that, on touchdown − having belatedly recognised that the “numbers” are not right and knowing LDA to be marginal − a crew should give serious consideration to a go-around. We are speaking in general terms, of course. The pilots may be so shocked by the severity of the impact that they delay the decision. Alternatively, they may rightly decide that the aeroplane is crippled.

So the issue of whether the crew should have the ability to override the automatics with a “panic-stop” button, as atakacs proposes, is a legitimate one. His own misgivings about inappropriate (or even unintentional) deployment are evident, however. The nearest example that comes to mind is that of a VC10 in 1972, in which the (handling) captain’s attempt to perform a go-around was thwarted by the copilot’s selection of spoilers and reverse.

There might be a better solution to the Quito-type gear-damage scenario. On Airbuses, the FACs (Flight Augmentation Computers) already seem to have a good understanding of how the thing flies. [They are capable, for example, of calculating current gross weight in the air.] No conventional aeroplane, I suggest, can maintain 1-G flight at a low airspeed with low alpha (angle of attack).

The combination of the above 3 conditions for more than a moment can only mean one thing: [U]aircraft on the ground.

[Stubenfliege 2]

Hi ya.

For those with spanish knowledge, the equadorian report about the A346 accident is going to be an interesting read:

http://www.dgac.gov.ec/Espa%C3%B1ol/Seguridad%20de%20Vuelos/07%20AIRBUS%20A-340-600%202.pdf

Any english translation of this report known?

Regards,

Christian

[akerosid]

Here's a precis from Aviation Herald:

http://avherald.com/h?article=422bdd7d&opt=0

[atakacs]

The flight data recorder showed, that the airplane was touching down at a calibrated airspeed of 153 knots, an actual ground speed of 188 knots at a vertical speed of more than 1100 feet per minute resulting in a vertical acceleration of 3.09G. The airplane had been doing a 960 feet per minute sinkrate down to about 9700 feet (500 feet AGL) at a calibrated airspeed of 153 knots and 188 knots above ground. Then a pitch down command occured resulting in about 1500 feet per minute sinkrate descending through 400 feet AGL down to 200 feet AGL. At 130 feet AGL the sinkrate had reduced to 992 feet per minute, but increased again.
Now that's a hard landing...
Although I understand that the pilots should have aborted way before I'm not too sure to understand as why they hit so hard ? When you have a 1100 ft/m sinkrate why on earth would you add a pitch down command ?

[barit1]

Upon touch down the spoilers deployed automatically, the tyres 3 and 8 blew, wiring harnesses of both main gear struts broke leaving the engines in approach idle.

This system vulnerability is a weak link in the 340 design, is it not? Further, aren't other aircraft vulnerable? I'd expect the 330 is very similar, maybe many more types.

[Sqwak7700]

Although I understand that the pilots should have aborted way before I'm not too sure to understand as why they hit so hard ? When you have a 1100 ft/m sinkrate why on earth would you add a pitch down command ?

Keep in mind that their GS was about 190kts, so their sink rate to maintain a 3 degree slope is close to 1000fpm. It does not take much to turn 1000fpm into 1100fpm. Especially when you are flying in bad weather in the mountains.

The combination of high elevation and high ground speed means your margin of error is much reduced. And I believe that SEQU's GS does not bring you to the ground, so there you have another threat which contributed.

As far as hitting the ground so hard, you have to take into account inertia. I'm not a bus pilot, but in the 747, when you get close enough to the ground, you run out of room to correct your sink rate. So if you incorrectly push slightly down passing 200' agl to correct for being slightly high, you have pretty much sealed your fate to a hard landing. I suspect the A346 is probably similar in this regard.

This height is also increased if you are flying a steeper than 3 degree slope, which these guys probably were doing. The control inputs this guy used probably worked ok down low, but they didn't up at 9000 feet.

[fermented herring]

maybe this is the magic button people are asking for?

Airbus reveals A380-linked pilot systems secrets (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/06/03/327310/airbus-reveals-a380-linked-pilot-systems-secrets.html)

seems pretty clever to me. Still to see that it does not create new confused situations. Would be interesting to know if it handles the type of approach that was made Quito. I guess it does as the case is known after this W/O...

BR

FH

[atakacs]

Very interesting stuff - I think it should warrant a separate thread

[Doors to Automatic]

Good system under normal ops but it still presumably relies on what the computers are thinking. I think the idea posted earlier about a panic stop button which overrides the computers and throws out everything possible to stop the plane quickly (regardless of which mode the computer thinks it is in) would be a good idea - perhaps and extra button on the Autobrake system marked "EMG".

[iceman50]

:ugh::ugh:

All this talk of "lets have a big panic button that will stop the aircraft no matter what". So what happens when the big button info gets corrupted or someone hits it by mistake?

People - the aircraft had basically "crashed" when it hit the runway! Big panic buttons would not have achieved anything.

[cessnapuppy]

re: your link...

The two fundamental data inputs on which both systems work is the aircraft's constantly updated real-time GPS position, and a terrain database that has precise runway location and dimensions embedded in it, along with full airport details.

Anybody else (other than me) that thinks depending on an outside signal like GPS is a bad idea?

[flyhardmo]

People - the aircraft had basically "crashed" when it hit the runway! Big panic buttons would not have achieved anything.

I agree with iceman. What ever happened to we F#çked up that approach, lets go around and try again. A runway overun is more damaging for your ego than a missed approach :confused:

[HotelT]

Having flown into UIO quite a few times (albeit other Company and Plane-about same size, forgive me if aircraft specifics are misinterpreted), tailwind at UIO35 is not unusual. Besides, the alternative –a circling (actually visual) for 17- was no option due to the weather (vis 3000 meters).

One of the things that might have been considered in the pre-landing phase is the braking action at UIO when experiencing wet runway conditions. (A.o. due to the high GS at UIO) a lot of rubber deposit can be found in the touchdown zone’s; extended touchdown zone’s due to the normal & displaced threshold 35, and the frequently inaccurate touchdown positions (both 17 and 35). When was the last time the RWY was grooved (report does not say)? If not recent the effective braking surface will probably not be very long (a few hundred meters in the middle). Combined with possibly remaining oil deposits on the RWY this can be quite hairy at UIO. Since friction meters in cars are not reliable under these conditions, the only thing you have is pilot reports and experience. Braking action is hardly an exact science, however in this case .. ‘poor’ (mu≈0.2 or lower) is far lower than normal mu≈0.4 (ba=’good’) for ‘normal’ wet runways (as used in the landing distance calculations). Reported ba ‘poor’ might have to generate even greater warning flags with the cockpit crew than it did, especially if you have been there a few times.

The proper -2020 hindsight- alternative for the crew in the pre-landing phase would have been to divert. However, that is not a very popular concept–company, passengers, attendants- if the data indicates a safe landing can be made and pilot reports are often inaccurate. I understand the decision to start the approach for UIO-35.

The UIO ILS/Visual 35 approach itself is challenging, especially with vis 3000 meters. Due to the terrain (hill) in front of the RWY, the GS is (500 meters) displaced leaving insufficient LDA for large aircraft. Therefore a PAPI is placed at the normal landing position, which flightpath you will pick up after passing the hill (with a VOR-QMS conveniently placed on top). With 3000 meters of visibility you will have the Runway on the ILS at approx DA. Normally –in good conditions- you will leave the ILS-GP to intercept the visual GP at or around QMS (about 4-4.5 NM out), now as I understand from the report –due vis- at DA (about 1.6 NM out). This, in order to pick up the PAPI from this position, requires an impressive sinkrate (more than 1500’/min), while being stabilized at 500’ GND has become impossible (more likely at 200’ at the earliest). Quite likely some interesting sinkrate warnings have added to the party. With that one may question this DA for larger aircraft like the A346; fine for the small aircraft, but far too low for these aircraft/procedure. No company advise had apparently been given on this situation.

UIO is famous for its hard landings: high groundspeed; challenging ILS/Visual approach procedure; high elevation (flare slightly higher); and last but not least the upslope of RWY 35. Even in perfect weather conditions a challenge. So, from this fairly unstabilized position in –for this airport- very limited visibilities it is now time to flare. This pilot knew he only had very few (136m as they later determined) meters of ‘extra’ runway on top of the certified touchdown point; not a lot and far less than the normal touchdown-zone. So, he minimized the flare. UIO RWY 35 unfortunately has a significant upslope in the touchdown zone; total upslope of RWY 35 may be limited (0.4%) but due to the “bump” in the runway actual upslope may be as much as 0.8% (if I recall correctly) in the touchdown zone. Add that to the 1100’/min VS (not abnormal for the 3 deg final app itself) upon touchdown, and one might give the A346 a bit of credit for not breaking up altogether. But then again, should an aircraft brake down from a “unflared” landing from a 3 degrees flightpath? Did you never “forget” to flare or flared “too late” (mostly aggravating the situation since the main gear is aft of the CG). I did .. a few times .. fortunately not at UIO (knock on wood).

Normally the bulk of the braking action comes from the wheelbrakes, however with braking action ‘poor’ (contaminated) the speedbrakes/liftdumpers (WOW) and reversers become ever more important. Autobrakes indicated defective upon the hard landing causing wheelbraking to be delayed by 3 seconds and eating up valuable runway before manual braking started (especially at UIO- groundspeeds). Upon landing deployment of the reversers was blocked by computer logic (air-ground sensors); there goes a major portion (up to 30-35%) of your total braking action, especially at high speeds. Add to this not only ground idle forward thrust, but approach idle and your braking action is further reduced. From the moment these systems failed this aircraft was doomed. Why did these systems fail; what happens with an RTO due to a tire failure during take off? Airbus computers help right upto the point that you really need them? Food for thought.

Yes, a lousy landing, but that's about it.

My two pennies worth...

[RoyHudd]

Sorry, incomprehensible to me. (Granted I am a bit thick). I do fly 330's despite that.

Can you re-word your report for idiots?

[HotelT]

I will try again on the important issues ... forgive me for not being fluent in English

1. Wet RWY is often extremely slippery at UIO, worse than the Landing distance calculations assume (mu-story), due heavy and extensive rubber deposits (often in combination with oil after a period of dry weather). Some companies have refused to fly into UIO unless the RWY was going to be grooved (after experiencing a few scary moments; it is no pleasure having your cockpit hanging over the end lights after landing). When was the last time the RWY was grooved (report does not say)? Was a “slippery when wet” NOTAM issued/warranted (and what is the company advise i.c.o.)? IMHO normal calculations for wet runways at UIO tend to be overly optimistic and incorrectly pretend it is an exact science (hence the “136 meters” in the report); it is not.

2. The published Decision Altitude is not realistic for aircraft like the A346; due to the construction of the approach (forced and necessary “duck under” to pick up the PAPI due to the displaced glide slope antenna – see approach plate) it is practically impossible to arrive over the threshold in a stabilized way from your DA. The captain managed -where many would probably have not– however resulting in an unstabilized approach. Why does the state allow unrealistic minima for Cat-C/D aircraft; why did the company not impose higher limits or at least put out a warning (even after several warnings of its crews, other companies did). The crew may be to blame, but where do other parties fit in?

3. Although the aircraft landed hard and some tires did burst, the aircraft was basically still intact. The problem was that the air-ground logic malfunctioned and from that moment on the airplane was going to crash – no escape possible. Approach (!) idle forward thrust i.s.o. reverse thrust (could not get it into reverse due failed air-ground logic) does not help the already poor braking action of the wheelbrakes (incl. the burst tires). Basically the increased forward thrust negated most of the braking of the wheels. Failure of the air-ground logic was a major contributing factor to the crash. Why does air-ground logic fail after a hard landing/tire burst? Should this not have been designed with a backup mode? What in case of an RTO due to a tire failure? Airbus/Certification authorities?

4. Only after 3 seconds the crew started manual braking, traveling over 300 meters before any braking occurred. Assuming the hard landing “warranted” an autobrake failure, how many seconds does it take for the crew to react? I don’t think 3 seconds is very long (especially after a hard landing in the given conditions), but where does it fit into your calculations? I have seen autobrakes fail upon touchdown for far less a reason, but is using a –potentially failing- autobrake system in such a critical situation the best option (given the extra time and landing distance i.c.o. failure)? Should extra time be added for using the autobrake system: for the failure to be displayed, for the crew to recognize this failure and for the crew to react (a bit like the V1-RTO times). 136 meters gives you only 1.3 seconds, not 3 seconds; 1.3 seconds is probably not even enough for the warning to appear. Certification authorities, (company) safety margins?

The report does not address these (political/sensitive) issues.

Hope I made myself clearer.