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Edmund Spencer
27th Oct 2007, 01:46
I am researching an action that took place on 24 May 1982. Two sea harriers intercepted 'ORO', a section of three daggers, north of Pebble Island late in the forenoon. The lead sea harrier shot down two of the daggers over the sea on an easterly heading. These were believed to be C-419 and C-410. The third and lead dagger , C-430, turned hard right and was hit by a sidewinder from the second sea harrier as he passed about south. His aircraft was observed impacting the high ground south of Pebble Island.
I have read various contradictory accounts of who was in which aircraft and several contributors to the internet have claimed sighting the wreckage of C-410 onshore.
Would anyone who has spent time in the Falklands and who might have visited any of the crash sites care to shed any light?
Many thanks
ES

Mark Nine
27th Oct 2007, 11:47
There was an interesting article in 'Flypast' magazine about the Falklands war crash sites a few months back.

TEEEJ
27th Oct 2007, 12:59
You've probably seen this version from the Argentine Air Force website?

http://www.fuerzaaerea.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/may24.html

'Tres M-5 Dagger, indicativo "Oro", armados con dos bombas retardadas por paracaídas. Tripulación: Capitán Raúl Díaz (C-419), Mayor Luis Puga (C-410) y Teniente Carlos Castillo (C-430). Despegaron de San Julián a las 10:24 hs.'

http://www.fuerzaaerea.mil.ar/index_win.html

I can't imagine them mixing up the pilots and airframes. I was always under the impression that it was Dagger serial C-410. The above info would make it C-430.

I was in the Falklands during 1998 when the nose section of an IAI Dagger was found. It was found if I remember correctly near First Mount, Elephant Bay. The wreckage was discovered by chance by a hotelier who was out walking in the hills. It appeared to be the nose section as the remains of Lt. Carlos Castillo were found. I have no idea if the wreckage was left intact or removed. Possibly the Falkland Islands Museum might be able to assist?

Quoting from the 1986 "Falklands: The Air War":

"Both of Auld's Daggers fell into the sea north of Pebble Island, while
Smith's impacted on the western edge of Elephant Bay on the slopes of
First Mount. . . Castillo therefore appears to have been the been the
pilot killed in the First Mount wreck."

And in the individual a/c histories:

"C-410 . . . Brought down over Pebble Island . . . . Teniente Castillo
was killed in the explosion. The wreck site has not been positively
identified but may be that found in the First Mount area (UD 170160)."

I remember reading in the RAF News an article on the funeral service of Lt. Castillo. An article appeared in a UK aviation magazine which, if I remember correctly, had details of the 'kill' markings found on the nose section from when it was last in Israeli service and an Israeli call sign plate found in the
cockpit from when the aircraft was an IAI Nesher.

I no longer have the magazine, but the call-sign plate could assist the match up between the Nesher serial and subsequent Dagger serial?

I think that the aviation magazine was Aviation News/Air Pictorial?

http://www.payhost.net/aviation/acatalog/Air_Pictorial.html

Shackman
27th Oct 2007, 13:06
There was certainly a Dagger on the ground to theSouth of Pebble Island and to the North West of Port Howard immediately after the war as we used to fly over it quite a lot (if/when I find my map of the time I might be able to give you a better position). However, I don't know how many were shot down overland during the conflict, so this could have one of any of them. It may also have been this one that was 'relieved' of it's tail and a few other bits by the guys and ended up in 18 Sqn crewroom.

TEEEJ
27th Oct 2007, 13:26
http://www.clarin.com/diario/1998/09/01/t-01401d.htm

A very quick on-line translation

'16 YEARS DESPUES: IT WAS DEMOLISHED DURING THE 1982 WAR
They will analyze in London the DNA of the pilot found in the Falklands

The lieutenant governor of the islands confirmed
The results will take several weeks
The Chancellery waits for the British report
And the mother of the probable pilot requests that the rest are brought to the continent.

ANA GERSCHENSO
The lieutenant governor of the islands the Falklands, Andrew Gurr, advanced to Bugler that just in several weeks will be able to settle down the identity of the rest found in an Argentine airplane that it fell in the Borbón island during the war of the Falklands. When it is verified tomorrow - between today and that the found rest are human, tests will be sent to London to make the DNA analyses, that allow to identify the body, said Gurr.En Buenos Aires, nevertheless, the spokesman of the British Embassy took care to keep plus the diplomatic forms of the case. Once we have the certainty that the rest are human we will inform to him immediately to the Argentine Chancellery, to know what we will do of there in ahead, said funcionario.Gurr, in charge of the government before the absence of its holder, Richard Ralph, added that according to the first examination that made the Police in the place, the found parts would belong to a Dagger airplane. The 24 of May of 1982, three Dagger airplanes were demolished by two Harrier in the Borbón island. Two of the pilots survived, but third, the first lieutenant Carlos Castle, to desapareció.Ayer, an equipment of investigation to the control of the malvinense inspector, Jonnathan Butler, returned to rise a small plane in Argentine Port to later land twenty minutes in the island Borbón, a zone descampada with a surface composed by crowd, stones and water. The group, next to officials of the court of the magistrate Keith Watson, in charge of the cause that was opened as soon as the airplane by kelper was found that it walked by the place, it was all the day taking samples from the rest and examined the ship to determine fehacientemente that is a Dagger.Los results on if the rest they are or nonhuman they are known between last morning and (for today and tomorrow), confirmed Gurr to Bugler, and confessed that to this height the data is almost one certeza.La Chancellery and the Air Force emitted two official notices of press yesterday to emphasize that they will only give official information when they conclude the investigations in Port Argentinean. The official notice of the Palace San MartÃ*n reveals that it is in contact with the enemy with the British Embassy and the General staff of the Air Force to the effects to obtain greater precisions than allows to identify the airship and therefore to that outside his pilot, so that into that way it is possible to be informed to familiares.En the Olive town, in Cordova, the family of the first lieutenant Castle waits for with anxiety the moment for counting on greater certezas.Onelia Guebel de Castillo, mother of the hero of the Falklands, said yesterday to this newspaper which if the British and Argentine suspicions are verified, for me he means that my son has died hoy.Onelia Guebel demanded the rest of the aviator, who in 1982 was 25 years old. To my son I want it in the continent with me. That me they bring it, as is, but I want it here, requested the woman of 68 años.Onelia tells that in one of the letters that to him his son wrote from the base of Port San Julian, in the province of Santa Cruz, said to him that if demolished it it were not going to leave the airplane by anything of the world. Then the greater Luis Pugas, than flew on a par of the Dagger de Castillo, confirmed that he saw when a missile demolished the apparatus and that the pilot could not eyectarse.En the entrance of the Olive town see two airplane wings, a monument to the aviator who was born in those calles.Desde that I listened to the first news on the finding of an Argentine pilot in the Falklands I thought that he was my son; all the information agrees with which we knew on him, her mother says to Onelia.Para, Carlos Castle was enamoring with the air, of the airplanes, but almost at the end of his studies in the Military aviation school, in Cordova, she was on the verge of letting study from fear of not being able to make specific his dream. It said to me, if in the last medical examination says to me that I have some problem and I cannot be pilot, I die, remembered Onelia.Y continued emocionada:Yo responded to him since we always make the mothers: Estudiá, tenés that to have a title, later is important. And he insisted, I am pilot or nothing, recuerda.En times of peace was in Tandil, seat of the Sixth Aerial Brigade. There they saw for the last time its parents it, in February of 1982. It waited for civilian dress while their companions shone the uniform. It always said us that inside of the base she was military man and outside Carlitos, evoca.Antes of which the squadron Gold was transferred to the south called by telephone to Olive. It spoke with all we, as if outside a goodbye; and it said to us: If anybody does not help us, they go to us to pulverizar.ENTREVISTA: FABIAN GARCIA. (Cordova Agency) '

TEEEJ
27th Oct 2007, 13:38
There is also this model article. It give completely contradictory info on pilots and serials, but has an image of a Dagger wreck. Possibly 430? I can't quite make out the serial. There is a contact e-mail at the bottom.

http://hsfeatures.com/features04/daggerpb_1.htm

TorqueOfTheDevil
27th Oct 2007, 14:32
The book 'Airloss', by Fred Clark, has the following details:

Dagger C410, shot down at 1500 by Sea Harrier ZA193, 1 fatality, wreckage on 1st Mt Pebble

Dagger C419, 1415, by XZ457, no fatality, aircraft in sea

Dagger C430, exactly as C419.

No details of who was flying the aircraft though.

TEEEJ
27th Oct 2007, 18:20
Pebble Island Lodge has the following. It might be a lead for the positive identification of the Dagger wreckage?

http://www.pebblelodge.com/history.htm

'Argentine aircraft: North-east of First Mountain there are two crash sites with the scattered wreckage of Argentine Daggers. These multi-role fighter/bombers were both shot down by Royal Navy Sea Harriers in May 1982. Further to the west near Marble Mountain, a memorial commemorates 5 Argentine airmen whose Learjet crashed in the area after it was shot down by H.M.S. Exeter on 7 June 1982.'

http://www.pebblelodge.com/contact.htm

Edmund Spencer
28th Oct 2007, 04:19
A million thanks for all your replies.
I was in the second sea harrier in this action.
The account of Capt Diaz who was leading the group of three daggers indicates that Castillo was on his left in C-419 and Puga on his right in C-410. Puga Shouts a warning that Castillo has been hit by a missile which Diaz initially does not understand. Diaz subsequently looks to his right and sees a second missile about to hit Puga. He transmits a warning to eject but he witnesses a massive explosion destroying Puga's plane. These were the two AIM9L's fired by Andy Auld in the lead sea harrier. Diaz, in C-430, then goes into a hard right break clearing his wing in the process. This is what I witnessed as I locked on to him with one of my missiles. I then fired and the AIM9 flew straight across the turn and hit him at about the ninety. I saw the plane impact the ground to the south of Pebble Island and, what I thought, was an unsuccessful ejection attempt.
As he has written the story it looks like me made it OK.
The confusion lies in who was in which aircraft.
ES

TEEEJ
28th Oct 2007, 08:13
I've posted on the forum at

http://www.acig.org/

Hopefully a positive tie-up can be made between Dagger serials and pilots?

So far I've had no luck on the track down of the Air Pictorial/Aviation news article on another forum of Lt. Castillo's wreck.

danieloakworth
28th Oct 2007, 20:30
Visited this crash site a few years ago, the one interesting fact was that we found the wing section which was not carrying pukka Argentinian Air Force markings, the argentinian flag had been painted over the top of a thin layer of whitewash. Beneath the whitewash were IAF markings.

TEEEJ
29th Oct 2007, 00:04
I wonder if the 'white' is what happened to the paint applied on the 24th May due to fading over the years?

Apparently the yellow ID markings were covered over with light blue paint?

http://hsfeatures.com/features04/daggerpb_1.htm

C-430 on the 24th with yellow markings covered over

http://hsfeatures.com/features04/images/daggerpc_c_430.jpg

'During the early hours of the 24th the maintenance crews had to travel to the town to get green paint to cover the ineffective yellow bands with green paint. The only one they found available was light blue. They found that the surface of the planes was covered in frozen mist, so they had to remove the ice first with newspaper and then apply the coats of paint. This process gave origin to the well-known turquoise color of the A-4Cs and the Daggers of “La Marinete”. It can be seen in the picture, taken shortly before C-430’s last mission, that there is some yellow showing through.'

I'm still trying to track down the magazine. I remember there was some Israeli kill markings showing Arab air force roundels around the cockpit. These marking were showing through as the paint had weathered.

danieloakworth
29th Oct 2007, 10:36
Possibly, I've got a photo somewhere, I'll see if I can find it and scan it in.

Edmund Spencer
22nd Dec 2007, 01:09
I have now received several messages from Colonel Raul Diaz and have, more or less, figured out what happened.
Diaz was leading 'Oro' formation with #3 (Puga) on his right and #2 (Castillo) on his left. Puga shouts that number 3 has been hit by a missile (himself?) He actually means #2! This is why Diaz looks and turns to his right and sees a missile about to hit #3. He shouts to him to eject but the missile hits a moment later. These were the two AIM9L's fired by Andy Auld. Both these Daggers crashed into the sea. Castillo was killed and Puga spent some five hours swimming but eventually made it ashore and survived. Meanwhile Diaz continues his hard turn to the right and is hit by my missile as he is passing south. He ejects at the last minute and his aircraft crashes on land south of Pebble Island. Despite being badly injured in the ejection he is subsequently rescued and survives the war.
I probably contributed to the confusion as I reported I had hit "number 3", when in fact I had actually hit "the third Dagger". History then went on to record that I had hit 'Oro3' which was also incorrect!
Many thanks again for the replies and information. If anyone has any photos of the wreck sites I would be very interested to see them.
ES

Paracab
22nd Dec 2007, 01:41
Edmund,
This thread is a little prune gem, I hope it stays at the top. Thanks for sharing the accounts of what happened.

TEEEJ
22nd Dec 2007, 11:41
ES,

Many thanks for posting an update. I've sent you a PM.

I've had no luck with tracking down the magazine showing an image of the Dagger nose section found in 1998. Lt. Castillo's remains were found in the nose section. I'll check out the aerojumbles/stalls at some of the airshows next year.

Regards

TJ

Edmund Spencer
22nd Dec 2007, 12:15
Thanks for this T.
Interestingly, I have evidence that it was not in fact Lt Castillo who was found but someone from a previous raid. I will check my my facts and post the story as soon as I have got it all together.
ES

danieloakworth
22nd Dec 2007, 13:21
ES, we've spoken I will get the photo scanned this afternoon. Without going into gory details, I stayed with a local who claimed that the body of one of the pilots was in wreckage on Pebble Island.

TEEEJ
22nd Dec 2007, 14:51
ES,
No probs. I did a further search on the web. The remains were initially thought to be of Lieutenant Castillo, but were later found to be of Lieutenant Hector Ricardo Volponi who was flying Dagger C-437.

http://www.escolar.com/NewsArchives/11/11d/archivo-j1681_esen.shtml

Navaleye
23rd Dec 2007, 00:26
ES,

Could you tell us something about your second (Skyhawk) kill on 8th June please? The books that I have lack detail, other than recording the event. I'm sure we'd all appreciate it if you could fill in the blanks.

Cheers,

Navaleye

Navaleye
23rd Dec 2007, 00:43
The story of the 2 Skyhawks that went missing on May 9 is equally as interesting. HMS Coventry reporting engaging 2 A4s escorting a C-130 on a supply mission in to Port Stanley. Coventry engaged at 38 miles with Sea Dart but claimed no kills at the time. Later two A4s were claimed, however the Argentines claimed they flew into cliffs on South Jason island in bad weather. Do the wreck site visits substantiate any of these claims?

Edmund Spencer
24th Dec 2007, 04:20
Goodness me, Naval, it is a rather long story but, at the risk of being 'moderated', here goes.
8 June 1982
Dave Morgan and I were launching from HMS Hermes on the first of our 'duskers' sorties to carry out a CAP south west of Stanley in the immediate overhead of HMS Galahad. I can't remember the actual figures but I think the transit was about 200 miles and the CAP was initially at 10,000 feet. Galahad had been hit by bombs earlier and I remember a thick cloud of black smoke pouring out of her and the aft end literally glowing red with the intensity of the fires below decks. We were right at the end of our time on task and about to depart back to Hermes when Dave spots four aircraft below. His actual words were something like "F..k me Dave! Four mirages! Follow me down!" (Subsequently turned out to be A4's.) We were 180 degrees out in a turn at the time and he promptly disappeared from sight into the gathering gloom. I rolled and pulled and went for the deck at full power calling Dave for the attack heading. He came back with something like "240" and I pulled out at about 150 feet doing just over 600 knots heading south west. I still couldn't see anything but a few seconds later Dave opened up in quick succession with both his sidewinders. I saw these missiles hit the back two A4's and thereby got visual with Dave. One of the A4 pilots had ejected and I very nearly picked him up on my wing in his parachute! Dave was then closing the third A4 and opened up with his cannons. From the bullet splashes on the water I finally got a 'tally' on the target and as Dave pulled off and out of the picture I got a good IR lock from one of my AIM 9L's. I reckoned I was at about 50 feet at this stage still doing about 615 knots and I still couldn't put the A4 on the horizon so he must have been quite low. The range looked a bit excessive and I remember hesitating for a second or two trying to assess whether it was worth taking the shot. At that very moment Sharkey Ward comes on the radio and says "OK, we are coming in from the south and taking over!" or words to that effect. This caused me to completely loose the bubble! Although I had seen Dave shoot at this target I hadn't positively identified it and I had an instant of pure panic as I questioned if it was actually Sharkey or Steve Thomas I had in my sights. Well, I fired anyway and this prompted "Who fired that shot?" from Sharkey and for a ghastly moment I thought I had shot at Steve. Then Steve came back with "It wasn't me, Boss" and I heaved a sigh of relief. The missile tracked the A4 and then seemed to flame out. I was fairly certain it wouldn't hit but then at the very end of its trajectory it detonated and destroyed the target.
As an interesting aside this action left us both very short of fuel and a recovery to the ship which was quite a bit later than the planned duskers! I don't even want to contemplate what I shut down with but I remember the flashing bingo lights from a very long way out from landing!
ES

Edmund Spencer
23rd Feb 2008, 18:23
As a post script I have been contacted by Allan of the Pebble Island Lodge in the Falklands and Capt (now Colonel) Diaz's parachute has been found in a nearby house.
He has sent me several photos and I vividly remember the orange of the chute and wondering why it had no camouflage panels like ours.
For 25 years I thought his parachute only just cleared the cockpit without deploying.
Photos available when I can figure how to upload
ES

Archimedes
23rd Feb 2008, 22:02
Edmund,

To post a photo:

First you need to have the photo hosted online - photobucket (www.photobucket.com) is where I keep my few.

Then, when posting the photo here:

In the message composition window, click on the second icon in from the right (next to the speech bubble)

A pop-up window then appears here asking you to enter the location of your image.

To prepare for this, you will have see on your photobucket page a box saying 'direct link'. You'll have copied that link, and you then paste it into the pop up window (taking care not to duplicate the 'http' that's already there, and ensuring that '' and [\IMG] don't appear at the start and end (if you've copied the direct link, you won't get this).

Once done, press 'OK'.

So, I have an image at http://img.photobucket...11-03067b.jpg (I've cropped this to fit this window, so you won't be able to link to it).

To post it, I click on the image icon and the box opens.

Now, I paste the URL in to the box, and....


[IMG]http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v443/Terrier24/DigiCamera1VC1012-11-03067b.jpg

sargs
24th Feb 2008, 16:53
Navaleye

I can't really comment on the events of 9th May 1982, I'm not a historian. What I can say, however, is having been to South Jason on several occasions, the Skyhawk wreckage is spread over a large distance on the north face of the island, consistent with a high speed CFIT. If you take that fact, coupled with the island's position and orientation, it would seem to me that the Argentine view would make most sense.

Edmund Spencer
13th Apr 2008, 00:43
I hope I am not overworking this subject.
Some very interesting feed back is coming back from my Argentinean Air Force contacts. I don't think these people have an axe to grind and, indeed, I think they flew an incredibly courageous war.
I believe the first true air to air combat with an absolutely classic "Eyeball - Hook" manoeuver was carried out by Steve Thomas and Paul Barton of 801 NAS on 1st May 1982. Paul confirmed a Fox 2 and although, Steve fired in range, his target disappeared into cloud before he could confirm the kill.
History records that the Mirage was so badly damaged by the missile hit that it had to attempt an emergency landing at Stanley Airport and was subsequently shot down by triple A from his own side.
The Argentinean version, according to ATC transcripts and other pilots who were airborne at the time, is that the Mirage was in perfectly OK shape but had run short of fuel by using A/B in the combat. The pilot had announced that he was completely airworthy but short of fuel to get back to the mainland. He considered an approach to Stanley a better option than ejecting and losing the valuable asset.
I have no idea of the landing performance of the Mirage but I did once have the pleasure of flying in the back of a Saab Viggen (Excuse spelling). The pilot demonstrated and incredibly short landing using the power against drag of a delta wing so I can believe this was serious possibility.
As we know the poor fellow was shot down by his own side and didn't survive.
I am wondering if anybody who has served in the Falklands subsequently can give me any information on this particular crash site. It would be very interesting to see if the aircraft actually had sidewinder damage. (I understand from the analysis of the A4 I shot down on 8 June, it is quite unequivocal.)
On the same day there are some substantial differences about how the combat between Martin Hale and Tony Penfold went down against Ardiles.
I will post the details of this later.
Also under investigation some very interesting different views of the Sharkey Ward and Steve Thomas attack on three Daggers on 21 may. No doubt about the result but some very different opinions from Sharkey's book about how it really happened.
ES
(Stay Tuned)

Dan Winterland
13th Apr 2008, 05:43
Does Sharkey have some opinions? I hadn't noticed ;)

TEEEJ
13th Apr 2008, 09:18
Footage exists of the attempted forced landing by Captain Cuerva at Stanley. It was filmed from a distance by an Argentine camera crew and used in various TV programmes about the conflict. The Mirage appeared to cartwheel as it impacted the ground.

A Falkland Islander was taken to the wreckage by an Argentine officer. The Argentine officer was adamant that they had just shot down a Harrier and was keen to prove it. He relented when he himself witnessed the Argentine Flag on the fin. It was recounted in his small booklet that he wrote and locally published on the Islands. For the life of me I can't remember his name, but I remember reading it when on detachment down there. It was a small reference booklet about the air losses on both sides.

TJ

Edmund Spencer
13th Apr 2008, 10:40
Thanks, Teeej.
Any idea where the crash site was?
ES

TEEEJ
13th Apr 2008, 15:13
Thanks, Teeej.
Any idea where the crash site was?
ES

No probs. Sorry, I don't have an exact location. The footage was shown on the History Channel quite recently. I'll see if I can find it on You Tube. I remember the sea being visible.

Regards

TJ

sandiego89
14th Apr 2008, 17:35
Great thread ES. Very interesting and looking forward to your updates.

Fugazi1000
14th Apr 2008, 18:10
I concur. An absolutely fascinating thread with unique insight. Most definitely not overworked. :ok:

klubman
17th Apr 2008, 10:32
TEEJ

The booklet you refer to is;

Falklands Conflict 1982
Airloss
by Fred Clark

It was designed and printed at the Flakland Islands Government Printing Office, Copy right 2001, Fred Clark

Hope this helps.

I bought my copy (for £3) in the NAAFI shop (during my time on TriShaws, having previously been on 1312 Flt many moons ago). It may still be available.

TEEEJ
17th Apr 2008, 10:41
Klubman,

That's the one! Thanks!

Cheers

TJ

Edmund Spencer
15th Nov 2008, 04:10
Some interesting stuff.
Apparently, Cuerva was in deep wing rock as he flew directly over Stanley town heading east. He turned to the right, I guess to position for a left circuit to land on the westerly runway and was then shot at by every gun available. He fired a prolonged burst of cannon shortly after being shot at. Stanley residents picked up the cannon cases from their gardens!
He and his aircraft crashed in the middle of a minefield south of the airstrip.
It sounds to me he was only just in control and that Steve's missile had done him some damage.
Can anyone add any information?
ES

The Claw
16th Nov 2008, 13:56
As far as I understand it, although Garcia Cuerva tried to avoid the missile, the missile exploded close to the rear, rupturing the fuel tanks and damaging the control runs. The TPS-43F radar guys told him to eject but he chose to head for Stanley even though they had been under attack. The Command Post was notified of his intentions but failed to advise the AA guys in time. Garcia then jettisoned his missiles and there after was shot down by the AA guys who believed that they were being attacked.

Al R
16th Nov 2008, 14:08
The air war. [Archive] - WW2inColor Forum (http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-4177.html)

ScottishCop
16th Nov 2008, 18:19
What a fantastic thread! Enjoyed your posts Mr Spencer!:ok:

barit1
16th Nov 2008, 18:37
I have no idea of the landing performance of the Mirage but I did once have the pleasure of flying in the back of a Saab Viggen (Excuse spelling). The pilot demonstrated and incredibly short landing using the power against drag of a delta wing so I can believe this was serious possibility.


The Viggen has some unconvention help (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fye_2AipFTA)for short landings!

MrBernoulli
16th Nov 2008, 19:42
As I recall from my various detachments in MPA, both the Herc and VC10 Navs had topo maps of the islands that showed the known outlying aircraft wreck positions. These maps were updated (renewed) occasionally, with the details being transferred to the new map. At the end of a det the map was passed to the incoming crew. Came in very useful for a bit of aerial sightseeing, and I distinctly recall seeing an isolated Pucara wreck in the south-west of East Falkland, as well as a Dagger on West Falkland. Both airframes very faded but recognisable as their respective types.

I wonder if any of said navs could get the wreck site details off the charts, and pass to those who are interested?

TEEEJ
16th Nov 2008, 22:32
Hi Edmund,
I still haven't found that footage of the Mirage crashing. Further to The Claw's post of radar ops. The following thread has one of the Argentine radar ops as a poster. He also has access to a small group of Argentine veterans who are researching the conflict. It might give further info as to the radio conversation that took place between Garcia Cuerva and Argentine controllers?

Falklands "What if...?" - Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums (http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=81971)

Edmund Spencer
17th Nov 2008, 10:47
Teeej
As usual your research is amazing. Thank you and well done.
Mr Bernoulli, thank you for a very interesting source. Any chance we can develop this and get a copy of the map?
I am currently looking at some very interesting stuff provided by Donadille who led the three Daggers against Steve Thomas and Sharky Ward on 21st May 1982.
All three Argentinean pilots survived this one and we have some absolutely amazingly different accounts about what actually happened.
The main stories are from Steve, Donadille and Sharkey.
I have spoken with Steve Thomas recently about this and it is hard to reconcile with Sharkey's book.
We all see air combat from our own little world and, let's face it, how many times has the biggest bul****ter won the fight! - In the debrief (At least until we went to the American ACMR's)
For those of you who have read Sharkey's book, consider this:
They are both on a parallel track heading west. Steve is to the north and Sharkey to the south.
They initiate a parallel turn to the right. Half way through the turn passing approximately north Steve inverts (this was his habit) and sees two Daggers in quite close formation passing under him.
I have yet to get from Steve what he said to Sharkey but I do know he aggressively turned on these two guys (Donadille and Senn) and shot them down in quick sequence. This sequence is exactly mirrored by Donadille. Sharkey subsequently shot down Piuma, who for some reason had neatly presented himself directly in front of him.
None of us can figure out what happened with Piuma. He ran in initially to the north of the formation but was eventually shot by Sharkey heading from the south to north east??
If we look at Steve's and Donadille's account there is something badly flawed about Sharkey's

Thoughts from the forum?
ES

skydiver69
17th Nov 2008, 20:55
I used to work with a guy called Geoff Fish who was a helicopter pilot during the war. He used to recount a tale of a mechanical failure which lead to his helicopter crash landing in a pond. I've tried googling this in order to find out more info but I drew a blank so can anyone on PPRuNe add any details?

TEEEJ
17th Nov 2008, 21:36
Edmund,
No problem. Hopefully the contacts will be able to add to the events surrounding Garcia and his Mirage?

reydelcastillo
22nd Nov 2008, 19:44
Good Morning Sir , let me introduce myself , Enrique Rey del Castillo , Retired as Captain - Long Range Radar operator during the Falklands Conflict in the Islands -
I do need to apolagise because my english is not as good as it should be -

Thank you and Regards Enrique

In the islands two long range radars

One from Air Force Westinghouse ANTPS 43 3D 220 NM range

One from Army Cardion ANTPS 44 2D 200 NM range

I was the operator for the one in the army

Al R
22nd Nov 2008, 20:12
Enrique

Your English is better than my Argentinian - welcome, bueno verle.

reydelcastillo
22nd Nov 2008, 20:25
Thank you Sir

TEEEJ
22nd Nov 2008, 21:06
Welcome Enrique!

Regards

TJ

reydelcastillo
22nd Nov 2008, 21:11
Thank you Sir

I was suggested by Mr Tommy Joe from Military Photos Forum to come into this Forum -

Thank you for your welcome

Regards Enrique

reydelcastillo
22nd Nov 2008, 21:37
Good Afternoon Sir Mr Tommy Joe from Military Photos told me that you were in search of info regarding Captain Garcia Cuerva -

I will request all the info prior to him been shot down by us to the Argie Forum and bring it to you -

On that afternoon thge Air Force Radra was in contact with Garcia Cuerva , he reported low fuel and that he was coming into the Airport , Mayor Silva from the Air Force was talking to him , instructed garcia cuerva to eject , Garcia Cuerva states that his plane is in good shape that he was confident it will land - After some back and forward with this and not been able to convince Gracia Cuerva to eject , Mayor Silva from Air Force Rdara lets CIC /PCDA ( Air Post Command in the islands ) that the plane is coming in - At that moment CIC/PCDA lets me know about this ( Army Long Range Radar ) and lets the Triple A units know about it -
At that moment in time we were under Red Alert with Reds incoming , Silva instrcts Garcia Cuerva to use the corridor in use for Helos - He comes in low , 180 Knts and what we think he did was either let go external tanks or shoots its missils wich for triple A even though had been told about this plane they take it as Red and not Blue -
He comes in north off Sapper Hill , unloads either external tanks or missils , missinterpretd by our Tripple A , shot by 35 mm , impacts hit belly of the plane , plane makes right turn heading south , still in comunication with Silva to whom heis last words were " They are shooting me " Plane looses altitude , doen not explote in the air , impacts right were land meets sea line - General location would be due south of Port Stanley right by the SEa Line ( were sea meets land )

Regarding what Garcia Cuerva encounter while in the air or which Royal Air Force Plane fought with him , I don't know let me ask in the Argie Forun =

Regardes Enrique Rey

Edmund Spencer
22nd Nov 2008, 23:22
A million thanks for your contribution, Enrique. It is fascinating to hear the Argentinean side of this.
I am travelling at the moment but will have much more to ask you when I get my feet back on the ground.
A warm welcome to the forum.
ES

reydelcastillo
22nd Nov 2008, 23:48
Thank you Sir for your welcome -

Regards Enrique

jualbo
24th Nov 2008, 19:05
Hi everybody. It´s my first message. I knew about you thanks to Enrique. I´m very pleased to meet you and hope to be useful in all questions you are writing.

I would like to make a question about something of 24th may downings. In some texts I could read about a fourth Dagger that scaped from Sea Harriers. Did it really exist? "Oro" flight was only three planes. But just this zone (Pebble island), was selected for a Dagger from "Plata" flight to return home after attacking in San Carlos Bay. "Plata" took off from San Julian just before "Oro" and was entering San Carlos entrance when listened by radio the interception by Sea Harrier of their fellows. According to 1st Lt Callejo, just after this he dropped his bombs over orange fuel tanks in land in the north shore of San Carlos Bay and then turned left to look for cape Dolphin. After finding it, followed his turning left towards west. Just close to finish his cross over Falklands sound, saw a frigate on his right, just north east of Pebble island (The SAM trap I think- Broadsword+Coventry). A missile was fired against him who faced the threat turning right (toward the missile) and jettisoning his fuel tanks (in fact one of them didn´t drop). After avoiding the missile, changed his turn to look for land, flying supersonically. He followed his way towards west overflying Pebble and the rest of islands north of West Falkland until he passed them where he slowed and raised the plane in order to save fuel to get home. He didn´t saw any Sea Harrier but think could be the fourth one.

Regards from Spain

MAINJAFAD
24th Nov 2008, 19:34
As I recall from my various detachments in MPA, both the Herc and VC10 Navs had topo maps of the islands that showed the known outlying aircraft wreck positions. These maps were updated (renewed) occasionally, with the details being transferred to the new map. At the end of a det the map was passed to the incoming crew. Came in very useful for a bit of aerial sightseeing, and I distinctly recall seeing an isolated Pucara wreck in the south-west of East Falkland, as well as a Dagger on West Falkland. Both airframes very faded but recognisable as their respective types.

I wonder if any of said navs could get the wreck site details off the charts, and pass to those who are interested?

Pucara wreck is that of Major Tomba shot was shot down by Lt Cdr Ward on 21st May 82 south of Goose Green. (Saw it myself in 89, that what happens when you end up on the same heilcopter as AVM Eng and Supply and your trip from one of the West Falkland radar sites to MPA turns into a battlefield tour, with a landing behind Government house at Stanley to boot, pity I had no film in the camera at the time)

The book 'Falklands, The Air War' written in 1986 has the UTM grid refs of all of the known wrecks at the time for all of the known losses including if memory serves the ones on the Jasons. Unfortunately, I lent my copy to a Falklands vet a while back, hence I can not put a list up of the known wrecks.

Edmund Spencer
25th Nov 2008, 06:57
Jualbo,
Very many thanks for your contribution. This clears up a mystery for me.
Here is what happened:
Andy Auld and I were on CAP to the north of the Falkland Sound under the control of HMS Coventry and HMS Broadsword. We had literally just arrived on task from HMS Hermes so were quite well off for fuel (Relatively speaking!)
HMS Coventry and HMS Broadsword were were just north of Cape Dolphin.
A few minutes after arriving on station the controller announced that the force had gone "Air Raid Warning Red" and to stand by. Several seconds later orders to vector west at full speed to intercept inbound targets, strength unknown but believed to be three or four.
We increased speed to about 540 knots and dropped down to 200 feet over the sea heading approximately 270 degrees. The controller was giving us 'Bravo' control which is essentially range and bearing of the target and it was up to us to sort the geometry out and self position for the intercept.
At about 50 miles contact was lost by one or other of the ships but we kept heading and speed on the off chance of making an autonomous pick up. As it happened, contact was regained at about 40 miles and the B control continued. Andy led the left turn for the intercept and called 'Tally' at about five miles. I was in a fighting wing on his starboard echelon. He fired first at the left hand Mirage flown by Lt Castillo. This was Oro 2 in a formation of three Mirage V's. He then quickly shifted aim and release his second missile at Oro 3 flown my Major Puga. The leader, Captain Raul Diaz then went into a hard right turn, clearing his wing in the process, and was hit by my missile as he was turning through about south.
Now this is where the confusion arose. I was visually tracking him as his burning aircraft descended towards the high ground south of Pebble Island and wondering why he hadn't ejected. Moments before the impact several things happened. I saw the ejection sequence begin with the bullet pulling an orange parachute out of his cockpit. I heard the emergency beacon on 243 MHz. At the same moment a fourth Mirage flashed under my nose heading west at high speed and I called a break towards it to try and get another missile off. As a result of this I only saw the fireball on impact of Diaz' Mirage out of the corner of my eye and never saw his fully developed parachute. The fourth Mirage quickly out distanced me and it wasn't even worth trying a missile shot at the rapidly opening range.
We both thought at the time that this fourth Mirage might have been part of Oro but as you quite correctly pointed out it was pure coincidence that he was in the same piece of sky at the same time. I also recorded that that I had shot down "number 3" when what I meant was I shot down the third in sequence. (Actually the leader.) History has always credited me with shooting down Castillo who was the only member of Oro not to survive the encounter.
You can imagine my surprise when I discovered as late as last year that I had in fact shot down Raul Diaz and my delight in receiving several emails from him describing what happened from his perspective! I quote:
"I continued to look at the aeroplane of Puga to see if he had ejected but saw no reaction. (Apparently he hit the sea with a partially deployed parachute and spent five hours swimming to shore. He survived the ordeal! ES) In the middle of the turn I was hit by your missile. My Mirage began to vibrate terribly, the flaw mermaid sounded and the lights of serious flaws lit all. I was left without commands. It began to enter smoke into the booth and strong sounds. I attempted to eject with the superior rings but I couldn't reach them. I had to make do with the inferior ones among the legs. When the ejection began I believed I was hitting the water because the pressure was unbearable. Single memory two instants of the ejection, when I saw my knees towards the sky and when the parachute opened up. During the ejection I had luxacion of the right elbow and fissures of the 4a and 5a lumbar vertebra.

He recovered and was flying Mirages again four months later!
ES

Navaleye
25th Nov 2008, 07:27
I had luxacion of the right elbow and fissures of the 4a and 5a

So have I but but not from an ejection and have been leaning to walk again for the last three weeks. for the uninitiated a sublaxation is when the disk actually bursts damaging the nerves in one or both legs, causing numbness and partial paralysis in the feet. Common in ejections.

Edmund Spencer
25th Nov 2008, 08:10
Sounds extremely unpleasant, Naval. Can we ask what happened? I hope you are on the road to recovery.
What exactly would a luxacion of the elbow be?
I think Colonel Diaz' reply to me was most probably written in Spanish and Google translated or something similar so several of the phrases are a bit hard to follow. The general meaning is pretty clear, though.
The whole letter is a wonderful document.
ES

Edmund Spencer
25th Nov 2008, 08:59
Enrique,
I have my feet back on terra firma now and can devote a bit more time to this thread.
Once again, many thanks for your contribution.
Do you know anything more about the detail of the conversation between Cuerva and the radar controllers. I have been trying to establish to what extent he was short of fuel or his aircraft damaged. Why would the controllers suggest he eject?
I have spoken with several Australian Mirage III pilots and they reckon the landing at Stanley would have been possible but highly risky. They are also surprised that he would have been so short of fuel after such a short engagement. There are some stories of Cuerva disappearing off the radar screen for twenty minutes after the combat during which time he is credited with straffing some of our ships. (I have a feeling this was endorsed by Pierre Clostermann but goodness knows where he got this from.) It was, supposedly, after this that he made his request to land at Stanley. I am also curious about the long burst of cannon fire either just before or just after he was shot at by his own AAA. Was this what set them off or did he clear his wing of tanks and pylons etc causing the ground forces to think they were under attack. Again this is a little questionable as he would have been directly over Stanley town. Most pilots would not drop their tanks over a built up area. (And for what reason? It looked like he was positioning downwind for a left circuit to land at Stanley on the westerly runway so why not clear the wing over the sea to the south?)
The second area of interest for me is the Penfold/Hale vs Ardilles combat on the same day. Are there any records or memories of the conversation between Ardilles and his radar controllers? You see, it is of great interest to us why Ardilles shot a rear hemisphere heat seeking missile at Hale head on from about ten miles and, apparently, nearly got him!! Martin Hale gives a graphic account of this missile tracking towards him and was amazed to find out, recently, that the shooter was not a Mirage III with Magic and Matra but a single Mirage V with no radar and Shaffrir heat seekers! The British radar, slightly embellished by Tony Penfold's "Multiple Boguey" call, indicated there were several hostiles approaching the merge. History records it was Ardilles on his own.
Enrique, I would be very interested if you can add anything to these questions.
Many thanks in advance.
ES

Al R
25th Nov 2008, 09:00
ES said: I think Colonel Diaz' reply to me was most probably written in Spanish and Google translated or something similar so several of the phrases are a bit hard to follow. The general meaning is pretty clear, though. The whole letter is a wonderful document.

Without being cheesy Edmund, the thread and not just the letter has some historical significance too. Welcome to jualbo and any other guys from 'the other side' who might be reading this.

Edmund Spencer
25th Nov 2008, 09:13
Al R
I meant no disrespect and I humbly apologize if it came across this way.
I hugely appreciate the contribution from our Argentinean readers and only regret my own inadequate language skills.
I treasure Colonel Diaz' letter in the way it is written and would not wish to change it in any way or form.
ES

Al R
25th Nov 2008, 09:20
Edmund,

Sorry - you missunderstood me - I think the entire thread is wonderful. Coming as it does at Xmas, I hope it continues to bring highly skilled, former foes together who were just normal blokes, flung into an extraordinary situation against each other at the same time. You have nothing to apologise for, and I shall choose my words more carefully the next time.

Regards,

Al

jualbo
25th Nov 2008, 11:47
Edmund and Al R, thanks for the welcome.

About the fourth Dagger, there is a testimony of this mission in spanish, written by him in one of captain Carballo´s book (the most famous argentienan A-4B pilot). I think it was "Dios y los Halcones" or "Halcones sobre Malvinas". Carballo´s book are plenty of first hand accounts principally from pilots just after the war finished, so they have a real historic interest.

1st Lt Callejo was a lucky man that day. He survived a Bomb Alley fly, then a second encounter with the most lethal SAM combination (Sea Dart from T-42+ Sea Wolf from T-22), and third, and unknown for him cause didn´t see you, a Sea Harrier pursuit. He was a solitary shooter. In his first mission on may 21 he was number 3 of Laucha flight. His two fellows attacked Ardent while he faced HMS Brilliant alone hitting her with cannon fire and a near miss bomb, avoiding a Sea Wolf from HMS Broadsword. He succesfully returned home. This flight is very famous cause Sharkey Ward was listening HMS Brilliant air controller when was hit by Callejo. The second flight from San Julian air base, just a minute later than Laucha, was then intercepted by Ward/Thomas, downing all three planes.

A similar situation happened on 24th May. The flight just after him from the same base (Oro) was intercepted by you, while they (Plata) could attack. Callejo attacked alone again. This time, an orange fuel tank in land. While his two fellows went for HMS Arrow. They scape for another route while Callejo decided to look for a north way to home.

It would be pretty you to contact him cause I´me sure none knows about this I´ve told you as Callejo never saw any Sea Harrier and you never identified the fourth Dagger. In my opinion Callejo is one of the most brilliant argentinean pilots and simultaneously one of the most unknown one. 21st may HMS Brilliant attack has always been erroniously pointed to other Dagger flight while his dangerous mission on 24th may is also little known.

I checked time needed to fly from San Carlos entrance (where his testimony says he listened Oro advice), get into the north bay, turn left towards Dolphin Cape and the towards west, cross the sound and being over Pebble island and think can be made in one minute flying almost supersonically, as Dagger made. So if he heard the moment in which Castillo warned firstly his fellows about Sea Harriers and then you spent some seconds (half a minute perhaps?) to shoot the last AIM-9L, then it´s possible you would spend the other seconds until you found the fourth Dagger.

Regards

reydelcastillo
25th Nov 2008, 12:08
Goog morning Sir

Its an Honor to read you -

Let me see who has the translation of the conversations between Garcia Cuerva and the Air Force Radar ( Westinghouse ANTPS 43 )

Regards Enrique

Juanballbo thank you very much for your help , I have suggested Tanoarg to come by and provide us whith what his got - Juanbalbo do you have the link to the Westinghouse radar with the conversation between Mayor Silva and Captain Garcia Cuerva ?

Thanks Enrique

jualbo
25th Nov 2008, 12:21
Hi again:
http://www.radarmalvinas.com.ar/descargas/facsimiles.pdf

Page 18 of the pdf document.

jualbo
25th Nov 2008, 14:14
About Ardiles-Hale/Penfold:

There are reports from British side about a second Dagger. in fact Rubio flight was a lone Dagger (the second had technical failures prior to take off). But I have a report from another lone Dagger that day. He was Captain Díaz. The pilot you downed on 24th may. He flew a mission with a radio call sign "Fierro". He had the same problem with his wingman that Ardiles. He took off alone.

I don´t know the exact time of his flight but he informed about an interception of an unkown air target over Darwin. I put his words in spanish and will try to translate:

"Cuando me encontraba nuevamente sobre las islas a las cuales pude distinguir a través de un orificio en las nubes (vi el Canal San Carlos y la zona de Darwin) el operador me informó de un ataque aéreo que el enemigo realizaba -con los Sea Harrier- sobre Puerto Argentino."
"When I was overflying the islands again, which I could see through a gap in the clouds (I saw Falkland Sound and Darwin area), the air controller informed about an air attack by Sea Harrier on Stanley."
"Le pregunté si me dirigía hacia allí, respondiéndome negativamente porque los incursores se encontraban dentro del sector de nuestra defensa antiaérea."
"I asked him if I had to go there, answering me not to go cause attackers were in the air defense engagement zone."
"Seguidamente me alertó sobre la presencia de un eco que se dirigía hacia mí, desde el Sureste a gran velocidad y tomando altura. El mismo fue detectado cuando se encontraba a 18 millas, giré hacia el Sur para adoptar un rumbo de colisión y mantuve una altitud de 26.000 pies, acelerando para 450 nudos, me dediqué a observar los instrumentos por última vez antes del cruce y con aprensión descubrí que no me quedaban más de 5 minutos de combustible para llegar al mínimo nivel requerido para el largo regreso."
"Shortly he advised me about an echo heading to me from the SE raising at high speed. It was detected 18 miles away and I turned south to take an interception course keeping my height at 26000 feet and increasing the speed to 450 knots, while I looked at my instruments for last time before the cross, noticing that I hardly had 5 minutes of fuel remaining to get the bingo status necessary for the long way back."
"Cuando nos separaban (con el o los incursores) unas 8 millas y estando unos 3.000 pies más arriba que él, decidió, abandonar la entrada en combate, probablemente porque no tenía una posición ventajosa; lo cierto es que descendió rápidamente hasta que nuestro radar perdió su eco."
"When I was separated (from him or them) around 8 miles and flying 3000 feet higher, he decided to abort the combat, probably for not being in a better position; anyway he went down fastly until our radar lost its echo."
"Me esforcé en tratar de visualizarlo, sin perder mi ventajosa altura, pero no lo logré, en esto escuché la voz del controlador que me preguntaba cuánto tiempo más podría permanecer sobre las islas, contestándole que había llegado el momento de regresar por falta de combustible."
"I tried to look for him without going down from my better upper position but couldn´t find it, when listened the air controller voice asking me how long I could stay over the islands, answering him that it was time to come back due fuel lack."
"Me deseó buena suerte y me dio el rumbo a casa; ascendí hasta el nivel óptimo para el regreso y concebí, durante el largo retorno esta equivocada idea: los ingleses rehuyen el combate aéreo."
"He wished me good luck and told me the home course; I went up to my optimal fly level to come back and thought, during my long way back, this wrong idea: English refused the air combat."
"Algunos días más tarde sufriría la propia experiencia de ser derribado, junto a toda mi escuadrilla por dos aviones Sea Harrier, cuando yo estaba por atacar la cabeza de playa de Puerto San Carlos."
"Some days after this I would suffer in my own the experience of being downed with all my flight by two Sea Harriers when were in an attack mission against the beach head."

It would be interesting to know the exact time of this mission. Some times, the overfly of Stanley airport was considered by air controllers as an air attack. This lonely flight didn´t happen during the early morning attacks by Sea Harrier against Stanley runaway by Sea Harrier, so the mention to it is probably the case I say.

If you keep in contact with captain Díaz perhaps he can confirm the time of this encounter.

Regards

PS: the link you asked:
http://www.radarmalvinas.com.ar/descargas/facsimiles.pdf
Page 18 of the PDF document

KG86
25th Nov 2008, 15:35
In the late 1980s, I was flying Chinooks in FI. The Jason Islands were off limits to us as they were a nature conservancy site. However, on this occasion, some scientists were maronned on, as I recall, Steeple Jason, and were running out of food, water and ideas. So I was tasked with flying in there to recover them.

Steeple Jason was a formidable sight, rising out of the sea a bit like a circular saw on a saw bench. I just managed to get my aft wheels and ramp on the very narrow ridge along the top, and the scientists scrambled aboard. Meanwhile, the front of the ac, with me, was hovering over free air. I recall glancing down, watching the large numbers of sealions gambolling about. As I lifted off, I said to the crew that we would descend to low level to see the sealions on our way out.

As I was descending and turning right, parallel to the ridge line, something caught my eye on the almost vertical rock face on my right. As I looked, there, in all its glory, was the imprint of an Argentinian fighter, which had clearly carried out a classic CFIT into a cliff face! At the base of the cliff, I could see more metallic parts, but I could not stay around to work out whether it was a Skyhawk or a Dagger.

Edmund Spencer
26th Nov 2008, 06:42
KG86
Thanks for this. Navaleye mentions this incident earlier in the Thread (21) and would no doubt be interested.
Jualbo.
Interesting post. Thank you.
I daresay, if Raul Diaz had been in the same piece of sky as Ardilles and Hale he would have seen the missile launch and mentioned it. Is it likely the two pilots could be intercepting the same target unknown to each other?
This may have happened with Eyton-Jones and Curtis at low level on our side but we will never know for sure.
What would be very useful would be a time line of who was airborne where and when during the conflict so we could put some names and faces to stories like these. I wonder who was approaching Diaz? It is highly unlikely he was alone as we always used to operate in pairs. Interesting the controller only mentions one contact. What would Diaz have been armed with in this instance? Cannon and Shaffrir?
ES

reydelcastillo
26th Nov 2008, 13:17
Good morning Sir

Were you on the first Air strick at the Falklands Airport on the early morning of May 01-

Thank you
Regards Enrique

jualbo
26th Nov 2008, 13:35
Hi again Edmund. I could find some aditional info about Díaz and his participation on 1 may events. According to Núñez Padín (argentinean aviation historician), he took off at 12:00 from San Julian while Ardiles made it at 15:45 from Río Grande. So aparently they weren´t in the air at the same time. Díaz overflew the islands almost the same hour that a CAP of Daggers (Bernhardt-Mir González) from Río Grande with the radio call sign "Limon" that took off at 12:30 (Río Grande was nearer the islands than San Julian). This CAP had an encounter with a Sea Harrier CAP (Barton-Ward). Ward thought they launched at him 3 missiles cause he saw 3 condensation trails. In fact they were trails from the 1300 litres external drop tanks from Bernhardt plane who was trying to go down for them when was stopped by his leader.

I´m beginning to think that perhaps Ardiles never fired a missile and it was a jettisoned external fuel tank (The central one. Daggers used to carry three 1300 litres external fuel tanks: two under wings and one under the belly). 10 miles exceeds Shaffir range and a head on launching doesn´t seem to be logical.

About 8th june downings I´ve always had a doubt. The identity of the ejected pilot (although never found). According to some sources he was 2nd Lt Alfredo Vázquez while others say he was Lt Juan José Arrarás. In fact he was the pilot downed in second hand by Morgan. I have some accounts talking about him as the pilot who ended the argentinean flight and the one didn´t bomb, aborting the final run. Other sources says he was one of the pilots who bombed but failed. The first down would be the pilot who aborted. I doný know. Any aditional info?

Regards.

cosmiccomet
26th Nov 2008, 18:44
Hello to everyone. I usually post in Freighter Dogs, South Asia and Spanish forums.
But some friends from Zona Militar forum told me about a post about Malvinas/Falklans war, so here I am.
I am an Argentine Freighter Dog. I am actually flying B744 SIC for CAL based in Taipei.

In the ZM forum we are wondering if the Sea Harrier has photocamera.
We have some shots from Dagger struffing runs over the UK's ships.

It would be very interesting to have some pictures from the SH combats over our airplanes.
As far as I remembered, the SH shot down using the DEFA 30mm cannon an A4Q Skyhawk on the 21st.
That day, three Argentine Navy A4Q were attacking the HMS Ardent and after hitting the ship, those were intercepted and shotted down by a SH CAP.
The first shot down was the A4Q leader, CN Phillipi, who was shotted down with a AIM9L. He could eyect and he survived the war.
The second one was TF Marquez, but in this case, the SH used the DEFA 30mm cannon. He couldn't eyect.

The last one, TN Arca, could scape badly damage from another DEFA attack but after reaching the Pto Argentino/Pt. Stanley, he couldn't lower the landing gear and according with the Argentine Procedures, he has to eyect from the A4.
The eyection was over the sea, and he was recovered by an UH1-H operated by the Argentine Army.

Another DEFA kill were the IA58 Pucara flown by the My Tomba and many Argentine Army helicopters.

Thanks for any information, specially if somebody can get those pictures.

I would like to state from the biginning that I don't have any hard feelings against the UK people. I hope the same attitude from the other side.

Cheers from Anchorage/Alaska:ok::ok::ok:

reydelcastillo
26th Nov 2008, 19:31
Hi cosmicomet it's me Enrique how are you -
It must be very cold up there in Alaska , any chance you could be transfere to Key West ?

Regards Enrique

ARXW
27th Nov 2008, 00:44
Hello,
regarding sea harrier combat camera or HUD footage there has been very little that has been released and available on the internet. Incidentally the only film I ever seen is of Lt Cdr Andy Auld's sidewinder shoot on one of the Daggers on 24 May in which Edmund was the wingman! I guess he can enlighten you on more of this stuff as he would have seen or captured himself tons of similar film!

By the way I always thought it must have been quite a feeling returning on deck after a air to air shootdown and I've seen Andy Auld being carried shoulder-high after the double shootdown. Wasn't there a similar reception for the wingman or was this a case of sn commander's privilege!? Edmund?:)here's the link to Auld's embedded video of one of his shots (scroll down to 24 May 10:15):One of their aircraft is missing (http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/argentine-aircraftlosses.html)

cosmiccomet
27th Nov 2008, 00:58
Thanks for the information. I have seen the Dagger shot down sequence in a magazine many years ago.

But there must be more of them...:cool::cool::cool:

Edmund Spencer
27th Nov 2008, 05:50
To answer the question about the guns camera in the Shar, the simple reply is that very little footage was taken. I thinks Andy Auld's might be the only one.
The problem was, if I remember correctly, the switching for the camera. It was wired in such a way as to make a weapon's stuff up highly probable and most of us didn't have the time or inclination to include camera film in the already quite busy environment. I wasn't as simple as raising the safety catch and expecting the camera to run. (Perhaps somebody with a better memory can enlighten us.)
ES

Edmund Spencer
27th Nov 2008, 05:59
Enrique,No I did not take part in the first strike on 1st May.
Jualbo, I have corresponded with Martin Hale about this and he is very convinced a missile was shot at him. He shot two missiles himself during the conflict and saw a Sea Harrier shoot another so he knows what a missile launch looks like.
It is curious that a Shaffrir could have acquired him head on from this range.
There is some technical discussion about this in another thread in this Forum.
ES

jualbo
27th Nov 2008, 07:37
Ardiles fuel tanks were found in Lively island but don´t know the number of them. I think the down was closer to Darwin. One Pucara pilot (Lt Morales) saw it from Darwin. I have accounts from other Dagger pilots that day and it was not unsual to jettisson the two external wing tanks during the aproach and when closer to the target, the central belly tank. Happened in this way with Ardiles? Could the missile be that last drop tank? From 10 miles, the condensation trail of a still partially filled fuel tank can be confused with a missile, as Ward made. If the object followed or not an intelligence trajectory or only a ballistic one is something that witness have to tell.

Tony Penfold account also may be important. I think that read in somewhere that he attacked the Dagger when was going up after the launching.
Was HMS Glamorgan the air control ship that day? What did they see?

Regards

Edmund Spencer
27th Nov 2008, 08:00
Martin describes the missile arcing gracefully downwards and towards him with a good solid smoke trail. It could have been ballistic, I suppose, and I really do not know what the vapour trail from a partially full drop tank would look like. You are quite correct that Sharkey mistook them for missiles.
It is worth pointing out here that Martin thought he was under attack by several Mirage III's armed with semi-active front hemisphere (Matra 530?) missiles. I believe Tony Penfold called multiple hostiles during the run in which further confused the picture.
ES

Edmund Spencer
27th Nov 2008, 08:14
Jualbo,
Regarding 8 June, I couldn't say for sure which A4 pilot ejected. I have been trying to search my memory but things are fading fast! (As was the light that evening)
I think Dave Morgan was ahead and slightly to my left. I think he shot at the left hand A4 first followed by the right hand. I very nearly flew into the parachute of the ejected pilot so it may have been the right hand A4. It was only when Dave opened fire with his cannons at the third A4 that I finally got visual with him and the A4 he was shooting at! He then pulled up and out of the picture allowing me to lock and fire one of my missiles.
ES

Gainesy
27th Nov 2008, 11:30
Diverging slightly, at what point did the Argentine AF and Navy realise that their bombs were not fuzed correctly for low level attacks?

It is widely believed that they first heard of this problem from a BBC World Service broadcast about ships having unexploded bombs to de-fuze, however I would have thought that the Argentine pilots would have been aware of this problem very quickly from attack mission de-briefs ?

ARXW
27th Nov 2008, 12:32
Yes regarding footage the only other mention of it is primarily in Dave Morgan's book. Two instances:
The gun camera of Flt Lt Ted Ball running into Goose Green at right angles to Gordon Batt and Nick Taylor when unfortunately with gun cam operating he recorded the fate of XZ450 Shar being hit by 35mm shells. On another occasion Morgan mentions Andy Auld (again) running into the attack with Simon Hargreaves on one of the Argentinian patrol boats at a settlement on west falkland and recording the impact of 30mm shells on the boat (and very close to the settlement in the background).

One of the astonishing events of the conflict was the guns shot of Flt Lt John Leeming on an Argentinian Navy A-4Q in which Lt Marquez unfortunately died. I don't recall where I red this or whether it was an interesting coincidence when I literally bumped into Cdr Rick Jolly one day in Foyles (bookshop) in London few years back, checking out (as I do) the falklands section when I felt a big guy rubbing against my shoulder when I turned round to see Rick Jolly. At the time I had a portuguese friend with me and Cdr Jolly thought we were argentinians. He was also checking some books out having come down to London for some commemoration day. I think it was he that told me that John Leeming had literally flown through the cloud of debris, right through the middle of it in fact and was exceptionally fortunate to survive. I think he pressed the shot down to 100yards or less when the skyhawk exploded. If Mr Jolly is reading this - my salute! He even waved his wife away in order to finish with the story!

Flt Lt Leeming was a very experienced ex Lightining pilot who at the time of the Falklkands war was flying Harriers. When the notice came up for SHAR volunteers he was an obvious choice having had both harrier VSTOL experience and air intercept experience. As Cdr Jolly explained though he was so rapidly converted to the sea harrier that in the heat of the moment he couldn't recall the correct switchology to switch to sidewinders for a shot and with a rapid overtake he proceeded to shoot guns instead.

MAINJAFAD
27th Nov 2008, 21:06
I do remember the MoD releasing TV tracker footage from one or more of the ships in Falkland sound of events that took place on 21st May 1982. Some of the footage is quite common in programmes about the conflict and include....

A Dagger being hit by a SAM.
Two A-4's releasing bombs.
HMS Ardent on fire and sinking.

However there is one piece of footage originally shown on the footage broadcast on British TV News back then that I have not seen since, and that is of a SHAR shooting down an A-4 with a Sidewinder.

The camera crosshair was on the SHAR when there was a flash under one of the wings (port one if memory serves, it's over 26 years since I last saw the film), Sidewinder departs the aircraft and the tracker follows it across the sky until it explodes in the rear of what looked like a Skyhawk, the footage released didn't show the Skyhawk crashing into the sea.

As a guess I would say that footage was of Lt Morrell shooting down Capitan de Corbeta Philippi.

The BBC or ITV may still have it in their news archives somewhere.

dead_pan
27th Nov 2008, 21:32
The camera crosshair was on the SHAR


There's also footage of a Sea Wolf striking what looks like a Dagger, the plane then rearing-up and disappearing out of camera shot. I believe this and the aforementioned SHAR footage was taken from HMS Broadsword.

A few years back I saw some footage taken of an Argentinian aircraft crashing onto a small peninsula (I'd never seen this before). The footage was taken at extreme range hence was hard to distinguish what aircraft was involved. Not sure who filmed this - it may have been one of the 'embedded' TV crews.

Incidentally, the HMS Broadsword (http://www.hmsbroadsword.co.uk/)website has some gun-camera stills from the Argentinian aircraft which strafed it.

MAINJAFAD
27th Nov 2008, 22:03
Indeed having just found the footage in a BBC on line archive as part of the 'Task Force South' series made just after the war, The SAM hitting the Dagger footage is mostly likely that taken from the TV tracker of the Sea Wolf system which did the engagement. Sea Harrier engagement is also on the footage (I remember it being described as a SHAR shooting down a Skyhawk on the news reports at the time, but you're right in saying that the aircraft are dots in sky), as well as the 'Skyhawks' dropping bombs, that at second glance look like they are actually Daggers.

Link to BBC ‘Task Force South’ series is Here (http://www.bbc.co.uk/southtoday/content/articles/2007/06/13/falklands_25_archive_feature.shtml). Tracker footage is in ’Beach Head’ link from approximately 08:30 to 10:00 into the programme.

cosmiccomet
27th Nov 2008, 22:25
The principal bomb used by the A4B/C during the war was the Mk-17.
The Dagger used also Mk-17 and Spanish built BR-250.
Finally the A4Q (Navy Aviation) were using Mk-82 with Snake tail.

Most of the Mk-17 did not explode after impact. One of the reasons was the high mass of the bomb wich after hitting the not so strong ships go through it to the sea.
As you can remember during May 25th attack to the HMS Broadboard at least one bomb hit the ship helicopter hangar, distroyed the helicopter and made a hole before exploding in the sea.:bored::bored::bored:

The other problem was the very very low level at the pilots were flying before lunching the bombs. So the fuses could not have time to arm the bomb.

The Mk-82 were more effective, those were disign for the job and the Navy Pilots were trained for the job well before the war.:cool::cool::cool:

I don't understand why my country army forces didn't cooperate giving the Navy Mk-82 Snake to the Air Force....:ugh::ugh::ugh:

TEEEJ
27th Nov 2008, 23:30
Dead pan wrote

A few years back I saw some footage taken of an Argentinian aircraft crashing onto a small peninsula (I'd never seen this before). The footage was taken at extreme range hence was hard to distinguish what aircraft was involved. Not sure who filmed this - it may have been one of the 'embedded' TV crews.

That would be the footage of Captain Garcia Cuerva's Mirage.

TJ

cosmiccomet
28th Nov 2008, 03:37
I ve never seen any photo sequence about the My (PM) Garcia Cuerva crash.

Cuerva was coming to land after fighting with 2 Sea Harrier on May 1st.
His wingman, 1st Lieutenant Carlos Perona was shotted down but he could eyect and come back to the continent.

Apparently, Cuerva kept fighting with the SH without hitting or been hitted, so both sides broke the engage.

The Argentinian pilot was run out of fuel for returning to his base in Patagonia.
So, he tried to land in Pto Argentino-Pt Stanley airport, but friendly fire shotted him down.

He couldn't eyect.:(:(:(

Willoz269
28th Nov 2008, 04:46
Many years ago I went to school with a good friend related to Lt Danilo Bolzan, who died in the conflict, I got to hear a lot of conversations recorded by the Air Force in Stanley....one of them (very short) was of Garcia Cuerva screaming "No Me Tiren, No Me Tiren"...which translated means "Don't Shoot Me, Don't Shoot Me"...and shortly after there was an abrupt end to the transmission.

I used to have the books Exocet and War In the Malvinas, published in Argentina, one of the notes is from an officer who saw Garcia Cuerva approach, and yes, they all say they saw something drop from the aircraft, which was interpreted as bombs, and AAA started up. This officer soon recognised the markings in the plane and started yelling at everyone to stop firing, but it was too late....elation soon turned to despair as the news came that they had shot one of their own, people were in tears.

I still have my old copy of "Dios y los Halcones" by Pablo Carballo and the 1986 Falklands Air War, as well as "Fight for the Malvinas", which is an excellent account of the Argentinian side of the war, if you need detail from any of those books, more than happy to provide what I have.

Edmund Spencer
28th Nov 2008, 05:19
Many thanks for this, Willoz.
I regret I was the one who shot down Danilo Bolzan.
Regarding Cuerva, we have been trying to establish whether or not he was damaged by Steve Thomas' missile before he attempted his landing at Stanley. Most Argentinean reports say he reported his Mirage as 'Pristine' but Steve reports seeing the detonation of his missile just as Cuerva dived into cloud. Witnesses on the ground saw him in deep wing rock and observed this mysterious prolonged burst of cannon fire either just before or just after he was shot at by his own AAA.
Without being able to examine the wreckage (it apparently landed in a minefield) we will not know if he had suffered any sidewinder damage from his encounter with Steve Thomas.
Allan White who lives in the Falklands has looked into it and reckons the mines will not be cleared for some time yet so the area is very much off limits.
ES

dead_pan
28th Nov 2008, 08:44
Edmund

Interested to know if you've ever read Sandy Woodward's account of the war (100 Days)? His account of the attack on Sheffield is the most gripping texts I've ever read in a war memoir.

DP

Navaleye
28th Nov 2008, 22:02
I would like ask our welcome Argentine guests how Morale held up with the pilots as aircraft losses went up. It cant have been easy to lose a flight of aircraft on a single mission.

cosmiccomet
28th Nov 2008, 22:23
My dear friends, as far as I know the Mirage IIIEA has never flown in combat sorties over MLV/Falklands equipped with MATRA 530.

The Argentine's Air Force was always very aware about the poor performance of that missile for combat against fighters.

The 8 single seater / 2 two seaters MIIIEA/BAs were bought in 1971, but those first batch airplanes were equipped with MATRA 530 and 2 DEFA 30 mm cannons for AA combat.

A second MIIIEA batch was deliver in 1981, but those were Matra 550 Magic I capable.
Only those second batch were Magic ready, those were deployed to Rio Gallegos AFB.

The First Batch airplanes were kept in Comodoro Rivadavia AFB and very few in Mariano Moreno AFB near Buenos Aires.

So, the MATRA 530 was only intend to be use against the VULCAN.

The other point is the Cirano II radar was not LOOK DOWN capable, so in most of those first combats the MIIIEA and Dagger were higher than the Sea Harrier.
It was impossible for the Cirano to LOCK ON to a SH from above.

The Nesher/Dagger's airplanes were delivered in two batches.
The first one in 1978 and the second in 1981.
A total of 39 airplanes were delivered before the war, but two were lost during training.

For AA, the Dagger's were fitted with 2 Shafrir Mk-4 + 2 DEFA 30 mm cannons.

At the beginning of the war, they were using 3 1300 lts fuel drop tanks.
Usually, the two wing drop tanks were dropped after been depleted, keeping the central one just before engaging usually 5 NM before crossing the SH.

But due the 1300 lts tanks shortege, the Dagger's were fitted with 2 1700 lts tanks.
The total fuel quantity was lower but the drag also was lower.

Cheers from TPE.

Navaleye
29th Nov 2008, 03:24
ES,

Circling back your original question, the serial number on that Dagger wreck is definately 430 if that helps clear up anything. A quick zoom shows the number clearly.

Edmund Spencer
29th Nov 2008, 09:23
Thanks, Navaleye. This has been confirmed my Allan White in the Falklands and by Colonel Raul Diaz himself.
Dead Pan. Yes, to answer your question and a very good read IMHO.
ES

Lower Hangar
29th Nov 2008, 10:11
Ref the brief clip in 'One of Our Aircraft is missing ( see #72) - - it worthy of note for the anoraks that the HUD is in REV - good old NAVHARS dumped again !!

(Additional anorak note: The camera is referred to as PDR and runs when the stick top safety flap was raised prior to firing missile/dropping bomb)

6foottanker
29th Nov 2008, 19:51
Having returned from the Falklands recently, there is a very good map on the wall of the Sea-King crewroom, which pinpoints each and every one of the wreck sites on the islands, together with an aircaft ID and dates of crash, including helicopters, herc, mirages, harries etc.
Don't know if the VC10 nav's crash charts still exist on 1312 though. Certainly no sign of them in the det.

ChrisBV
29th Nov 2008, 20:53
Greetings everyone!

I was invited to this forum by Enrique (reydelcastillo) as he told me somebody was researching the incident involving Argentine Air Force Captain García Cueva being engaged and shot down over Port Stanley by friendly anti-air defences on May 1, 1982. I'm not a professional historian but I could find a few accounts on various publications and submited them to cross-referencing. I posted my findings on Militaryphotos.net but I'll post them again here, in case they could prove useful to anyone.

The following is part of an article titled "Dagger en Malvinas" (Dagger in the Falklands) that I got from "Aeroespacio" magazine (an Argentine aviation-related publication). It contains recollections by Argentine Air Force pilots involved in the incident. The article is in Spanish but I did a quick translation to English, so here it is:

Testimonies by:
Torno Flight:
- Comandante Roberto Rubén Dimeglio
- Comandante César Fernando Román
- Vice-comandante Gustavo Aguirre Faget
Fortín Flight:
- Brigadier Guillermo Adolfo Donadille
- Comandante Jorge Daniel Senn

DARDO IN COMBAT

Over isla Borbón (Pebble Island) at low-level flight, callsign Torno II, Lt Aguirre Faget, watching the right sector of the formation, relays to his flight leader - Attention! Harrier at 3 o'clock! - Captain Dimeglio observes in the indicated direction as he spots a Harrier climbing toward the clouds. He figures that it should be one of the British aircraft engaging Escuadrilla Dardo (Dardo Flight) integrated by Cap García Cueva and 1st Lt Perona. Ignoring whether the enemy pilot had spotted them or not, they continue flying.

Com Senn - on the CIC (Centro de Información y Control/Combat Information Centre) frequency, all of us, Torno and Fortín flights, could listen García and Perona yelling instructions at each other as they engaged the Sea Harriers.

Brig Donadille - on the events of that day, I could forget many details, but what happened to García Cueva, I will never forget.

(by that moment, Capt Cueva's aircraft had been damaged by a near-detonation of an AIM-9L Sidewinder missile. His wing man, 1st Lt Perona, had been shot down and managed to eject safely. Captain Cueva's Mirage is damaged and low on fuel...)

Captain García Cueva reports to CIC the shooting down and ejection of 1st Lt Perona as well as the safe opening of his parachute and his descent over Pebble Island. CIC advises immediately to Cueva a vector for for his egress and return to base, but he does not answer; he's low on fuel and plans to land at BAM Malvinas (Port Stanley airport). CIC reports back to him:

- Negative; Base is currently under enemy naval bombardment

The vessels bombarding the airport were precisely those Cap Dimeglio is tasked to attack. García Cueva insists on his current status, saying that he cannot return to base given his aircraft being low on fuel, as he is presented by CIC with the opportunity of ejecting. Confronted by the possibility of losing his aircraft, García Cueva replies:

That's too bad. It's a brand new aircraft, spotless

After a brief interchange of assessments, CIC allows Dardo I to approach BAM Malvinas.

Meanwhile, for Torno flight, the first uncertainty for them is presented north, right at the mouth of Falkland Sound. There, straight ahead, a faint sillouhette of what seems to be a large vessel appears to their eyes. It turns out not to be such a thing but the impressive Roca Remolinos (Eddystone Rock), which they overfly safely. They fly over the Sound at 420 knots, between 50 and 100 feet in altitude, having a cloud cover at about 2000 and 3000 feet, altitude that they must keep an eye on without help of a radio altimeter, coming around north of Isla Soledad (East Falkland) about 3 miles off shore.

Meanwhile, Dardo I, Captain Cueva's aircraft, prepares to land. The lookout at the control tower, helplessly and without radio communications to warn the artillery positions, witnesses a drama of war: anti-aircraft defences open fire uppon Dardo I and, hit by a barrage of fire, the Dagger, turned into a flaming wreck, plummets out of the sky and hits the ocean. Pilot never manages to eject.

Vcom Aguirre Faget - Flying north of East Falkland, before reaching our target area, I could hear desperate cries from BAM Malvinas' control tower: - Don't shoot! It's one of ours! Hold your fire! - I figured that happened when the lookout saw our anti-aircraft artillery opening fire upon García Cueva's Mirage while he was trying to land. We could see, farther away, tracer rounds streaking through the cloud cover.

Com Senn - When García Cueva indicated his intentions to attempt to salvage the aircraft, I was about to ask him to eject, but for the sake of discipline, I didn't. It was his personal decision; we all knew the dangers existing around BAM Malvinas: they were on red alert, receiving heavy enemy naval bombardment and there was no communication between the control tower and the anti-aircraft artillery positions. The runway was 1500 metres long and it was difficult to perform an emergency landing there, but García Cueva was an experienced and highly skilled pilot and he could have been able to land and slow down his Mirage in 700 metres using the aerobraking parachute.

Brig Donadille - the last words of García Cueva, as Senn and I heard them, were textually: ¡Me están tirando a mi... carajo! (They are shooting at me... damn it!)

Now, this account renders Captain Cueva's aircraft as a Mirage Dagger, whereas other sources claim it to be a Mirage IIIEA. In "Air War over the Falklands 1982", the encounter is related by the two British pilots (Flt Lt Paul Barton and Lt Steve Thomas) who engaged Perona and Cueva. Lt Thomas recollection on the events follows:

"I was continuing my turn and the enemy leader was doing quite a hard descending turn to the left, going down very fast to the top of the solid cloud cover at 4000 feet. I'm not sure if he knew where I was. I rolled into a vertical descent behind him, locked one of my missiles and fired it. The missile streaked after him and just before he reached cloud I saw it pass close to his tail. Then both the aircraft and missile vanished".

The author, Christopher Chant, describes the shooting down of Cueva as follows:

(after being damaged by the missile and approaching Stanley airport for landing) Losing fuel rapidly from his machine's ruptured tanks, Cueva released his drop tanks and Argentine gunners, believing that these were bombs, opened fire and destroyed the Mirage IIIEA, in the process killing Cueva.

Again, British pilots seem to have identified the aircraft as a Mirage IIIEA while Argentine pilots said it was a Dagger. That's the only significative discrepancy I found while cross-referencing the stories on both sides.

I cross-checked with "The British Aerospace Sea Harrier" by Andy Evans and the Harrier Special Interest Group (SIG) and both of them acknowledge García Cueva's bird as a Mirage IIIEA (registration number I-019 of Grupo 8 de Caza, damaged by an AIM-9L Sidewinder missile lauched by Sea Harrier XZ453 flown by Lt Steve Thomas on the 1st of May) and recognise the loss of the aircraft due to friendly fire by Argentine air defences.

Hope this helps :ok:

cosmiccomet
2nd Dec 2008, 04:21
I would like to know if during the Super Etendard/Exocet attacks, the Sea Harrier's tried to intecept the Argentine airplanes.

From the Argentine Navy reports, those attacks had to fly below the deck for the last 150 NM before the suspect tarjet.
Approaching the tarjet area, the SUE climbed to make a quick radar serch and go down again.
At least in each attack, two of those jumbs were done. So that gave enough clues to the UK Task Force of the SUEs were coming.

The lunching usually was at 20 NM from the tarjet well inside the radar range of the UK's ships and the SH range.

According to some British reports, after the May 30th attack, many SH were lunch to try to intercet the intruders.
There are also reports about the lunching of 5 Sea Dart that day from the HMS Invincible.

Chipmunk
3rd Dec 2008, 20:51
All many thanks for posting such an informative and thrilling thread. Having read many books on the subject its great to have such a balanced view of the actions.

Out of interest (and not wanting start another sidetrack) could our friends from South America provide their perspective on the Vulcan missions ?

reydelcastillo
3rd Dec 2008, 22:25
Yes Sir

Let me tell you what I know and saw back then , it certainly will need more input since others have been researching and gathering more info along the years -
During the Falklands conflict I was the Radar Operator for the Army Radar , there was another Radra operated by Air Force -

The first Vulcan strike was on May 01 at about 0430 AM local time , on the radar 5 or 6 ecos were seen at 090 degrees ( due east of Stanley ) and about 70 or maybe 80 miles - I saw them coming in , at about 10 NM they go low and the first strike hits the airport - In other Forums I.ve been told that only the vulcan Strike will the other airplanes shown on the screen were countermeasures - And that only one Sea Harrier was standing about 20 NM east to cover.protect the vulcan -

I still have my doubts , I still believe the vulcan did not come by himself -

The other vulcan missions as what I remember , some how the Air Force radar let us know that we should expect a vulcan raid a few hours before it actually happen , for that matter , we several times when in doubt that the the airplane would be a vulcan , we would go into standby for several minutes and then back on line -

The vulcan mission that hit the 35 mm Sky Guard happen during the night , I remember Air Force Radra telling us , we should expect a raid , that night we had turn off the radar a few minutes before the strike , and when back on line it had already hit -

Regards Enrique

I'm sure that more input will be provided by Chary Bv / Cosmicomet 74 / Juanbalbo and others - Thank you

ScottishCop
3rd Dec 2008, 23:41
With regards the above comments on the Argentinian Skyguard:
It was captured by the RAF and is still in use to this day for use in low flying complaints and as 'enemy' radar on ranges.

reydelcastillo
4th Dec 2008, 00:15
Yes Sir , that is correct , the capture ones are same as the one destroyed by Shrik missil - They belong to the GADA 601 ( Triple A ) - The one Hit was the one operated by Tenent Dachary and his crew - Total of 4 in the Sky Guard killed only surviving the crew that was operating the cannons -
The one hit , was airlifted by C-130 back to continent before the end of the conflict -
The Vulvan raid that hit that Sky Guard is the one that had to land in Brazil due to problems in refueling

Regards Enrique

MAINJAFAD
4th Dec 2008, 20:38
Yes, the Skyguards are still in use to monitor low flying, and used as threat emitters at Spadeadam, before that they, along with the 30mm guns were operated by a RAuxAF Regt Sqn at Waddington. As for the bigger radars, the TPS-43F was put into RAF Service as the Radar Type 99, operated by 144SU at Wattisham from 1984/5, TCW at Brize Norton from 1989 and 1ACC at Boulmer from 1995 as part of the Mobile Radar Reserve force with deployments all over the place. (Had it deployed to my unit as a gap filler during the early 1990’s, The operator cabin was like a freezer, and it had purple CRT displays which looked really weird compared with orange ones found on most RAF Radars). It was phased out in the late 1990s while deployed on Cyprus. As for the TPS-44, It was planned to be put into RAF service as the Radar Type 100, however for some reason this never happened, and the only time I ever saw any of it was the antenna platform at RAF Locking in the mid 1980's. One story I would love to hear is what ‘Equipment Denial’ actions were carried out on the two big radar’s by the Argentines before the surrender. (I’ve heard rumours about nasty stuff being poured into cooling systems and timing boards going under the hammer).

reydelcastillo
4th Dec 2008, 22:07
Thank you for the information on the radars , as far as what was done to the ANTPS 43 Westinghouse when conflict ended I really don't know - That one was the one Air Force had in use -

As far as the ANTPS 44 Cardion , which was the one I operated during the conflict , remember we were hit by naval artillery the night of may 11 , which put it out of service - We didn't need to do anything since it was already damaged by shrapnel from the naval artillery -
And going back to this particular event , that night we were operationg , suddenly naval bombardment starts hitting us , we just run out of the cabin , one soldier is killed right there , I remmember laying on the flor at the entrance of the radar and naval proyectils exploding for what to me seemed to be above ground and shrapnel hitting every were - When hit , very loud explosions and very bright light and seems as everything shakes -
I still think that they were exploding just above ground , with proximity amunition ( Does naval 4.5 amo have proximity detonator ? )

That Cardion had impacts on the side of the antena and the side of the cab were electronics sit , several panels dammaged -

Navaleye
4th Dec 2008, 22:30
Does naval 4.5 ammo have proximity detonator ?

Yes it does. Mainly used in the Falkland/Malvinas campaign because of the wet, boggy nature of the land. We called it VT Fuse high, the others two options were VT Fuse Low for delayed action and DA (explode on impact). Your own side had the same problem with your 120mm mortars which tended to make big holes and throw soil around.

reydelcastillo
5th Dec 2008, 13:42
Thank you for the info , it clarifies a thought that I had for many years -
It must have been that type of amunition that hit us on the knight of June 11 -

Thank you , Regards Enrique

Navaleye
5th Dec 2008, 16:01
Air burst shells are always the weapon of choice if you are attacking troop emplacements or soft skinned target due to its increased lethality. DA would be used against harder targets. Ardent's NGS against the Pucaras was done exclusively with air burst as far as I recall,

Logistics Loader
5th Dec 2008, 19:12
i remember there being wreckage of a Wokka below Mt Kent...

MAINJAFAD
5th Dec 2008, 19:54
Yes there is a Chinook Wreck just off the ‘road’ that goes around the top of Mt Kent, it was taken out by a Harrier GR3 flown by Flt Lt Mark Hare on the morning of 21st May 82, with 30mm Aden cannon fire. There is wreckage of a Puma not that far away from it taken out in the same attack.

Both aircraft were from Batallon De Avivcion de Combate 601 (The Argentine Army's combat helicopter unit).

Chinook was AE-521 , while the Puma which was only damaged was AE-501 (It was finally destroyed by a BL755 CBU dropped from a GR3 flown by Sqn Ldr Jerry Pook 5 days later).

There is a third helicopter wreck close to Mt Kent, in the shape of Puma AE-508 that was lost in confusing circumstances on the night of 30th May 82. The Argentine Army reported that it was shot down by a British missile, though no British unit claimed a engagement that night, hence there is a possibility that it was an Argentine own goal. That wreck is about 2Km to the East North East of the Chinook.

I've had chance to have a good look at the Chinook wreck, last time I was down south (about 10 years ago), Didn't bother to take a look at the Puma, didn't have the time.

petop
5th Dec 2008, 21:24
I was in the Falklands in 91. Went to the Mt Kent Chinook and Puma crash site. I have photos somewhere, will try and scan and post.

petop
5th Dec 2008, 22:05
http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b391/smudgesmith/img001.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b391/smudgesmith/img002.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b391/smudgesmith/img003.jpg

MAINJAFAD
5th Dec 2008, 23:00
The Westinghouse TPS-43 was still going strong, last time I saw it. After UK service it spent a few years in storage before being refurbished and sold to Pakistan.

Shame that Argentina never settled the bill with Westinghouse - made getting spares for the radar a little difficult for a while.

Didn't know that it had been sold off, though the fact that the Argentines never paid for the thing is one of the more famous stories about that radar (Did GW1 didn’t it as well?).

(Off Topic) Do you know what happened to the Type 94's that were down south ? Where they sold off in the end, I was down south when 751SU was kicked into touch, and was involved in the rip out (Which wasn't helped by the fact that when the radar was first deployed, a Wokka could lift each cabin fully intact. Something they couldn't do when the time came to remove them).

reydelcastillo
5th Dec 2008, 23:02
I didn't know that we also owed money to Westinghouse for the Radars - Are yo sure ?

On the Sky Guard , yes four life lost , the two inside plus two soldiers that were by it when it was hit -

The canons operators were the only one that survived -

Regards Enrique

Navaleye
5th Dec 2008, 23:12
I'm led to believe it was new kit in 1982 and because of the financial difficulties in argentina at the time, the funds were never transferred. Westinghouse just assumed that the UK was new lawful owner and expected payment. They didn't get it and the sourcing of spare parts was via the US Military.

MAINJAFAD
5th Dec 2008, 23:17
Thats what I was told, when I got a close look around it in the 1990's.

reydelcastillo
6th Dec 2008, 00:18
Good afternoon Sir

Interesting , we forwarded the bill - I hope we did it only on that Radar -


Regards Enrique

BarbiesBoyfriend
6th Dec 2008, 13:24
I haven't read the whole thread.

A ex AAC mate of mine (CF) tells me he visited many of the crash sites just after the war.

I believe it was in order that human remains would be properly dealt with.

AR1
7th Dec 2008, 16:01
RE: Kent wrecks.
I never found the 3rd wreck. - Which I was told was a Huey. The Puma was in two pieces about 10m or so apart and was fairly close to the Chinook, the occupants of the first Kent site had one of the blades on display, complete with cannon holes in it.

Also nearby where a number of personal shelters in the rock formation at the base of the mountain, looking at it back then you could clearly see the pattern of CBU explosions across the rocks. I wouldn't have wanted to been around there when they came down. below taken in 86
http://i235.photobucket.com/albums/ee114/AR_1_b/n538371585_1182131_1403.jpg
http://i235.photobucket.com/albums/ee114/AR_1_b/n538371585_1182129_844.jpg

Navaleye
16th Dec 2008, 23:32
Jualbo,

Tony Penfold account also may be important. I think that read in somewhere that he attacked the Dagger when was going up after the launching.
Was HMS Glamorgan the air control ship that day? What did they see?

Yes it was. I need to check from reference material, but I believe the D in Glamorgan counted 3 of pairs of high level contacts, 5 miles apart and reported this to the CAP. I will check and get back to you.

jualbo
20th Dec 2008, 20:58
Hi again. I found that more or less, at the same time that Ardiles was flying over Falklands there were the following argentinean flights on air in the zone:

-Torno flight: 3 Daggers (Dimeglio-Aguirre-Román) aproaching at low level over the north shore of Falklands, so probably not detected by HMS Glamorgan. They attacked Glamorgan as well as Alacrity and Arrow.
- Buitre flight: 2 Mirage III CAP (Gambandé-Yebra)
- Dardo flight: 2 Mirage III CAP (Gª Cuerva-Perona)
- Fortín Flight: 2 Dagger CAP (Donadille-Senn)
- Rubio flight: 1 Dagger CAP (Ardiles)

And also probable (according to FAA cronology -Fuerza Aérea Argentina-although contradictory in time with other sources):
-Fierro Flight: 1 Dagger CAP (Díaz)

Regards

Frans175
20th Dec 2008, 21:07
Food Evening Gentlemen , Please let me introduce myself , Frans , No aeronautical background , served in the Royal Dutch Diving Engineers 108 DKPLT in 1990. The Falkland conflict is of personal interest to me.
I was happy to find this tread, as I was looking for the same informatie for the last few months and found it.
I do need to apolagise because my english is not as good as it should be
Here is a photo the three Daggers before they took off.

Source: a modelairplane site
Please let me know if it's ok for me to post the other photo's of Dagger C-404.

Regards,
Frans

http://i65.photobucket.com/albums/h213/Aiyoku-R/Daggers.jpg

reydelcastillo
21st Dec 2008, 03:14
Please go ahead and do so

Thank you Enrique

Polikarpov
21st Dec 2008, 03:49
Please go ahead and do so..You chaps may be familiar with these resources, but there a lot of good images of Argentine Daggers during the conflict (and links to various videos) to be found in the following locations. I'm afraid I don't speak Spanish so can't speak for the content of the former, although it's certainly an impressive collection of material:

http://misvivenciasenlaguerrademalvinas.*************/

Argentine Daggers in the Falklands 1982 - Military Photos (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=148090)

Regards, P.

Edit - I see PPRuNe doesn't like b l o g s p o t . c o m, which is the bit behind the stars.

Frans175
21st Dec 2008, 08:44
Certainly, I give you all that I found and the source

Regards,
Frans









Italeri 1/48 Mirage IIIE converted to Dagger, by Pablo Calcaterra (http://modelingmadness.com/reviews/mod/fr/calm3.htm)

Frans175
21st Dec 2008, 14:25
Certainly:ok:

I must post them one at the time, so I'll do my best

http://i65.photobucket.com/albums/h213/Aiyoku-R/Dagger404.jpg

Frans175
21st Dec 2008, 14:28
http://i65.photobucket.com/albums/h213/Aiyoku-R/Dagger404-2.jpg

Frans175
21st Dec 2008, 14:39
http://i65.photobucket.com/albums/h213/Aiyoku-R/Dagger404-4.jpg

Frans175
21st Dec 2008, 15:01
http://i65.photobucket.com/albums/h213/Aiyoku-R/Dagger404-3.jpg

jualbo
21st Dec 2008, 16:51
Welcome Frans 175. I´m also interested in photos of Daggers during the wartime. Specially in the following planes: C-417, C-418, C-431 and C-436. If possible from the starboard side and upper surface.
Thanks a lot
Regards from Spain

Frans175
21st Dec 2008, 17:26
If I find some I will post them too:ok:

Regards,
Frans

reydelcastillo
24th Dec 2008, 16:53
Merry Christmas to all -

Sincerely yours Enrique

taxydual
24th Dec 2008, 17:43
From an Ex Falklands guy to an Ex Malvinas guy.

Happy Christmas and Peace be with us.

Regards

reydelcastillo
24th Dec 2008, 20:33
Thank you very much Taxi Dual -

We are back Home for Christmas -

God bless Her Magesty The Queen and My Country -

Have a Merry Christmas -

taxydual
24th Dec 2008, 21:43
¡Feliz Navidad y Próspero Año Nuevo!

herkman
24th Dec 2008, 22:03
As an ousider from Australia, I have read the whole story with great interest.

What the records tell me shows that when things have to be done, amazing things can happen.

The air to refueling mod to allow the C130's to transit so far, alldone and in use in 6 weeks.

The ability of people to clearly remember facts over a quarter of century ago. My experience as an aviation researcher and historian indicates that often veterans cannot remember what they did last week, but ask them to go back a long way, the memory is as clear as today.

The story also shows, as we have seen in previous conflicts, that the "enemy" on both sides, quickly after the conflict is ended, soon close ranks and we all go back to what we enjoy most, and that is being military aircrew.

This discusion is made so much more interesting, by the contributions from the other sides armed forces.

Show to me the spirt of Christmas is still with most of us.

Regards

Col

Edmund Spencer
27th Dec 2008, 10:46
Jualbo and Navaleye.
Quote:
Hi again. I found that more or less, at the same time that Ardiles was flying over Falklands there were the following argentinean flights on air in the zone:

-Torno flight: 3 Daggers (Dimeglio-Aguirre-Román) aproaching at low level over the north shore of Falklands, so probably not detected by HMS Glamorgan. They attacked Glamorgan as well as Alacrity and Arrow.
- Buitre flight: 2 Mirage III CAP (Gambandé-Yebra)
- Dardo flight: 2 Mirage III CAP (Gª Cuerva-Perona)
- Fortín Flight: 2 Dagger CAP (Donadille-Senn)
- Rubio flight: 1 Dagger CAP (Ardiles)

Is it possible to time line these and find out which pairs the 'D' in Glamorgan was looking at especially when Martin Hale and Tony Penfold were vectored?
Martin is quite vociferous on this matter. He vehemently claims he was shot at and tracked by a front hemisphere missile of some kind. His emails make compelling reading but he will not allow me to publish them on this forum.
I certainly have no reason to doubt him.
I believe the 'D' in Glamorgan? reported a contact exiting the area at high speed just after the Penfold/Ardiles engagement.
The whereabouts and activities of 'Buitre' flight would be particularly interesting as they would have been the only others airborne at the time with radar (head on) missiles.
Did any of these Argentinean CAP's release any weapons other than Dardo flight against Thomas and Barton?
ES

PabloCalcaterra
27th Dec 2008, 18:15
hello Mr. Edmund! Good to hear from you...
And hello to the other Argentine members.

As far as I have read (very quickly, to be honest) I cannot agree more with information and sources mentioned by Jualbo. In fact, you are using the same magazines and books I have.

I remember that in the Official video of Malvinas (by the Air Force) there is a short shot of a Mirage being chased by a missile, being hit and cartwheeling on the ground (the plane is in a right hand tight turn). I clearly remember that the Mirage was not smoking (only the standard smoke that comes out of the jet exhaust). Now, if all accounts say that GC was hit only by 35/20 mm guns, this is not his plane (as stated somewhere above) because a missile hits him.

All Air Force sources I have checked have confirmed no damage to his plane before approaching to land.

Hope this helps.

Pictures posted above (Dagger 404) were taken by Allan White for my article (in www.modelingmadness.com (http://www.modelingmadness.com)) where the historic part was researched along with one of the members of this thread...

Happy 09 everyone!

Pablo

PabloCalcaterra
28th Dec 2008, 14:17
got an answer from a contact who was in the islands during May 1sts, recording the events.
GCuerva's plane was not smoking or leaking fuel. He rocked his wings to be identified and got shot by all guns (no missile).
So the film that was mentioned above is not Garcia Cuerva's plane being shot down.
Regards
Pablo

Navaleye
28th Dec 2008, 23:00
I've been having a look at the 1st Black Buck raid on May 1, I was curious to know relative position of the task force force for this raid. A quick trawl quickly yielded the information as shown on the graphic below. Thought this might be of interest for our Argentine friends.

This places Invincible 106NM from Stanley airport, 530NM from Rio Gallegos and 483NM from Rio Grande.

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y184/Navaleye/Vulcanraid.jpg

Navaleye
29th Dec 2008, 16:18
KG86,

Many thanks for the info about the wreck on Steeple Jason. I took a peek on Google and the scene is still just as you described. Pic below from Google Earth.

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y184/Navaleye/steeplejason.jpg

Later edit: I took a look from another angle, south to North and its an A4 to be sure. The tail is very distinctive. Can't tell what's in the debris field, possibly drop tanks. I would guess the impact point at 300ft. Is this consistent with the attack profile used at the time?

The two accounts of this engagement don't stand up. Coventry locked up three targets, assessed to be a C-130 and two escorts, believed Mirages. Coventry engaged at 38 miles with a pair of Sea Dart, one aimed at the Herc, the other at the escorts. Both 909s had lock and two channels were available. The Herc shot was seen to miss, but the second was seen by Broadsword to hit at least one of the escorts.

Now: Steeple Jason Island is 143 miles away from Coventry. If this aircraft was part of the flight, it could have paid no part because it crashed inbound and could not have been detected by Coventry at that range/altitude if she was East of the Falklands.

Could our friends in Argentina shed more light on this?

TEEEJ
29th Dec 2008, 17:14
PabloCalcaterra wrote

I remember that in the Official video of Malvinas (by the Air Force) there is a short shot of a Mirage being chased by a missile, being hit and cartwheeling on the ground (the plane is in a right hand tight turn). I clearly remember that the Mirage was not smoking (only the standard smoke that comes out of the jet exhaust). Now, if all accounts say that GC was hit only by 35/20 mm guns, this is not his plane (as stated somewhere above) because a missile hits him.

Please excuse me if I am incorrect, but was this the footage that you saw?

YouTube - Harrier derribado desde tierra por comandos argentinos (http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=BejP833FgAI)

The footage although linked to the conflict shows the demise of an F-102/F-106 target drone. Not having access to actual combat footage many documentaries fall back on drone test-range footage to represent shootdowns.

The footage of Captain Garcia Cuerva's Mirage crashing does exist. It has been shown on at least one documentary.

TJ

reydelcastillo
30th Dec 2008, 14:06
Not sure about footage on Garcia Cuerva shot down on blue / blue -
Shot by 35 mm while atempting to land - 35 mm did not have camera option -
Plane inbound from west to east , just north of Sapper Hill using Helo path -I saw the palne crash on land , were it meets with the ocean - no ejection -
Regarde Enrique

TEEEJ
31st Dec 2008, 01:40
Hi Enrique,

Thanks for the reply. The footage was most likely shot by an Argentine TV crew.

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/297920-falklands-crash-sites-5.html

Dead pan wrote.

'A few years back I saw some footage taken of an Argentinian aircraft crashing onto a small peninsula (I'd never seen this before). The footage was taken at extreme range hence was hard to distinguish what aircraft was involved. Not sure who filmed this - it may have been one of the 'embedded' TV crews.'

jualbo
1st Jan 2009, 22:38
Very fast: About Coventry´s Sea dart, they were fired at two different Learjet flights, missing in both cases. I have to look for the info but think it was a solitary Learjet in the first flight a nd two in the second. Coventry fired one missile on each aircraft, missing (one very close by the way). Coventry was placed around Stanley I think. Skyhawks were believed to crash in the air due to horrible bad weather: three other argentineans strike flights (looking for Coventry) had to abort due to poor visibility. Also in the day Coventry downed a Puma. I believe must be a video from Sea Wolf TV camera on HMS Brilliant (the Coventry´s company that day in the missile trap).

Navaleye about 1 May Invincible position, could place the one she had when Canberra flights aproached?

Edmund I´ll post the exact time of taking off and landing of that flights. Be patient. The exact time over the island must be suposed in the half of taking off and landing. But remember that Ward confused drop tanks with missiles also that day. Anyway there is no other testimony of the combat except for Martin and Tony. Although i still i´m trying to look for the Pucaras pilots on land (Goose Green) who wittnessed it.

Fortin flight pursued a Sea Harriers CAP that was following one of Torno Daggers. This plane had fuel transfer problems after his strike on british ships and had to go up to save and arrive home. Then a Sea Harrier CAP, probably guided by air controller began to pursuit him. All this was seen by the Malvinas radar who directed Fortin CAP to follow Sea Harriers CAP. It seemed like a race. A solitary Dagger (Torno) followed by 2 Sea Harriers and those followed by 2 Daggers (Fortin).All finally broke and everybody went home.

Regards from Spain

PS: Edmund I have to ask you about your combat on 8 june and Dave Morgan´s book. According to him, Héctor Sánchez, the argentienean survivor, had him in sight and could fire at you. In a BBC radio program, Héctor talked about having see both of you making a turn to avoid you. But also afirm to see the splashes around his plane, so he must be the pilot fired by Morgan, while you probably found your prey (Bolzan) by a sort of chance, cause he wásn´t the pilot fired by Dave, although had to be flying in a paralel course to Sánchez´s one. What do you think?

Navaleye
1st Jan 2009, 23:21
Jualbo,

The Canberra engagement happened much later in the day approaching dusk. I don't have the precise coordinates for the task force at this time, but most likely the fleet was operating in roughly the same area as in the morning given the need operate strikes against positions on the Falklands and to provide adequate CAP coverage for them. It would have moved East at night; The raid was detected by Invincible on her 1022 set was at 120 miles closing. I believe the Canberras were operating from Trelew (perhaps you could confirm this). If so the graphic below would help explain.

The Alferez Sobral was sent sent to look for the downed Canberra crew when it was attacked by Coventry's Lynx with Sea Skua missiles. This was reported to be approximately 80 miles NW of the task force at the time. Coventry was on the northern most sector of the Type 42 Screen on that day.

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y184/Navaleye/Canberrapickup-1.jpg

Edmund Spencer
1st Jan 2009, 23:51
Jualbo
I wrote an account of the combat earlier in this thread.
A more recent communication with Hector Sanchez would indicate that he never was in a position to fire at Dave Morgan or myself.
As I wrote previously, initially, I had no visual contact with either Dave Morgan or any of the A4's. I pulled out of my dive at about 100 feet above the sea doing about 610 knots on the attack heading Dave had called. Shortly afterwards I saw Dave fire his two sidewinders in quick succession about a mile or so ahead of me. I saw both these hits and thereby got visual with Dave. He then closed the third A4 and opened up with his entire magazine from both 30mm Aden cannons. This enabled me to get visual on the A4 he was firing at and, when he pulled up and clear, it was this A4 I locked with one of my sidewinders and fired at. There is absolutely no doubt about this!
I never saw Hector but from recent conversations with Dave we gather he was ahead and to the right of both of us. I have to say he is probably extremely fortunate I didn't see him as I would have been in a good firing position to shoot at him as well!
ES

reydelcastillo
1st Jan 2009, 23:57
There was one crew of profesional news , leaded by Kazanzeu , who had the oprtunity to film almost all the war , but saddly all what was film was censored and destroyed before it was able to send back to continent , and when in continent it was censored again -
At the best he may have been able to recover only 10 % of all what he had - Because of that most part of the History was lost -

Edmund Spencer
2nd Jan 2009, 05:21
As a matter of interest here is a photo recently taken by Dave Morgan of the A4 I shot down on 8 June 1982.
http://i711.photobucket.com/albums/ww115/smi6086/visit56.jpg
ES

MAINJAFAD
2nd Jan 2009, 12:26
I used to work with a guy called Geoff Fish who was a helicopter pilot during the war. He used to recount a tale of a mechanical failure which lead to his helicopter crash landing in a pond. I've tried googling this in order to find out more info but I drew a blank so can anyone on PPRuNe add any details?Helicopter was a Scout AH1, full details and a photo of the aircraft sitting in the pond are in 'Falklands, The Air War', which I don't have access of at the minute. According to some British reports, after the May 30th attack, many SH were lunch to try to intercet the intruders. There are also reports about the lunching of 5 Sea Dart that day from the HMS Invincible.Invincible did fire three salvos of Sea Dart on 25th May at an unknown high speed contact a few minutes after the Exocet strike which resulted in the loss of Atlantic Conveyor. Only Sea Darts fired on the 30th were by HMS Exeter

Navaleye
2nd Jan 2009, 12:37
Exeter fired three Sea Dart in single shots, downing a A4s at very low level. The total Sea Dart expenditure in the campaign was about 30 missiles.

Snapshot
2nd Jan 2009, 17:38
Guys from each corner of the globe, this thread is what is beautiful about
modern technology and the net especially!
Can you imagine the Spitfire and Hurricane Pilots of WWII chating like this
with their Luftwaffe counterparts a few years on?

Ive never been so excited and compelled to read each reply to this amazing thread! Having people, live humans interacting online WHO WERE ACTUALLY THERE! Just awesome!
I was a mere lad of 16 when this took place! Ive been fortunate to be around the military and aviation for many years since!

I simply want to say thank you to everyone who has contributed and offered
their personal memories (many of which I am sure are still painful to some of you)

Human nature is an amazing thing sometimes!
God bless all of you and I wish everyone who reads my message a peaceful 2009
I actually feel quite honoured to read this!
Thank you again
AB

reydelcastillo
2nd Jan 2009, 19:58
How close to the Atlantic Conveyor were the Carriers when it was hiy by the Exorcet on may the 25 th ?

Regards Enrique

jualbo
2nd Jan 2009, 21:57
According to FAA webpage:

Two Learjets, radio call sign "Pepe" tokk off from San Julián at 10:07, takinf the route Río Gallegos-Falklands- Río Gallegos-San Julián, arriving to Falklands at 10:30 in a flight level 350 (I think the time is obviously wrong. Probably 11:30) Being at a position 51º 30' S/58º 30' W they contacted Malvinas radar. Number 2 saw two missiles coming almost horizontally. Both planes opened the formation avoiding them. Malvinas informed no plane was in the air at the moment, so the missiles had to come from a ship (HMS Coventry or HMS Broadsword). They went down hardly coming back home. They landed at Río Gallegos at 12:57. And from there, they finally landed at San Julián at 17:15.
Another two Learjet took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 10:10 with a radio call sign "Litro". Litro 2 aborted shortly after due to mechanical problems. Litro 1 arrived at Falklands at 11:45. Flying at FL 400, under radar control they took a 90º course going away around 30 miles. Then radar ordered to came back as fast they could. They began a hard right turn. The observer could apreciate a SAM really close to the wing extreme. Then went down fast and returned home landing in Río Gallegos at 13:10 cause Comodoro Rivadavia was close due to bad weather.

Navaleye
2nd Jan 2009, 21:57
At the time of impact on AC, Hermes was on a reciprocal to Invincible 2000 yds off her port bow. Atlantic Conveyor was 14 miles to port. Neither Hermes or Invincible were in any danger from this attack, if they had been both Exocets would have ditched. AC was defenseless but was only hit by one Exocet which did detonate.

jualbo
2nd Jan 2009, 22:26
Navaleye. On 1 may there were two trio of Canberras with a time separation about 25 minutes. The first one encircled HMS Brilliant and HMS Yarmouth. They say they were fired two missiles. I have reports from that ships to have fired rocket chaff missiles (probably fearing an Exocet raid) or perhaps ASW rocket or mortar (they were hunting for ARA San Luis). The first trio aborted. One of the planes was damaged while turning (I think he skirmished the water while turned to avoid the suposed threat cause, according to some sources, the wing was deflected but not burned or holed by shrapnel). I have no account from both ships of having fired.
They saw the islands and one ship, confusing her position with the northern entrance of Falkland sound. In the scape they saw two air objects in the horizon believed helicopters or Harriers and a ship they confused with a carrier. I think probably the other frigate (one Brilliant, the other Yarmouth and the air objects Sea Kings that were supporting the ASW mission)

The second trio was intercepted by Sea Harrier (Curtiss-Broadwater) 25 minutes later when closing to Invincible (24 miles). But there is no testimony of pilots about having watched her. I think you are probably right in the position in the map of this flight that also took off from Trellew. This flight probably was flying a northern route by a navigational error cause its intended target was the same than the first trio (british landing crafts in Berkeley sound) that clearly saw the islands and the ASW group.

One question: On 23 may attacks against Antelope, the two bombs that hit her, were Mk-17 1000 lb or one of them was Mk-82 Snakeeye 500 lb and the other a Mk-17? In that case, which was the one that hit the starboard aft section, the first dropped or the bomb that hit in second place? Which type was it?

Thanks

jualbo
2nd Jan 2009, 23:21
One question: A crewmember from Exeter told me about one of their Sea Darts launched on 30th may, flying over HMS Avenger. Is it true?

Edmund I found these links in military photos forum:
http://db.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/ram/falklands2.ram

http://db.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/f...ogramme2.shtml (http://db.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/f...ogramme2.shtml)

It´s the interview to Morgan and Sánchez.

I have no doubt about your words but if you listen Sánchez is in some way contradictory. I think he didn´t see all the action or perhaps was flying closer to Bolzán than it seems. The only way to see shots from Morgan would be if he would have been flying forward to Bolzán and some past shots would explode close to him after passing Bolzán plane. It would explain the fire watched by him. He doesn´t talk about any kind of advertisment to his fellows so probably didn´t saw the launchings of Sidewinders against them. From where Morgan affirm in his book that Sánchez had him in his way and could fire? FAA webpage says in Bolzán´s obituary that Sánchez saw two Sea Harriers coming from upper and right position. Does it mean that was ahead and on the left when you shoted down Bolzán? Or behind (what would explain he to be the only to not attack) on the left. In this case perhaps he could take you on sight. It would explain you didn´t watch him.

Also FAA webpage says that his plane was damaged by small arms (probably when they aproached to the target flying over land in Fitzroy area). It´s possible these are the shots he talks about. According to Morgan three planes dropped their bombs against the craft. The fourth (Sánchez) aborted and didn´t attack.

Great photo of the infortunate Bolzan´s Skyhawk.

Thanks again

According to FAA webpage:
Torno took off from San Julian at 15:45 and landed at 18:25. So probably overflew the islands around 17:05.
Fortin took off from San Julián at 16:00 and landed at 18:40. They intercepted the CAP that pursuited Torno 3. So they probably were over Falklands at 17:10.
Buitre took off from Río Gallegos at 15:50 and arrived at 17:40 (so flying the island around 16:45)
Dardo took off from Río Gallegos at 15:45 (so over Falklands at 16:40)
Rubio took off from Río Grande at 15:54 (so over Falklands at 16:54)
The witness of this last combat were the Pucara pilots Cap Grünert, Cap Vila and 1st Lt Fasani.

Some sources also places a solitary Dagger from San Julián (Fierro) over the islands around 17:00, but Núñez Padín ( a reputed argentinean air historician places this flight in the morming tooking off from San Julián at 12:30)

Regards

Navaleye
3rd Jan 2009, 01:23
One question: A crewmember from Exeter told me about one of their Sea Darts launched on 30th may, flying over HMS Avenger. Is it true?

Not exactly, I went to a briefing with Hugo White CO of Avenger (later Rear Adm). Avenger had fired both chaff charlie and chaff delta and had seduced the Exocet fired at her. Exeter was 18NM north east and locked on to the A4 flight following the Exocet. She fired three Sea Dart, the first was seen to miss, the second and third both recorded confirmed kills, confirmed by the Argentine Air Force.

The Exocet ditched at the end of its flight and the two remaining Skyhawks made unsuccessful attacks on Avenger scoring no hits. Invincible was was 22 miles from Exeter which was controlling the engagement which was broadcast over link 10. Exeter had the latest ADAWS kit, plus a highly effective type 1022 volume search radar. At no time was the Exocet in range of Hermes or Invincible

The rest is history.

Navaleye
3rd Jan 2009, 01:43
One question: On 23 may attacks against Antelope, the two bombs that hit her, were Mk-17 1000 lb or one of them was Mk-82 Snakeeye 500 lb and the other a Mk-17? In that case,

I may be wrong, and I'm happy to be corrected, but I believe the bomb that blew in Antelope was French made.

Edmund Spencer
3rd Jan 2009, 02:35
Thank you very much for the link, Jualbo. This is the first time I have listened to this interview.
Far be it from me to contradict Dave or Hector but some of what was said was highly unlikely/incorrect.
Firstly, if Hector saw cannon fire behind him he would have been ahead of Bolzan. I saw Bolzan manoeuvering with the cannon fire all around him. If Hector was that close I am very surprised I didn't see him.
Secondly, an A4 is not going to get a guns solution against a Sea Harrier doing in excess of 600 knots at 50 feet over the sea no matter what anyone says!! I also fail to see how he ended up behind Dave if the cannon fire was observed behind him in the first place and Dave pulled up as soon as he had finished firing.
I did not fire my cannons in this attack.
Thirdly, I never called that Dave was under attack.
ES

Navaleye
3rd Jan 2009, 02:46
Snapshot,

It was a long time ago, but thanks for your kind words. Best wishes for 2009.

Cheers,

Navaleye.

Edmund Spencer
3rd Jan 2009, 05:10
To go back to Cuerva's crash on 1st May I have attached a photo of the wing of the A4 shot down on 8th June. I am told that the hook shaped shrapnel marks are unique to the sidewinder warhead. If we could locate and inspect Cuerva's wreckage we might be able to establish how badly he was damaged by Steve Thomas' missile.

http://i711.photobucket.com/albums/ww115/smi6086/visit61.jpg

ES

Edmund Spencer
3rd Jan 2009, 11:39
Navaleye
I am interested in your quote:
At the time of impact on AC, Hermes was on a reciprocal to Invincible 2000 yds off her port bow. Atlantic Conveyor was 14 miles to port. Neither Hermes or Invincible were in any danger from this attack, if they had been both Exocets would have ditched. AC was defenseless but was only hit by one Exocet which did detonate.
I remember the evening of the attack vividly.
I had just been released from flying duties and had hurried down to the wardroom for the first of my rationed two pints of CSB (Courage Special Bitter) per night. The wardroom bar in HMS Hermes opened at 18:00 and closed a couple of hours later as it was the dormitory for the entire flying group onboard. (5 Deck was evacuated because of the anticipated submarine attack.)
Shortly after taking my first sip the air raid siren went off and we were all told to "Close all red openings" (Shut and clip every hatch) followed by "Everybody HIT THE DECK!!!!" Followed by more alarmingly "MAKE SURE ALL THOSE CLIPS ARE REALLY TIGHT!"
I remember the wardroom bar being closed with the shutters coming down and me cuddling my precious pint of CSB lying flat on the deck like it was the most important thing of all time! I remember the noise of chaff rockets being fired and thinking "where is this missile going to come inboard?"
The wardroom in HMS Hermes was quite close to the waterline and I could quite literally imagine the weapon coming inboard through the wardroom at any moment.
After what seemed like an eternity we were given the all clear but I remember being deeply traumatized by the being inside a confined space with absolutely no idea of what was going on outside. (Thank goodness for the pint of CSB which I am glad to report survived the situation!)
An aircraft handler from our squadron later said he saw the missile hit Atlantic Conveyer whilst he was on deck and he was so stressed he he bit through his back teeth and required dental treatment from our onboard toothwright!

If the AC was 14 miles away how could we have been so involved in the action?

ES

Edmund Spencer
3rd Jan 2009, 12:34
Regarding the Atlantic Conveyer I have to relate another interesting story.
One of my instructors at RAF Valley who I had a huge regard for was one of the pilots who came down to the Falklands with The Atlantic Conveyer as a newly fledged Sea Harrier pilot. These guys had done the absolute minimum of Harrier training and had been sent down to the South Atlantic to help us out.
The transfer of Sea Harriers from Atlantic Conveyer to HMS Hermes and Invincible required a vertical take off from Atlantic Conveyer and (obviously, a vertical landing on the designated carrier)
The vertical take off in a Harrier was an interesting manoeuvre.
It required the carefull and calculated handling of a colossal amount of power delivered to you in an incredibly short period of time.
For me this is twenty years ago but if I remember correctly, it was:
Slam to 55% (check accel time) Nozzles to 40 (Check duct pressure) Nozzles to the hover stop (without delay) Back to the throtlle and slam to FULL POWER!
Those of you who have flown high performance fighters will know what it is to get 21,000 pounds of thrust in approximately one and a quarter seconds!
I believe this particular individual forgot to move his nozzles to the hover stop and took off from Alantic Conveyer with 40 degrees of nozzle selected.
Miraculously, he survived, but like Tony Penfold took no further part in the proceedings.
These were terrific guys. John Leeming was amongst them.
He got involved in combat shortly after he arrived. He, apparently closed an A4 and tried to fire his missile. Sadly, he had forgotten to turn the electronics on but the gun switches were similar to the Lightning which he had just been flying so he switched these on and fired a complete magazine of 30 mm Aden rounds at the A4 and subsequently flew through the fireball!
ES

Navaleye
3rd Jan 2009, 14:27
ES,

That was an account heard from from someone on Invincible, which is slightly misleading as this would place AC on Hermes starboard quarter. Doubtless the whole task group would close up to action stations and lay chaff for deception on receipt of a Handbrake racket. AC of course had no chaff and was allegedly hit by an Exocet which was itself seduced by Yarmouth's chaff pattern. The account of this AC attack is quite confused and in some cases contradictory. Good news that your CSB survived intact though! I guess it tasted even better after. Invincible launched 6 Sea Dart in 90 seconds during the attack at a target later assessed as Hermes first chaff pattern, which shows how confusing the attack was. This was a well planned and well executed attack by the Argentine navy. I am working on a creating a full time line for this attack in due course.

The BoI report is here. (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/BoardOfInquiryIntoTheLossOfSsAtlanticConveyor.htm)

However it is also inaccurate in some respects, believing that AC was hit by two missiles, when their is no evidence of this.

The Am39s used by the Argentines were export models and had a less sophisticated centroid homing seeker than the NATO spec weapon. Regardless, they worked well against large undefended targets.

jualbo
3rd Jan 2009, 15:23
Hi again:

Thanks for Snapshot words. Nice to read them.

Returning to 8 june action I found this link to Morgan book:
Hostile Skies (http://www.britains-smallwars.com/swbooks/extract_hostileskies.html)

There are two interesting paragraphs:

1º: Unbeknownst to me, on my entry into the fight, I had mistaken the third Skyhawk for the rearmost man, a mistake that should have cost me my life. As I was about to line up my sights on the second A4, the rear man was manoeuvring in an attempt to spoil my whole day with a stream of 20 mm high explosive rounds. I had made the classic mistake of barrelling into the fight without total situational awareness. As a result, I had nearly collided with the fourth Skyhawk and was now directly in front of him. Purely by chance, Primer Teniente Hector Sanchez had taken some ground fire a few minutes earlier, which had damaged his gun in such a way that it would not fire. He had to watch, helplessly, as his formation fell prey to my deadly missiles.

2º: Suddenly, over the radio came an urgent shout from Dave Smith, "Pull up, Pull up, you're being fired at!" All he had seen of the fight up until now, because of the failing light, was two missile launches followed by two explosions. He then saw an aircraft, only feet above the water, flying through a hail of explosions and assumed it to be me. By now I had run out of ammunition and at Dave's cry, I pulled up into the vertical, through the setting sun and in a big lazy looping manoeuvre, rolled out at twelve thousand feet heading northeast for Hermes with my heart racing.

Is Morgan taking some literary license?
According to him, it seems as if you have intercepted a row of planes in the third step. The forth one, Sánchez, would have kept unseen in a forth place. According to FAA webpage, he saw the interception from upper and right, so he was on the left. This would place him ina left rear position. In fact, interception began before argentinean pilots get their objetive. Morgan describes how while is making his hard dive, he sees the first plane to attack and miss. Then the second scoring a hit. And the third taking a paralel course just on his left. He´s the one to be fired and the one to be shot down. Does it mean that Sánchez really was behind you on the left?

I agree that it´s impossible he to be behind and finally ahead. I think when he mentions to be fired, it could be the small arms that fired at him when overflew land during the ingress. Mazo and Martillo flights came from the west towards east. Overflew Fitzroy where were fired and damaged and then made, under Malvinas radar indications, a 180º right turn to look for the target. This put them on a west course over sea, heading for the landing craft. That´s just the moment in which Morgan saw them and began the interception. If they were flying an arrow formation, the ones on the left side probably placed in the rear after the right turn. Sánchez was probably one of them.
What do you think? In the second paragraph he says you thought he was the pilot flying betwen shots. What is not logical at all cause you indeed fired at that plane what hadn´t happened if you really had thought it was Morgan.

Navaleye ,about 30th may raid, my source, a crewmember named Andrew Mawman, told me that Exeter was 12,5 miles NW from Avenger. So someone´s is wrong, or both :). And Invencible 24 miles east from them.

Argentineans used no french bombs during the war. The ones were Mk-17 (1000 lb) and BR-250 (250 Kg). The Naval aviation spent american Mk-82 with snakeye tails

Regards

Navaleye
3rd Jan 2009, 16:00
Jaulbo,

That just goes to show how confusing the fog of war can be when trying recreate an action, even official documents are frequently wrong. Its also hard to synchronise exact positions especially with aircraft where a time difference of two minutes can lead difference of several miles. I would need to see the track chart of each ship to ascertain the precise position of course. These are not readily available though.

sargs
3rd Jan 2009, 17:07
Navaleye / KG86

I’ve followed your posts with respect to the two Skyhawks lost in the Jasons on the 9th May 1982 with interest. A couple of points, in the spirit of debate, if I may:


There is definitely at least one A-4 on South Jason Island, at approximately 51 12 21.67S 60 53 27.18W. I first visited this wreck on 29th December 1993 – I remember it well because I had to be winched from a Sea King onto the hillside! I was trying to determine if it was one or two aircraft, but I didn’t have long enough on the hill to decide. On the 12th January 2001 an EOD team visited the island to dispose of any live ordnance that had become apparent since their last visit (those visits were annual then), in our Sea King we were able to land on the ridge to drop them off but you wouldn’t have got a Chinook on there. The EOD team actually set fire to the island by mistake – it created a real upset with the conservationists, and questions were asked in the British Parliament. I (and many others) spent the next 5 days trying to water-bomb the fire out, together with the Chinook crew from 78 Sqn with their very impressive bucket!
This A-4 hit the North West side of the ridge heading Easterly. In my (unprofessional) opinion it was a CFIT by an aircraft heading INBOUND to the islands – this was supported in my mind by the EOD team I spoke to after my first visit in 1993 who informed me South Jason was the location of at least one unexploded 1000-pounder on their list of “interesting things to find”.
I can’t see the “distinctive tail, debris field, and poss drop tanks” you refer to on Steeple Jason (19 miles away to the NW). I have to say though, I can’t see any of these items on the crash site on South Jason either, so I’d be surprised if you could see them on Google Earth
KG86 – could you have been hovering on the South Jason ridge? Your description of a “circular saw” is classic South Jason.Happy New Year, regards to all on this fantastic thread.

Navaleye
3rd Jan 2009, 17:58
Sargs,

Thank you very much for your post, I had a look on Google at your position and believe I can see the debris you refer to. Strangely, I did a complete look at South Jason and missed it. It only deepens the mystery. If these wrecks are indeed related to Coventry's 9th May engagement. In my opinion they were not as they would have been undetectable, so a bad weather CFIT fits the bill. I guess we may never know what unit they belonged to and when they were launched.

Jualbo, the Bomb Disposal expert on Antelope did report a French bomb/fuse and had no knowledge of how to defuse it. More fog....

TEEEJ
3rd Jan 2009, 22:02
Navaleye wrote

I guess we may never know what unit they belonged to and when they were launched.

Argentine Aircraft Lost - Falklands War 1982 (http://www.naval-history.net/F64argaircraftlost.htm)

' Two A-4C Skyhawks of FAA Grupo 4 lost. Possibly damaged by Sea Darts from HMS Coventry or crashed in bad weather, with one aircraft found on South Jason Island. Lt Casco and Lt Farias killed.'

Argentine Skyhawks in the Malvinas (http://www.skyhawk.org/2e/argentina/falklands-malvinas/argentina-malvinas.htm)

'Grupo 4 attempted to strike the British ships but deteriorating weather forces most Skyhawks to abort. One flight attempting to complete the mission lost two Skyhawks. Teniente Jorge Farias flying C-303 simply disappeared, and C-313 flown by Teniente Jorge Casco crashed into cliffs of South Jason Island. Teniente Casco's body was found in the wreckage.'

TJ

jualbo
3rd Jan 2009, 22:17
As I told in a previous post, Coventrys´ Sea Dart were launched on 9th may against Learjets not against Skyhawks and all missed. Three missiles were detected and avoided by the argentineans decoy Learjets.

Lt Casco and Lt Farias A-4Cs Skyhawks were lost in bad weather the same day on Jason islands. There is even a letter from 1st Lt Vázquez, later killed on 30th may, in which describes the impossible conditions to fly that morning cause he also flew another flight that had to abort after reaching West Falkland. It´s suposed that they could crash in the air, falling one to land and the other to sea. Both planes carried one solitary Mk-17 1000 pound bomb, so the bomb may be from them.

About debris field in Steeple Jason island, I have some reports on argentine planes that aborted missions and threw his bombs, as a practice, over the islands they found on their way home. I remember one mission on 29th may in which two Daggers (1st Lt Román and Lt Aguirre), after aborting for a CAP presence jettisonned his bombs on islas Salvajes (in english Grand Jason and Steeple Jason islands).

Regards

PD: Don´t know if the fuses were french but the bombs used that day were Mk-17 (A-4 B from FAA) and Mk-82 (A-4Q from Navy)

jualbo
3rd Jan 2009, 22:34
On 25th may two Skyhawks were downed by Sea Dart from Coventry while flying over north West Falkland. One of the pilots ejected and was later found dead on Golding island some years after. He was Captain García. The other pilot was captain Palaver and was never found (I think). Do you know if there are rests of their planes or probably fell to sea?

Edmund Spencer
3rd Jan 2009, 23:34
Just This Once:
The shot was directly astern. It was a very long range shot for low level. I estimate I was at about 50 feet doing approximately 615 knots. I couldn't put the A4 on the horizon so he must have been at 30 feet or so. I thought the range to be a good mile and a half and can only assume it reached the target because of my substantial overtake. In fact, I saw the motor flame out well before impact.
Jualbo:
Yes, I would say a fair degree of literary licence! But nonetheless, a good read.
ES

Navaleye
4th Jan 2009, 14:16
EJ,

I hate to ask if the bottle of port cure really worked! :(:\:uhoh:

Lower Hangar
4th Jan 2009, 18:27
I was in the 899/800 readyroom ( you know the big one on 4 deck where Des hung out and Neil Thomas slept ) trying to glean what had or had not worked on returning SHAR's and Dave Morgan came in ( it was late in the afternoon/early evening - but dark - and he must have just returned from CAP ) " Conveyor is out there" he said " - and its going up like November 5th ". DM always was a cheerful /upbeat kind of a pilot which I always thought percolated through to the deck crew to good effect

As far as the attack on AC - popular rumor mill/urban myth was that the down range Lynx installed I band transponder did the trick as far as saving Hermes and Invincible.

jualbo
5th Jan 2009, 17:49
I found on Military photos phorum a news about one of Antelope´s bombs:
Falklands 25 - Page 36 - Military Photos (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=107232&page=36)

The one that exploded was a british Mk-17.
Still mistery about the second one.

Willoz269
6th Jan 2009, 00:42
If the AC was 14 miles away how could we have been so involved in the action?

ES


Better still Dave, that is amazing eyesight from your aircraft handler being able to see the AC if it was at 14nm distance on a rolling deck at that time of the day!

Edmund Spencer
6th Jan 2009, 01:06
My sentiments entirely, Will!
Possibly the result of an overactive imagination but I definitely remember his account of this.
With all the noise and excitement going on in HMS Hermes we could have been forgiven for thinking the action was a bit closer. I was surprised to hear from Navaleye that the AC was so far away.
ES

Willoz269
6th Jan 2009, 01:14
On another note Dave, and this probably opens up a can of worms so you can reserve your opinion if you so wish.

But knowing today what you know of the Argentinian Air Force, what could they have done differently? I am asking as I re-read some of the books of the time, and found a quote from one of the GR3 pilots who didnt have many kind words as to the performance of the FAA in the conflict. Particularly in the Air to Air environment.

I read a few days ago a report in Spanish that the FAA did indeed have an Israeli instructor in the months prior to the conflict, to impart some tactics and techniques of modern aviation warfare.

Would the fact that they had no airborne radar, RWR, or HUD really have tipped the scales significantly? Again, you don't have to answer if you don't feel like it, I respect that.

Edmund Spencer
6th Jan 2009, 02:03
I think the one thing that stood out and was a constant surprise to us was the way they flew tactical formation at low level. They generally flew as a fairly tight finger or arrow formation at very low level and at relatively high speed (500kts plus.) This meant they had little or no mutual support or cross cover which would have been provided by the battle spread we would have flown in similar circumstances. They would probably argue that they wanted to be close so that they could all pass over the same target together (Col Raul Diaz' email to me indicated this.) If this was the case they should have provided a card escort behind the attacking force of, say, two Daggers armed with Shaffrir. This would have put an entirely different perspective on the situation for us.
I believe in many of our intercepts we were unsighted until our first missile had struck home. (Certainly so on 24 May against 'Oro' flight.) If there had been a card escort a couple of miles behind the main attack force our attacks would have been much more difficult to execute with impunity.
Even in the first true air to air encounter between Steve Thomas/Paul Barton against Cuerva/Perona it appears Perona was flying in arrow when he should have been way out on Cuerva's 90 at a different altitude. This would have enabled him to pass Paul Barton head on and start a decent fight. As it was it seems he rolled conveniently into Paul's 12 o'clock!
Interesting to hear what the other tacticians out there might think about this.
ES

Willoz269
6th Jan 2009, 04:27
Could it be Israeli tactics?

An interesting snippet from "My experiences in the Malvinas", I have condensed the content:

"In 1978 the need to purchase a Fighter Bomber for the fleet was identified. Israel was the only realistic provider due to the European and American embargo in place at the time. An initial order of 24 IAI Nesher was placed, the aeroplanes received the name "Dagger" which really was the code name for the project to purchase the aeroplanes from Israel!

With a view to accelerate the acceptance into service of the new aeroplance, pilots were sent to:
-VIII Brigade to train with the Mirage III contingent
-Quinones Gonzalez Air Base (Peruvian Air Force) to train with Squadron 611 equipped with Mirage 5P.

In late October, the rest of the personnel were sent to Eitam Air Base in Sinai for training with the Israeli Air Force. Eight of those pilots underwent training in aeroplanes marked for the FAA with no markings as the whole operation was still under a cloud of secrecy. (It appears most of these pilots were ex-MIII)

Argentina was the first Latin country to receive Air Warfare instruction by Israel. The same course was later available to FAA pilots at Tandil base in Argentina, under the Israeli instructor Shlomo Erez.

The first batch of Nesher was loaded on 26th November 1978 on the "Jaspers" to Buenos Aires."

Navaleye
6th Jan 2009, 16:57
A quick note on the visual detection ranges, particularly in the South Atlantic. I should mention that I'm on a ship down to the Canaries lecturing and one of the other lecturers is none other than Michael Nicholson, ex-ITN who covered the campaign with Brain Hanrahan on Hermes and other ships at the time. I had a very pleasant chat about his voyage which I will expand on when i get a cheaper internet connection. Its $1 a minute on board.

Anyway back to visual detection ranges for those interested. The longest recorded visual detection of one ship by another was in 1939 by the Graf Spee when she detected a contact visually at 53,000 meters (!) which she subsequently sank. I able to put this partially to the test today and with a good pair of bins on a murky overcast January day. I could easily make out container ships at 11 miles and beyond.

The South Atlantic is so clear and un-polluted that this is possible, although I am not claiming this to be so in the case of AC given the time of day and the time of year. My dead reckoning position for AC may also be out as it is taken from Alacrity's track chart. Her satnav system was inoperable from Ascension southwards, so there may be some margin for error depending on when her last Astral fix was taken. Also as you get near to the poles, spurious radar targets become more common. I understand that at least two ships engaged targets beleived to be enemy surface vessels with guns which turned out to be anaprop.

Anyhow a nice sunny day in Lisbon beckons tomorrow. If anyone remembers Michael Nicholson, I'd be very pleased to say hello for you.

taxydual
6th Jan 2009, 21:41
Navaleye

You could ask him if he ever got over the early morning wake up smells of his colleague(?) Max.

"Gas Gas Gas" springs to mind.


This bit added

He won't remember but we two had a very interesting chat about the weather whilst leaning over a ships rail. Ah well, long time ago.

Isn't it strange that when two Englishmen meet for the first time, in foreign places, that the first thing discussed is the weather.Still happens.

Willoz269
6th Jan 2009, 22:03
Navaleye,


The aircraft handler was on the deck, with no binos, at close to sun down in the middle of alert red....if he stopped to fetch binos and look around, he should have had his rear end kicked for not doing what he was supposed to be doing.

Still, with binos, you got 11 miles and beyond...this guy got 14nm with a mk1 eyeball!

So...was the AC closer than the stipulated 14nm or the RN employed a descendant of Hawkeye as an aircraft handler on the Hermes???

reydelcastillo
6th Jan 2009, 23:58
It had been and was also at that moment transfering helos , and supplies to the carriers , so probably much closer than that

reydelcastillo
7th Jan 2009, 00:04
Other Forums that have also talk about this event have reports that would suggest the distance between A/C and carriers with in the range of 2 to 5 miles at the most

Edmund Spencer
7th Jan 2009, 02:15
Navaleye,
I have heard that just after the Penfold/Hale vs. Ardiles combat Tony was immediately invited to a press debrief on return. Martin declined the offer.
I would be very interested to know what was said during this debrief.
Can Michael Nicholson shed any light on what was said.
ES

Lower Hangar
7th Jan 2009, 06:52
Hanrahan did the interview with TP

Navaleye
7th Jan 2009, 16:19
Edmund,

I will ask Mike, maybe he was at the interview. He still speaks with Brian Hanrahan and maybe can shed some light on what TP said. Mike did the "walkover" interview with Sandy Woodward. His comments about his relationship with Lyn Middleton was very interesting. He is a neighbour of Lyn Middleton and they are friends so I could ask Lyn, via Mike to shed some light on this.

LH, strangely we talked about Robert Fox last night, but after several large glasses of Merlot I can't remember too much of what was said. I don't think he mentioned the problem you described. he did say that Bernard Hesketh the BBC camera man died a couple of years ago.

Good day from Lisbon.

Navaleye

Lower Hangar
8th Jan 2009, 06:43
As I recall the ready room was empty apart from the BBC crew ( BH + cameraman) and TP.

I may be slightly off mark with 'empty' - Bob Reeder (DAEO 800 NAS) might have been there as we usually met up in the ready room to discuss entries in the journal that was kept there which recorded all Weapon System comments on returning SHARs - some subtle points don't always come out at an ACR debrief so I created the journal speifically for this purpose and my visit would have been normal procedure post recovery - some of the crews could be quite detailed in there analysis of what had or had not happened to their weapon systems - some could be almost flippant - Mike Blissets entry on 1 page -was simply " Good System - splashed 2 x A4's "

Edmund Spencer
8th Jan 2009, 07:54
I remember Brian being quite protective of his Sea Harrier pilots so we may never learn the details of the interview and if that is his wish and Tony's let's leave it at that.
If my memory serves me correctly I think I remember him rescuing me from a couple of Sun reporters the night before our return into Portsmouth. I was about to tell them my life's story after one pint of CSB too many! I shudder to think of the headlines had he not intervened.
ES

MAINJAFAD
9th Jan 2009, 21:23
I was going to post this before Navaleye put the 14 miles post on.

According to 'The Royal Navy and the Falklands War' by David Brown (Naval Historical Branch) which has a whole chapter on the sinking of the AC, the attack came from the north west of the carrier battle group. There was one T42 (Exeter) on picket duties, 25 miles west of Invincible. Hermes was 5 miles to the north of the other carrier, with Brilliant near to Hermes playing goalkeeper. AC was five miles from both carriers, in a screen with one or more LSL's. Glamorgan and Ambuscade were up threat of the AC and LSL's. SuE's picked up 3 contacts on their pop up (Brown thinks they were Sir Tristram, Ambuscade and AC) and the Exocets were actually fired at Ambuscade (Handbrake being called by both Exeter and Ambuscade on ESM detection of the raid). The missiles were tracked by Brilliant and seen to be decoyed by Ambuscade's chaff pattern. After flying though the chaff pattern, one of the missiles reacquired a target in the shape of AC.

I haven’t got access to the book at the moment, but the account does also cover the Sea Dart firings by Invincible and the consternation caused by the missile salvos to three other battle group assets. One of them was the Hermes, the second I cannot remember and the other was one of Invincible’s own Sea Kings on ASW picket duties to the north of the group.

By the way Navaleye, according to ‘Falklands, The Air War’ Yarmouth was in the Falklands Sound area during the 25th.

Navaleye
10th Jan 2009, 17:23
MAINJAFAD,

I have no doubt you are right regarding Ambuscade not Yarmouth. Alacrity was on Circle 5 off Hermes, No matter how long I look at her reported positions I can't tally these with the others, so I have to assume it is wrong. However, if she was on Circle 5, and ACO was five or so miles from Hermes, that would make her the nearest ship and she was in fact the first to render assistance. I don't Chris Craig's account with me, but I'll dig it out when I'm back at home

MAINJAFAD
10th Jan 2009, 22:13
Navaleye.

Brown states in the front of the book that no official documents were used in its compilation, but he had access to personal accounts from multiple sources and had used them. He also only listed ships on the attack axis of the carriers and the only positions given were for Exeter, Hermes and Atlantic Conveyor, relative to Invincible.

So who really knows???:ugh::ugh::ugh:

nazca_steve
14th Jan 2009, 00:34
I just came across this fascinating thread and it's taken a good chunk of time to read through it - well worth every minute.

I was wondering if anyone on here remembers or knows any more details about the engagement between Curtis and Broadwater against the Canberras on 1st May. I read Sharkey Ward's account and by all means it filled in a lot of gaps, as do the Argentine accounts. From what I have read, the Argentine lead crew spotted a SHAR firing, but apparently too late to take initial evasive action. This confirms Sharkey's account that the SHARs approached from behind having flown past them (unnoticed?).

We know that Alan Curtis was sadly killed with EJ on the 6th, but I would dearly like to hear Mike Broadwater's account of the attack as well. I've spent almost two years on and off trying to track him down but to no avail. There's a good chance he does not want to be found, and fair enough, a man's privacy is his own business. However, if anyone on here ever spoke or heard Mike speak about the engagement, I'd love to hear about it.

An earlier post mentioned the ARA Alferez Sobral searching for the crew of the downed B-110, and I have often wondered if they would have had any luck had they not run into the RN patrol chopper and opened fire on it. My guess is that in the south atlantic waters, the two crewmen would not have made it that long (as it was quite a few hours later I believe when the boat went out).

Anyway, all very interesting stuff on here, and many thanks to all those from both sides of the Atlantic for sharing these stories.

Steve

bast0n
15th Jan 2009, 11:36
Atlantic Conveyor

Regarding the distance from AC to Hermes at the time of the Exocet attack - I was on the staboard bridge wing of AC at the time, clutching the stock of my machinegun that had been removed from a Wessex and welded to the edge of the bridge and hoping to have a bash at anything that came close! I am sure that we were only about 5 miles from Hermes at the time, certainly far less than 14 miles mentioned elsewhere. I also understood that it was possible that we were hit by two Exocets as it was thought that as they were fired very close together one was tracking the other.Is this possible?

Edmund Spencer
15th Jan 2009, 12:01
bast0n
Very interesting input. Thank you.
Can you give us some more information. For example, could you actually see HMS Hermes or any of the other ships from where you were on the Bridge wing?
ES

Navaleye
15th Jan 2009, 13:04
Bast0n,

A very interesting post - thank you. The BoI report does not exclude the possibility of two Exocet hits, but cannot confirm it either. The external evidence shows just one impact hole and the eye/ear witnesses record only one initial detonation.

Now, it is possible for two Exocets to hit at the same place as their homing seekers would be identical and would seek the largest radar return. This did indeed happen with the USS Stark in the Gulf when she was hit by two air launched Exocet. The second actually flew through the ship through the damage caused by the first.

I would be very interested to hear your recollection of the attack. I appreciate you were on the other side of the ship and would not have seen the Exocet(s) inbound, however, I would be very interested to hear what warning you had any what if any evasive action the ship took prior to impact.

Best regards,

Navaleye

Navaleye
15th Jan 2009, 13:14
This bit added

He won't remember but we two had a very interesting chat about the weather whilst leaning over a ships rail. Ah well, long time ago.

Isn't it strange that when two Englishmen meet for the first time, in foreign places, that the first thing discussed is the weather.Still happens

You were right and he doesn't ah well... :confused:

bast0n
15th Jan 2009, 13:46
Atalantic Conveyor

Yes, from the bridge wing one could see nearly all round as they were huge and stuck right out. A clear view of all the ships around, firing chaff and being very warlike was not only possible but quite entertaining. A bit like watching a war movie being made! We were a bit detached from reality as we did not have the tactical updates that everyone else had, lack of tactical radios and such like I would guess. Probably could have even seen over the port quarter where the Exocets came from - if we had known they were coming!! I was in the bar having a drink on Cunard prior to disembarking the next morning, we had been delayed 24 hours, and our little alarm bell went off so we had a quick swill and went to our action stations. As I said mine was on the starboard bridge wing -
http://i291.photobucket.com/albums/ll301/tallbronzedgod/jsf_Photo_scan_3731.jpg

You may note at the end of the day it was the only bit of the ship that did not burn and you can see my little machine gun still there! I was hoping to sharpen up some passing "pinger" with a bit of tracer but unfortunately never got the chance............

Navaleye - I do not recall the ship taking any evasive action before the impact, and we certainly had no chaff or other missile distractors fitted. The first we knew that there were things flying about was when there was an almighty thump and we looked at each other and said "what the ******was that", We soon found out.

AR1
15th Jan 2009, 17:45
How did you disembark BastOn - If I recall correctly (from Air Clues) some light blue on board had to jump.

bast0n
15th Jan 2009, 19:01
ARI - Very few actually jumped as the main deck was very high from the sea and we had ropes and ladders rigged. I started off down a rope ladder - it seemed a good idea as abandon ship had been ordered and my flying boots were melting! Unfortunately the ladder I chose had been cut off half way down by Alacritys heroic attempts at helping fight the fires, and as things (very hot things) were bursting out through the hull all around it seemed a good time to jump the rest of the way. Then things got very interesting......

seanbean
15th Jan 2009, 20:41
FFS Bast0n - you can't stop there! Pour yourself a large one and pray tell all...

bast0n
15th Jan 2009, 21:18
Do you think that this an appropriate story for this thread? I am not so sure. Senior Pilot are you out there??

taxydual
15th Jan 2009, 21:47
bast0n

I'd forgotten how big AC was. I've seen the Alacrity and Irishman pictures but not your picture. Memories, some not so good.

I was asleep at the time, big bang, lots of smoke then 'the ladder'.

Only once met IN to talk to properly, Doncaster man, my home town. Big respect. RIP.

My best regards to you.

Navaleye
16th Jan 2009, 08:45
Do you think that this an appropriate story for this thread? I am not so sure.

Very much so and I'm sure we'd all would like to hear your story. This is one of the most interesting and diverse threads I've seen on PPRuNe in the years I have been here - and long may it continue.

airborne_artist
16th Jan 2009, 09:22
I can't add anything to this thread as Maggie stopped my lot from going on Corporate. Seems she couldn't countenance some TA soldiers being mobilised when we had a Regular Army of 160,000. The fact that we had skills/kit not present elsewhere was beside the point.

However, my father played a key role in the central staff of the MoD, as he was a) Dep Dir of Ops, Rest of the World, and b) the last Captain of Endurance to be ashore - he'd handed over to NB in the summer of 1980. I have all his personal notes, taken at various meetings in London and Northwood from the end of March to the end of June. They are brief, and will really only mean much to someone already immersed in the subject and the language of the RN at the time.

He and I were doing some wall-papering on Sunday 21st March when the Duty Cdr rang from the MoD and told him the scrap-merchants had landed on S Georgia

If anyone reading this thread would like to see them, I'm sure we can arrange something. My father died in 2003, so you'll need exceptional comms conditions to make direct contact with him.

bast0n
16th Jan 2009, 21:19
Atlantic Conveyor

OK Navaleye - I will try. It is not easy as so many people on that day were hugely heroic, and unsung heroes. I had it easy as I was an aviator so was trained in survival, had a goon suit and Maewest and was not close to the explosion. I will try to give an account of what happened as I saw it. Of course the whole affair goes back at least a month with some extremely challenging flying from rather small decks on AC in quite tricky weather. We should never forget Ian North - the Cunard Captain - who died on that night. A truly amazing charismatic leader of a diverse bunch of men. His sense of humour and palpable joy at once again being given the chance to serve his country was awe inspiring. I will never forget him. Watch this space.

Snapshot
16th Jan 2009, 22:55
Thank you BastOn for sharing this! I'm sure I speak for many, we are all very
lucky to have this opportunity to not only read valuable accounts from a
personal point but as never before (when reading from a book), actually interact with those who were there!
Lest we forget!!
Some paintings from the time, I trust you don't mind people?
I thought it would aid to the amazing energy and atmosphere created from the words people are writing!
Snaps

http://www.avcollect2.co.uk/buccaneer/rtaylor/rt_seaking_rescue.jpg

http://www.avcollect2.co.uk/buccaneer/rtaylor/rt_airstrike.jpg


http://www.avcollect2.co.uk/buccaneer/rtaylor/RT_ships_south_at_task_web.jpg

bast0n
17th Jan 2009, 09:40
Snapshot - thanks for that. I am writing up an account and will post it when finished. I also am happy to recieve emails directly from interested parties. I have already had some really moving ones from those who were involved, and those who were not, and I think that even after all these years it helps to talk and share memories. I have never put pen to paper before on this subject so I expect my wife and children may find it interesting..............!If anyone has any pictures of these events they would be of great interest as most of us lost our cameras and little remains.

AR1
17th Jan 2009, 15:03
Thanks BastOn, it makes a change from us having to get it via Amazon.com!!

bast0n
17th Jan 2009, 15:19
Atlantic Conveyor
(Before I start, this is a totally personal account of my experiences and you have to accept that this is the best that I can do with hindsight. I mention no names as it would serve no useful purpose to do so. Those who read this and have personal knowledge can join in as they will, and hopefully add to the story. I still feel that in getting sunk we in some way let the side down. That feeling will never change. Our aircraft and men would have been so useful to those already ashore.)

I think it a good idea to go back to the moments before the missile strike in a little more detail. Atlantic Conveyors Cunard crew were simply amazing. They could not do enough for us in enabling things to happen on their merchant ship, the like of which they had never seen before, and much of it involving considerable risk to themselves and the ship itself. You only had to watch the fuel bags burst as the first bad weather arrived to get the idea! Huge bag tanks as used in the field were strapped into containers alongside the upper deck to provide aircraft fuel. Add a bit of pitch and roll and you can quickly get the notion that this was not a very good idea as the fuel sloshed back and forth until the bags burst and fuel poured all over the deck and down the sides of the ship. They dealt with all this alongside the servicemen aboard as though it was an everyday happening.

You get the idea – a crew of servicemen and merchant seamen led by a combined command of Captain Ian North of Cunard and a Senior Naval Officer to meld together the disparate needs of aviation and vital store ship roles. The banter and humour was truly amazing. Not much political correctness in the South Atlantic thank goodness, and I have to mention here that much of this wonderful ambience was down to Ian North and his First Officer – sterling chaps both of them.

For reasons that I still do not understand, the disembarkation of 848 Squadron Wessex 5s was delayed by 24 hours – what a difference a day makes!! Anyway you can probably guess by now that it was a very happy ship with everyone working to the same aim. 848 were pretty short of some supplies as we had left Yeovilton after the others but had overtaken them on the way south. We picked up some vital spares as we passed through Ascension – including a sunhat for me – bald head don’t you know – but the crew of AC helped as well providing Wellington boots, torches and other bits of equipment that would be so useful once disembarked.

As I posted earlier the officers of the AC had invited the officers and senior rates of the embarked force for a drink on Cunard on the evening of the 25th May. We had a bell system that sounded alerts – the only one that was ever used was “Air raid warning” and this was what sounded as we were about to ruin Cunards profits for the year. My action station was on the Starboard bridge wing manning my 7.62 machine gun, ably assisted by my loader a Petty Officer armourer. I was on the bridge as I was commanding officer of the Squadron and thus available to the command on aviation matters. Standing there on that evening, the weather grey and a bit forbidding with a fairly low swell, (unlike the blue skies evident in the picture of the burning ship above), looking out at all those warships getting very excited indeed. Helicopters flashing around dropping chaff, rockets going off in all directions, and us not knowing what the hell was going on. Personally I had no fear at all at that point – as my father, an army officer used to say “where there is no sense there is no feeling”!!

Time seemed to roll on and I have even now no idea of the time frame of the following events. As we stood around chatting about the dramatic scenes unfolding we had no idea that there were two Exocets on their way towards us. Decoyed away from several targets apparently, they finally fixed their beady little eyes on us and as we had a, no idea they were coming and b, there was nothing we could do about it, we stood about in blissful ignorance.

Then the amazing WHUMP. We looked at each other and said “what the **** was that” almost in unison. We soon realised that not all was well as smoke started to appear extraordinarily quickly from the side vents that line the upper deck, ventilating the enormous holds below. Smoke also seemed to be coming from the port quarter where we soon learned was where the missile or missiles had struck. At the time of the impact we had one Wessex airborne on an HDS sortie and one Chinook airborne on I think a test flight. We also had one Wessex spread on deck amidships facing aft and another on the stern deck. All the others were folded and tucked away. I discussed with the SNO whether I could perhaps get the spread Wessex airborne, but it very quickly became apparent that we were now two ships companies. One was forward near the forward flight deck and the rest of us from the superstructure aft. Somewhere around now I thought it a good idea to put on my goonsuit that was in my cabin just below the bridge. I dragged it and my maewest (life preserver for you young!) up to the bridge. I was very upset to find that it no longer fitted! I soon found out why as I had knicked my senior pilots suit and he was very indignant!

Down below every effort was being made to fight the fires – but this was no warship – so no comprehensive firemain or water and fireproof doors. Jury rigged firemains had been rigged and these were being used as best as possible. At about this point Alacrity came alongside our starboard side and poured huge amounts of water in all directions in a truly valiant attempt to help us. She just nudged up to us and stuck there. She eventually was ordered I believe, to leave us as there was a distinct danger that we might explode and take her with us. We were after all full of excitingly explosive bits of kit. It was getting distinctly darker now and after much discussion between the SNO and the Captain it was decided to order “Abandon ship”. There was by this time no proper broadcast available to inform everyone of the decision, and so the SNO told me to go down to the main decks and encourage everyone to get off. I was lucky to be able to go down inside the island as as yet the smoke was not too thick to stop us using the main stairwell. The SNO and the Captain had subsequently to climb down using the iron ladders on the exterior of the bridge – no joke. The port side of the ship was a no no and so starboard aft seemed to be the place and all the RN standard liferafts were thrown over the side, along with more rope ladders and ropes. Everyone had “once only” suits, those ghastly bulky bright orange things that are difficult to put on quickly let alone correctly – though everyone had been drilled in them and the liferafts on the way south. They also had ‘board of trade’ lifevests.

A quick diversion to explain the liferafts. Big white fibreglass containers that you heave over the side and their painters pull the inflation firing pins as they take the weight. Now what no one had realised in the fitting of them is that they were designed for warships with a comparatively low freeboard. When they were chucked over from the AC that had about a 50 foot main deck to sea height, they hung from their painters at about a 45 degree angle all on top of one another like a line of dominos. This made boarding them a nightmare for those climbing and jumping from the ship. It must have been getting hot as the APU I think of the parked and rotorless Chinook on the after deck started up all on its own!

It was now getting dark, and having passed the word to everyone around to go, it was time for me. The soles of my very smart Clarkes desert boots having started to melt, it seemed a good time. I climbed down a rope ladder but about halfway down discovered that it had been cut off, probably by Alacrity nudging alongside during her valiant efforts at fire suppression. It was not a time to hang around thinking clever thoughts of survival tactics as the ships side where I was, was starting to glow red and bits of hot stuff were pinging straight through the hull all around me. Discretion being the better part of valour, I let go! I arrived in the water alongside a liferaft that was tipped up at an angle and was helped aboard by one of my Royal Marine crewmen. I then got out my aircrew knife and cut the painter tying it to the next raft in line. I then hopped around a few rafts doing the same thing and reminding people where the survival knives were stowed in their rafts. After a while we had a few rafts in the water at the correct angle and some drifting off astern. One small problem at this stage was the shape of AC’s hull down aft. Being a greyhound of the seas she was beautifully streamlined with a “cruiser” stern. In the swells she was pitching up and down, and on the upstroke was sucking the rafts in underneath her and on the down stroke………well you can guess! Not a pleasant place to be.

Alacrity was at this stage firing gunlines over the rafts to enable them to be dragged across and emptied of survivors. Gunlines are very thin nylon lines and bloody difficult to hang on to especially with cold hands. I was quite warm at this stage as I had my goon suit on and had been hopping about a bit. The time came to cut free from AC and get pulled over to Alactrity. (other liferafts were drifting off to other ships astern and I cannot recount their stories). I was tugging like mad to get us away from AC and by the time we eventually got along side Alactrity I could not feel my hands having been clinging to this tiny wet gunline as though it was life itself. Alacrity had scrambling nets down all along her midships section of her port side and In turn we were trying to climb up. We had one or two bodies bobbing about which was not much fun. When it came to my turn to climb up, I got halfway and realise that with my feelingless hands I was going to get no further. No problem I thought – do it like they do in the movies and think of the wife and family. I fell off. I landed in the water alongside one of Alacritys ships divers who very calmly said” Good evening Sir, may I help you?” Oh what joy!! I looked up at the deck above and standing there was an old chum , a Jungly pilot doing time as First Lietenant of Alacrity. They then threw scrambling nets down from the flight deck – much lower freeboard – and used the flight deck crane to help hoist the tired and incapable to safety.

We stayed in Alacrity for a few days, my goodness they were kind to us, keeping out of the way whilst they dashed about fighting the war, and were eventually transferred to the BP tanker The British Tay, to take us back to Ascension. We were no use in theatre as we had no aircraft, no kit and would have been a drag on the rations.
Fly home to Brize Norton from Ascension………………and that’s it.:O

http://i291.photobucket.com/albums/ll301/tallbronzedgod/img041.jpg


You may have seen this before, but it does illustrate some of the fun flying we had before the WHUMP!! Tip clearances.................Eh?

Navaleye
17th Jan 2009, 17:02
Bast0n,

Thank you very much for such a detailed and compelling read. Strangely not much as been written about life on AC, so you have filled a few blanks. Thanks also for the pic too.

seanbean
17th Jan 2009, 20:36
Bast0n, many thanks for that - fascinating and informative stuff.. Thank you.

iwalkedaway
17th Jan 2009, 21:55
Baston - extraordinary story, vividly presented. Thank you so much for putting this on the record. There is a recurrent AC story that there is a survivor who actually glimpsed one of the missiles briefly inside (!) the hull, before the damn thing detonated. Is that something of which you are aware, or is that just another much-repeated urban myth???? The thrust of the story, obviously, is 'how lucky can you be'...

bast0n
18th Jan 2009, 08:28
iwalkedaway - I have not heard that one! He must have been damn quick on his toes to survive don't you think? :)

Thinking about it over my breakfast, I vaguely remember that someone on the aft flight deck thought he may have seen missile/missiles at the last second before impact. Is this possible? How fast do these things fly?

Navaleye
18th Jan 2009, 11:28
http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y184/Navaleye/Conveyor_25May.jpg

For the the benefit of bast0n and others, using as much official and unofficial data available, I have tried to re-create the events of 25th May. I have a powerpoint graphic which helps to clear up most anomalies but also highlights how inaccurate the recall of some eye witnesses can be. So here we go.

Position of Atlantic Conveyor (ACO).

The BoI gives positions of hulk sightings for 27th and a presumed sinking position for 28th May.

Position of the Task Force.

Working backwards from these positions, we can estimate with reasonable accuracy the position of the TF at that time. David Brown estimates that the CVBG at 60NM NW of Cape Pembroke, CO Alacrity gives it as 80NM and Sharkey Ward as approximately 100NM. Given a realistic amount of drift for the wreck over 2 days, I am inclined to believe the latter and I have used this as the basis for my illustration.

Relative Positions of Escorts.

The CVBG on the slide consists of Hermes with Brilliant and her "Goalkeeper" with Invincible 1NM astern. I have not included other ships like Fort Toronto for clarity.

Alacrity is 5NM ahead of Hermes and Exeter a further 20 miles upthreat

Ambuscade is off Alacrity's starboard bow and ACO is 3NM off her port bow.

Ambuscade detects a Handbrake bearing 338deg (off her starboard bow) which is broadcast and detects Exocet release at 22NM and calls it.

All warships sew chaff for deception.

Reports on what happened next are slightly confused, one Exocet was seen to be deceived by Ambuscade's chaff and re-acquired on ACO travelling at 650kts.

So - how did ACO get hit in her port quarter when she was starboard on to the attack? The answer is in the BOI report. She turned due east on a course of 040deg (as did Hermes - as reported by Sharkey Ward). Thus she exposed her port beam to the attack and was thus hit.

BOI Reports:

Part 1 (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/EC14467A-DFAF-4030-BDFB-9E1AAF00205E/0/boi_atlanticconveyorpt1.pdf)

Part 2 (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A2B1A9E9-9EF1-413A-979C-A90C6507DBD4/0/boi_atlanticconveyorpt2.pdf)

Utrinque Apparatus
18th Jan 2009, 11:50
Looking at those helicopters on deck reminds me, I'd still like a confession as to who hit the post office in Stanley ? You know who you are :E

bast0n
18th Jan 2009, 11:51
navaleye - that is fascinating stuff. I have never seen the BOI report and am probably a pretty unreliable witness as to ships positions!! I do recall the AC did alter course a few times as the main body moved. Do you have a graphic that you can post or email. 650 knots - it would be a pretty fleeting glimps(spelling?)! don't you think unless you were looking directly uptrack. Keep it coming - I do so hope more people will join in. History at first hand is fascinating stuff.(repitition!)

Navaleye
18th Jan 2009, 13:02
bast0n,

I have posted the graphic and the links to the BoI reports - some late night reading for you, enjoy.:eek:

Regarding a visual on an Exocet, I've seen one my self and they have a darn great rocket exhaust coming out the back. Sheffield's bridge team spotted theirs and I would have thought in the half light murky conditions at the time it would have been visible, albeit briefly.

Regards,

Navaleye

bast0n
18th Jan 2009, 13:39
navaleye - thanks so much for that. 6.7 miles is quite close to 5 so I am happy that I am not totally bonkers! Keep the facts coming.

PS - could you email me the powerpoint thingy, as the background being dark blue and a bit fuzzy it is quite difficult to interpret.

This is quite a bizzare footnote that makes the hairs stand up!!

"An interesting footnote - when we were married in 1966 an old friend who had given us a very nice present for our wedding thought that it was insufficient and took me into his attic to rummage through the junk to find something else. He did and in 1982 the only picture of a ship that had hung in our house for all those years was a picture that he found in the attic – HMS Alacrity . An old watercolour of her when she was an Admirals yacht in the Far East"

Navaleye
18th Jan 2009, 14:01
bast0n,

By all means, if you could PM me an email addy I'll send it across. I should point out that without precise bearings their will be a +/- 10% margin for error in any reconstruction.

Guern
18th Jan 2009, 15:26
Bast0n

Thanks for a very interesting account of what happened.

jualbo
18th Jan 2009, 19:01
Navaleye, great reconstruction of facts on 25th may attack.
bast0n, welcome and a really great testimony.

Navaleye, could make the same with 30th may attack? In Zona Militar forums, one of the members remembered a testimony from David Tinker in his posthumous " a Message from the Falklands", which also placed Gamorgan in the scene. He talks about the AM-39 falling to sea just 400 meters from them.

By the other hand, in key publishing forums (Historic aviation) , a Cardiff crewmember remembered his ship shotting 4,5" gun fire against the Sea Darts fired from Exeter aginst the Skyhawks. So they also had to be very close to the trajectory of these Sea Darts to be able to do so, otherwise the effective range of Vickers 4,5" gun wouldn´t let it.

So we have Exeter, Cardiff, Glamorgan, Avenger and Invincible.

What do you think?

Regards

Navaleye
18th Jan 2009, 19:06
Utrinque Apparatus,

More please....

Lets fill in some more blanks.

Navaleye
18th Jan 2009, 19:44
Jualbo,

Thank you. I don't have exact positions for the 30th May attack, but I do have testimony from Capt Hugh Balfour, CO HMS Exeter, also with that of Hugo White, CO Avenger. Hugh Balfour reports engaging two low level targets with Sea Dart, the first A4 was splashed at 13 miles, the second missed, the third was hit and destroyed at 7 miles. This correlates exactly with the FAA account of the time. I will try to reconstruct this.

Exeter was the first of the batch 2 T42s and had a new and untested fire control system. She had just completed trials with the USN and although she had just taken out two target drones, her command system crashed each time. New software was sent out to the Caribbean and she sailed south, fully operational.

Having heard the reports from both COs. I have no doubt as to their accuracy.

If I can add more, I will.

Best regards,

Navaleye

bast0n
18th Jan 2009, 20:35
Utrinque Apparatus

Are we thinking SS11 here?

A.Agincourt
18th Jan 2009, 22:19
bast0n: Utrinque Apparatus - Are we thinking SS11 here?

Though not present at the time, I have heard many a tale told laughingly about a certain person who did in fact lob an SS11 into the post office. He took quite some stick for it if I remember correctly.

Best Wishes

bast0n
19th Jan 2009, 08:23
Yes - no stamp on it.....................

Utrinque Apparatus
19th Jan 2009, 09:43
That would be the one. However, firing a missile with it's speed calibrated in furlongs per fortnight and watching all that Swiss triple A swivelling in one's direction would tend to focus the mind ?? :E

I'd hate my flip remark to distract all from a very poignant and interesting thread, but I suppose you could call the Post office a Comms HQ, of sorts ?

bast0n
19th Jan 2009, 10:09
Utrinque Apparatus - were you personally watching all the triple A? If you were your story could be a good one to tell. I may be able to get the SS11 pilot to join in - that would be fun!

Navaleye
19th Jan 2009, 11:43
I know of the story, I didn't know we had secretly developed a Stealth Wessex thast could get that close undetected. I'd like to hear more from the folks involved.

Spurlash2
19th Jan 2009, 13:14
Navaleye

Believe the missile was an AS12. 7500m range rather than spitting distance for the 11.

Spurlash2
19th Jan 2009, 13:23
Sorry, forgot the reference.

Falkland Islands - A history of the 1982 conflict (http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/mov1.html)

extract...

The period between 8 and 11 June was mainly taken up by patrolling and the moving of supplies nearer the front line in readiness for the final battles to take the high ground surrounding Stanley. On the 11, however, an unusual operation was attempted by a Wessex of 845 Squadron flown by Lieutenant Peter Manley with Petty Officer Arthur Balls acting as gunner. It was known that the Argentine High Command in the Islands met every morning at the Town Hall. The Wessex was armed with two AS12 wire-guided missiles and approached Stanley from the north under cover of the hills surrounding the harbour. Both missiles were fired, the first narrowly missed and hit the Police station, the other missile was defective and fell short, there were no casualties. By this time, anti-aircraft artillery was exploding all around the hovering Wessex, which made good its escape

Also from memory.

A.Agincourt
19th Jan 2009, 15:39
How odd, the PO incident seems to have been attributed to some others [AAC] and from what you say, the crews maligned all these years might be due a substantial apology.

Untitled Document (http://www.656squadron.org/recFalklandsOther.html)

[Go to last section bottom of page]

Best Wishes

bast0n
19th Jan 2009, 16:19
I have emailed Peter Manley to see if he knows the difference between a Post Office and a Police Station. I hope he will post a reply soon. This is a great amd most amusing story! I do hope that more will join in with their own ditties.

Mzee
19th Jan 2009, 18:17
Ah Bastoon
Excellent thread, I well remember the tip clearance (or lack of) and the horrendous turbulance aft of the vast stack and the first "trash the aft guardrails with a load" trials on Conveyor!!

As for Stanley Police Stn, I dug out my diary on the event and it seems a few facts need to be aired, certainly brought back a few interesting memories. Give me a mo and I'll post what really happened - maybe a bit long though.

bast0n
19th Jan 2009, 19:00
Now we are rock and rolling......................:):):)

jualbo
19th Jan 2009, 20:49
Some ten years ago I contacted a crewmember from Exeter: Andrew Mawman. He explained to me that according to his info Exeter was 12,5 miles NW from Avenger when faced the threat. And Invincible around 24 miles easter. The first A-4 was downed over 13-14 km from Avenger (7 miles) while the second A-4 was shot down and exploded around 3-4 km from the target (2 miles). Always according to FAA surviving pilots.

Both distances matches with your source if Exeter is around 5-6 miles from Avenger.

So the difference of distance from Exeter to Avenger would be around 7 miles depending on the source (12,5 Mawman and 5 Balfour).
In my opinion, and knowing that visibility was around 15 km that day according to FAA pilots (Vázquez was splashed after watching the target in the distance), 5 miles is too short. Ureta and Isaac would have watched her. And they didn´t report it. 12,5 miles is a distance that let the ship hit in the maximun Sea Dart effective range (12,5+7= 19,5 miles) and being unseen by the attackers after overflying the target (cause the visibility was around 8 miles).

Still a mistery if Glamorgan was close or not.

Regards

PD: There is a report in the argentinean book "Comandos en acción. El Ejército en Malvinas" ("Commandos in action. The Army at Falklands") by Isidoro J. Ruíz Moreno, about the Wessex attack. Argentineans green berets had their base in the building opposite the police station and believed they were the real target. I think one missile fell close to ARA Bahía Paraíso, anchored in the Bay

Mzee
20th Jan 2009, 10:59
Here goes - took a bit longer than I planned but I thought you might like some of the detail.:ok:

On the 9th June I was asked by Jack Lomas if I thought I could attack a target in Stanley with AS12s – ‘Tell me more’ I heard myself say! Intelligence had established that General Menendez was having morning briefings in an upstairs room in the Town Hall in Stanley and the powers that be decided it would be a cunning plan to park a missile on his desk whilst the coffee was brewing thereby hoping to shorten the war.

The concept was conceived by Col Mike Rose and his team on Sir Lancelot and as I had the only Wessex gunship deployed from Conveyor to assist if needed with the landings it was ideally suited for the task with 2”RP, fixed fwd and cabin mounted GPMG’s and most importantly AS12’s with a range of 7000yds.

Jack and I flew to Lancelot for a fulsome briefing and we fleshed out the plan, two concerns prevailed; anti-aircraft systems around Stanley harbour and artillery. It was reckoned that two or three twin-barrelled Oerlikons (20/30mm) anti-aircraft cannon systems were somewhere along the foreshore giving protection to the harbour complex and the Artillery was scattered but predominantly to the west shelling us during the early mountain battles. The Oelikons had an MER just below my 7000yds and the artillery, at best guestimate if they were good, couldn’t acquire and get the first rounds down in less than four minutes – just enough time for me to fire 2 AS12’s and depart.

To give some understanding of the targeting and firing solution for AS12s; the a/c has to arrive at the firing position (max 7000yds from target) in a stable hover as low as possible commensurate with camouflage etc and in line-of-sight. The target then has to be acquired by the aimer through a gyro-stabilised sight which is itself joystick driven, the firing mechanism selected and 1st missile fired with a very loud bang (solid fuel propellant) trailing two thin copper wires through which the aimers control (another joystick) commands are sent – true fly-by-wire in the strictest sense, no sticking the crosshairs on the target and fire-n-forget here!! Flares at the rear of the missile aid visually in keeping the missile just above the target for most of its flight and dropping it down onto the target just before impact – control becomes increasingly difficult with distance (signal time delay) and the change in missile centre of gravity as the propellant burns giving an increasing nose-down attitude. After impact, roughly 30secs, the wires are cut and the second missile can then be selected and fired. After the wires are cut the a/c can then vacate the firing position. Practically a two missile attack should be accomplished in less than 3mins!

With all the difficulties and risks seemingly covered and minimised I concurred the mission could be done. I was a missile aimer but felt that taking two pilots, one flying and me as aimer, might be too risky as we could ill afford to lose 2 pilots, I therefore selected Arthur Balls, a fine aimer with much experience particularly at night and in twilight conditions, and considered by me as a better aimer. After briefing he agreed (I gave him the choice) to accompany me and we set about ‘tooling up’ the Wessex. The a/c systems had been checked but had yet to fire anything and as this was a fairly risky one-off I felt a practise shoot would benefit us both and prove the a/c.

10th - moving to Teal Inlet settlement was as close as we could get to the front without risk of observation. The practice shot went well knocking a chunk out of a tiny unnamed island somewhere in Teal Inlet and we returned to prep the a/c and brief an accompanying a/c that was to observe from a distance and come in to hopefully pick us up if we were shot down.

Early on the 11 June we set off flying NOE routeing past Long Island then south towards our IP in the lee of Beagle Ridge and 12 o’clock Mountain. Arthur said the sight was misting up and I briefly parked in a gulley and he managed to clear it and we carried on to our planned firing point of approximately north of the Town Hall in the lee of Beagle Ridge giving us a good backdrop and en-route making contact with the SAS up in the hills to establish that nothing was airborne and no activity to disturb our approach. It was a grey and very misty morning and we had real difficulty in finding the target and had to keep going until Stanley came out of the gloom and Arthur had a workable view of the target. I reckon we ended up at around 4-5000yds in a very high hover to get the line of sight over Cortley Hill and as all was quiet we proceeded to engage the target. The launch was uneventful but lit up the gloom like a beacon and made a seemingly greater racket than usual.

Arthur called ‘impact’ and as far as he could tell it was on target; as nothing had moved and with no activity ahead of us we fired the second missile at the secondary target a Chinook parked by Government House that apparently was grounded but we needed to make sure. Just as it left the rail our comfort zone was rudely interrupted as the world and his dog started throwing all sorts in our direction luckily none too accurate but definitely well within range and traversing back and forth towards us as though searching the gloom for us.

Arthur couldn’t see what was going on from behind the sight but keeping still in a hover for 30secs is a bit unnerving in a regular fireworks display including tracer. At about 20secs he called ‘lost control’ and ‘fallen short’ and he cut the wires and upon stowing the sight let out few choice words at the illuminations outside which by this time were all around. With the collective now under my armpit we shot out of there like a grouse on the Glorious Twelfth just as the first artillery rounds started coming down. We made it back to Teal Inlet for a cup of tea (terribly British) and a wind down with the realisation we had got away with it. Eventually the other a/c pitched up, they had seen the shelling and had been trying to get close to our position which was obscured by smoke and debris from the artillery to ascertain our status and were much relieved to see us back.

We heard that we had missed the Town Hall with the 1st missile and were somewhat deflated but cheered by a report from the BBC (and the NY Times on the 12th) reporting that the Argentines were complaining that their hospital ship, the Bahia Paraiso alongside in Stanley, had been attacked by a missile from a British a/c. Our 2nd AS12 had either snagged its wires over the ridge or been cut by explosion and given the default command is down and right it went into the harbour just short, a pity really as it opened fire the following night on an SBS patrol – so much for Red Cross immunity.

Stanley fell on the 14th and I went to see the results of our attack. The Town Hall looked in rude health but the Police Station was not so, although the walls were intact with a small entry hole the interior was trashed – typical of an AS12 designed delayed detonation after piercing the outer shell. I spoke to a lady living down the street who went out to investigate the bang to see a cartoon-like scene of smoking people staggering out of the Police Station – and she said it certainly raised morale as the story went around.

I discovered that the fireworks were caused by the artillery using the 105 mm OTO-Melara Mod 56 field guns and the anti-aircraft cannons were the Rheinmetall 20 mm Twin-barrelled Anti-Aircraft Cannon using HEI-T(High Explosive Incendiary with Tracer) and SAPHEI (Semi-Armour Piercing High Explosive Incendiary) sporting eh!!

I paced out the track of the missile and it missed the Town Hall by as little as a yard and went down a side street crossed the main road and into the Police Station. It turned out Menendez did not have a meeting that morning, fortuitously and more importantly the hall was used as valuable accommodation in the aftermath and crucially the Post Office remained intact – can’t have mail interrupted in times of crisis! Moreover the Police Station was occupied by the Military Intelligence with a particularly nasty piece of work (can't remember his name) who delighted in hassling the civilian population.

We understood that the attack had given them a real shock in that we could seemingly pick off a target in the middle of town with such accuracy and thus placed doubt in their minds and had indeed helped to hasten the end.

Navaleye
20th Jan 2009, 11:54
Mzee,

The nasty piece of work you are referring to was Major Patricio Dowling of Argentine Military Intelligence. Its was lucky for him he was shipped home or I suspect he would have met with a very nasty and fatal accident had he been captured.

forget
20th Jan 2009, 12:03
Falkland Islands Info Portal - History Articles (http://www.falklands.info/history/hist82article19.html)

'Nice Argies, Nasty Argies'

The Argentine who caused most fear was the "sinister and dangerous" head of military police intelligence, Major Patricio Dowling, who personified "the Argentine terror machine". He had detailed personal dossiers on Islanders and carried out arbitrary house searches and arrests. In one incident at Neil and Glenda Watson's Long Island Farm, Dowling pointed a weapon at their young daughter Lisa and repeatedly ordered her to stand up. Lisa repeatedly said no and continued sucking her thumb, until Dowling gave up.

bast0n
20th Jan 2009, 12:08
Pete - your a star! :I might even let you bring me a drink at the Jungly - (note spelling) - CTP!!! - D :ok:

Mzee
20th Jan 2009, 12:15
Bastoon - absolutely no chance - you owe me big time!!

Thanks Navaleye, I remember now wishing he had been in the Police Stn at the time! I went back on the 2002 Pilgrimage and heard further accounts and all those I spoke to were of the same mind as I.

bast0n
20th Jan 2009, 12:53
Mzeee - I will see if I can get hold of "Big Time" but I fear much as she loved you I have heard that she has gone back to Ascension..........!

Navaleye
22nd Jan 2009, 23:40
I've just been sent a copy of:

NP 1840, The loss of Atlantic Conveyor, by Charles Drought. 192 pages.

It may shed some light on our discussions, I should have read in a couple of days and will pass on any relevant details.

Navaleye
24th Jan 2009, 11:12
For those interested, the account given by author records two Exocet hits, each preceded by a warning. Its a good first hand account and can be had on the second hand market for about £2,

Utrinque Apparatus
24th Jan 2009, 15:04
Baston

We watched in awe, and marvelled at the ability of an old boot of a helicopter being able to lift 4 gonads that size (Messrs Manley and Balls). I'm in an airport lounge in transit back from the ME just now and will post a longer version on return and after a refresher with old oppos in London.

We thought it was the Oerlikon 35 mil stuff but that's just the poor memory of an old has been (my mate, not me). Peter was of course well placed to measure the rounds involved :E

taxydual
24th Jan 2009, 15:50
Navaleye,

Thank you for the 'heads up' on the Conveyor book.

Amazon
N. P. 1840 The Loss of the Atlantic Conveyor: Amazon.co.uk: Charles Drought: Books (http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1901231410/shopzilcouk-21/ref=asc_df_1901231410302042)

are quoting a ridiculous price for a second-hand copy!!!

I'll keep Googling.

Regards

bast0n
24th Jan 2009, 16:44
Navaleye

Thanks for that. I am rivetted to know what the warnings were and to whom and by what means they were delivered!!

Keep it coming.

Navaleye
24th Jan 2009, 18:23
Bast0n,

It was as simple of "Air raid warning Red, hit the deck" just prior to each impact.

BTW, How many Wing Commanders were aboard at the time?

bast0n
24th Jan 2009, 19:09
Navaleye

I think that is what was broadcast on warships such as Hermes whose Ops rooms knew there were missiles inbound. We did not - only that there was an Air Raid Warning. I was standing on the bridge at the time of the impact,(just the one impact - but perhaps two missiles), and I did not hear that warning of which you speak, otherwise I may have hopped about a bit!! Perhaps I was deaf from the Mk 1 flying helmet? What?

ps - I have just ordered the book from Amazon at £9.99 - any chance of some rich chap out there sending this pensioner a sub?