Cirrus CAPS deployment option during emergency

[worldpilot]

I've been strongly advised by my cirrus instructor not to ever deploy the CAPS over land.:=
However though, he says thats an option to consider when flying over water. He says, "when flying over land, always try to land the plane as you will do with any other plane during an emergency".:ok: When flying over water, you should consider deploying the CAPS. That makes sense to me.:D
I'm of the opinion that when the CAPS is deployed, you virtually have no control of the aircraft anymore.

Any Cirrus pilot here ever deployed the CAPS? How was the landing and final outcome? Did the aircraft sustain any damage?

I'm not quite sure if this is something I should try to simulate.

I appreciate your thoughts in this respect.:ok:

WP

[sternone]

What if you loose your wing over land (due for example collision with other aircraft) and you have no control ? Does your instructor also keeps his statement ?

Also ask him what the procedure is when you get into a spin with the Cirrus.. even over land..... :hmm::hmm::hmm:

[denhamflyer]

Sounds reasonable to take the approach to land the plane if you can. If something is so bad that it would not be possible then use the CAPS.

I understood that most of the energy absorption was done in the wheel/landing gear. So when using the CAPS over water MAJOR injuries would occur because nearly all the impact is transferred to the people inside. This may be hearsay so I would check it out ( I read it on one of forums in the states some time ago) and if so I would attempt to "land" on water - rather than taking all the impact in my back.

[DFC]

The CAPS brings you into contact with the surface at about 1600ft per minute if my memory is correct. (I think that v hard landings (the ones where you look to see if the oleo has come through the wing) are about 600ft per minute). Thus the CAPS will wreck the aircraft and most likely injure you. The up side is that it will not kill you which as has been said - loss of a wing at 6000ft probably will.

If you are in control of the aircraft and think that you can make a more gentle arrival than that then do so.

Regards,

DFC

[scooter boy]

Personally I can't think of an aircraft type more likely to lose an essential part of its structure during flight and require a parachute.

SB

[soay]

I understood that most of the energy absorption was done in the wheel/landing gear
Actually, a significant amount of energy is absorbed by the honeycomb seat base - if it hasn't already been crushed by people kneeling on it. The pilot of the only CAPS pull over water suffered from a compressed vertebra, but was otherwise uninjured by the impact. His vivid description of the ditching can be read here (http://www.ilanreich.com/Public_Pics/Crash/Cirrus%20in%20the%20Water.htm).
I've been strongly advised by my cirrus instructor not to ever deploy the CAPS over land.
Use of CAPS has been extensively discussed on the Cirrus Owners forum (COPA (http://www.cirruspilots.org/cgi-bin/wwwthreads/wwwthreads.pl?Cat=&C=2)), which any Cirrus pilot would be well advised to join. You'll get much more sensible advice there than your instructor seems to be offering.

[englishal]

The CAPS brings you into contact with the surface at about 1600ft per minute if my memory is correct. (I think that v hard landings (the ones where you look to see if the oleo has come through the wing) are about 600ft per minute). Thus the CAPS will wreck the aircraft and most likely injure you. The up side is that it will not kill you which as has been said - loss of a wing at 6000ft probably will.
1600 fpm = 15.7 kts vertical speed. Easily survivable in an aeroplane built with a 25G cockpit, airbags and impact absorbing seats.

(600 fpm = 6 kts vertical).

In my Rallye, if it hits the fan, I can hold the stick fully aft and come down at 700 fpm (I have tried it).....;)

[yawningdog]

The decision would be much easier to make if you knew for certain that the chute is actually going to open. In Australia recently, the chute did not open properly leaving no other options to the crew.

My feeling is that the chute should not be regarded as an "alternative landing" procedure, but more of a "last available option".

It gets tricky when deciding bettween marginal options, ie: hitting the water in nil wind at around 70mph (which is pretty fast), or using the chute. If the wind increases, then the ditch option might be more favourable until the waves start to become walls.

One ex-chute pilot said that in hindsight, he wished he had pulled the chute at a lower altitude, otherwise the landing point could be quite hard to predict. Although some pilots have kept the engine running so they can reduce the drift in the descent.

[sternone]

The pilot must activate CAPS swiftly in accordance with the procedures and restrictions in the POH. In other words, the aircraft must be operated within demonstrated CAPS deployment guidelines to include an airspeed and altitude and the decision must be made early.

If the aircraft is operating below the minimum demonstrated CAPS deployment altitude or operating above the maximum CAPS deployment airspeed, there is a possibility that CAPS may fail to deploy properly. There have been some situations with the pilot activating CAPS above the maximum deployment airspeed after an icing encounter (this cirrus plane had TKS anti-ice capability according to records)....without succes...

[RudeNot2]

Hi all

Did the aircraft sustain any damage?From what I have read the CAPS deployment would be the very final choice made by the pilot for his aircraft. The aircraft would be written off but the occupants should survive - providing the necessary actions are taken from the POH in relation to the parachute deployment.

RudeNot2

[007helicopter]

Personally I can't think of an aircraft type more likely to lose an essential part of its structure during flight and require a parachute.


SB - obviously not a fan then?

[stickandrudderman]

The chute is a LAST OPTION!
It doesn't matter where you are, if it really is your LAST OPTION, pull the handle, that's what it's there for!

Interesting reading the link to a first hand account.
Who knows how well you'd cope in that situation?
My initial instinct would be to continue with the approach, since the airframe had apparently survived the ordeal until then, but I'd then be in pretty deep do do if the wings folded 250ft from the ground!

So I reckon he's a better man than me!:D

[Fuji Abound]

Personally I can't think of an aircraft type more likely to lose an essential part of its structure during flight and require a parachute.
.. .. .. and the evidence for that statement .. .. .. would be sad lacking then.
There have been a number of CAPS deployments. Each is well reported. I would have thought any Cirrius operator would want to have read some if not all of them.
Personally, I would have thought the obvious circumstances for deployment include

1. In IMC with a low base,

2. Mountains or terrain where a successful forced landing is unlikely,

3. Sea with high swell,

4. Any aircraft failure which results in serious control issues,

5. Icing, in circumstances where the airframe has accumulated a dangerous amount of ice (depending on the circumstances),

6. Pilot incapcitation,

7. At night - depending on the terrain,

8. Perhaps over heavily forested terrrain where a landing clear is not possible.

[worldpilot]

Here is a quote from the Cirrus POH:

Quote"The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) should be activated in
the event of a life-threatening emergency where CAPS deployment is
determined to be safer than continued flight and landing.
• WARNING •
CAPS deployment is expected to result in loss of the airframe
and, depending upon adverse external factors such as high
deployment speed, low altitude, rough terrain or high wind
conditions, may result in severe injury or death to the
occupants. Because of this, CAPS should only be activated
when any other means of handling the emergency would not
protect the occupants from serious injury."Quote

Well, I will try to land that plane no matter what the circumstances are. I'm of the opinion that I've a better choice when I have the possibility of applying any control measures than just leaving the outcome to a parachute.

WP

[soay]

Well, I will try to land that plane no matter what the circumstances are. I'm of the opinion that I've a better choice when I have the possibility of applying any control measures than just leaving the outcome to a parachute.
Apparently, that attitude prevailed amongst military pilots, after the introduction of ejector seats, so unnecessary deaths continued to occur. They had to be trained out it. You really should read the discussions on COPA, before deciding how to use the parachute.

[IO540]

There is a difference between a GA plane which (if SE) has a max Vs of 61kt and should be able to do a forced landing in a field, and something with a Vs of say 150kt which will almost certainly disintegrate in any landing except on a runway.

Over water, always pull the chute - the plane is lost anyway (it will sink and even if retrieved will be scrapped due to water damage).

Over forest or rough terrain, it's a virtual certainly of a writeoff, so pull the chute.

That leaves a forced landing in a suitable field, and I would go for a forced landing there because if pulled off correctly the cost is only a few k, and nil if one can fly out of there.

If an aileron fell off (which happened once, IIRC) I would fly using the rudder, and go to some place with a big runway. One doesn't need ailerons to fly a plane.

[bjornhall]

Then there's the question of who is underneath... If you survive yourself but kill some poor guy on the ground in the process you've done a really crappy job. Once you pull that chute you no longer have a say in the matter!

[IO540]

Then there's the question of who is underneath... If you survive yourself but kill some poor guy on the ground in the process you've done a really crappy job. Once you pull that chute you no longer have a say in the matter!

Unlikely. AFAIK the last aviation-unrelated 3rd party casualty in UK aviation was Lockerbie, and that one made a right big mess on the ground.

[Fuji Abound]

I am not certain landing on water would always be a candidate for deployment.

If you review the accident records you will find that the vast majority of forced landings on the sea or water are successful and injuries are minimal (although the subsequent death toll from exposure is another issue).

Yes, the aircraft will always be lost (even if recovered) in these circumstances but the concern is giving the crew and pax the best chance of survival.

Hitting water at speed after a chute deployment is going to result in hard landing (the water will seem like concrete at that speed). Perhaps the flatter the conditions the harder the impact, and perhaps harder than on land because the u/c will not provide any breaking resistance - the wings and under belly will take the full force.

Perhaps ideally in conditions with a big swell deployment might make best sense because a ditching is far more unpredictable and the uneven surface of the water when the deployed aircraft contacts is likely to spread the load,

in conditions with a very light swell a conventional ditching might make more sense,

and strangely, and you will know if you have done some float aircraft flying, in mirror carm conditions a deployment might be marginally better despite my earlier commnents because making a reasonable landing on the surface is going to be difficult.

Of course, I might be totally wrong. :}

[sternone]

If an aileron fell off (which happened once, IIRC) I would fly using the rudder, and go to some place with a big runway. One doesn't need ailerons to fly a plane.

I can't seem to be able to imagine flying a GA plane with a lost wing, for me it looks absolutely impossible with all the stuff i have learned ? It's impossible you could control your plane with your rudder conteracting the instability!

Hitting water at speed after a chute deployment is going to result in hard landing (the water will seem like concrete at that speed)

Maybe in a Cirrus it's best to jump out of the plane with CAPS deployed a few meters above the water ?

[Fuji Abound]

Maybe in a Cirrus it's best to jump out of the plane with CAPS deployed a few meters above the water ?

What a bit like jumping off the floor of the lift a split second before it hits the ground after the cable has split. :bored:

[Contacttower]

Surely if you jump out, you'll be going down at 1600fpm as well, which is probably worse than going down at that speed but at least being inside the plane.

[IO540]

I said aileron, not wing, sternone :)

I reckon one could fly with a missing aileron, despite the loss of lift from that piece of the wing surface, but it depends on how big they are. Some are very big.

A whole lost wing is a certain death - probably minus several thousand fpm and coming down at what would definitely be an "unusual attitude" and one that is rapidly varying too :)

[Cap'n Arrr]

Haven't read the whole topic (lazy, I know), but basically it goes like this. IF you suffer a plain engine failure, and there are fields nearby which you can land in, then fly a forced landing like you would in any other plane. Heard many stories about Cirrus pilots being injured or killed because they deployed it when they didn't have to.

I would use the CAPS if:

1. I lost control of the aircraft (including lost wing, seized controls etc)
2. If I entered a spin (CAPS is the flight manuals spin recovery, although I'd probably try and get out of it myself before pulling it)
3. If I was over terrain which would not permit a forced landing (water, forest etc)

The seats are a honeycomb design so they absorb the impact a little, and the shoulder pads on the harness also inflate like airbags. Good thing too, according to the manual a CAPS deployment is the equivalent of a fall from 10 feet.:eek::bored:

Basically, if you have control and you can put it down safely without the chute, then don't use it. It's probably safer, not to mention cheaper.

[sternone]

Sorry about the wing/aileron the crap is that in Belgium they have translated all the aviation words, so my books are always in Dutch and foruming is in english

Why don't they make the CAPS solution that you can still guide the chute ?? Like a parachutist ?? Could it be that hard from within the cockpit ? Now that would be cool!

[gasax]

We have to remember that the CAPS is part of an engineered system. That system is however only for extreme situations - as per the quote in the manual!

If you fitted the parachute to most of the spamcan fllet you would not have a survivable situation if you used the chute - the crash resistance of the spamcan fleet is very poor, the crew would be lying in their wrecked cockpit with spinal injuries.

If the spamcan fleet had cockpits designed to the 25g requirements of the modern code then a chute makes sense. Given the protection the Cirrus already gives makes it a much much better aircraft to have any sort of crash in. Adding the CAPS should mean there are very few situations where you would be very disappointed not to walk away from an accident in a Cirrus.

As for the 'homespun wisdom' of not using it over water, wanting to steer it, etc etc pleeeaaassee can we have less ignorance?

[sternone]

wanting to steer it, etc etc pleeeaaassee can we have less ignorance?

No

[Flap40]

Unlikely. AFAIK the last aviation-unrelated 3rd party casualty in UK aviation was Lockerbie, and that one made a right big mess on the ground.

Two since then that spring to mind:

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_502174.pdf
and
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/LS1F%20Glider,%20BGA4665%2002-07.pdf

[Runaway Gun]

I highly suggest sitting down with some experienced pilots, and discussing a set of criteria for using the chute, for your experience level.

Some random examples (without having read the Cirrus Manual):

Loss of control (including caused by structural failure) or spin below 5000ft

Engine failure over water

Engine failure when IFR or at night below LSALT+2000ft

Engine failure with no suitable forces landing area in range.

Engine failure after takeoff when over that forest until at least 800ft (depending on deparure airfield of course).


Make a set of definite criteria that you can revise, under which you have predecided to pull the handle (just like the military pilots do with their ejection seats). And then alter takeoff criteria according to the departure aerodrome (and the arrival one if doing a touch and go etc).

Making the majority of decisions might afford you a precious few seconds to control the situation whilst you can.

As to whether it might damage the aircraft, forget about that. It has failed, and you now need to look after No 1 (you and your mates on board). If aircraft is totalled in the process of you living, then so be it.

Also consider a checklist for actions after pulling the chute, if time permits...
eg. confirm all harnesses tightened, loose objects stowed, secure engine ignition and fuel, squawk Emerg, Mayday call etc.

[Fuji Abound]

As for the 'homespun wisdom' of not using it over water, wanting to steer it, etc etc pleeeaaassee can we have less ignorance?

Oh, yes please, so I am sure you are going to point us in the direction of some of the reports of ditchings without chute so we can make an informed decision as to how they turned out.

[IO540]

Flap40, I said NON aviation related 3rd parties. Those killed/injured in the reports you cite appeared to be spectators. Plenty of spectators have been killed at airshows and such.

But the chance of getting an unconnected member of the public by crashing your plane at a random point in the UK is close to zero.

Back to the topic, Cirrus may well recommend the use of the chute in almost every major in-flight emergency, but they have to do this for liability reasons. I am sure that their liability is lower if every pilot losing the plot just pulled the chute and wrote off the airframe. "We" can all take the p1ss out of the said pilots (for not having had proper hair on their chests, for using their get out of jail free card, etc) but one can hardly argue with the manufacturer's approach.

Fuji - ditchings are a difficult one. The fatal ones we don't know much about because of a lack of feedback; the plane just goes missing and that's it, and lots of planes go "missing" over water. The successful ones were ... successful. I reckon a chute would be brilliant for ditchings. Water is like concrete if hit fast but the ground is even more like concrete if hit fast :)

[gasax]

2 minutes with google will give you a whole series of successful ditchings without chutes.

Several hours will not yield any with chutes, 'cos there haven't been any so far!

The CAPS does however offer the almost certainty that you will arrive on the water right way up in good order, as opposed to vertically downwards or inverted with the doors and windows blown in. The cockpit survivability should mean you open the door and deploy the raft. A somewhat better situation than swimming to the surface?

As for the unsuccessful ditchings... start where you want, I've never found anything published in terms of the odds of a successful ditching, its nearly all anecdotal. but having some time on floats I certainly would not want to try ditching in anything more than 1 metre seas - and that largely means most of the time in open water. Hitting that sort of wave is pretty much the same as a wall and that is asking a lot - even of a 25g cockpit!

[Fuji Abound]

I reckon a chute would be brilliant for ditchings. Water is like concrete if hit fast but the ground is even more like concrete if hit fast

Yep, point taken about the accident reports. It is however interesting if you review the reports of aircraft probably lost at "sea" on the G register in the last ten years for which the cause has never been established after the loss of the crew and those where the ditching was successful how many fall into the second category. I am going to do a comparision between land and sea based "ditchings" out of interest in so far as those reported are concerned.

Water is like concrete if hit fast but the ground is even more like concrete if hit fast

Interesting point - do you really think so. Just considering chute only cases presumably a lot of the energy of the crash is abosrbed by the undercarriage collapsing. With a deployment over the sea, presumably there is a good chance the undercarriage would not collapse and would absorb relatively little energy, so the first real contact between the sea and the aircraft would be the load spread across the belly of the aircraft rapidly followed by the wings. At that speed presumably there would be very little displacement of water to initially absorb the energy. What do you reckon?

[bjornhall]

As for the unsuccessful ditchings... start where you want, I've never found anything published in terms of the odds of a successful ditching, its nearly all anecdotal.

There is an attempt here: http://www.equipped.com/ditchingmyths.htm

Seems the message on that site is that pilots are often too afraid of ditchings...

FWIW, we were taught in the PPL theory class (last year) that water, such as a forrest lake, is priority three for emergency landing sites, after clear open fields (#1) and standing crop or ploughed fields (#2) but ahead of tree tops. No chute required!

So if a ditching (without chute) is quite survivable and comparatively easily accomplished, whereas a ditching with the chute appears to hold a risk of spinal compression injuries (not nice at all!), why would one prefer to use the chute then? High waves is all I can think of...

[IO540]

You may well be right Fuji. OTOH I don't think water hit at -1600fpm (16kt) will be anything like concrete, really.

Another problem with ditching data is this: my strong suspicion is that the often discussed topic of engine reliability is actually a wide spectrum, with some engines (probably the newish IFR tourer types) being very reliable, while many others in popular usage, e.g. the Rotax and similar "sport" types, are very unreliable. (Maybe Rotax are OK now but there are many thousand flying which are old). I would expect the Cirrus engine to be as reliable as one can get in GA, so we should see few if any chute deployments in engine failure cases, and I believe this is entirely the case. Most ditching data will come from the other parts of the engine reliability spectrum.

Another thing is that the vast majority of Cirruses have been sold in mainland USA. According to COPA Europe, c. 2006, UK sales are about 60, German similar, which points to under 200 in Europe. That is perhaps 5% of total sales. And the vast majority of flights in the USA are not over water.

So I am not expecting much data on chute assisted ditchings...

I wonder how many ditched planes are recovered? If the pilot was incapacitated, he should still be inside, or nearby. If he got out and then died, he will be somewhere else... OTOH I know of one water crash (TB20, apparently loss of control while flying < 500ft in fog, over water) where the body was recovered a long way away, but then the airframe did get well smashed.

Bjornhall - you may well be right. I would still prefer to ditch very near the shore though :)

[soay]

2 minutes with google will give you a whole series of successful ditchings without chutes.
Several hours will not yield any with chutes, 'cos there haven't been any so far!
Ahem! Try googling "ditching +CAPS".

[bjornhall]

Ahem! Try googling "ditching +CAPS".

Which google are you using? :confused:

[soay]

Which google are you using?
google.co.uk, but to save time, read message #6 of this thread.

[Shunter]

A whole lost wing is a certain death

I'm sure you've all seen this before, but interestingly not always...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LveSc8Lp0ZE

Disclaimer: not applicable to GA aircraft, but worth watching all the same.

[sternone]

I hope you agree that if you loose your wing, it's over... even with an afterburner (he did not lost his complete big wing... )

[Shunter]

That's the whole point, he DID lose essentially a whole wing and it was NOT all over. I'm not the world's greatest pilot, but I do know quite a lot about physics and their conclusion stands up. With sufficient speed the characteristics of the aircraft become more those of a rocket. Clearly there are many other contributing factors, but for this particular type the evidence speaks for itself.

[worldpilot]

This is an impressive video showing a positive outcome of a very serious situation. It is evident that despite this dangerous circumstances, the pilot decided to land the plane; even though he had the option of ejecting from the plane. A very courageous pilot.
He got out of the spin, then stabilized the jet and landed it safely. Great job.:ok::D

Thats exactly the type of situational awareness that I always strive to accomplish when I jump into the cockpit.:D

WP

[sternone]

the pilot decided to land the plane; even though he had the option of ejecting from the plane. A very courageous pilot.

If he had knew how his tail looked like, he would have ejected his seat..

[worldpilot]

sternone,

I'm not sure if the physical structure of a plane is vital aspect for decision making. I would rather say that it is the feeling. The question is: am I in control?:confused:
Even if I know that the structure of my plane is not intact (e.g. part of the wind is off), but my feeling for the control is OK and that I'm satisfied with the flight or aerodynamic characteristics (stability) of the plane, I would continue with the flight and try to land the plane.:D

In this case, the pilot made the right decision.:ok:

WP

[Pilot DAR]

There sure is a lot of chatter about things falling off aircraft. In the civil world, the physical loss of an aircraft component vital to safe flight, during unabusive flight is very rare. It happened to me in a C180 (flap track), and I got it down with no more harm done. There are a lot of dangerous situations, and pilot induced risks which desreve management, education, and discussion long before things falling of GA aircraft, or even control loss or lock up.

I can't say that there might not be a day in the future when I wished I had a parachute. I wore one lots when flying jumpers (operational requirement), but there would be lots of things I'm sure I'd more likely need in an emergency first. How about pop out floats for the whole plane? Helicopters have them! Or a second engine!

GA aviation has so much experience, that we know where the hazards are by now. Parachute won't help most of them. I would choose to not carry the weight, and ongoing maintenace burden.

I agree with the previous writer, if it will fly at all, you fly it. If you cannot fly it, make a really good job of crashing it. Oh, by the way, were you wearing the already available shoulder harness? If you're not wearing that, the parachute is going to hurt you!

Pilot DAR

[MikeJ]

I thought that the only real reason for the 'chute was that in initial testing,
no reliable spin recovery technique could be found, and the POH gives 'chute pulling as the recommended action if in a spin. Personally, in all the other cases, I would want to fly it down as any other aircraft.

Over the sea, all advice I have ever seen is that in significant waves, 'land' along them, whatever the wind direction. Wave height will not be relevant.
The statistics are that water 'landings' are highly survived - its the hypothermia that gets you.

[Fuji Abound]

Personally, in all the other cases, I would want to fly it down as any other aircraft.

Hmmm.

Fair enough, but the aircraft "inspires" people to fly hard IFR.

As I commented early, I wouldn’t want to fly the aircraft down with a low cloud base.

Airframe icing is another scenario when you would think twice.

I also commented before there is some terrain over which I certainly would not want to try a forced landing.

Boulder strewn moorland areas will always require some luck as will any mountainous terrain even if you aim for the valleys to name but two.

Finally, any FL at night is going to owe more to luck than judgement.

[soay]

I thought that the only real reason for the 'chute was that in initial testing, no reliable spin recovery technique could be found, and the POH gives 'chute pulling as the recommended action if in a spin.
That argument is refuted in this (http://www.cirruspilots.org/uploaded_images/3-105960-Cirrusstall-spinreport.pdf) interesting document. See page 16 for the actual recovery technique.

[IO540]

Every one of those people who say that spin recovery should be taught in the PPL should read that document.

So, only about 0.5% of the total airplanes, or just short of 1% of those prohibited from spinning ( 9 airplanes in this study), were in an environment that would have allowed a recovery.

(page 10 of the PDF).

[scooter boy]

"If an aileron fell off (which happened once, IIRC)"

It has happened at least twice actually.

In the first incident the Cirrus test pilot was tragically killed as the aircraft he was flying did not have a CAPS fitted.

The second incident I read about shortly after the fatal one - it ended with a successful CAPS deployment.

So there is evidence Fuji.

IMHO Something is inherently wrong with the design if essential control surfaces are falling off rendering the aircraft unflyable.

No I am not a fan, 007.
The Cirrus was designed for drivers not pilots.

SB

[Gertrude the Wombat]

FWIW, we were taught in the PPL theory class (last year) that water, such as a forrest lake, is priority three for emergency landing sites, after clear open fields (#1) and standing crop or ploughed fields (#2) but ahead of tree tops.
I was told by an instructor whilst flying over a trees-and-lakes part of Vancouver Island to go for the trees in preference to the water.

On account of people's brains don't work very well whilst in water just above freezing point, they do things like swim into the back of the plane instead of out of the door.

Having accidentally ended up in cold water once, off a capsized sailing boat rather than in a plane, I wouldn't want to do it again - my brain wasn't functioning at all, and I just did nothing until the rescue boat picked me up a few tens of seconds later; all the stuff to do with righting the capsized boat and sailing off, which I can do perfectly well in warm water and have done more than once in anger, just vanished. And of course on that occasion I was wearing all the right gear for falling into cold water off a boat - which you won't be wearing for a flight above trees-and-lakes.

[soay]

IMHO Something is inherently wrong with the design if essential control surfaces are falling off rendering the aircraft unflyable.
Unarguable, if true, but doesn't fit the facts. According to the NTSB report (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20021008X05290&key=1), the aileron failed because it hadn't been properly reinstalled after maintenance.

[MikeJ]

soay,
I find the article fascinating from a number of points that emerge. In particular, IO540's point re the uselesness of PPL spin training, and the clarity of the bit that sets out examples of incompatible spin recovery methods for different aircraft types. One example is that the PA38 recovery method will fail to recover a Firefly from a spin.

Nevertheless, whilst I was quoting an opinion gained from varied sources, this definative document does to me confirm my original statement. Several times it emphases that the discovered best method could not be relied on, and that you could have lost too much height finding this to then use the 'chute.

But, re IO's point, the large majority of stall/spin fatals start from a height from which neither spin recovery nor the 'chute would work.
The whole purpose of the paper seems to be to justfy removing the spin recovery method from the POH (AFM = approved flight manual = POH).

I'm in no way critical of this, nor of the Cirrus in general. If you want an aircraft with that type of mission profile, I think its super.

Mike.

[Cusco]

Don't lose sight of the fact that the fella who deployed the parachute whose account is linked in post#6 had an undiagnosed/unexpected blackout and when he came to not only was he 'plummetting' but his right leg had gone numb. (And he subsequently turned out to have a brain tumour).
It is a fact that major incapacitating 'strokes' can often be preceded by mini-strokes:
IMHO he did the right thing to pull the plunger: who was to say he wasn't going to have another (pretty big; totally incapacitating) stroke while he was b*ggering about in naff visibility trying to sort himself out, with the adrenalin surge the event was causing shoving his blood pressure up still further?
I'd have pulled too.
Cusco;)

[SkyHawk-N]

The question is would you pop the chute if this happened to you, or would you go for the forced landing?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTemKnL8X30

[IO540]

Did the plane in the cable strike have a chute?

[SkyHawk-N]

Did the plane in the cable strike have a chute?

Yep it did. Did you watch the video? :O

If there was an obvious landing opportunity, however short, I'd probably go for it and not pop the chute. If over water, dense woodland or mountains I'd pop it.

[IO540]

I did watch the video, and I hear the pilot referring to pulling the chute, but the plane involved didn't appear to be a type which has a chute. But then I know little about the many different types.

If the timing on the movie is real, he was on the ground very quickly, which suggests he didn't have much time to mess about looking for landing sites.

[gasax]

Yes MikeJ that is the usual advice

Over the sea, all advice I have ever seen is that in significant waves, 'land' along them, whatever the wind direction. Wave height will not be relevant.

But if you are at sea level in that sort of sea then wave height is very relevant. A large swell will be obvious from height - the sea superimposed on it often is not. So you line up with the major visible element and then presuming you are able to land exactly in line with the moving wave (moving sideways relative to the aircraft) you notice the sea and the small waves running in a different direction - and so making the height of the major swell rise and fall by the same amount.

Wave height suddenly becomes very relevant. So given the choice of contacting the water at 15kts odd downward versus 60 plus forward what is the preference? The contact areas are going to have the same effect - the airframes stops pretty much 'dead'.

[a4fly]

Fuji, out of interest how serious would the airframe ice need to be before you would think of deploying the 'chute ?

[Fuji Abound]

a4fly

I don’t know a great deal about how the Cirrus "performs" when carrying ice - my suspicion would be that relatively low amounts of ice accumulation are going to cause a dramatic loss of performance because of the design of the wings. I would however want to do some reading on what Cirrus operators who have encountered these conditions have to say.

Obviously the first option would always be to extricate oneself from icing conditions without pulling the chute which in most cases should prove possible.

However if I could not get out of cloud and out of freezing conditions and there were any indications of ice accumulation causing the onset of flight control issues personally I would pull the chute.

Icing in an aircraft with no means of removing or preventing it (I appreciate some Cirrius have a wet wing and prop system) is in my book an emergency situation and one where you need to do something about it fast.

[a4fly]

Fuji, thanks for that. I've only once had experienced of flying a non-deiced single in what turned out to be light / moderate ice and was grateful to be flying a slab winged Piper. I'm sure that I would have felt much more uncomfortable in a modern aeroplane with a higher wing loading. However, only complete loss of control would make me want to deploy the 'chute because of the permanency of this course of action. Do you think that having the apparent " safety net " of a 'chute might encourage pilots to press on in the scenario of flying in forecast icing ?

[IO540]

IMHO only a fool would get a Cirrus into a situation where he lost control due to ice and had to pull the chute.

For starters, contrary to what most VFR pilots think the strategy for IFR flight is not to sit in IMC long term. It is a rapid climb to VMC on top, and stay in nice sunshine enroute. If the tops forecast looks like FL250 with the 0C level at FL080 and terrain at FL130 :) :) then one should scrap the flight.

[Fuji Abound]

I0540 is correct but it is not always possible.

Unless you have an IR climbing into the airways into VMC on top is not possible and even if you do you may elect not to go on an airways flight plan.

On a recent trip, quite contrary to the forecast, I encountered moderate icing at FL85 an IMC down to 1,500 feet. Another 500 feet and it was VMC on top but having not filed airways a significant chunk of the flight was IMC to maintain below the TMA.

It didnt matter because the aircraft had full anti icing and in any event the freezing level was high.

However the forecasts are not always accurate so a combination of high terrain and low bases and a TMA to restrict the climb into VMC it is possible to get "caught out" even if it should never happen.

The anser is never to fly in such marginal conditions but the Cirrius is an IFR competant platform which may persuade the pilot to use the aircraft for hard IFR.

In short the answer to your question I think is therefore yes.

There was an interesting article in Flying recently about an ATPL who encountered unforecast icing in an Arrow ending up flying the ILS with an iced out screen.

He admitted he was very lucky and I guess he would have thought about pulling the chute if he had had one!

Sh*t happens I suppose.

[IO540]

The vast majority of Cirruses are in the USA, where a large % of pilots have an IR and are thus limited only by weather and aircraft performance. In any case they can fly VFR to 17,999ft and that will get you above the clouds most of the time, enroute. They also have good weather forecasting systems over there.

Here in Europe, the utility of a Cirrus is minimal unless one has an IR, because CAS is so low down, all over the place.

I wonder what that "ATPL" was doing. Actually an ATPL (basically, somebody who sat a load of exams 20 years ago and now flies a big jet) knows hardly more about this than any experienced PPL. There is no such thing as "unforecast icing" :) Icing is never forecast with the slightest reliability. Anytime in IMC below 0C one can pick up ice; sometimes one doesn't, sometimes one does.

Pilots differ on their attitudes to risk. Many are in the "I always go" camp. I think that there is a definite technical limit to mission capability, and it's according to the operating ceiling, oxygen carriage, and the anti-ice equipment one has. In the TB20 (TKS prop) I would not embark on say a 5hr flight in freezing IMC no matter what - even if I had a chute - and a Cirrus is just the same.

The key to flying long distances - VFR or IFR - is to fly VMC, and VMC on top if necessary.

I am sure e.g. an Aztec with the rubber boots can sit in icing conditions for hours and just carry on, and many piston twins do this under "VFR" to avoid Eurocontrol route charges, but it isn't really a solution for having a nice flight with passengers.

[Fuji Abound]

I was reading "Flyig VFR in Marginal Weather" last night as it contains some interesting anecdotal accounts.

In the US and here another trap is the pilot getting himself set up VFR on top on a long cross country. He expects to descend clear of cloud at his destination but pushes on over a solid undercast. A cold soaked airframe, a descent in IMC and AT asking the pilot to hold in a step down and the classic conditions for a severe icing encouner come together. To some extent the higher the pilot is "suckered" into climbing the worse a problem he can create for himself.

In the air the aircraft starts to behave "strangely". To maintain height the amount of pitch has to be increased and the aircraft requires a lot more power. Back on the ground there is not a trace of the amount of ice the airframe accumulated, and the pilot might never know how close he was to the stall.

I'd think about pulling the chute if the control problems became severe.

Yes, all totally avoidable, but again it is this type of scenario that can and has happened.

Yes, I dont think you want to maintain in icing conditions for any length of time what ever aircraft you are flying, but clearly something like an Aztec is likely to cope a great deal better than many underpowered twins or singles with half baked ice "protection".

[sternone]

an Aztec is likely to cope a great deal better than many underpowered twins or singles with half baked ice "protection".

The Mooney is one of the only GA planes with a 'real' certified known ice protection.

The one that Diamond got on their DA-42 is certified in Europe, it seems to be that the certification in Europe for known icing is a joke, since there was no possibility to certify the DA-42 in the USA, it would not standed a chance like the Mooney succesfully did....

[A and C]

It would seem to me that having trauled the four pages above the advice in the flight manual is the best Fuji and some others have given this a great deal of thought and refined what the flight manual stated adding greatly to the debate however I think that chute deployment is most likely to have to be a split second call and reading the above debate will rase the chances of a pilot making the correct decision with not very much time to do so.

Chute deployment will write off the aircraft as stated in the flight manual and a forced landing if done well will result in no damage, I have to take issue with IO540 on the subject if ditching always writing off an aircraft, It is very likely that his TB20 would sink apon ditching but if it did not the salt water would result in a write off unless the aircraft was recoverd and treated with water dispersant very quickly. A compostie airframe is not subject to corrosion and so the airframe structure should not be subject to secondary damage by salt water immersion.

In my opinion the if you ditch a Cirrus the chances are it will float and the chances of the aircraft being repaired are 60/40 in favour.

[BackPacker]

A compostie airframe is not subject to corrosion and so the airframe structure should not be subject to secondary damage by salt water immersion.

The engine will be written off for sure due to internal corrosion. All the electrics will break down sooner or later due to corrosion of contact joints. Hinges, pushrods, rudder cables, pulleys and such will all corrode or at the very minimum scratch and tear because of salt crystals when things dry out. Upholstery is toast. The foam that holds the inner and outer skin apart will soak up water and lose its strength. Water will get inside the tubes that make up the engine mounting frame, starting corrosion there. And so forth...

And even if the aircraft will float, there's no aerodynamic balance keeping the plane level. It's just gravity. So it will float nose-down, submerging the most expensive bits of the aircraft in water anyway.

Cars that have been immersed in water (driven off the dike, say) are written off, and for good reason. So should aircraft.

[a4fly]

IO540.

not only fools do foolish things ! remember the discussion we were having

recently about a twin that came a cropper in the Alps. You are right about

ice, it's a pain in the ar*e because you never really know when it's going

to appear, other than in certain circumstances like C.B.s and we try to

avoid them. Flying any aeroplane that doesn't have anti-ice in icing

conditions needs careful consideration.

Let us hope that there will not be a group of pilots out there that feel

that having a 'chute allows them to push their luck even further than they

already do.

[A and C]

You realy are showing how little you know about this subject.

The engine will have to go for a shock load check and any problems with corrosion would be delt with during that check, the cost of the seat fabric and internal furnishings are very low as a % of the airframe.

The likelyhood is that the aircraft will float on it's wings as the fuel tanks are the largest sealed structure, as you may know the lift (c of p) acts from about 30% of the MAC so the aircraft will float at about the same place as the weight acts from, in composite aircraft this usualy keeps most of the electrics and radios out of the water.

Internal corrosion is an issue in tubular structures and the chances are that these will be scrappedas would the control cables.

Water should not penetrate the foam sandwich as it has to be watertight to avoid water turning to ice at high altitudes and damaging the structure and even if some water dose get into the foam it is not hard to repair.

The high value of the Cirus airframe is the critical to the chances of a write off, so I stand by the statment that the chances of repair are 60/40 in favour, and I speak as some one who has had some technical involvement in at least three aircraft that have returned to flying followind ditching.

[soay]

If the aircraft comes to rest the right way up, the cockpit will slowly fill with water through the air vents and the passageways for the control surface cables and rods. I doubt that there would be sufficient buoyancy in the wings to keep it afloat after that. The SR22 (http://www.ilanreich.com/Public_Pics/Crash/Amateur%20photos.htm) that ditched under its parachute sank, as did a DA40 (http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Light+plane+makes+emergency+landing+in+Helsinki%E2%80%99s+So uth+Harbour/1135227564650) that ditched in Helsinki harbour.

Here (http://www.ilanreich.com/Public_Pics/Crash/USAIG%20airplane%20for%20sale.htm) are some pictures of the recovered SR22, taken for the insurance sale.

[IO540]

Nearly every unpressurised plane will sink - unless it is made of wood and ditched because it had empty tanks :)

I don't buy the recovery after ditching. In a typical modern IFR plane, the value breakdown is roughly

1/3 engine, prop and related parts
1/3 airframe
1/3 avionics

The engine will be trashed, unless recovered fast and immediately dismantled.

Same for the prop.

The avionics will be totally trashed; sometimes the instruments get sold to companies making flight simulators and such.

Anyway, unless the incident is something mysterious with significant fatalities, nobody will bother recovering the plane from the seabed.

I have personally seen the remains of a TBM700 which ditched in shallow water and the whole thing was written off.

[BackPacker]

A and C, your original post suggested (at least to me) that a Cirrus ditching under its parachute in salt water would float, could be pulled from the water, rinsed off and fly again. I think you and I have clearly demonstrated now that that's not the case. Even if the fuselage itself can be reused, lots of components will need to be tested, cleaned, overhauled, replaced or whatever. Not trivial.

As for floating on its fuel tanks after ditching, I do not have the numbers here for a Cirrus but a standard Diamond (no long range tanks) can hold 28 USG of fuel. When empty, that's 106 liters of air providing 106 kg of buoyancy (a little more than that in salt water). The empty weight of our (IFR, so comparatively heavy) DA-40 is 815.3 kilos. So in order for it to float, it needs to pull some serious amount of buoyancy from somewhere. I doubt whether the foam sandwich will provide enough, and I cannot readily think of anything else that's significantly lighter than water in the aircraft that can provide buoyancy. So my gut feel is that as soon as the cockpit fills with water, the aircraft will sink.

Soay, nice pics of that SR22. It clearly shows that a ditched aircraft will sit in the water with a nose-down attitude due to the weight of the engine. In this case, initially some 20 degrees or so, going to about 90 degrees as the cockpit fills up.

[A and C]

Compostie aircraft seem to float rather well if you look at the history of G-WAVE you will find a composite aircraft that has ditched, been taken in tow by a lifeboat and in now flying.

[BackPacker]

The only reference I could find on G-WAVE was a PPRuNe archive, and they said that the wife, who remained on board, only got wet feet when she transferred from the aircraft into the lifeboat. So in this particular case I guess the cockpit stayed dry, or filled up with water extremely slowly. Obviously that provides a lot of buoyancy. Plus, it means that all the avionics and most of the electrics probably stayed dry as well.

But now that I think of it... All the composite aircraft that I remember from pictures or flying (Europa, DA-40 and Cirrus) have gull-wing doors or doors that open up upwards and sideways. In other words, the doors only extend from about halfway the fuselage upwards. If the bottom end is sufficiently sealed, you've got a pretty effective boat hull. So it might be because of this design (which may have its roots in the strength characteristics of composites) that composite aircraft do indeed float better than the average spamcan (with full fuselage height doors).

Mmmm. "Close all air vents" might actually be a very sensible emergency ditching checklist instruction.

[soay]

Compostie aircraft seem to float rather well if you look at the history of G-WAVE you will find a composite aircraft that has ditched, been taken in tow by a lifeboat and in now flying.
Are you generalising from this case of a motorglider, which must have a very light engine, or do you have more data to back that statement up?

http://mp.motoplaneur.free.fr/images/A_CIMG2170.jpg

[Fuji Abound]

The one that Diamond got on their DA-42 is certified in Europe, it seems to be that the certification in Europe for known icing is a joke, since there was no possibility to certify the DA-42 in the USA, it would not standed a chance like the Mooney succesfully did....

I didnt know that was so.

The 42 appears to have a reasonable anti/de ice system encompassing as you would expect wings, screen, props, and tail. Moreover there are no sharp surfaces elsewhere which would "attract" ice. I have used the system in icing conditions and it did a fine job, albeit the icing was not severe and I climbed above the tops.

I wonder why the system on the Mooney is considered superior as it is based on the same TKS technology as far as I was aware.

[A and C]

I did give the Cirus a 60/40 chance of being rebuilt after a ditching based on other aircraft that I have known to be recovered.

However the build quality is not as good as most of the Europan compostie aircraft so this might sway the balance, the other thing that will cause problems is the lack of composite repair experience within the Cirus company.

Cirus use the Boeing repair manual as a starting point, this might well be satisfactory for composite panels on large aircraft but is not good enough for light aircraft structual repair, Cirus are learning fast about the practical aspects of aircraft repair as people damage there products but the level of knowlage is far below that of the european glider repair business that has been doing the job for years.

The result is that Cirus might well not approve a repair that would be approved by a european company due to the reasons stated above or go for a "belt & braces" repair that would make the job an economic non-starter.

[davidboucher]

I would deploy CAPS over land if in IMC conditions that exteded below about 1500ft AGL or at night(unless I were visual with a runway or able to get to one within comfortable gliding range). Regarding attempting a landing overland in good VFR I would attempt this if the terrain were good enough ie large enough fields and there was at least some headwind component otherwise I would deploy CAPS, I would try to position myself well 1st ie not over built up area or rocks.

If you are flying a Cirrus regularly, have you joined COPA (Cirrus owners and pilots association)? they run CPPP's (Cirrus pilots proficiency programme) once or twice a year in Europe and they cover matters like this. The last one I went too in Baden Baden last summer included a debrief on most CAPS pulls that have occurred since inception.

Hope you never need to make that decision, happy flying.

Dave Boucher

[scooter boy]

"I wonder why the system on the Mooney is considered superior as it is based on the same TKS technology as far as I was aware."

Simply because it is attached to a superior aircraft.:E

Seriously though, there is a lot more to TKS certification than just attaching the panels and a pump.
The degree of systems redundancy required for FAA certification is staggering (3 pumps in total) plus other extras. There is a numbered standard that everything needs to be tested to (can't remember it off the top of my head). I remember reading on this site that FIKI certification on the cirrus and columbia would be nigh on impossible due to the possibility of ice accretion on the fixed undercarriage.

The Mooney remains the only factory fitted FAA approved TKS system approved for flight into known icing. I can tell you from personal experience it works extremely well both as de-ice and anti-ice - (worth every penny) and has made more challenging missions possible for me which I would have been unable to handle without it. Funnily enough I have hardly used it in the last year but the year before I went through gallons of aeroshell compound 07.

SB

[sternone]

I wonder why the system on the Mooney is considered superior as it is based on the same TKS technology as far as I was aware.

The main reason that they let the DA42 do the certification in Europe instead of USA is because in Europe it seems to be that the test minima are much below the ones that are in the states.

I assume there must be a valid reason why a manufacture that installs a certain kit takes the least difficult path to get the certification. Do you care when you pick up loads of ice ? I do!

[IO540]

The FAA requires two alternators for known-ice cert and that alone stops a lot of N-reg planes being KI certified.

However (as most N-reg pilots know) the whole "what constitudes KI" debate is pretty convoluted and that is before you start extending it to flying an N-reg in Europe, obviously using the European aviation weather services.

[Kit d'Rection KG]

Going back to the original thread...

1600 fpm vertically will hurt - a lot - but won't kill you. :\

40 kts horizontally into the wrong sort of impact will kill you for certain.:\

The Rallye pilot on page 1 should think about this carefully. ;)

[soay]

40 kts horizontally into the wrong sort of impact will kill you for certain.
Here (http://www.newsherald.com/headlines/article.display.php?a=4213) is a report of a Mooney that ditched off Panama City Beach yesterday. The landing was perfect, but the pilot hit his head and was knocked out. His passenger could not get him out before it sank, but she was rescued while he drowned.

[sternone]

but the pilot hit his head and was knocked out

Very sad story, but that raises the question, is having a helmet on board a good option in case of an emergency landing ?? It may sound stupid, but it does makes a lot of sence no ?

[scooter boy]

Sternone, The Robinson helicopter company have advised all pilots to wear helmets and Nomex flightsuits with gloves while flying their product.
How many Robbos do you see being flown by people attired this way?
Sure, this clothing may save a life once in a very long while, chances are you will need it the day you forget it at home!

Basically another example of liability suits leading to backside-covering advisories.

SB

[valenii]

worldpilot

I suggest that you get yourself a proper Cirrus instructor, you must understand the system if it will ever help you.

If you are serious about flying a Cirrus SPEND $50 and join COPA www.cirruspilots.org and then read and search the members forums.

For your instructor to give you such bad advise "don't pull over land" is unbelievable. HE does not understand what its for, and you can only get as good as he is able to teach.

What else does he not know? Has he taught you about alternator or flap failures? or brake failures? or "gotchas" in the Avionics, or how to ensure your fuel is balanced and correct, or how to even lean the thing properly?

I would be suprised if this guy knew how to lock the doors. The CAPS system could save your life one day, and HE is not prepared to learn about it and teach you some seanarios and decision trees?

If you haven't thought this thru and practiced it in your mind: when, where and how you might use this, then in an emergency you will freeze and forget a life saving option.

Do the RAF let their pilots fly a Harrier without training them on the ejection seat?

Phew!

[p32r]

I was told by a CFI flying the Cirrus in Dubai you should not deploy the parachute over water as the design assumes in a parachute landing on the ground the landing gear absorbs some of the shock before the body of the aircraft hits the ground. In water the shock is absorbed directly by the body as the legs enter the water i.e. the shock goes directly into the body of the aircraft and :ouch:the spine of the pilot and passengers.

[Fuji Abound]

I am not aware of any such limitation in the POH.

Clearly the landing gear provides a crumple zone. There are other strategic crumple zones underneath the seats.

It would be interesting to better understand the dynamics - which I dont.

At parachute speeds does the undercarriage still absorb some of the impact on water - after all the spats will collide with the water first and they do present a bit of a surface area. Secondly, is the energy transferred landing on water exactly the same as on the land - or is it a little less? Thirdly, if the landing is on anything other than a flat water surface does a swell result in a different transferance of energy?

[bjornhall]

Then there is the question: Is a ditching really a desparate enough situtation that you'd want to try the chute? Most ditchings in non-chute aircraft are survivable, even in low wing fixed gear planes...

[Fuji Abound]

Is a ditching really a desparate enough situtation that you'd want to try the chute? Most ditchings in non-chute aircraft are survivable, even in low wing fixed gear planes...

Not sure that is the question.

The question I think is if you are going to ditch is the degree of injury on average likely to be moe or less with the chute?

I might add I dont know the answer.

Ditching into a six foot swell mind you is always going to be interesting.

[bjornhall]

The question I think is if you are going to ditch is the degree of injury on average likely to be moe or less with the chute?

I might add I dont know the answer.

Ditching into a six foot swell mind you is always going to be interesting.

Good point, and then I have an even better question... ;)

If you are going to ditch, is the degree of injury in this particular situation likely to be more or less with the chute?

Swell, wind, visibility/darkness, pilot confidence in executing a ditching, etc etc ...

[IO540]

I think the general idea is that a chute drop onto water might injure your back, but the aircraft will almost certainly be in one piece and reasonably sealed, whereas if you ditch conventionally (60kt+) the outcome is certainly not assured.

All all the ditchings (i.e. where the pilot was conscious and in full control) the only ones we know about were the ones which worked. All the fatal ones (which include a fair number where the pilot was doing a ferry flight etc and was dressed like an astronaut) are unknown but one has to assume that in most of them ('most' because the normal stats on pilot incapacitation are barely significant) the pilot was in full control, but still didn't pull it off and died.

The margin between a back injury, and no injury, is thin, and varies according to the person. It is like electrocution. Some people have a bad heart and will die from touching a cattle fence. If you chute-landed (water or land) 10 Cirruses, each with 4 people, I bet a % of the occupants would suffer some injuries, but purely on the basis of the % of the population who are unfit, obese, etc, what would one expect?

So far we have I believe only ONE data point to play with, which isn't much.

I would take a chute ditching every time. But I would recline the seat way back :)

[RatherBeFlying]

In a recent World Gliding Contest held in Sweden, pilots were given a briefing on lake landings as Sweden has extensive forested areas where landing in a lake is the better option:uhoh:

I know of one Canadian metal glider that landed in water; indeed, flew in it afterwards.

Yes, it helps to have a simple airframe, no engine and not many instruments and avionics.

[bjornhall]

We actually know a good deal about ditchings, successful and not... For example: EQUIPPED TO SURVIVE (tm) - Ditching Myths Torpedoed! (http://www.equipped.org/ditchingmyths.htm)

I wouldn't pull a chute rather than ditch, unless circumstances were particularly bad. The main problem IMV, cold water and time to rescue, is no different...

Edited to add one more point: You are unlikely to be seriously injured in a ditching. Either you survive unharmed (by far the most likely outcome), or you die. Both options seem rather more pleasant than surviving with a crippling back injury IMHO...

[Madbob]

I don't know if anyone has posted this before but quite amazingly there have been three CAPS "saves" this month! Two in the US and one in France all due to engine failures in flight......two happened at night.

Dates are 4th Jan, 6th Jan and 9th Jan.

Result 6 people alive but at the cost of three broken aeroplanes.....

Sometimes I wonder if Cirrus pilots even consider the option of a forced landing without power or do they automatically grab the handle irrespective of the terrain or proximity to an airfield. Sadly, all the airframes seem to suffer substantial damage and get written-off after a chute pull.

Has anyone died landing under a CAPS canopy? The odds seem pretty safe in these three cases with only minor injuries reported.

MB

[cockney steve]

Seems a bit like airbags in cars...if the bump is such that they deploy, the vehicle is effectively a writeoff , due to the damage caused by the bags and the cost of replacement.

no doubt, the CAPS system could be refined and turn the plane into an overgrown paramotor / paraglider, with a slower.gentler,more controllable descent trajectory. this would increase the already significant "deadweight" penalty of CAPS.

The manufacturer , like the automobile trade, has made a compromise and potentially gets to sell a replacement vehicle whenever the safety system deploys. It's not in their best interests to have a "low-damage" deployment.....but there again I'm a cynical old bugger.

[Jonzarno]

In answer to your questions:

1. Cirrus pilots are not taught to grab the handle as soon as a warning light comes on.

We are taught to make CAPS an integral part of emergencies handling and to make sure that we pull early enough to ensure a successful outcome and if we are not absolutely sure of a nailed on emergency landing, to pull rather than take the risk.

For me, at least, a 90% chance of surviving a forced landing in a field or a ditching just isn't good enough odds. YMMV!

2. When deployed within design parameters, ie max IAS 133 KTS, and for that matter significantly above that (the extremes are 34 KTS whilst inverted and over 190 KTS), the only fatality was a pilot who was taken ill at the controls and died from that whilst CAPS saved his passengers.

There was also a fatality when a pilot pulled to late after an icing event and pulled the chute off the aircraft in an uncontrolled dive at about 300 KTS.

There have, however, been several fatalities when pilots have either decided not to pull at all or have left it to late and pulled when they were to low. Hence my comments in 1, above.....

Here (http://https://www.cirruspilots.org/copa/safety_programs/w/safety_pages/723.cirrus-caps-history.aspx) is a review of all CAPS activations since the Cirrus was introduced.

What is striking about it is the wide variety of circumstances in which the aircraft have come down (land, sea, someone's back garden, trees, on a truck.... Etc) with nobody in the aircraft or on the ground killed.

I hope this helps!

[Flyingmac]

Choice of two. To or too. Pick the right one too avoid confusion.:ok:

[Pace]

Jonzarno

I am sold on the Cirrus and the Caps as a huge safety addition for SEPs my concerns only lie in two areas!

The extra decision making process! Do you pull or use conventional techniques ?

The false confidence factor luring pilots into situations that they or the aircraft are not capable of

Pace

[Madbob]

Jonzarno

Thanks for the post. Very informative, sadly I was not able to get your link to open.

Don't get me wrong, IMHO CAPS is a good piece of kit, and worth the weight-penalty/cost but obviously not is every situation and not something to make one discard shall we say, skills which "traditional" pilots have had to rely on for years......much in the same way when I learnt to fly in the RAF we were still taught forced landings without power in aircraft such as the Jet Provost, Hawk (and Hunter) even though we also had ejection seats.....these were taught with both night and IMC procedures to follow such as the basic flame-out controlled descent through cloud to the "one-in-one" which was a bit more challenging.

Fly safe!

MB

[Jonzarno]

I agree with you that CAPS does not in any way remove the need for proper airmanship and basic flying skills.

In many ways, it's analogous to the use of an ejection seat in a military aircraft where, as you know, many air forces mandate the use of the ejection seat in the case of a flame out.

I'm sorry you couldn't open the link. Here's what you would have seen. This data was compiled by Rick Beach who is a COPA Board Member and who has studied all of these incidents as well as the sad number of fatal accidents we have seen. It includes both saves and incidents where the system has been deployed well outside its design parameters.

Rick has personally interviewed a number of CAPS survivors and is widely acknowledged as the leading authority on the system.

I'm sorry for the slightly iffy formatting, but I've only been able to copy and paste the text from the original article. Anyhow, here goes:


As of 10 January 2014 there have been 41 saves with 85 survivors in aircraft equipped with the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS).

Introduction
CAPS stands for the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System. It consists of a ballistic rocket-fired parachute that extracts a large round parachute attached to the airframe. The rocket ensures that the parachute will deploy successfully despite the attitude of the airframe in flight, such as a spin or while inverted. The parachute inflates slowly and the risers are reefed to ensure a rapid transition to stable attitude under canopy.

Tests demonstrate that within 8 seconds all forward velocity is reduced to zero (relative to wind) and descent occurs at about 1700 fpm or 17 knots or 20 mph. The parachute deployment airspeed was demonstrated at Vpd of 133 knots. The demonstrated loss of altitude was 400 feet from level flight and 920 feet from initiation of a 1-1/2 turn spin. Four CAPS deployments occurred successfully at higher speeds, 168, 171, 187 and 190 knots indicated airspeed, and one deployment failed at speeds estimated at over 300 knots airspeed.

No person has died when the CAPS system deployed within demonstrated parameters
(airspeed below Vpd of 133 knots and altitude above 920 feet in a descent).



CAPS Activations and Saves
CAPS provides an additional level of safety for the Cirrus Design SR2X fleet. However, it is not a guarantee.

There have been 53 known CAPS events as of 6 January 2014.

Of those activations, 41 deployments are considered "saves" that involved 85 survivors with one fatality (figures do not include one unborn child who was also saved in CAPS event #13).

CAPS Event Summaries
Here is a synopsis of all of the known CAPS parachute activations. Each summary lists the deployment by year, location and injuries, then describe the factors that lead to the activation, the activation scenario, and the landing scenario.

CAPS event #1, Oct 2002, Lewisville, TX

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #1) - Factors: VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error and airplane became difficult to control, after maneuvering, first parachute deployment by pilot in a certified production airplane; Activation: low altitude, 1,500 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: bushes near golf course

CAPS event #2, April 2004, Lethbridge, AB, Canada

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #2) - Factors: VFR night cruise, loss of control, autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, SR20 performance Activation: high altitude, deployment upon loss of control; Weather: VMC night; Landing: landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers

CAPS event #3, April 2004, Fort Lauderdale, FL

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #3) - Factors: confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system; Activation: low altitude, 1200 feet; Weather: IMC; Landing: trees

CAPS event #4, Sept 2004, Peters, CA

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #4) - Factors: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery; Activation: high altitude, above 10,000 feet, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC; Weather: VMC, then IMC under canopy, then VMC; Landing: walnut grove

CAPS event #5, Feb 2005, Norden, CA

1 fatality; (not CAPS Save, parachute separated from airframe) - Factors: severe icing at 16,000' over Sierra mountains, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots; Activation: uncertain if intentional activation or due to airframe stress in high speed descent, located along track to crash site; Weather: IMC, icing; Landing: high speed impact in mountainous area

CAPS event #6, June 2005, Haverstraw, NY

1 serious injury; (CAPS Save #5) - Factors: pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs; IFR on approach to KHPN, Activation: low altitude, last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots groundspeed (well above Vpd of 133 knots); Weather: VMC; Landing: water, bay of Hudson River

CAPS event #7, Jan 2006, Childersburg, AL

3 uninjured; (CAPS Save #6) - Factors: severe icing at 9,000 feet, loss of control; Activation: high altitude; Weather: IMC icing; Landing: trees

CAPS event #8, Feb 2006, Wagner, SD

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #7) - Factors: pilot disorientation in clouds, shortly after takeoff; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: flat, frozen field

CAPS event #9, Aug 2006, Indianapolis, IN

1 fatality, 3 serious injuries; (CAPS Save #8, parachute observed not fully deployed) - Factors: IMC, loss of control, stall/spin descent; Activation: low altitude; 528 feet AGL in 100 knot spin (3-1/2 turns) just 4 seconds prior to impact, well below design parameters for survivable CAPS deployment, first activation of CAPS by non-pilot; Weather: IMC; Landing: water, pond among residential housing

CAPS event #10, Sept 2006, Bull Bay, Jamaica

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #9) - Factors: loss of control, VFR cruise, passenger activated when fuel streaming from tank filler openings; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees

CAPS activation #11, Feb 2007, Sydney, Australia

2 injuries; (not CAPS Save; parachute not extracted due to anomalous rocket trajectory) - Factors: VFR cruise, engine problems, rocket took unusual trajectory, , successful emergency off-airport landing; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees

CAPS event #12, Apr 2007, Luna, NM

1 injured; (CAPS Save #10) - Factors: IMC cruise, climb to avoid weather, loss of airspeed indication, terrain warning in IMC; Activation: low altitude, inverted, 34 knots airspeed; Weather: IMC, icing; Landing: trees, mountainous terrain

CAPS event #13, Aug 2007, Nantucket, MA

2 injured; (CAPS Save #11) - Factors: VFR in IMC during approach, parachute tangled with tower wires, 1 serious injury, 1 minor injury, 1 unborn child saved; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: tower, flat open terrain

CAPS event #14, Oct 2008, Spain

3 uninjured; (CAPS Save #12) - Factors: IFR in IMC during approach, pilot reported turbulence and loss of control, parachute tangled with power line wires; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: power line

CAPS event #15, Nov 2008, Turriaco, Italy

1 seriously injured, 3 uninjured; (CAPS Save #13) - Factors: fuel exhaustion and loss of engine power, parachute deployed at low altitude and late in the power-off glide scenario, approximately 400 feet above ground; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees and grass

CAPS event #19, Mar 2009, Gaithersburg, MD

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #16) - Factors: door popped open upon takeoff, pilot reported rain in the cockpit and attempted to manage door but became disoriented; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: residential street

CAPS event #20, Jun 2009, Mount Airy, NC

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #17) - Factors: catastrophic engine failure with oil obscuring windscreen, Activation: high altitude, 6,000 feet above ground; Weather: IMC; Landing: level field

CAPS event #21, Dec 2009, Hamilton Island, Australia

1 seriously injured; (CAPS Save #18) - Factors: engine loss of power, misfueled with Jet-A, attempted return to airport; Activation: low altitude, 441 feet above ocean; Weather: VMC; Landing: ocean

CAPS event #22, Feb 2010, Boulder, CO

2 fatalities; (not CAPS Save, parachute activated due to impact forces) - Factors: mid-air collision between Cirrus SR20 and tow-plane with glider in tow; Activation: high altitude, 8,000 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: level field

CAPS event #23, May 2010, Sirdal, Norway

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #19) - Factors: icing induced high-speed descent followed by parachute activation, Activation: high altitude, 6,000 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: uneven rocky terrain

CAPS event #24, 10 July 2010, Hornton, United Kingdom

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #20) - Factors: sprial dive while pilot distracted, VFR pilot flying in low ceilings and visibility, Activation: 2,000 feet; Weather: IMC; Landing: field surrounded by trees

CAPS event #25, 16 August 2010, Idabel, OK

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #21) - Factors: loss of engine power, rapid descent, decision to avoid off-airport landing, activated parachute, Activation: low altitude, below 500 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: grassy field

CAPS event #26, 23 August 2010, Porter, TX

1 seriously injured; (not CAPS Save, parachute had no effect on outcome) - Factors: go-around after aborted landing, failed to clear tree obstructions, activated parachute after first impact with a tree ; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees

CAPS event #27, 30 September 2010, Mathias, WV

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #22) - Factors: loss of control in turbulence while on approach in stormy weather, Activation: 1134 AGL, 171 KIAS; Weather: IMC; Landing: trees, remarkably the plane wedged itself on branches about 20 feet above the ground, pilot and passenger were injured when they attempted self-rescue and fell onto rocks below

CAPS event #28, 15 December 2010, Nacogdoches, TX

1 uninjured; (not CAPS Save, parachute activated after ground impact) - Factors: loss of engine power, decision to avoid off-airport landing; Activation: after ground impact; Weather: VMC, night; Landing: residential area

CAPS event #29, 27 January 2011, Cross City, FL

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #23) - Factors: loss of engine power, decision to avoid off-airport landing, activated parachute, Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC, night; Landing: recently logged forest with lots of stumps

CAPS event #30, 30 January 2011, Bennett, CO

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #24) - Factors: pilot disorientation due to vertigo, activated parachute, Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC, night; Landing: field

CAPS event #31, 24 October 2011, Carrollton, TX

1 fatality, 2 serious injured; (not CAPS Save, parachute did not have time to fully deploy) - Factors: pilot reported mechanical problem and attempted approach in fog, went missed, attempted second approach and plane lost control prior to missed approach point; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: field

CAPS event #32, 20 November 2011, New Orleans, LA

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #25) - Factors: pilot reported loss of engine power and attempted return to airport then activated over Lake Pontchartrain, repacked parachute, Activation: 300 feet; Weather: IMC, day; Landing: water

CAPS event #33, 7 January 2012, near Andros Island, Bahamas

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #26) - Factors: engine seized and propeller froze in flight due to loss of oil pressure, Activation: 2300 feet; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: water

CAPS event #34, 29 February 2012, at Melbourne, FL

4 fatalities; (not CAPS Save, parachute did not have time to fully deploy) - Factors: pilot lost control on base turn to final and pulled at low altitude, Activation: almost at ground impact; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #35, 24 March 2012, near Itu, Brazil

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #27) - Factors: engine lost power and pilot avoided off-airport landing, repacked parachute, Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #36, 22 July 2012, near Pickens, SC

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #28) - Factors: pilot reported mechanical problem, Activation: about 1000 feet AGL; Weather: VMC, day; Landing: trees, suspended about 20 feet above ground, occupants stayed in plane until rescued

CAPS event #37, 6 October 2012, near Birmingham, AL

1 uninjured, 1 minor injury; (CAPS Save #29) - Factors: pilot disoriented during missed approach in IMC , Activation: 1000' AGL; Weather: IMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #38, 16 November 2012, near Show Low, AZ

1 minor injury; (CAPS Save #30) - Factors: engine lost power and pilot avoided off-airport landing , Activation: 1500' AGL; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #39, 21 November 2012, near Gilgandra, NSW, Australia

1 uninjured, 1 minor injury; (CAPS Save #31) - Factors: engine lost power and pilot avoided off-airport landing , Activation: 1000' AGL; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #42, 23 January 2013, near Danbury, CT

3 uninjured; (CAPS Save #32) - Factors: fuel exhaustion; Activation: TBD; Weather: night VMC; Landing: powerlines in residential area

CAPS event #43, 29 March 2013, near Alexandria, MN

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #33) - Factors: pilot lost control due to flap anomaly; Activation: TBD; Weather: VFR; Landing: frozen lake

CAPS event #44, 16 May 2013, near Addison, TX

1 uninjured (not CAPS save, parachute did not deploy) - Factors: pilot reported loss of instruments, activated CAPS, but rocket failed to extract the parachute from the aircraft; repacked parachute; Activation: possibly 7000 feet; Weather: IMC, hard rain; Landing: pilot recovered the airplane and descended underneath the clouds to about 800' AGL and returned to airport trailing the rocket, lanyard and incremental bridle behind the aircraft

CAPS event #45, 6 June 2013, near Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, United Kingdom

1 minor injury; (CAPS Save #34) - Factors: pilot reported "navigational difficulties" while on approach to Cheltenham airport when ATC changed runways and vectored the aircraft to a different approach; Activation: approximately 2000 feet; Weather: IMC; Landing: garden in a residential area of urban city

CAPS event #46, 5 July 2013, near La Guajira, Colombia

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #35) - Factors: mid-air collision with Cirrus HK-4752; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: ocean

CAPS event #47, fatal accident #97, 18 July 2013, near Lanseria, South Africa

2 fatalities; (not CAPS Save, parachute did not have time to fully deploy) - Factors: low altitude activation after touch-and-go departure; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Field

CAPS event #48, 20 July 2013, near Tappahannock, VA

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #36) - Factors: loss of engine power; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Trees

CAPS event #49, 31 July 2013, near Poncins, France

2 fatalities; (not CAPS Save, parachute did not have time to fully deploy) - Factors: TBD; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Trees

CAPS event #50, 19 August 2013, near Texarkana, AR

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #37) - Factors: loss of engine power; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Field

CAPS event #51, 14 November 2013, near Brazil

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #38) - Factors: TBD; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Field

CAPS event #52, 4 January 2014, near Buckhannon, WV

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #39) - Factors: mechanical, loss of engine power on final approach short of the runway; Activation: 500' AGL; Weather: VMC; Landing: Road

CAPS event #53, 6 January 2014, near Claveau, Deux Sèvres, France

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #40) - Factors: mechanical, loss of engine power; Activation: 1800' AGL; Weather: TBD; Landing: Field

CAPS event #54, 9 January 2014, near Fort Hall, Idaho

2 minor injuries; (CAPS Save #41) - Factors: mechanical, loss of engine power; Activation: TBD; Weather: TBD; Landing: Field

CAPS Anomalies
The unsuccessful deployments involved three anomalies and eight activations at an altitude too low to fully inflate the canopy:

CAPS event #5, Feb 2005, Norden, CA, activation at very high speed (likely in excess of 300 knots indicated, over twice the deployment speed) where parachute separated from the airframe
CAPS activation #11, Feb 2007, Sydney, Australia, activation at very low altitude where the rocket took an unusual trajectory resulting in a failure to extract the parachute
CAPS event #44, 16 May 2013, near Addison, TX, activation where the rocket failed to extract the parachute from the aircraft (only anomaly within demonstrated parameters)
Several activations occurred prior to ground impact but at too low an altitude to fully inflate the canopy (witnesses report 50 to 200 feet above ground): Indianapolis, IN; Waxhaw, NC; Deltona, FL; Porter, TX; Nacogdoches, TX; Asturias, Spain; Carrollton, TX; Melbourne, FL.

The rocket trajectory anomaly in 2007 was investigated and an airworthiness directive was published requiring a modification of the CAPS rocket assembly.

In addition, there have been several fatal accidents where the parachute has deployed by forces due to impact with the ground, which are not considered in this history.

9 CAPS Planes that Were Repaired and Flew Again
Despite the language in the Cirrus POH that cautions pilots that CAPS may cause damage, several aircraft that landed under canopy were repaired and flew again.

Revision A7 of the Cirrus SR22 POH currently states "CAPS deployment is expected to result in damage to the airframe" that updates the earlier language that "The system is intended to saves the lives of the occupants but will most likely destroy the aircraft."

However, the following aircraft have landed under canopy, all occupants survived, and the airplanes have been repaired, determined to be airworthy and returned to service.

N1223S, SR22 s/n 105 -- CAPS Save #1, repaired by Cirrus, sold, subsequently involved in a fatal accident
CGEMC, SR20 s/n 1241 -- CAPS event #2, self-insured, repaired and still flying
N916LJ, SR22 s/n 80 -- CAPS event #3, reregistered in AZ and still flying
N931CD, SR22 s/n 261 -- CAPS event #4, repaired, sold to friend of pilot, and still flying
N479SR, SR22 s/n 2794 -- CAPS event #17, reregistered in 2010 and subsequently involved in a fiery crash in Uraguay
N34TG, SR22 s/n 386 -- CAPS event #20, reregistered in 2011 and still flying
N470RD, SRV s/n 1636 -- CAPS event #24, repaired and still flying
N576WT, SR22 s/n 3440 -- CAPS event #27, repaired, renumbered N311KN and still flying
PP-CIE, SR20, s/n 1050 -- CAPS event #35, repaired and still flying


Media inquiries: [email protected]

[Jonzarno]

Pace

I don't really see it as an "extra decision making process" but as an integrated element that is part of an existing decision making process.

Although I've only ever pulled the chute myself in a simulator, I have had two real in flight emergencies, both engine related, that have necessitated an emergency landing at an airport.

In both cases, my first action was to touch the handle to remind myself it is there and to call out my hard deck of 1000 ft AGL. I then went through the rest of the relevant check lists, when I reached the hard deck confirmed I could make the airport safely and did so.

As regards your "mission stretch" point, I do tend agree with you at least in principle. It's a real temptation and, whilst I would like to claim I don't do it, I'm actually not so sure.

For example, I'm not sure I'd want to fly night IMC in an aircraft without CAPS but I do it regularly in my SR22. Equally I'm sure many people fly night IMC in other non CAPS equipped planes.

I think it's a matter of degree and personal attitude to risk.

Where I'm absolutely with you - and here I caricature - is the pilot who launches into icing conditions in the mountains because he thinks the chute will save him if it goes wrong. That's just plain stupid, but I guess you also need to ask what risks he would take even if he didn't have CAPS available.

[Pace]

Jonzarno

these make horrifying reading not because of the CAPs but because of the lack of basic flying skills! Many are stalls and loss of control, navigation errors loss of airspeed indications! Most could have been avoided with proper flying skills and knowledge of the aircraft.

pace

[Jonzarno]

Pace

There is no doubt that the pilot is probably the biggest factor in GA accidents. Hence the efforts that COPA makes to reach out to the Cirrus community to get Cirrus pilots to participate in safety programmes such as the Cirrus Pilots Proficiency Programmes and Critical Decision Making seminars.

That said, I think you're being a bit harsh in your analysis. Yes there are some pilot related pulls but not as many as your post implies - and by the way there are also some pilot related, and non pilot related, fatal accidents where CAPS wasn't pulled - but there are also an awful lot of saves that aren't a result of a lack of flying skills.

As I hope you would agree, however, whatever the cause of the pull, there are a lot people alive because the system saved them. The penalty for stupidity should not be death, neither for the pilot nor their passengers.

[Pace]

Jonzarno

I have re read the accidents and the vast majority are pure bad piloting. Many are stupid things like loss of control and stall on autopilot. Loss of control in IMC etc a lot of loss of control and inability for basic recovery. pilots flying way out of their ability levels.

As stated i am sold on the Cirrus and the BRS. I still think the Cirrus coaxes pilots ill equipt to fly in conditions they should not be in and think a lot more emphasis should be put on basic handling skills which appear to be lacking in many of these accidents.

Pace

[Jonzarno]

Pace

I agree that most GA accidents are caused by pilot error and that a substantial proportion of the CAPS pulls in the list are in that category (we can debate what constitutes a "substantial majority" :)).

Whilst this is by no means limited to the Cirrus fleet, your point about the need for training beyond the minimum required to pass a PPL is well taken. As I said in my earlier post, that's exactly why COPA tries so hard to reach out to Cirrus pilots to deliver that.

As regards your comment about pilots being enticed to take on flights they shouldn't because they have the chute, as I said in my earlier post, I think there is an element of risk homeostasis in some pilots behaviour, but this isn't limited to Cirrus pilots. One man's risk homeostasis is another man's acceptable risk in light of experience.

For example, the JFK Jr accident in which he seems to have bet his life and those of his two passengers on the ability of his autopilot to cope with a night over water flight when he had no instrument qualification. He lost.

As another example: ferry pilots regularly bet their lives on a SEP getting them across the Atlantic (I think you may even have done that yourself?). Personally, I wouldn't, not even in a Cirrus :), but that's my risk assessment and I wouldn't call anyone who chose to take that risk a bad pilot.

[echobeach]

I have only about 200 hours in the last couple of years in a cirrus.
I don't know why it attracts sometimes such adverse publicity and comments
I have enjoyed flying this more than anything else I have flown, twins included
I hand fly it 95% of the time.
It's just a joy and easy to fly.
I have flown longer, further and greater distances across water (the med) than in anything else.
I have read the poh on iPad more times than I can recall, and joined copa.
I cannot understand the criticism that cirrus pilots may somehow push the boundaries more than others. Makes no sense to me.
But I have though that in a water crossing more than a 100 miles that the parachute gives me one more option.
But it's no more than my training in endless forced landings in fields. It's just another technique for that worst day !

[Pace]

EchoBeach

not at all the Cirrus is a fabulous plane and the BRS a superb addition to safety
The Cirrus would be my choice of a personal aircraft and the proven BRS is part of that choice.

But those statistics make sobering reading not for the saves the BRS has made but the sort of needless accidents that has resulted in the BRS being used.

A pilot has to fly within his and the aircrafts limits and a lot of those accidents indicate pilots who are not up to it being in conditions which they are not adequately able and lack the skills to deal with.
Basic stalls on autopilot (perfectly recoverable)
frozen pitot (perfectly rectifiable without use of the chute and many many other examples.

There is without doubt accidents where the chute has lured pilots into conditions where maybe they would not be in without the BRS.

I would not be comfortable in a single at night yet I would regard the BRS as a sort of second engine on a twin so would fly at night.
that is an example of how the BRS can lure you to fly in conditions where you might think twice in a conventional aircraft.

Anything which is new and different will attract scrutiny and the cirrus fills that criteria the fact that it defies conventional recovery techniques will also attract scrutiny and we all had a long discussion on when and where to pull the chute in engine failure.

So nothing against the aircraft or the BRS but we do need to look at problems which that extra safety brings in overconfidence with ones abilities and which then creates situations where the BRS is needed when it should NOT be needed.

Jonzarno quotes pilot error but some of these accidents are more than pilot error as such but are accidents waiting to happen.

As another example: ferry pilots regularly bet their lives on a SEP getting them across the Atlantic (I think you may even have done that yourself?).

Jonzarno piston twin and jets yes :ok: singles ??? I am not that brave :{ i don't trust piston engines that much through experience especially just one piston engine.
Pace

[India Four Two]

I still think the Cirrus coaxes pilots ill equipt to fly in conditions they should not be in and think a lot more emphasis should be put on basic handling skills

Pace,
I think you've hit the nail on the head. My limited experience in the Cirrus (1.5 hours, three airports, three takeoffs and landings and one ILS) led me to the same conclusion. The main purpose of my flight was to see how the EFIS and autopilot worked, but I did enough manual flying to agree with Jonzarno that it is easy to fly.

However, while being coached on how to use the electronics, or more often, watching my instructor pushing buttons,when things got busy (Los Angeles area), it struck me how simple it all was (assuming I had the 15-20 hrs training). We turned on the autopilot after departing Avalon on Catalina Island and left it on until the ILS DH at Burbank. Never touched the controls, apart from the power lever.

I saw how easy it would be, particularly for an owner with no previous aviation experience, to be lulled into a false sense of security, which might leave them in a difficult situation in the event of a critical failure or a serious weather problem.

[Pace]

I have flown both the 20 and 22 but very limited time maybe 4 hrs so far from an expert :E

Yes they are easy to fly my only concern is the roll rate which I timed 45 degrees both ways. it had the same roll rate as a firefly aerobatic machine I had flown so I could imagine in the wrong hands in IMC it could be easy to over bank.

Not sure on the latest versions as I think they did do something with the tips and dihedral ?

But yes my choice as a personal tourer and I also like the BRS concept! maybe i would not use it as readily as some here but it is definitely a life saver.
A stall on autopilot? What on earth are they playing at climbing in VS mode?
It is not brain science to identify that disconnect and recover and in my books not a grab for the chute and wreck an aeroplane situation. Sounds to much like reliance on an autopilot and not enough hand flying skills or awareness.

Pace

[Jonzarno]

A stall on autopilot? What on earth are they playing at climbing in VS mode?

This is a problem with the Stec 55 autopilot that was fitted as standard to the G1, G2 and a few early G3s before the switch to the Garmin avionics. VS is the only mode that you can use to climb with the Stec and it does need watching carefully.

That said, I once flew mine into a stall deliberately in VMC to see how it behaved and have to say it was no big drama.

A number of Cirrus pilots, myself included, have upgraded to the Avidyne DFC 90 which has lots of great features including IAS mode and envelope protection as well as much more accurate tracking.

[Pace]

jonzarno

will PM you for some pointers on renting some hours on one ;) As getting fed up with just Jets nowadays not even any piston twins anymore :E

Pace

[olasek]

Read the accident reports on the Cirrus makes sobering reading!
I suggest you do read them too, vast majority of them have nothing to do with following 'TV screens'. Pretty much the same 'falling out sky' applies to majority of GA accidents (your 'ADF" equipped aircraft are hardly immune) in which pilots get into situations they should never get into.

[Pace]

Olak

I am not in a position to put a link at present but many we're chute pulls in ridiculous situations nothing to do with the screens but to do with poor basic piloting skills

Pace

[olasek]

but to do with poor basic piloting skills
First of all you aren't in a position to judge someone's decision to pull a chute, you weren't there, second even if they pulled chute unnecessarily it speaks nothing about their piloting skills, perhaps about being overly cautious which frankly it ain't so bad considering decisions others made (like not pulling a chute) and went to their graves. If you find a report lambasting pilot's decision to pull a chute, let me know.

[RTN11]

I'm personally of the opinion that having the chute there gives a false sense of security, so pilots get themselves into situations that they wouldn't otherwise have gotten into.

Unfortunately, I have no stats to back that up, and as far as I'm aware the stats so far are that every time the chute has been pulled within it's limitations (and a few times outside it's limitations) it has resulted in a safe landing for all on board and noone hurt on the ground. There have however been a few pilots who killed themselves in cirrus aircraft when the chute could have saved their lives if they had decided to pull it before it was too late.

Perhaps only a matter of time before someone on the ground is hurt which will change the statistics and some pilot's point of view.

[Pace]

Olasek
Make your own judgement quite a few do not make good reading

CAPS Activations and Saves
CAPS provides an additional level of safety for the Cirrus Design SR2X fleet. However, it is not a guarantee.

There have been 53 known CAPS events as of 6 January 2014.

Of those activations, 41 deployments are considered "saves" that involved 85 survivors with one fatality (figures do not include one unborn child who was also saved in CAPS event #13).

CAPS Event Summaries
Here is a synopsis of all of the known CAPS parachute activations. Each summary lists the deployment by year, location and injuries, then describe the factors that lead to the activation, the activation scenario, and the landing scenario.

CAPS event #1, Oct 2002, Lewisville, TX

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #1) - Factors: VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error and airplane became difficult to control, after maneuvering, first parachute deployment by pilot in a certified production airplane; Activation: low altitude, 1,500 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: bushes near golf course

CAPS event #2, April 2004, Lethbridge, AB, Canada

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #2) - Factors: VFR night cruise, loss of control, autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, SR20 performance Activation: high altitude, deployment upon loss of control; Weather: VMC night; Landing: landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers

CAPS event #3, April 2004, Fort Lauderdale, FL

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #3) - Factors: confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system; Activation: low altitude, 1200 feet; Weather: IMC; Landing: trees

CAPS event #4, Sept 2004, Peters, CA

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #4) - Factors: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery; Activation: high altitude, above 10,000 feet, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC; Weather: VMC, then IMC under canopy, then VMC; Landing: walnut grove

CAPS event #5, Feb 2005, Norden, CA

1 fatality; (not CAPS Save, parachute separated from airframe) - Factors: severe icing at 16,000' over Sierra mountains, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots; Activation: uncertain if intentional activation or due to airframe stress in high speed descent, located along track to crash site; Weather: IMC, icing; Landing: high speed impact in mountainous area

CAPS event #6, June 2005, Haverstraw, NY

1 serious injury; (CAPS Save #5) - Factors: pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs; IFR on approach to KHPN, Activation: low altitude, last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots groundspeed (well above Vpd of 133 knots); Weather: VMC; Landing: water, bay of Hudson River

CAPS event #7, Jan 2006, Childersburg, AL

3 uninjured; (CAPS Save #6) - Factors: severe icing at 9,000 feet, loss of control; Activation: high altitude; Weather: IMC icing; Landing: trees

CAPS event #8, Feb 2006, Wagner, SD

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #7) - Factors: pilot disorientation in clouds, shortly after takeoff; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: flat, frozen field

CAPS event #9, Aug 2006, Indianapolis, IN

1 fatality, 3 serious injuries; (CAPS Save #8, parachute observed not fully deployed) - Factors: IMC, loss of control, stall/spin descent; Activation: low altitude; 528 feet AGL in 100 knot spin (3-1/2 turns) just 4 seconds prior to impact, well below design parameters for survivable CAPS deployment, first activation of CAPS by non-pilot; Weather: IMC; Landing: water, pond among residential housing

CAPS event #10, Sept 2006, Bull Bay, Jamaica

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #9) - Factors: loss of control, VFR cruise, passenger activated when fuel streaming from tank filler openings; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees

CAPS activation #11, Feb 2007, Sydney, Australia

2 injuries; (not CAPS Save; parachute not extracted due to anomalous rocket trajectory) - Factors: VFR cruise, engine problems, rocket took unusual trajectory, , successful emergency off-airport landing; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees

CAPS event #12, Apr 2007, Luna, NM

1 injured; (CAPS Save #10) - Factors: IMC cruise, climb to avoid weather, loss of airspeed indication, terrain warning in IMC; Activation: low altitude, inverted, 34 knots airspeed; Weather: IMC, icing; Landing: trees, mountainous terrain

CAPS event #13, Aug 2007, Nantucket, MA

2 injured; (CAPS Save #11) - Factors: VFR in IMC during approach, parachute tangled with tower wires, 1 serious injury, 1 minor injury, 1 unborn child saved; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: tower, flat open terrain

CAPS event #14, Oct 2008, Spain

3 uninjured; (CAPS Save #12) - Factors: IFR in IMC during approach, pilot reported turbulence and loss of control, parachute tangled with power line wires; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: power line

CAPS event #15, Nov 2008, Turriaco, Italy

1 seriously injured, 3 uninjured; (CAPS Save #13) - Factors: fuel exhaustion and loss of engine power, parachute deployed at low altitude and late in the power-off glide scenario, approximately 400 feet above ground; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees and grass

CAPS event #19, Mar 2009, Gaithersburg, MD

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #16) - Factors: door popped open upon takeoff, pilot reported rain in the cockpit and attempted to manage door but became disoriented; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: residential street

CAPS event #20, Jun 2009, Mount Airy, NC

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #17) - Factors: catastrophic engine failure with oil obscuring windscreen, Activation: high altitude, 6,000 feet above ground; Weather: IMC; Landing: level field

CAPS event #21, Dec 2009, Hamilton Island, Australia

1 seriously injured; (CAPS Save #18) - Factors: engine loss of power, misfueled with Jet-A, attempted return to airport; Activation: low altitude, 441 feet above ocean; Weather: VMC; Landing: ocean

CAPS event #22, Feb 2010, Boulder, CO

2 fatalities; (not CAPS Save, parachute activated due to impact forces) - Factors: mid-air collision between Cirrus SR20 and tow-plane with glider in tow; Activation: high altitude, 8,000 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: level field

CAPS event #23, May 2010, Sirdal, Norway

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #19) - Factors: icing induced high-speed descent followed by parachute activation, Activation: high altitude, 6,000 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: uneven rocky terrain

CAPS event #24, 10 July 2010, Hornton, United Kingdom

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #20) - Factors: sprial dive while pilot distracted, VFR pilot flying in low ceilings and visibility, Activation: 2,000 feet; Weather: IMC; Landing: field surrounded by trees

CAPS event #25, 16 August 2010, Idabel, OK

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #21) - Factors: loss of engine power, rapid descent, decision to avoid off-airport landing, activated parachute, Activation: low altitude, below 500 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: grassy field

CAPS event #26, 23 August 2010, Porter, TX

1 seriously injured; (not CAPS Save, parachute had no effect on outcome) - Factors: go-around after aborted landing, failed to clear tree obstructions, activated parachute after first impact with a tree ; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees

CAPS event #27, 30 September 2010, Mathias, WV

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #22) - Factors: loss of control in turbulence while on approach in stormy weather, Activation: 1134 AGL, 171 KIAS; Weather: IMC; Landing: trees, remarkably the plane wedged itself on branches about 20 feet above the ground, pilot and passenger were injured when they attempted self-rescue and fell onto rocks below

CAPS event #28, 15 December 2010, Nacogdoches, TX

1 uninjured; (not CAPS Save, parachute activated after ground impact) - Factors: loss of engine power, decision to avoid off-airport landing; Activation: after ground impact; Weather: VMC, night; Landing: residential area

CAPS event #29, 27 January 2011, Cross City, FL

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #23) - Factors: loss of engine power, decision to avoid off-airport landing, activated parachute, Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC, night; Landing: recently logged forest with lots of stumps

CAPS event #30, 30 January 2011, Bennett, CO

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #24) - Factors: pilot disorientation due to vertigo, activated parachute, Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC, night; Landing: field

CAPS event #31, 24 October 2011, Carrollton, TX

1 fatality, 2 serious injured; (not CAPS Save, parachute did not have time to fully deploy) - Factors: pilot reported mechanical problem and attempted approach in fog, went missed, attempted second approach and plane lost control prior to missed approach point; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC; Landing: field

CAPS event #32, 20 November 2011, New Orleans, LA

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #25) - Factors: pilot reported loss of engine power and attempted return to airport then activated over Lake Pontchartrain, repacked parachute, Activation: 300 feet; Weather: IMC, day; Landing: water

CAPS event #33, 7 January 2012, near Andros Island, Bahamas

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #26) - Factors: engine seized and propeller froze in flight due to loss of oil pressure, Activation: 2300 feet; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: water

CAPS event #34, 29 February 2012, at Melbourne, FL

4 fatalities; (not CAPS Save, parachute did not have time to fully deploy) - Factors: pilot lost control on base turn to final and pulled at low altitude, Activation: almost at ground impact; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #35, 24 March 2012, near Itu, Brazil

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #27) - Factors: engine lost power and pilot avoided off-airport landing, repacked parachute, Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #36, 22 July 2012, near Pickens, SC

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #28) - Factors: pilot reported mechanical problem, Activation: about 1000 feet AGL; Weather: VMC, day; Landing: trees, suspended about 20 feet above ground, occupants stayed in plane until rescued

CAPS event #37, 6 October 2012, near Birmingham, AL

1 uninjured, 1 minor injury; (CAPS Save #29) - Factors: pilot disoriented during missed approach in IMC , Activation: 1000' AGL; Weather: IMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #38, 16 November 2012, near Show Low, AZ

1 minor injury; (CAPS Save #30) - Factors: engine lost power and pilot avoided off-airport landing , Activation: 1500' AGL; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #39, 21 November 2012, near Gilgandra, NSW, Australia

1 uninjured, 1 minor injury; (CAPS Save #31) - Factors: engine lost power and pilot avoided off-airport landing , Activation: 1000' AGL; Weather: VMC , day; Landing: field

CAPS event #42, 23 January 2013, near Danbury, CT

3 uninjured; (CAPS Save #32) - Factors: fuel exhaustion; Activation: TBD; Weather: night VMC; Landing: powerlines in residential area

CAPS event #43, 29 March 2013, near Alexandria, MN

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #33) - Factors: pilot lost control due to flap anomaly; Activation: TBD; Weather: VFR; Landing: frozen lake

CAPS event #44, 16 May 2013, near Addison, TX

1 uninjured (not CAPS save, parachute did not deploy) - Factors: pilot reported loss of instruments, activated CAPS, but rocket failed to extract the parachute from the aircraft; repacked parachute; Activation: possibly 7000 feet; Weather: IMC, hard rain; Landing: pilot recovered the airplane and descended underneath the clouds to about 800' AGL and returned to airport trailing the rocket, lanyard and incremental bridle behind the aircraft

CAPS event #45, 6 June 2013, near Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, United Kingdom

1 minor injury; (CAPS Save #34) - Factors: pilot reported "navigational difficulties" while on approach to Cheltenham airport when ATC changed runways and vectored the aircraft to a different approach; Activation: approximately 2000 feet; Weather: IMC; Landing: garden in a residential area of urban city

CAPS event #46, 5 July 2013, near La Guajira, Colombia

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #35) - Factors: mid-air collision with Cirrus HK-4752; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: ocean

CAPS event #47, fatal accident #97, 18 July 2013, near Lanseria, South Africa

2 fatalities; (not CAPS Save, parachute did not have time to fully deploy) - Factors: low altitude activation after touch-and-go departure; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Field

CAPS event #48, 20 July 2013, near Tappahannock, VA

4 uninjured; (CAPS Save #36) - Factors: loss of engine power; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Trees

CAPS event #49, 31 July 2013, near Poncins, France

2 fatalities; (not CAPS Save, parachute did not have time to fully deploy) - Factors: TBD; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Trees

CAPS event #50, 19 August 2013, near Texarkana, AR

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #37) - Factors: loss of engine power; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Field

CAPS event #51, 14 November 2013, near Brazil

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #38) - Factors: TBD; Activation: TBD; Weather: VMC; Landing: Field

CAPS event #52, 4 January 2014, near Buckhannon, WV

1 uninjured; (CAPS Save #39) - Factors: mechanical, loss of engine power on final approach short of the runway; Activation: 500' AGL; Weather: VMC; Landing: Road

CAPS event #53, 6 January 2014, near Claveau, Deux Sèvres, France

2 uninjured; (CAPS Save #40) - Factors: mechanical, loss of engine power; Activation: 1800' AGL; Weather: TBD; Landing: Field

CAPS event #54, 9 January 2014, near Fort Hall, Idaho

2 minor injuries; (CAPS Save #41) - Factors: mechanical, loss of engine power; Activation: TBD; Weather: TBD; Landing: Field

CAPS Anomalies
The unsuccessful deployments involved three anomalies and eight activations at an altitude too low to fully inflate the canopy:

CAPS event #5, Feb 2005, Norden, CA, activation at very high speed (likely in excess of 300 knots indicated, over twice the deployment speed) where parachute separated from the airframe
CAPS activation #11, Feb 2007, Sydney, Australia, activation at very low altitude where the rocket took an unusual trajectory resulting in a failure to extract the parachute
CAPS event #44, 16 May 2013, near Addison, TX, activation where the rocket failed to extract the parachute from the aircraft (only anomaly within demonstrated parameters)
Several activations occurred prior to ground impact but at too low an altitude to fully inflate the canopy (witnesses report 50 to 200 feet above ground): Indianapolis, IN; Waxhaw, NC; Deltona, FL; Porter, TX; Nacogdoches, TX; Asturias, Spain; Carrollton, TX; Melbourne, FL.

The rocket trajectory anomaly in 2007 was investigated and an airworthiness directive was published requiring a modification of the CAPS rocket assembly.

In addition, there have been several fatal accidents where the parachute has deployed by forces due to impact with the ground, which are not considered in this history.

9 CAPS Planes that Were Repaired and Flew Again
Despite the language in the Cirrus POH that cautions pilots that CAPS may cause damage, several aircraft that landed under canopy were repaired and flew again.

Revision A7 of the Cirrus SR22 POH currently states "CAPS deployment is expected to result in damage to the airframe" that updates the earlier language that "The system is intended to saves the lives of the occupants but will most likely destroy the aircraft."

However, the following aircraft have landed under canopy, all occupants survived, and the airplanes have been repaired, determined to be airworthy and returned to service.

[olasek]

Nice list, so what am I supposed to deduce from it, what golden thought, what startling pattern, what hidden gems? :confused::ugh:

[Big Pistons Forever]

Lets see there are at least 65 people that are not dead that were in situations that frequently result in fatal accidents.

But there are some CAP's deployments that seem to be the result of less then good actions/decisions by the PIC.

Yes I can absolutely see that it would be much better for GA in general and the ego's of certain pprune posters if these less than perfect pilots were punished with death when they screwed up :rolleyes:

Oh and I guess when they take innocent passengers with them it should just be considered collateral damage :hmm:

[Jonzarno]

I'm personally of the opinion that having the chute there gives a false sense of security, so pilots get themselves into situations that they wouldn't otherwise have gotten into.

Given that there are over 5000 Cirrus and many other BRS equipped aircraft in service, that seems a bit of a sweeping generalisation and implies that this is also always a bad thing.

It may well be that BRS equipped pilots take risks that they otherwise would not. For example, I am probably guilty of that myself: I would no longer fly a non-BRS equipped SEP on a dark night but do regularly fly my SR22 at night. Many other non-BRS equipped pilots do fly at night and I am not criticising them for doing so.

This is more a question of what I won't do WITHOUT having CAPS available rather than a reckless risk I would take BECAUSE I DO have it.

Is that a bad or unsafe stance?

[RTN11]

Reading through the list, there's quite a few that a pilot without a CAPS would probably have just recovered from. A high altitude autopilot induced stall for example, another pilot may have monitored the autopilot better preventing it happening in the first place, or when it did happen just recovered as trained to do and then continue onto destination having learnt a lesson.

Same with "loss of control" in IMC, can't see it being any worse unusual attitudes than we deal with in training, so many pilots would be able to just recover. Some on the list seem to go straight for the chute, which writes off the aircraft.

Yes, there are some great times to use the chute, and it would give greater peace of mind when flying at night, but my opinion is that the lower hours guys who fly with it are too quick to reach for the chute when there could of been a way to just fly out of the problem.

[Jonzarno]

a pilot without a CAPS would probably have just recovered from

I agree that there are some deployments that seem to fit this description. That said, I wouldn't criticise any of the pilots who pulled in those circumstances. I wasn't there, I don't know what triggered their decisions and I don't know how "probably" they could have recovered without using CAPS.

All I do know is that they, and their passengers, are alive.

Sadly, however, there have also been far too many accidents where Cirrus pilots have decided not to pull and died with a perfectly good parachute undeployed behind them..... Had they been properly trained in its use many would have lived.

There are also far too many fatal accidents in non-BRS equipped aircraft that would have been survivable had BRS been available to the pilots.

To be clear about this, I'm not advocating pulling as the first reaction to any anomaly. I am strongly advocating the system itself AND training to incorporate its use into emergency handling.

The numbers don't lie.