1996 USAF T-43 (737-200) crash near Dubrovnik

[alph2z]

Just saw a documentary about the crash of :

US Sec. of Commerce Ron Brown and others crashed in the USAF T-43 (737-200) near Dubrovnik, Croatia years ago during a rushed NDB approach.

Does anyone know if the theory of the NDB closest to the threshold was not jammed by "terrorists" ??

A fake more powerful NDB signal could have been temporarily installed around the crash site.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=40796

Is there a full report online ??
.

[kontrolor]

short version (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/Dubrovnik/summary-T43.html)

btw - one of the controllers in charge that day later commited suicide.

[DownIn3Green]

They just got behind the power curve...just one more reason why having an ATP (or the USAF equivelent) does not qualify one to fly in some of the more remote regions of this planet...

How many of the "new hires" at any airline today would be able to conduct an NDB approach safely in IMC?

[ATC Watcher]

btw - one of the controllers in charge that day later commited suicide.

Because of the crash ? I have not read anywhere previously that ATC had any responsibility in that accident.

[bomarc]

when this crash happened, I brought a copy of the apch plate (jepp mind you) to the ready room and asked my fellow pilots how they would set the radios for the approach...1 adf receiver only.

no one could figure it out.


as I recall, the primary navaid was NOT the one at the threshold...if someone has a copy of the plate, they might post it.

[kontrolor]

ATC Watcher - it was never officialy linked, but there were some strange things surrouding his suicide.

[reynoldsno1]

as I recall, the primary navaid was NOT the one at the threshold
That is correct - there was a secondary locator close to the threshold, so strictly speaking it was a Twin NDB approach. The aircraft hit terrain at the edge of the navigation containment area for the single primaty NDB, that was then behind them.

[alph2z]

quote DownIn3Green: " They just got behind the power curve... "

say what !!?? 80 knots too fast does not seem behind the power curve. You mean not behind the ball.

" .....According to the report, the pilots did not properly configure the aircraft for landing before starting the final approach. They came in 80 knots above final approach speed, without clearance from the tower. The rushed approach, late configuration and a radio call from a pilot on the ground distracted the crew from adequately monitoring the final approach, which proved to be nine degrees left of the correct course, Coolidge said.

The pilots also failed to identify the missed approach point. If they were unable to see the runway at that point, they should have executed a missed approach..... "

Since they hit near the top of the mountain doesn't that mean that they could of been doing a go around !!??

Any one wanna jump in.
.

[Jet_A_Knight]

This Flight Safety Foundation article refers:

http://www.flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jul-aug96.pdf

[john_tullamarine]

Can we confine the discussion to tech aspects, please .. and leave the conspiracy things to other places ... ?

[Centaurus]

I seem to recall that the USAF dictated the ADF must not be switched to the next aid (company procedure?) and as a result the 737 continued to back track on the NDB behind it instead of once passing that NDB, bringing the ADF to the NDB in front of it. That latter NDB I think was needed for the missed approach. Result being the aircraft was tracking inaccurately and more and more off the inbound published track. The reason for the company procedure was purportedly to reduce the chances of the crew mis-selecting the NDB ahead. Difficult to believe the curious reasoning by whoever dictated this limitation.

[alph2z]

Let me rephrase, what specific post here do you consider conspiracy ???

Quote:
Can we confine the discussion to tech aspects, please .. and leave the conspiracy things to other places ... ?

[john_tullamarine]

.. easy on, colleague ... all I am requesting is that posters avoid dabbling in the occult in respect of this thread .. keep it factual, or reasonable opinions relating to the known story, and all is well.

Tech Log is not the place for the conspiracists .. there exist other places where such discussion is welcome.

At day's end, right or wrong, the moderators are the arbiters of content and folks who might be offended have the avenue of redress to the PPRuNe senior hierarchy.

[Mach trim]

Fatigue was a factor in this one.

See Tony Kern's book Flight Discpiline has a good section on this one.

[Clandestino]

Current Jepp plate (16-1, 24 MAR 06) has interesting note
1. Inbound from KLP, change to CV at midpoint.
Also MDA is now 2300 ft, terrain contours are depicted on chart and luckily, there are VOR, DME and ILS at the airport.

[GuinnessQueen]

Apologies for dragging up a thread from over a year ago, but does anyone know if the formal report is available online?

I have read the short version and the Flight Safety Foundation pdf, I could just do with an online copy of the pucker version! I am led to believe it is fairly lenghty.

Cheers

GQ

[barit1]

A fake more powerful NDB signal could have been temporarily installed around the crash site.

That was essentially the premise of Ernest Gann's book "Band Of Brothers" - which was loosely based on a real 727 accident in Taiwan (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19680216-1).

Great read, BTW. :)

[galaxy flyer]

The briefing I received on the accident, was that it was a Two NDB approach which requires BOTH NDBs to be similtaneously received and navigated off throughout the approach. The idea of dual NDBs was that the trapazoid off the outer NDB expands until it intersects the trapezoid from the NDB at the approach end, the later trapezoid then narrows approaching the station. This dual beacon allows lower mins due to the smaller containment area and the positive MAP. The 737, however, was not equipped with two separate ADFs thus it was not equipped for the approach. This analysis was vetted by an outside contractor.

None of the foregoing negates the fact the crew poorly briefed the approach, did not understand the equipage required, configured late, may have had crew rest issues due to late changes in the itinerary, etc. AF-wise, a significant accident that had some nasty effects for senior officers involved. GF

[411A]

None of the foregoing negates the fact the crew poorly briefed the approach, did not understand the equipage required, configured late, may have had crew rest issues due to late changes in the itinerary, etc

Clearly a multitude of errors, and with an NDB approach, something that many crews do not accomplish on a regular basis, proper procedures can fall by the wayside rather quickly.

A lesson for all here, think ahead, for best results.

[jolly girl]

Not to mention the incredible pressure the crew was under to complete the mission...

[Brian Abraham]

........ and the failures in the management chain that had the crew flying an approach they were not permitted to fly, and failings in the approach design where the MDA was 442 feet lower than it should have been. The pilots unfortunately just pulled the trigger on a weapon well and truly loaded by others, as usually happens - holes in cheese and all that.

[Clandestino]

The accident flight was not operated by 732, but by a T-43. What's the difference? The very significant one that CVR and FDR were not fitted and were not required to be fitted. We don't have much clue about what the crew thought and did. Speed and altitude in the report came from AWACS that was tracking the flight. From the remains of ADF tuning box it was ascertained that sole ADF was tuned to KLP beacon (FAF) and not CV (MAPt). Therefore: 1) crew was flying outbound NDB approach which is conceptually tricky (remember pulling the tail?) 2) they had no chance of identifying MAPt 3) even if there had been false NDB to lure the aeroplane away from approach track, it would be useless as CV wasn't tuned. Also impact point was almost abeam threshold and 1654ft above it - even if the crew made visual contact with runway a minute before impact, their chances of making straight-in landing would have been zero.

[skeletor]

Makes you realise how lucky we are to have modern day equipment like EGPWS, Terrain Overlay, FMS track guidance etc (thank heavens for the guys n gals who design and build these systems!) Not fullproof but all the same.....

Even for 1996 I understand that this wasn't the best equipped aeroplane.

RIP