Benalla six dead and $5,000 VOR reward

[Dick Smith]

It is now over 2 years and 7 months since the terrible Benalla accident where six people died because the professional pilot was about 11 miles off course. See the ATSB report here (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2004/AAIR/pdf/aair200402797_001.pdf).

At the time the Airservices controllers turned off the route monitoring alarm three times rather than inform the pilot.

I mistakenly thought that after this terrible accident that there would be a quick move to utilise the radar properly in this area – i.e. introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Of course, this has not happened.

The prime reason for the Government’s decision to go ahead with NAS was so the use of radar could be maximised to save peoples’ lives.

I wonder if there is going to be more needless loss of life – say at places like Proserpine, where there are high mountains nearby but the radar is not used effectively.

It occurs to me that we need an air traffic control expert to push for the introduction of either new procedures or more Class E airspace.

Everyone at the time raved about how fantastic Voices of Reason (VOR) was, when many postings were being made in relation to airspace. Even Gaunty appeared to think that VOR was fantastic.

VOR placed the following post (see below) on 21 April 2004. This is of course the person we need to get involved in airspace reform. I’m prepared to make a $5,000 donation to the Royal Flying Doctor Service (Broken Hill Branch) if the VOR who wrote the below mentioned piece will identify himself or herself and assist with airspace reform.

I can understand why some people would be loathe to give their real names on PPRuNe, however I cannot understand when professional pilots are dying, along with their passengers, that there wouldn’t be at least one air traffic control expert who would not be prepared to push for the greater use of controlled airspace and radar - under their own name.

So VOR, how about becoming up front and identifying yourself so you can be effective and see if you can get involved in the necessary reform.

I point out that at one stage I thought I knew who VOR was – I believe it was a previous head of air traffic control in Australia. No, not the one who recently passed away. This person has denied being VOR, so VOR must still be out there.

Read the following post and realise just how valuable a person with this experience and knowledge would be. For surely no one wants to die after making a simple human error and not maximising the use of our $350 million radar system.

Class E Airspace and United States Practice

We have watched with incredulity at the dangerously naive statements being made on threads in the Australian PPRuNe sites, concerning the operation of Class E airspace. Class E airspace is NOT an unsafe categorization of airspace, and is in fact used safely and effectively in substantial portions of the globe.

EACH AND EVERY transport and passenger carrying aircraft operating in the United States is required to operate for some portion of their flight in designated Class E airspace – effectively between 18,000 feet and the upper limit of Class B, C or D airspace – or the surface for non controlled aerodromes. This equates to over 10,000 passenger-carrying flights per day, every day of the year. The Class E airspace within which they operate is in the so-called most dangerous phase of flight – climb or descent. Your national carrier is no exception.

There are in excess of 150,000 general aviation aircraft operating in the United States, to either the visual or instrument flight rules – many many thousands per day.

There are CONSTANT interactions between IFR passenger carrying aircraft and VFR aircraft on a daily basis – with no hint that this practice is unsafe.

There are countless examples where aircraft provided with routine terminal area instructions whilst still in Class E airspace are routinely provided sequencing descending turn instructions by controllers in one breath, and VFR traffic information in the other.

We agree that Class E airspace is mostly within radar cover in the United States – probably the greater part of 95%. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and where they can, provide traffic information on VFR flights.

Radar coverage is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace, and in fact in several cases the Class E airspace linking certain aerodromes to upper airspace is not covered by radar. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and as they cannot observe VFR, do not pass traffic unless they know by some other means. That positive IFR-to-IFR separation may, in many cases, be applied on a “one in at a time” basis. The airlines accept that mode of operation.

NOT ONE SINGLE AIRLINE in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.

Our observation in relation to the Australian experience has been one of giving proper effect not just to training and education, but also to the cultural change requirements. Pilots need to understand that operating in Class E airspace IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT to the service that they have received in the past – but need to accept that this is a normal way of doing business.

Australian controllers need to STOP being negative, embrace the concept of Class E airspace and to be blunt, get on with it. Controllers in the United States provide services in Class E, without questioning its “safety”, day in and day out, and have done so [either as Class E, or its predecessor], for over 50 years.

NOT ONE SINGLE CONTROLLER in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.

We are concerned that this constant questioning and second-guessing by your pilot and controller fraternity will in fact generate a safety deficiency larger that the problem you are trying to solve. By our estimation, there is NO JUSTIFICATION for the large amount of Class C airspace presently designated in Australia, and subject to the appropriate change management processes we have previously described, you should introduce Class E airspace wherever possible.

[apache]

It occurs to me that we need an air traffic control expert to push for the introduction of either new procedures or more Class E airspace

Dick - for once I agree with you.
Let me highlight the bit where YOU yourself admit that you are NOT the man for the job...
It occurs to me that we need an air traffic control expert to push for the introduction of either new procedures or more Class E airspace.

[IMHFO]

Hi Dick,

This really isn't meant to be a silly response but surely with the new OAM being a part of CASA from 01JUL07, and not AA, the representation and future SHOULD provide somewhat greater balance to the airspace debate with the new GM of OAM (whoever that is) driving/guiding new Australian airspace managment strategies.

Am I being naive (again)?

FTDK

[J430]

Dear Mr FTDK

you need to see a specialist IMHFO, as it seems you have an identity crisis:} :}

Cheers
FTDK:cool: :E :ok: :sad: :8 :hmm:

[IMHFO]

Yairrsss

and with the skilful withdrawal of posts this now becomes an inside joke; with SOMEONE's slip now protected inthe noise....

Heh Heh Heh!

FTDK no charge!

[tobzalp]

This is just an attempt at unmasking a person's identity on Pprune. A bannable offence. With the reward money as well. Disgusting.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

Dick

I have no disagreement with the thrust of this post, but you would have to agree that it only addresses a breakdown in the "safety net".

As someone who oftens flies GPS/RNAV approaches (including Lockhart River and Proserpine), I find this accident deeply disturbing as the primary cause remains unexplained. How can someone proporting to fly a GPS/RNAV Appr be so far off track and apparently not know it?

For these reasons I always fly with at least 2 GPS's operating (even though one is a top of the range VFR only) and a moving map display. In addition I now have terrain avoidance on my GNS430. I figure the GPS satellite system would have to have a major malfunction for me to come unstuck in this way. It would seem to me that the only alternative to check one's position would be to fly over the NDB or VOR prior to commencing the GPS/RNAV Appr - which really goes against the ease and convenience of the GPS Appr in the first place.

At the time I was surprised by the failure of ATC to advise the pilot that he was diverging from the expected track. I have been queried on a number of occassions by ATC in similar circumstances. The last time it happened took me a bit to figure out what they were on about cause everything in the aeroplane said I was on track. It eventually dawned on me that my departure clearance was ammended to put me via a waypoint that was not on my plan, and that detail had not been passed down the line. I was where I was supposed to be and headed to the right place - just not where that controller thought I should have been headed.

I don't think the airspace issue can be blamed for Benalla, but agree that a change in procedures (among a number of things) may have averted a disaster.

Dr:cool:

[peuce]

It occurrs to me that we need a Driving Expert to push for the introduction of a special driving lane for me to use on the way to work...

Smart arse? Well, yes, I'm guilty.

However, if I don't agree with the laws, it's up to me to push to have them changed. I can't expect some expert to jump to, for my cause ... unless, of course, I have first convinced him that I'm right and that it's in his best interests too.

[En-Rooter]

Alright then, I admit, I am VOR. Now give the five gorillas to Uncle Bob at BH and lets be done with it.:E

Dick, I don't know how many times you have to be told.

The radar coverage at Benalla is CRAP.

I....WORK....THAT....SECTOR....AND....THE....RADAR....COVERA GE....IS....CRAP.

Give me a procedural approach rating and I will monitor and separate every aircraft into Benalla and every other aerodrome in the sector. Better still put an ADS-B transmitter or radar head at Benalla and every other aerodrome in the sector and I will talk you all the way down.

You will need to double or triple the ATC staff to do it though.

Step 1: Upgrade the facilities if you want the service.

Step 2: Staff the sectors correctly.

Step 3: Train the staff appropriately.

Step 4: There's about 20 more steps

[Canary51]

How incredible is it that on the day the coroner makes a decision to hold an inquest, DS rakes the coles again. :hmm:

[Wicked shimmy]

I am Spartacus!.....eer I mean VOR.

[Capt Wally]

.........I dearly wish that the real reason behind the BLA accident could be indentified once & for all as I knew the PIC of the PA42 for many years, to me it seems almost impossible ( I said almost, we are afterall only human) to think that the (PIC I won't mention his name out of respect)) did anything wittingly wrong but as always with these 'event's it's a chain of events, sadly the chain wasn't broken in time to save 6 lives. Radar coverage will always be a bone of contention through out Aus whether it kept that 'chain' linked or not simply for what I believe to be two reasons.

One being we don't have the traffic (compared to OS) for our geographic size hence a somewhat 'limited' service & secondly we simply can't afford it under the "user pays" system...sad I know but that's the bare facts & there's little we can do about it in the short term.
Aviation will always be a risk, calculated mostly but never the less risky.

Next time vote wisely although there ain't enough pilots of all denominations to have any real long term effect at voting time unfortunetly.

RIP K...., ( & the 5 others) I still think of our quite times at BLA


Capt Wally

[Capt Wally]

......apologies yes it was a PA 31T, I used to fly the PA 42 so that's where the mix up was from, old age gets ya aventually !!......obviously people read with a very alert mind.

Capt Wally

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
I sincerely hope you are NOT using the deaths of these people to further peddle your E airspace agenda. You know very well that TAAATS could be used to provide all the safety functions now: it couldn't give a rats about what airspace the aircraft was in.

By all means push to get ATC to use the TAAATS alarms. Just don't bother pushing that 1950's rubbish of E.

Tarts cost $600m BTW.

[SM4 Pirate]

Dick, Cancelling a RAM without telling a pilot is not negligence. I do it most days somewhere between 20-80 times.

By all means push to get ATC to use the TAAATS alarms.
Cancelling a RAM "Route Adherance Monitor" Alert is not the same thing as 'the aircraft was off track' (even if it was 3 times). The flight plan that the system had, didn't match the the cleared route (=RAM). Tracking DCT to GPS RNAV waypoints can cause this for almost all GPS RNAV tracking points that are "not defined" within the TAAATS data set. Was this the case?

Everytime we vector or have WX diversions, guess what the System route doesn't match the clearance = RAM alert; do I tell the pilot, no way, it's not unexpected, I know why I'm getting the ALERT.

If an aircraft is tracking to a point not defined in TAAATS the obvious happens the RAM goes off. We put the point the aircraft is tracking to in the LABEL so there is no need to inform the pilot they are off track the RAM is not, repeat, not unexpected thus it's cancelled.

What are we supposed to do:
RAM ALERT
Controller: "You're indicating off track for direct BLA"
Pilot: "We're not tracking DCT BLA we are tracking for BLAED as cleared"
Controller "Oh yes that's right, sorry about that"

Obviously ATC are not in the habit of telling pilots they are complying with their clearance in CTA, that's the point. In class G we have no ability to dictate a particular path to fly; if we get a RAM that is unexpected then we would tell the pilot.

The problem for the ATCs in this case is the 'black and white' docs that 'require' this and that action; but the reality is most ATCs would have done the exact same thing; and would still do so today. Reasonable actions of a reasonable man; there but for the grace of god go I.

The biggest issue here is ATCs are not required to monitor appraoches in Class G and in this circumstance the radar coverage is not sufficient to enable anything near effective monitoring anyway. If we were the sectorisation would change massively and you'd need to more than double the low level sectors and controller numbers. RISK vs COST, CBA. Dick is always on about costs; six lives this time, nothing to be laughed at, but what safety benefit would all that cost actually provide. Would have Class E to 1200 AGL saved this flight?

Would enabled MSAW data helped? Probably not as this was removed due to inaccuracy and relevance in Class G; ie MSAW ALERT on a landing aircraft = Issue alert to pilot; terrain alert, oh yes it's the 2 miles of black tar called a RWY.

If this accident happened at YSDU or YBHI or YMIA would it be the 'fault' of the airspace and/or controllers? Even if they cancelled the RAM 80NM before the aerodrome, there would be no subsequent RAMs due to lack of RADAR (just like in this accident).

While I'm here, rumours I've heard is an American (ex ATC) is being hunted to head the new AIRSPACE OFFICE within DOTARS. Here we go again.

NAS is firmly back on the agenda people.

[Dick Smith]

Apache, any success I have ever gained has been by surrounding myself with competent people. I do not see myself as an air traffic control expert. I have, however, spent a lot of time studying airspace systems around the world and asking advice from those who have expertise in airspace.

For example, I can see the advantages of upgrading Class G airspace to Class E – especially where we have radar. This will undoubtedly improve safety.

Tobzalp, no I am not trying to forcibly unmask a person’s identity, but why is it that no ATC expert working for Airservices will post under their own name on this website or even make a public statement to the aviation industry about Class E airspace? It makes you wonder doesn’t it?

ForkTailedDrKiller, the accident could have been caused by either an equipment failure or human error. I’m sure you will agree that as humans we can make just about any mistake that is possible – look at the Tenerife accident where the Dutch 747 Captain took off without a clearance.

You are surprised by the ATC failure to advise the pilot of the track divergence. You obviously know that in Class G airspace (where the aircraft was heading) there is not even a requirement to report when visual – i.e. the air traffic controller has no idea whether you are still in cloud or visual.

In Class E airspace it is totally different. There is quite a different responsibility for the air traffic controller. That is why Class E airspace in this location – which has quite good radar coverage to the initial approach fix – would have very likely prevented the accident from happening.

En-Rooter, you say that the radar coverage is no good at Benalla, however look at the ATSB report. You will find that there was adequate radar coverage to allow a properly trained controller, using properly introduced procedures, to advise the pilot that he was many miles off track.

I agree that proper training is required. My suggestion is that you look at the Cabinet approved NAS document here (http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/artman/uploads/nasfinal_001.doc), especially Note 12 which states:

It is noted that this will require extensive training for air traffic controllers. Canary51, I had no idea until you made your posting that the Coroner had decided to hold an inquest. However what has that got to do with anything? Are you suggesting that because the Coroner believes it is serious enough to conduct an inquest, that I should not continue to push for the proper use of radar in the area?

Do you accept that there could be another accident before the Coroner makes his finding? I would imagine his finding will most likely support proper procedures being introduced, and the use of radar to minimise the chance of similar accidents happening in the future.

Capn Bloggs, you have obviously made up your mind that Class E airspace is “1950’s rubbish”. However it is obvious from the posting of VOR above, that he or she does not agree with you. There must be many pilots and controllers who accept that in radar covered airspace, Class E is better than Class G.

If TAAATS cost $600 million, it is all the more reason to use it properly.
SM4 Pirate, you make the very point of why Class E airspace is safer. You state:

In class G we have no ability to dictate a particular path to fly Of course, in Class E – until the pilot cancels IFR – you do have that ability, and that is what makes it safer.

By the way, I don’t believe that NAS was ever off the agenda. I think that you will find it has always been Government policy (see here (http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/cat_index_39.php)), and now that people are looking at these six deaths, they are more focused on why we are not using the radar correctly.

These threads are really healthy because they show how some people have made up their mind that the present system is adequate and that accidents like the one at Benalla cannot be prevented by proper procedures and a better use of the radar.

Lastly SM4 Pirate, you say:

Dick, Cancelling a RAM without telling a pilot is not negligence. I have never stated or implied such a thing. I have made it very clear in everything I have written that as far as I know, the controller was complying with the rules and training material that existed at the time - but six people did die.

[gaunty]

Ahhh I really would have liked the RFDS to recieve the $5,000 BUT cherry picking doesn't cut it around here
Below is the last post from the real VORs from that particular thread.
Some of you may recall it.
27th April 2004, 07:37 #61
Voices of Reason
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: New York
Posts: 132
Clarifications
First, we wish to apologize for some of the recent content (quoted above )under our nom-de-plume – the offending party has been removed from the roster of participants.

Second, as to credentials, suffice it to say our resumes would stand more than favorably against any offered by participants to this forum.

Now, in relation to this thread, perhaps we could go to first principles and try to clarify our original post.

As we have stated before, the entire basis for airspace service levels should be set around equitable risk management – that is, no single party should be exposed to a higher level of risk than another, unless that risk is accepted voluntarily.

By that, we mean that those that have sole responsibility for the risk to which they expose themselves – VFR pilots, glider pilots, military fighter pilots etc – may choose to operate to higher risk levels than those who have little or no control over risk – i.e., the fare paying passenger.

Good and effective airspace management is about ensuring that the fare paying passenger is not exposed to inappropriate risk levels – and just as important – inequitable risk levels.

So, the risk to a passenger flying to Sydney should be no higher than that for a passenger flying to Broome, Alice Springs, Launceston or Mildura, and vice versa.

Prior to the ICAO alphabet airspace classification system, there were as few as two classifications available in most parts of the world – controlled and uncontrolled airspace – with some States offering mid-range services such as Visual Exempt, or Instrument Visual airspace. The ICAO alphabet airspace system when finally codified offers seven layers of airspace service, and seven layers of risk management.

As we have previously stated, the system was developed by a panel whose primary responsibility was the accommodation of VFR flights in an increasingly complex environment of IFR flights – and an increasingly complex set of IFR flight parameters.

Now, for an airspace designer starting with a clean sheet of paper, it would be relatively simple to codify Australian airspace, so that the levels of risk are set to appropriate levels, and no single section of the community is subject to abnormally high levels of risk – except, as we stated before, where they choose to accept that risk. Some service leveling would be required to ensure that the model was not overly complex – so naturally there would be apparent over-servicing in certain areas. This occurs in all States.

We said “appropriate levels of risk”. Here is where it can get exceptionally difficult, even for a clean sheet approach. What one section of the aviation community will accept as appropriate may differ by one or two orders of magnitude to another section of the community. So a glider pilot might well be prepared to accept risk levels one hundred times higher than an airline pilot, or ten times higher than a VFR general aviation pilot. A VFR general aviation pilot might accept risk at a level ten times higher than an airline pilot. Is this wrong – basically no. The point of most contention comes where the high risk acceptor and the low risk acceptor come together. Here the airspace designer may need to impose an airspace classification that accommodates the lower risk threshold, or establish mitigating procedures.

So far, this is a lesson in theory.
The practicality of your debate in Australia is the superimposition of a model which may, or may not, set appropriate risk levels, over a system that has been in place for quite some time, and has therefore established a defacto risk standard.

Yes, it is absolutely true to say that for a given volume of airspace, with a set volume of traffic, the risk associated with Class G is higher than Class F, which is higher than Class E, which is higher than Class C etc. It is also true to say that if you have been providing a higher level of service for some time, the reduction from, say, Class C to Class E may appear either cost neutral or cost negative – i.e., a reduction for no cost benefit.

In fact, by our research into the airspace reforms conducted over the last 15 years in Australia, we have seen enormous overall cost benefit associated with the change in service levels – without any provable or demonstrable change in risk.

We understand that you have transitioned from over 2500 air traffic and flight information staff to around 1100. We accept that a large part of that was due to a technology change – nevertheless, traffic levels have increased, so the cost effectiveness has increased.

We expect that your responses will be along the lines of “we can provide the service, so why don’t we?”. This goes to one respondent’s quotation from Justice Gibbs. We have seen this, and other similar statements – particularly those associated with the United Kingdom and European Occupational Health and Safety directorates. The statements, on there own, are misleading, and need to be linked to the benefit side of the equation. Effectively, it is the passengers who will determine risk tolerability versus cost, a fact that Broome has tested. So, if a passenger can fly from Broome to Perth for $100.00, they may tolerate a “safety tax” of $5.00, but would baulk at $50.00. So the fact that a service can be provided is not necessarily an indicator that it should be provided, particularly when it can be demonstrated that risk is within an acceptable bound.

We suspect that some years ago, talk of controllers simultaneously providing traffic information in Class G airspace and separation services in Class C airspace would have been anathema. We understand it is done routinely now.

Yes, the change from Class C to Class E does increase risk – but is it an unacceptable level of risk – probably not. Are the incidents in Class E airspace indicative of a safety deficiency – yes. Is it a deficiency in airspace design – probably not. It is more likely to be a misapplication of the procedures associated with Class E airspace. Despite the protestations from some that Australia is somehow “different” to the rest of the world, evidence in other States with Class E airspace would seem to indicate that the design of Class E itself is not deficient.

Now to the question of transponders in Class E airspace.
Our research – and we would challenge any participants in this thread to look back through airspace change documentation to validate this information – indicates that the transponder carriage and activation proposal was mooted as part of a reform initiative called Airspace 2000, and was offered as a trade-off by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association as a safety enhancement mitigators, in return for reduction or elimination of airspace charges.

The regulations giving effect to the transponder carriage and activation in Class E airspace were put in place immediately before Class E airspace was implemented on your east coast, several years ago. We understand that it had originally been planned to implement Class E airspace along your entire east coast, from the north of Queensland to South Australia, at 8500 feet and above, and that charts had been printed and distributed. We understand that a Richard Harold Smith ordered the charts withdrawn and the implementation stopped, in favor of a much smaller implementation in New South Wales, two months later. We understand that charts were re-printed and issued – but on instruction from the director of your regulator, apparently at the specific behest of the same Richard Harold Smith, the effective date was deferred for two weeks whilst a debate raged around the need for mandatory transponders. We understand the carriage and activation of transponders was opposed by the same Richard Harold Smith.

As we have stated previously, the carriage and activation of transponders is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace. Yes, it does enhance its application – but it is not a requirement. As we have also stated, the carriage and operation of transponders should only be seen as a means by which the traffic alerting characteristic of Class E airspace is better enabled – and NOT as a way to alert TCAS carrying aircraft to the presence of VFR flights.

We trust this provides clarification.

:= :D

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
These threads are really healthy because they show how some people have made up their mind that the present system is adequate and that accidents like the one at Benalla cannot be prevented by proper procedures and a better use of the radar.

Name "some people" please. Prune names will be fine.

[SM4 Pirate]

For example, I can see the advantages of upgrading Class G airspace to Class E – especially where we have radar. This will undoubtedly improve safety. But at what cost? There is an implication that it is more cost effective than G, that doesn't mean less expensive.:ugh:
...they are more focused on why we are not using the radar correctly. Who are "they" and why do "they" say it's been used incorrectly?
I have never stated or implied such a thing. I'm sorry but what other implications can otherwise be drawn from comments such as At the time the Airservices controllers turned off the route monitoring alarm three times rather than inform the pilot. in this very thread. ... in this location – which has quite good radar coverage to the initial approach fix – would have very likely prevented the accident from happening. Who says this location has good radar coverage? I can tell you it is rubbish; don't mistake what the radar head observed (ie a radar plot) with what was available on an ATC console; they are not the same thing. If the RFP (radar front processor) says paint not accurate (or strong) enough there is no displayed paint on the 'synthetic' TAAATS console; please come and look for real at the data we actually get in this area, often below FL110 is non-radar; some days A075 works fine; but I can't recall seeing lower than that in this area, ever. Would you really want E to AGL 1200 with radar paints dropping out somewhere near 5000+ feet higher than the base of E; all on inference that final approached will have better monitoring. That's right you don't need radar to do E:ugh: :ugh: :ugh: :ugh: :ugh: :ugh:

[Dick Smith]

This is getting better! Now we are to believe that there are different VORs – the “real” ones and the (no doubt) “fake” ones. How are we to know the difference? Well it appears that any VORs that are against NAS are “real” and any VORs which explain how NAS works so well in the United States and could work well here, are “fake.”

Now of course it isn’t quite explained how the “fake” VORs (i.e. the ones that support NAS) have somehow got hold of the password to post, and how we are to know the difference.

By the way, any claims about me preventing Class E airspace implementation are rubbish – I have been a consistent supporter for more Class E.

If the people who make these claims don’t have the self-confidence to phone me and ask the facts, what can we do?

I say again, to answer this nightmare and for the reasonable people who are reading, why is it that Airservices has so frightened its staff and its knowledgeable people that they cannot say anything publicly about airspace?

I too have heard that staff have been threatened if they put anything on PPRuNe or say anything publicly about their professional opinions in relation to airspace. Can you imagine working for such an organisation?

This is not an issue of national security, it is an issue of aviation safety – where there should be no secrets. To intimidate your staff and management so they are not game to say their true beliefs in relation to safety is a damning reflection on this organisation.

Just as with the Wheat Board, it will all come out one day and be exposed - you wait and see.

[Dick Smith]

SM4 Pirate, it was obvious that the pilot was well off course when above FL110 – in very good radar coverage. That is when the pilot could have been told that he was heading well away from the GPS approach, and that is when there is a chance that the accident could have been prevented – it is as simple as that.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

Dick

On further reflection, you are indeed correct. When queried on my tracking by ATC, I have been in Class E airspace not Class G.

Dr:cool:

[SM4 Pirate]

...it was obvious that the pilot was well off course when above FL110 To who? In hindsight, yes, agreed, after plotting it out; but at the time what were the controllers (the three sectors involved (WOL, BLA and HUM) = three alerts) using to assess this "obvious" deviation from track? This has nothing to do with using the radar "correctly".

As far as I know the GPS RNAV/GNSS points were not in the data set at the time, so rerouting it to accurately describe the RAM corridor wasn't an option; thus the only reference point was the navaid/aerodrome; where the aircraft was not going; probably hence no advice to the PIC.

This probably has everything to do with a pilot being below the MSA still in a white/grey/black puffy lump of clag; yes the BLA GPS RNAV can get you lower than the MSA of 3500 within 10NM; but we all know you have to be on the damn thing.

From my untrained eye and from memory the aircraft appears to have gone to EE not ED; but flown the approach as if going to/from ED; sorry I have this all wrong. :ouch:

Dr, You will get advice from ATCs , about being in RAM in G too, in radar coverage, IFR, when you aren't on the CTAF, and your diversion from track is unexpected; the same RAM rules apply to all classes of airspace; ie there are only one set of rules.

[En-Rooter]

Dick.......Dood,

You are looking for an expert in airspace design, I'm the first to admit that I'm not that.

I have however been working this sector for a number of years. AND I AM TELLING YOU THAT THE RADAR COVERAGE IN THIS AREA IS CRAP! Why can you not accept my word on this? Do you think I am lieing?

Saabs are routinely lost (momentarily) at levels up to F120 out of YMAY to YMML.

I do have reservations about working E airspace, but only in areas where radar coverage is crap. Give me the radar coverage, the staffing (we have been understaffed on this group for at least 5 or 6 years) and the appropriate training and I will do it without complaint!

You also need to educate VFR acft on the implications of their transponder limitations and for christ sake stop them from navigating on IFR tracks.

Regards,

ROOTER.

[gaunty]

How are we to know the difference? Well it appears that any VORs that are against NAS are “real” and any VORs which explain how NAS works so well in the United States and could work well here, are “fake.” well I guess if you want to take that argument to its logical extension ipso facto you should not quote the VOR in any form to support your agenda of the day.

I doubt that there is anyone in Australia, or the world for that matter, watching or paticipating in the VOR NAS debate who wasn't able to work out what was and wasn't "fake".

And allegations of intimidation of staff by Airservices :rolleyes: coming from you is really cute don't you think:}

There are some very sound and very well proven reasons why many PPRuNers choose to remain anonymous, notwithstanding the accuracy and rationality of their posts and it has very little to do with the likely actions of their employers.

[ShockWave]

Dick,
I agree with the fact that if the pilot had been advised of his track error the accident could have been avoided. I say could not would. Obviously some very bad errors were made or equipment failures caused this accident.

In the end though you just can not fly below your msa without being absolutely sure of where you are and you can't be sure unless you have multiple sources of information. If ATC have radar that is one possible source, so is a DME, VOR, NDB, IRS etc.
I have flown too many Radar controlled airports around the world where I still don't descend below the MSA until I am sure of where I am, and not simply by the controllers advice. It is the only way to stay alive in this job.

I feel that to connect the need for more class E airspace to this accident is a bit of a stretch. There are a lot more things that can be done to prevent a repeat of this kind of accident that would be of more benefit before calling for more E airspace.

We can't positively control the whole of Australia by radar so the focus for this accident and for other remote areas needs to be on procedures, training and equipment required on board IFR aircraft.

Will class E airspce help? I don't know, but I do belive that it probably isn't the best way of preventing the above type of accidents.
Cheers.

[Pass-A-Frozo]

In the end though you just can not fly below your msa without being absolutely sure of where you are and you can't be sure unless you have multiple sources of information. If ATC have radar that is one possible source, so is a DME, VOR, NDB, IRS etc.
I have flown too many Radar controlled airports around the world where I still don't descend below the MSA until I am sure of where I am, and not simply by the controllers advice. It is the only way to stay alive in this job.
Sound advice. The Radar Terrain Clearance charts that RAAF AIS provide should be available to all. I've been on one flight when we were vectored below the alt displayed on chart. After questioning the controller we were promptly cleared to the correct alt.

[Capn Bloggs]

Just as with the Wheat Board, it will all come out one day and be exposed - you wait and see.
You can say that again, Sunshine. And you had better have a padded bottom, 'cause it's gunna be whacked hard.

PS: Answer the question.

[Spodman]

I mistakenly thought that after this terrible accident that there would be a quick move to utilise the radar properly in this area – i.e. introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Of course, this has not happened. Prior to this crash not all RNAV approach points were available to ATC to insert into flight plans, so if a flight was cleared direct to such a point in E airspace or a pilot advised he was doing so in G airspace we would just expect him to be up to 15 NM away from his planned route. Now the points have been defined and it has been indicated to ATC that we must monitor tracking and advise discrepancies, regardless of the class of airspace. Of course, this has not happened. Of course, you have got it wrong again.:ugh:

The ATSB report makes it quite clear the controller WAS monitoring the track of the aircraft, he was just confused about which point the flight was heading for. Despite the points not being defined the discrepancy WAS noted, but the when the ATC weighed the probabilities of he or the GPS being wrong he decided he must have got it wrong. We all know better now.

My name is in my profile if anybody cares, don't see how it is relevant though, I have no ambitions to become a media tart.

[Will964]

it was obvious that the pilot was well off course when above FL110 – in very good radar coverage. That is when the pilot could have been told that he was heading well away from the GPS approach, and that is when there is a chance that the accident could have been prevented – it is as simple as that.

Really? Could it have been prevented if the radio altimeter, which was fitted to this aircraft, had not been disabled by the pilot?

Whilst ATC monitoring of IFR tracks forms part of the system's defences, surely the final defence layer in the prevention of a CFIT should lie in the use of airborne technologies. In this case those technologies were knowingly disabled and so this final defence was breeched and the accident was allowed to occur. To pin-point the ATC's role in this accident as the 'make or break' point is misleading and is in direct conflict with the systemic approach to accident causation.

[tobzalp]

So in summary, the pilot flew the wrong way and hit a hill. ATC did not tell him and it is ATC's fault? The pilot made no error? User plays, user pays.

[019360]

I know one of the ATC guys on duty at the time. And any implied suggestion that he and others were smoking the odd cigarette, feet up on the console, oblivious to all but the heavy metal at FL 350 is cruel, wrong and just nasty.

And Dick.....most airlines, including mine...as part of our CRM training in the classroom, the simulator and on the line....tell pilots, Captains (yes this poor guy flying up near Benalla was a PIC) to listen to "that sick feeling that something is wrong". he was flying without GPWS, not even a Radio Alt (I think) in IMC relying solely on his version of a GPS plotted track. I know he didn't mean to get into this place but ultimately HE was PIC, not ATC whatever may or may not have fleetingly appeared on their screen.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

While a comment from ATC to alert the pilot to the track error may have prevented this accident, ATC can not possibly be blamed for this tragedy. If the approach had been into somewhere remote like Coen, this debate would not be relevant. Equally a cross check on the position with a VFR portable GPS might have alterted the pilot to a problem.

IMHO the buck stops squarely with the PIC. Like most aviation accidents, the plugging of any one of a number of "holes in the cheese" would have prevented it.

I did my GPS/RNAV Appr rating with a Trimble GPS, and found it much more difficult to work with than the GNS430 that I now use.

I have gotten into the habit of navigating soley by reference to GPS, but as a result of this accident, I now try wherever possible to cross-reference my GPS position with a ground station or radar position at some point in the flight prior to flying a GPS/RNAV Appr.

The pilot's habit of pulling the circuit breaker on the radio altimeter is curious. I wish I had one, and if I did I would ensure that I used it appropriately where ever possible.

Although apparently not diectly relevant in this case, the fact that the GPS database was not current is also interesting.

Dr:cool:

[019360]

And with reference to "stand-alone" GPS approaches. Just to put them in perspective. At the airline level, my company which has operated 777s for 10 years has JUST received approval, with a number of caveats even then, for "stand alone" GPS approaches. We need that for ETOPS alternates like Midway.
And we have the mother of all nav systems to back up the two GPS systems. The ADIRU with its many IRS and fiber-optic standby back up IRUs would by itself be more accurate than almost all non-ILS approaches. And we have 2 active FMCs and all manner of cross-checks. On IRS alone we can navigate for 12 hours without any other updating.
And yes, I am old enough to remember the "old" days when we didn't have all that gear and you have to have positive ADF station passage, or passing over a VAR Marker (remember MONEA up near Mangalore and the "Z" marker at HBA? etc).
There's just no substitute for knowing where you are, as PIC, before you let down. If I ever have to go into Wake or Adak with one engine out, ATC will be the people I call on SATCOM after I land, not someone I expect ANY help from on the approach.

[Dick Smith]

SM4 Pirate, you state:

As far as I know the GPS RNAV/GNSS points were not in the data set at the time I believe the Echo Delta waypoint was in the Airservices database. How else could the aircraft be cleared to track to Echo Delta, and how could the air traffic controller call the pilot and say that he was 65 miles from Echo Delta?

Gaunty, you falsely added words to the VOR posting of 27 April to give PPRuNers a completely different view. In the original post VOR did not add the words “quoted above.” VOR was referring to recent content, and if you go back and look at the history it is obvious that VOR was referring to posts other than the one that I have quoted.

Why ever would VOR be removed from the “roster of participants” for stating the facts about the US airspace system as I have quoted in the first post on this thread?

ShockWave, you state:

There are a lot more things that can be done to prevent a repeat of this kind of accident that would be of more benefit before calling for more E airspace. And then you state:

Will class E airspace help? I don't know In fact, if you look at my initial posting I made it very clear (when I said the radar use should be maximised) that the only alternative was not just Class E airspace. I said:

… introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Nothing could be clearer.

Just so everyone understands – in Class G airspace there is no regulatory responsibility for the controller in relation to LSA/MSA because the controller does not know if the pilot is visual. Under NAS the pilot must report visual or on the approach, and it is a very much more disciplined system where the responsibility is clearly shared between the controller and the pilot in a more definite way.

Spodman, you state:

Prior to this crash not all RNAV approach points were available to ATC to insert into flight plans If this is so, it is outrageous. You can buy a complete Jeppesen database for about $150. Are you suggesting that this had never been installed in the TAAATS system? However as stated above, in relation to this accident, the initial approach fix Echo Delta was in the TAAATS database.

[gaunty]

Gaunty, you falsely added words to the VOR posting of 27 April to give PPRuNers a completely different view. In the original post VOR did not add the words “quoted above.” VOR was referring to recent content, and if you go back and look at the history it is obvious that VOR was referring to posts other than the one that I have quoted.

Why ever would VOR be removed from the “roster of participants” for stating the facts about the US airspace system as I have quoted in the first post on this thread?

Is that the best you can do ??:ugh: :ugh: :rolleyes:

I added “quoted above.” to, hopefully point to the post you quoted at the beginning of the thread, there was never any intent to to give PPRuNers a completely view, most of them are capable of distinguishing the proverbial := from shinola.

I'll back my record for rational and consistent argument around here against yours any day.

And for the lazy ones around here, here is the full thread, I recall it well and it seems pretty clear to me what's happened. But then what would I know.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=127459&highlight=Class+E+Airspace+United+States+Practice

In the meantime I'm back to doing something useful, like actually progressing the state of the GA industry instead of frightening the bejeesus out of the callow chattering class and gormless gapers.

[Dick Smith]

Coral, it has nothing to do with grandstanding. It is all about preventing unnecessary deaths.

I do like to see that the available safety dollar is spent where it is most effective. I haven’t said that we have to have Class E airspace at Benalla. I have made it clear that if we introduce better procedures we can benefit from the use of radar.

If you question my real motivation possibly you are judging me on what you would do in similar circumstances – that is not sensible. I have one interest and that is having the highest possible safety and participation rates in aviation.

[SM4 Pirate]

I believe the Echo Delta waypoint was in the Airservices database. How else could the aircraft be cleared to track to Echo Delta, and how could the air traffic controller call the pilot and say that he was 65 miles from Echo Delta? Point one regarding the clearance, in the same manner that you clear an aircraft for a holding pattern, an NDB let down, a weather diversion; you use your experience and knowledge to facilitate the arrival as requested; you don't need to know "exactly" where a point is to clear an aircraft to it. When separating you then "add on for mum". If ED was in CTA then you're probably right re the clearance, but it wasn't.

Point two, run the distance measuring tool from the aid to the aircraft and then subtract the distance from the aid to the tracking point. ie 80-15 = 65; or something like that. They got the chart info from the menu in AAARDS (which is a computer monitor adjacent to the dispaly; but not on the display, if it was available, where we have our RAPIC) or from opening the DAP East like everybody else.

I absolutely support the increase in safety participation; unfortunately to suggest it's simple and won't cost serious dollars, is outrageous; please don't quote whilloughby report figures; nobody with more than $3.50 in the bank can see the logic behind that one; unless it's millions more than $3.50.:}

[Canary51]

It is the PIC who is asked for his TOD and replies with 65 NM to Echo Delta. The controllers subsequently use that report in coordination. Nowhere in the transcript do the controllers refer to a distance to run a waypoint, other than by reference to a pilot’s report. :ugh:

[Chris Higgins]

Dick,

Somewhere along the line we need to get back to better pilot training and cockpit disciplines before we start asking controllers to fly the aircraft for us.

We know that this discussion centres around improving the NAS, but you're going about it the wrong way mate!

[Dick Smith]

Chris, I’m amazed with your comment:

Somewhere along the line we need to get back to better pilot training and cockpit disciplines before we start asking controllers to fly the aircraft for us. Not at any stage did I ask the controller to fly the aircraft. I simply believe that if we are going to spend over $300 million (some claim $600 million) on a radar system, we may as well use it as another safety net.

All pilots, including professional pilots, will make human errors. Of course, air traffic controllers will do so too. However, surely it is obvious that if we have procedures which allow “checking” to take place, accidents may be reduced.

There is no doubt in my mind that if better procedures existed or if Class E airspace had been introduced in the Benalla area, there would have been less of a chance of this terrible accident occurring. Surely you must agree with this.

[Chronic Snoozer]

There is no doubt in my mind therefore... Surely you must agree with this.
Surely anyone can see these two positions are incongruous.

[bushy]

Are you really saying that if Dick says it then no-one can agree with it?

I thought we weere having a sensible discussion here.

[Howard Hughes]

I have been watching this thread with interest...
There is no doubt in my mind that if better procedures existed or if Class E airspace had been introduced in the Benalla area, there would have been less of a chance of this terrible accident occurring. Surely you must agree with this.
OK, I will agree with your point better procedures (ie: Class E), may have averted this accident! Now, will you then agree, that in order to have this extra net of safety, we need the ASSOCIATED INFRASTRUCTURE!

Just listen to the controllers on this thread who work this sector everyday, they are saying the facilities do not exist, or are intermittent at best!:ok:

Since day one of the airspace debate, I have been saying that we can't adopt the system you propose without the necessary infrastructure! When ever I raise this point in threads, you never seem to repond, you are quite happy to deal with the peripheral issues, but not this major question.

So as I have not yet received a satisfactory response, I will ask again, "How can we institute a US style airspace system without the necessary infrastructure".:ugh:

There is 96% radar coverage of the contiguous United States, now I know you keep bringing up small pockets of US airspace, but these are very isolated areas and not the 'satus quo' in the US!

We are talking about almost the reverse situation in our own country, the percentage without radar must be around 80% at least! Take Benalla for example less than 200 klms by road from Australias second largest city, yet it does not have suitable radar coverage, this is what we are dealing with!

If you want to propose changes, implement the infrastructure first, then implement the airspace changes, its a bit like trying to put the horse before the cart, just doesn't work!

How about we stop trying to apportion blame and get it right, by doing whatever it takes, including the infrastructure?:ok:

[OZBUSDRIVER]

This accident has nothing to do with airspace or airspace control. What must be accertained is why the PIC followed that particular flightpath. If ATC did give a warning, who is to say that the PIC would have checked his instruments to have them tell him that he was on course (for the wrong waypoint) and inform ATC of the same. The PIC asked for a clearance to ED and recieved it. I am curious if it is possible to mistake EG for ED when selecting the right approach. If EG was selected then it would explain why the aircraft was that far SE. IF EG was selected the autopilot would fly to the point where the turn would be commenced to turn NW to intercept the approach starting from EG. If the pilot was expecting the turn at EI he knew it would be safe to be about 2000ft because he probabley knew that the terrain was off to the south as he came in from the NE on the ED approach(the altitude for EI on the approach is3890ft with the LSA after that point down to 2200ft).

That day was as cruddy as they come for the NE of Vic. Solid O/C down to the deck. There would have been no visual cue that the PIC was in the wrong place until the aircraft turned and descended into Mt Bellvue. The accident site is 5.3nm SE of the BLAEG waypoint at an altitude of about 1900ft. The aircraft was heard overflying the Myrtleford area, a long way east of an expected track for ED but believeable for the GPS to stear for a turn to the NW to pick up EG.

Forgive me if I draw a long bow but Dick is drawing an even longer one by trying to blame ATC for this.

[b737800capt06]

Australian airspace classification:

Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) - commercial and selected general aviation aircraft
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) – general aviation aircraft

Class A: IFR flights only are permitted. All flights are provided with an air traffic control service and are positively separated from each other.

Class C: All aircraft must get an airways clearance and communicate with air traffic control. IFR aircraft are positively separated from both IFR and VFR aircraft. VFR aircraft are provided traffic information on other VFR aircraft.

Class D: All aircraft must get an airways clearance and communicate with air traffic control. IFR aircraft are positively separated from other IFR aircraft and are provided with traffic information on all VFR aircraft. VFR aircraft are provided traffic information on all other aircraft.

Class E: IFR aircraft require an airways clearance and must communicate with air traffic control. IFR aircraft are positively separated from other IFR aircraft and given traffic information on known VFR aircraft. VFR aircraft do not require an airways clearance and are not required to communicate with air traffic control.

Class G: IFR and VFR flights are permitted and do not require an airways clearance. IFR flights must communicate with air traffic control and receive traffic information on other IFR flights and a flight information service. VFR flights receive a flight information service if requested. :ok:

[Howard Hughes]

Do you have a point Captain?

I think we are all aware of airspace classificaton!:ok:

[b737800capt06]

It is interesting to read how personal some of the attacks get here. I suspect if you were having dinner with Mr Smith at Est restaurant you may tone it down a little.

Mr Dick Smith has contributed a vast wealth of knowledge/effort in the Australian avaition scene:D .

I should think that a great deal more respect should be shown to a man of his level, even if you do not agree with his position:ok: .

Cost and avaition is a subject that has always been with us, and now with 'cheap airlines' Jetstar, Lionair etc this debate is sure to continue.

My two cents worth: Where the traveling public pay to fly the level of safety should be second to none - Class C/D minimum.

Control of airspace is central to any safe flight with aircraft carring 150+ pax, let alone 6 people. Pilot error is always there, but why not have airspace controllers there as a second set of eyes.

So what would be the cost to upgrade to class C or class D? :ok:

[Whiskey Oscar Golf]

Please forgive my stupidity here people, I have been watching this and the plethora of other threads like it for a while and I'm a touch confused.

From what I can gather Mr. Smith and others in GA would like to make some changes in airspace designation and the duties and role of ATC, this would bring it into line with the US, am I right so far? Would these changes require a large infrastructure expenditure to bring them on a comparable level to the US? If so is this part of federal aviation policy? How long would it take to complete the required infrastructure?

Are others arguing that there is a comparable, cheaper system in ADSB that is not yet in commercial production and a fair way away from general usage. If ADSB is implemented would Mr. Smiths changes still be valid and effective? Are they linked or is ADSB V Radar a seperate argument.

Sorry for the questions I just get a little lost in these threads because it does seem straightforward and I'm worried I may be missing something, or maybe I'm just dumb.
Thanks

[En-Rooter]

Thank you Mr Hughes, (I don't care what they said about your mental health, you're a very sensible man!)

For Mr Smith:

The radar coverage at Benalla is not adequate for class e airspace.

The radar coverage at Benalla is not adequate for class e airspace.

The radar coverage at Benalla is not adequate for class e airspace.

The radar coverage at Benalla is not adequate for class e airspace.

The radar coverage at Benalla is not adequate for class e airspace.

Are you accusing me of lying?

Are you accusing me of lying?

Are you accusing me of lying?

Are you accusing me of lying?

Are you accusing me of lying?

Answer the questions that are asked of you.

Answer the questions that are asked of you.

Answer the questions that are asked of you.

Answer the questions that are asked of you.

Answer the questions that are asked of you.

:=

[ferris]

A quick break to update the newcomers....

definately not a b737800capt06: Mr Smith's position is completely opposite to yours. Please join the legions trying to minimise the damage (even though you respect him so highly:hmm: ).

WOG: You are correct. Mr Smith and others ARE trying to align airspace, ATC duties etc. to more closely align with the US. However, he is trying to do this whilst EXPRESSLY NOT changing any infrastructure to match. In fact, he is trying to stop us doing what we do that mitigates our lack of infrastructure, removing the "Australianess" of our system (DTI in G). This is what the industry is railing against (both the end product, and his methods of achieving it). He believes that if we all start talking and acting like the US, we magically don't need infrastructure like radar, flight service etc.

Many here are simply pointing out that advances in technology will give him what he wants soon enough, without the bull-in-a-china-shop approach. It begs the question; why? To an outsider, it would almost seem that Mr Smith's aims have nothing really to do with "safety" or "helping GA". I'm sure one could be forgiven for thinking he just has a pathelogical hatred of (in order) the ATSB, CASA, ATC, airline pilots, other government departments etc. etc. Don't you agree?

[gaunty]

So about that $5,000 for the RFDS, pity, they could do with the money.
:ugh: :ugh: :ugh:

I am very privileged to know of a philanthropist whose serious mitigation of a venal, self serving and mischeivous albeit "legal" wrong will forever remain publicly unknown.

Perhaps the VOR are likewise motivated.

And yes I remain a great fan.

And yes the revelation of their identity would only serve one person to the detriment of the rest of us.

Perhaps Mr Smith will never learn that the anonymity of the poster is what confers the greatest strength to their argument. If it, the argument, cannot stand on its own, devoid of the perception of or invested with the position or personality of the proponent, then it is no argument at all.

For the folks who dont get it, just try the 'ol substitution test. :ok:

[Dog One]

This thread seems to be going around in a continous loop. How ever, I would like to know why we really need to adopt the "American system of airspace design"? I have just finished reading an article entitled "Blinded by See and Avoid" (Business & Commercial Aviation Jan 2007)

Part of the article lists the number of mid air accidents which have occurred over the past few years, and even a small percentage of such accidents occurring in Australian airspace would create a very public out cry.

We are Australians, let us design our own airspace needs (which meets ICAO requirements) to suit Australian conditions. Design criteria would take into account that Australia has only 20% radar coverage and provide some protection to RPT aircraft operating into non controlled airports. The concept of E airspace out side of radar coverage is one of the most flawed concepts of the current airspace model, as it certainly doesn't work in the USA, where their is greater radar coverage, yet a large number of mid-air accidents.

[gaunty]

:cool:

You mean this article;

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=3109934&highlight=Business+Commercial#post3109934

there are two parts but required reading for anyone who anyone who thinks the big sky theory and see and avoid should be the primary basis of our airspace design.:rolleyes:

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

No doubt I am showing my age, but it always surprises me when I find my Bonanza sharing the circuit with a B737 at an uncontrolled aerodrome like Mt Isa or Proserpine.

Would be interested to hear the 737 crew's perspective on this.

Dr:cool:

[Capn Bloggs]

FTDK,

I don't fly 737s, preferring a much nicer ex-McD type, and can tell you that I don't have any problem at all sharing the airspace (SHARING being the operative word, Dick) provided I know there other aircrfat is there and we can organise a mutually beneficial outcome to save either of us having to swan around wasting fuel, time (WOFTAM) and decreasing flight safety. This concept to Dick and his mate the airline pilot from the USA Richard ? is of course totally unpalatable.

Over many many years, I have almost always had a pleasant and safe experience with G/A types in the circuit. Funnily enough (well not so funny really), the only dramas I have had have been since NAS 2b came out when Mike Smith, ably supported by his mate Dick Smith put in AIP:

[QUOTE]Direct Pilot to Pilot dialogue should be avoided where possible./QUOTE]

On two occasions we had to make reasonably positive unilateral flight path changes to avoid a collision and the third time a Cessna went straight across in front of us (we never saw him) as we took off. He made his inbound call on the CTAF but we didn't hear it because we had not yet taxied and he hadn't yet made his downwind call. None of these GAs attempted to say "hey, we're here, are we going to be a confliction?" or even acknowledge our calls.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

Capt B, I didn't mean to insult the McDD set (one of my favourite aeroplanes as a passenger), its just that my recent experience has found me sharing the circuit with the 737.

Cheers

Dr:cool:

[the wizard of auz]

Now if you were in your trusty 185 mustering machine, you could just firewall the bugger, out climb him and it wouldn't be an issue. :} :)
of course, you would have to be in your typical half fueled mustering configuration though. :}

[J430]

Bloggs

Slight thread drift here, but hey this is D&G.

I have found all the -8 and above guys very pleased to converse with us bugsmashers, especially when being proactive in making life easier for the bigger faster machines. Even recently while doing some scenic ops close to HBA I felt it polite and prudent to let a VB crew know our details etc as the TCAS would identify us close by and he may not have been on the CTAF when we broadcast prior to them starting up. Nice of them to thank us afterwards when departing the CTAF too. Its all about manners and common sense, not necessarily the AIP only.

Due to speed differences and the instance you describe, you almost need to be asking for any traffic in the CTAF to identify themselves, otherwise they assume you heard them 10 miles out......contrary to the AIP thing of course. Just a thought!

J:ok:

[Dick Smith]

Howard Hughes, Here is a much belated answer to your posting of 26 March 2007.

You stated on this thread:

Since day one of the airspace debate, I have been saying that we can't adopt the system you propose without the necessary infrastructure! When ever I raise this point in threads, you never seem to respond, you are quite happy to deal with the peripheral issues, but not this major question.

So as I have not yet received a satisfactory response, I will ask again, "How can we institute a US style airspace system without the necessary infrastructure". Howard Hughes, I have answered this many, many times. Why don’t you give me a phone call and I will go through it again? I will try to cover it here again too.

We don’t have as much infrastructure and radar coverage as the USA as we have roughly one fifteenth of the amount of traffic in the same land area. However between Melbourne and Cairns, the area where we have our mountains and the greatest density of traffic, we have a radar system which is as good as anything the US has.

For example, at airports only 130 miles to the west of Washington DC, there is no radar coverage in the Class E airspace above Class D airports. The US has an extensive radar system, however there are mountain ranges and this gives the same line of sight problems that exist everywhere in the world.

My philosophy is simple. Why can’t we have the proven safe US procedures, which maximise the use of radar and controlled airspace, where we have the same radar coverage advantage?

The situation at Benalla would be very typical of airports in the Appalachian Mountains on the East Coast of the USA.

You state:

Take Benalla for example less than 200 klms by road from Australias second largest city, yet it does not have suitable radar coverage, this is what we are dealing with! As explained, this is absolutely typical of similar airports in the USA. Their system maximises the use of radar and controlled airspace, so you know as a pilot that you will have air traffic control assistance until you leave radar coverage.

This is not the Australian, system as we do not even have a procedure where a pilot in uncontrolled airspace informs the controller that he or she is no longer in IMC.

By the way, I’m not apportioning blame to anyone – other than to those who have the power to make the necessary changes to maximise the use of radar, yet are not doing so. I have found that many controllers with whom I talk would like to see better procedures introduced – it just doesn’t happen.

[Jerricho]

Mr Smith, please go and re-read post #54 by En-Router.

Feel free to reply in your own time.

[Dick Smith]

Jerricho, post 54 basically says that in the view of En-Rooter, the radar coverage at Benalla is not suitable for Class E airspace. No evidence is given on why En-Rooter claimed this is so.

It appears that it is not suitable for Class E, but still suitable for the ATSB to do a report showing radar traces to low level, which clearly show that the pilot was many miles away from the correct approach point.

As stated by Voices of Reason at different times, Class E airspace has nothing to do with radar coverage. All IFR approaches in the USA are covered by a minimum of Class E airspace. Over 50% of their approaches are below radar coverage.

I ask you to support at least trying one bit of low level Class E airspace – let’s say at a place like Charleville or Mt Isa – to see how it will work, to find the extra training costs for the controllers, and to find out if there are any delays for IFR aircraft. Surely that is the way of seeing if a system will work safely.

Remember there were pilots who supported the engineers in claiming that a Boeing 767 could not operate without a special engineer’s console on the flight deck. Ansett took notice of this resistance to change and it was the start of their downfall – that is, the millions of dollars wasted in ordering 767s with an engineer’s position, and then the tens of millions of dollars wasted in removing those engineer consoles many years later.

Isn’t it a pity that the pilots and engineers at Ansett at the time couldn’t have taken advice and at least tried the proven system which now works in airlines all around the world?

[CaptainMidnight]

My bolding:I ask you to support at least trying one bit of low level Class E airspace – let’s say at a place like Charleville or Mt Isa – to see how it will work, to find the extra training costs for the controllers, and to find out if there are any delays for IFR aircraft. Surely that is the way of seeing if a system will work safely.No, it isn't.

We don't risk lives by "trying" something to see if it will work safely, and blind Freddy can see that.

We first conduct a thorough hazard identification and safety analysis exercise to determine if a proposal is indeed safe, and in addition - via the minister's direction - that there is a demonstrated cost benefit.

[Dog One]

I believe that Class E airspace outside of radar coverage is a complete farce, as it provides no protection for IFR aircraft from VFR aircraft. So why have it? Just because the USA does it that way, it really doesn't mean that we should.

Why do we have to look to the USA or Europe to model our airspace, when we have sufficient expertise to design our own to meet the ICAO standards.

[Chris Higgins]

Dog One- That's a very provincial view of the world mate! Now how the hell is anyone who flies in your unique solution from outside of Straya going to do it safely with a cracked up solution like that one.

Read Dick Smith's example about the Ansett engineers panel on their 767s, then imagine the perplexed look on the faces of Boeing engineers when they were actually asked to put the bloody things in!

It's time for us to have a system that is similar to other countries in order to make the airspace understandable for users both in Australia and for those who come in for trade and commerce.

Smith has also outlined very effectively the arguments to make our system similar to other widespread examples of Europe and USA to make the avionics and ATC software and training standards similar as well.

I just back from Heathrow and Ireland and there are still enough differences between Europe and USA that need to be researched thouroughly the night before. Don't go and make a country like Australia complicated. No foreign pilot will bother to learn it, they'll just meander through it. Not a good solution at all.

[Jerricho]

in the view of En-Rooter, the radar coverage at Benalla is not suitable for Class E airspace. No evidence is given on why En-Rooter claimed this is so.

Other than he is an Air Traffic Controller who works that airspace. :rolleyes: I'll give you a little hint..........post #10 of this thread.

Shall we turn a blind eye to the number of times YOU have posted your views both here and in the media without providing facts (now we wait for the tired old "Well, why doesn't he use his real name if he really cares")

And before you start shoving Class E down my throat, I work 2 terminal areas that are Class E up to 12,500 feet surrounding a Class D tower. Both are mandatory transponder airspace. Both have excellent radar coverage. While we're at it, why don't you ask me about the priority Medevac flight that was pissed around last week and delayed in landing because of some tool who wasn't talking to ATC and stooged straight through the final approach of the active runway at 3500 (unverified altitude of course, because it was never verified by ATC).

[Chris Higgins]

Jerricho,

Without hijacking this thread, most of these examples you cite have a lot more to do with the declining standards of Australian pilot training and nothing to do with Dick Smith or airspace.

A VFR aircraft running through the final and not talking to anyone is going to happen anywhere if you don't hold training to a certain standard in the first place.

[Jerricho]

No Chris, what that one example (what "examples" are you talking about? Huh?) shows is that in the all magical Class E airspace, our little VFR friend squawking 1200 doesn't need to be talking to ATC and squawking an altitude that is not verified and is pretty much useless.

[J430]

Jerricho, Chris, Dick.

Just a thought, an unverrified altitude is usually correct, but I know appreciate what Jerricho is saying. I have on my desk right now, for installation this evening a brand new altitude encoder. Why when the one on board is only 2.75 years old I could ask. Luckily for me my Transponder displays the PA from the encoder, and I noticed an abnormality. Flying in Class G on Wednesday I noticed this, asked Brisbane radar to monitor the output and it was all over the place, worse than the display was showing me (update rate on display) so select Mode A and replace the encoder ASAP.

I have since been informed they have a life span of 3 - 5 years, unlucky me:{ , but it makes you think very hard about the fact that most older GA aircraft (and some no so old) probably have deffective encoders, that only get checked every two years (hopefully) and their Transponders do not have a display for the PA being transmitted.:eek:

Jerricho should be concerned in fact!!! So unverified is a radar controllers concern.

Question Jerry, with changes after changes, I may be wrong, but I thought one requirement for class E was to be on the correct ATC freq. and yes I know there is no guarantee. On the rare occassion I am in Class E I ask for a VFR flight following, mainly so you guys have contact and its better for any IFR around also for me to be "known" traffic. Just good manners I think.

What do you think?

J:ok:

[Jerricho]

Hi J430,

The Class E airspace I work is in North America. You know, that airspace system somebody is trying to emulate ;)

[gaunty]

J430:ok:
I have since been informed they have a life span of 3 - 5 years, unlucky me , but it makes you think very hard about the fact that most older GA aircraft (and some no so old) probably have deffective encoders, that only get checked every two years (hopefully) and their Transponders do not have a display for the PA being transmitted.
A point that has been studiously avoided by the protagonists here on this and the TCAS debate.:rolleyes:

Jerricho:ok:

[Howard Hughes]

Dick, I understand the considerable population and infrastructure differences between Australia and the US! I also respect that the way things are done in the US for the most part, may work very well there!

For Australia however, I am still not convinced that unannounced VFR's in E airspace, with or without Radar coverage, with possibly incorrect mode C readouts and on the wrong frequency is a good thing! It seems by the reponses to this thread, that I am not a lone voice, surely it is reasonable to acknowledge these deficiencies in the proposed sytem and try to improve it whilst staying as close as possible to the ICAO model.
Dick Smith Said: This is not the Australian, system as we do not even have a procedure where a pilot in uncontrolled airspace informs the controller that he or she is no longer in IMC.
I don't get this statement, is it imperative for ATC to know what flight conditions an IFR aircraft is in when OCTA? What is the US procedure? When I was there, "Cancel IFR" had the same meaning as "Cancel SAR"!
Chris Higgins Said: It's time for us to have a system that is similar to other countries in order to make the airspace understandable for users both in Australia and for those who come in for trade and commerce.

Chris, most people coming in from the USA (and elsewhere for that matter) for business and commerce, would be IFR in controlled airspace, if you operate in Australia the same way you do in the USA in controlled airspace, you would not have a problem! There are numerous examples of this happening everyday!

Furthermore if we are going to align ourselves with any system, then why would we not align as close as possible to ICAO? This would make it simpler for incoming flights from all countries, not just the US! Frankly I don't think that the differences in airspace cause any concern to foreign operators entering Australia.

[gaunty]

In the meantime notwithstanding Mr Smiths laudable intent, the RFDS is still short of Dicks $5,000.

I’m prepared to make a $5,000 donation to the Royal Flying Doctor Service (Broken Hill Branch) if the VOR who wrote the below mentioned piece
will identify himself or herself and assist with airspace reform.

appears either to have fallen on deaf ears or;

the VOR by identifying themselves see themselves on a hiding to nothing or;

are of the belief that there is truly nothing they can add to the issue.

If I recall correctly they only entered the fray here;

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=117373 its worth reading through the thread again

to observe ;

Before we close – a respondent made a reference to our organizational allegiance. We do not represent anyone or any organization. We are concerned that many decisions made not only in your country, but in many others, are based not only on [hopefully] mis-understanding – but also [hopefully not] on deliberate mis-interpretation. We are concerned about safety – and we are concerned that any money that is spent on airspace management is correctly applied to ensure safety, without unnecessarily restricting the amenity of any user.

and suggest;

Might we suggest that rather than exchange frustrations on this site - clearly not heeded by your airspace designers - that you access ALL of the information on which their decision making is based - you might be [very] surprised at what you uncover.

We would suggest two mechanisms. First, as we said - be very specific in your request. Do not simply ask for airspace documents - ask for documents relating to every name and iteration over the last several years. We think you have had NAS, Class G Demonstrations, LAMP, Airspace 2000 and so on. Make sure you ask for information at EVERY level in the organization - not just at senior executive level.

The second is to establish a credible [to you] framework in which to request and analyse the information - that could be done by partnering with an interested party - such as your aviation investigation body - or if you are serious, with a dedicated newspaper reporter. You might find that the latter is less manageble [obviously reporters have particular reasons for participating] - but might accelerate the process so that your aviation investigation body is DIRECTED to act [we suspect you will understand what we mean].
If we can be of assistance, please post accordingly.

and point out;

If our views are not helpful, we will, of course, withdraw from your forum. We seek only to offer the benefit of experience in these matters - and to offer sources of information which you may use to the benefit of aviation safety in your country. From what we have observed, you are fighting misinformation - skillfully manipulated - but incorrect, nonetheless. We can provide assistance to discredit such misinformation, and point you to correct source material.

It's a pity that the RFDS will miss out on a donation the trigger for which was probably unfounded and uncollectable. It got everybodies attention though.

So lets get back to tors and context on this shall we, before you or anyone else feels tempted to invoke their authority to personal advantage.

It is a fact the your airspace designers referred to in the context of the debate were NOT Airservices nor CASA they were the NASIG and you know who.

[bushy]

Really? Are we really fitting such rubbish in our aircraft? Do the sales people tell us these things when they sell them?
Do the authorities understand this when they make the fitting of them mandatory?
How can you know if these things are working properly when you are at Birdsville? By using the test light?
Can you get them tested or fixed at Birdsville?
If not, is the fitting and use of transponders actually practical.

[Quokka]

bushy,

If you can get Dick Smith to support the Low-Level Phase of the ADS-B project in Australia then you will be able to check your transponder at Birdsville by calling up ATC with a request for a transponder check.

Always have installed, and, always switch on your transponder. Some day it will save your life when a higher performance aircraft picks you up on it's TCAS and takes avoiding action.

If we can get Dick Smith to support and call for the mandatory carriage and operation of transponders by all aircraft operating in Class G airspace, a lot more lifes will be saved.

If you don't believe me, ask an RFDS pilot.

[J430]

Yes and here is what the Ameriking web site says

:: FAA TSO-C71 approved.

FEATURES:

Extremely Accurate (+/- 20 Feet) and Extremely Reliable.
Compatible with all Transponders.
Prefabricated wiring Harness Assembly Included.
Currently OEM Production Supply (FAA TC approved)
to many Airframe Manufacturers including Mooney Aircraft, Aviat Aircraft, American Champion Aircraft, Luscomb Aircraft, Skystar, Diamond Aircraft of Canada, Aerospaciale Socata Aircraft of Germany etc.

ACCESSORIES:

Wiring Harness Assembly with Connector built-in Thick Tygon Pneumatic Hose, Parker Hannifin Brass Fittings, Anodized Mounting Tray.
OPTIONAL ACCESSORY:

Wiring Jumper, wiring junction interfaces (parallel data) from Altitude Encoder to GPS / Transponders / EGPWS / Air Data Computer etc. This allows Unlimited Cascading to many other Receivers as needed. Hence substituting the requirement for adding a Terminal Junction Block or PCB at the Encoder Data Outputs.

WARRANTY:

One and a half (1 1/2) years. Optional Extended Three (3) years Warranty.




So anybody else have this experience?? I know with any thermal element device they may not live forever and when turned on and off a fair bit they have only so many cycles. Mine was clearly an early failure. It had not failed completely but was very unstable.

Bushy, I see your point clearly hence my comment, the typical Bendix/king Transponder has no PA readout, mine does and its a handy reference if your EFIS and normal altimeter fail at the same time:eek: because you can display the PA at 1013 or select the display to actual altitude by entering known QNH.

J:ok:

[Howard Hughes]

If you don't believe me, ask an RFDS pilot.
Don't think many RFDS aircraft have TCAS, hang on a minute, maybe those fancy PC-12's do!!:}

I'd give up my GPS for a TCAS...;)

[gaunty]

Quokka

If you don't believe me, ask an RFDS pilot. God bless em AND anybody else operating high performance aircraft into regional, mining and remote strips.:ok:

Maybe Dicks $5,000 could go towards some TCAS's in the RFDS aircraft that dont have em:E

[Howard Hughes]

Or perhaps towards an ADSB receiver! :}

[Pinky the pilot]

Maybe Dicks $5,000 could go towards some TCAS's in the RFDS aircraft that dont have em

OK Dick, What about it??:ok:

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

"I'd give up my GPS for a TCAS...;)"

I wouldn't give up my GPS for ANYTHING!

Dr:cool:

[Dick Smith]

Dog One, you state:

I believe that Class E airspace outside of radar coverage is a complete farce, as it provides no protection for IFR aircraft from VFR aircraft. So why have it? Could the reason be that it provides greater protection from aircraft actually colliding with each other in cloud? I suggest you look into the incident at Bundaberg on 16 May 1997 where an IFR airline aircraft and another aircraft flown by a commercial pilot were doing an instrument approach at the same time, and allegedly got so close to each other whilst doing the approach that the strobe lights of one aircraft affected the pilots of the other. That is a close call – caused by one of the professional pilots accidentally dialling up the wrong MBZ frequency.

Or what about the incident of 23 June 2006 at Orange, where professional pilots attempted to do instrument approaches in the opposite direction at the same time in IMC. I suggest you look here (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2006/AAIR/aair200604222.aspx).

Isn’t it amazing that we have these fantastic separation standards for aircraft in controlled airspace, but when we have, let’s say, a Jetstar Airbus doing an instrument approach in uncontrolled airspace at the same time that a low time private pilot is doing an instrument approach, that there is absolutely no separation standard at all.

[tobzalp]

You know what Dick, I totally agree with you. I really do.

Do you have costings for the implementation of E airspace right down to control these approaches? It must be quite high I am sure you will agree. I am not saying not to do it based on cost, just want to know the cost.

Lets use an example of an IMC day along the coast between Sydney and Brisbane. As you often state, a D aerodrome controllers responsibility should be near to the airport where collision risk is greatest. I agree. Take Taree for example which has no radar coverage below A040 and porr to no VHF below A020, will there be additional facilities required?

With the disposition of aerodromes, how many controllers will be required to give full attention to each and every approach in the E (which is actually A in IMC remember?). No need to give me an exact number, just More, Less or Same with your reasons for that selection.

[Jerricho]

Mr Smith, what are your thoughts on the Medevac example I have provided? You know, the ONE IN CLASS E AIRSPACE.
You've had it pointed out to you before that your beloved controllers in North America treat Class E as a bastardised Class D (see link here) (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=2956078#post2956078), especially in the vicinity of Class D zones.......Hmmm.....:hmm:

[tobzalp]

Pfft. That is Separation Standard H1. Holy Cow!

[LeadSled]

Coral,
RE. utube, that looks (in practice) like the northern VFR lane v. the 16R ILS at YSSY to me.
So what's the problem, if you think 500' is OK, after all, it's "ICAO" and all that sort of stuff. If you want to see real "close up and personal" have a look at Orange County/John Wayne International simops (just one of many US examples - and believe it or not --- it's in the NAS 2B paperwork -- We statistically have more mid-airs than US) some time.
Tootle pip!!

[bushy]

Funny how things change, and what was taboo becomes good. Airlines that could not possibly accept operation outside controlled airspace all of a sudden find they can operate into Ayers Rock. There's money to be made there.
See and avoid is no good, and proper separation procedures MUST be in place. But the military can operate at night with no radio transmissions and no external lighting. (When I saw that I was tempted to say that I would be too!)
Military aircraft could operate at low level in the same area where I was doing low level survey flying without any notification and no vhf radio transmissions.( I do not think they actually had VHF radios.)
At one time the lane of entry into Melbourne was a couple of miles wide, and 2000 ft high, with a restricted area 1700 ft high at one point, leaving a slot 300 ft high for two way traffic. No TCAS then. No controller. Only see and avoid. Funny, it seemed to work.
The US have parallel ILS's onto parallel runways, and about 100 times the ammount of traffic and they seem to manage.
Probably the scariest thing I saw was scenic flights at Ayers Rock.
One time, in a King Air I made all the right radio calls for departure out of Ayers Rock and on departure found that I was nose to nose with a Boeing. We self separated and when I got back to Alice we replayed the tape and found that the problem was too much yacking on the radio so the system was overloaded and transmissions were often clipped and confusing. Not long after that they took the flight service component out and that reduced the number of transmissions so the system worked much better with merely self separation.
If the airlines do not like class E, lets change it all back to class G.
An interesting thing to do with ADS-B. I took a taxi ride in Adelaide and found the taxis have a system that transmits their GPS position to a central controlling point. It's all automatic. They've had it for many years. But it's whizzbang high technology for us.??????

Quokka
I do not need to ask an RFDS pilot. I was one for about ten years.

Gaunty
Yes. God bless em, and all the others who operate into remote and mining airstrips in the outback, regardless of what type of aeroplane they operate. No need to discriminate.

[Dick Smith]

Tobzalp, any success I have ever had has come from asking advice and copying the success of others. I did not think we should change every Class G approach in Australia to Class E – as it is in the USA. Places which do not have mountains around, and may only have one IFR approach per day, obviously do not require Class E. However places like Port Macquarie, Taree and Proserpine I believe could benefit from Class E with no measurable increase in cost.

This is because IFR traffic information cannot be given on a workload permitting basis – it has to be given at any time – whereas Class E separation quite often can be delayed for a few minutes. For example, an IFR aircraft wishing to depart Taree can be held on the ground for 2 or 3 minutes whilst another aircraft is landing, or due to ATC workload.

I agree that there will be a cost to this, but that can be measured by actually placing some Class E at one of these airports and training the controllers and the pilots on how to operate the airspace correctly.

There has been previous criticism when I talked about doing a trial. It is as if Qantas would buy a 747 without taking it for trial flights first – a crazy idea.

It is all a matter of degree. Aviation safety is not absolute. We all know that a compromise often has to be made between cost and benefit.

The alternative of course is to leave Class G airspace at a place like Port Macquarie, but write procedures which give a better service to IFR aircraft when in cloud. This is what happens in the UK.

Class E airspace has a number of advantages over Class G. One is that it offers a “failsafe” normally redundant system for IFR aircraft in cloud, and also allows the radar to be used more effectively to reduce controlled flight into terrain accidents.

Taree aerodrome would be very typical of many aerodromes I have flown into in the United States, where radar coverage does not exist below 4,000 feet, and there is no VHF coverage in the circuit area. As the USA has no land based HF system, at these airports (believe it or not) a clearance is often picked up by talking to a UNICOM operator or by telephone before departure. It sounds as if there would be delays, but in practice there are not.

When I was the Chairman of the CAA, I arranged for controllers to visit the USA and sit by the air traffic controllers there. This should happen again – especially in relation to Class E. I’m sure we will find that there are some things that they do better, and there are some things that we do better. In many cases we could keep what we do better, take what they do better, and end up with a more effective and safer system.

[peuce]

Mr Smith,
I also don't think QANTAS would take that 747 for a test flight until:

They were comfortable with the proposed price
They are convinced that it will safely get their test pilots off and back onto the ground
They were convinced that it could be used in their configuration and under their conditions ... even though others might be using it under their specific conditions i.e that it was fit for purpose

[CaptainMidnight]

Taree aerodrome would be very typical of many aerodromes I have flown into in the United States, where radar coverage does not exist below 4,000 feet, and there is no VHF coverage in the circuit area. What Taree are you talking about?

Taree in NSW has coverage on the ground on 120.55.

[Chris Higgins]

Regarding the seperation into New York, it looked about right at about 500' . If you look at the frame just as he shoots up at the airliner he does zoom it..at least slightly. We used to fly over the VFRs all of the time going into JFK and it didn't look any different to this one.

I know there is VHF on the ground at Taree and Port, but I think the bigger issue is having enough radar sites to assure seperation standards down to the latter stages of the approach. If Tobzalp says we only have radar down to around 4,000, that's not really seperating much.

[Quokka]

Dick,

There is only one area of RADAR coverage in WA... Perth. That coverage is shielded by the Darling Range, meaning that all of the country airstrips East of the Darling Range are NOT in RADAR coverage, not to mention all of the mining airstrips in WA where high frequency charter flights are struggling to cope with the mining boom.

Most of the airspace that is in the best RADAR coverage is taken by the military during weekdays and into the evening, that is, during the times when we experience the biggest traffic flows into, and out of, the Perth/Pearce/Jandakot Terminal Area.

No amount of procedural changes and training has fixed the traffic saturation problem... too many aircraft, no surveillance and poor frequency coverage in the Goldfields, the Pilbara and the Wheat Belt.

Dick, please ask the industry in WA and fix the problem, it's gone on for too long and there have been too many close calls.

Don't forget the West Coast... everyone else has.

[ferris]

Chris- It has been explained to Dick many times that you cannot just make some rule changes and have the "US system" in oz. It is quite possible that controllers in the states can provide much greater surveillance- of the nature Dick describes. It is due not just to radar coverage (although that is a major factor). Another is the sheer size of their entire industry. This has been explained to Dick over and over, but is studiously ignored. A controller in the states is looking at a screen (on average) set to a much smaller scale, because they are controlling smaller chunks of airspace (due to traffic volume). A controller in oz can control the same number of aircraft at any one time, but has his screen set on a much larger scale in order to achieve any sort of efficiency. The oz controller, looking at a screen set to, say, 400nm, is just not able to monitor terrain on approaches etc. On that sort of scale, the aircraft 'paints' appear about 3nm wide (roughly). To carve the airspace up in oz so that the controller could provide such close monitoring, would require a whole lot more controllers (just like they have in the US).
Yet another example of why non-experts shouldn't meddle. Especially when they ignore what they are told.
Dick would get a lot more respect if he did things that would actually benefit the industry (see Quokka's post above). Dick; procedural control is great in low traffic areas. WA is no longer a sleepy hollow. Considering the amount of money that state is awash with, and the money generated 'out there', surely that's a fight you could win (getting some radar)? There's a safety- and cost- benefit way bigger than fiddling with E. And winnable. Surely you agree?

[Jet_A_Knight]

Taree in NSW has coverage on the ground on 120.55.

I suppose you could call it that.:hmm:

But there's no way you could rely on that sort of intermittent (at best) or nil (the usual) reception for any comms with centre - let alone IFR clearances into Class E.

[Dick Smith]

Ferris, one part of the United States which has similar traffic densities to Australia is Alaska. It does not generally stratify its airspace – i.e. have high and low level sectors – for exactly the reason you describe. If the sector is too big, the air traffic controller’s radar has to be set on too large a scale for the ATC to be able to monitor approaches correctly.

Can you answer this? Between Sydney and Melbourne, why do we have stratified airspace, with a high level sector and low level sectors? Surely we could use the same number of controllers by not stratifying the airspace. This would reduce the sector size and allow us to provide a proper safety service to a place like Benalla.

By the way, I have listened to all of the comments in relation to the US versus the Australian system. However, most of this is tied up with resistance to change. There are undoubtedly some places in Australia which are similar to some places in the USA where they use Class E airspace to low levels.

I believe that as I pay for a full enroute ATC service when flying IFR in my aircraft, I should get just that. This is not the present system. Currently when I get to the place I really need ATC (i.e. at lower levels in the terminal area – doing an instrument approach) I am handed off to a “do it yourself” system where I have to become my own air traffic controller.

As I have said before, I do not believe that we should, or could, put Class E airspace in at every instrument approach. However I know that we can put Class E in to low levels in some enroute approach airspace. Safety will be improved and there will be no measurable increase in cost.

However under the present circumstances where air traffic controllers and people at Airservices have closed their minds and say it will not work, we obviously will never move anywhere.

[jumpuFOKKERjump]

Erm, where exactly in Alaska do they have traffic densities similar to between Sydney and Melbourne????? Stopped taking anything seriously after there.:p

Service Delivery Environment is keen to deliver even vaster G/E low level sectors. This will have the advantage of limiting the training burden of further NAS bastardry, as only a third of controllers will be affected instead of all of us. It will have another advantage of being able to directly measure the cost of any further NAS bastardry in the unlikely event any more is implemented, or even the more unlikely event that current service levels continue. Other than that, what is SDE for? Ummm, sorry I forgot.

[peuce]

Mr Smith, you said:
"I believe that as I pay for a full enroute ATC service when flying IFR in my aircraft, I should get just that. This is not the present system. Currently when I get to the place I really need ATC (i.e. at lower levels in the terminal area – doing an instrument approach) I am handed off to a “do it yourself” system where I have to become my own air traffic controller."

I think you are incorrect. You, in fact, pay sufficient to cover (in theory) the service that you currently receive. No more, no less.

You (and the flying community) can have any additional service you want ... as long as you are willing to pay an additional premium.

It has been stated over and over again, by those with accurate and current information, that what you are asking for... will cost extra in resources, training and salaries.

As much as you "believe" that it should not, or "believe" that it should be provided under the current cost regime, the facts, as provided by the majority of Professional Controllers and Administrators, do not support your beliefs.

However, if you wish to prove the majority wrong, you are welcome to provide an actual cost-benefit analysis that will support your argument.

Amatuerish statements such as "well, they do it in the United States" or "surely you agree" or "I believe it should be thus" ... just don't cut it any more in a modern business world, relying on minutely refined budgets, safety management systems and risk management models.

[the wizard of auz]

too many aircraft, no surveillance and poor frequency coverage in the Goldfields, the Pilbara
That statement is just purely erroneous. I operate in those areas and have done for quite some time. the current system works fine. I am unaware of any of the operators that fly in these regions that have a problem with self separation or frequency congestion. a bit of professionalism and a little two way coms makes for a system that both works and costs very little. I also, very rarely have any sort of frequency problems. there are the odd areas that have less than perfect coverage, but generally, it is very good coverage.

[homeoftheblizzard]

".....people at Airservices have closed their minds and say it will not work, we obviously will never move anywhere."

I agree what have the people at Airservices EVER done for us! Well apart from flextracking, RNP approaches, multi lateration trials, ADSB implementation, tailored arrivals, SATNAV development rolling out NAS, rolling back NAS, reduced staff, reduced costs, re-orged to be even more responsive to their customers, .......

thosed closed minded luddites......

[Dick Smith]

Peuce, what you are basically saying is that Airservices cannot become more efficient. In effect, that as a monopoly provider of services it has become as efficient as possible. This is unlikely.

Airservices operates control towers in the United States under a competitive environment, which gives about a 50% saving compared with the cost of the FAA running the control towers.

You would not accept any cost benefit study I did. That is why it would not be too difficult to provide some Class E airspace at a place like Port Macquarie or Proserpine, train the enroute controllers for the approach work and then check the additional cost.

If I were the CEO of Qantas at the time they were flying DC4s with 4 engines, and someone came along and said that twin engine DC9s would not only be more cost efficient, but safer, I would want to give it a go. If a large group of people were complaining that two engines would not be safe, I would at least want to follow what was happening overseas.

Our “do it yourself” system for IFR aircraft in the low levels is more akin to a 4 engine DC4 than a Boeing 777. The perception from uninformed people might be that the DC4 with 4 engines is safer than a twin engine aircraft, but we all know that this is not so. It is the same with airspace. The perception of extra costs and no need for the extra safety could be just that – a perception.

I know that many of the older pilots prefer to have a “do it yourself” radio-arranged separation environment when in cloud, rather than using air traffic control and radar. That is because these pilots believe that they will never make an error which results in a controlled flight into terrain – therefore they do not need the back up of radar and ATC.

Evidence in recent years has shown that professional pilots do make errors – just like everyone else – and if radar is available and used correctly there is a chance that it could reduce the likelihood of controlled flight into terrain accidents.

It is not much use having the radar (as we do in many of our mountainous areas) if we do not have a procedure that informs the air traffic controller whether the pilot is in cloud or visual.

[gaunty]

Here is an interesting article, I learnt a fair bit from it and I'm sure we can all take a lesson from it here.
Ozbusdriver suggested in another thread that I was an aquired taste, maybe so but if you don't think outside the square you stay there. I guess if you do, and in aviation terms you cannot be assured of a more positive outcome than prior you must retreat to what you know and experience has shown is safe and achievable. So who actually owns this monkey, read on?

Monkey Management

Imagine one day that you are walking down the hallway at your organization, and a subordinate approaches you with a problem about one of his subordinates. "I cannot believe how Jane is acting toward our customers. She is curt, unfriendly and sometimes downright difficult. I have told her several times that her behavior is just not acceptable, but it doesn't seem to help. Can you visit with her and see if she takes it better from you?"

As a manager, you have a number of choices. Which is the right choice for you, for the supervisor, and for Jane?

In a classic article in the Harvard Business Review in 1974, authors William Oncken, Jr., and Donald L. Wass offer a theoretical framework for seeing this situation in its true light and making the right decision. In the article "Who's Got the Monkey?" the authors tell the tale of an overburdened manager who allows his employees to delegate upward. When a manager takes an unsolved problem from his subordinates, he is allowing a figurative monkey to leap from the employee's back to his back. When a manager has too many monkeys, he is increasing his own load, failing to develop his subordinates, and probably not solving the problems effectively in the final analysis.

Oncken and Wass offer a well defined basic law for managing monkeys. It is:


At no time while I am helping you will your problem become my problem. The instant your problem becomes mine, you will no longer have a problem. I cannot help someone who hasn't got a problem. You may ask my help at any appointed time, and we will make a joint determination of what the next move will be and who will make it.
Refusing to accept problems that subordinates try to delegate upward, and instead giving them opportunities to meet with you to "feed the monkey" is the best choice for both the monkey and for its keeper. The employee who is closest to the problem usually has the knowledge and skill to solve the problem, if empowered to do so. Consultations with the manager will serve to broaden perspective and offer new ways of seeing the problem. And as the employee feeds and eventually solves the problem, he or she learns important skills that make them more valuable to the organization and to the managers.

In addition to the law of monkey management, the authors list six rules of managing monkeys that are instructive to managers. These include:

1. Monkeys should be fed or shot. No one likes the consequences of a starving monkey. They tend to be very disagreeable and squeal and raise a ruckus. Monkeys must be fed periodically; in this analogy, the problem must be dealt with between the manager and the employee with the problem on a regular basis. If the monkey can be shot (the problem solved quickly), then feeding times are not necessary.

2. Every monkey should have an assigned next feeding time and a degree of initiative. After a feeding session, the manager should select an appropriate time for the next feeding and should have a number of action steps for the employee to take. "Can we meet next Tuesday at 10:30 a.m. to see how things are going and what we should do next?"

3. The monkey population should be kept below the maximum number that the manager has time to feed. The authors suggest that it should take 15 minutes to feed a monkey, and that managers should keep the list of problems that are in various stages of solution at a manageable number.

4. Monkeys should fed by appointment only. Allowing employees to bring problems to you on their timetable increases the chances that the monkey will move from the employee to the manager. By setting specific times for addressing the problem, managers empower employees to make interim decisions about the problem, and still report back.

5. Monkey feeding appointments may be rescheduled but never indefinitely postponed. Either party, the manager or the subordinate, may reschedule a feeding appointment for any reason, but it must be scheduled to a specific time to avoid losing track of the monkey.

6. Monkeys shall be fed face to face or by telephone, but not in writing. Holding feeding sessions via e-mail or memo transfers the monkey to the manager. An employee can pass the monkey to the manager by simply requesting a response. Feedings that take place in person or on the phone require the monkey to remain with the employee unless the supervisor takes an affirmative step to take it.


Proper delegation skills, properly applied as suggested in this creative approach, can help managers better solve problems and develop their employees' problem solving skills. Visualizing each problem as a monkey that is impatient and noisy can help managers see problems as they really are and address them in the best possible way. Beware of the monkeys that may come into your life today!

[Chris Higgins]

Dick,

They're not disputing the ability of radar to provide service and reduce the possibility of an error chain producing an accident. They're worried about cost.
Nobody can dispute the value of radar, you have to prove in cost analysis that it would work and be affordable in the way you describe.

In the case of Port Macquarie, you would disappear as soon as you went below Middle Brother Mountain, just South of your old private strip at Kew.

The value of radar seperation would be lost during the approach phase of flight.
Are you suggesting we use build radar repeating stations? Use satelites? Open new radar rooms and primary radar facilities? I don't know if I quite follow you on this idea. I like the ADSB one better.

[Dick Smith]

Chris, I just don’t understand it. When something can simply be done with existing equipment at no measurable cost, you start talking about ADS-B – a system which is going to cost tens of millions of dollars to install and hasn’t even yet been certified for GA aircraft at an affordable price.

In the case of Port Macquarie and Middle Brother Mountain, if you look at the Runway 03 RNAV approach, it is aligned directly over Middle Brother Mountain. An aircraft on arrival should not go below 4,100 feet until 12.4 miles from the missed approach point – which is close to the aerodrome. It doesn’t require rocket science to have the existing radar system set up so that an alarm is enabled if an aircraft goes below this altitude when outside the distance.

At the present time the approach is in uncontrolled airspace. The alarm cannot be enabled because the air traffic controller would not know if the aircraft was in IMC or VMC.

This is a situation where, with proper use of the radar, we could improve safety at no measurable cost. By the look of it, the changes won’t happen until we have a similar accident at Port Macquarie to the one at Lockhart River.

As I’ve said, we could either put in Class E airspace to a lower level at a place like Port Macquarie, or write better procedures for operations in Class G when under radar surveillance to “close the loop” – and keep the air traffic controller responsible for advising the pilot not to descend below the minimum radar altitude until the pilot reports visual. It’s not really rocket science and doesn’t require a $100+ million ADS-B system, which probably won’t cover the area around Middle Brother Mountain any better than the existing radar system!

[J430]

Dick, Chris,

reading the above brought back my thoughts of a year or so ago about ADSB and its potential for better safety levels on IFR approaches into regional airports such as Lockhart River in IMC. Yes I know some will be saying that now rules require EGPWS for a/c like the metro, but what about all the other charter, private, corporate/government or RFDS or whoever that do not have EGPWS anyway.

ADSB should be implimented, and the cost of reducing old enroute radar etc numbers be used to subsidise its roll out. Dont start on the issue of airlines etc etc......

Now assuming we get the whole fleet 100% ADSB fitted, and all the sites like Lockhart River, Longreach, and Port Macquarie, and Benalla and many other places justifying ADSB ground station coverage, we now have the data to use for an enhanced radar / ADSB ATC system.

So , when any aircraft is on an IFR plan into Karumba or where ever, the ATC software can monitor its progress wrt to traffic and or terrain quite effectively. All it takes is software (may not be easy today) but its possible. If the pilot advises he is in IMC he gets "watched" all the way to the ground. If he is in VMC he can be given the less attention in a manner like now for class G.

The point is and I am not an ATC expert, is that the potential for greater protection at little extra cost once ADSB is introduced is immence and this is why it should be followed through with all seriousness.

J:ok:

[Quokka]

J430, you are correct.

The software can be programmed to monitor the progress of the flight in relation to tolerances applied to the track of the aircraft as defined in the Flight Plan as it was submitted and any subsequent amendments advised to the controller by radio. It obviously cannot read the mind of the pilot.

And, it will only work with ADS-B.... not with RADAR.

Contrary to the advice given by Dick Smith, RADAR is not as accurate as ADS-B and is in no way sufficiently accurate to enable monitoring of the displayed track on the screen to the commencement of the instrument approach.

Why, because RADAR is NOT accurate. RADAR accuracy diminishes significantly with range at lower levels (ie, the bottom of the RADAR beam is higher from the ground the further away from the RADAR site and the bottom of the RADAR beam is a "grey" zone, not a defined transition). Intermittent RADAR returns with display errors appear on the screen, if at all. Large tolerances are applied to the displayed track when used by the controller due to the potential errors in the information gained by the RADAR. These tolerances are too large to enable accurate monitoring of the aircrafts flight path to the degree required in Dick's proposal.


RADAR is only accurate at ranges close to the RADAR site. Accuracy diminishes significantly with range.

ADS-B is accurate.

ADS-B is more accurate than RADAR.

ADS-B accuracy does not diminish with range.

ADS-B will work with Dick's proposal.

RADAR will not.

[Howard Hughes]

The point is and I am not an ATC expert, is that the potential for greater protection at little extra cost once ADSB is introduced is immence and this is why it should be followed through with all seriousness.
You may not be an ATC 'expert', but you can see what is needed, nice work J-430, I agree wholeheartedly! :ok:

[Blockla]

In effect, that as a monopoly provider of services it has become as efficient as possible. This is unlikely.Why is it so difficult to believe; they are always looking at ways to reduce costs, I'm sure you would agree. Because of the US Towers exercise = we must be less efficient than the FAA; perhaps it actually demonstrates that we are actually efficient here in sleepy hollow; or perhaps the whole thing is a financial disaster?Class G when under radar surveillance to “close the loop” – and keep the air traffic controller responsible for advising the pilot not to descend below the minimum radar altitude until the pilot reports visual. All this extra functionality without effecting cost; I’m sure you would agree that is just a load of bunkum.

Extra cost to industry in IFR to IFR delay without any change in VFR protection combined with extra ATC resources to provide all of this. Outside a surveillance environment it is not practical to put the MSA responsibilities on ATC; which could create confusion about when it is and isn’t provided; it’s a pilot issue; leave it there; or establish ‘real’ ATC services not this half pregnant Class E rubbish; but that is probably not cost effective for the increase in safety. Think of all the different possibilities for MSA when you start including all the RNAV approach types, GPS NPA, RNP, RNP-AR etc. the ATCs have a system with multiple workarounds add extra stuff to do; where is a mistake most likely to occur? The pilot flying the approach with the plate/FMS loaded or the ATC ‘picking’ a level relevant to the location and type of approach?

So have you actually increased safety or decreased it whilst potentially increasing cost?

[CaptainMidnight]

I just don’t understand it. When something can simply be done with existing equipment at no measurable costThis is a situation where, with proper use of the radar, we could improve safety at no measurable cost.operations in Class G when under radar surveillance to “close the loop” – and keep the air traffic controller responsible for advising the pilot not to descend below the minimum radar altitude until the pilot reports visual.I think these say it all.

Clearly an increase in ATC sectors, staff and facilities would be required for ATCs to closely monitor aircraft conducting an instrument approach (possibly at multiple aerodromes simultaneously with typical widespread bad WX) while still providing services to all their other aircraft. In addition, Quokka has outlined well the inappropriatness of attempting to use radar for this, so an alternative method would need to be implemented, but still require the ATC resources to monitor approaches.

Your constant failure to listen to those with direct experience, knowledge and expertise - dismissing their input when it differs from your opinion as resistance to change - reaffirms the waste of time it is to engage in debate here, going over the same issues time and time again.

[J430]

but still require the ATC resources to monitor approaches.

Sadly after talking with an ATC parent at my kids school, they are so understaffed now, its surprising we get any service at all now. :eek:

J:ok:

[Chris Higgins]

Dick.

I think we all want the same thing here; the ability of ATC to provide tracking information and collision avoidance. I also share your concerns about cost and going through an enormous change burden on the entire industry. Perhaps this is the reason we should be doing it though...airspace is still growing, even general aviation deliveries are back up, it will only get more expensive the longer we put it off.

Nobody seems to be taking training seriously anywhere right now, but somewhere along the line we need to address the "Pavlovian School of Aeronautics" syndrome that is plaguing us. Recently I have seen some really crappy airmanship going on. Nowhere is the value of ATC more valuable than to make up for this obvious shortfall.

[Dog One]

Could you explain to me how E airspace to a low level can be any safer than G airspace, where you are seperated from IFR aircraft, but are not seperated or made aware of VFR traffic. Without radar coverage,I cannot see how E airspace would be safer, as your safety is reliant upon the lowest common denominator, ie a VFR aircraft. Your safety levelwould increase if vFR aircraft were required to get a clearance to enter E airspace, which means they would then be notified as traffic. Whilst I have TCAS to provide some protection whilst on descent, it is the last protection and reliant on the VFR aircraft having a servicable transponder and it being switched on. What worries me, is the turbine commuter or RFDS King Air behind me, also decending at 250 kts,which do not have TCAS as the final protection against unnotified VFR traffic.

[Jerricho]

Now we sit and wait for a certain individual to start the "ADS-B is sooooo bad coz it can have extra traffic added by some bad guy on the ground with a computer..........." :rolleyes:

[Chris Higgins]

Jerricho,

Not a completely unjustified concern... and not a completely impossible problem to fix with encryption technologies perhaps? We have to address all of the concerns and national security is one of them.
Back on the limitations of radar...

Do you guys remember that Cessna 210 that went in over the Barrington Tops? It's rego was VH-MDX. Did they ever find the wreck? It was thought that the radar scale at that time was so bad that the last known contact could have placed it anywhere within quite a number of square miles.

[Jerricho]

No Chris, not a completely unjustified concern. However, being the smart guy you are, how many ways can you think of screwing up the present system with the use of a simple radio? Holy sh*t. Stop press...........you can render a busy terminal frequency useless just by using a radio? To attempt to blatently grab headlines (and constantly) by waving a big scare flag as was done with this ADS-B spoofing thing is sensationalism some of the British trash-mags would be proud of.

[Chris Higgins]

Very good point Jerricho, and I'm sorry to hear that this is your perception of Mr Smith. I hold a slightly different view of him; that he is very passionate about his points of view and yes, he does use his fame and fortune to spread his beliefs. There's certainly nothing wrong with that.

Back on track....

We all realise that the present system has many problems and all that we need to do to seal this deal with Dick Smith and the regulators is to prove that these problems are able to be fixed and at reasonable speed and cost.

Mr Smith has outlined his concerns about European versus US versions of ADSB in what seems to be a technological race between closely competing products for user acceptance. His argument has merit..we don't want to buy a lemon; one that the rest of the world wont be using and has no manufacturer support. That seems to be getting resolved as more research about cost and availability is being shared, even on this forum.

Security concerns with technology are with us everytime we turn on the computer. It's a real concern and one that must be addressed to responsibly move forward.

It seems popular to turn these forums into a bashing session. The time has come to put down the weapons and yes; to stop the grand-standing and get to work.

There are great number of lives that can be saved in the next 20 years by being proactive on these initiatives. Healthy concern about direction is a good thing, not a bad thing.

[Jerricho]

Ah Mr Higgins, you highlight the very crux of my (and others) disdain of many points that are thrust into the public limelight as gospel and fact........they are beliefs not necessarily based on facts.

I have pointed out several times just how Class E airspace is actually used in North America. Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to fit into "a belief", and discussion never ensues. A poster here pointed out that radar coverage in the Benalla isn't great........the retort is "no evidence is given on why En-Rooter claimed so". How about the mere fact En-Rooter is a licenced Air Traffic Controller (as was identified early in the topic). I think I know who is qualified to make a statement like that. We then digress again into tired old arguments/beliefs again that we have all heard time and time again

Radar=good, ADS-B=bad
Class E = good, contollers = bad.
Number of controllers in US = heaps, number of bad lazy, change resistant controllers in Australia = not so many

It's a broken record being put on the turntable for another spin. And you're right, it turns into negativity and sledging, and is counterproductive.

I do however applaud with all my heart your observations regarding training and standards and that word "airmanship" (my little Medevac scenario is an excellent example of that one). :ok:

[Spodman]

Could you explain to me how E airspace to a low level can be any safer than G airspace, where you are seperated from IFR aircraft, but are not seperated or made aware of VFR traffic.I've seen this posted a heap of times and don't see its relevance. ATC treat VFR exactly the same in E airspace as G. IFR aircraft receive exactly the same information about VFR aircraft in E airspace as G. Whether there is radar coverage or not in a particular piece of airspace in the case of a VFR confliction with an IFR aircraft there would be no change in the risk of collision between the two if it were G or E airspace. It is the same risk, it is not a factor in a choice of airspace classification between G & E.

Replacing C airspace with E? That is something different, an obvious increase in risk, but probably still safe enough in enroute airspace. Most on this forum do not seem to agree.

The only possible safety benefit for E replacing G is where IFR aircraft arrange their own separation with each other and with the ground. Dick's whole message is that pilots are not capable of doing this unless visual, so until they do they must get an ATC service. Bewdy, bring it on. Benefit is full IFR separation, cost is, ....erm, full IFR separation.

G: "ABC taxying Arglebargle" "ABC, traffic is DEF 10 nm east, on descent."

E: "ABC taxying Arglebargle" "ABC, unable clearance, traffic is DEF 10 NM east, for a VOR approach."

I had two aircraft pass south of Mildura today, one at 41 DME, the other 43. "We're well clear," said one. Have to wait till ATC had 10 DME in E airspace, have to wait 10 minutes if there was no DME:yuk:

[En-Rooter]

Unfortunately Dick is surrounded by sycophants who agree with everything he says and tell him what he wants to hear:hmm:

I think one poster pointed out that the ATSB radar plot may not have been what the controller saw. No reply to that post!

It doesn't matter how many times the facts are pointed out to Dick, he just WILL NOT LISTEN:ugh:

[Creampuff]

A simple question for the ATCers:

Is the existing TAAATS system capable of reliably and accurately setting off an alarm if - to use Dick's example - any aircraft with any IFR code descends below 4,100 more than 12.4 miles from PMQ? Or let's say below 4,500 more than 13 miles from PMQ?

Yes or no. I get the impression from earlier posts, that the answer is 'no'.
Dick: if the answer is 'no', I'm afraid your reasoning is specious. You cannot achieve the outcome you suggest can be achieved, unless someone spends money on more technology to get the necessary reliability and accuracy of automatic systems, or money on more controllers to watch smaller chunks of airspace, or both.

If the answer is 'yes', why aren't those alarms set up?

I recall the same issue arose with respect to Benalla.

[Quokka]

The answer is no.

Why.... "reliably" = no "accurately = no

TAAATS + RADAR = not possible.

TAAATS + continental ADS-B coverage = possible.


To achieve Dick's aim would require the following...


Complete the roll-out of the Low-Level ADS-B stations throughout Australia, including the additional supplementary stations that were planned for installation if sufficient funds were left in the budget. Ensure continental ADS-B coverage is achieved.

Employ sufficient controllers to replace the current shortage plus an additional number to provide the extra service planned by Dick, Class E down to 5000FT.

Train all the controllers (this takes several months due to staff shortages) in the use of ADS-B with the current airspace structure.

Allow a period of six months after training to enable the controllers to practise and consolidate their knowledge and application of techniques, standards and phraseologies associated with the use of ADS-B using the current airspace structure.

Train all the controllers in the additional Class E service provision using the proposed changes to the airspace structure (ie. ATC simulator exercises that familiarise the controller with the likely IFR/IFR conflicts and separation specific to the new Class E airspace that they will be responsible for).

Multiple software upgrades to the TAAATS system at each stage.



It can be achieved efficiently and safely...

...not with RADAR but with ADS-B...

...not with the current surveillance coverage but with continental ADS-B coverage...

...and not without a significant increase in the number of Air Traffic Controllers.

[CaptainMidnight]

We all realise that the present system has many problems

That is a matter of opinion.

I believe I can safely say that the widespread industry view here is that any airspace and related problems are the direct result of implementing changes of questionable benefit - cost and safety - that were unsupported, unpopular and forced upon it.and all that we need to do to seal this deal with Dick Smith and the regulators That is certainly NOT all we need to do, and I would have thought you would have noticed here over the years his views vs. those you may loosely refer to as "regulators" (ASA CASA) are usually diametrically opposite :)

And well said, Quokka - spot on.

[J430]

Quokka
I do believe much of what you have said I commented on about 18 months ago.............and I was shouted down:ugh:
ADSB if implimented properly and with decent staff levels (which we dont seem to have anyway) should be financially viable and provide better levels of coverage and safety.
I can see it, several others here can see it, so what do we need to do to sell the concept to those who need convincing? Maybe Quokka and HH and myslef can get together and make something happen apart from posting here for the next few years...:ugh:
J:ok:

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

.. wheat from chaff
.
J .... the silent majority see it .. as do the those who 'own' the decisions .. the pollies do not want others running the agenda though ... it is particularly galling for them when they appear petty and bereft of effective solutions! :suspect:
.. motherhood statements do not cut it any more with the general populous! .. the information age has ensured that anyone with an interest in a particular matter has all the info and resources they need at their keyboard finger tips to become informed, voice an opinion and influence change! …. tis true that opinions are like political election promises, plenty of them, most could be described as ‘non-core’ and never materialise post poll … the ones that do, generally involve political expediency and/or no defendable reason not to adopt policy X ... the latter is not so easy for pollies though, often the WBP proposals that have been publicly scrutinised through wide peer review, come not from them, but from within an industry! … don’t they hate not coming up with the goods on their own! := … governments cannot stomach others being able to collectively think for themselves in a ‘true’ democracy … no .. that would give rise to empowering people to use ‘considered’ free speech more often! :p
.
Thankfully, there are many grass roots individuals and groups prepared to have open discussions when decisions are afoot! …. once bitten twice shy would seem to be a widely held view amongst our community when it comes to received wisdom from those with a dubious track record of decision making! …motherhood statements do not cut it any more with the general populous! … nor do repeats of the same discussion! … people know what is fact and what is self interested grand standing .. repeating garbage over and over again just further clarifies and galvanises the opinions of interested parties ... I guess that’s why pollies, and dare I say it some of the ‘traditional media’ are also uncomfortable with ‘two way’ discussions like these …no more one way received wisdom!
.
..on the subject ... 2c
.
.. a variance to ICAO and allow class D procedures (where surveillance exists and traffic warrants) in regional terminal and enroute airspace above A045 (or higher where WamLAT/ADS-B, terrain and approach commencement altitudes warrant) up to A105??
.
.. a variance to ICAO that enables VFR to cross/enter D once in receipt of either an airways clearance OR an acknowledgement from ATC … in other words, all that VFR need do is say ‘I’m here, going there, climbing/descending/maintaining X’ .. and unless they hear no reply or ‘remain OCTA’ they continue as intended or cleared.
.
- IFR/IFR Separation (defined minimum separation standards)
- IFR/VFR Segregation (traffic information or ‘separation’ as necessary dependant on traffic disposition and frequency loading)
- IFR have ATC protection from VFR
- VFR have ATC assistance for segregation and traffic information (workload permitting)
- ATC have an ability to manage VFR traffic levels for IFR and VFR protection
- Free for VFR
- Transponder mandatory in CTA above A045 (same as E)
.
.. best of all:-
.
- Maps need only define CTA and OCTA!
- CTA areas need only include line boundaries with the appropriate ATC freq to monitor (OCTA) or call (CTA) with a simple (S) after the freq to denote surveillance services, therefore removing pilot confusion surrounding Centre/Tower procedural and surveillance service provision differences
- VFR will (in all CTA cases) receive either separation, segregation or traffic information as appropriate (as determined by ATC at the time) .. so all they need to do in CTA is listen for traffic info and look for other VFR!
- IFR will receive separation OR segregation with traffic information on VFR .. so all they need to do is comply with the clearance and listen for traffic information!
- CTA airspace classification becomes transparent to pilots dramatically reducing the need to define, educate and understand different classes of CTA service to both IFR and VFR! …. Simplicity!
.
.. the only difference between this arrangement and the sort of utopia Dick describes is VFR using a radio in a very basic way. By doing so, giving ATC the ability to provide an appropriate service to ALL in CTA?
.
… in areas where CTA is warranted ... is it too much to expect VFR to be able to use a radio for the benefit of themselves, their pax, the IFR and their pax and the population centres on the surface below them? :ugh:
..
In the not so distant future … CTA and OCTA will become much more comfortable for all with ADS-B (… as long as all traffic is on the same wavelength so to speak with no pun intended :hmm: )!
.
… so go on:-
- tell us why it won’t work
- tell us why it is not compatible with WBP
.
…and if so:-
- tell us why ‘ICAO’ E is safer, more cost effective and VFR friendly!
.
… it might be time for some to dust off their exit strategy’s! ….. signal spoofing has already been done unsuccessfully … so don’t use that one again Plse! :p :E

[Jerricho]

One more time for the people down the back ;)

motherhood statements do not cut it any more with the general populous!

:D