Indonesian B737 runway overrun/crash [Archive]

MOCA

7th Mar 2007, 01:30

JAKARTA, March 7 (Reuters) - A jet from Indonesia's state
carrier Garuda crashed and burst into flames on landing at
Yogyakarta airport on Wednesday morning with 140 passengers and
crew on board, according to Garuda officials.
Casualties were not immediately clear, but survivors said
many people had escaped the burning plane.
"The manifest shows 133 passengers and we have seven active
crew on board," a Garuda spokeswoman told Reuters.
Australian media said the plane's passengers included
Australian journalists and diplomatic staff. The journalists
had been covering a visit to Indonesia by Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer, who was not on the plane but had been
expected in Yogyakarta later in the day.
"It happened when it overshot beyond the runway and burst
into flames," Yogyakarta provincial secretary Bambang Susanto
told Reuters through texted messages.
"... we know that there are passengers being treated at the
air force hospital," he added. Elshinta news radio said 16
injured people had been taken to hospital.
"The plane overshot the runway during landing and hit the
airport fences," Julianto, one of the survivors, told Metro TV
"I was sitting at the back of the plane and people started
to jump out of the plane after that. Some even jumped into the
paddy field," he said.
The plane's fuselage was burned to a twisted shell, and
thick white smoke spewed from the wreckage.
State news agency Antara said the flight number was GA-200,
which would be a Jakarta to Yogyakarta flight that is generally
using a Boeing 737.
Indonesia has suffered from a string of transport accidents
in recent months, including an Adam Air plane that disappeared
in January with 102 passengers and crew on board, and a ferry
sinking in late December in which hundreds died.

REUTERS

YesTAM

7th Mar 2007, 02:59

Spokesman for Indonesian President on ABC (Australia) says 91 apparently rescued.

strangers_in_thenet

7th Mar 2007, 03:52

I pick this from websites. hope this usefull 1.

Pusat Krisis
Sementara itu, Kepala Komunikasi Perusahaan Garuda Indonesia, Pujobroto menyatakan, pesawat GA 200 itu berpenumpang 133 orang dengan rincian 120 orang kelas ekonomi dan 13 kelas bisnis. "Nomor register pesawat adalah PK-GZC dan diterbangkan oleh Kapten Pilot Marwoto Komar," katanya.
Garuda, katanya, sudah membentuk pusat krisis di lobi Kantor Pusat Garuda Indonesia di Jl. Medan Merdeka Selatan Nomor 13 dengan nomor telepon yang bisa dihubungi adalah
062-021-2311393,
062-021-2311801 extension line 7205. Pujobroto juga belum bisa memastikan, dari 133 penumpang tersebut yang selamat atau meninggal. "Kami juga terus berkoordinasi dan mendata," kata Pujobroto. Pihaknya, kata Pujobroto, baru menerima laporan bahwa dari 133 orang penumpang tersebut, baru 76 penumpang yang bisa dievakuasi ke rumah sakit di sekitar Bandara Adi Sucipto.

YesTAM

7th Mar 2007, 04:36

ABC is now reporting 49 confirmed dead, 92 alive and/or injured. Condolences to all the families.

India Four Two

7th Mar 2007, 05:02

The emergency numbers quoted above do not appear to be correct for IDD dialling.

They probably should be:

IDD prefix (011 for NA, 00 elsewhere)

and then 6221 2311393
or 6221 2311801 Ext 7205

visibility3miles

7th Mar 2007, 05:08

Excerpts from an AP story by CHRIS BRUMMITT, Associated Press Writer:

The Garuda airlines jet shook violently as it prepared to land and then overshot the runway, hitting fences and slamming into a rice field shortly before 7 a.m., survivors said.

Many passengers escaped and rescuers battled flames to reach those trapped inside, said Capt. Ari Sapari, operations director of national carrier Garuda. The blaze, which gutted the aircraft and sent black smoke billowing into the air, took two hours to put out.

Howard said Indonesian officials had confirmed 49 deaths, though it was not clear where that information came from.

Laras Widhyo, from Garuda's Yogyakarta office, said at least 22 were killed and 92 were being treated at three hospitals, some with broken bones and burns. He said some passengers were thought to have walked away from the accident, making it difficult to confirm the death toll.

The state-owned airline said that 140 passengers and crew were on board. Howard said around 10 Australians were aboard the plane, but he could not confirm any Australian deaths.

The Australians on board were diplomatic staff and journalists who were traveling from the capital, Jakarta, ahead of Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer and Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock, who had been due to attend a function later Wednesday. Neither official was aboard the stricken plane.

There was no immediate word on what sparked the blaze. Survivors said it began at the front the plane before engulfing the aircraft.

"Before the plane landed it was shaking. Suddenly there was smoke inside the fuselage, it hit the runway and then it landed in a rice field," local Islamic leader Dien Syamsudin told El-Shinta. "I saw a foreigner. His clothes were on fire and I jumped from the emergency exit. Thank God I survived."...

...Another survivor told local TV station RCTI TV that "before landing I felt the plane shake strongly."

"We overshot the runway, then I heard the sound of an explosion and ran through an emergency exit," continued passenger Muhammad Dimyati. "I believe many passengers remained trapped on board."

SeniorDispatcher

7th Mar 2007, 06:16

More pictures at:

http://www.indoflyer.net/indoforum/tm.asp?m=116617&mpage=7

May take a little long to load...

XPMorten

7th Mar 2007, 06:31

Aircraft history,

http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b737-25664.htm

M

Ex FSO GRIFFO

7th Mar 2007, 06:33

From the Vision so far,

I am unable to make out the cockpit area - the forward fuselage seems to be 'missing' from just forward of the forward door - does anybody know if the crew made it out of there?

RoyHudd

7th Mar 2007, 06:54

Time for IATA to have a close examination....the recent record is abominable, without doubt.No possibility of coincidence, I am sure.

I wonder who is supposed to regulate Air Safety within Indonesia. Any ideas?

And do IFALPA have any involvement with their colleagues in that country?

Not trying to stir it here, just wondering what can be done, short of grounding the carriers.

pumping iron

7th Mar 2007, 07:40

JAKARTA : At least 49 people were killed when an Indonesian plane burst into flames upon landing in the central city of Yogyakarta on Wednesday, according to a provincial spokesman.

Witnesses said the front wheel of the Garuda Indonesia plane burst as it touched down, causing flames to shoot into the air and triggering a series of explosions which sent the aircraft skidding off the runway.

Australian diplomats and journalists covering Foreign Minister Alexander Downer's visit to Indonesia were among those on the flight from the capital Jakarta.

Downer was not on board, Australian officials confirmed.

"I saw many bodies, dozens of bodies badly burnt near the exit," Captain Yos Bintoro, an airport official, told Elshinta radio. "I saw people dead in the cockpit," he added.

Television pictures showed firefighters battling giant flames and thick smoke spewing from the broken fuselage as it lay smouldering in the grass off the end of the runway.

The tailfin bearing the blue colours of Garuda, Indonesia's national carrier, was almost sheared off.

Transport Minister Hatta Rajasa told Metro TV station that the plane was carrying 133 passengers and there were 76 confirmed survivors.

Reports said seven crew were also on board.

The incident is just the latest in a series of crashes and safety scares involving Indonesian airliners which have forced the government to set up a team to urgently improve transport safety.

"I was sleeping then the plane slammed twice and I heard people screaming. It was dark and there was smoke everywhere. I saw many passengers hurt," said Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of Indonesian Muslim movement Muhammadiyah, who was on the plane.

"I was sitting not far from the emergency door. I felt someone guide me to the right," he said. "There were many people inside the plane when I got out."

Ngadiman, a witness to the accident, told the detikcom news website: "The front wheel burst, then there was an explosion from the front and then the rear wheels burnt as well."

Dozens of injured people were taken to hospital.

"16 people were brought into the hospital, with injuries ranging from bad to minor," Paulus, from the Panti Rini hospital, told ElShinta.

Around 50 injured people had been taken to a separate, air force hospital near the airport, a Metro TV report said.

One of the injured is a foreign correspondent from the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper and was being operated on, said Widodo, a doctor at Sarjito Hospital.

The Australians on the aircraft included one foreign affairs department official, a federal policeman and "at least five media representatives", Sky television reported from Canberra.

It was believed some of the Australians had survived, but further details were not available, Sky said.

The Japanese government said it believed at least two Japanese nationals were on board.

The city of Yogyakarta, which lies 450 kilometres (280 miles) southeast of Jakarta, is renowned as the centre of classical Javanese art and culture.

Indonesia's flight safety record has come under renewed scrutiny since an Adam Air Boeing 737-400 with 102 people on board crashed into the sea off the island of Sulawesi on New Year's Day with no survivors.

Last Friday a Boeing 737-200 operated by local Indonesian carrier Merpati Nusantara was forced to make an emergency landing on Batam Island after the pilot reported a dangerous oil leak. - AFP/c

strangers_in_thenet

7th Mar 2007, 07:45

07 March 15.14 WIB, from http://www.republika.co.id/online_detail.asp?id=285316&kat_id=23

Passengers were injuried in Panti Rapih Yogyakarta Hospital, Korban yang dirawat , dan sebagian diperbolehkan pulang terdiri;
1. Hendi Yuniarsa (L/30) Lebak Bulus (Karyawan BCA Finance) pulang (Arta Hotel)
2. Abdul Haris (L/24) Tangerang (Karyawan BCA Finance) pulang (Arta Hotel)
3. Yulita (P/24) Wonosari (Karyawan BCA Finance) pulang (Arta Hotel)
4. Iswanto (L/27) Depok (Saphir Yogyakarta) pulang
5. Yulia Kusuma (P/30) Cijantung inap CB5/523
6. Asti Peranginangin (P/54) Pondok Labu, Jakarta Timur
7. Saiful Rahmat (L/37) Tangerang inap CB5/515
8. Suparo (L/50) Bekasi rawat jalan (Quality Hotel)
9. Soni Indarto (L/40) PT Sari Husada inap E61/108B
10.Jimmi Kurnia (L/45) Kemayoran
11.Ami Widiastuti (P/27) Bintaro rujukan RS Panti Rini
12.Purwoko Joko P (L/32) Wukirsari Cangkringan Sleman rawat jalan
13.Papip M (P/25) Karyawan BCA Finance pulang (Arta Hotel)
14.I Ketutu Putra E (L/42) Wisma MM UGM inap MP15 VIP
15.Susiyanti (P/45) Permata Hijau, Jaksel inap MP14 VIP
16.Ti Wan Li (L/46) Permata Hijau, Jaksel inap MP14 VIP
17.Nunik Savitri (P/30) Bogor (PT. Sari Husada)
18.Ashari Mekta (L/46) Cimanggis inap CB6/615
19.Riil Pasaribu (L/47) Magelang
20.Reni Gonowati (P/46) Terban
21.Kenji Yamada (L/31) Jepang
22.Tunggul Yogi (L/41) Candigebang, Sleman
Passengers injuries in Bethesda Yogyakarta Hospital;
1. Adrianus (L/40) Cimanggis Ruang Shinta 5
2. Agus Sutrisno (L/37) Bekasi
3. Aji Munawar (L/34) Pontianak Anggrek 5
4. Arif Budiman (L/37) Serpong, Tangerang pulang
5. Budiyarti (P/40) PuloGadung Anggrek
6. Djohan Tanuwidjaja (L/40) Tangerang
7. H. Parlindungan Lubis(L/49) Pekanbaru
8. Firdaus (L/42) Jakarta Selatan Petronella
9. Francis Kartika Dewi (P/26) Ciputat Galilea 413
10.I Wayan Joko Astina (L/52) Sidoarjo Jasmine 3
11.Ida Wardani (P/39) Bekasi Jasmine 6
12.Indri Prastanti (P/26) Lebak Bulus
13.Ir. Gunawan Lucito (L/51) Duren Sawit Srikandi 1
14.Ito Shinji (L/45) PT. Sony Indonesia Jakarta pulang
15.Jimmi Maniar Nadadap (L/30) Kebayoran Lama Galileo 310
16.Juli Astuti (P/38) Cibubur, Bekasi Anggrek
17.Ketut Sunadi (L/50) BPN Jakarta Pusat Bakung 4
18.Mahfud Hadi Wijaya (L/57) Tebet (pulang)
19.Michel Hatton (L/47) Canberra(Staff Menlu Australia)
20.Nurgum Batubara (P/55) Tanjung Priok (pulang)
21.Petrus Cahyadi (L/32) Jakarta Utara
22.Poppi Mahfud (P/56) Wirobrajan
23.Reza Badri (L/32) Pondok Bambu
24.Ridwan Anthony S (L/43) Duren Sawit (pulang)
25.Roli Irawan (L/44) BPN Jaktim
26.Ronald Stefanus Gunawan (L/32) IMC Tebet Barat, Jakarta
27.Ruth Meigy Panggabean (P/30) Jakarta Pusat (Petronela)
28.Santi Hendara (P/30) Pontianak (Petronela)
29.Slamet (L/29) Sarihusada Yogyakarta Anggrek
30.Sri Irianti, SKM M Phill (P/48) Tangerang
31.Suarno (L/24) Pontianak (Petronela)
32.Suyatno (L/63) Pejaten Barat Jakarta
33.Yulianti (P/39) Cileduk, Jakarta
34.Kyle Quinlan (L/23) Canbera Australia
antara
is

CargoOne

7th Mar 2007, 08:15

RoyHudd

IATA has nothing to do with safety (even they pretend to do so), it is only about money.
It should be ICAO to address this.

DGCA (DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION) is responsible body there.

Max Tow

7th Mar 2007, 08:26

See http://au.news.yahoo.com for video taken shortly after crash by TV cameraman onboard.
Truly horrific.

Bankstownboy

7th Mar 2007, 08:40

Probably too early to speculate about anything, but I do wonder whatever happened to "Go around, go around, go around" as we're always taught in the world of aviation.

Regardless, RIP to all who didn't survive.

Bandit650

7th Mar 2007, 09:04

See http://au.news.yahoo.com for video taken shortly after crash by TV cameraman onboard.
Truly horrific.

No thanks. I can imagine the scene - thats quite enough. This is reality, not a movie.

Ultralights

7th Mar 2007, 09:21

the video is not that horrific, i have seen more injuries in a football riot video...
but i did notice, flap was not fully deployed, looks like take off flap settings were used for landing.. looks to be leading edge slats extended, and about 15 deg flap.

DanAir1-11

7th Mar 2007, 09:22

With regards to Garuda's safety record, I care not to comment directly. However, it is a fact that since 1950 they have lost 595 pax + 1 'ground fatality' in 15 accidents plus have suffered a further 3 serious accidents that were non-fatal.

Todays accident is a truly tragic event, as is any aircraft accident, and I feel for those whom are either directly or indirectly involved in this tragedy.

With all the rumours and speculation concerning the moments immediately prior to touchdown, it is hard to know what is truth and what is speculation or sensationalism. What intrigues me however is the report of severe buffeting
as the aircraft crossed the threshold, presumably not a stall as by all accounts thus far the a/c landed hot and hard, but again this is only speculation. As with any accident, only time will tell. My sincerest condolences to all involved

Speed bird 002

7th Mar 2007, 09:31

20 dead now....previous figure stated wrongly by News Channels:(

Jonty

7th Mar 2007, 09:51

BBC now saying 22 dead :(
Condolences to all the families.

BSB,
Dont know if this is true, but BBC say it was on fire before it landed, so go around not really an option.

mingalababya

7th Mar 2007, 10:11

Here's a video from You Tube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-xib4P3ybl8) of the 737 in flames.

blackace

7th Mar 2007, 10:31

video taken shortly after crash by TV cameraman onboard.

So the cameraman did what all journalists do, he made sure he grabbed his luggage (camera) before leaving the plane. That is unforgivable as it could block the escape of others. but it seems he was not the only one, the report says many passengers were trying to get their luggage.

Reports are also saying that the nose wheel was on fire before landing, what could possibly cause that ?

Taildragger67

7th Mar 2007, 10:39

Blackace,

Possibly, but also possibly such footage could be useful in the investigation.

Condolences to the victims.

allan907

7th Mar 2007, 10:39

From the scenes shown here on Oz TV news it seems that the fire/crash crews were a bloody long time getting there.
Wx seemed CAVOK

Capt Fathom

7th Mar 2007, 10:46

Being surrounded by water & rice paddies will stop most fire trucks!

Based on the position of the approach lights, and the perimeter road, and the wind direction, the aircraft may have come down before reaching the runway! Just a thought.

Just a Grunt

7th Mar 2007, 10:50

From the Garuda website - current as at 0700Z

"Information on passengers of GA200

14:00 Jakarta Time

Among 133 passengers onboard GA200, 112 passengers survived while the other 21 passengers perished. One among the 7 crewmembers also perished.

Survivors are being treated in hospitals around Yogyakarta.

For inquiries please contact the family assistance center at 021-5506721, 021-5500747. or for Yogyakarta 0274-7461802

Other contact numbers:

Garuda Indonesia head office crisis center:
021-2311393 and/or facsimile no. 021-2311105.

Customer care:
021-2310049 and 021-3520461

Garuda Indonesia Call Center: 0807-1-807807 or 021-23519999"

blackace

7th Mar 2007, 10:51

Possibly, but also possibly such footage could be useful in the investigation.

The investigation comes after first making sure everyone is safe, the fact he decided to carry his camera off the plane shows he was not following the accepted evacuation procedure. To me this is unforgivable.

If he did not carry the camera off the plane then I apologise for pointing out this possible error of judgement, but I fail to see how a broadcast quality camera would be lying near the plane or another TV crew got to the crash before the fire tenders.

The fact the video is useful is secondary. Prime consideration should be for evacuation and saving lives.

bomarc

7th Mar 2007, 10:58

runway is 7200 feet long...oriented 9/27

does anyone have a way of getting wx at time of crash? reports of rain, possibly runway wet, x winds

BusyB

7th Mar 2007, 11:00

blackace,

You are making accusations when nobody yet knows the circumstances. Reporters I know would have had the camera to hannd at all times. even during the flight, in order to film anything of interest. If he was holding it to film the landing through the window I can't see anyone leaving it behind deliberately.

Wait until there is more info before making unfounded aspersions, you sound like a manager.:ugh:

Porrohman

7th Mar 2007, 11:05

Quote: "Reports are also saying that the nose wheel was on fire before landing, what could possibly cause that?"

I know nothing about the 737 nose-undercarriage design, but I know about environmental testing of hydraulic components. Hydraulic fluid can form an explosive mixture if it forms a fine mist in a contained space as a result of a high-pressure leak. For this reason, the environmental test chambers belonging to a company I used to work for were fitted with sensors to detect hydraulic leaks. If these detected a leak then, amongst other things, all power to the unit under test was withdrawn, all unnecessary equipment in the chamber was shut down and massive extractor fans were used to rapidly ventilate the chamber. In case these measures failed to prevent an explosion, the doors and walls to the chamber were blast-proof. There were massive earth banks outside the chamber, which would deflect any explosion in case the walls failed. The ceiling was deliberately weaker than the rest of the structure to allow any explosion to exit vertically.

Whether a hydraulics fire / explosion in the nose-wheel bay had anything to do with the tragic events is impossible to tell and it’s not something I’ve heard of happening in other aircraft accidents.

My sympathy goes out to all family and friends of those affected.

Porrohman.

bomarc

7th Mar 2007, 11:33

taking your camera would be as natural as a doctor taking his medical bag, or a decent lady taking her purse...it is a cheap shot against journlists!

it is because of those photo journalists that this plane crash will get worldwide attention and POSSIBLY improve things

Oceanz

7th Mar 2007, 12:11

The fellow is a stringer cameraman working with the Australian 7 network, not a journalist.

lomapaseo

7th Mar 2007, 12:15

it is because of those photo journalists that this plane crash will get worldwide attention and POSSIBLY improve things

unfortunately all the rest of the world can do is watch as they rearrange deck chairs and focus on inignificant mechanical things like age of fleet.

Manston Airport

7th Mar 2007, 12:22

Just seen it on the BBC news at 1:00GMT they are saying 20 people are dead.So was it pilot error?

James

Load Toad

7th Mar 2007, 12:30

Has there been an investigation yet James? No - so anything is just speculation isn't it?

With regard the camera man taking his camera; yes - providing these pictures may well make people sit up and take notice of how horrific this was and it might hopefully bring some attention to Indonesia's transportation problems - it certainly seems to need attention.
And should the camera man have picked up his camera - maybe not but it wouldn't be the first time that passengers leaving a crashed aircraft have stopped to pick up personal belongings. I'm sure there are those on PPRUNE who have studied how crowds act during 'disasters'. It maybe immediately following the crash that there appeared to be no need to rush to passengers probably suffering shock, trauma and the weird effects of adrenalin....

So maybe the camera man should not have taken his camera - but if something can be learnt because he did that helps to reduce the risks or improve things in future then at least something good will have come out of it.

fox niner

7th Mar 2007, 12:45

From the scenes shown here on Oz TV news it seems that the fire/crash crews were a bloody long time getting there

Well, at least they found the wreckage. Last time they were looking for a 737 in Indonesia it took them almost a month.

That's it. I am not taking any Indonesian airliners ever again.

cammron

7th Mar 2007, 12:45

My condolences to those who lost loved ones and to those souls that perished may God have mercy on you......

mickjoebill

7th Mar 2007, 12:52

News cameras are often kept under the seat in front rahter than overhead locker.

Quote from the cameraman
"We opened up the emergency door, and I do not know what happened after, because I am out - I picked up my camera and ran away.

"But for people in the front seats, I think there is a big problem because the front of the aircraft is cracking up, broken...."

Perhaps he helped open the door?
Perhaps his camera was of the consumer sized variety?
His first shot is 100 feet from the aircraft, perhaps he helped others to saftey?

The recording which may have a hidden time stamp reveal;
Three other passengers with large bags, two with rucksacks on their backs.
Audio reveals engine still operating.
There were ample able bodied passengers to help attend to those who couldn't help themselves.
No rescue attempts at front of aircraft.
No one exiting rear door after x number of minutes.

All useful info for the industry.

Like any passenger he had a choice to go to the front of the aircaft and help, but with a broken leg perhaps he thought better of it.

Mickjoebill

Beanbag

7th Mar 2007, 13:03

As humble SLF myself, I'm with Blackace on this. If I'm trying to leave a burning aircraft I don't want my exit impeded by someone retrieving or lugging baggage - be it a camera that 'might be useful to the investigation' or a medical bag that 'might be useful for treating the injured'. Getting out is the single best thing that can be done for my survival prospects.

BobbyPAX

7th Mar 2007, 13:07

As a professional camera man, I put my case that I often have video in hand during the flight. You need to bear in mind that many news people these days carry very small units. The days of the hulking shoulder jobs has gone.Camera is my life and livelihood and as such I feel a responsibilty to capture such moments providing it does not impede rescue attempts.
As some have said here, the story is important to ensure that it highlights problems with the safety or industry.
I, for one, feel safer bringing these matters into the open and knowing they're being fully investigated.
Some of your writers have said 'look at the flap settings', and that could indeed be useful at some time.
I have developed a kind of sixth sense over the years of where everyone is about me. That means that I am aware if I'm in the way, and make sure I notice and observe things of importance.
I can't have a collision with a top politician or stray into a mine field !
I would also sum up if I could be of assistance and drop the camera instantly if that was the case, as would most.
Do not forget the number of camera people killed highlighting news stories and bringing things to the public eye, and bear that in mind when saying that he 'grabbed his valuable camera and saved himself'.
The poor guy had survived a plane crash and was still doing his job !

Thoughts with those who lost someone in this terrible crash.

Bob.

GearDown&Locked

7th Mar 2007, 13:19

Do not forget the number of camera people killed highlighting news stories and bringing things to the public eye, and bear that in mind when saying that he 'grabbed his valuable camera and saved himself'.
The poor guy had survived a plane crash and was still doing his job !

:D

GD&L:ok:

blackace

7th Mar 2007, 13:20

The video itself shows some passengers retrieved luggage before evacuating the aircraft. This also supports many passenger statements that say many were concerned about getting their luggage, rather than just getting out.

These are passenger statements not mine.

If the industry learns anything, then at least I hope they take note of this and act instead of appearing to condone it.

Another survivor said some passengers were scrambling to get their belongings before he shouted at them to save themselves.

"Some passengers wanted to get their hand luggage. I cried to them, 'Get out, get out',"

Cleared Visual

7th Mar 2007, 13:20

Local Television here in Darwin reports that a RAAF C-130 that departed for Yogya carrying medical teams supplies will be returning early tomorrow morning with some critically injured Pax to the Trauma ward at Royal Darwin Hospital.

To those quick to criticise the journo who shot the footage, please respect that one of his collegues is amongst those unaccounted for and remember that regardless of one's occupation, nobody would wish having to go through such events on anyone!

Condolences to all involved, but let us all hope that some good may come from the investigation and lessons of this accident to improve air safety, especially in Indonesia.

bomarc

7th Mar 2007, 14:11

all this BS about the cameraman...it is his life and his right to decide how to get out as long as what he is doing does not hinder others...I haven't heard one word about flight attendents or flight crew handling the evacuation

if all forward died, that is the captain and 2 of 3 or 4 flight attendents.

also recall that if throttles are not fully at idle stops it is impossible to get into reverse (sw...midway)

Grongle

7th Mar 2007, 14:18

I think we have a bit of a red herring here, regarding the cameraman. If you shift back to the thread about the recent Adam Air plane that went missing, and you read some of the comments regarding safety, there is, unfortunately, a more insidious catalyst to be considered here.

You can find right in the forum, first, the prediction that Indonesia would sooner or later be bound to see an unnecessary crash; second, that the authorities there do not really know what safety is; and third, that the government is so closely linked to the air carriers that conflict of interest reigns supreme.

Then a skeptic might turn to the ordinary news, and judge for himself, when he reads that the solution being considered is to fly newer aircraft. The implication seems to be that aircraft are safe for a decade, even when there is no great interest in maintaining them. Once again, if you read back to the specifics of suspect components being traded around, the pattern becomes pretty convincing. It would seem as though the Indonesian air industry is dedicated to minimal ongoing maintenance costs, and that there is every chance of faulty components triggering a real variety of disasters.

(I wouldn't say the Indonesians are more stupid than the rest of us—the world in general takes the very same attitude regarding our biggest aircraft of all, Planet Earth.) But because most people can more easily envision plane crashes than environmental crashes, we do generally like to think our plane flight is based on maintenance and real safety, rather than profits and excuses. Spend awhile reading the Adam Air thread, and then read this one, and consider whether you yourself would feel relaxed flying Indonesian airlines.

THE CLOUDS ABOVE

7th Mar 2007, 14:21

"Quote" Well, at least they found the wreckage. Last time they were looking for a 737 in Indonesia it took them almost a month.

That's it. I am not taking any Indonesian airliners ever again. "by fox niner"

Having flown with Garuda many times on various Hajj detachments i find there approach to safety just as thorough as any UK carrier and would happily fly with them again.

I have also done this paricular route many times with Garuda and can tell you that run way is very bumpy and uncomfortable as a pax. Although not as bad a UPG.

I was quite saddened when i found out about this accident having flown on that particular aircraft just 3 months ago and the very approachable and friendly crew that i have experienced on many Garuda flights.

RIP all who perished.

DooblerChina

7th Mar 2007, 14:51

Here, here

I also have completed this years Haj and found Garuda to be an excellent outfit, lets try not to speculate too early on who was to blame...

Globalwarning

7th Mar 2007, 15:18

"The Clouds Above", you have got to be kidding? Mates of mine have some spectacular storeys of flying with Garuda. One named Shagger reckons he was almost killed flying into UPG as Pax, Garuda has some fine aviators but the standard is not consistent. Indo-Nigeria

Same standards as the UK....you do have your head in the clouds!:ugh:

fox niner

7th Mar 2007, 15:19

Hey guys...

I'm not blaming anyone here. I just find "flying on an indonesian carrier" too risky for comfort nowadays.
Just look at this footage for a moment.

http://au.news.yahoo.com

At time 00:59 into the film, apparently someone can be seen climbing out of the cockpit window. The cockpit itself is not visible on the footage. What's more, he seems to be wearing clothing resembling a cockpit uniform. Just take a look.

In many reports, survivors tell the media they felt the plane shaking/vibrating heavily prior to touchdown. This may be caused by three things:

1. Weather. However, it seems to have been CAVOK at 7 AM, smooth air...
2. Spoiler/Speedbrake extended with flaps greater than 15, to bleed off energy.
3. flap extension to a greater flapsetting than 15, despite a high airspeed.

points 2 and 3 would mean that the landing was made from a rushed approach.

PaperTiger

7th Mar 2007, 15:35

In many reports, survivors tell the media they felt the plane shaking/vibrating heavily prior to touchdown. This may be caused by three things:
1. Weather. However, it seems to have been CAVOK at 7 AM, smooth air...
2. Spoiler/Speedbrake extended with flaps greater than 15, to bleed off energy.
3. flap extension to a greater flapsetting than 15, despite a high airspeed.4. Imagination and/or PTSD.

An Paddy Eile

7th Mar 2007, 15:51

Just reading reports of the nosewheel being on fire before landing....

I have heard of other aircraft having problems with taxy lights causing fires after overheating the gear bay. I believe it had to do with the taxy light switch being left ON but the microswitch that would normally turn it off during gear retraction not working correctly.

Has there ever been any trouble with this on the Boeings? I fail to see any other reason for there being a fire from the nosewheel area???

THE CLOUDS ABOVE

7th Mar 2007, 16:00

Oi Global warning, There no need for rudeness...............
Was merely stating that they are very thorough and yes they do seem as thorough as most UK carriers. However I didn't say they have the "same standards". There your words....
I presume you are not familiar with the UPG approach especially if circling for an approach from the east (High ground), Obviousely not, your relying on someones elses experiences............. Just as you are with regards to Garuda.
It will be intersting to see what did cause this incident, But until then leave the Garuda bashing and lets just pray for the people who lost their live today and hope for a quick recovery of the injured.
As previously said i would still happily fly with them. Much rather them than any of the Indo loco's!

Eirefly

7th Mar 2007, 16:08

Fair enough Indonesia hasn't had the best safety record in the past few months but there is no point in speculating at this time, it will be months before we even hear a preliminary report.

Condolences to all that were affeceted by this tragedy.

Shaggy Sheep Driver

7th Mar 2007, 16:10

Quote:
In many reports, survivors tell the media they felt the plane shaking/vibrating heavily prior to touchdown. This may be caused by three things:
1. Weather. However, it seems to have been CAVOK at 7 AM, smooth air...
2. Spoiler/Speedbrake extended with flaps greater than 15, to bleed off energy.
3. flap extension to a greater flapsetting than 15, despite a high airspeed.

4. Imagination and/or PTSD.

5. Stalling (flow-break-away buffet).

teleport

7th Mar 2007, 16:13

The debate about whether the press should report or participate in rescue efforts is not new nor is it restricted to aviation incidents/forums.
Both sides of the argument have got validity.

RoyHudd

7th Mar 2007, 16:15

Just to remind you, a Lion Air crashed fatally at Solo in 2005, and this line have had 2 other accidents since; a national 737-200 crashed at Medan on take-off early 2006 with full loss of life, Adam Air have had 2 significant crashes THIS YEAR, and had the memorable "lost" 737 last year that ended up on a tiny island strip. Now this from Garuda, and I can assure you, other public transport fatal accidents have taken place in Indonesia in the last 24 months; on a smaller scale, but still involving death.

What is so pitiful is that some writers here are expecting the authorities to investigate and publish findings. Indonesia is a death-trap aviation country, based on recent stats, and no remedial action has been announced. Third world country, third-world standards. (Competing with Cuba, Egypt, and Nigeria)

This may not be PC, but I challenge others to offer a solution to the carnage which will doubtless continue.

Clarence Oveur

7th Mar 2007, 16:20

I challenge others to offer a solution to the carnage which will doubtless continue.I suppose you would as all you have done so far is fingerpointing.

Sleeping Freight Dog

7th Mar 2007, 17:46

Grongle,

Lumping all Indonesian maintenance into one group as you have done is
a big mistake. The GMF, Garuda Maintenance Facility, in Jakarta is
rated by both the FAA and CAA/JAA as a top notch facility able to enforce
the strict regulations of the European and American Aviation standards. In
fact many top notch carriers from both regions send their aircraft there
for C and D checks. To catagorize Adam Air and their attempt to run a
cost deficient safe operation as the same as the GMF is like calling all
Englishmen drunks.
Ask the Aer Lingus crews who were stationed to Indonesia for the B747
Combi operation, ask the HAJJ crews who fly every year, there are
strict standards in effect. A poor decision to push a bad landing does
not sothsayer make. Let's let the injured be tendered and the dead be
mourned before we go throwing stones.

Few Cloudy

7th Mar 2007, 18:20

Very often witnesses to crashes get into a time warp. Fire balls come down from the sky etc. although it turns out that any fire has first started after the crash.

It's the same with talk of shuddering before landing: if there has been an off runway accident, who is to say where any juddering happened,or even when the landing was deemed to have happened?

Now our experts list reasons for nosewheels to be on fire before landing and why there was juddering - all based on witness statements as described above.

Better wait and see.

FC.

bomarc

7th Mar 2007, 18:37

Foxniner

I think you are quite right about the things you mentioned and I AM GLAD we are SPECULATING...it makes people think... ...we have to think now.

stable approaches, checklists properly done, touchdown on speed in touchdown zone...that is what makes safety

I also agree with the comment that many of these vibrations etc felt by witnesses may have been out of chronological order...it happens.

bomarc

7th Mar 2007, 19:04

Two RAAF officers ONBAORD the plane said it was too fast...if anyone rises to the rank of an officer in the RAAF, they should have a good clue about planes. That is good enough for me, the black box should have IAS info too.

here is the article from ABC (australian broadcasting)

ABC Online

ABC Online

Crashed plane may have been speeding, experts say. 08/03/2007. ABC News Online

[This is the print version of story http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200703/s1865942.htm]

Last Update: Thursday, March 8, 2007. 0:22am (AEDT)
Aviation disaster experts say speed may have been a factor in the crash.

Aviation disaster experts say speed may have been a factor in the crash. (REUTERS)
Crashed plane may have been speeding, experts say

An Indonesian Airforce commander at Yogyakarta Airport says a plane that crashed on landing, killing dozens of people, may have been travelling too fast.

The plane's operator, Garuda, says at least 22 people have died, while a Government spokesman has put the death toll at 49.

Health Ministry National Crisis Centre chief Rustam Pakaya said 23 people, including two Australians, died in the crash.

Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer says 10 Australians were in the plane.

He said five Australians were injured and at least another four -- an air force liaison staffer, a police officer, an embassy staffer and a journalist -- were unaccounted for.

Mr Downer has inspected the crash site and visited the injured Australians in hospital.

He says four remain in hospital in varying conditions, including two Air Force members with minor injuries.

One Australian walked from the crash uninjured.

Mr Downer said two survivors, both in the Australian air force, had told him the aircraft landed too fast.

"The two who are in the best health told me that the plane came hurtling in to the runway at a much greater speed than an aeroplane would normally land at," he said.

"They themselves thought the plane would never stop in the length of the runway, which it duly didn't.

"They just ploughed across the end of the runway, across a road, hit a bank and a culvert and went into a paddy field. When it hit the bank and the culvert, it exploded."
Investigation

First Air Marshall Benyamin Dandel said the plane appeared to be speeding, causing it to overshoot the runway by about 300 metres.

Yogyakarta's Adi Sucipto airport is known for its relatively short runway.

The head of the National Transport Safety Commission, Tatang Kurniadi, told Elshinta news radio the commission was investigating the disaster.

"It's not easy to reach a conclusion on an accident like this. We're looking for evidence such as where the fire had come from," he said.

Aviation disaster expert Robert Heath from the University of South Australia said aircraft speed might have been a factor in the crash.

"From what I can see so far the aircraft appeared to land intact and that may point to excess speed being a factor," Dr Heath said.

Indonesia President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has ordered the chief security minister to investigate "non-technical" matters related to the crash, Cabinet Secretary Sudi Silalahi told reporters.

Indonesian investigators at the scene say they have recovered the black box flight recorder from the wreckage.

Garuda spokesman Pujobroto said the Boeing 737-400 plane, manufactured in 1992, had its last major inspection last month and had logged 34,960 flight hours.

Indonesian Transport Minister Hatta Radjasa said Australia would join an investigation into the accident.
Survivor

One of the Australian Defence Force Members injured in the crash, Kyle Quinlan, has told the ABC's Lateline he and his colleague were lucky to survive.

"Pretty much a few seats in front of us we couldn't see much more due to the smoke and fire, everyone screaming, just trying to punch through the exit," he said.

"Once we were out of the aircraft I just assisted with Flight Sergeant Haddin, due to him taking a fairly big brunt of taking the force on his forehead he started losing his vision and with his dislocated shoulder was in a very bad state."

He says he knew the plane was in trouble as it approached the runway.

"It just seemed like it was coming in too quick -- I looked out on the right hand side and saw how fast we were coming in, which was not a normal landing from the descent and how low we were to the ground -- that's when we hit the ground," he said.

"We bounced off the tarmac and sort of bounced again and from there it was just pretty much brace ourselves for the impact."
Assistance

Mr Downer has told the ABC's 7:30 Report two Australian support teams are flying to the area.

"One of them is a medical team from the Australian Defence Force," he said.

"In addition to that there is an official government Boeing coming up here overnight which is bringing an emergency response team -- people who can provide logistical support of one kind or the other for the Australians."

- ABC/Reuters

© 2007 Australian Broadcasting Corporation
Copyright information: http://abc.net.au/common/copyrigh.htm
Privacy information: http://abc.net.au/privacy.htm

PK-KAR

7th Mar 2007, 20:24

Fair use edited excerpts from other places...

The team in JOG from IndoFlyer, Indonesia's aviation forum, have sent in their pics.
You can find the pics at:
http://www.indoflyer.net/indoforum/tm.asp?m=116617&mpage=7
http://www.indoflyer.net/indoforum/tm.asp?m=116617&mpage=9

A few of our guys are willing to sacrifice their limbs to take these shots, so please enjoy and keep the pics there...

Blackboxes retrieved, and secured... Then the skidmarks.

Here are some stuff on the accident...
According to "trained eye witnesses", as in, those who are familiar with air ops and the airport, the approach was fast and "vertically unstable," producing a late touchdown. Nose hit the ground hard and a pop/bang was heard, indicating the nosewheel tyreburst. U can see the leftover marks of the nosewheel, producing a metal to ground contact, hence the reports of nosewheel on fire. Main gear skidmarks indicated maximum manual braking for maximum stopping power, but wheels have skidded, producing only 30% of the applied braking power.

This should dismiss most of the speculative/unclear reports on what actually happened on the runway. On the previous pics, it was apparent that after the aircraft have gone over a perimeter fence and a road (luckily a quiet one linking the main road to the Air Force Academy), where the right engine contacted the opposite embankment, resulting in right outer wing detaching and flinging itself over to the left side of the aircraft, and a fire from the fuel followed.

Given the wing detaching, fuel was spilled causing fire, and as the aircraft stopped, the fuel with its momentum was thrown forward onto the front right fuselage, where fire initially was reported to start, and then working itself back, eventually engulfing 2/3 of the fuselage with a starboard bias.

Everything else, you know and/or have seen.

and...

This was verified by a witness in the aircraft whose information I just received, being a regular flyer to JOG, however he did not sit in the window seat, but on the left of the aisle. He only noticed a few things through his glances out of the window. The aircraft was higher and faster than usual, 2 runway contacts as in, it bounced before doing the landing roll, and quite hard, he cannot recall whether it was nose first or not. Once he saw the terminal passing by, given the speed, he braced for impact. He cannot recall how many impacts apart from it was loud and mostly from the right side. After aircraft coming to rest, smoke was apparent and fire was visible from the front left, he assisted with pax trying to open the emergency exit window, then made it out. He saw the aircraft was catching fire, that was the last details he gave.

For those saying the emergency vehicles taking a long time...
It went out of the runway perimeter, over a road, onto an embankment (hence the nose impact and wing detachment), before coming to rest ain a fenced off area on the other side of the road.

Now, to get there, there no roadway across the embankment onto the other fenced off area where the approach lights are. So, the emergency crew have to literally get out of the airport first to get there... and open a few gates in the mean time.

All the ambulances were in the road below the embankment, they can't make it over the embankment !

And...

It hit the opposite embankment of the road after the runway... If you're familiar with the Kegworth Crash, imagine the aircraft overrunning the runway at high speed and flying accross the M1 and hitting the opposite embankment...

Colleagues have collected info on the crash site and also on the witnesses... aircraft stayed intact until crossing the road... hitting that embankment ruined the day. Cockpit was 80% intact due to impact but was twisted just behind L1/R1. That's how the pilots got out alive. Current info is that some pax were still strapped to their seats, indicating they were knocked unconscious during the impacts (most likely the 1st embankment impact) and so was the FA1... Hence they didn't make it alive.

Furthermore, it is still unclear whether the Captain was the pilot flying. The history of the F/O is also being chased.

On culture and personal traits, Go-Arounds are encouraged in GA when you're "out of the slot"... Why he didn't go around despite the unstable approach remains unknown at this stage. Witnesses on the ground airside in JOG watched the aircraft land waaay late in horror, they were all screaming "GO AROUND" and knew disaster was impending when they heard the reversers... The skid marks indicated max manual braking, sometime during the landing, someone tapped on the brakes disengaging the Autobrake (set on 2, GA SOP)... and anti skid protection was lost thereafter.

Spoilers were deployed as per eyewitnesses airside.

Some further facts:
1. No distress calls were made. The firefighters arrived within the required 120 seconds of raising the alarm, which was not late given the nature of the accident and the whole landing roll and impact was visible from the tower. The problem was that some the beefy fire engines was prevented getting accross the embankment! Ambulances couldn't make it over the embankment from the road the aircraft jumped over.

2. No fire from wing 3 mins previous to the landing as per some claims. The 'trained' eyewitnesses in JOG airport mentioned wing vortex instead. This is due to the small spread between the temp. and the dew point which is normal for mornings here.

3. No windshear. Winds were CALM according to JOG ATC.

4. Cabin crew were seen rushing to get food into the galley. This is NORMAL for CGK-JOG flights. A 50min flight with full meal service, whaddya expect? I've seen very late rushes to secure galley on these flights, incl CGKJOG.

5. Air Pocket... err... Terrain Convection "bumps" on landing is normal for JOG... the surrounding geography makes this an everyday (even pepetual) occurence. 09 Approach goes over small hill range, then after glideslope intercept, nearing the landing, you have... a few main roads, a fly over, a field, houses, then a small river valley, with an embankment onto the runway... So, mild bumps normal. Pax reports of bumps are unclear whether on approach, or the landing itself.

6. Aircraft confirmed to have bounced 2x.

All that has been written was given through collection of colleagues in the field doing their investigative work (yes, we like to play "see how fast NTSC comes up with a finding and how different it would be"). However, these are for "amateur" objective speculation purposes only...

So now 3 questions remain...
1. Why the unstable approach? No abnormalities to the glideslope reported.
2. Why the nosewheel burst?
3. Why did the landing continue even if he touched down past the touchdown zone?

Now, this gets into the domains of human factors, where, currently available info is scarce, and not something I'd like to get into at this stage.

It's been a long day, 22 now confirmed dead. I know 2 pax injured on that flight, spent the day tracing them, 1 other pax uninjured... all this less than 24hrs after we almost lost 1 732 being vectored into a mountain elsewhere... with it some friends on it. What a heck of a 48hr period!

Lynx206

7th Mar 2007, 20:45

HotDog

7th Mar 2007, 21:56

The Qantas 747 over run at BKK could have ended in a similar disaster..but for the grace of God. I wouldn't categorize this accident as an ethnic problem.

Seaman Staines

7th Mar 2007, 22:37

PK-KAR

Many thanks for the update.

Unfortunately many of us cannot access the pics.

Could you repost them here or elsewhere?

PS. I'm on Fraudband, not dial-up.

Anyone else?

Ex FSO GRIFFO

7th Mar 2007, 23:50

THANKYOU 'PK'......

For taking the time and the trouble in these, your 'trying times', to provide your excellent description / summary of what I might call, 'qualified observations / thoughts'.

This site is all the richer because of you and your colleagues, and your contribution was certainly worthwhile, and APPRECIATED!

Best Wishes to You, and Condolences to you and your colleagues.

Like you said - "What a heck of a 48 hour period".....

Regards......:ok:

Carol24

8th Mar 2007, 00:50

I have seen a picture of PK-GZC landing on that runway and flying over the Airports fence and the heads of spectators at an altitude of 30-40 ft. Is anybody out there who has experience with that runway ?
Excuse my poor english, pls.

theamrad

8th Mar 2007, 00:52

Unfortunately many of us cannot access the pics.

Could you repost them here or elsewhere?

PS. I'm on Fraudband, not dial-up.

Anyone else

Yep, been trying on and off for quite a while and can't get anywhere.

Hi there PK-KAR, had a feeling you'd turn up here. Thanks for the serious update - all the more so valid when "trained/aviation savvy" witnesses are the source - and hopefully enough to silence the more wild among speculators. Have been hearing the usual "one eyewitness said this, one eyewitness said that" for most of the day - reports which don't match the facts - but are churned out by certain elements of the media, verbatim, nonetheless. For example: Channel 4 news: "Garuda have the worst record in the region" - I think they're confused with some other airline with an unrelated name!!-(strangely, newly painted 'white' bananas come to mind!! )

I remember a while back expressing the cynical view (as others have) that there was more to follow in the way of tragedies - but I genuinely didn't think Garuda would be involved in the next one. I think this accident seems more of a tragedy personally than any of the others in Indonesia because I've been on that flight. I think Yogya airport is a real "little gem" (short and rollercoaster bumpy runway aside) - I've even spent some time with my wife (being ever-patient) on the side of that road near the threshold of RW27 "spotting". I've even got a picture looking along that road with a hazy Merapi in the background!!

It hit the opposite embankment of the road after the runway........aircraft stayed intact until crossing the road... hitting that embankment ruined the day

That embankment seems pretty insidious when driving along that road - but not hard to imagine the consequences of an aircraft encountering it at ANY speed. I don't have charts for Yogya - but I would have thought that to get off for parking without getting to the end - you'd have to be hitting pretty close to the mark on RW09 - esp. if on the heavy side. If, in the final analysis, this turns out to be purely down to crew error (without any technical/other mitigation) - I really can't imagine what they were thinking??? As for not aborting the landing - with what you indicate about the aircraft's predicament being so obvious to witnesses airside and on the aircraft - I'd like to think that in the crew's mind at least - there was something (on the tech side) which they believed precluded a go-around "on the ground" - but I know it's looking like that's pure wishful thinking.

We're due to go back to indonesia sometime this year - hopefully for good. I'd often thought I'd like to jump on a bike and go back to that spot every once in a while - but I think it will seem different after today's tragedy - I'm sure the scars will be on that embankment for a long, long time.

I hope those you know aren't too badly injured, and that all those injured make as speedy a recovery as possible.

The Qantas 747 over run at BKK could have ended in a similar disaster..but for the grace of God.

I think that applies in a lot of runway excursions - here at Dublin a few years ago, a Delta airlines MD11 left the runway in bad weather thanks to a "freak" gust. The plane departed to the left even with full right rudder and tiller(too fast to be effective during the occurrence). wind gust wasn't recorded by the anemometer at the threshold, but fortunately the crew were exonerated thanks to the statement of a ground personnel member who experienced the same "freak" gust while inspecting lights nearby. The aircraft came to a stop close to the perimeter fence on soft ground with no injuries. I've often thought how different the outcome would have been if the gust had been encountered earlier in the landing roll - with more speed/energy, probably through the perimeter fence, encounter with an 8ft deep "gear swallowing/crunching" drainage ditch, and potentially a similar outcome to today’s tragedy.

sinala1

8th Mar 2007, 01:02

I may be missing something but I didn't notice any escape slides from the forward and aft doors.
The forward door has probably been extensively damaged but the aft door looks like it opened normally.

In one of the pictures posted from the Indonesian Spotters site, you can see the L2 door has its "Slide Warning Strap" not secured across the viewing window, indicating the FA probably removed it to "check outside conditions" before opening their door. You can also see the L2 slide pressure gauge viewing window, which appears to have nothing behind it - indicating to me the slide was at least removed from the slide bustle, and hopefully deployed.

Other doors I have not seen so cant comment.

Hope that helps! :ok:

Centaurus

8th Mar 2007, 01:04

In the national newspaper The Australian today at page 7 (The Nation) Stephen Fitzpatrick the Australian reporter who is Jakarta Correspondent says "In more than 10 years of flying into Yogyakarta's airport since my first arrival there as a student in 1994, I have never felt comfortable hitting the heavily pitted and too-short runway. I have regularly seen passenger jets run off the end of it, becoming marooned in the rice fields that surround the airfield."

I guess that explains why this type of accident was inevitable.

StudentInDebt

8th Mar 2007, 01:35

I may be missing something but I didn't notice any escape slides from the forward and aft doors.I think the slides need to drop a certain distance before they will inflate, it looks like the gear has separated so I imagine the drop wasn't sufficient and the passengers would have been able to step off the aircraft into the field. From memory this sort of thing has happened a few times in the past with overruns.

theamrad

8th Mar 2007, 02:25

too-short runway

c. 7800ft for B737
I guess he'd be positively appoplectic landing at, for example, Queenstown on an NZ B734 after a challenging approach to a runway which is a hell of a lot shorter!!:eek:

On the other hand - if being vexacious, some might say 12,000 feet of runway at BKK isn't long enough for some B744 crews :}

I have regularly seen passenger jets run off the end of it

As far as I know, 1 other occurance of excursion. And that was apparently with standing water after a thunderstorm with 'possibly' not the most advantagous flap setting - (30 instead of 40)

I guess that explains why this type of accident was inevitable

I guess 'Stephen Fitzpatrick' 'aint no expert' on aircraft performance. I've landed (as a passenger) at Yogya and was quite happy at the time.

Carol24 - I humbly suggest you might be refering to landing in the opposite direction to the accident aircrafts path. If I'm wrong, i apologise. I don't have flying experience at Yogya airport - but in the absence of a reply from someone who does - I can only say that for the type in question, and in terms of total runway length, from a performance perspective there should be no difficulty. The only time the length would be limiting would be when contaminated (like standing water) AND at large weights(fully loaded AND considerable extra fuel for further sectors) - I can't imagine that GA would have enough extra fuel onboard for further sectors that would ever bring about that situation.

As far as geography is concerned I don't have charts for Yogya, but can say the following - the approach to RW09 is a straight in approach with ILS facility. The only limiting local terrain is to the East of the airport and would/should have had no bearing on today's accident. That terrain would be a factor in arriving in the opposite direction to todays accident aircraft (to Rw27) and requires a visual turn on finals - but i don't know what instrument segment is published for leading up to that runway's approach.

Porrohman

8th Mar 2007, 04:18

Were the flaps correctly deployed for landing? Eyewitnesses and passengers report that the landing was unusually fast. The photo published in Flight is the clearest view of the wing that I've seen:

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/03/07/212491/picture-garuda-indonesia-737-400-aircraft-burns-on-landing-in-yogyakarta-in-central.html

Porrohman.

SkySista

8th Mar 2007, 04:45

I haven't heard one word about flight attendents or flight crew handling the evacuation

If you look carefully on the Channel 7 footage, you can see two Garuda FAs assisting another man to help a pax on the ground. A little later a woman (am pretty sure is also an FA as her top looks like the kebaya worn by the crew) can be seen running back toward the aircraft (she waves her arms as if to keep her balance).

So I would say they were doing what any would do and helping where needed. Also not to forget they also had just lost a colleague and were likely in shock too, so to still be standing is a feat in itself!! Around this time in the video the L2 can be seen with no-one exiting, so the FA responsible for L2 may well have moved on to help people who could be helped.

As for slide, I thought the same as Sinala when Isaw the video, it looks like something is hanging from the door but definitely not infalted. Either not high enough or possibly damaged? Photos will tell i guess.

Seems to be a very bad year for this region so far :(

YesTAM

8th Mar 2007, 04:55

It has been reported to me (I have'n't seen it yet) that Channel 7 news has shown an interview with one of the pilots who explained that they had severe turbulence during the flight and an incidence of severe turbulence three minutes before landing (that presumably stuffed up their approach - My assumption). The CVR and FDR are on their way to Australia.

Ultralights

8th Mar 2007, 04:57

flap setting??

http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage2.jpg

PK-KAR

8th Mar 2007, 05:10

Seaman Staines,
The hits on the sites have been overwhelming THE ENTIRE PROVIDER! It's nuts! Whenever there's an accident, that site gets overwhelmed. I can give you the link, but unfortunately, I do not have permission from the photoowners to even hotlink it outside the site.

ExFSO,
I was extremely annoyed when a housewife was interviewed saying "there were thin smoke coming out of the wings that morning"... and then the academics and so called experts talking a load of you know what... It gets tiring and annoying, especially when you know some of the people on board that plane!

A heck of a 48hr period? At least I got extra sleep after I made that post... ;)

Radarlove,
METARS for JOG has been rather difficult to get, TAFs are broadcasted but not the METARS, which is solely in the national met office AFAIK, and God knows who they transmit it to! This problem became excruciating when they changed the code from WIIJ to WARJ...

Carol24,
There is a pic of GZC landing on JOG's runway 27 taken meters from the embankment where the fatal impact took place... the photographer was one of the sources to what I wrote as he happened to be in town, and jumped to the airport on first call, and its been trying times for him, he'd been trained in Garuda, worked on GZC, and also on Adam's KKV and KKW... so these past 3 months have been difficult for him to come to terms with.

Theamrad, yeah well, it was only a matter of time before I post these things here, but it was a heck of day tracing 2 pax on the flight... so couldn't get here until early morning local. Yes, the "new flying banana", then this... disturbing times. But no one expected Garuda to be the next one! It's a shock to almost everyone here! If it was another Adam or Lion, we'd just shrug our shoulders and say "oh not again!" Interestingly, there were 2 other incidents yesterday, though minor/precautionary measures.

As to JOG, bumpy runway indeed, but a strong one... 2200m, definitely enough, but yes, you need to be on the mark especially on 09, that downslope after txy C can put you in a LOT of trouble if your speed's off the mark! Put many friends in hairy situations. Normally, on touchdown, "if you don't think you can make it at C or be at fast taxy speed at C, might aswell go around!"

At the moment, unfortunately it does look like crew error, but there are heaps more factors to consider, because such a botch is nowhere near Garuda's dictionary! They're known for LOW AND SLOW, and they've caused those "high speed below 10 above " types to make a few 360s in the past! Something else must have caused them to make the error... but we dunno what, either wrong descent profile caused by the nice wind we're having at the moment (yes, 20kts surface winds over the past week or so, which to us, is "unusual"... we're used to the <5kt! LOL). One more thing is that we're looking closely at the pictures of the wings, which may not have been at GA's SOP of 30 for landing, which would then pose a few more questions.

Sinala,
I don't think anyone made it through R2 without getting burnt... as to why the slide didn't deploy on L2, well, we gotta ask the F/A2 on the flight.

In the national newspaper The Australian today at page 7 (The Nation) Stephen Fitzpatrick the Australian reporter who is Jakarta Correspondent says "In more than 10 years of flying into Yogyakarta's airport since my first arrival there as a student in 1994, I have never felt comfortable hitting the heavily pitted and too-short runway. I have regularly seen passenger jets run off the end of it, becoming marooned in the rice fields that surround the airfield."

I guess that explains why this type of accident was inevitable.
These kinds of comments make me laugh! 2200m! FAR requirement for 734 at MLW and dry runway is 1650m... Dunno why that guy has a problem about it!

As far as geography is concerned I don't have charts for Yogya, but can say the following - the approach to RW09 is a straight in approach with ILS facility. The only limiting local terrain is to the East of the airport and would/should have had no bearing on today's accident. That terrain would be a factor in arriving in the opposite direction to todays accident aircraft (to Rw27) and requires a visual turn on finals - but i don't know what instrument segment is published for leading up to that runway's approach.

Coming into JOG along W17, you'd expect to be over GEPAK at 6000, and radial 276JOG@8NM at 4000... at that point if you don't get put in a hold, you'd stay at 4000, and intercept the LLZ for the ILS just before JOG VOR. When you do get the hold, it's down to as far as 2500ft.

For 27, from W17, they'd bring you in over departures and vector you straight for the right downwind, or do so from 8DME, or you do an ILS circle to land.

Terrain factors are to the east, north (10NM from approach path), and 3000ft terrain between GEPAK and 276JOG8DME. The other challenge is, it's only a 12NM wide corridor either side if W17 and the ILS for below 6000... a series MILCTZ, and JOGAPP is run by the military... so they keep those MCTZs intact unless it's an emergency or severe wx.

Now his initial touchdown would leave only 1400m or so of tarmac to go... an overrun was inevitable... just no one thought he'd go over the ditch! Well he did bounce twice... the rest is history.

PK-KAR

Scurvy.D.Dog

8th Mar 2007, 07:34

PK-KAR .. thanks for the insight!
.
.. couple of things, to note:-
.
I make no comment on the cameraman filming after extrication other than to say … look, really look at the information being presented to you all by that footage:-
- The wind was not calm that morning, the smoke plume was moving away from the aircraft at a rate of at least 10-15kts, probably faster up higher above 500ft AGL
- If the aircraft resting position was still aligned to the runway then there was a crosswind of 10-15KTS from the left …. If the aircraft resting position was not aligned with the runway, the wind could have included a downwind component?! .. PK- you might look into this!
- If the winds aloft were not forecast or the descent was delayed due traffic or else, there may have been profile issues?!
.
.. the other, Spoiler position?
.
… I do not know if loss of HYD pressure would mean the spoilers would retract (even after a prang), but I have seen on other types, the spoilers remain in the last selected position after detachment or other system loss events??? .. any ginger beers care to comment!? .. it is also possible the crew closed them prior to system loss, or bumped closed during the accident sequence?! .. FDR will tell I guess!
.
.. none of this should infer anything, (time will tell why the crew did not elect to go-around) … rather to point out what can be gleaned from many sources including camera footage.
.
The other thing I noted (although not really relevant), was the turbine noise was clearly the APU, not the number two as someone suggested !
.
… can we have a civilised look at these issues without the fragile ego pissing contests please ladies and gentlemen! :=

smokey2

8th Mar 2007, 07:53

I do not wish to get into any argument of what or why the crash :( happened

- but this evenings news said that the tail had been repainted white to obscure the Garuda logo.

This is complete contempt for the investigation process and is sign that Indonesia really is a third world dictatorship not capable of running an international airline.

I walked past the Canberra headquarters of the Australian Federal Police this afternoon. A car pulled up and out got a very well dressed lady in AFP uniform. She had chaplain marked on her uniform. With 2 AFP officers missing the last 24 hours have been very dificult for this person.

SkySista

8th Mar 2007, 08:18

Yeah, i thought that comment made on the news was odd, especially as when it was said the footage showed the engine clearly NOT rotating... I can only guess they have been watching too many re-runs of Lost!! :yuk:

Also, the reports said 7 crew onboard with one lost. So that would mean 5 FAs, yes? Not "2, 3 or 4" as someone else mentioned earlier??

And another thing I am curious, perhaps PK could shed some light, as mentioned it looks as though the cockpit is missing, though it was said to be mostly intact.. is it just bent around to the right of fuselage (back of photo), so we cannot see it? Or did it detach completely? Thanks. PK you are invaluable in a situation like this, stops the speculating that is going on as we have such quick access to what is REALLY seen out there!

PK-KAR

8th Mar 2007, 08:24

Scurvy,
Indeed, the footage shows a headwind. Aircraft nose is still relatively in the direction of travel. If you look at the frame at 3:27, that's where the airport and the runway it overran are. By the looks of it, wind was 5 - 10 degs off the runway from the left. I think this footage dismisses tailwind.
Spoiler position, eyewitnesses stated spoilers deployed with reversers.
The high pitched whine throughout the video is the airport siren, same with the fire engines. We use that kind of siren over here. The sound started from frame 0:10 in the vid.
Looking at the flap position, it looks like it's not at 30, but 15 is more like it... Probably it was a flap assym, then something went wrong in the flare due to the speed and lower drag... but this part is just guesswork.
----
This is complete contempt for the investigation process and is sign that Indonesia really is a third world dictatorship not capable of running an international airline.

I wonder if I should laugh or cry at this one! Painting the logo out and airline name is standard anywhere if it crashed within the vicinity of an airport, unless the aircraft is in small pieces, then that's a different story.
----
Skysista,
5 F/As, the FA1 died. Garuda's Citilink (which this flight wasn't) carries 3 F/As...

Cockpit was said to be "80% relatively in tact", but bent due to hitting the opposite embankment, which sheared the landing gears and right wing. It then caught fire quickly hence you can see it in the video but not in the photos...

PK-KAR

SkySista

8th Mar 2007, 09:00

Thanks PK. Yes now you mention it, siren makes sense, it didn't seem to be engine noise of course but I wasn't sure if an APU would carry on like that (also I didn't think it was used in the air, anyway, only on ground)

Reports of people who just walked away from airport and went to hotels, do you know if they managed to find out how many yet? I suppose when shock takes hold it seems like the logical thing to do, of course they would not be thinking they would be missed...

Scurvy.D.Dog

8th Mar 2007, 09:41

... not sure whether we are talking about the same footage ... at the very beginning of the film we saw in Oz you can see the heat plume from the APU and hear it!
.
SkySista
.
.... they are used in flight (WX for restart/elec/A/C etc)!
.
http://www.b737.org.uk/apu.htm
.
PK,
.
. do you think the loss of HYD PRES stowed the spoilers?

Pilot Pete

8th Mar 2007, 09:48

Regarding speedbrakes. It is quite possible that as part of their passenger evacuation drill they stowed the speedbrakes. SOP with many.

As regards pax taking hand baggage, perfectly normal reaction when getting off a aircraft, as it is what they ALWAYS do when they get off an aircraft. Despite emergency brief from CC etc, in the heat of the moment many are just instinctively going to stand up and open the overhead locker, however crazy that may seem to us armchair punters. The inbuilt behaviour is to not leave behind your valuables and things like passports.......

PP

PK-KAR

8th Mar 2007, 09:57

Are talking about this? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YkdkXoIddM

GA SOP for APU on arrival is simply... long taxi APU start on landing roll or completion thereof, short taxi, APU start on approach.

I dun hear the APU on the footage...

Scurvy, the current info is that the capt. ordered an evac and so did the f/o, none of which were heard in the cabin, which the F/A already initiated the evac. Now if that was true, one would assume that the evac checklist was done, which included the spoilers being retracted...

But this is going into guesswork...
---
An update,

capt. marwoto
fo. gagam
pu. wiranto waryo
sr. irawati ira
sr ati maryati
sr imam iskandar
sr. budianto ratna

Purser Wiranto Waryono died in the accident. His body was identified by his brother this morning, and his body is being flown back sometime today.

Current info was that he died while trying to evac pax from the Biz class. RIP... Duty to the last breath!

Respects!

PK-KAR

mickjoebill

8th Mar 2007, 09:59

http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/survivor-cameramen-filmed-their-ordeal/2007/03/07/1173166805660.html

This contradictory report quotes the cameraman seeing fire "a few minutes out from landing" and that he called his TV station on his mobile "as the plane was crashing" which is possible if he noticed something a few minutes out.

But could be a poor use of past/present tense by witnesess.

The report also states the station manager called by cameraman heard sirens in the background so perhaps the call or a second call was made after landing.

Mickjoebill.

ABX

8th Mar 2007, 10:01

PK, once again your clear, informed and timely posts save us from a bunch of nonsense.

Thanks,

ABX

ABX

8th Mar 2007, 10:14

PK et al,

In this link to Youtube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YkdkXoIddM) that PK posted, around the 4 minute mark several explosions can be heard, I don't think that they were fuel tanks exploding as reported on the news.

Could they be tyres? Oxygen bottles? Other pressure vessels on board?

Can someone who might actually know have a guess for me?

Thanks,

ABX

Dagger Dirk

8th Mar 2007, 10:37

Regarding speedbrakes. It is quite possible that as part of their passenger evacuation drill they stowed the speedbrakes. SOP with many.
C'mon now. The cockpit wasn't attached to the rest of the fuse when it all came to rest and Captain Marwoto quickly shinnied out the flightdeck hatch.
.
a. Low time Right-seater flying and a quite experienced captain in the LHS being so distracted by the unstable approach that he doesn't lower any flap (normally a RH seater's duty). They may have also landed with a slight tailwind component (judging from the post-crash smoke, there's little wind at all however).
.
b. RH seater trying so hard to plant it at high-speed (due to the total lack of flap) that he drives the nosewheel in - in a classic porpoise cycle initiation (i.e. a nose-to-main-gear continuing reverberation). (which explains some of the pax descriptions of what they felt).
.
c. Nosewheel breaks away, hydraulics are lost, MLG braking quickly exhausts any stored accumulator pressure, reverse isn't engaged due to pilot distraction, spoilers don't deploy (possibly because of the flaps being left up/no hyd pressure).
The photographic evidence for this is above (i.e. the flaps are UP). In the other images, look at the port wing-root.
.
It's clear in the composite image that the flaps are still up. That fact would be very hard for Indonesia's KNKT Chief and chief apologist Professor Oetrajo Diran (of Silkair crash fame) to explain away. The DFDR will have all the objective evidence however.
It would seem to be naught but a classically incompetent very heavy landing carried out by a tyro and supervised very maladroitly by a non-instructor type - notwithstanding any claims of wind-shear.
.
Indicative of what's coming down the pike eventually with the ICAO's infamous MPL licence.
.
If the approach is not stabilized at 500ft, you must go round. Costs you nothing. Anything else is the beginning of a nasty accident

Scurvy.D.Dog

8th Mar 2007, 10:46

PK.
.
.. caught the late news on ABC (I believe it is the same footage as shown yesterday) .. you are absolutely right .. siren ... heat plume from fuel fire right side!

Rananim

8th Mar 2007, 10:53

Very sad and unnecessary accident.

As some have stated,the shaking reported by passengers,probably relates to spoiler extension with landing flap.Speedbrake should not be used with flaps greater than TEN.

This airport has 7200' of concrete,less of course on the glide,and we dont know as yet about any NOTAMS.

Its all down to pilot training and this modern cockpit ethos.AP engaged,VOR LOC/GS green,and the pilot sits there and watches the speed build up too afraid to intervene(The FDR will reveal whether or not the flap load relief protection activated or not-Im betting it probably did).In desperation,he takes speedbrake with landing flap.Recovery from a fast or high approach is not a complex maneuver and should be part of any pilots make-up.In a 737 it is not a difficult procedure.Usually it stems from pilots not being trained to recognize that the VNAV profile stored in the FMC doesnt match the vectors/profile that they are being given in real time by ATC.The reliance on the automation and the erosion of traditional flying skills sets the trap very nicely.

Recovery from above the profile is accomplished by engaging VORLOC only,foregoing the profile and throwing out 30/40 flaps,and arming and capturing the GS at a lower platform.If you dont achieve the window by 500/1000 then simply perform a go-around.Tailwind and pilot skill are the critical factors here and determine the mindset.

Ive said it before and Ill say it again;pilots today arent trained to fly the plane.They're trained to program the FMC and use the automatics in a set and standard way.Fear of the QAR and these wretched SOP's divert their attention from their primary goal;FLY THE PLANE.The only relevant SOP here is the stable-approach criteria by 1000/500.If you dont meet it,go-around.

RoyHudd

8th Mar 2007, 11:03

Stable at 500/1000, sure...Standard A320/330/340 SOP, nothing to do with FMS/FMGC, the automatics will do a nice G/A once TOGA selected. 737 can't be so different, bit more primitive, that's all.

Capt Fathom

8th Mar 2007, 11:18

Several posters have made comments in regards the flap position as viewed in photos/video.

Fortunately you are not part of the investigation team.

Do you really believe that the position of the flaps, as evident in the photos and post crash, is representative of the flap setting prior to the accident? The forces involved in the accident destroyed the aircraft...but the flaps/slats remained intact & in position? Circumstantial evidence!! Wait for the facts!

Smokey2 took much displeasure at the painting-out of the airline logo on the tail!
It's called PR.
Standard procedure in any company is to white/blackout the company logos..if any remain!! GA, Regional, and Airlines. All countries do it.

unconcerned

8th Mar 2007, 11:29

Apart from a couple of NWA DC-9 ground incidents that may be write-offs, there have been five jet aircraft total losses so far in 2007. Four of those have been PK-registered aircraft. It doesn't matter how much spin or how many excuses you apply to it, that is still a shocking statistic.

PK-KAR

8th Mar 2007, 11:37

a. Low time Right-seater flying and a quite experienced captain in the LHS being so distracted by the unstable approach that he doesn't lower any flap (normally a RH seater's duty). They may have also landed with a slight tailwind component (judging from the post-crash smoke, there's little wind at all however).
GA SOP for ILS approach is A/P on until glideslope intercept unless NOTAM reveals reported significant deficiencies in an ILS transmitter or the aircraft's receiver.

b. RH seater trying so hard to plant it at high-speed (due to the total lack of flap) that he drives the nosewheel in - in a classic porpoise cycle initiation (i.e. a nose-to-main-gear continuing reverberation). (which explains some of the pax descriptions of what they felt).
Ever flown behind a GA 737 on approach? Bloody slow! The cowboys have moved to other airlines for faster promotional schemes and faster money!

It would seem to be naught but a classically incompetent very heavy landing carried out by a tyro and supervised very maladroitly by a non-instructor type - notwithstanding any claims of wind-shear.
Perhaps you'd like me to give you the phone numbers of Capt. Marwoto, or F/O Gagam, or perhaps a coffee session with Marwoto's seniors in Garuda? Perhaps that would change your view... or perhaps not...

If we're sticking to what we have evidence for...
The cockpit wasn't attached to the rest of the fuse when it all came to rest and Captain Marwoto quickly shinnied out the flightdeck hatch.
Please have a look at the video... before fire took over, cockpit WAS still attached.

If you look at: http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage1.jpg you can see the elevators were slightly up also, which could mean cables still connected prior to fire.

It's clear in the composite image that the flaps are still up.
I disagree flaps are up.
http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage2.jpg shows flaps on the left wing deployed but not at 30 as per GA's standard operating procedures. The wing on top is the right wing, slats deployed.

And in http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage1.jpg you can see the inboard leading edge flaps on the left wing were deployed (not just hanging).

Now whether the flap position on the photos are the same as on the approach, we'd have to wait and see, but yes, IT WAS DEPLOYED! If trained eyewitnesses can identify the spoiler being deployed, I'm sure they'd be able to tell if flaps were retracted, somewhere near flap15, or somewhere near flap30/40 as it went by them!

I myself only noticed the flap position on the montage not more than 24hrs ago, and it CAN match a botched flap 15 approach. Whether that was what happened or not, for the moment we can only guess, but please, silly guesses aren't useful.

The head of Garuda's pilot association managed to interview Capt. Marwoto last night, and he quoted that there was a "minor problem" with the aircraft "which was solved and acted upon prior to the landing." Now whether Capt. Marwoto's having selective amnesia or not in his interview, we'd have to wait and see.

Now if the FDRs reveal the opposite of you say Dagger Dirk, I wonder if you'd claim the whole investigation's a cover up?

If you want to speculate, speculate responsibly! Why? As Clandestino said, learning from mishaps is one way to improve... slapping comments like "tyro non-instructor type", or "low hour newbie" isn't one of those ways, unless you know directly or indirectly through someone.

Furthermore, the purser died on duty, reportedly amidst evacuating the business class section, where there were some deaths... I hope you don't brand him as trying to sneak out of the aircraft quickly!

PK-KAR

Ultralights

8th Mar 2007, 12:01

referring back to this photo here, http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage1.jpg there is some UP elevator, but it looks to me to be trimmed in a level or nose down trim, with 30 or so flap, i would assume the trim would be a lot more Nose up??:confused:

Sinbad1

8th Mar 2007, 13:11

:ok:
Quote:

I may be missing something but I didn't notice any escape slides from the forward and aft doors.
I think the slides need to drop a certain distance before they will inflate,

If you look very closely to the footage, You will see that L1 is still intact and faired with fuselage. On the other hand the cabin crew did not attempt to open the door due to the area being completely inaccessible.

On another note; The worse thing anybody can do is to speculate without the facts and I will most certainly not take the words of a pax who's just been involved in one of the most horrific experiences, not to mention the shock they were under during the ordeal as a basis, to identify the cause of a crash. Do yourself a favour and wait for the findings and facts.

As for the slide on the B737, when you close the door you have to physically lift the bar and place it on the floor to arm the slide, then the Red Ribbon is placed across the door pane to indicate it is armed for the people outside. It is not like the Wide-body set up whether it is 747 or A330/A340 or even 320 for that matter which is automatically engaged.

please see below.

A737-300/400/500
MAINTENANCE MANUAL
E_S_C_A_P_E_ _S_L_I_D_E_ _A_S_S_E_M_B_L_Y_ _(_D_O_O_R_-_M_O_U_N_T_E_D_)_ _-_ _D_E_S_C_R_I_P_T_I_O_N_ _A_N_D_ _O_P_E_R_A_T_I_O_N_
1 . G_e_n_e_r_a_l_
A. Each escape slide assembly has these components:
(1) an escape slide pack
(2) an escape slide compartment
(3) two floor brackets.
B. The escape slide assemblies are installed on the lower inboard face of
each entry and galley service door.
C. Two floor brackets are attached to the floor inboard of the doorway.
D. The escape slide pack has these components:
(1) an escape slide
(2) a detachable girt
(3) a girt bar
(4) an air bottle
E. The air bottle holds high-pressure gas to inflate the slide.
F. The compartment holds the slide pack in the folded position and opens
when the slide is used.
2 . O_p_e_r_a_t_i_o_n_ (Fig. 1)
A. Prepare and inflate the escape slide.
(1) Install the slide assembly with the door closed.
(2) To arm the slide, remove the girt bar from the stowage hooks on the
door and install it in the floor brackets.
(3) Open the door as usual but do not hesitate until it is fully open.
(4) The girt will extend while you open the door.
(5) As you open the door, the conection between the girt and the latch
will pull tight, and unlatch the compartment.
(6) When the door is almost fully open, the slide pack will pull down
and out of the compartment.
(7) The slide will fully inflate in approximately six seconds.
(8) If the slide does not inflate automatically, pull the inflation
handle sharply to inflate the slide manually.
(9) To remove the slide from the airplane, lift the flap and pull the
ditching handle.

From the picture, it does not look like the slide was armed!!!:ok:

bear11

8th Mar 2007, 13:27

http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/garuda-pilot-blames-downdraft-for-jet-crash-at-yogyakarta/2007/03/08/1173166898059.html

"A MASSIVE downdraft caused Wednesday's catastrophic crash of a Garuda Boeing 737, plunging it into the runway, its pilot says.

The aircraft's wing flaps also may have malfunctioned during the landing, Captain Marwoto Komar has told Captain Stephanus, president of the Garuda Pilots Association.

Although a plane would normally fly around and try to land again in such circumstances, Captain Komar felt he had to continue the landing after the initial impact, Captain Stephanus said.

After the rough landing, the aircraft bounced and ploughed across fences and a road at the end of the runway before bursting into flames.

It is believed five Australians and at least 16 Indonesians perished. Indonesian authorities have said four Australians are confirmed dead: Mark Scott, Morgan Mellish, Allison Sudradjat and Brice Steele. The death of the fifth missing Australian, Liz O'Neill, is yet to be established.

Captain Komar is feeling guilty and depressed and may be suicidal, doctors and Captain Stephanus said. He said the two pilots and the other four surviving crew were being held by police against their will at Harjo Lukito military hospital.

Flight conditions appeared normal until the aircraft was about 1000 feet above the Yogyakarta's runway, Captain Komar and his co-pilot told Captain Stephanus yesterday.

"The captain felt a downdraft and the aircraft sinks so rapidly," Captain Stephanus said. "They just felt the aircraft hit the runway and bounce and then because the speed is very fast the aircraft overran. Then the engines hit the ground."

The pilot did not explain why he was travelling so fast, Captain Stephanus said. "They said there was a problem, there was something wrong with the flaps, the flaps cannot extend normally.

"Usually you should go round, but the captain felt as they had already hit the runway it was best to land. This is a freak incident. We are very sorry; please don't judge us until we find the truth."

Captain Komar was unfit to be questioned, and plans for police to question him were inappropriate as the accident was outside their jurisdiction, Captain Stephanus said. He said police could try to make the pilot a scapegoat.

A hospital doctor has written a letter stating that Captain Komar was mentally depressed and unfit to be questioned. "We are very afraid he could kill himself," Captain Stephanus said. "The captain is very depressed. He is feeling very, very guilty."

Military police guarding the crew said they were under strict instructions to isolate them. They blocked attempts by the Herald to interview the crew.

Captain Stephanus discussed the crash with the crew, including the co-pilot, Gagam Rohman, and four flight stewards, and other Garuda officials yesterday.

Captain Komar, 45, had been a Garuda captain for five years and had 22 years' experience as a pilot, Captain Stephanus said.

He said after the crash the crew followed standard emergency procedures, opened all the exits and managed to evacuate most of the passengers.

Australian police and safety officials yesterday joined the Indonesian investigation into the cause of the crash. They located the aircraft's flight data recorders, which will arrive in Canberra for analysis today.

A deputy director of investigations with the Australian Transport Safety Board, Allan Stray, said the recorders were expected to yield vital clues to the crash, including how fast the aircraft was travelling as it came in to land. This would help to determine the direction of the investigation. The boxes should have recorded all flight information and the final 30 minutes of radio communications and cockpit conversations.

The lead Indonesian investigator, Mardjono Siswosuwarno, of the National Transport Safety Committee, said that as well as examining the hard landing, investigators were looking at whether there could have been a mechanical failure in the aircraft's nose due to cracks or corrosion.

Yesterday airport workers painted out of the Garuda logo on the plane's tail, in an apparent attempt to mask its identity. Officials later pulled the tail down, calling it a potential hazard to aircraft.

Military police guarding the crew said they were under strict instructions to isolate them. They blocked attempts by the Herald to interview the crew.

Captain Stephanus discussed the crash with the crew, including the co-pilot, Gagam Rohman, and four flight stewards, and other Garuda officials yesterday.

Captain Komar, 45, had been a Garuda captain for five years and had 22 years' experience as a pilot, Captain Stephanus said.

He said after the crash the crew followed standard emergency procedures, opened all the exits and managed to evacuate most of the passengers.

Australian police and safety officials yesterday joined the Indonesian investigation into the cause of the crash. They located the aircraft's flight data recorders, which will arrive in Canberra for analysis today.

A deputy director of investigations with the Australian Transport Safety Board, Allan Stray, said the recorders were expected to yield vital clues to the crash, including how fast the aircraft was travelling as it came in to land. This would help to determine the direction of the investigation. The boxes should have recorded all flight information and the final 30 minutes of radio communications and cockpit conversations.

The lead Indonesian investigator, Mardjono Siswosuwarno, of the National Transport Safety Committee, said that as well as examining the hard landing, investigators were looking at whether there could have been a mechanical failure in the aircraft's nose due to cracks or corrosion.

Yesterday airport workers painted out of the Garuda logo on the plane's tail, in an apparent attempt to mask its identity. Officials later pulled the tail down, calling it a potential hazard to aircraft."

lomapaseo

8th Mar 2007, 14:04

Several posters have made comments in regards the flap position as viewed in photos/video.

Fortunately you are not part of the investigation team.

Do you really believe that the position of the flaps, as evident in the photos and post crash, is representative of the flap setting prior to the accident? The forces involved in the accident destroyed the aircraft...but the flaps/slats remained intact & in position? Circumstantial evidence!! Wait for the facts!

I don't agree that the forces involved in the accident destroyed the aircraft to the extent that they would likely alter the flap setting as seen in the photos. The eye off the beholders are probably making their judgements bases on in-situ relationships between fixed and movable surfaces. From what I see there is relatively little damage in these areas. Of course the actual investigators on-scene would have a look at jack screws and relative gouge marks to confirm.

Cytherea

8th Mar 2007, 15:03

I don't want to get involved in the speculation over causes of crash simply make a point that if the L2 slide had deployed, peoples exit from that door would have been severely hampered - the slide is some 14 feet long - the distance to the ground in this specific instance is an easy step. Had the slide been there it would have been a complete hindrance. Maybe we should think the best of the cabin crew (who clearly acted with utmost dignity and professionalism) and assume they disarmed the slide until evidence is posted to the contrary. Prayers are with the relatives and injured.

RatherBeFlying

8th Mar 2007, 15:23

The reported crew interview hints at an inability to deploy landing flaps. Possible causes are asymmetry as previously noted, hydraulic problem or ??? This may explain the increased landing speed, but does raise the question of finding a longer runway.

Definitely not the time to have windshear added to your troubles:(

As to the decision to continue with the landing, Air Canada lost a DC-8 at YYZ with all aboard after taking it back up after a heavy landing following an inadvertent spoiler deployment:(

Sinbad1

8th Mar 2007, 16:08

:confused:
Cytherea (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=89936)
Quote;"I don't want to get involved in the speculation over causes of crash simply make a point that if the L2 slide had deployed".

I assure you Cytherea and guarantee you that slide was not even armed let alon deployed have agood look at the picture ( The Bustle still attached and the slide is intact).See the operating instruction I post it above.

Sinbad1 :\

BEagle

8th Mar 2007, 16:29

Many existing airline pilots have said that the MPL will not cause any aircraft handling incidents under their command - as they simply won't let the MPL holders ever touch the flying controls.

Unexpected buffeting and high sink rate have been mentioned - but although that sounds like classic stall warning, the reported high landing speed certainly does not.

So it's time to wait for the accident report, I would think.

Cytherea

8th Mar 2007, 16:33

Thanks Sinbad, I'm aware of that - What I am suggesting is the reason the slide wasn't armed when the door opened was the person who opened that door had the presence of mind to disarm the slide BEFORE opening the door having taken the outside condition into account. Given their actions after escape I would like to Assume this scenario rather than seek to blame them without evidence

TheShadow

8th Mar 2007, 16:50

There's a vague possibility that they had a flap asymmetry (which locks the flaps in present position) - and pressed on.
.
However the more I read about passenger and witness descriptions of their perceived sequence of events, the clearer it is that the nosewheel was driven in and that a destructive PIO called "porpoising" began. Porpoising can become a divergent phugoid in a jet that's landed far too fast for its weight (and with insufficient drag flap).
.
What's Porpoising?
After the nosewheel oleo rebounds upwards and the aircraft "bounces" (courtesy of the MLG oleos decompressing a short time later), the neophyte pilot's natural tendency is to instantly lower the nose and again "spot the deck" (i.e. try to force the airplane onto the ground). It's completely opposite to a normal flare and hold-off process. The inevitable result is another nosewheel first strike (and rebound). The PIO is underway......
.
This apparently happened three times and on the third occasion the nosewheel oleo snapped off (thereafter no hydraulics, no nosewheel steering, no directional control via rudder, no reverse and MLG braking only from the brake accumulator - about five applications before it's empty).
.
Complicating matters in turboprops and piston-engined airplanes is the instant power response that's available (i.e. pilots can easily get "out of sync" by adding power in the bounce [i.e. on the rebound]). That added power cycling tends to "eat up" runway remaining. However to achieve the same porpoising effect in a jet, you just have to be "hot" (and high) over the threshold, have little or no flap (i.e. drag to kill off your float speed), try to force the airplane onto the ground (resulting in a tricycle landing or even worse, striking nosewheel first).
.
You might recall that I once told you about this being done to me by a gent called XXXXXX in an SP2H Neptune at XXXXXX. He looked up at night to locate and dump the jets, (whose throttles were in the overhead console), and inadvertently let the nose drop whilst in the landing flare. Wildest ride I ever sat through (as a young copilot). Coincidentally he had the worst stutter you'd ever imagine acceptable in a pilot. Seems fitting somehow that he could also create the most memorable porpoising ride of my flying career.
.
Back to porpoising. Adding to these self-wrought woes is the fact that any power "adds" (or throttle manipulation) will inhibit spoiler extension and add to the overrun likelihood. Even without throttle jockeying, you still need the MLG squat switches to be depressed long enough for the spoiler panels to pop up (and then of course, the oleos to remain depressed). During porpoising that just won't happen so, lacking that spoiler effect, the wing just keeps "flying". It's a PIO cycle that's destined to end up destructive and/or off the end, particularly if you're hot and have landed much too far in. We can expect to see many more of these types of "mishandling, confused and fixated" accidents the world over - as pilot experience levels drop (and the new MPL licencees move up in the airline world).
.
I have a fairly high degree of confidence in this theory having been the underlying cause for Flight GA200's fate once they'd touched down. But why they allowed it to get hot on finals? I'm sticking my neck out by saying that the RH seater just neglected to select flap (or only took 15 degrees and then totally forgot about the flap lever because of the distraction of a wind-shear/microburst and overshoot trend). If they flew through a sharp gust or thermal and picked up a temporary tailwind and just lowered the nose to correct the overshoot trend? Well that would just indicate a fairly inept handling of a common everyday problem. Unless there was some other complication, I'd tend to put it down to an inability to cope with the environmentals - and the inexperience of the RH seater. I believe the captain was actually quite experienced, but probably let it all go too far. Porpoising is a PIO - and by definition it can be a self-sustaining destructive process. And fixation (leading to task saturation) is by far the most common cause of mishandling accidents during the landing evolution.
.
For some examples of porpoising, try this link (tinyurl.com/33ektj)

Sinbad1

8th Mar 2007, 17:01

:ok:
Cytherea,
I accept your explanation, apology for the misunderstanding.

For those flyers that are not Boeing and who are interested in B737, below some explanation with regards to that discussion that has taken place to the Flap position and what might and might not happend. I am sorry I can not upload schematic for some reason on the Pprune sight (I did try photo buckets) but no joy. Enjoy it or
ignore it

http://www.b737.org.uk/flightcontrols.htm

PeePeerune

8th Mar 2007, 17:43

Yaw damper coupler pin corrosion again?????

theamrad

8th Mar 2007, 21:05

PK’, thanks for the details on JOG approaches. I think your efforts at giving us information as accurately as possible may, unfortunately, be lost on some. Despite the compelling information so far indicating a probable course of events (and probably discounting others), some are still making suggestions in a surprisingly confident manner, when based on the most wild and tenuous of witness reports – akin to the remarks of the housewife that you mentioned. The media have continued in a similar vein: “jets of fire”, “series of explosions”, “’jumping the road’”, c**p, rubbish, waffle etc. As in common with many other disasters, yesterday’s event were big enough, dramatic enough and TRAGIC enough NOT to warrant the usual religious use of inaccuracy, over-emphasis, and over-exaggeration demonstrated by much of the press. Reminds me of: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=265200…………

As for the report that the captain indicates encountering a downdraft, and resultant high sinkrate: PK – you indicated winds of around 20kts at the time – I presume, in the absence of a detailed weather report for the accident time, that it was Easterly. It makes me wonder; if we give him the benefit of doubt, with an Easterly airflow over the mountains/high terrain to the East, it seems to me that the possibility (even probability) for terrain induced turbulence is quite high. Maybe even to the point of rotor/vortex type structures being generated. I’m taking a stab in the dark here, but wonder what others might think. To date, I have a not too large experience base on Indonesian (spec. Yogya!) local weather/climate:confused: – I’ve noticed reports of deaths in recent days/weeks as a result of high winds etc, (Jakarta and Probolinggo) which make me wonder if the area around Yogya can experience the odd unusual ‘perturbation’?? After all, although a lot of the time we can consider ourselves smug in our knowledge of weather and aircraft performance – it’s not beyond the bounds of possibilities for something to jump up out of the blue occasionally and bite in the *ss!

While I concede that landing with flaps appearing to be deployed well above 30 would be a symptom of possible asymmetry, I personally think it can be discounted for the following reason: The captain is reported to have said they encountered a “minor” problem which was rectified before (attempted!) landing. If this report is accurate, would he have described flap asymmetry and possible drive stop at a lower setting as a “minor” problem, or that it had been rectified if (he felt) forced to land in a less than optimum configuration for runway length because of it?

Now I must resist the temptation for further speculation - like others have quite correctly said, the FDR readout should answer a lot of questions.

Sinbad1

8th Mar 2007, 21:26

:sad:

Here are some facts to consider;

Captain Komar, 45, had been a Garuda captain for five years and had 22 years' experience as a pilot, Captain Stephanus said.

Which mean, he would have been performing this landing to perfection and knowing the landing check list by heart.

The head of Garuda's pilot association managed to interview Capt. Marwoto last night, and he quoted that there was a "minor problem" with the aircraft "which was solved and acted upon prior to the landing. Flight conditions appeared normal until the aircraft was about 1000 feet above the Yogyakarta's runway, Captain Komar and his co-pilot told Captain Stephanus yesterday.
Captain Stephanus said. "They said there was a problem, there was something wrong with the flaps, the flaps cannot extend normally.The problem could not have been flap asymmetry for two reasons; firstly he would not have been able to act upon "minor problem" prior to landing and fix it. Secondly flap asymmetry is not minor problem as he would have sudden roll in the aircraft and as he stated everything was normal up to 1000 feet. The gauge with comparator switch would have told him that. This tells me that the flap at 30 would have been already selected and I could assume there were no asymmetry until then.

According to his chief pilot"The captain felt a downdraft and the aircraft sinks so rapidly," Captain Stephanus said. "They just felt the aircraft hit the runway and bounce and then because the speed is very fast the aircraft overran. Then the engines hit the ground."The pilot did not explain why he was travelling so fast, I would've thought there is a common approach speed,Such an experienced pilot like Mr Kumar, He must know the approach and the landing configuration by heart and even if he had one of these days what about his FO??!

If the hard landing would have been the cause of such damage ( I think not) you could only go back to Adam Air and see the difference. Unless of course he landed the aircraft nose first which could definitely cause the nose gear to smash. Also such landing would have reduced the engine clearance to the ground. Just to remind you of the A320 in the USA when it landed with the nose wheel completely off to the side.

Loss of hydraulic fluid do not cause the aircraft to veer to the side or catch fire. The hydraulic system has fuses which seal the affected area downstream of the leak after a few drops of leak have been detected. Hydraulic power from system A is used to turn the nose wheels to either side from zero to 78 degrees. In addition, on some airplanes system B may also be used to turn the nose wheels. An alternate nose wheel steering system, activated by a switch on the captain's forward panel (Fig 1), allows power from hydraulic system B to turn the nose wheels if power from hydraulic system A is lost.

The captain said after the crash the crew followed standard emergency procedures, opened all the exits and managed to evacuate most of the passengers.I think the Cabin Crew did a magnificent job under the circumstances, but I cannot see how the pilot would have been doing this, especially when the cockpit section ended up separating from the rest of the fuselage.

Finally, my sincere sympathies go to the families who have lost their loved ones and can't help feeling sorry for the flight crew. I am sure nobody would want to be in that situation no matter what the reason is. I salute the cabin crew for their heroic efforts.
:sad:

HotDog

8th Mar 2007, 22:21

There are a lot of "expert" opinions here that need correcting. The Shadow please note:This apparently happened three times and on the third occasion the nosewheel oleo snapped off (thereafter no hydraulics, no nosewheel steering, no directional control via rudder, no reverse and MLG braking only from the brake accumulator - about five applications before it's empty). The 737 has two independent hydraulic systems "A" and "B". Even if system A was completely lost when the nose gear sheared off,(nosewheel steering was no longer of interest) Rudder, No.2 Thrust Reverser and Normal Brake system still powered by sys. B.

PK-KAR

8th Mar 2007, 23:43

Ultralights,
(warning: guess hazard)The 734 has something what I call "partial trim assist", dunno the real term for it... ie. if you pull the nose up, there will be some up trim to assist the elevator, and the same for "down"... However of you have that trim we see on the photo, it's one heck of a low trim.

If we may guess, the last significant yoke movement before any off runway impact was down. The yoke up is possibly (warning: guess hazard) a result of yoke displacement or cable distortion due to the ground impact.

The flap does not seem to be flap 30...

---

Sinbad1,
I checked with an F/A on the 737 on why the slide wasn't deployed, she said, they need to assess the situation whether the slide would assist or hamper the evac. According to their manual (this is not from GA btw), for after impact land emergency...
1. Remain in brace pos until complete stop. Several impacts possible
2. Turn on Emergency Light (L1 position) {FA comment: This may not have been possible looking from the vid}
3. Wait for Command from Cockpit, if no word, if situation requires evac, initiate evac.
4. Shout emergency commands (edited)
5. If pax panic, shout assertive commands (edited)
6. Assess condition, feel for heat and look out window. Look for fire or obvious structural damage that could be hazardous for slide/raft deployment.
7. If exit is usable, open door.
(remainder of list is edited).

Now she commented, if you see obstacles or severe fire hazard, you do NOT inflate the slide. Now looking at http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage2.jpg there was the RIGHT wing ONTOP of the LEFT wing, I asked the F/A, if you see that, would you deploy the slide? Answer, No, if that catches fire, you're in trouble because it could give fuel to feed the fire even nearer to the door, hence blocking your last few exits. So, after seeing outside, you disarm the slide and open the door. Hence the "slide armed tape" is still hanging.
---

but does raise the question of finding a longer runway.
That seems to be the case, but we have to wait for confirmation. A flap assymetry on/near final approach does not seem to be a reason to declare emergency. That is a judgement call for the PIC to continue, or divert. Given that the nearest alternative is 50NM away and runway length is 400m longer than JOG, and the nearest longer runway after that is Surabaya (40mins - 1hr under normal conditions, which diverting there with flap assymetry being a risky proposition in terms of fuel burn, giving you an even less choice of actions upon the ultimate approach), he had to make a decision, "is it possible to land in JOG with whatever I have left?"... Flap15 at MLW and max man brakes under 2200m, able... go for it. Now whether that was the right call to make, we'll let Garuda and the NTSC decide... bear in mind hindsight is always 20/20. If the "land long" was caused by a flap15 landing using a flap30 flare technique, well, that could explain a lot... but again, we have to wait and see.

---

This apparently happened three times and on the third occasion the nosewheel oleo snapped off (thereafter no hydraulics, no nosewheel steering, no directional control via rudder, no reverse and MLG braking only from the brake accumulator - about five applications before it's empty).

Does this: http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/nosewheel.jpg
Look like the oleo snapped off? I've to see the pics of what part of the nosegear they found on the airport perimeter, but I am told that it is the wheels that had come loose, not the landing gear oleo.

Back to porpoising. Adding to these self-wrought woes is the fact that any power "adds" (or throttle manipulation) will inhibit spoiler extension and add to the overrun likelihood.

Well, airside eyewitnesses stated spoilers and reversers deployed, nosegear contacted runway with the wheels absent hence the sparks.

---
Theamrad,
Well, high sink rate and downdraft report could be a result of confusion due to severe emotional stress clouding one's memory. But, logically, chasing an ILS at 170 knots-ish comparing with 140, would yield a higher sink rate... and also give the visual impression to those on the ground that he was high and fast. For all we know, he could have been on slope... need the FDRs for that.

ATC reports wind as calm, but, seeing the video of the post evac, we can see there's a 5-10kt breeze... and some estimates up to 15kt. Colleagues from JOG did specify that wind that night was "unusual", but by the morning it was as we saw in the vid. Now given JOG, it wouldn't surprise me if the wind at 500'AGL would be a totally different story... thanks to the terrain.
---
Flight conditions appeared normal until the aircraft was about 1000 feet above the Yogyakarta's runway, Captain Komar and his co-pilot told Captain Stephanus yesterday.
We need to determine whether "flight conditions normal until about 1000ft above" was the aircraft config, or the handling of the aircraft, which would be explained by (but needs a look into), the wind and the surrounding terrain, oe other the flap itself?

but I cannot see how the pilot would have been doing this, especially when the cockpit section ended up separating from the rest of the fuselage.
Pls check the beginning of the video, with a mangled cockpit.. but still attached (and eyewitnesses said it was still attached prior to the fire taking over).
---

Finally got normal sleep last night...

PK-KAR

Capn Bloggs

8th Mar 2007, 23:55

Hotdog, agreed.

Sinbad,
he would have been performing this landing to perfection and knowing the landing check list by heart.
So? Chuck Yeager still makes mistakes.
The problem could not have been flap asymmetry for two reasons
Where in your quote is flap asymmetry mentioned by the chief pilot? What about if they had selected the first stage of flap at say 10nm, it got stuck there, they upped the speed bugs for the reduced flap setting for landing and decided to continue, not knowing they were going to get hit with undershoot shear during the flare?
If the hard landing would have been the cause of such damage ( I think not) you could only go back to Adam Air and see the difference.
So ALL hard landings result in Adam Air damage? I've been in a few hard landings that have resulted in a bounce/s but the jet hasn't broken apart!
I think the Cabin Crew did a magnificent job under the circumstances, but I cannot see how the pilot would have been doing this, especially when the cockpit section ended up separating from the rest of the fuselage.
It is quite conceivable, considering that both pilots survived, that they got out of the cockpit (if they were still in it) and went back to help the CC with the evacuation. In fact, it's probably in their SOPs to do so.

Dagger
a. Low time Right-seater flying and a quite experienced captain in the LHS being so distracted by the unstable approach that he doesn't lower any flap (normally a RH seater's duty).
Is it Garuda SOP for the right seater to select the flap?

For your information, GPWS, for years, has had a function which warns the crew if not landing at normal landing flap. I very much doubt if this Garuda 737 was not fitted with it. So landing with no flap at all is, to my mind, a complete furphy, unless the crew did it deliberately, which is just not practically believable.

I too come to these types of threads in an effort to learn something. Unfortunately, a worrying number of posts are just pure and utter speculation, full of red herrings, by people who appear to know nothing about what they are talking.

Casper

9th Mar 2007, 00:27

stillalbatross

9th Mar 2007, 00:57

The sad thing is there is no way an Airbus would have sheared off the nosegear and fallen apart like that. And Casper you could have taken full flap and the aircraft would have eventually given it to you when speed decreased appropriately.

Condolences to the families who have lost loved ones.

PK-KAR

9th Mar 2007, 01:12

Is it Garuda SOP for the right seater to select the flap?
For the benefit of DaggerDirk,
PF calls, PM selects (and checks the indicator)
If PF doesn't call, PM recommends.
GA doesn't like F/Os who just sit there and follow the Cpt blindly anymore! The ones that are, gets FIRED.
For your information, GPWS, for years, has had a function which warns the crew if not landing at normal landing flap. I very much doubt if this Garuda 737 was not fitted with it. So landing with no flap at all is, to my mind, a complete furphy, unless the crew did it deliberately, which is just not practically believable.
There's video evidence somewhere with the GPWS installed on GA 737s, though not on this 737. It's ex JetAirways, ask JetAirways if they had 734s without GPWS. *grin*

The sad thing is there is no way an Airbus would have sheared off the nosegear and fallen apart like that.
Should I just laugh this one off?

Capn Bloggs

9th Mar 2007, 01:43

Don't all you system experts forget that, if the aircraft is travelling fast enough, the flaps won't fully extend despite the fact that they have been selected and their operation is serviceable.
True, but only over 160ish KIAS and then only from 40 back to 30 or 30 back to 25??

Re GPWS, if this aircraft was indeed not fitted with it, then that reflects (badly) on the regulatory authority.

theamrad

9th Mar 2007, 01:58

The sad thing is there is no way an Airbus would have sheared off the nosegear and fallen apart like that.

WTF!! (All notions of self restraint thrown aside!!) Maybe (I hope) you havn't seen the embankment it collided with??

Maybe in the infamous LeBourget Airbus crash - the rest of the craft disentegrated, but the nose gear was still intact?
If there's no way the nose gear could shear of an Airbus try a search for the following:

March 10, 1997. A40-EM Airbus A320-212 Gulf Air
February 7, 2001. EC-HKJ Airbus A320-214 Iberia
October 26, 1999, VT-ESL Airbus A230-231 Indian Airlines
August 28, 2002. N635AW Airbus A320-231 America West

It's bizarre where the A vs. B thing pops up - i know which side I'm on - but usually try to refrain from joining in - appologies to those who it bugs.

Casper, I can only find one other event similar (runway excursion) to this one in reasonable near history - maybe you could enlighten me to the considerable other events.

Where in your quote is flap asymmetry mentioned by the chief pilot? What about if they had selected the first stage of flap at say 10nm, it got stuck there, they upped the speed bugs for the reduced flap setting for landing and decided to continue, not knowing they were going to get hit with undershoot shear during the flare?

Capn Bloggs, I believe there is a report of early flap difficulties, but that it was resolved (again reportedly). I think the scenario you suggest is a pretty reasonable possibility - leading to the dilema - what inadequate level of flap (and consequent increased speed/landing distance) would be acceptable vs. a divert to a longer runway ...... IF fuel with decreased performance adequate. If you put yourself in that situation, at a certain level of flap - distance is limiting and you've got to make the call of risk balancing. It also links in with PK-KAR's suggested possibility:"If the "land long" was caused by a flap15 landing using a flap30 flare technique, well, that could explain a lot... but again, we have to wait and see."
Altogether, would not be a nice situation.

PK-KAR

9th Mar 2007, 03:44

Theamrad,
Casper, I can only find one other event similar (runway excursion) to this one in reasonable near history - maybe you could enlighten me to the considerable other events.
I found 2... 1 was a flap assym landing with no damage... Again, with a looong flare requiring speedbrakes to "ease the baby down"... used about the whole 3000m of runway.

The other, was a late flare on possibly flap15, again under flap assym... result was a write off. However details are not to be disclosed (coz I got it from a leak). If you want to check which one this one was, try the Lion Air 734 in Makassar (UPG/WAAA) in December.

Capn Bloggs, I believe there is a report of early flap difficulties, but that it was resolved (again reportedly). I think the scenario you suggest is a pretty reasonable possibility - leading to the dilema - what inadequate level of flap (and consequent increased speed/landing distance) would be acceptable vs. a divert to a longer runway ...... IF fuel with decreased performance adequate. If you put yourself in that situation, at a certain level of flap - distance is limiting and you've got to make the call of risk balancing.
Try this for the balancing act:
Just out of curiousity, if you're shooting an ILS, and then at 3500AGL (4000ft), 1 dot below glideslope you do the normal thing, gear down, and flap 15, then as you enter the slope, you want to go to the next setting, but then you found an assymetry... say at one wing at 15 and 20 on the other, there's 1 traffic being told to take off in front of you and he's gonna make a tight left turn to "downwind", the runway is 2200m, you're surrounding terrain is:
>2000ft 4NM after the runway, with 1000ft contour about 3NM from the other end of the runway
The terrain to your right is >2500ft extending to your 4 o'clock from your present position,
A mountain to your left where the 1000ft mark is 5NM to your left, and 2000ft at 10NM, thereafter rising rapidly to 10,000ft.
The only escape in front is to the front left at your 10.30
The nearest suitable runway longer than JOG is 400m longer, anything longer than that (3000M) is 250NM away... which is your alternate... over some "nice" terrain.

1. Would you land and risk it bear in mind traffic and terrain and try a max braking landing knowing that under max braking the numbers are OK?
2. Would you go around and re-prepare? (which is probably a good thing given the hindsight)
3. Or would you divert?

Bear in mind a go around on that approach under non-normal (assume Flap Assym) can out you in conflict with the departing traffic, or any of the surrounding terrain.

Remember, hindsight is 20/20... We need to know why he didn't! He might have had a damn good reason not to!

I don't see anything wrong with the approach should this be a flap15 under assym, the problem was the flare... by this time, there are a lot of IFs and COULD HAVE BEENs, the only 2 things are consistent: the runway remaining rapidly running out, and those damn hills at the other end!
---
Collar,
Wanna bet that the CVR would reveal otherwise?
1. We don't drink teh tarik here! That's Malaysia!
2. F/A entering F/D below 10,000 on GA would only be to report "Cabin ready"... and as far as I know, it is strictly applied.

PK-KAR

VP TAA

9th Mar 2007, 06:02

Rather B Flying
I think in the air canada one the spoilers did not retract when go around power was applied , so they tried to fly with full ground spoiler deployed. Also as a result of this accident MDC later modified the spoiler systems so that they would retract when the throttles were advanced for a go around.
I Must say though its not looking too good for the pilots right now ...hope Im wrong
VP TAA

Sinbad1

9th Mar 2007, 08:55

Capn Bloggs (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=48133) "So? Chuck Yeager still makes mistakes."

:ugh:

I think you have misunderstood my posting big time. I was not having a dig at the flight crew, when I referred to the pilot knowing his landing by heart, I was trying to eliminate any mistake with regards to his landing calculation. After all the pilot has 22 years experience. Also looking at wreckage, the first question I asked "I wonder if the flight crew are alive?!" Believe me I was very happy to find out they survived. I was mainly saying how was it possible that the flight crew managed to help under the circumstances given the state of the wreckage?!! Obviously the pictures must have been taken after the fire have consumed most of the fuselage. When I saw the footage on Euronews and watching the Pax scrambling out of the aircraft I thought that was as close as you can get it. I have been working, advising and flying with pilots for decades, most of them are great, some are not so great. My personal well wishes goes to the recovering Pax, FLIGHT CREW, and of course the unknown heroes the cabin crew.

As far as the flap is concerned, this is not the first aircraft that may or may not suffer such condition. In fact the 747 classics and the 400 often suffer such incidents, especially after a hangar check due to rags left in the sailboat which obstructs the cable run. However, your point is valid with regards to the flap setting. My comments about asymmetry was in response to posts on PPRune (Porrohman page 6) and the fact that the captain of the Garuda flight told his chief pilot that he could not extend his flap (see Bear11 page 6).

With regards to the Hard Landing, NO not all aircraft suffer the Adam Air fate after hard landing (God knows how many hard landings I have inspected following inbound flight over the years), but if you read the statement coming out from the chief pilot, taking in to account the latest statement from the Civil Aviation Safety body of Indonesia in their finding evidence of debris left on the runway from the nose gear, the initial hard landing (and forgive me for saying this) would be on the main wheel first, not the nose wheel, would it not??

PK-KAR

Thank you for your explanation, When I said the slide was not deployed or armed , I was stating facts in reference to a post on this website and in no way I was criticising the cabin crew action. I know how hard those boys and girls work under normal circumstances, especially during a long haul flight let alone under crash conditions. The cabin crew as far as I am concerned are the real heroes of this terrible accident. I am sure all the crew followed the procedures as they saw fit.:ok:

PK-KAR

9th Mar 2007, 09:39

Sinbad1,
Sorry if you took it as a criticism of your post, I was trying to elaborate on your point using the procedures they used here. Sorry if it sounded "a bit defensive/offensive", but after reading several posts blaring out "tyro-type captains" and having "teh tarik" on final approach, restraint becomes a very precious asset. Sorry if I sounded as if I was criticizing you, wasn't the intention... it's been a loong few days over here. Flight cancellations, pax wanting refunds, almost loosing clients, family and friends all within a few days...

Yes they do work hard, some work so hard they get trodden allover, some love their work, some hate it, but at least most of them go about what they do as professional as they believe they can.

As for the cabin crew, I'm still trying to verify the last actions of the FA1 who died on duty...

Interestingly, all the cabin crew on that flight are seniors! Perhaps that too was a factor.

With regards to the Hard Landing, NO not all aircraft suffer the Adam Air fate after hard landing (God knows how many hard landings I have inspected following inbound flight over the years), but if you read the statement coming out from the chief pilot, taking in to account the latest statement from the Civil Aviation Safety body of Indonesia in their finding evidence of debris left on the runway from the nose gear, the initial hard landing (and forgive me for saying this) would be on the main wheel first, not the nose wheel, would it not??

Still trying to sift through some details of recollections of my friends of some eyewitnesses. They mostly concur with main landing gear first on the first bounce, but everything after that was blurry (apart from "it bounced 2x") until the point spoilers and reversers were deployed, at which point everyone was in utter disbelief, coz what they expected and feared most next, happened!

PK-KAR

Sinbad1

9th Mar 2007, 10:36

Dear PK-KAR, Thank you for your humility. I assure you no offence was taken. I take it you work for the company. It must be a terrible time for all. As for the bounce, normally when an aircraft comes hard and bounces, especially the nose gear, tends to have a recoil action which means the oleo leg compresses and bounces off the ground and could cause the geometry downlock to break, and that would collapse the nose gear for sure.
If you remember last year Lufthansa 747-400 collapsed its nose gear at the gate, Eva Air at Heathrow 747-400 and the Fokker 27 of SAS had oleo nose collapse. I think PPRune would have a picture of that in their archive.
As for the ground spoiler getting fully deployed, on the 737 they have on the right hand main gear a cable called "ground spoiler interlock" which as soon as the undercarriage hits the tarmac, it actuates the ground spoiler immediately, and the thrust reverser action is purely pilot command.
Finally, I sincerely feel for all of you guys and hope some lessons come out of this terrible tragedy.

PK-KAR

9th Mar 2007, 11:27

Sinbad1,
No I do not work for the company.
Right now we're hoping that the investigation will not be interfered.

PK-KAR

Left Coaster

9th Mar 2007, 11:31

Hi All, just in ref to the Air Canada DC-8 YYZ accident, the jet hit the rwy so hard it shed one or more engines, it did get airborne again but only really under little control. Sad accident for my family, it killed one of my Dad's best friends...he was the Capt... Sorry for the families and crews in Indonesia...hope the truth can be found soon.
LC

GroundScot

9th Mar 2007, 15:31

PK-KAR

Am advised that FA1 exited the aircraft after helping people out, he was seen on the video returning to the aircraft twice to further help/carry people out.

Sadly on the last return to the aircraft....... he did not reappear.......

A brave purser who sadly lost his life helping his passengers........

theamrad

9th Mar 2007, 18:05

PK-KAR, while perceptions have been mentioned a few times already – it is of course fair to say that sometimes perceptions (pilot or otherwise) can be larger than reality. A problem with flap asymmetry or failure to drive past a certain position should arguably not be a ‘critical’ event in itself. I would suggest the same would be true of a ‘downdraught’ encounter at 1,000’ AGL (if not a fully-fledged microburst!). But then IF one occurred after the other – an already heightened stress level could hit the overload level, and radically alter the ability to make the ‘right’ decision. I say that not as a criticism of this crew – but more as a remark on our sometimes frail human nature. ‘Human factors’ experts tell us that we are more likely to stick to a decision we have made, even after the information on which that decision has altered significantly, then reappraise the situation and alter our initial decision. Of course, accident reports and human performance of pilot action is done in the “cold light of day” through 20/20 hindsight goggles. I think there are a good few examples where pilots were criticised for their actions – with the benefit of hindsight….when the more reasonable would admit they would do the same thing under those circumstances…….There, but for the grace of God, go I!! etc.

Whatever the leadup here – like I said before, luck can play a major roll. Nice long stopway or nice level field of grass versus road, depression and embankment = completely different outcome……more’s the pity.

If I try to ignore hindsight – and put myself at the pointy end of the stick - as far as that balancing act is concerned – the major unknowns in my mind would be fuel remaining (Garuda SOP’s and specifics for that route?) and hydraulic status. Diversion of 50nm for 400m extra or 250nm for 3000m runway – I think I’d be biased against. Including the terrain/traffic complications you’ve outlined - as for the other 2 choices :

– If hydraulic system failure (separate from or associated with) asymmetric flap – that would seriously influence my decision (While strict adherence to checklists (non-normal) is nice and for the most part essential – I believe, like some others, it shouldn’t override the use of ‘good judgement’)……. I don’t think I’d go for MA and extra time with control potentially a problem or with reduced authority. I’d be going for landing as soon as possible.
– If flap asymmetry alone, hydraulics ok and controllability not badly affected – I’d take the MA and extra time option. With that scenario – there’s bound to be a certain “startle” element (especially IF speed reduction/flap extension was on the late side anyway), and personally I’d be glad to take the extra time if at all possible. Obviously there would be a stern self briefing and same for F/O about t/d on the first available asphalt being supercritical.

This is what I think my personal decision process would be – but of course, I admit, I’m not under the stress of being “at the pointy end” and we are dealing in the realms of possible scenarios / speculation.

Sinbad1

If you remember last year Lufthansa 747-400 collapsed its nose gear at the gate

Just out of curiosity – you know if there’s a source for more details about that?

I Must say though its not looking too good for the pilots right now ...hope Im wrong

I have to admit it seems that way to me – but I hope I’m wrong too. Hopefully the FDR/CVR details will paint a different picture.

Silberfuchs – I agree with what’s been said just above. I think this is just an expression along the lines of natural human emotion (as has happened in other events in which pilots understandably felt guilt – even though they were in no way responsible for an accident) and not in the sense of trying to imply any ‘liability’ on the part of the crew. Maybe Captain Stephanus is a bit naïve/innocent in comparison to how some of the media can sometimes twist things.

Anyone care to comment on whether the FDR details will be released to the public? Or kept quiet while investigation is ongoing? (Genuine question – NOT snipping!)

llondel

9th Mar 2007, 18:17

The Lufthansa incident was LH760 in May 2006, the gear collapsed on pushback.

http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1147785921.html

http://www.forum.plane-mad.com/viewtopic.php?t=3851

theamrad

9th Mar 2007, 18:54

Thanks a lot, llondel - I'll take a look.

KATLPAX

10th Mar 2007, 15:58

If the crew had some sort of flap issue, however minor during approach, would they not have informed someone as to the potential problem and request to have emergency crews standing by? From what I have read, nothing was mentioned. I would have thought with the possible higher speed (alleged) approach that an overrun was a possibility and having ground alert to this wise. What do SOP's require in this situation?

fox niner

10th Mar 2007, 16:35

I will usually be at about 5 minutes before landing that the flight crew finds out that they have some sort of flap problem.

The thing NOT to do when a flap problem arises, is to continue the approach. Just pick up a holding somewhere / get radar vectors and do the appropriate checklist.

When the failure is more or less sorted out, the crew can then assess what the next step will be. do they need a long runway? maybe. depends. for some partial flap landings (flaps 15 for example) 7800 feet of runway could be sufficient. depends....on many factors.

And if the 7800 feet at yogya happens to be sufficient, there is no need to call the fire brigade. the result will be a normal landing from the passengers' point of view. Slightly higher approach speed, 160 in stead of 140. Touchdown-reverse-braking-exit via a taxiway at the end of the runway.

But Frankly, I don't think there was anything wrong with the airplane. After reading all the info, I still have the feeling this was a rushed approach.

bomarc

11th Mar 2007, 05:31

Interesting recap of accident...worthy of your attention:

Welcome to The Sydney Morning Herald.

March 10, 2007

Life or death was dictated by where you sat, writes Mark Forbes in Yogyakarta.
Latest related coverage

* Pilot blames downdraft for crash
* The plane's crashing, Seven cameraman screams
* 'It was going too fast'
* Five Australians feared dead after crash
* Plane was travelling too fast: airforce commander

GARUDA airlines flight GA200 was full, 140 passengers and crew aboard. Left behind in Jakarta were several journalists unable to squeeze onto the 6am flight to cover Wednesday's trip to Yogyakarta by the Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer.

On board were two journalists who had grabbed the last tickets held by the Australian embassy, the Financial Review's Morgan Mellish and the Herald's Cynthia Banham. The embassy's most senior aid, information and police officers were sitting alongside them in business class.

Back in economy were more junior officials and two Indonesians working for Channel Seven, cameraman Wayan Sukarda and assistant Ardi Rahman. As many cameramen do, Sukarda cradled his camera during the flight.

The hour-long trip passed smoothly, but approaching Yogyakarta many passengers - all too aware of recent Indonesian crashes - became alarmed.

Murni Indarti, a university professor, said all appeared fine until minutes before landing.

"We felt something was wrong. The plane didn't seem to fly properly. We could see the land already. I joked with the passenger next to me that maybe this is what they call a hard landing. Then suddenly the situation was out of control."

Two RAAF officers, Michael Hatton and Kyle Quinlan, were exchanging nervous glances. Quinlan thought the aircraft was coming down "too fast, too hard", watching trees and buildings flash by his window.

"I've taken my earphones out and looked over at Mick. I said to him, 'this is coming in way too fast'," Quinlan said. "He nodded at me, and the plane started bouncing. It was a pretty rough ride. I grabbed my legs and braced for the impact."

In the cockpit, Captain Marwoto Komar and co-pilot Gagam Rohman were wrestling to control the Boeing 737-400. They could not fully extend the wing flaps and were rapidly approaching the airport, they have told Garuda officials, including the president of its pilots association, Captain Stephanus.

Just 300 metres above the runway "the captain felt a downdraft and the aircraft sinks so rapidly", Captain Stephanus said. "They just felt the aircraft hit the runway and bounce and then because the speed is very fast the aircraft overran. Then the engines hit the ground."

Normally pilots would try to "go around" and attempt another landing, but Captain Komar felt he had to complete the touchdown. Investigators believe the nose wheel snapped on the first impact

But, already more than a third of the way down the runway, the speeding jet was out of control.

It crashed through the airport fencing, then across a road. Landing gear and engines were ripped off. With a fuel tank ruptured, explosions began and flames soon followed.

Cockpit indicators did not warn of a fire, but as the crumpled jet slid to a halt Captain Komar saw smoke outside the window and ordered stewards to open the emergency exits and evacuate the passengers. The plane filled with smoke, fire and screams.

"People panicked because we saw fire," Professor Indarti said. "Things were just chaotic. People tried to get out of the plane, everybody was helping themselves."

Raham's left leg was trapped beneath his seat. Stumbling into the aisle, he fell and other passengers "were stomping on me". They broke his ribs, but Raham heard a steward calling people to the exit, struggled up and jumped. Then he ran: "All I could think of was to get as far as possible from the plane."

Sukardo said "we hit very hard", slapping his hand. "People say 'Oh my God, oh my God'. There was smoke and fire.

"All the luggage just fell down. Many people were crying, hysterical. The cabin staff opened the back door and directed passengers out. It was too, too quick. Very, very quick."

Sukardo grabbed his camera and headed for the rear exit. Jumping into the rice paddy, his boots lodged in the thick mud. He pulled his feet free and ran barefoot from the aircraft as aviation fuel sparked a series of explosions.

"I jump and run. I felt a big blast," he said. "I got away from the aircraft and I film. I am a cameraman; everywhere I go the camera is with me."

Turning his camera towards the wreckage, he captured Captain Komar jumping to safety from the cockpit as passengers struggled from the exits. "I don't know why the pilot not help the passengers," he said.

Co-pilot Rohman had turned back towards the cabin and saw a large elderly woman trapped in her seat with the flames approaching. He could not lift her and frantically beckoned through the gaping hole in the aircraft's side to three Indonesian Air Force officers outside. Together they pulled her to safety.

Quinlan and Hatton were sitting in economy's emergency row above the wing, but the nearest exit to their right was covered in flames. Hatton had been nearly knocked out by a locker, so Quinlan grabbed him and headed for the exit opposite.

"We were probably among the first five people who got out, and I looked back at the body - it was engulfed in flames, and I knew if there was an explosion and we stayed there, we wouldn't be alive," Quinlan said.

"Everything pretty much from two seats in front of us was gone. I can't imagine how anyone survived in the front of the plane."

Business class took the hardest impact. The cockpit was almost severed from the fuselage.

A dazed Cynthia Banham looked down and saw flames around her legs. Beside her people were "burning alive", still strapped in their seats, she said.

Banham, who had embarked on a fitness campaign to take part in marathons over the last few years, somehow pulled herself from her seat and dragged her badly burnt body towards an exit.

She tumbled from the aircraft, then rolled herself across the rice paddy before being rescued by onlookers. By then flames had engulfed the front of the aircraft and those within. Several died still trapped in their seats.

The passengers on either side of Banham, Mellish and the embassy spokeswoman Liz O'Neill, never emerged.

Twenty-one people on the flight perished, and Indonesian officials confirmed yesterday that they had identified all five Australian victims.

Amid claims that pilot error caused the crash, Captain Komar and the rest of the crew have been imprisoned by police at the local air force hospital.

He was suicidal, Captain Stephanus said. "We are very afraid he could kill himself.

"The captain is very depressed; he is feeling very, very guilty."

Describing Wednesday's crash as a "freak incident", Captain Stephanus urged the public not to pre-judge the pilot, pointing towards the claims of a downdraft and the possible flap malfunction. There have also been questions asked about the condition of the 15-year-old plane.

Some Indonesian investigators are convinced Komar is at fault for coming in too fast. Australian and Indonesian police have joined the investigation, which has prompted a behind-the-scenes turf war over jurisdiction.

Air safety officials believe they should be conducting the inquiry and are angered by the description of it by the Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Mick Keelty, as a "police investigation", and revealing the pilot's claims of a downdraft forcing the accident.

GA200's data recorders have arrived in Canberra, where the details of the final 30 minutes of the flight are being extracted. Investigators on the ground continue to comb the blackened wreckage, attempting to piece together the causes of the crash.

Friends and families of the victims remain in shock, attempting to piece together their lives.

with Karuni Rompies and Stuart Wilkinson

Sinbad1

11th Mar 2007, 11:29

:confused:
Sinbad1;
Quote:
I think the Cabin Crew did a magnificent job under the circumstances, but I cannot see how the pilot would have been doing this, especially when the cockpit section ended up separating from the rest of the fuselage.
Capn Bloggs (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=48133):
Quote;

It is quite conceivable, considering that both pilots survived, that they got out of the cockpit (if they were still in it) and went back to help the CC with the evacuation. In fact, it's probably in their SOPs to do so.

bomarc:
Quote:
Turning his camera towards the wreckage, he captured Captain Komar jumping to safety from the cockpit as passengers struggled from the exits. "I don't know why the pilot not help the passengers," he said.

Business class took the hardest impact. The cockpit was almost severed from the fuselage.:confused:

Sinbad1

11th Mar 2007, 13:43

:ok:
This is from the Australian.com.au

<LI class=byline>Stephen Fitzpatrick, Jakarta correspondent
March 10, 2007
CRASH investigators have ruled out suggestions of a downdraft being responsible for the Garuda Airlines disaster this week that killed 21 people, including five Australians.

Crash scene head, Marjono Siswo Suwarno, said early investigations had revealed weather conditions were fine at the moment flight 200 from Jakarta crash-landed just before 7am on Wednesday. At Yogyakarta's airport, where Australian and Indonesian police and other investigators continue the painstaking task of piecing together the final moments of flight 200, investigations chief Mr Marjono dismissed suggestions that a down-draft had forced the jet into an uncontrollable descent.
"There was no down-draft at the point of landing," said Mr Marjono, from Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Bureau.
"Data from the meteorological board shows that wind speed was less than five knots, so conditions were good. There was no mayday call from the plane."
In fact, Mr Marjono added, "the final words from the control tower were 'clear to land"'.
Investigators continue to interview the two pilots, Marwoto Komar and Gagam Rahman, but have moved them from the secure location where they were being held after the crash. The two men had been under police guard at a military hospital in Yogyakarta. Although Captain Marwoto hasbeen reported as being suicidal, hospital sources denied this.
Mr Marjono said he expected preliminary information from the plane's "black box" flight recorder and cockpit voice recorder to be made available some time next week, after investigators from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau sent the devices to Canberra on Thursday night.
"The data will be retrieved there, but analysis will be carried out here," he said.
"The ATSB is not leading the investigation, just helping us."

Flight Safety

11th Mar 2007, 14:22

I'm in basic agreement with fox niner. The story of the pilots is not adding up (for me anyway). I'm skeptical of the possibility that this accident was caused by both a flap extension problem and a large downdraft on final approach.

First, fox niner says it correctly. If there was a flap extension problem on approach, I'm nearly certain that the approach would have been abandoned, and the pilots would have a spent a few minutes assessing and planning for a high speed landing, including runway selection, etc. A flap extension failure or anomaly is not something you can assess and plan around in the very brief time of a final approach.

Second, we have our first report that there was in fact no downdraft over the runway at the time of the accident, from the crash investigators no less.

The FDR (and CVR) will tell the tale.

Forgive me, but I'm very skeptical of the stories being told by these pilots.

(edited to fix typos)

PK-KAR

11th Mar 2007, 16:33

Flightsafety,
I got details from 5 737 classics (or former) pilots that there could be a possibility that they themselves would not abandon the approach.

As to the stories of the Captain of the flight, I must remind people of the interview that night I saw on TV...
The initial interview with the chief of garuda's pilot association mentioned:
1. when he flared, he felt like something pushed his aircraft from behind (not push it down), MAYBE a downdraft.
2. there was some problems with the aircraft but that was resolved prior to the final approach.
3. he did not know why he was so fast that he could not stop.
4. he is in a state of depression and emotional stress.

The story about the downdraft developed out of this interview within 24hrs! (and all those "so-called instant experts" wasted TV airtime and newspaper pages on it)... WX at the time was OFFICIALLY:
2330UTC: 050/07 5000 HZ SCT018 24/23 1003.6
0000UTC: 050/05 6000 HZ SCT018 24/23 1003.6

However, got the WX details and ATC transcripts today... and where the 2 touchdowns were made. Added with elevator up, flap15, and the damage on the air force academy road the plane jumped over (more damage being on the embankment on the runway side and not on the opposite side and the central divider undamaged), and where the landing gears and engines were found, and where the right wing outboard of the engine ended up... Added with the rubber deposited and the nose gear leg digging tracks on the runway, and bounce at 685m beyond thr, 2nd wheel contact was at 885m...
leads me to believe that:
1. It was a flap30 landing, visual with a/t on.
2. High flare (above 27' AGL), AT didn't auto D/C, speed drop, A/T kicks in, long flare.
3. Belly flop it to the runway and a/t d/c
4. Reversers and spoilers deployed... max man brakes applied.
5. At some stage someone decided to go around while the other was still trying to stop the aircraft on the brakes.
6. floated across the road.
7. stalled
8. fatal impact, wing flew over to the other side, fuel dispersed catches fire.
the rest U know.
Without CVR and FDR, this is just a theory... until the CVR is decoded, I have to settle with only guessing what happened in the cockpit.
Recompiling the findings *yet again!*
PK-KAR

fox niner

11th Mar 2007, 16:48

Hi ther PK-KAR, you wrote:

Added with elevator up, flap15, and the damage on the air force academy road

and

1. It was a flap30 landing, visual with a/t on.

So do you think they landed with flaps 15 or 30?

By the way, captain's weather at time of accident........

tightcircuit

11th Mar 2007, 16:59

F9
How about flap30 for the approach and flap15 for an attempted go-around. That seems to be what PK-KAR is suggesting.

fox niner

11th Mar 2007, 17:40

Thanks tightcircuit,

didn't get that.:ok:

PK-KAR

11th Mar 2007, 18:02

Did someone mention weather?
Just received today: Weather report from the airport.
WARJ 2200UTC 080/06 5000HZ SCT018 24/23 Q1003.6
WARJ 2230UTC 060/06 5000HZ SCT018 24/23 Q1003.6
WARJ 2300UTC 050/06 5000HZ SCT018 24/23 Q1004
WARJ 2330UTC 050/07 5000HZ SCT018 24/23 Q1003.6
WARJ 0000UTC 050/05 6000HZ SCT018 24/23 Q1003.6
WARJ 0030UTC 060/10 6000HZ FEW017 26/23 Q1004

Time of accident was 23:57

theamrad

11th Mar 2007, 18:20

In more than 10 years of flying into Yogyakarta's airport since my first arrival there as a student in 1994, I have never felt comfortable hitting the heavily pitted and too-short runway. I have regularly seen passenger jets run off the end of it, becoming marooned in the rice fields that surround the airfield

Another previously mentioned piece of "inspired" WAFFLE from the same individual. I sure would LOVE to meet Mr. Stephen Fitzpatrick in person! - who, I presume, is working off his own copy of the -400 AFM and also the relevant SOPS. Although, at least, this time the personal opinion seems to be a bit less prevalent.
------------

this could be to blame for the whole thing.

As could alien abduction, UFO encounters, Mickey Mouse playing a joke - depending on one's intellect base. So you’ve changed your mind?

Now I wonder where that post suggesting this was caused by Indonesians being too lazy to maintain their aircraft went to??????? Anyone care to comment?????? The one concerned knows exactly what I refer to. If you want to continue to post completely unfounded waffle - maybe I'll have to quote exactly what you said previously(now missing) and comment further on it – ‘what say you’?

As someone else already said:

Gentlemen, pleeeease! There are some of us who come to the PPruNe to see what was behind the last mishap in order to learn from other people's mistakes and to avoid becoming next hot PPruNe thread. I'd really appreciate if we could just cut down the noise. If you have something meaningful to contribute (kudos to PK-KAR ) please do so.

I agree.

------------

Sinbad1, I know it's difficult, because I'm really tempted to get involved too - but I suppose we just have to try our best to rise above acknowledging the wildest of speculative opinion/comment

------------
KATLPAX,

If the crew had some sort of flap issue, however minor during approach, would they not have informed someone as to the potential problem and request to have emergency crews standing by?

Generally – obviously prudent if rw length marginal - but not necessarily so (if rw length ok) - dependant on what else it happening (i.e. pilot workload), and whatever else is going on (matters being weighed up in any decision making). Without prejudice or any reference to this accident - you can see how this happening on approach to a really long runway (say c10,000ft) - the commander would have no reason to believe anything other than a normal landing would result - albeit at increased speed.

----------------
PK-KAR,
Personally, I think I was at the stage where I was going to refrain from commenting on the downdraft issue anymore – I’d already seen DIFFERENT reports attributable to the captain about his claim. One indicating the occurrence at 1,000 AGL – and a separate one suggesting it happened much nearer to the ground. Whether it’s the fault of the media or not…..? Now to consider it happening at 1,000 and causing an influence all the way down (and affecting the actual landing) AND surface wind at the time reported as <10 kts – was always going to seem tenuous and subject to some skepticism. In any case – seems like an official knockdown on that issue now from the investigators and the METAR's themselves.

At first glance – your new information seems to suggest some earlier theories voiced here are mainly redundant – but on looking a little longer – I’m a little more confused now than before. Seems like your suggested cause is now possibly bringing in a CRM conflict as well – whether deliberate on the part of the crew, or 'forced' on them by a rapidly deteriorating situation.

If you are correct about flaps 30 landing – we’re still at a loss as to why the approach was apparently/reportedly so fast. It’s a pity – but it seems none of the witnesses onboard have said anything about flap position when landing (that I know of).

High flare (above 27' AGL), AT didn't auto D/C, speed drop, A/T kicks in, long flare.

On -400 should have been off before 360'AGL for vis approach(50' AGL if single a/p to DH)– correct? Again if true – has been neglected a couple of times in other incidents – so is possible.

bounce at 685m beyond thr, 2nd wheel contact was at 885m

- Suggesting that an aborted landing should have been initiated, at the latest, before the second bounce – but then if the captain/fo suspected severe damage already done on the first touchdown – perhaps he would have felt committed to staying on the ground. Do you know if the nose wheels separated on the first or second contact?

As for all our discussions concerning flaps – hopefully the FDR and CVR data will be known shortly – whether released or leaked. I just hope we can get an idea of the recorded information – and not some dunderhead’s (or indeed speculative nervous flyers!) interpretation of it!

Thanks for the continued insight – much appreciated here – as even the lower (more speculative) echelons of the media on this side of the world have long since ‘moved on’ to other stories.

tightcircuit

11th Mar 2007, 18:30

I know that Garuda have been making efforts to improve the safety culture in the airline but it is obviously taking a long time to alter the flightcrew mindset. They have for instance emphasised that pressing on with approaches during thunderstorms is a bad idea. As a result there are far more diversions these days and far fewer Garuda a/c parked on the grass (shame some of the other operators don't take this on board).

It seems though that the advice has not been interpreted as applying to other aspects of the operation. I was a passenger on a Garuda flight from Solo to Jakarta last year. During the taxi out and take off I was reading my book and not paying too much attention to the events going on around me (apart from the safety brief of course). When we landed at Jakarta two engineers who were also passengers on board asked me what I thought of the extraordinary take off. Apparently at the start of the T/O the flaps were still up and were running out to the T/O setting all the way until rotate.

I have to say that since we survived I am glad I hadn't noticed. If I had known I would have felt compelled to do something about it but I am not sure what effect a Bule Gila (mad white man) running down the aisle shouting stop would have had.

theamrad

11th Mar 2007, 19:21

Tightcircuit,
I have to admit to a SLIGHTLY similar experience on a flight from Jakarta to Yogya about 3 years ago, but not as serious. Maybe it was on the borderline – but at the time, it seemed to me at least, the engines were spooled up just a little too soon while early in the lining up turn. Quite a lot of acceleration with more than just a few degrees turn left to make!

I just wonder, in your case, was the flap handle moved before or AFTER the T/O configuration horn was wailing?:eek:

Miraz

11th Mar 2007, 20:05

Another passenger account

AFTER a last glance from the paddy field to the blazing jet that had carried him to Yogyakarta on Wednesday, Alessandro Bertellotti caught a cab into town, bought clothes to replace those splattered with blood, and decided to use his return ticket to Jakarta that afternoon.
He believed he could never face flying again if he delayed.
Mr Bertellotti flew home to St Kilda, Melbourne, on Friday, unaware he was the mysterious 10th Australian who disappeared from the crash site, sparking confusion and consternation.
Speaking to the Herald yesterday, Mr Bertellotti's lucid memories of the final minutes of the flight may cast a clearer picture on the causes of the crash. A veteran air traveller who takes more than 100 flights a year, Mr Bertellotti was four seats back from the wing. He said he was startled that the Boeing 737-400 was coming into Yogyakarta too fast. When he checked the wing, he could clearly see the air brakes above the wing raised, but it appeared the main flaps below were not extended.
Normal procedures had not been followed. The announcement to prepare for landing was issued about 10 seconds before the aircraft hit the tarmac, and some of the crew were not in their seats.
Mr Bertellotti felt the aircraft dip suddenly before landing, but he believes the speed of the approach made a crash inevitable.
The Herald revealed on Friday that the Garuda pilot had said a
down draught slammed the aircraft into the runway and that the wing flaps were malfunctioning. "We were travelling at an incredible speed," Mr Bertellotti said. "Everyone was screaming before the landing because we knew it was too fast.
"I look outside, the air brakes were up, but I saw the airport building passing by in a flash. My impression was the flaps weren't down …
"There was no wind at all before the crash. I did feel it dip for just a moment. We were about 50 metres above the ground. There was this fast movement, but already we were approaching too fast. We were already screaming.
"I don't understand why they didn't touch and go [take off and try to land again]. There was a huge bang and that was it."
Two stewards were still running towards their seats. The impact threw them into the air.
"I am very lucky. I am still alive. I was in seat 21C on the right side and the fire started on the left side four seats in front …
"Everything was incredibly dark, but we saw the light from the rear door and in eight steps I was out. There were six or seven people in front of me.

"The hostess was just standing there, showing us the door with her hand and kept silent; it was very strange. Outside there was an incredible silence. No one was speaking. It's incredible the plane didn't catch fire when we crashed - [the fire] only got big after two minutes. In those two minutes most people got out.
"There were a few ambulances but I said I didn't need them because nothing was broken and to use them for the people who were hurt."
Mr Bertellotti, a journalist with Italian TV who covers the region from Melbourne, then went into Yogyakarta to meet a cultural official at a conference he was meant to report on.
The official helped him buy clothes and glasses. Mr Bertellotti said he then reported back to the airport, but the message appears not to have reached Australian officials.
Mr Bertellotti holds dual Australian and Italian citizenship, which may have added to confusion over his whereabouts. He was listed as an Italian survivor when Australian officials were trying to find the 10th Australian they knew was on the flight.
"I went back to the airport later to tell them I was fine. I got a call from Canberra that afternoon. I told them I was fine and not to worry about me but look after the others who were hurt."
He decided to leave immediately, stopping in Jakarta before catching the first flight he could to Melbourne. "I wanted to leave this day behind, and the way was to go back with the ticket I had with Garuda. I think if I don't I won't fly any more." Boarding the flight he was "fighting the shadow of the memory".
"I'd like to leave this experience behind. This will live with me forever, but life goes on."

PK-KAR

11th Mar 2007, 20:51

One indicating the occurrence at 1,000 AGL – and a separate one suggesting it happened much nearer to the ground.
Well, no mention about odd winds on the ATC... I can now confirm that... the transmissions between the aircraft and ATC are:

23:55
T GIA200: Adi Tower, Indonesia 200, selamat pagi
T TOWER: Selamat Pagi Indonesia 200, surface wind calm, continue approach runway 09, Report final, traffic one Bravo on line up position.
T GIA200: Continue approach, check final, copy traffic, Indonesia 200

23:56
T TOWER: Indonesia 200, Wind Calm, check gear down and lock, cleared to land.
T GIA200: Cleared to land, Indonesia 200

No other transmissions between GA200 and the Tower. (the gear down and lock is likely as a habit of JOG ATC, since they're military and serve a lot of military student pilots based at the airport).

Accident happened at 23:57:50...

At 23:56, something happened...
T TOWER: Bravo errr... Indonesia 406... (radio interference/scramble/static)... s... s...

and

T TOWER: Indonesia ahhhh, J-406, contact Jogja Approach Sir

This indicates a possibility the tower was startled at seeing the GA, while the J-406 traffic was already airborne.

If you are correct about flaps 30 landing – we’re still at a loss as to why the approach was apparently/reportedly so fast. It’s a pity – but it seems none of the witnesses onboard have said anything about flap position when landing (that I know of).
Well, that's still what's baffling...

When we landed at Jakarta two engineers who were also passengers on board asked me what I thought of the extraordinary take off. Apparently at the start of the T/O the flaps were still up and were running out to the T/O setting all the way until rotate.
U sure they weren't pulling your leg?

the engines were spooled up just a little too soon while early in the lining up turn. Quite a lot of acceleration with more than just a few degrees turn left to make!
I've had that a few times too...

Cheers,

PK-KAR

PK-KAR

11th Mar 2007, 21:51

Miraz,
Seat 21C on the RIGHT side and fire started on the LEFT side?
And outside no one was speaking?

Has he seen the video?
Can this guy tell what's left and what's right?
21C is left side of the aisle, and the fire started from the right side.
Furthermore, if the cabin is not ready for landing, the aircraft would not land unless it is an emergency, and the announcement would be different. A normal landing would require the FA1 or one that has been told by the FA1, to tell the captain that the cabin is ready... And cabin ready for landing is part of the checklist... so this is only possible if there is an emergency or a severe omission of the landing checklist.

PK-KAR

Miraz

11th Mar 2007, 22:10

Just quoting local media - suspect the usual amount of journalistic license needs to be applied when reading it.

I have had the misfortune to be a pax in two runway overshoot incidents, thankfully neither of which involved any fatalities - the second of which involved an aircraft fire and a full on emergency evacuation.
I know that I was sufficiently together during the evacuation that I helped a number of panicing passengers, undo seat belts, get out of their seats and pushed them towards the exits before getting out myself.

As has had been said by previous posters - take any pax accounts with a big pinch of salt. I know that some aspects of my own memories turned out to be inaccurate.

Grongle

11th Mar 2007, 22:28

1.
I'll feel somewhat relieved if the downdraft is not held responsible. I realize there have to be times when such anomalies occur at critical moments, and so could be catalysts toward fatal accidents. Be that as it may, airlines rarely warn their passengers that "we shall arrive at 0730, unless, of course, a difficult wind comes along at the same time we're already dealing with other difficulties, in which case, of course, we shall be killed." There are millions of flights taking place around the world, and, thank goodness, downdrafts are more generally reckoned as dangers through which pilots can and do skillfully maneuver their machines.

Recent headlines [this is one: "Pilots say wind caused Garuda crash"] seem to have said: "It was the downdraft", as though readers would then say, "Oh. Well. No wonder, then."

2.
There is a very healthy belief in this forum that "I know I am right, so you must be wrong." However, the forum title is generously worded: RUMOURS and News. Rumours, according to WordWeb, are "gossip (usually a mixture of truth and untruth) passed around by word of mouth", and are related to "hearsay".

Some folk just want the facts, and that's fine, but that is not really what this forum is exclusively about. It is set up as a conversation pit, and if you don't like the "rumours" component, then it would be appropriate to suggest to the powers that be, for another forum to be established: The Facts Behind the News, or whatever you like. Both could exist side-by-side. But, as things exist, this is Rumours & News. Both.

tightcircuit

11th Mar 2007, 22:53

PK-KAR
Tidak percaya Ya? Yes thanks I am sure they weren't pulling my leg. There were other factors I didn't mention earlier. The flight was well delayed, the turnround was unusually quick and the taxi out was unprofessionally fast too. I know them, I believe them.

Salamat.

nojwod

12th Mar 2007, 01:44

My cynical side tends towards thinking that the crew got themselves into a pickle due to the unspecified problem they faced on approach, once they had been distracted they found themselves too high and too fast but figured they could get down inside the numbers, and I suspect that will be found to be at least a contributory factor.

My kinder side wonders if the numbers that the crew were seeing on approach were within the limits, but somehow they got it wrong. If they believed the flaps were down and the airspeed was OK, the attitude and apparent speed of the aircraft might not have been enough to convince them until too late. The passenger who caught a taxi from the scene said that the spoilers were up but the flaps weren't fully extended. If there was an anomalous airspeed indication, if the flaps lever was in the landing position but the flaps indicator wasn't consulted, the possibility of the plane sinking fast as lift disappeared due to the spoiler deployment seems not too far fetched. If at the same time the crew somehow believed they were within a reasonable range of landing speeds, their behaviour could be plausible.

Just a thought from a curious bystander.

theamrad

12th Mar 2007, 05:05

nojwod,
the scenario you describe is quite (possibly even very) plausible. But if what you describe turned out to be correct - the crew would be 100% responsible for failure to conduct/monitor the approach correctly - both from an AFM standpoint and, I think fair to assume, from the point of view of company SOP's (I'd imagine Garuda SOP's cover the issue comprehensively like everyone elses - but I don't know what they actually are).
Although the Italian witness mentions flaps - it is stated in a manner which isn't really definitive. What he does state clearly concerns the spoilers. If this is true - that alone would be another breech of AFM limitations - no spoiler deployment below 500'AGL when visual (at least that's my information - others may differ slightly in their AFM and SOP's)

As far as INADVERTANTLY leaving the spoiler deployed - that's why it's a damned good idea to keep your hand on the lever when it's out - and not take it off 'till it's stowed. This has figured in disasters before - performance analysis indicates it was a probable factor in the CFIT at Cali, Colombia, during the attempted escape manoeuvre. I'd have a genuine difficulty in seeing that happening by accident - all the way down - and with neither crew member spotting it. Even if only from the higher than normal n1's and the change in pitch needed to maintain the g/s.
-----------
PK-KAR,
- just thinking about Flap 30 again - if spoilers also deployed (not recommended beyond flap 15 from Mr. B' - due severe vibration and possible damage) I imagine there would be buffeting which would border on the severe. I don't think anyone reported anything which could be explained as buffeting - maybe pushes things away from having landing flaps selected again?

ATC transmissions don't indicate anything really - except to educate me about the "check gear down and locked" advisory - I've honestly never heard of that being done before - but a good prudent idea given the military training:ok:

I find it strange (obviously not suspecting malice or anything else) that Captain Stephanus gave some information about the crew's conversation with him - but never actually mentioned what the minor technical problem was.

PK-KAR

12th Mar 2007, 05:07

Tightcircuit,
It is possible, I am not dismissing your claims at all... especially given the surrounding factors you mentioned. I have been in similar situations, though relieved they took their time after what it seems to be "omissions of certain aspects of pre-airborne tasks", and we sped up in the air instead.

PK-KAR

PK-KAR

12th Mar 2007, 05:11

but never actually mentioned what the minor technical problem was.
From a separate source, I'm awaiting confirmation regarding the brakes being changed from the day before. Plus, the #1 reverser was locked before the flight, and the crew were aware of it. The reason was due to delayed deployment (as far as I am told).

PK-KAR

theamrad

12th Mar 2007, 17:54

Amos2, I think that’s just because the original poster was mirroring the first media reports.- Had it been here – the first report I heard in this neck of the woods said “five feared dead”. So understandable, if indeed inaccurate now.

brakes being changed from the day before……........#1 reverser was locked before the flight

Getting into the realms of speculation again – so more in terms of thinking aloud – from the second contact point you indicated, if still a good bit beyond Vref(even for Flap 30) breaking to a stop and staying on the runway becoming doubtful – I think (885m - time to start manual braking, even if autobrake selected, time to get to full manual application, possible modulating if directional control a problem, POSSIBLY your crewmate thinking of GA and applying thrust again(even for a brief time)). I think you mentioned something like ‘track marks’ earlier – if I’m not misunderstanding – even with max. manual braking that, could indicate anti-skid problem – I know I don’t have enough facts and this is really reaching at this stage.

Reverser locked (not unusual)– well we know is not a requirement from regulatory and AFM standpoint. For DRY runway – should have no bearing on decision making of actual performance BEFORE the landing – as for any effect on what seems to have happened on the runway if both reversers were available – we’re heading into the realms of detailed performance analysis of FDR data. If your theory is correct – one pilot trying to GA and the other trying to stop, if reverse thrust had been available and selected by one – that would/should have been the end of trying for GA. I think the suggestion of confusion arising in the cockpit is pretty compelling over a GA or not decision.

In thinking about chain of events - plenty of incidents in the past with initial minor mistake leading to further mistakes/wrong decisions, all the time - the potential consequence of each step becoming worse. Like a cascade of disaster - some pilots have become 'trapped' in the sequence - inspite of their training and 'our' retrospectively applied common-sense.

Everything is pretty much “up in the air” still (no pun intended). Still a bit hopeful, like before – but I think that it is becoming more desperate as time goes by.

To get away from the specifics of GA200 momentarily, I do have a ‘statistical’ curiosity/question for anyone experienced in the professional field of Indonesian aviation. If for a moment we were to assume that ALL operators were performing in the way they should/how we would like them to, with total fleet age/maintenance profile that would match anywhere else. In terms of amount of traffic, the myriad of airfields/available facilities served across so many islands, frequently challenging terrain in many of those places, and ‘rainy’ season tropical weather/runway length generally available. It SEEMS to me that Indonesia could expect to have a higher incident rate than another tropical country, in any fair comparison anyway. Just wondering if any Indonesians, or expats with experience working in Indonesia, would agree or disagree?
I’m asking because I want to ‘test the water’ wrt the general situation – without reference to the frequently misleading/sometimes condescending media reports. To date, my limited personal experience base in Indonesia (non-professional) starts and ends in Java, but I do have a reasonable understanding at the ‘socio-political’ level and the background as relates to corruption.

Wrt the tone of previous threads related to Indonesia – it seems impossible to improve aviation/general transport safety in isolation – in terms of corruption generally. Unless maybe you think in terms of appointing an “aviation imperator” with the specific purpose of getting things sorted out (similar to Russia/Aeroflot years ago) – but then that requires political will/cooperation – (Adamair!?!)

Porrohman

12th Mar 2007, 18:10

A lot of posters have been critical of the aircrew but until we know what technical malfunctions occurred during the flight, and there may have been many, certain members of this forum should not be so quick to criticise the aircrew in my opinion.

I'm fairly certain that investigators will find multiple causes for this accident, and the extent to which the aircrew affected the outcome is currently unknown. As a forum, shouldn't we support the aircrew rather than criticise them and speculate about what they might have done wrong? I expect that those who are being critical would expect no less than this of their fellow professionals if they were in the unfortunate position that this Garuda crew finds themselves in.

Porrohman.

PK-KAR

12th Mar 2007, 18:59

Theamrad,
The brake change can't be confirmed yet.
The #1 Reversers inoped is more or less believable, but shouldn't affect the landing performance as you said... single reverser didn't cause the accident, but is a contributor to the effects of the accident thanks to reduced deceleration ability and controllability issue if one "lost the plot"...

I think you mentioned something like ‘track marks’ earlier – if I’m not misunderstanding – even with max. manual braking that, could indicate anti-skid problem – I know I don’t have enough facts and this is really reaching at this stage.

Would max man brakes with antiskid protection result in some track marks?

If your theory is correct – one pilot trying to GA and the other trying to stop, if reverse thrust had been available and selected by one – that would/should have been the end of trying for GA. I think the suggestion of confusion arising in the cockpit is pretty compelling over a GA or not decision.

As likely/unlikely as it is, I must advise caution on this one at this stage of the investigation. As you said rightly, a small mishap can lead to a disaster if one does not act/react correctly, but I'm extremely curious on what the pilots will say on what happened and their reasonings for their actions before I go anywhere near judging them.

As to improving the situation, let's just say that improvements in a lot of aspects happened between 2000 and 2004 (I'm not talking about the rate of mishaps but the general atmosphere of the industry in terms of safety mentality), but, since then, it appears to have gone downhill extremely fast for some reason.

PK-KAR

theamrad

12th Mar 2007, 22:38

Porrohman – I’ve no wish to impune your right to an opinion, but I think in fairness I would have to say that I can’t understand your criticism concerning the speculation of some posters here (just because the thinking of some, rightly or wrongly, on available information, leads them to think the crew possibly or probably caused this)– when you yourself have been speculating as to cause. Why should speculation about possible crew action not be allowed – but speculation about possible tech’ problems be ok? Personally I try my best to look at things from a cause standpoint (whether crew, weather, tech or otherwise) as opposed to blame. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with reasonable/informed speculation based on our personal knowledge base and the best available information – it’s the stuff based on complete supposition, those with no background/knowledge of aviation matters and/or ‘information’ from the wildest of some of the media tirades that I personally find annoying.

I expect that those who are being critical would expect no less than this of their fellow professionals if they were in the unfortunate position that this Garuda crew finds themselves in

Like it or not – I think that’s just the ‘way things are’ – I’m pretty sure almost all of us know that if someone here screwed up badly on any given day – there’d be a thread started here about it before we could even catch our breath. Then again – reasoned discussion versus unfounded waffle makes a big difference! I don’t know about you – but I myself don’t have a problem about knowing, or others knowing, I’m not infallible. The day I feel otherwise – I think, is the day that others are in danger. I hope my ego doesn’t dictate how well or not I should react to reasonable peer comment, whether criticism or advice. If I screwed up – I wouldn’t expect my peers to defend me blindly – I would like if they applied reason/knowledge/pertinent facts in their discussions though. I can only speak for myself on this – whether or not they were to blame in the final analysis has no bearing on the level of how unfortunate I think their predicament is now.
Peace.

-------------------------

if one "lost the plot"...

Yep – that could make an already bad situation a whole lot worse.

Would max man brakes with antiskid protection result in some track marks?
Probably better for the techies at this stage – but to hazard an OPINION with carefully chosen words. I THINK it probably would. But I would argue, that it should be easy (for investigators) to tell the difference between max brake a/skid operative with possible pattern closely spaced due modulation at a/skid normal working freq, and what would result from a/skid inop – with more sustained lock-up, higher temp at contact point, etc (even if pilot perceives skid and tries to modulate manually - pattern likely to vary over interval in the order of seconds)
- all just my opinion of course.

if one does not act/react correctly

I’ve seen enough reports with detailed ‘human factors’ input to realise some were caused initially by relatively simple mistakes – which any pilot could have made. I don’t wish to be judgmental either: The incidents I know of where things went along the lines of this type of scenario – became so dynamic – that I don’t think any reasonably minded person would expect the ordinary notions of CRM to provide any relief to the crew. One incident occurred here as a result of a land/GA conflict in marginal weather (wind/gust/shear) – fortunately the only consequences were nose gear damage. But the events in the cockpit became very dynamic and understandably confusing to both crew members. All this without prejudice to this accident – we were still dealing with a speculated scenario and, as you say, many more facts are as yet unknown.

HotDog

12th Mar 2007, 22:55

theamrad, would you be living in Cork by any chance, near the Blarney stone?:E

Porrohman

12th Mar 2007, 23:32

Theamrad,

I agree with your comments. I've no problem with criticism of the aircrew where evidence indicates that it's warranted, and you make a fair point that I was speculating (in a post which is now deleted) about faults in the machine where the evidence to support such suggestions was questionable. I'll try to be more careful with my posts in future.

Porrohman.

YesTAM

13th Mar 2007, 02:50

According to the Australian today (sorry no link) the Australian Transport Safety Board, which is assisting Indonesian authorities, has gotten nothing useful (whatever that means) out of the CVR and the FDR only has records of 22 or so parameters out of a total of 200. The boxes have apparently been forwarded to Boeing for further analysis.

It appears that the speculation may continue for a while yet.:sad:

Miraz

13th Mar 2007, 03:06

This article - http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21364524-23349,00.html claims that the ATSB have already sent a reasonable amount of data from the FDR to Indonesia and that they were having problems with the CVR reconstruction.

theamrad

13th Mar 2007, 03:31

theamrad, would you be living in Cork by any chance, near the Blarney stone?:E

No dude - that's quite a bit away from me - I'm at the civilised end of things:} - just kidding..........no really I am! I like Cork a lot - and I've met many fine people there over the years!

Porrohman - sorry if it seemed a bit harsh - i meant it in the tone of discussion, not criticism. At this stage, I'm finding it hard myself not to wander of what I think is reasonable speculation and into what is pushing into the realms of fiction writing! I have to keep reminding myself to stick to what's known so far (which is very little). ''nuf said':)

records of 22 or so parameters out of a total of 200

Not sure what they mean 'out of 200' - 22 parameters sound about right for what would have been fitted originally, and mandated at that time? I remember one incident(B737) in the US not too long before the time this aircraft was manufactured where only 5 parameters were recorded - any type of mandate for improvement only came out in US sometime after that incident (I think!).

RiccardoGRSB

13th Mar 2007, 06:18

Hi forum-ites,
I've been reading this forum since the Adam Air crash since January and it's a valuable source of knowledge. I'm a research consultant, based in Indonesia, and I'm a bit perplexed by something. The local media in Indonesia has repeatedly stated over the last 24 hours that the CVR is "being sent to Boeing for analysis." Everything I've read from wire services or other international reports say it's going to Honeywell -- the manufacturer.

The significance of this was brought to light in an Indonesian paper today, wherein a 'local aviation observer' makes accusations of foul play on the part of Australian and US investigators and claims that Boeing (presumably with the CVR now in its possession) will destroy evidence of "problems that may emerge with the Boeing 737..."

Another poster above also mentioned Boeing. BTW, Honeywell Aerospace is in Redmond, WA next door to Microsoft and Boeing is in Seattle, about 10 miles away.

PK-KAR

13th Mar 2007, 07:08

Riccardo,
Which paper? I'd be interested to give my word to the paper! *evil grin*

PK-KAR

RiccardoGRSB

13th Mar 2007, 07:22

Hi Pk-Kar,

It was the lead, front-page story in today's (Tuesday March 13) English-language daily, THE POINT. They don't have an active website yet, but I've put more of the article quotes on my blog/forum here: http://grsb.jakchat.com

PK-KAR

13th Mar 2007, 07:46

Riccardo,
Knowing Dudi Sudibyo, the "observer" quoted, I find it EXTREMELY HARD TO BELIEVE that he said what he said. He is an editor at the local aviation magazine, so we'll know if he was misquoted or he did actually say those things if Angkasa magazine starts claiming those too!

After reading this:
What the Aussies did find is that there was no windshear, no downdraft and nothing out of the ordinary in terms of weather. However, that stands in stark contrast to what the Garuda pilot's union chief (conflict of interest??) said last Friday. All the major local media ran front-page headlines -- despite knowing full well that the union chief would want to cover up guilt -- saying it was strong wind that caused the accident.

I'm branding that publication as subjective, equally as bad as the subjective members of the local media.

The thing about no windshear was aired early on, before even the Aussie media started talking about the possibility.

The Garuda pilot's union chief in the initial interview NEVER insisted that it was a windshear, he just said the pilot felt like "something pushed him from behind" when flaring... which CAN MEAN windshear. If you see the TV interview at the time, you would know the media frenzy screaming downdraft over the next 24hrs was a result of this interview.

I had to spend 4 hrs at a local TV station on Sunday evening lecturing them on what is possible, what isn't, and the things they've mistranslated. And the faces they had about 'Oh Sh1t! We did bad!' was countless!

I find this rather offensive...
THE MORAL OF THE STORY IS:
The Indonesians, specifically those from the most populous island, are trying once again to shift the blame and what better targets, the USA, Australia and a big Capitalist MNC (Boeing)!

They are trying again to twist the public's mind (or refocus it) so they won't have to work on fixing any of their gross problems OR be accountable for this culture of lying, cheating, shoddy maintenance or faulty pilot training methods...

Perhaps one should look into what the local aviation forum has discussed.
1. No conspiracies (dismissed by nightfall 7th evening)
2. No downdrafts (dismissed by nightfall 7th evening)
3. No sabotage (dismissed by nightfall 7th evening)
4. Pilot error possible (raised by nightfall 7th evening)
5. Mech error possible, with the types of possible failures, not just a general comment), (raised 8th evening)
6. No ATC at fault based on current evidence. (Raised Sunday).
Is that another "Bules are great and locals are dumb" publication?

Seriously!

PK-KAR

Blacksheep

13th Mar 2007, 07:54

Two points of fact:

1. An eye witness aboard the aircraft says quite clearly that he noticed the flaps were not extended.

The account by Mr. Bertelloti is clear, straightforward and unembellished. He is observant and clear headed and is familiar enough with flying to be aware that the flaps are normally extended for landing. He is in short, a credible witness.

2. In the photographs of the remains of the aircraft the flaps are not extended.

More interestingly - they appear not to be fully retracted either. There is a small but significant gap between the trailing edge of the (partially raised) spoilers and the leading edge of the flap.

Now I speculate - and I hate to do so - but these facts suggest that the problem the crew experienced with the flaps was an asymmetry lock-out, following which they attempted a flapless landing. Which for reasons presently unknown, went badly wrong.

To learn if that is the case, we must await the findings of those conducting the investigation who will no doubt, have many more facts to work with than are available to we who are reduced to poring over photographs and newspaper reports.

RiccardoGRSB

13th Mar 2007, 08:11

I've been reading the local aviation forum, as well as pprune, and I totally agree with with you that the correct info is out there. However, the journos are not printing that stuff. (btw, THE POINT is pro-govt as its main benefactor is a top minister A.B.) As a frequent traveler around the archipelago, I truly now fear stepping on planes as more comes to light about the safety culture, bribed inspectors etc.. My editorializing in the blog was not meant to offend you or anyone else (sincerely sorry if it did), it was meant as a criticism of politicians, bureaucrats, media and airline execs who already seem to be paving the way for an escape route away from the hard work of improving the safety culture.

I can almost hear the next statements coming from some gov't official: -- 'We need a gazillion more $$ to update our fleets and we're appointing General XXX to handle all the procurement...' And that saddens and frightens me.

PK-KAR

13th Mar 2007, 08:47

Riccardo,
I've been told that at least one journo in Tempo magazine has printed stuff more towards the real possibilities, well, at least not in the lines of "sensationalistic journo'ism".

My editorializing in the blog was not meant to offend you or anyone else (sincerely sorry if it did), it was meant as a criticism of politicians, bureaucrats, media and airline execs who already seem to be paving the way for an escape route away from the hard work of improving the safety culture.
Well, I have no objections to this version... :ok:

PK-KAR

YesTAM

13th Mar 2007, 10:53

I apologise for not providing the link to the story about the cvr and Fdr in "The Australian".

It is my fervent wish that the Indonesian Authorities and their helpers at the ATSB and Boeing/Honeywell/FAA/whatever are working in a spirit of full and open cooperation to understand what has happened and learn from it, bearing in mind that it could happen again anywhere in the world, if the cause is not understood and dealt with.

It would be a tragedy if this investigation degenerated into a nationalistic fight and I respectfully suggest that Pprune people should do their best to arrest any trends in this direction.

I have full confidence in the Indonesian Authorities to investigate this matter properly. Indonesia is a smart country.

Clandestino

13th Mar 2007, 12:21

The account by Mr. Bertelloti is clear, straightforward and unembellished. He is observant and clear headed and is familiar enough with flying to be aware that the flaps are normally extended for landing. He is in short, a credible witness.

Mr Bertellotti, a journalist with Italian TV

...is the guy who went directly after mishap into town to buy new clothes because his old were stained with blood as a consequence of him being a pax on a plane that crashed. To call him reliable witness would also imply admitting him to posess quite a dose of uebermenschness. Perhaps it was flapless landing, perhaps there was downdraft, perhaps they were too fast as they came to land, perhaps, perhaps, perhaps...perhaps we should wait till FDR shows which witnessess are truly reliable?

Few Cloudy

13th Mar 2007, 13:02

Until we see the FDR readings we won't know anything about configuration, ROD, IAS etc. Just because flaps appear not to be at appropriate landing setting after a crash doesn't neccessarily mean they were like that all through the manoever.

Wait and see still applies.

lomapaseo

13th Mar 2007, 17:19

It is my fervent wish that the Indonesian Authorities and their helpers at the ATSB and Boeing/Honeywell/FAA/whatever are working in a spirit of full and open cooperation to understand what has happened and learn from it, bearing in mind that it could happen again anywhere in the world, if the cause is not understood and dealt with.

It would be a tragedy if this investigation degenerated into a nationalistic fight and I respectfully suggest that Pprune people should do their best to arrest any trends in this direction.

I have full confidence in the Indonesian Authorities to investigate this matter properly. Indonesia is a smart country.

I have no fears about the thoroughness of the investgation.

It's the response afterwards that matters.

Indeed with the Indonesian, Australian and US investigators there is little worry about them missing anything. However issues having to do with internal operations remains in the province of the State of operation,

theamrad

13th Mar 2007, 20:39

Here we go again.
Just when it seems most on this thread are doing their best to approach things from a knowledgeable/reasoned/informed/responsible perspective, and the general consensus seems to be to try to demonstrate self-restraint and “wait and see” what the recorders throw up, this agendised :mad: turns up.

union chief would want to cover up guilt

With prejudice for PK-KAR’s comments above – the presumption here being that Captain Stephanus “editorialised” the comments made to him by the crew. He only claimed to be repeating what was said to him. By all accounts – he never made any other claim about his statements. In this neck of the woods – rubbish like that would be bordering on libellous.

find this rather offensive……
Personally I think there’s additional material which is even more offensive – and more of it pointing to the authors ‘intentions’ here. Offensive to all things Indonesian – and, personally, i think offensive to the intelligence of most sane individuals.

My editorializing in the blog was not meant to offend you or anyone else (sincerely sorry if it did),
…………….HORSE:mad:

Some of your other “editorialisations” about this accident – more accurately your opinions:

LET the STUPIDITY, the SCAMS and COVER-UPS BEGIN!!.................
laying out the Conspiracy Theory that 240 million clueless sheep will swallow! ..............Bring the whole family from the kampong to view charred bodies:………………….
shows where the tire of the nose wheel obviously shredded off the rim…………..
The first hint that it may have been sabotage………………..Dudi goes on to whinge and whine because……………….
The odd little minds of ignoramuses unwilling to accept blame……………….
Local cops having a looky loo and discussing "compensation":……………………
Flight attendants are not just there to be pretty face…………………………</SPAN>
Pilot error has so far loomed large as the reason behind Wednesday's disaster. ………………….
fuel line under the wing had exploded

“Material” purporting to concern the missing Adamair flight:

Perhaps their looting everything they can get, like wallets, jewelry and anything else of value…………………..
but within 10 kilometers there is a wall of 600m + mountains, which he slammed into……………………..
I can just hear the javanese army boys now, "eh pusing banget, capet sekali dong."………….
The plane was hijacked by jihadi boys, turned off all the coms and flew below the radar to the southern Phillipines landing on a remote airstrip. They will hold the passengers for ransom (Abu Sayyaf and MILF are accustomed to this sort of thing), then fill the plane to the brim with dynamite or c-4 or whatever they can get, and train some guy who's ready to meet his virgins, and fly the 10,000 pound bomb into ??????? (take you're best guess -- I'll take a shot and say they go for the US embassy in Singapore or Manila)......................had their HPs off, so the only explanation is the jihad boys, collected them all straight away and disabled them………………………..
does Indonesia have it's own "Bermuda Triangle"????...............

Ah well, efficiency is never a priority, only a chance at grandstanding matters for these kooks......................
SERF1: Er... uhhh... I'm not a dimwit pak, I still have to do this regular stuff for at least 6 more years to get promoted to dimwit. If you want to speak to His Honourable Chief of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia's Dimwit cor......
it's in their friggin' DNA here.................
Maybe the air force was paid by someone to blow it to smithereens.

Some of your forums other “contributors”

Just a wild idea (just may be)...possibility of suicide killer?
I don't want to call it a "Mickey Mouse" country as that would deeply offend Mickey...........
As indonesian is so boringly simple - why not just post the original text - after all , a goat can learn to speak it , and perhaps if there is a goat around - it can help Ross .
I suspect Ross has quite a few goats round .

THE POINT is pro-govt

Well then – at least they would be pro-something Indonesian – as opposed to anti-everything Indonesian. – Since you demonstrate such poisonous and acidic disdain for Indonesia and Indonesians – why do you stay there?

criticism of politicians, bureaucrats, media and airline execs and “240 million clueless sheep”

Bring the whole family from the kampong to view charred bodies:………………….
IMO – a truly disgusting remark which warrants nothing more than disdain. Grow the :mad: up!

I’m not sure what motivated you to come here, but, since you already have YOUR OWN forum and a means for voicing this speculative, childish, unfounded and racially abusive :mad: – is there some overriding reason why you felt it necessary to come to this forum and infect the discussion here with your agenda? Fortunately, most of us have already been able to enjoy a balanced source of valid information from someone who knows ‘something’ about Indonesian aviation. You say you are a ‘research consultant’ – for who - Sky news, Fox news, the Heritage institute? You mean to suggest that with opinions like yours you would actually have 'clients' in Indonesia?! I can’t see anything which adds to the debate other than a tirade of negative nonsense. All questions of course being rhetorical – I’ve no interest in reading a response!

I have no difficulty in placing a hell of lot more confidence in the investigator’s final conclusions, than the 'editorialised' version which will, no doubt be written.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

It would be a tragedy if this investigation degenerated into a nationalistic fight

Yestam - I don't think that actually will happen - but it's highly likely that certain elements of the media might suggest it - especially if they nothing better to do.

The account by Mr. Bertelloti is clear, straightforward and unembellished. He is observant and clear headed and is familiar enough with flying to be aware that the flaps are normally extended for landing. He is in short, a credible witness.

I think I agree with the tone of Clandestino on this one - but then in fairness - in what I saw - the gentleman concerned only said he 'thought' the flaps weren't down - he was more definitive about the spoilers. In any case.... perhaps, perhaps, perhaps. :)

I had to spend 4 hrs at a local TV station on Sunday evening lecturing them on what is possible, what isn't, and the things they've mistranslated. And the faces they had about 'Oh Sh1t! We did bad!' was countless!

Well - I suppose at least you got an acknowledgement - unlike maybe Sky News:}

lomapaseo

13th Mar 2007, 21:29

theamrad

Reposting libelous (sic) material from other rarely read sources does nothing to address your concerns about what has been said. All you do is increase the readership and the level of confusion.
:*

fox niner

13th Mar 2007, 22:14

So why exactly did you copy/paste all these outrageous remarks when they never contributed to a meaningful discussion in the first place?

RiccardoGRSB

14th Mar 2007, 02:43

Theamrad,
That site is merely an over-the-top dose of healthy irreverence, not meant for the squeamish, and not meant to be taken too seriously, sorta dark humor and crass satire. And discussion of it does not belong in this serious forum.

My only intention here was to ask (my original question) about the CVR. Is Honeywell or Boeing looking into it? The reason for my question was that an Indonesian paper stated it was Boeing and made allegations that Boeing would try to cover up any wrongdoing in terms of A/C manufacture. I wanted to know from people here what the SOP is on something like that and if it's possible that Boeing could do such a thing as claimed.

Then someone asked me where the article was and (unfortunately) I gave the link to that "shock jock-type" blog because the paper doesn't publish online.

theamrad

14th Mar 2007, 02:57

I get your point fox Niner, but since you ask
So why exactly did you copy/paste all these outrageous remarks

because the one responsible tried to pass himself off as some kind of 'genuine contributor' in the sense of 'acting in good faith'- and then makes things worse with the statement "My editorializing in the blog was not meant to offend you or anyone else (sincerely sorry if it did)", Fox Niner - at the end of the day - there would have been no response, etc - if he hadn't ADVERTISED his own forum. we can all beat around the bush sometimes (speculation) - but that (I think) takes the prize. It would be nice to think the rest of us can get on with what you describe as 'meaningful discussion'

lomapaseo - I would normally agree with you in general - but sometimes things go off the scale - most here contribute in good faith, some are here for serious reasons - some not so serious (albeit for slightly different reasons/purposes), but if it seems an agenda, or just plain scurrilousness might be involved - I think its better to throw everything on the table - and let the 'reasonably minded' decide for themselves.

If I might humbly suggest dropping the issue now, what's said is said - since none of us come here for the sake of arguing but to debate and discuss, and I'm sure the majority won't appreciate the topic degenerating into an ass kicking contest. Although I'm sorry for the rest of you that you have to put up with a reaction from me - I mean what I said.

-------------------------------------------------------
To get back to the topic, it seems to me there won't be much more information for a while - with it looking like the CVR needs to be reconstructed. The FDR might tell us what happened - but without the CVR, we may be left not knowing why, for a while at least. Can anyone clarify the number of parameters recorded? Was the initial report of 22 accurate?

Indeed with the Indonesian, Australian and US investigators there is little worry about them missing anything. However issues having to do with internal operations remains in the province of the State of operation,

I think your right - with the Australians 'in the loop' of the actual investigaion - I think even the most skeptical about the Indonesian investigators would have a hard time arguing that anything might go amiss. My personal opinion is that I have no reason to doubt the integrity of the investigators themselves. The past seems to suggest that they take their work seriously - even if the rest of the regulatory environment doesn't function properly. I think PK-KAR would have a better informed opinion on that though.

UNCTUOUS

14th Mar 2007, 06:45

Color me confused.
.
Was this nosewheel scrape at the point of initial touchdown (i.e. approach end of 09) or was it achieved at the departure end?
.
http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/images/Garuda_nosewheel.jpg
Did it lose tires, wheels or the whole oleo?
.
I thought I'd recalled reading that it lost its "nosewheel(s)" at the third bounce.
Can anyone clarify?

PK-KAR

14th Mar 2007, 07:22

My only intention here was to ask (my original question) about the CVR. Is Honeywell or Boeing looking into it? The reason for my question was that an Indonesian paper stated it was Boeing and made allegations that Boeing would try to cover up any wrongdoing in terms of A/C manufacture. I wanted to know from people here what the SOP is on something like that and if it's possible that Boeing could do such a thing as claimed.
It should be Honeywell... if ATSB or whoever else can't decode it, they need to look into the raw data (as in whatever was placed on the CVR remains of such)... Honeywell can then reconstruct the recording data from the raw data, which then is used by the investigators.

Manipulating the CVR doesn't serve Boeing's interest, the FDR however, can be subject to Boeing's interest to manipulate, albeit unlikely. Coz the technical defects (and/or effects thereof to the aircraft) are recorded in the FDR not the CVR.

I think your right - with the Australians 'in the loop' of the actual investigaion - I think even the most skeptical about the Indonesian investigators would have a hard time arguing that anything might go amiss. My personal opinion is that I have no reason to doubt the integrity of the investigators themselves. The past seems to suggest that they take their work seriously - even if the rest of the regulatory environment doesn't function properly. I think PK-KAR would have a better informed opinion on that though.
In the past, the data revealed doesn't get manipulated, but the interpretation of such data is what's open for discussion! This is where my worry lies in this investigation. This is why we are important in our objectivity (or whatever other forums you are member of), because the media reads forums like this and use them as sources to point to leads and speculations.

For example, the misquotation of the windshear by the GA PilotAssoc. chief, in my opinion is extremely dangerous! A late dismissal of such, have been translated as a possibility of the pilots lying! Which is not the case if one had seen the actual interview with Capt. Stephanus, who relayed what the Captain said, and then the interviewer asked, "what do you mean forced from behind?" He answered, "well, maybe a windshear?" We know how that fed the frenzy and where it led to afterwards (go back to the beginning of the paragraph *grin*).

Was this nosewheel scrape at the point of initial touchdown (i.e. approach end of 09) or was it achieved at the departure end?
This was taken from the overrun at runway 27... meaning, this was the marks towards the end of the fateful landing roll. It's the oleo digging into the asphalt.

PK-KAR

theamrad

14th Mar 2007, 10:52

That reminds me (yet again) of the ‘Bristol runway charade’ – journo comes here to PPrune and asks for ‘truth’, journo gets truth, journo’s organisation (later on same day) continues to sprout waffle, more annoyingly – continues to allow certain ‘director’ to waffle UNCHALLENGED about matter, public more confused and thinking that some airlines just get nervous when there’s a little rain – ‘truth’ or any notion of counter-arguement never mentioned!:{

I think the only ‘crime’ that Captain Stephanus may have committed might involve an element of not being media savvy. But on the other hand – if someone is deliberately careful – the accusation might be that they are being evasive – and then the charge of ‘cover-up’ gets thrown around. Even when in possession of all the details – SOME of the media still demonstrate an obsessive addiction for artistic interpretation, sometimes even deliberately! :confused:

the FDR however, can be subject to Boeing's interest to manipulate albeit unlikely.

At least in this case the whole issue doesn't even arise. I'm mindful of Colarado Springs - and the NTSB's approach to the integrity of data/component testing in conjunction with third parties, which was learned by experience - witnesses etc.

Dagger Dirk

14th Mar 2007, 11:07

Said earlier: "Re GPWS, if this aircraft was indeed not fitted with it, then that reflects (badly) on the regulatory authority."
.
Assuming that GPWS or EGPWS WAS fitted, then is any warning about landing without flap triggered by:
.
a. gear being down
.
b. a speed threshold (i.e. "below XXX knots")
.
c. radar altimeter
.
d. FLAP actual deflection
.
e. FLAP handle/lever position
.
f. some combination of the above
.
1. What can neutralize any such alert?
2. What height AGL does it cook off? What form does it take?
.
Anybody know?

PK-KAR

14th Mar 2007, 11:24

Although the answer seems obvious, is there anyone with authority (a LAME or someone who was involved in accident investigations) answer the now big question of:

"Is it possible for the 737 trailing edge flaps to retract (assuming it was deployed at flap30 for the landing) sometime during the landing roll or after the overrun (when the right wing ending up detached), without manipulation of the flap control lever?"

This is needed to pin down the possibilities of flap positions on landing, and allow us to focus on two possibilities.

PK-KAR

fox niner

14th Mar 2007, 11:49

Hi there theamrad,

If that is the reason for your copy/pasting, then that is fine.:ok: I was just wondering whether you thought that any amount of speculation is unwarranted. Because I think that some amount of speculation is allowed. But posters of speculation must be of the kind that know what they are talking about. (pilots/ATCO's/objective first hand observers) Otherwise any discussion om this forum becomes impossible.

Dagger Dirk:

The EGPWS system will activate for:

TOO LOW GEAR when it is not down, 3 greens below a certain radio height.

TOO LOW FLAPS when the actual flaps are not in a landing configuration (30 or 40 for the 737) below a certain radio height (about 250ft). It does not look at flap lever position. Suppose your flap lever is in 30 (landing flaps) but you get a flap load relief to flaps 25 because you come in too fast, you will get a TOO LOW FLAPS warning.

EGPWS does not look at speed. a high airspeed may result in a SINKRATE warning, but that is triggered by terrain closure rate.

TOO LOW GEAR and TOO LOW FLAPS warnings can be cancelled by pressing a button, by checklist, when deliberately making a partial gear landing (because you have a gear failure) of when making a partial/all flaps up landing. Also because of a failure that you might have. (hydraulics/engine failure/flap assymetry/etc)

Pressing the GROUND PROXIMITY FLAP OVERRIDE SWITCH without using a checklist, simply because you can not achieve a landing flap configuration in time, is the most outrageous form of cowboyism that I can think of. That would be deliberate endangerment/criminal offence. I think.....

But I don't think they did that though.

fox niner

14th Mar 2007, 12:19

PK-KAR,
the flaps are of course driven by the hydraulic system. But the actuators will keep the flaps at a certain setting, regardless of hydraulic pressure.
Suppose you are flying around with flaps 30. then suddenly, you get a hydraulic failure, pressure drops from 3000 psi to zero. this will have no effect on the flap setting. the loss of pressure does not cause the flaps to aerodynamically blow back to a lesser setting. and that is a good thing, because otherwise you would stall.
So automatic flap movement is only possible to a lesser flap setting when you have a flap load relief situation. And of course this was not the case after they had "landed", because the airspeed was well below flap load relief speed. And besides, flap load relief does not retract to flaps 15, as I'm sure you know.
So if the flaps were found to be at 15 after the crash, that means they were put there by the flap handle. perhaps they were never touched again and they landed that way, or maybe they were put in 15, from flaps 30,when rolling down the runway, by someone who wanted to go around while the other guy wanted to stop.

theamrad

14th Mar 2007, 12:54

Fox Niner -
copy/pastingI agree completely with everything you say.

I know it’s kind of a mute point – I believe we would be dealing with GPWS and not the E- one. I know either way – the same functionality would exist in terms of flaps not at 30 etc.
Pressing the GROUND PROXIMITY FLAP OVERRIDE SWITCH without using a checklist – I think that’s quite right – esp if done for “convenience” and not as part of pre-briefed procedure or non-normal reason. But then again – if ones intention was to do that “for convenience” in a too “hot and high” approach – your thinking would already be out of the box – and all it achieves is to silence the pending alarm – which you would anticipate to sound anyway for being “bold”.

PK-KAR,
I think I already know one of the scenarios you’re thinking of – just food for thought – it APPEARS to me that IF speed was so much out of the norm for ‘ordinary’ pax to notice/be alarmed - that we may be dealing with a speed above flap load relief activation – in which case we’d POSSIBLY be out of the flap 30 region anyway. At least, I think, in those circumstance, you’re looking at somewhere in region of 20 to 30 kts over?(don’t know Vref/weight). But as Fox Niner says – as the speed drops, at whatever stage, the load relief would cancel and drive down to whatever was selected. Again – just food for thought. Seems to me the GA scenario with one selecting GA flap is still a reasonable possibility at this stage.

PK-KAR

14th Mar 2007, 14:26

FoxNiner & Theamrad,
Yeah, we know those are the obvious answers, just wondering what else to say to someone who insists on hearing that from an accident investigator...

I told them the jackscrews keeps them in place, unless the screwthreads are eaten away, it would stay at the last deployed (or commanded if no mech problems) flap setting.

"yea yea we know PK, but we wanna hear an investigator say that." :ugh:

PK-KAR

lomapaseo

14th Mar 2007, 15:57

theamrad

14th Mar 2007, 17:46

I believe I already said that in post #112
I don’t think that’s exactly the same point you were making – but then there’s no point in us arguing about it:) .

I think the emoticon’s brick wall says it all at this point. I don’t think anyone else is going to come along with any more knowledge here which would make that scenario more or less certain(from a systems standpoint). That seems the only reasonable thing you could say to anyone at the moment in trying to explain “staying at last deployed position”. Even if you get someone with the relevant knowledge - it may turn out to be a " if this happens and that happens and the other happens then it's just remotely possible that that could result........theoretically" - alternatively it's the waiting game for the actual investigators to say something.

The only other thing you can try is to post it as a separate question in another area of the forum and hope you get lucky with a techie/engineer/even investigator with B734 experience and/or the B734 maintenance manual turning up who has the authority to give a definitive answer once and for all.

PK-KAR

15th Mar 2007, 01:03

Now, this is a different answer to what was expected....
"the flap deployment can change in the above scenario, though unlikely."
He recommends looking at the flap lever...

That is very odd...

Lomapaseo,
Yes I was aware that it had been answered in #112 about the flap being preserved in the last deployed position (sod the slats!), but... the question was "would it be able to move at all after a loss of HYD and/or wing detachment"...
That was the key point to the question.

I think it has been answered, I'm just looking at various ways to explain it.

PK-KAR

Blacksheep

15th Mar 2007, 01:19

The TE flaps shown in the photos of the wreckage are not extended; the LE devices (Slats outboard, Krueger flaps inboard) are extended.

The TE flaps are driven by screw jacks turned by a hydraulic motor. They will either remain in the position they were driven too or break off completely. An impact cannot knock them back to the stowed position.

Conclusion. Either a) The flaps were not extended before landing or b) they were retracted by the crew during the landing roll in preparation for a go-around.

A credible witness reports that he noticed the flaps remained stowed during the approach. This confirms that option a) is the case.

There are several reasons for landing without deploying the flaps, but we have some indication that the crew experienced a flap problem prior to landing but "had dealt with it" - using the QRH no doubt. Since neither the primary nor alternate flap drive systems deployed the flaps, one is led to suspect that the problem was an asymmetry lock-out. This is most commonly a sensing system defect - genuine asymmetric deployment is extremely rare. Flap position indicator faults are not - the weak point in the asymmetry sensing system has always been the flap position indicator.

For an asymmetry sensing fault, the flaps would have had to move at least a small amount. Therefore, another factor that I feel supports this hypothesis is that although the flaps shown in the photos are not extended, neither do they appear to be fully retracted.

Once committed to a flapless landing, the pilots must be very careful about controlling speed during the approach. For obvious reasons practice flapless landings are usually conducted in a simulator. Is the actual handling of a B737-400 making a flapless landing matched by the simulator motion systems?

I'm a Technical Services Engineer with FDR readout experience and trained in accident investigation, not a pilot. Perhaps a B737-400 rated pilot can comment on the simulator/aircraft handling comparison?

PK-KAR

15th Mar 2007, 01:34

Blacksheep,

This is where the problem lies...
A credible witness reports that he noticed the flaps remained stowed during the approach. This confirms that option a) is the case.
Yet, there are also credible witness reports at the airport who saw the plane went by them stating that the flaps were deployed for landing (they are familiar with seeing flap30/40 for 737 landings).

But the purpose of the question was not to say whether that was deployed or not, but to propose 2 alternatives based on one or the other.

From the photos, they do appear to have ended up with a flap15 position or thereabouts.

Thanks for that...
PK-KAR

Sinbad1

15th Mar 2007, 09:54

PK-KAR
Some insight

Mechanical failure of the transmition;

Retraction of the flaps due to air loads is prevented by a no-back friction brake in the inboard transmission assembly at each flap. If transmission assembly should fail, a torque limiter in the remaining transmission assembly on that flap will stall the flap drive system to prevent structural damage. Stopping the drive system also prevents operation of the remaining flaps, thus maintaining the airplane in normal flight attitude.

Flap Lockouts;
The flap drive system is most susceptible to lockouts in the flaps 30 to 40 range where the highest air loads exist. If the lockout occurs in the flaps 0 to 25 range structural interference, drive gearing failure, jammed transmissions, foreign object damage or hydraulic system failure are the most probable causes If the Flaps did not extend hydraulically or electrically in flaps 0 to 25 range in-flight then Structural failure and/or interference is the probable cause. When the trailing edge flaps are between 1 and 5 units, the control valve fully extend the leading edge flaps and extend all leading edge slats to the intermediate position. When the trailing edge flaps are positioned to 10 units or more, the control valve ports pressure to fully extend all leading edge slats.
If system B hydraulic pressure drops to 2000 psi, the flap and slat actuator blocking valves will hydraulically lock the actuators in the position at which the loss of pressure occurred. This locking action prevents aerodynamic blow back of the leading edge flaps and slats.

T/E Flap must have been selected other wise the slat and the Kruger's will NOT be able to extend.

Flap Load Limit System;

The system is armed When the airspeed switches or the ARINC 429 receiver senses an airspeed in excess of a range of 158 to 162 knots, the hydraulic solenoid valve positions the trailing edge flap control valve to the 30-unit position, As airspeed decreases to below a range of 153 to 157 knots, the solenoid valve is de-energised.

For the flap load system to operate, the Flap Lever must be in the 40 unit detent.

The problem of the Flap last selected position to what ever unit it was, is simply resolved by going to the remaining bits of the Cockpit and you will see the last selected position of the Flap Lever as well as the Flap gauge. I believe the cockpit was not affected, at least that was my understanding.

Having said all that I wonder if we were in the flight crew position, how we would all reacted to all these possibility in the span of few minutes.!! I am sure the flight crew regret some of their decision. :confused:

Few Cloudy

15th Mar 2007, 12:28

PK-KAR,

I don´t know who you are but if you are really involved in the investigation process, you shouldn´t be posting details and opinions here on PPRuNe, however piquant they may be.

If, on the other hand you are not involved, then we will take it with a pinch of salt.

FC.

PK-KAR

15th Mar 2007, 13:09

Few Cloudy,
Feel free to take it with a pinch of salt. All that's said is subject to change when the CVR and FDR gets translated, and then the final report.

I'm just fed up with some of the silly speculations and some of the outrageous comments lately (not necessarily in this topic).

PK-KAR

Magplug

15th Mar 2007, 13:11

Remember what that guy told you in flying training.... Good landings come from good approaches.

The evidence is mounting here to suggest a grossly mishandled/rushed approach followed by a heavy landing + bounce. There may have been an attempt to GA (flaps around F15), or the flaps may have been at the maximum the extent they could manage due to excess speed on approach. In any case one good bounce on the nose gear precipitated separation and the energy/flap profile on reaching the upwind end of the runway precluded further flight.

All seemed to be well in R/t exchanges prior to landing with no suggestion of an abnormal config. Perhaps they were so laid back that they got F15 out + gear down and then realised the mistake when they tried to flare. It seems the CVR may be corrupt as the Aussies have sent it back to Honeywell for deeper attempts to salvage any recording so we may never know the mood on the FD prior to landing. The FDR data thankfully seems to be intact and has been communicated back to the Indonesians.

Not much longer to wait I think.

Edited to add:... If this turns out to be a flap assymetric lock-out that went unnoticed by the crew at some stage during decel/flap deployment then I think Boeing will have another lawsuit on their hands in the manner of Helios.

In the 737 there is NO centralised warning or attention-getter to the crew if the TE flaps fail to extend during deployment. The procedure relies totally on the pilots noticing the demanded flap position being at odds with that selected. In other words it is trapped entirely by pilot verbal SOP discipline.

The consequence would be the operation of the aircraft, close to the ground, at a speed well below that required for the demanded flap config..... that would do it. Another fine example of how not to design an airliner!

lomapaseo

15th Mar 2007, 13:15

If, on the other hand you are not involved, then we will take it with a pinch of salt.

From my general reading of PPrune, I rarely expect direct involvement from posters but far more likely they simply listen to folks who do have some sort of access.

There are various souces of info, some of it more credible than others. Thus a little salt often helps the digestion.

I come to PPrune just for a taste on a daily basis :ok:

FlexibleResponse

15th Mar 2007, 14:32

With the current focus on the flap configuration, some consideration might be given to problems associated with an abnormal flap approach and landing scenairio. These are general comments, not necessarily about the subject accident, and should be taken with a pinch of salt.

In a swept-wing jet, it is difficult to control speed on a 3 degree approach accurately at VRef with flaps at reduced angle and especially with flaps retracted. This is due to the low drag configuration and unexpectedly and low engine RPM required.

The common error seen in training is for the pilot to stabilize the speed at 15-20 knots above Vref and then for the pilot to experience some difficulty in reducing the speed in a timely manner to Vref. The higher approach speeds associated with reduced or zero flap angles further reduces the time available to accomplish the tasks necessary to line the aircraft up for landing and carry out the standard and abnormal checklists.

If the approach speed error is significantly above Vref, idle thrust must be selected to allow the speed to creep back to the correct speed. If the pilot's attention is diverted and the speed is allowed to go more than about 10 knots below Vref, the inherent low response for jet engines to spool up from idle and the very high induced drag (on the backside of the drag curve) can very quickly result in even further speed reduction with a very high vertical sink rate situation.

At the best of times, landing distance required is very limiting with reduced or with zero flap angles and therefore it is critical to achieve the correct touchdown point on the runway at the correct Vref speed for the configuration, so that the aircraft may be stopped in the remaining runway length.

theamrad

15th Mar 2007, 16:15

Sinbad1 – thanks for the technical clarification – I was a bit rusty on some of those details.

Few Cloudy – the guy has never claimed to be involved in the investigation – and in fairness, has never said anything to suggest he is.

As far as a ‘pinch of salt’ is concerned – probably good advice in general on PPrune....certain times requiring more salt than others. (ref. to my previous outburst).

Magplug – if by “the manner of Helios” you mean a scurrilous claim – then I would agree.
(Without prejudice to the cause of this accident!) - However, if that’s not what you mean, in any aircraft not fitted with the relevant warning devices by design (and subsequent relevant certification), how would the manufacturer be responsible in the case where the crew fail to monitor the approach (spec, the deployment of flaps on the flap position indicator) properly. In the case of flap lever movement – the complete responsibility lies with the crew to monitor that they get what they expect.

In the 737 there is NO centralised warning or attention-getter to the crew if the TE flaps fail to extend during deployment

GPWS “TOO LOW, FLAPS” – which monitors actual flap position – not the selected position. But then – this should be considered in the manner of a “secondary” warning – the primary being proper procedure on the part of the crew.

The consequence would be the operation of the aircraft, close to the ground, at a speed well below that required for the demanded flap config

Most likely – very difficult for the crew not to notice (pitch ‘n power). If, for example, flaps at 5,10 or 15 – and IAS well below Vref for that position (heading for Vref 30) – and in relatively calm winds and visual – pitch and power relationship will be out of odds with the ‘norm’ and the different ‘landing picture’ will also be a cue to the crew that something’s wrong. Very hard if ‘by accident’ and not done purposefully.

Flexibleresponse - sorry if seems some of the above might cut accross your post - which of course is a quite accurate commentary. I hadn't seen your post when i logged on.:)

fox niner

15th Mar 2007, 23:23

Hey everyone,

We have been speculating on whether the flaps were at 30 or 15 when the plane crashed. Just take a look at these pics:

First, the crashed Garuda jet. Take a close look at the pylon between the inboard and outboard flap sections, and the amount of droop that is visible.

http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage2.jpg

Then, look at this photo, of a 737 in flight with flaps 30:

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0194314/M/

The pylon between the inboard and outboard flap section looks the same to me....

Then, take a look at this photo! It is of a 737 just after it landed WITH FLAPS 15, probably because of the Airworthiness Directive that was active at the time, forcing operators to land with flaps 15 (2005).

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0937376/M/

Now THAT is flaps 15. Look at the amount of pylon visible....

So in my opinion, the Garuda guys landed with flaps 30. But still, it appears to me to have been a rushed approach...

Dogimed

16th Mar 2007, 02:12

F9,

I think the pylon has been pushed up. By your pictures, if you look at the second photo, the pylon is flush with the wing, in the first, it is bent well upward, thus giving the effect the flaps are further down than actual.

Dog

PK-KAR

16th Mar 2007, 02:17

FoxNiner...
U forgot one thing...
The trailing edge of the engine pylon in the crash photo was dislodged, and had bent a few degrees UP! If you see from the flap15 and flap30 landing photo, you would see that it is flush with the upper surface of the wing.

A better way would be to estimate the length of flap deployment in comparison with the length of the engine pylon trailing edge.

Now use that method when comparing all three photos, and you'd quickly see that when the aircraft crashed, the flaps were not at 30.

PK-KAR

Seloco

16th Mar 2007, 02:27

I agree with Dogimed - I think that the photos referenced by Fox Niner actually show that the flaps WERE at 15, judging by the amount of flap section upper surface that is visible. The pylon has obviously been pushed up through the top of the wing so is no longer a fixed reference.

It's an interesting time to be in Jakarta at the moment; the rumour mill around this accident is in overdrive, as one might expect!

fox niner

16th Mar 2007, 08:28

OK sorry guys, flaps 15 it is.:ok:

At least we cleared up that part of the story.

Dogimed

16th Mar 2007, 10:29

http://www.news.com.au

Indonesia may close airlines after crashesFrom correspondents in Jakarta
March 16, 2007 08:05pm
Article from: ReutersFont size: + -
Send this article: Print Email
INDONESIA may close some airlines after a government-sanctioned team of transport experts called for a revamp of the aviation industry following a series of air accidents, Vice President Jusuf Kalla said today.

Last week, a Garuda Indonesia plane with 140 people on board overshot the runway in cultural capital Yogyakarta and burst into flames, killing 21 people including five Australians.

"Whoever fails to meet regulations will face sanctions, including airlines which fail to meet aviation regulations," Mr Kalla said.

He said errant airlines would be given warnings, suspended or shut down following an audit depending on their state of affairs.

"Just wait for news from the director general of civil aviation," he said.

A team commissioned by the Government after a passenger jet with 102 people on board disappeared in January has said safety standards had deteriorated since the deregulation of the aviation sector in the late 1990s.

Yesterday, it urged the Government to shut down air operators that ignore safety rules in a series of recommendations to the government.

Investigators in last week's Garuda crash are questioning the pilots and the cabin crew to see if human error was involved in the accident.

Air travel in Indonesia, a country of more than 17,000 islands, has grown substantially since the liberalisation of the airline industry that has triggered price wars among airlines.

The rapid growth has raised questions over whether safety has been compromised and if the infrastructure and personnel can cope with the huge increase.

The team is also due to come up with recommendations on improving safety on other transport networks including the nation's overstretched ferry system.

pls8xx

16th Mar 2007, 15:55

I suppose I'm a little late with this, but enlarging the crash photo linked by fox niner, the pylon does appear to be bent up and also twisted with the top closer to the fuselage.

If the twist is taken out and the pylon brought down to conform to the wing surface you get a different look.

For whatever it's worth or whatever it means, an edited photo ...

http://i9.photobucket.com/albums/a93/pls8xx/montage3.jpg

Few Cloudy

16th Mar 2007, 16:04

OK PK, just reading some of your posts it sounded as though you had been called as a witness - glad you weren't.

I still don't think the photo tells us anything definite about the flap setting before the crash, by the way. If you really belted a flap from 30 or 40 all the way up to 15 by brute force, then something has to give. Something has given - as witness the fairing being out of position.

Only when the fat lady in the Flt Rec has sung, will we know.

FC.

bpmsmith

17th Mar 2007, 01:29

Investigation team confirms flaps not in landing configuration and no wind shear.

http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/wing-flap-failure-in-crash-jet/2007/03/16/1173722744310.html

PK-KAR

17th Mar 2007, 05:28

FewCloudy,
At least the photos were useful to push the investigators a bit to admit that flap failure is being looked at... At least we know we're on the right track...

PK-KAR

Seloco

17th Mar 2007, 09:11

FewCloudy,

Surely, if the flaps were forced from 30/40 back to '15' by the crash forces, they wouldn't just neatly rewind up their screwjacks/fairings, would they? More likely they would be bent and broken off.

Magplug

17th Mar 2007, 14:12

Flaps not in landing config?..... An abnormal situation yes, but by no means one that precipitates a crash.

I can hear Mister Cock-Up coming !

Few Cloudy

17th Mar 2007, 19:40

Exactly what I meant Seloco something has to give - ie. break. You can't wind a screw jack back by pressure of course - that is why it is often used in this application - you can however break the structure / mechanism.

jet_noseover

17th Mar 2007, 20:33

From Magplug
I can hear Mister Cock-Up coming !

You bet!

Landing speed cockup...........

YesTAM

17th Mar 2007, 20:38

Apparently the CVR has been "fixed" by Boeing.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200703/s1874431.htm

The chief investigator confirms speed was high and suggests that flaps would not extend because of it (if I am reading this correctly and allowing for journalistic licence)

RiccardoGRSB

18th Mar 2007, 00:28

From the Reuters article above:
The chief crash investigator, Mardjono Siswosuwarno, says the aircraft's wing flaps failed to extend for landing and that might have been caused by the high speed.
"This could be a contributing factor, but what is more important is that the plane's speed was higher than normal. Why? We don't know yet," Mr Siswosuwarno said, from the National Transport Safety Commission, told Reuters.

The questions now become, what would be the options for the pilots (assuming they were aware of the flap problem) as they were coming in without proper flap config?

Also what could cause such a malfunction?

Seloco

18th Mar 2007, 02:27

Few Cloudy:
Exactly what I meant Seloco something has to give - ie. break. You can't wind a screw jack back by pressure of course - that is why it is often used in this application - you can however break the structure / mechanism.
I think we are in agreement FC, but my point is that it is unlikely that the various flap sections would be forced neatly back into their semi-stowed '15' position, which is what the site pictures appear to show; rather they would be distorted upwards but still in their original articulated positions.

Anyway this is now probably academic as the investigating authorities appear to have confirmed that the landing was made without the flaps being in normal landing configuration, and additionally claim that this because the aircraft was going too fast for them to be so. I'm sure a poster will (if they haven't already) set out the minimum speeds for each flap increment for us.

In the meantime it seems that the CVR has now been successfully decoded, which will hopefully shed more light on the cause, and perhaps confirm/deny some of the rumours swirling round Jakarta last week.

fox niner

18th Mar 2007, 03:11

aahh...

But if the flaps would not extend because of high speed, that means that they were kept at 15 by flap load relief. If that were the case, the flaps would extend to the selected setting during the landing roll as the plane was decelerating.

They did not.

Therefore, the flap lever was in 15, and the flaps stayed there. Apparently the crew did not have time/forgot to select flaps 30.

And that would be OK (sort of) if they simply had made a go-around.

theamrad

18th Mar 2007, 04:10

and additionally claim that this because the aircraft was going too fast for them to be so

suggests that flaps would not extend because of it

Guys - this is still only a journo' report - and the expression used was 'might have been caused by....'
Fox Niner - We still don't know where the flap lever was before runway contact - maybe 15, maybe 30, maybe moved back to 15 for an attempt at going around. Maybe the crew never moved the handle beyond 15 because they already knew they were above Vfe for flap 30.
"Therefore, the flap lever was in 15, and the flaps stayed there" The flap handle stays where its put - irrespective of flap load relief operating or not.
In any case, a go-around at Yogya isn't just "completely straighforward" - there are other considerations (as mentioned earlier in the thread: traffic ahead, terrain, etc.).
----------------------------------------
It seems like a lot of people have dived on flap load relief because of the mention of problems with flap extension - to me personally, I wouldn't regard the operation of load relief as a "problem regarding flap extension". It's there for a good reason - the best example being encountering gusts/or shear which might otherwise cause overload damage. The use of the words 'problem' or 'difficulty' implies, to me at least, a malfunction/breakage etc, not the normal operation of the relief system. Flap assym' or other flap drive faults are still possibilities also. At then end of the day, we are still dealing for the most part with media reports - and there are still a lot of unknowns. None of us know what has been said in crew statements - and we are unlikely to find out for quite some time.

Rabbit 1

18th Mar 2007, 05:25

Deleted this pic from Page 6 and placed it here. B707. Flaps remained at selected position. B737 different? Haven't flown a 707 but the comments about this prang can be find via the pictures link.http://i156.photobucket.com/albums/t38/temakin/0109176.jpg

Few Cloudy

18th Mar 2007, 08:12

Yes, there are various scenarios - but the data, when it becomes available will make all clear.

By the way, was there a shot of the right wing TE?

Sinbad1

18th Mar 2007, 15:49

for
RiccardoGRSB (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=169883)

What could cause such malfunction...See post 43 page 11 :ok:

Torres

18th Mar 2007, 20:41

Sky News reports this morning that investigators claim the accident was caused by excessive speed at landing.

BOAC

18th Mar 2007, 22:25

There's an awful lot of rubbish and speculation on this thread, so can we PLEASE lay the 'flap load relief' wild rabbit to rest as has been pointed out before? There is no such thing at Flap 30 on the Classic, only on the NG. The CERTIFICATION RECOMMENDED flap limit for flap more than 15 is 190kts, and if they landed at more than that.................

wesky

18th Mar 2007, 23:38

BOAC not sure what classic (734) you have been flying but the last one I stepped out of had a nice big notch of flap 30, the one just before 40...

In saying that though, Im with you on the load relief – drop it!

This all comes down to one thing and one thing only, pure and outright negligence.

THEN, the pilots had the ordacity to make excuse after excuse. The box never lies, trust me, ask it anything :E

There is one thing that is 100% controllable and that is your speed. In saying that, contrary to any sort of flap problem, they still did not manager their approach or their aircraft. One fella mentioned previously – what ever happened to the Go Around? 15 clicks would have been fine, even if the thing was stuck! The only excuse I can see here that might be worthwhile is that one of the dashboard crew had a bad case of Diarea and needed to get it out quick – that would be a worthwhile excuse in some sickening case – Aviate, Navigate & Communicate with the element of ****iate if needed – their goes that maturity level!

These 2 pilots have not only destroyed their own career, both by telling fibs and being inconsiderate pilots, they have also destroyed the reputation of all pilots - once the media get it out.

As if it is not hard enough having pax who are extremely scared of flying, and wonder how and if the plane will fly (the good ol' "will it fall out of the sky" theory), now we will have to deal with the "can the pilots really fly this plane" said Martha, "yeah, especially after those 2 pilots from Garuda flew it to fast" quoted Marg. Keep in mind, the Media will not display all the who-har about the situation, it will just be published as “Pilots, to fast” or maybe even “Pilot clocked at 350km/hr, kills many, receive's speeding fine”. Don’t laugh, it could be true, they only want the gory and vilifying details.

All I ask is that don’t look to deep in to the situation, check out the basics of it all – half of us are not LAME’s, we just know how the damn thing flys and how to keep it up there, not every little rivet, screw and liquid nail used to hold the thing together (Journos, use that one for me :D ). Any technical talking will give the journos, who are no doubt hounding this forum, more fuel to play with – lets let them keep their current story – to fast.

Cheers.
:ugh:

Flight Safety

18th Mar 2007, 23:42

Some of us Ppruners are getting sloppy at finding the facts....

How did we miss this one (from March 13th) ...

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21378678-1702,00.html

wesky

18th Mar 2007, 23:50

Maybe my bowel theory was correct?

haha.

Honestly, I should not be joking. Apologies to those that I offend!

G-MKAA

19th Mar 2007, 00:50

"Flight GA200 originated in Jakarta (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jakarta) and was carrying 133 passengers, At approximately 7 am local time, while attempting to land at Adisucipto International Airport (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adisucipto_International_Airport), Yogyakarta (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yogyakarta), Indonesia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia), the plane overran the end of the runway, went through the perimeter fence and stopped in a nearby rice field. Passengers in the plane and witnesses on the ground reported the plane approached the runway at a speed greater than normal. According to passengers, the plane shook violently before it crashed. At some point the plane caught fire, and while most passengers were able to escape, a number of passengers perished inside the burning fuselage. This may have been caused by the broken main exit door, which is located at the front left. The fire may have been ignited from the nose landing gear after its wheels were snapped off, which were found later on the runway.The pilot, Captain Muhammad Marwoto Komar, claimed that there was a sudden downdraft (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vertical_draft) immediately before the flight landed, and that the flaps on the aircraft may have malfunctioned. The latest theory being examined by investigators is that an airport vehicle was on the runway at the time of landing. Investigators believe that whilst the landing was high and fast, had the vehicle not been on the runway the pilot would have simply aborted the landing after touching down. Instead the pilot steered the nosewheel away at such an angle it broke off, impacting the wing and igniting the inferno."

Surely any 'Airport Vehicle' would have been aware of inbound traffic / been advised of the approching A/C via GND/ATC??

theamrad

19th Mar 2007, 04:39

There's an awful lot of rubbish and speculation on this thread……….
There is no such thing at Flap 30 on the Classic

BOAC you are of course CORRECT – on BOTH counts.
---------------------------------------------------

THEN, the pilots had the ordacity to make excuse after excuse. The box never lies, trust me, ask it anything

Wesky – since you have the definitive cause already – and suggest the ‘box never lies’ – maybe you’d share the CVR,FDR and other data with the rest of us who are interested, and haven’t got access to it yet? I’m curious about the ‘excuses after excuses’ also. They weren’t perhaps based on the speculative waffle appearing in the media, as opposed to fact? “Maybe my bowel theory was correct?
haha. Honestly, I should not be joking. Apologies to those that I offend!” – Well, maybe you’ve got a point there, your ‘diarea’ theory is probably founded on the same level of factual knowledge, as that with which you express such certainty as to the blame of the crew, at this premature juncture. As for joking about the crew involved in a fatal accident – whether blameless or otherwise – the adults here can decide for themselves.
-----------------------------------------------------
AIR traffic control transcripts contradict claims by the pilots of doomed Garuda airlines flight 200 that a sudden downdraft was to blame for the crash.…… For the last :mad: time, no-one ever said there was a sudden downdraugt, not the crew, not Captain Stephanus, nor anyone else….just a mention of one word by way of an explanation to the idiots and……. the birth of yet another media red herring which they invented and propagated. Anyone who has bothered to read the rest of the thread would have already known that days ago.

Sky News reports this morning that investigators claim the accident was caused by excessive speed at landing.
Accurate as always – so far that’s not what the investigators actually said – hopefully the investigators are a little bit more thorough than sky news. But then again, who am I to question the journalistic abilities of sky news, after all they have educated us to the fact that trains are steered!

FullWings

19th Mar 2007, 08:47

It's sounding more and more like a "rushed approach" which, unfortunately this time, ended in disaster... :sad:

Conditions have been reported as benign. I would have thought a landing at Vref15 (if that was as much flap as was available) was still possible in 2200m; I'd guess you'd need c.1800m at MLW, although it's been a while since I flew the "classic".

PK-KAR

19th Mar 2007, 09:58

Fewcloudy,
Here's the right wing T/E
http://i115.photobucket.com/albums/n309/hurry_02/DSC00060.jpg

G-MKAA,
As much as I like wikipedia, I must say that a lot of the things there on this crash are wrong...
Surely any 'Airport Vehicle' would have been aware of inbound traffic / been advised of the approching A/C via GND/ATC??
Indeed. There was 1 preceeding traffic a military trainer. Now for vehicles to cross the runway, they'd call the tower on the air ops tower freq. or call the tower on the ground ops frequency...

PK-KAR

Midland63

19th Mar 2007, 11:42

Question from SLF

In the article in the Australian linked to a few posts back, it said:-

"One minute later, the tower again told flight 200 the wind conditions were calm, and asked the pilots to check the aircraft's landing gear was down and locked before declaring the plane clear to land."

Is that normal? The tower participating in the checklist?

Sorry for thread drift!

M63

Magplug

19th Mar 2007, 12:14

Question from SLF
Have you read the rest of this thread ? Read post #158 by PK-KAR

Let me float a theory/hypothesis call it what you will......

The approach was rushed, to the extent that normal landing flap and Vref(30)+5 was not achieved. The aircraft has #1 reverser locked out (PK-KAR's post #169).

The aircraft touches down with some flap but at very high speed. In order to kill that energy crew apply FULL reverse on the only serviceable reverser and in doing so lose directional control on the runway. The Captain cancels reverse but instead makes a bold NWS input at an inappropriately high G/SPD and the two NW tyres burst. The NW rims shatter on rwy contact and the aircraft overuns the stop-end resting on the main gear an the NW oleo.

chuks

19th Mar 2007, 12:47

If this was a joint civil/military field with military controllers then the normal military SOP is for the controller to say something like, 'Check gear down and locked, cleared to land.' Even if you are flying a fixed-gear aircraft you will still get your landing clearance issued in this way, because it is simply a military SOP. It would not suggest that there was any problem in this case with having forgot to put the gear down.

PK-KAR

20th Mar 2007, 01:20

Midland63,
"check gear down and lock" words from tower is normal here at airports handling military traffic, and JOG, is an airbase... with a civilian enclave... At another airbase (with civilian ATC), it's "check gear down three greens" coming out for the milboys.

Magplug,
Garuda rushing an approach and not becoming stable is something which, though possible, seems unlikely, without other causes.

It seems morelikely that things were normal, then a flap malfunction, leaving them to land with little flap... The problem wasn't so much the lack of flap deployment, but the decision to land in JOG with that known flap (even 732s pilots wouldn't land their 732s in JOG with a flap15!), and also the differences between a normal approach and a flap15 approach added with the time of day/runway alignment.

A flap15 approach would give a nose higher than normal approach, it is extremely tempting to dip the nose down for a "better look", which would end up gaining a lot of speed thanks to the lower drag config, pull the nose up try to bleed off the speed, and repeat the whole thing again...

Add that with the sunglare, given that it was 7am and they were approaching into the sun. Furthermore, the threshold being above the surrounding terrain, with the runway above a bush-walled embankment with a river in front (no/little clearway before the runway), an upslope for the TDZ, but downhill until the end of the runway, can and has yielded visual illusions causing airplanes to come in high... Now in a flap15 config, that's not a good thing...

PK-KAR

wesky

20th Mar 2007, 05:11

This leaves 2 options, they couldn’t get the thing back up in the air due to malfunction or they made a bloody stupid decision. As for the comments from the pilots re wind etc etc, apparently that’s what they were telling the officials who then told the media. In saying that, I guess you cannot trust them.

Not just for their sakes (Garuda boys), but others who make a living out of having a pole between their legs or a stick to their side, I really hope this turns out to be some sort of mechanical failure and not pilot error.

PK-KAR

20th Mar 2007, 07:33

Magplug & Wesky,
I seriously doubt that they had this accident because they went in too fast and cannot reach Vref30+5 assuming the flaps were all working.

I've just reviewed the interview SCTV did with the GA Pilot's Assoc, and again, there was no part of the interview where the pilots claimed wind... they claimed "something pushed the aircraft"... not "windshear brought us down".

Whether this is pilot error or mechanical failure? It's possible that it's both. However, some are saying it's pilot error leading to mechanical failure (flaps not extending due to speed), and I tend to take that as a rare possibility, and it is more likely that it was mechanical malfunction leading to pilot error.

I'd like to raise another write off that happened on 24th Dec here in Indonesia, also involving a 734. According to NTSB Factual Report (id: DCA07WA017):

On December 24, 2006, at around 0050 UTC, a Boeing 737-400, registration PK-LIJ, operated by Lion Air departed runway 31 at Hasanuddin Airport, Makassar, Sulawesi, Indonesia. The flight was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Jakarta carrying 157 passengers, 2 flight crew and 5 flight attendants. On arrival, the aircraft was executing a visual approach via a left downwind pattern to runway 31. The crew maneuvered in a close pattern due to proximity of terrain on under the base and final approach areas of runway 31. The weather was reported to be 10 km visibility (approximately 6 sm), surface wind calm, no clouds, and surface temperature 29 C. According to a written report from the crew, when they selected the flaps from 15 deg. to 30 deg. on final, they observed that the flaps indicator indicated a asymmetrical condition. According to the report, the crew re-selected the flaps back to 15 deg. and they elected to continue approach and landing. The report said that the crew referred to the QRH for the situation and they also checked the actual landing distance for flaps 15 deg. landing configuration. The captain was the pilot flying. According to ground witness reports, on landing the aircraft was not on centerline, it bounced twice, and swerved down the runway. The aircraft came to rest beyond the runway in the overrun area. The passengers were evacuated with no reports of injuries. According to a report from the local airport authority, the aircraft sustained substantial damage; the right main landing gear was detached, the left main gear protruded through the left wing structure, and some fuselage skin was wrinkled. There was a significant ground scar on the runway surface. The FDR and CVR has been removed and secured after the event.

In this case, again, no emergency was transmitted, no malfunction were mentioned to the ATC, and the reports of "amazing speed" was noted...

It seems more like the case of a long visual final, early deployment to flap15, then the same thing as what happened to LIJ happened.

Now in the case of GA200, they were landing at runway 09, at 7am, straight into the low sun, at a higher than normal nose attitude (glare probably adds to the difficulty). At a runway where the threshold is higher than the preceeding terrain, and where the runway perimeter is only 25m from the threshold, preceeded by an elevated riverbank. The TDZ 09 itself is an upslope, but it goes downhill down to the last 100m of the runway at the end of 27, where it levels out. (Just for an idea, standing at 27, you won't be able to see the tail of a 737 at 09). Even under normal landing config, flights coming in tend to touchdown late. Colleagues flying to JOG said being low there is a bit risky, there's also a flyover on finals.

PK-KAR