(Kegworth)Lessons Not learned? B737 Dials to Screens

[Telstar]

http://www.aaiu.ie/AAIUviewitem.asp?id=8545&lang=ENG&loc=1652

It seems that the lessons of Kegworth have not been learned. Two crew relatively new off the -200 onto the -800 who amongst other things could not programme a Bearing Distance waypoint into the FMC amongst many other contributing factors.

Does this point the finger again at the civilian world of minimal time, minimal cost conversion from type to type? The comment that came to mind when I read this report was from a Pilot of BMI at the time, being interviewed for the infamous televsion documentary about Kegworth. Along the lines of "I had spent X amount of months (6?), converting from one military type to the other, but for the -200 to -300 it was a five day course"

I know that this operator in particular uses a FMC trainer on a desktop PC, which I thought was far inferior to the actual mock up unit used by other operators, offering a more tactile experience, especially for older pilots who are not at all comfortable using PCs (There are lots of them still out there).

So what do people think? Please lets try and keep it a seperate discussion from T&Cs that is well covered elsewhere on the site!

[Zeffy]

...Does this point the finger again at the civilian world of minimal time, minimal cost conversion from type to type?

While the aspects of economic pressures and minimal "differences training" are not insignificant to this incident, might the principal cause be closer to continuation of a rushed approach, with unrelenting time pressure?

In other words, might not the same type of incident have been possible if a -200 crew had also been shorted the AIP information prior to takeoff, had to completely toss the arrival plan at the last minute to fly an approach beginning much closer to the radome? Could we also have seen a -200, descending unconfigured, trying to catch or maintain the G/S with a significant tailwind component, with the pilots losing the "big picture"...?

The last-minute change to the approach plan was also significant in the B757 accident at SKCL back in 1995 http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19951220-1&lang=en -- not trying to change the thread topic, just pointing out that a rushed approach can be a risky endeavor, even to crews carrying plenty of experience with glass.

At EIKN, did the requirement to circle to the opposite end of the airfield subtly fade or blur the traditional "safety gates" for a stabilized approach -- i.e., were the crew perhaps considering that the requirements for configuration, descent rate, spool-up, etc. would not apply until turning base or final during the visual circling maneuver?

[Telstar]

might the principal cause be closer to continuation of a rushed approach, with unrelenting time pressure?

I honestly don't think so. It wouldn't be for me.

We are encouraged to not allow any unessecary delays on the turn around, but thats it. At the base I am at they certainly have never required an explanation for any delay. The company is at pains to point out that they have landing gates, strict SOPs, callouts and that if they can't be achieved a go-around is mandatory and that there is a no blame policy for Go Arounds. They have gotten so desperate to avoid these events(there has been a relatively high occurence) that they have got to the stage were a memo has been issued stating that anyone busting the 500' gate will be demoted.

About the -200, then I presume they would have been able to handle the GPS in the 200s as they were more familiar, or would have been expected to have done the full proceedure in the -200?

At EIKN, did the requirement to circle to the opposite end of the airfield subtly fade or blur the traditional "safety gates" for a stabilized approach -- i.e., were the crew perhaps considering that the requirements for configuration, descent rate, spool-up, etc. would not apply until turning base or final during the visual circling maneuver?

I honestly don't think it got to that stage of thinking. The task saturation had taken grip, and they weren't thinking that far ahead. The company SOP is to be fully configured on the ILS before breaking off for the circle.

[vapilot2004]

When presented with new tech, tunnel vision can develop and we may forget that the 'tried and true' procedures and equipment we already know are still useful.

I have found that it is a lack of personal confidence in the basic operation of something like an FMC, that will get in the way of mastering the thing. (and in a related observation - over-confidence is often the cause for PC savvy youth errors.)

The external box is a better learning tool than the PC version. :ok: