Problems with mechanical flight displays

[antonybradford]

Can anyone think of an example of a pilot having too much data infront of them, which can lead to loss of situational awareness? This is concerning old flight deck layouts, eg 737-200,

Antony

[alf5071h]

Antony, it is not having too much data that contributes to loss of situation awareness; it is more likely to be poor mental discipline in focussing attention on the appropriate data, i.e. filtering out the unnecessary data (at that time).

Your focus of attention is the dominant factor in determining what is ‘seen’, and thus what is understood. This, together with a comparison of previous knowledge (mental model), provides a ‘true’ awareness of the current situation. Therefore you have to know which data is important in each scenario, and where to find it, i.e. in level flight you scan altitude frequently, but during climb and decent less frequently.

The tasks above are essential elements of an instrument scan; this determines what ‘is seen’ how often it is reviewed and the sequence that enables you to build a mental picture of the situation. The concept of an instrument scan can be applied to most aspects of flying; i.e Plane, Path, People. ( http://crm-devel.org/resources/article/flyingcareers.htm)
An ‘old’ flight deck might appear to have ‘a lot’ of information, but provided there is a logical layout, well marked instruments, and clear indications, then these old aircraft provide a good basis for an instrument scan.

Conversely, some modern aircraft with EFIS have a similar amount of information, but due to a ‘cluttered’, compact format the information is not easily ‘seen’, e.g. EFIS might show the label ‘DME’ next to a DME beacon range and ‘DIST’ for LNAV range to a waypoint; given appropriate circumstances enabling human error, then these could be interchanged resulting in a loss of situation awareness.

[john_tullamarine]

I would imagine that the majority of us who flew both were more concerned with too much information on the electronic wizardry .. and, probably, never on the older steam driver equipment ..

[411A]

JT is right.

For example, when departing an airfield, in the L1011 or my private aeroplane, and as the first turn is started, I always look outside in the direction of the turn...when it's visual, of course.
Yet, I find many First Officers are too busy glancing at the FMS, to pay much attention to anything else, and even making selections, when this job is more properly done by the NF pilot.
Many new general aviation aircraft are now equipped with avionics that make even the best of the recent generation of jet transports look old fashioned, and FAR too much time is spent heads down.
This, in my personal opinion, from a safety standpoint, is NOT good, as when VMC, separation is see-and-be-seen.

[Old Smokey]

I cannot hope to approach Alf's level of dexterity with the written word here, so I must tread carefully.

For the 'old' cockpit, I think that Alf has 'nailed it' (as usual) in his statement that the solution to your dilemma lies in filtering out extraneous information. As an example, I have no interest in the Mach Number as we pass 20000 feet, even though it is on display, although it has my complete attention later in cruise at 37000 feet. The ability to filter appropriate and inappropriate information largely comes with experience. If I review my flying career, I believe that in my early days, I sought the minimum information required for safe operation. Now, 40 years later, I find that I'm constantly seeking more information, to enable more complete situational awareness.

A significant advantage of the 'old' cockpit, is that although, as you suggest, there may be an excess of information, information is predictable in it's location, that is, it cannot be moved electronically to another location as can happen in the glass cockpit. If the DME is in one location, and the Distance to Run to the next waypoint is in another, then that's where they'll stay, there's little room for confusion. Alf's last paragraph was a chilling reminder to me of a fatal CFIT in our company -

e.g. EFIS might show the label ‘DME’ next to a DME beacon range and ‘DIST’ for LNAV range to a waypoint; given appropriate circumstances enabling human error, then these could be interchanged resulting in a loss of situation awareness.

In the case in point, DME OR Distance to Waypoint was pilot selectable in the same display location in a 'glass' cockpit. Descent was carried out believing that DME was on display, whereas in fact, Distance to Waypoint was on display, resulting in CFIT 28 miles before the airport (No GPWS).

One of the modern 'glass' cockpit advantages is that much of the filtering is done for you, e.g. Localiser / Glideslope information will only display for the FMC destination airport. A further advantage, is that there's an OFF switch for most information, right down to raw data.

Once you've been married for long enough, you will become very skilled at filtering useful from totally useless extraneous information.:E

Regards (and apologies to Alf and my wife),

Old Smokey

[PLovett]

Whilst I cannot add anything to the above replies as I have never flown a "glass cockpit" anything there is one issue about the older "steam driven" stuff that concerns me.

The increasing regulatory demands for new equipment in old cockpits is leading to some very unsatisfactory layouts. On a flight a few months ago in IMC that required an initial NDB approach with a subsequent missed approach (could not get visual by the missed approach point) and then an ILS into a nearby airport I was struggling because of the cockpit layout where some information was well outside the scan pattern.

At present in Australia there is an on-going investigation into this country's worst air crash for some years. The aircraft, a Metro 3 (or 23) was conducting a GPS approach into a north Queensland aerodrome when it hit a ridge in IMC. The investigation is being hampered by an inoperative CVR and a damaged FDR. Without wishing to be seen to pre-empting the findings (which I suspect are going to be inconclusive) the aircraft appears to have been in a higher than normal rate of descent which presupposses a loss of situational awareness by the PF. There has been a lot of discussion in Australia about the way in which distance information is presented during a GPS approach and that it is not always showing the distance to the runway.

The GPS was a later inclusion in the cockpit of this Metro in which there is not a lot of room for the inclusion of anything. I cannot say where it was located but I suspect it was not easy view of the PF (this particular Metro was not equipped with autopilot).

I, for one, shall be very interested to see whether the cockpit layout in the Metro is considered as one of the factors in the crash.

[Miles Magister]

I agree whole heartedly with Alf, 411a and JT.

In the older aircraft interpretation of the core information was generally taught well. The selective radial scan coupled with a three dimential picture served many well. The main problem was when the 3 dimentional mental picture broke down.

Many of us were worried about the glass cockpit presenting too much information, and it often does. The ability to revert to the basic scan is a wonderful skill. I recently experienced a spider bieng ill on the MFD whilst in the sim, the TRE (who was even older than me!) totally lost SA whilst I reverted to the selective radial scan and followed the old fashioned needle which worked a treat.

A pilot can loose SA in any cockpit. Good basic skills training is what will save the day.

[john_tullamarine]

PLovett,

First, may I qualify my comments to be unrelated to any specific accident, incident, or modification.

Confining my remarks to Oz (I see that you are so located ..) .. and presuming that your comments related to Oz observations ...

The intention in the certification process is that the TP certification fraternity make assessments and adjudicate on the acceptability of pilot station layout. It follows that, for modifications affecting flight station layout, the same folk should be involved in assessment ..

For many years in Australia, however, that assessment task has been delegated routinely to the flight standards examiner folk (regardless of whatever evolving titles they go by). I suggest that the reason for this is that the Regulator (likewise) has never had other than a minimal (usually one) TP on staff with the result that the certification TP only has had time to be involved with the more significant mod programs. I note that I have been out of the modification design game for several years so my comments should be seen as historical and may not be totally correct for current circumstances.

The results of flight station modifications have been mixed, to say the least.

I am not suggesting that the good flying folk are not competent - quite the opposite - however, in the main, their competence lies in flying and flight standards assessment rather than design and certification things.

As a consequence, in Australia at least, many aircraft modifications have been assessed as being satisfactory from the viewpoint of flight station layout when, probably, the certification TP would have given a different assessment ....

Two anecdotes ..

(a) I had a lengthy technical discussion with the relevant TP colleague in respect of a mod which had a nav display in a not altogether desirable location .. the cockpit was sufficiently busy that there was just nowhere else to put the thing .. we eventually agreed that it was OK to leave it rather than redesign the entire forward panel to put it someplace else.

(b) on a single seat endorsement years ago, the ASI was located up on top of the coaming (interesting location I thought and possibly desirable for the air ag community) .. endorsement was done one afternoon so that I could go towing the next day .. cloud base lower (?) than desirable for an endorsement ... I was quite alarmed for a few seconds when the thing leapt off the ground in about 100 ft and I couldn't find the ASI (under stress, of course, looking to the "normal" location) .. never a good thing to let oneself get behind an aeroplane ..

[A37575]

One only has to read the accident report (dressed up admirably and easy to read in the Australian author´s MaCarthur Jobs series of Air Disaster - or Air Crash books) on the Thai Inter A310 fatal accident into the mountains at Kathmandu. Briefly, the crew were initially distracted in the course of a straight in VOR/DME approach in IMC and with much uncertainty and cockpit flight management confusion elected to go around in the early stage of the approach and have another go. Although the missed approach procedure is quite complicated involving various radials before reaching a holding pattern, the crew flew in a circle quite different from the published missed approach procedure and spent an inordinate time heads down attempting to programme one waypoint which was out of sight on their MAP.

If they had simply observed the passage of a NDB needle and a VOR needle on their respective RMI´s it would have been readily apparent that the aircraft was at 10,500 ft tracking away from the airport into a 21,000 ft MSA.
But as often happens with glass cockpit operation the crew were automatic pilot monkeys who relied blindly on the MAP regardless of the appropriateness of such a situation.

I know of a highly experienced expatriate captain on contract to a European operator who was read the riot act by his chief pilot because some first officer had leaked the startling news that the expat pilot actually turned off the flight director in flight. The chief pilot (quite nicely, I might add), gently castigated the expat captain explaining that "Our first officers are not trained to monitor raw data flying - please stick to the full automatics.":ugh: