TC Security passes

[flyboy519]

Hi guys ...

Question for any of you out there that returned to canada after spending time overseas. Did the TC background check provide with any headaches ??? I remember a few years back a thread about problems with getting an approved restricted pass if you had spent anytime flying overseas. Id especially like to hear of anyone whyo went back after working in the middle east.

Thanks

fb519

[J.O.]

The same issue still exists. Essentially you need an official record of where you have been during your time away. The local police can often provide the required documentation.

[Carrier]

I have asked several times on this and other forums how this pass works and what are the problems with not having one. Nobody has given an answer. What to a commercial pilot trying to earn a living and stay ahead of the tax predators in Canada are the benefits of having a pass and what are the problems caused by not having one?

For example, if I do not have one does this mean:

1. I am forbidden to fly an aircraft into or out of certain Canadian airports, or
2. I am not allowed to fly at all in Canada, or
3. I am allowed to fly into certain major and supposedly secure Canadian airports from non-secure airports but another pilot with a pass will have to retrieve the plane from the secure airport because I am not allowed back on the apron once I have left it, or
4. I may fly in and out of secure airports but will have to be escorted from and to my plane by armed goons. What would be the problem with this in Canada? It is fairly normal in some countries where I operate to be met on the apron or seen off the premises by government goons with AK47s.

Where does Human Rights and the right of Canadians to earn a living at their chosen occupation in their own country come into this? Surely all Canadian citizens should be regarded as innocent until proven guilty and all Canadian citizens should have the right to work in their chosen occupation anywhere in Canada unless the authorities actually possess concrete evidence as to why they should not. Has anyone instigated a Human Rights challenge? Is Transport Canada now complying with such a basis and doing the checks with appropriate speed?

Is it now possible for an individual pilot to apply from overseas and obtain security clearance? This is what happens with legal immigrants. All the police, medical, employment, professional qualification checks, etc are done overseas before they are given permission to move to Canada. It makes sense for a Canadian pilot intending to return to Canada to obtain the TC security approval and pass before giving up his job overseas. It would be rather dumb to give up a good job overseas and move back to Canada only to find that the clearance is refused on some technicality, because certain information is simply not available, or because of a bullying TC official on a power trip.

Am I perhaps expecting too much in the way of intelligence and customer service from TC by asking if such a practical solution is available?

I will be very grateful if somebody would take the trouble to explain the full implications to a pilot of having or not having a pass.

[bcflyer]

First off if you are so concerned about getting a security pass, why not call up Transport and ask them? That way you know you are getting the correct information.
You can fly into any airport in Canada with an appropriate pilots license and stop at the local FBO. You may need to show said license and be escorted to your aircraft to leave but it should be possible.
If you want to fly for an airline that operates out of the terminal at an airport, you will be required to have a security pass. The paper work is not all that bad although you will be required to provide info on your parents, spouse, and inlaws as well as your history for the past 5 yrs (where you worked and lived) The application must also be signed by the company you are working for. (you can't just go and get a pass, you must be working for someone) The security checks aren't done by TC, they are conducted by the RCMP and if there is a gap in your history (don't have proper documentation of your last 5 yrs) the application will come back to Transport as incomplete and you will be denied a pass.
As for your human rights crap, get real. If you have lived in Canada and can document everything, you won't have a problem with your pass. The problems have arisen from people who LEFT CANADA (mostly to the Middle East looking for the greener grass) and now want to come back. Its not impossible to get the information, just a few more hoops to jump through. To fly for an airline in Canada, possessing a security clearance is part of the requirements. If you can't meet the requirements then you don't get the job. I agree that it can be tough on some people trying to come home, but there is no Human Rights violation here

[Willie Everlearn]

So many flight crew get security screened at Canadian airports these days, why bother with a RED pass at all ??? :ugh: Especially deadheading.

If you're going to be treated like the passengers, whether your operating crew or deadheading crew or just going home, what's all the fuss over an Airport Security badge ??? Doesn't seem like you "really" need one. You still have to go through the 'routine' at the scanner.:confused:

Last time I checked, the form was a lot more invasive than it probably needs to be. But then, so's the whole security at airports issue.:=

OH well, whatever.:sad: :mad:

Cheers,
Willie

[sec 3]

When I was working in canada the only time I had to take my passport out of my bag was when I came home to canada.:yuk: As previously stated, what's the use of an airport security pass when you have to jump through all the hoops just like the pax:*

[bcflyer]

Actually there are alot of airports in Canada where crew can bypass security while on duty. YVR YYC YEG YWG YHZ being the major ones that I know of. Most of the smaller airports will let crew bypass as well, of course you must have your security tag to do so. It does have some perks.

[J.O.]

Actually there are alot of airports in Canada where crew can bypass security while on duty. YVR YYC YEG YWG YHZ being the major ones that I know of. Most of the smaller airports will let crew bypass as well, of course you must have your security tag to do so. It does have some perks.

The concept of crew bypass is changing. It has already happened in the new concourse at YYC and T1 at YYZ. The other airports will be changing as well. It will be replaced by separate crew security screening areas. All crew members will be required to pass through security screening, but they'll have a dedicated security line to do so. With the new biometric passes, there will no longer be any need to compare a person's pass against a master list of expired or lost passes.

[CD]

With the new biometric passes, there will no longer be any need to compare a person's pass against a master list of expired or lost passes.

Several years ago, there was an interesting article published relating to the use of biometrics and the problems associated with this kind of id.

Smart card, dumb idea: Biometric ID cards are bad for one reason: they're too hard to replace

THE OTTAWA CITIZEN
11/18/2002

Immigration Minister Denis Coderre has suggested that Canadians concerned about security debate the merits of a "biometric" national identity card. Civil libertarians are alarmed about the privacy implications of cards containing so much personal data. But there's another reason to oppose them too: bad engineering.

For the uninitiated, "biometric" cards use sophisticated technology to identify their bearers by some unique physical characteristic recorded on the card. To enter a restricted area, you have to have the card, and the eyeballs or fingerprints to match it. That makes these cards hard to counterfeit.

They're already in limited use by governments and businesses, and the Canadian Air Transportation Security Agency is considering them. But while biometrics" sounds cool, there is a broad problem. Security systems based on it may be unlikely to fail, but if they do fail, the consequences will be very serious.

No one likes failure, but between unpredictable events and predictable human stupidity, it happens a lot. That's why engineers, when designing any safeguard, must ask what the consequences of failure are. (They use the term "ductile" for a system that fails relatively "well" -- that is, in which any failure is either limited or can be fixed quickly. They use the term "brittle" for a failure that will have widespread consequences if things go badly.)

In a perfect world, for example, there would be no car accidents. But between bad weather and bad driving, accidents happen. So in addition to sophisticated vehicle and road designs, automotive safety experts build in a simple safeguard: the seat belt. Likewise, architects first try to design buildings that won't catch fire. But they also incorporate features to minimize the harm should a fire occur, such as smoke detectors.

The Atlantic Monthly recently profiled cyber-security expert Bruce Schneier, who devoted himself to devising theoretically foolproof computer systems -- until one day he realized he was doing it for clients who couldn't program their VCRs. Then he realized, and began to preach, the importance of "ductile" rather than "brittle" security systems. He puts biometric cards in the latter category.

Suppose, he says, all your data is encoded to your thumbprint, and someone hacks into the database. True, you can stop them from using it by cancelling it. But what next? "The bank can issue you a new card with a new number. But (with biometrics) this is your thumb -- you can't get a new one." Identity theft is bad enough with replaceable passports, bank cards and drivers' licences. With a biometric ID card, the only way to get rid of the stolen identity would be permanently to delete the legitimate one as well. That's a nightmare for governments and citizens.

Anyone who has seen the film Minority Report knows what he's talking about. In the movie, a character played by Tom Cruise, whose eyes are biometrically scanned all the time in his futuristic world, has to go to the trouble of getting an eye transplant when he wants to change his identity. Biometrics are definitely "brittle."

Recently, nearly 1,000 traditional Pearson International Airport passes were misplaced. Security supervisors quickly cancelled them (and eventually recovered them). If they'd been biometric, and stolen rather than misplaced, cancelling them wouldn't have been enough. You'd have had to change employees -- hire ones with different thumbs or eyeballs (or go the Tom Cruise route).

In seeking to protect Canada's national security, the specific measures will be as varied as the problems, but they must all share one characteristic. In addition to being designed not to fail very easily, they should be designed not to fail catastrophically.

Atlantic Monthly: Homeland Insecurity (complete article here...) (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200209/mann)

[Throttle Arms]

Suppose, he says, all your data is encoded to your thumbprint, and someone hacks into the database. True, you can stop them from using it by cancelling it. But what next? "The bank can issue you a new card with a new number. But (with biometrics) this is your thumb -- you can't get a new one." Identity theft is bad enough with replaceable passports, bank cards and drivers' licences. With a biometric ID card, the only way to get rid of the stolen identity would be permanently to delete the legitimate one as well. That's a nightmare for governments and citizens.

Recently, nearly 1,000 traditional Pearson International Airport passes were misplaced. Security supervisors quickly cancelled them (and eventually recovered them). If they'd been biometric, and stolen rather than misplaced, cancelling them wouldn't have been enough. You'd have had to change employees -- hire ones with different thumbs or eyeballs (or go the Tom Cruise route).

The fingerprint or iris merely provide the nesessary values for the mathematical algorithm. If a card is lost, new values can be taken from the eye or finger and the database administrator can invalidate the previous algorithm. In other words, an eye or thumb transplant is not required.

http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/2006/20061111/html/regle3-e.html


It uses smart card technology, which integrates a small computer chip, including a microprocessor and memory to store two kinds of biometric data: fingerprint and iris templates. These templates are generated by algorithms that encode distinctive features from an individual's iris and fingerprint images. The templates cannot be used to recreate images of the iris or fingerprints.