aircraft crash in Stord, Norway

[matkat]

being reported on various Norwegian news channels anybody hearing anything about it?

[angels]

Reuters has a brief item not saying what type of plane but say 'small.'

It has burst into flames after sliding off the runway. 16 pax on board.

No further details I'm afraid.

[M609]

Atlantic Airwas BA46

16 POB confirmed, including 4 crew

http://www.vg.no/bilder/edrum/1160461171874_572.jpg

Bad day......

Edit:

http://pub.tv2.no/multimedia/na/archive/00273/flybrann_p__Stord_273360b.jpg

[matkat]

Thanks Angels, I am in Norway but the news is sketchy even from Norwegian radio cannot determine aircraft type either but operated by Atlantic air of the Faroe Islands.
pic here
http://www.vg.no/
more details when I can provide.

[matkat]

Norewgian radio saying there is a possibility of one Survivor.

[M609]

RCC in Stavanger confirms Atlantic Airways.

Looks like it went off the end of RWY33.

I hope the fire did not start right away, if so I fear the worst. The terrain is really steep at the crash site. :uhoh:

[angels]

Blimey those pics look grim. Reuters quoting a spokesman for the southern Norway reescue centre (didn't know there was such a beast) as saying its not clear if the pax and crew got out.

Fingers crossed that they did.

[matkat]

Norwegian radio now reporting 12 survivors and 4 missing.

[A2QFI]

12 survivors, from what is shown in those pictures, is amazing! Sympathy to those who died and their families.

[matkat]

A2QFI, there is still a possibility of more survivors as it appears(I am getting translations from My Norwegian Collegues) that several of the survivors were picked up at sea and there is hope of more being picked up, lets just hope and pray at the moment.

[M609]

Someone must have been watching over them, I'm astonished that so many got out. As you can see from the images, the terrain around the rwy is rough. I see another push by the CAA to get full size RESA at more of the short-ish airports.

On NRK Television now:

RCC for Southern Norway in Stavanger confirms 13 surviviors, 3 missing.

[matkat]

On BBC now(eventually!)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6036321.stm

[luoto]

YLE (FINLAND) reporting NRK 13 rescued, 3 missing. (1020)

[luoto]

http://www.nrk.no/contentfile/file/1.1098442.1160461053!img1098398.jpg Latest image from NRK

Flight was operated by Fareoese carrier Atlantic Airways on route Stavanger, Norway to Molde with a middle landing in Stord. Report by Norwegian news agency says it was chartered by Aker Stord for employee transfer.

Alarm raised 0737 local (EDIT: local media reports unclear now with conflicting times. Eyewitness times incident c0715-0730)

[luoto]

Video now of the incident from Norwegian TV:
http://www1.nrk.no/nett-tv/klipp/195354

One person very badly injured and all are being treated in nearby hospital.

Norwegian press report aircraft was BAE-146/200. Unconfirmed by Atlantic.

According to Atlantic they have (http://www.atlantic.fo/Default.asp?sida=140) three -200s.

[pineridge]

Non-precision approach only at Stord, circa 1500 metres of runway, from the photos it looks like low stratus in the vicinity, not a good recipe.

[luoto]

Metar etc för Stord with satbild

http://weather.gladstonefamily.net/site/ENSO

(Now sitting in the dark here, since the electric has been taken off for fixing fault.. running on UPSes).

Media report this is not the first crash at the airport but they are not suggesting anything untoward. In 1998 nine persons died with a Cessna crash (sadly also working for Aker Stord). Another (tabloid) reporting that a month or so ago another Atlantic plane with 100 pax needed to make an emergency landing in Bergen due to brake concerns. Again one should not draw any parallels or make conclusion.

[Blackcoffeenosugar]

That video clip is showing a 146 on the tarmac away from the flames at the end of the RWY. Does anybody know if there were supposed to be two 146's that were chartered? And the news are saying there were four crew members onboard. According to their web page Atlantic operate with 6 crew members.

[luoto]

Another wx chart (http://www.lfv.se/map.asp)


http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/distrikt/hordaland/1.1098277

[luoto]

Few more pics:

http://www.bt.no/multimedia/archive/00288/newPic_6793_JPG_288076c.jpg

http://cache.aftenposten.no/multimedia/archive/00462/_stord_tittel_jpg_462436v.jpg

archive picture:
http://cache.aftenposten.no/multimedia/archive/00462/SPECIAL_ARKIV__stor_462491s.jpg

[luoto]

I must be away now so hopefully some one else can make any updates. Press conference being held shortly as well to update more and crash investigators and politicians are en route to do their thing.

[Fornax]

There was another BA146 from Atlantic at the airport according to:
http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2006/10/10/479300.html

A captain from Atlantic was in the tower (AFIS) as the aircraft landed, saying:"It looked like a normal landing".
Airport: http://www.ippc.no/norway_aip/280906/AIP/AD/ENSO/enso.html

3 people is confirmed dead. 13 surviviors.
http://www.nettavisen.no/innenriks/article765208.ece

Wasn't there some pics of an Atlantic 146 running off the RWY in Scotland(?) not long ago on these forums? Brake problems, or something...

[midweeksaint]

Any idea which particular aircraft was involved?

[Capt. Inop]

Any idea which particular aircraft was involved?

It was this one:

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0921710/L/

[bixman]

There has been a couple of instances recently with flap-problems regarding Atlantic Airways' BAe-146's - I hope this is not related to that.

[JEP]

According to the news - both the captain and F/O survived.

[Safe-T]

Wasn't there some pics of an Atlantic 146 running off the RWY in Scotland(?) not long ago on these forums? Brake problems, or something...
This same plane (OY-CRG) had an incident some time ago (2 August 1989) at Vagar (FAE). Unstabilized approach, short and wet runway. According to the AAIB DENM report: Touchdown took place 430-450 metres down the 1250 metres long runway with a speed of 121 .68 knots (FDR read-out) or approximately 15 knots above the touchdown speed estimated by the aircraft manufacturer. As the reduced tyre friction on the wet surface produced insufficient retardation to stop the aircraft it was deliberately turned on to the high speed turn-off area where it collided with rising terrain. No injuries, some damage to the plane.

[M609]

http://cache.aftenposten.no/multimedia/archive/00462/_stord2_jpg_462597s.jpg
Image from Aftenposten.no

Just watched the press conference.

3 dead, one of them part of the crew.
12 survivors confirmed, but nr 13 has gone missing after the initial count by airport rescue services. Still unaccounted.

Of the survivors 6 has been sendt to the burn unit at Haukeland hospital in Bergen. (National burn unit)

Media has picked up on the restrictions put on "large aircraft" by the CAA regarding operations at Stord. No movements in vis <800meters or when the runway in contaminated with ice/snow.

Forensic specialist from the national criminal police branch (KRIPOS) has arrived at the crash site. AAIB on the way.

[M609]

http://gfx.dagbladet.no/pub/artikkel/4/47/479/479310/flyvraket1_1160480040.jpg

AAIB has arrived

[White Knight]

I'm sure that the very solid build of the 146/Avro series has something to do with the fact that there are survivors here...

[captaink]

Instead of being

[Flagon]

Before 'captaink' kicks off yet another wild PPRune red herring expedition, this time on the 146, may I point out that:-
1) it was designed to operate without them, and
2) landing distances are calculated on this basis.

[cameltrader]

Av Safety Network also has a report out on this accident. Here is the link:

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20061010-0


This is tragic!

[the_hawk]

Of the ten BAe146 hull-loss occurences on aviation-safety.net four are runway overruns. Just stating the fact. Three more are CFIT, and I guess no-one would deduce the BAe146 is prone to CFIT accidents.

[fixaBAe146]

I'm sure that the very solid build of the 146/Avro series has something to do with the fact that there are survivors here...
I think you are 100% right there White Knight, build like a tank, strong plane keeps on going. Already 25years of BAe146 flying and a excelent safety record!:D

[White Knight]

Well captaink,as you probably know, a lot of overruns have been by aeroplanes WITH reverse thrust:ugh:

The 146/Avro has sterling short field performance....

[Wycombe]

.....ten losses (one of which was caused by a lunatic with a gun) from a fleet of 360 aircraft over 25 years is a pretty good safety record, by any measure.

This was Atlantic's longest serving 146, wasn't it.

Looks like an over-run turned into fatal accident by terrain, looking at the pics:(

[M609]

The person missing has been found dead inside the wreckage. (source: NRK Television) Looks like the inital registration as survivor was human error by the airport staff.

They allso report that the national road administration (Vegvesnet) has arrived to measure the runway friction.
"To see if the runway was wet"

What good that is going to do 10 hrs after the crash beats me. Hopfully more to this then the media report..... :uhoh:

[vector3]

Confirmed 4 dead now.Cpt and FO survived.Newspaper report possible tyre-burst on landing.

[Doors to Automatic]

Another one where an arrestor bed would have saved lives (and probably the aircraft)

[goshdarnit]

I suspect that this is something that may have been commented on before, but surely pragmatism would recommend against a runway that is so unforgiving? I know that Flight Crew are amongst the most highly trained and proffesional folks of any industry anywhere in the world and that is why incidents (of any description) are so rare. However incidents do occur, and with terrain like that pictured the outcome of a misjudgement or meterological effect or mechanical failure (or whatever it turns out to be) can clearly be tragic. Surely better to identify a strip of land with "ample" room for overrun, and if not available then no runway built.
I know that an overrun on any terrain can still have disatrous consequences, but I bet there have been many slight overrun's that have resulted in little more than damaged landing gear.
I am not a pilot.

[spuis]

The same problem was seen with the Airfrance A340 last year. a clear area instead of a ditch would have made a big difference. (luckily no injuries there!)

But the problem remains of course when there is not much room. Do you build a shorter runway with a clear area, or do you use up all the space and use everything for concrete.....

Spuis

[alf5071h]

I recall reading in either a UK or JAA advisory document that when landing on runways where the standard of the overrun area is less than normally accepted, then operators should adjust the landing distance required; can anyone direct me to the reference? It could have been a JAA discussion document where the assumptions made about the formulation of landing distance are outlined. Operators rarely see or fully understand these assumptions, particularly when embedded in regulations e.g use / availability of thrust reverse, speed margin at touchdown.

Reviewing the statistics of landing overrun events, they are dominated by the environmental conditions (wet runways) and crew behavior (judgment, landing long and fast) and not aircraft type. Yet again this year we should revisit the advice given in Managing the Threats and Errors during Approach and Landing. (www.flightsafety.org/ppt/managing_threat.ppt)

From a poor picture on Google Earth the runway appears to be concrete, or at lest part concrete. This might be a factor – see note on wet concrete runways in the link.

[120.4]

Captaink - Just curious, as a non-pilot

How could the lack of thrust reversers be an issue if the aircraft has been certified to make 5.5 degree approaches onto a runway the length of London City, with water at the end of it? Surely, if it can manage that safely for all these years it must have ample stopping ability?

.4

[WHBM]

Another one where an arrestor bed would have saved lives (and probably the aircraft)
Before we go too far down this route again, let us note that at London City, which bears a notable resemblance to the accident airfield here in runway length, tight boundaries, and types able to operate there, had arrestor beds installed for quite some years.

A couple of years ago, at considerable expense, they were dug up and replaced with concrete overruns. There was no LDA or TORA benefit as a result of this work. There must have been a very valid reason for LCY to get rid of them.

[jondc9]

The 146 doesn't have thrust reversers and that is not the cause of this accident. It can land on very short runways.

The person who sees the similiarity to YYZ Air France A340 would seem to be right on.

Does anyone know if the tail speed brake had been deployed during approach?

this plane can land so smoothly, one wonders if the spoilers deployed.

[M609]

Politics play a major part in the runway lenght game in Norway. Many regional airports are bulit in rocky terrain, and there is often no level ground beyond the concrete. There is massive pressure on the CAA to make excemptions from rules regarding RESA for many regional aiports, because of the massive cost of improvement.

:(

(I can think of several with similar layout, massive drops close to the runway.
We have allmost 3km of concrete at Bardufoss, but if you go past the over run area on RWY10 you are a dead man.)

In my humble opinion this was only a matter of time, we have had many rwy excursions in Norway in the past. Many of the STOL aerodromes, but on larger ones as well.


Hope this will put the last nail in the "we don't need to comply with international standar because it's a small airport" coffin.

:uhoh:

[PJ2]

The same problem was seen with the Airfrance A340 last year. a clear area instead of a ditch would have made a big difference. (luckily no injuries there!)
. . .Spuis

Not to take the thread off course, but there were in fact some serious injuries including the Captain. My understanding is that his seat actually came adrift during the accident sequence and he suffered back and head injuries but cannot confirm this as fact from any report thus far available.

The "ditch" at the western end of the 24's was actually a ravine/gulley that had been filled in after another overrun accident in 1978 I believe involving a DC9-32. That aircraft literally "flew" over the edge and pancaked into the gulley...fortunately, no fire. The gulley may be filled in, but the Air France A340 was less than a fuselage-length away from the cement bases upon which the approach lighting towers were mounted...the towers themselves may be frangible but there is nothing frangible about cement.

Sorry for the slight thread-drift.

[RRAAMJET]

Condolences to those who have lost loved ones....:sad:

Having flown the 146 (all models, military and civilian) I have to agree that its sturdy build and generally lower energy levels on the runway contribute to its high survivability.

1500 meters is not particularly short for the 100/200, but as I recall the aircraft is generally landing distance limited in its STOL ops.
I've landed the TQF jets down to 1000m, and on short dirt strips, and all I can say is it's 'technique, technique...or go around'. You plonk it down and let its excellent trailing link gear do the work. However, if you burst a tire you're into 'ere be monsters' territory - can't stop/can't go. Add water to the equation and you're probably just along for the ride.

About reversers: generally not much use below about 100kts compared to brakes. A lightish 146 would touch down at about 105-110, and if it had rev would not have them deployed and powered-up until about 95kts. Therefore they were not needed - wheelbrakes and spoilers with correct technique are sufficient.

[Middle Seat]

Includes breif description and tail number.

http://www.atlantic.fo/Default.asp?sida=142

[jondc9]

rramjet

I agree with your views on landing the 146 and its strengths. indeed the only weakness I found was the engines early on circa 1989...

it is technique, precision of flying the approach, right on target speed and plunk onto the runway and not the last third either!

I flew into and out of a short runway airport in northern california...amazing takeoff performance (flaps 24 if memory serves) and we were easily off and clearing 50' in less than 1800feet of ground roll.

Landing, we never quite used a max effort for pax comfort, but certainly less than 2200' to complete stop.

when well maintained and properly flown, this type offers unique capabilities, but it is not a helicopter.


Why get rid of arrestor beds? My guess is that if you used one, you would have some repair bills, if you went off into designated over run that was normal concrete, you would have shame...or disaster!

Money is the answer. (again only a guess!)

[Flap40]

120.4

It is 8 years since I have been there but the steep approach at LCY is (used to be) actually an advantage.

In the 146-300 that I flew it was assumed that the step approach would result in a smaller "scatter" in landing positions (compared to a 3 degree approach) therefore we were given a credit of 143m in LDA (ie assume that the runway is actually 143m longer than reality). From memory the -100 got 83m so I would assume that the -200 is somewhere in between.

[M609]

Survivors report hearing a loud bang on the left side of the aircraft at touchdown, followed by a slewing motion.
They allso claim the landing was harder then normal. :hmm:

[jondc9]

tire burst?


does anyone know if the rear speed brake had been deployed during approach?

[captaink]

Instead of being:

[matkat]

One point the BAe 146 has NO thrust reversers.

[Conan The Barber]

Another point the Pope IS Catholic.

[captaink]

Instead of being

[Viscount Sussex]

Captaink
Q) Do you know where Atlantic Airways are based?
A) Vagar Airport.
Q) Do you know the runway length at Vagar airport?
A) 1250 metres.
Q) Do you know what type of aircraft this people have been operating in and out of there for several years?
A) The BAe146... and guess what?... without thrust reversers!
:ugh:

[Wycombe]

....and also 737's at Vagar, which sounds considerably more exciting.

[ChristiaanJ]

Can somebody with better Norwegian than myself translate the headline
"- Kapteinen gikk inn i det brennende vraket
Forsøkte å redde passasjerene fra flammene"
in this link
http://www.vg.no/
and possibly the first bit of the connected article?
I think I've understood it, but don't want to comment on it before somebody confirms it.

[Viscount Sussex]

Yep, you are absolutely right. I’ve seen the Maersk guys a few times coming in on the B737. As you say, it used to be very exciting indeed.
:ooh:

[teleport]

"- Kapteinen gikk inn i det brennende vraket
Forsøkte å redde passasjerene fra flammene"

Means that the captain went into the burning wreck and tried to save the passengers from the flames

[ChristiaanJ]

teleport,
Thanks, that's what I read. Good for him..... I'm glad he didn't pay the ultimate price for doing so.

[bearcuban12]

People I know tells me that he looked slightly high with a good overspeed when he approached RWY33, maybe it was only the 5-8 knots tailwind which made it look like this?

My point is, at a RWY with 1200 meters LDA with no overun whatsoever, the 146 is quite unforgiveable if you are slightly high, maybe a little high on IAS, a tailwind as in this case and a puncture after touchdown.




So the aircraft landed downwind?

[CargoOne]

Maersk used to fly B735 daily (or 5 times a week, cannot remember now) to Vagar. Generally area layout there is quite similar to what is shown on Stord photos, but approach on Vagar is much worse.

[M609]

...but it looks like Vagar has some kind of emmergency breaking lane/exit from the runway.
d. Close to RWY 13 and 31 areas with broken stones have been established. The diameter of the stones are from 20 to 100 MM. The stone layer depth range from
150 MM at the runway shoulder to 450 MM at the end of each area. The areas will be worked up twice a year to maintain a porous structure. Snowclearance and
deicing will not be carried out on the areas. The areas are not marked. Previous accidents indicate that braking effect can be expected only by blocking the
wheels. Damage to aircraft using the areas may be expected. Use of the areas take place solely on the operators own responsibility/

Does anyone know if it has been used by large aircraft?

[JEP]

Does anyone know if it has been used by large aircraft?

It has - by a BAE146 from the same airline. I have the report somewhere - I think it was in the mid 90s.

No one was hurt - but the plane was damaged.

Edit: See post #27 - it was in 1989 - not in the mid 90s.

[captaink]

ItInstead of being

[LN-ATC]

So the aircraft landed downwind?
Yes, and the BAe (also Atlantic Airways) arriving approx. 30 minutes earlier did actually land on RWY 15, even if this meant a slightly longer approach.

[safetypee]

Vagar is recognized a demanding airport for commercial aircraft operations – 737 etc. One reason that the BAe146 was chosen is that is gives a greater safety margin – approach stability, landing distance, etc. The 737 operation required special approach speed profile and had limitations on the point of touchdown. The acceptable touchdown zone (very short – almost a square box) was marked with yellow boundaries; if the aircraft was not going to achieve a touchdown in the zone then a go around was flown.

The BAe146 operation did not require either the special speed profile or the landing box, however the box was retained to provide additional safety.
This is similar but not the same as BAe146/Avro RJ operations at LCY; there is a fixed distance marker which can be used (advisory) to define the end of the acceptable touchdown zone. From a previous post, the LCY operations have a required landing distance advantage from the steep approach. Vagar did not when I last visited. Although the NPA was steeper than normal it was not a precision system, thus there was no distance advantage; is there an ILS now?
It appears that Stord had none of the additional safety aspects of steep approach (landing distance) or landing box; neither apparently a suitable overrun area or protection.

A BAe146 'visited' the overrun protection area at Vagar on a previous occasion; the aircraft was not damaged. The incident was caused by a lift-dump / spoiler failure (possible crew error), the effect of which IIRC requires an increase of 40% in the landing distance. In most operations, such a failure after touchdown is not hazardous as the landing margin within the distance required and excess runway distance available enables the aircraft to be stopped safety. However, operations on a limited runway may not have all of this safety margin and the operating technique should be adjusted i.e. immediate high / max braking until all retardation devices are confirmed working. The point of change over can be defined by checking the margin (%) from the max allowed landing weight for the given conditions; if at any time it is 100% of MLW because the aircraft is distance limited (not often in the 146), then always use max brakes after touch down.

Avoid tailwinds, wet runways, and especially wet concrete runways

[ChristiaanJ]

In another thread we used the expression "the holes in the cheese lining up".
Isn't this what happened here?
Limited LDA, known "difficult" airport.
Low ceiling.
Landing with a tailwind.
Coming in fairly fast, and touching down late.
Wet concrete runway.
Tyre burst at the wrong moment.
No overrun area.
None of them individually would have caused the accident.
All together ... another "aircraft that crashed before touchdown".

[LN-ATC]

In another thread we used the expression "the holes in the cheese lining up".
Isn't this what happened here?
Limited LDA, known "difficult" airport.
Low ceiling.
Landing with a tailwind.
Coming in fairly fast, and touching down late.
Wet concrete runway.
Tyre burst at the wrong moment.
No overrun area.
None of them individually would have caused the accident.
All together ... another "aircraft that crashed before touchdown".
The accident happened at 0537z (30 mins before sunrise).
METAR ENSO 100520Z 11006KT 9999 FEW025 10/10 Q1021
Rather nice weather actually. I guess they executed a visual approach (instrument approach require own navigation via STAR, or procedure turn overhead...). The runway (asphalt) was most likely dry, or possibly damp/wet after rain showers the previous evening.

[AnEviltwinEr]

I'm sure that the very solid build of the 146/Avro series has something to do with the fact that there are survivors here...

Utterly Rubbish.

Recently, VG, a newspaper in Norway, released parts of a written log from one of the survivors.

I quote:
"A man... tried to open the emergency exit at the left side, but failed" (Door was trapped). -This must be the forward left exit, as he later writes that he exited through aft left exit.

"...I looked back, and saw the flame inferno (inside the cabin) rage about 4-5 meters from where we stood"

"Beside me stood a guy who tried to open the second (possibly the aft right) emergency exit."

"Only seconds after we were out of the plane, the flames shot out of the door."

As i see it, there were only a matter of seconds before the plane were fully lit on fire. Those who were unlucky enough to sit in front, died, as they couldn't escape. -The First Officer escaped through a window in the cockpit.

" Kenneth Palmér says that (his) colleagues... sat infront of the Atlantic Airways-machine. Both died."
Sad. :(

To those who are able to read Norwegian, here's the link to his story:
http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=134087

The confirmed deaths are 4, 12 survived.

-AnEvilTwiner, a norwegian citizen. :)

[PEI_3721]

I'm sure that the very solid build of the 146/Avro series has something to do with the fact that there are survivors here... Utterly Rubbish.
AnEviltwinEr you might benefit from keeping an open mind on the issue.
There could be some substance in what White Knight posted. For example at Samsun and Siirt there were no fatalities even though the aircraft were written off. In Puerto Williams there were 53 survivors even though the aircraft demolished a stone wall, the fatalities were due to drowning. 58 survived at Yinchuan at over 150 kts. 9 survived the CFIT accident in Zurich – a remarkable feat for that type of accident. Similarly, 5 survived CFIT at Diyarbakir. I suspect that there are few aircraft that could match this ‘success’ (survivors/total pax) together with a low accident rate – none of which involved the aircraft design or construction.

[teleport]

Condolences to all those involved!
This translation of the VG article from a non-Norwegian (Danish native) - one or two words I am not entirely sure of.
________________________________________________
VG has been allowed to publish an excerpt from Kenneth’s personal log of the landing and the escape from the burning plane wreck.
On the dining room table in front of the experienced manager from Sandnes lies handwritten and detailed notes about his experiences of the drama minute by minute.
“Approx. half a minute after the landing I heard a bang (like a puncture). Straightaway, I leant forward. Then came two or three thumps with one second intervals as if the plane had traversed a small hole and bounced into the air afterwards”, he has noted.
Palmer’s opinion is that the pilot advanced the throttle on the left engine in an attempt to stabilise the plane.
“I looked out the window and saw that we were approaching the terrain on the left. Two thumps later we were over a hump, off the edge. Then I put my head on my knees again with my hands on my head. We were in the air for half a second before the first bang came from the body of the plane. I looked up. It was dark in the plane. Then another bang” he wrote in his log.
After the 3rd bang the plane came to rest. One engine was roaring loudly. And the 34 year old saw that fire/flames emerged from the outer engine of the left wing. The smell of burnt rubber spread in the cabin and the floor was glowing. Right over him the roof was torn off such that he could see the darkened sky.
Flames
-Everyone were calm and it went really quick. It was like watching the military, these were highly trained people moving towards the exit without signs of panic. My mind was blank, and we just did what we have been drilled to do through in safety briefings, said Palmér, who sat in the seat behind the left wing.
“”I took off the seat belt, climbed over the seatbacks towards the rear of the plane and saw someone at the right exit on the right hand side. A man in a white ?sweater? with dark dots tried to open the emergency exit on the left hand side. But it appeared to be stuck.”
He stood himself behind a colleague from IKM Testing, who was next to the 42 year old, who was the first out of the exit on the rear left hand side. According to Palmér the stewardess opened the door, but blocked it with one arm.
“He who was out first asked her why she blocked the exit. I did not hear her response. I noticed someone tapping me on the shoulder. It was Tor Arne, and about 3 to 4 meters away from him the flames were approaching fast”.
-Tor Arne shouted in my ear: jump out for f…, jump. Simultaneously, the front guy shouted: I have no f… time to wait and removed the arm of the stewardess. Then he and the next colleague jumped almost simultaneously.
After them Palmér jumped sensing Tor Arne Johannesen’s (33) hand on his shoulder. “Next to me was the man who had tried to open the other emergency exit. As I landed on my feet I noticed Tor Arne behind me. I rolled over with Tor Arne coming on top of me, crawling on all four about 5 meters down the slope to a thick tree”.
Kenneth Palmér commends stewardess Maibritt Magnussen (21) for opening the door so quickly.
- Only seconds after we evacuated, the flames were coming out of the door. I then went back to get her.
Palmér gave the stewardess support and went with his colleagues to a safe distance. He escaped with a ?kink? in his back, a broken breast bone and singed hairs on the back of his neck.
Sent SMS
He sent a text message to his mother at 07:37 and informed cohabitant Jane at 07:38. His mother was informed:
“Plane has crashed. I am OK”
Kenneth Palmér informs that his colleagues of nine years at IMK Testing, Jarle Reime (33), og Martin Charles Evertsen (25) were sat at the front of the Atlantic Airways-plane. Both perished.
- Now all my thoughts go out to those who died and their families. I think a lot of Jarle. What happened when he tried to escape and how long did it take? I think that several of those who did not make it out were in caught in shock, said Palmér to VG.
Reime was found dead at the rear of the plane, by the exit where at least 5 of the 12 had gathered seconds before the flames caught up with them.

[AnEviltwinEr]

AnEviltwinEr you might benefit from keeping an open mind on the issue.
There could be some substance in what White Knight posted. For example at Samsun and Siirt there were no fatalities even though the aircraft were written off. In Puerto Williams there were 53 survivors even though the aircraft demolished a stone wall, the fatalities were due to drowning. 58 survived at Yinchuan at over 150 kts. 9 survived the CFIT accident in Zurich – a remarkable feat for that type of accident. Similarly, 5 survived CFIT at Diyarbakir. I suspect that there are few aircraft that could match this ‘success’ (survivors/total pax) together with a low accident rate – none of which involved the aircraft design or construction.


My point was that the aircraft failed at most points.
First: Stop.
Second: Safety. Only one exit was confirmed working. Out of four! That gives a rather poor rate, 75 % of all the emergency exits got blocked. And, nothing externally blocked them. (The plane stopped with the belly down.) A thought tis that the four who were killed, would have a bigger chance to survive if they haw indeed Worked.
:hmm:
Third: Fire prevention. The fire started immediately, and spreaded like a... um... Something really fast. In fact, only seconds after the plane had stopped, the inferno begun.
Fourth: Integrity. Some here are claiming that the BAe146's frame integrity helped alot to the fact that so few were killed. I think they are wrong, because the plane didnt really go off that cliff at such a high speed. If it did, then it would have stopped alot futher down. Come on, every small commercial plane could, in theory do the same. (Clarification: not fall apart when impacting with the ground at such a low speed, after going off the edge of the runway.)

Hope this clears things a bit up. Yeah, I can be a bit cryptic at times. ;)

-AnEvilTwinEr

[M609]

AAIB Norway stated that there is no evidence of a puncture as claimed by some passengers. No rubber found on the rwy.

Passengers have reported that the cres used differential thrust to steer the aircraft on the ground. Sounds strange to me. :suspect:

[PEI_3721]

AnEviltwinEr I think that you expect more from an aircraft in a crash situation than it would be certificated for.
1. If an aircraft overruns on to rocky terrain and descends a steep slope you would expect it to break. There is no pre-fire photographic evidence to support your view.
2. When structure is deformed, few exits in any aircraft type will work. Wait for the report to see if everyone was capable of escaping the fire – unconscious, broken bones, trapped, etc.
3. If you puncture a fuel tank and it is near a hot engine then you must expect a fire.
4. Let us wait until the report clarifies the overrun speed; even at 10 kts in a 30 ton aircraft there is a lot of energy to dissipate.

The primary issue is not the aircraft’s post crash integrity, it is preventing the crash, preventing the aircraft overrunning into hazardous terrain. The focus of the safety defences should be on these issues. Land and stop the aircraft safely on the runway or in the event of mishap / failure, provide an additional safety margin with an acceptable overrun area. If the latter is impractical then the airport / operator / pilot has to take additional precautions, e.g. no landings on a contaminated runway, no tailwinds, reduced weight, non normal operating procedure.

[Bamse01]

The pilots both survived.
The Capt wanted to talk to the press yesterday, but the company said no.
Why all this speculation when statements from the crew should be
coming shortly ?.Pax saying brakes failed etc.
Let's wait for the statements.....

[Blueandyellowflier]

From boarding.no:

"Et av de store spørsmålene etter flyulykken på Stord Lufthamn er :
- Hvorfor ble ikke motorene stanset etter utforkjørselen ? Prosedyrene sier at drivstofftilførselen skal kuttes med en gang noe går galt. Motorene på ulykkesflyet på Stord fortsatte å gå i flere minutter etter utforkjøringen. Det kan ha vært årsaken til den fatale brannen.
- Jeg stusset på at motorene på ulykkesflyet fortsatt var i gang etter krasjet, sier flykaptein Otto Lagarhus til Stavanger Aftenblad (http://www.aftenbladet.no/).
Den tidligere Luftfartsdirektøren sier at stenging av drivstofftilførselen er noe av det første en pilot skal gjøre når det går galt - og i alle tilfeller før man forlater cockpiten. "

The very short version is he says it is standard procedure to shut down the engines when something goes wrong, here the engines was left running, which may have started the fatal fire.


This "captain" Otto Lagarhus runs a cosultant company and must be desperate for attention and clients. :=

[LN-ATC]

Nice to know: Lagarhus was temporary Director General of the (Norwegian) CAA 1 February 2005 - 1 May 2006.

[Tjosan]

The very short version is he says it is standard procedure to shut down the engines when something goes wrong, here the engines was left running, which may have started the fatal fire.


This "captain" Otto Lagarhus runs a cosultant company and must be desperate for attention and clients. :=

It's easy said sitting behind a desk.

[RatherBeFlying]

After falling over a cliff and distorting the fuselage so much that three of four exits were inop, it would not surprise me if the engine control runs (mechanical and electrical) would have been seized or severed.

[JW411]

I would have thought that it was highly probable that the structural damage was such that all controls to the engines could well have ceased to exist but such a possibility would never occur to the clever sods who post on pprune nowadays (usually with no knowledge of what they are talking about).

One of my friends ended up partially in Boston harbour with a DC-10 some years ago (it wasn't his fault) and the No.2 engine got stuck in full reverse and could not be shut down.

Douglas had always considered this to be impossible because the No.2 engine fuel supply was delivered by electric pumps but the impossible happened.

[DozyWannabe]

Same thing happened with the Pan Am 747 at Tenerife too...

[RRAAMJET]

JW411 - couldn't agree more....some of the postings on here just beggar description :hmm:

Jeez - I've had an undamaged engine refuse to shut down on a JP when its control runs came off the cam....

I believe the 146 has only mechanical connections to the FCU on the engine - as I recall the only electronic connection was to the TMS, which had a limited authority actuator on the FCU. Don't know about later versions of the ALF507, though...

[JW411]

I believe it was an RJ which means it also has FADEC.

[RRAAMJET]

Capt Otto Lagarhus needs to be put in his car and told to drive off a cliff at speed, then to shut down the engine when he comes down....:rolleyes:

Good luck, old bean....:ugh:

[ManaAdaSystem]

Mods, how about deleting the last few posts?

Sometimes I really wonder what kind of people frequent these pages?:yuk:

Captain Lagarhus only states the obvious, it is SOP to pull the fire handles when accidents like these happen, but he declines to comment on what happened in this case.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Regarding the survival rate; most (all?) passengers on board this flight were oil workers and probably well trained in emergencies, evaquations, etc.
Apart from not being crushed to death, I think this was one of the major reasons why so many survived.

[RRAAMJET]

Manada: "...accidents like these..." (ie: falling off a cliff) don't really have SOP's, there is nothing "Standard" or "procedural" about this sort of impact: hence Capt Otto's comment seems superfluous to me. Evacuation checklists may or may not have been run in this case - I've no idea - but if the crew just scrambled out, well, no foul in my book; probably in severe shock, anyway. Sounds like the jet caught fire immediately on impact and checklists might have been a waste of time...a cockpit full of smoke and 'off'-flags and a 60-degree list to port makes SOP's tricky.

The last thing on my mind falling off a cliff would be running the evac checklist and pulling the T-handles. 'Self-Preservation' checklist springs to mind...

A runway overrun onto flat ground in the sim is a whole different matter - nice to think I'd do it for real in this case, but I've not fallen down a hill in a jet, thank heavens.

I don't see the need to delete posts discussing engine controls on the 146 or the RJ, frankly, nor the need for the vomit smilie. :confused:

[Ignition Override]

PEI 3721: That appears to be amazing, especially for an aircraft with a high wing.
The fuselage and landing gear must absorb much, if not most of the energy during deceleration in a crash landing or other high-speed impact.

On the other hand, maybe this can also mean less chance of a wing fire?

[Ignition Override]

M609:

You mentioned "...nails in the coffin..", or such.

A reminder here about US-style bureaucrats.

The only time that the US FAA, also known as the 'Tombstone Agency' :ouch: , reacts to an accident and then allows vital changes (i.e. requiring that a standby/reserve crewmember have an 8-hour period in each 24-hour period free from duty or phone calls) in the regulations to take place, is after a lot of people die in an airplane. For example, after the tragedy at Little Rock, Arkanasas (MD-83), the FAA decided to limit the duty periods of pilots. But if they go from flying freight or people to flying an empty aircraft, the duty rules do not apply. The known (to the FAA , BEFORE the crash at Roselawn, IN) problems with the ATR-42's wing de-icing boots etc are just one more example.

This will and has not happened when a freight airplane crashes etc, even though the primary cause for the DC-8 accident at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was largely a result of a very long standby period with no rest before the flight. This was the NTSB's conclusion, and the first time that it stated that crew fatigue was the cause.

[Bigmouth]

I.O., you'll find that the boys from the FAA are downright friendly, helpful, on the ball, courteous, insightfull - I could go on - when compared to their counterparts in other parts of the world.

[LN-KGL]

For those of you not familiar with the aviation industry on the civilized side of the pond :E - you can read about mr. Lagarhus here
http://www.lac.no/prescv.htm

[CargoOne]

So he was Director General of Norwegian CAA and president of aviation consultancy company at the same time? :D

[LN-ATC]

So he was Director General of Norwegian CAA and president of aviation consultancy company at the same time? :D
Nope, http://www.lac.no/newspage.html
"The news items have been only occasionally updated during the last 18 months, due to the fact that the editor, Captain Otto Lagarhus, was appointed by to the position of Director General Civil Aviation, and Head of the CAA of Norway. This as a special assignment by the Norwegian Minister of Transport. As a consequence, he was prevented from working with other aviation activities."

[hobie]

For those of you not familiar with the aviation industry on the civilized side of the pond :E - you can read about mr. Lagarhus here
http://www.lac.no/prescv.htm


It would seem to me that one would have to go a long way to find someone of such distinguished service to the world of Aviation .......

[Bamse01]

Reported today that the spoilers did not deploy on landing.

[TheShadow]

Reported today that the spoilers did not deploy on landing.

What are the triggers?
WOW switch + arming? (or something more arcane like wheel spin-up/nose-wheel on?)
.
What are the pitfalls (if any)? Is it in the pre-landing checklist?

[JonaLX]

What are the triggers?
WOW switch + arming? (or something more arcane like wheel spin-up/nose-wheel on?)
.



- thrust levers idle + Weight-on-wheel + main wheels (left OR right) reach 'spin up' speed (33 kts), if fitted with autospoilers (avro RJ).
- idle + WOW + manual deploy if no autospoilers

[flying brain]

Spoilers not deployed on crashed Atlantic 146:

Norwegian investigators have discovered that spoilers did not deploy on the British Aerospace 146-200 which overran the runway while attempting to land at Stord Airport on 10 October.

Four of the Atlantic Airways jet’s 16 occupants were killed when it careered off the slightly-damp runway and down steep terrain, before coming to rest and catching fire.

Wreckage analysis has also revealed evidence that the aircraft suffered ‘rubber reversal’ as it tried to stop – a phenomenon where heat generated by the tyre vaporises the surface moisture and reduces runway contact.

But while ‘rubber reversal’ causes deterioration of the tyre condition, there is no indication any of tyres punctured or deflated.

Flight RC670 had been arriving at Stord, in western Norway, after a domestic service from Stavanger. It touched down on runway 33 with a 6kt tailwind.

While there was nothing unusual about the airspeed, touchdown point, flap-setting, landing weight or air-brake, preliminary analysis shows that neither of the two independent spoiler systems deployed.

One system controls a single spoiler on each wing, the other controls a pair, giving six in all. These systems are normally activated by the crew on touchdown, but a spokesman for the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board says the inquiry has yet to determine the reason for the failure.

“The crew did not feel it was appropriate to make a go-around,” adds the spokesman. “But in a last attempt to stop the aircraft they tried to put it into a skid. It was actually skidding down the runway at one point.”

Investigators are to examine the aircraft’s maintenance record as part of the inquiry. Atlantic Airways is based in the Faroe Islands and the Faroese ministry of trade and industry says that the jet had undergone a C-check in Sweden and returned to the fleet two weeks before the accident.


Courtesey ATI

[JW411]

On the BAe146, the ground spoilers have to be manually selected. I have no knowledge of the Avro RJ.

[TheShadow]

A. So on the BAe146 if a pilot who usually flies an Avro RJ is in the RH seat, it's conceivable that he might have a brain unstart and just forget to deploy the spoilers? (because they're armed and auto-deploy on the Avro).
.
B. Assuming that's possible, there's nothing to give anybody a heads up that this has happened? No alarms, alerts or whatever?
.
c. Is it conceivable that spoilers were selected and just failed to (I imagine hydraulically) deploy?
.
D. Are LH and RH spoilers on the same electrical bus?
.
E. Any history of WOW failures on the BAe146 (or throttle at idle switch failure)?
.

[PEI_3721]

What are the pitfalls (if any)?
1. Manual spoiler (lift dump) selection after touchdown (BAe146), normally done by the Captain (may depend on company SOP).
2. Non-flying pilot confirms deployment and calls ‘Yellow / Green’. A habitual call i.e. easily done without the spoilers deployed (human factors), thus it would be better to call any failure to deploy (threat and error management). Some aircraft are fitted with glareshield Spoiler Fail lights – spoiler not deployed when on ground + 6 sec.
3. Failure to position elevator controls at neutral; forward stick with excessive airspeed can delay main wheel WOW contact and prevent spoiler deployment. Forward stick technique is often used on rear engine aircraft (MD-80) and habit can surface during demanding, high workload operations. Check the crew’s previous aircraft types?

See post #71 re additional landing run required and crew precautions for spoiler failure. Is the 40% actual distance or factored landing distance required?

Contributions from a tailwind and wet (slightly damp) runway? ‘rubber reversal' = aquaplaning? Point of touchdown?

[towser]

The Shadow; On the Avro it is our company policy to deploy them manually anyway as a back up to the automatics. don't know what others do but this would eliminate what you suggest.

[Belgique]

backstick braking link (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=204897&highlight=backstick+braking)
would probably have been a logical and effective solution - if they'd been familiar with the technique.
PEI-3721 said:
Failure to position elevator controls at neutral; forward stick with excessive airspeed can delay main wheel WOW contact and prevent spoiler deployment. Forward stick technique is often used on rear engine aircraft (MD-80) and habit can surface during demanding, high workload operations. Check the crew’s previous aircraft types?
Search Pprune for backstick braking and you'll see what I mean. It works and works well. You'll find a reference in the link above to some BAe146 and Avro RJ pilots using it invariably. On wet runways it's a life-saver (or at least a reputation-saver).

[PEI_3721]

Belgique I think that you are mistaken in concluding that a particular technique would be beneficial based on the evidence in the link. My reading of the discussion suggests that operators should always follow what the manufacturer recommends.
In the case of the BAe146/Avro RJ crews are specifically instructed to place the control column at the centre position; this not only avoids the hazards of forward stick just after touchdown, but other problems that might result from back stick on wet / slippery runways where additional directional control could be required.
Instead of relying on a non-standard technique operators should concentrate on the simple standard items, such as landing into wind, correct approach speed and touch down point, selecting lift dump and checking correct deployment, using the appropriate braking level for the conditions, and checking thrust is at idle.

[AnEviltwinEr]

I believe it was an RJ which means it also has FADEC.

Nop, sorry. According to the company's website, the plane that were lost is OY-CRG, and on their fleet page, it states that the only RJ100 plane they have, is OY-RCC.

And to answer PEI_3721:

-Come on, all the eye witness accounts states that the fire started inside the cabin, after only a mere seconds after the impact, possibly before! And pictures of the aircraft shows that the fuselage is nearly purified:

http://www.vg.no/bilder/edrum/1160648737029_778.jpg
http://www.vg.no/bilder/edrum/1160560679414_638.jpg
(Images owned by VG)

That means only one thing: agressive fire. And, flammable insulation, cabin interiour etc, hazardous materials such as jet fuel, hydraulic fluid, etc, in close proximity to the cabin itself.

What you obviously didnt get out of my posts, were that I questioned the safety of the aircraft as a whole. And I still do.

-AnEvilTwiner :)

[remoak]

What you obviously didnt get out of my posts, were that I questioned the safety of the aircraft as a whole. And I still do.

Considering that there has never been a hull loss of a BAe146 or RJ that was attributable to mechanical or structural failure, nor a single person lost to either of those causes, I find your statement remarkable.

It is statistically the safest airliner out there, of it's era, and certainly a lot safer than the 737 has proven to be, so I think you may need to re-visit your logic!

[TheShadow]

PEI_3721 said:
....but other problems that might result from back stick on wet / slippery runways where additional directional control could be required.
Que?
Suggest you acquaint yourself better with the technique (and the aerodynamics etc involved). Try the link provided. On there you'll find posts by BAE146 drivers who believe in and use the technique. It works. If it stops you going off the end and over a steep cliff, well it's gotta be beneficial.

[teleport]

VG.NO yesterday reports that analysis of the cocpit voice recorder confirms the suspicion of malfunctioning spoilers. A representative of the Norwegian AAIB is quoted as stating that combined analysis of the flight data recorder and the CVR confirms what the cockpit crew had explained to the investigators.
In Norwegian:
http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=136019

[safetypee]

Suggest you acquaint yourself better with the technique (and the aerodynamics etc involved).
You might take time to review PEI’s public profile. I suspect that a senior pilot with flight test and 4 jet experience, who is involved in accident investigation and from a ‘slippery’ part of the world, has indeed a very good understanding of braking techniques, aerodynamics, etc.

Being familiar with the type I support his views on the need to follow aircraft specific procedures and concentrating on doing the simple tasks well before considering ‘exotic’ braking techniques. If you or any one need further convincing (particularly 146/RJ operators) then see the ‘incident’ report on an Avro RJ (www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_501191.pdf); apart from auto spoiler the BAe 146 systems in this respect are the similar. The relevant text is:-
The aircraft floated and the nose wheel touched down just beyond the lights which mark the end of the touchdown zone. After touchdown the control column was pushed fully forward. This action was contrary to advice contained in the aircraft manufacturer's training manual which contains the caution warning "After nosewheel touchdown, do not move the control column significantly forward of neutral". The warning was issued because if significant forward pressure is applied and held, lift generated by the elevators can reduce the load on the mainwheels to the extent that the 'weight on ground' sensors remain open. Without weight on the mainwheels the wheel brakes are ineffective, the ground spoilers cannot be deployed and the engines generate flight idle thrust instead of ground idle thrust. Consequently the landing ground roll distance increases markedly and heavy braking may be needed when the weight on wheels sensors eventually sense that the aircraft is on the ground and allow the ground spoilers to deploy. … the aircraft should have stopped without the need for fierce braing had the commander not held the control column fully forward.
I appreciate that the discussion was in relationship to back stick, but I also note that the 146 uses the nosewheel squat switch in the spoiler logic as well as the main wheels. Thus in addition to requiring the nose wheel on the ground for steering, some of the systems may depend on this for correct operation; therefore follow the manufacturer’s procedures, do not use back stick.

[Flap40]

It is a while since I flew the 146 and all my manuals are packed away in the loft, but from memory, when the spoilers are selected out the green system spoilers (the inner one on each wing) will immediately deploy providing any two of the three squat switches are signalling on ground.
The yellow system (outer two on each wing) will not deploy earlier than 1.5sec after two of the three squat switches are signalling on ground.
In practice, If your observe a 146 landing, all deploy together as it is usual to wait for the nosewheel to touch before selecting the spoilers out and this usually takes a couple of seconds from mainwheel touchdown.
If the spoilers are selected out before the nosewheel touches there is a marked loss of downforce from the tail and firm arrival will occur if you are not quick with the elevator.

[teleport]

VG.NO on Nov 4 published an interview with a Norwegian police lawyer who apparently speculates that noone will be charged. The Nowegian prosecution service now await the report from the Norwegian AAIB.

[Anotherflapoperator]

Urr,

The yellow inner spoilers will always deploy slightly ahead of the green outer ones. The roll spoilers are yellow driven BTW, as are the flap. assymetry brakes next to them.


Landing on a short runway like that with a 6kt tailwind gives me a shudder...no thanks. If they floated and touched down late then stood on the brakes without giving time for the wheels to spin up, then they would have managed a pretty long skid! Spoilers are very good in braking, at anything over 1800m runway, I tend not to brake at first, and let the spoilers do the hard bit for a second or so, but then my little old kite has very snatchy brakes that take a good feel for smooth operation.

There's a lot of reasons this could have happened. The Norwegian CAA will let us know which one it was. The 146 has fantastic brakes, but like anything, if you use them hard without antiskid protection, you'll lock them right up. The spoilers and a smooth progresive pull back on the stick will press the wheels in nicely and both main and nose can take a fair old firm landing without any problems at all.

Short field technique requires a positive sit down and conformation of spoiler deployment then a good squeeze of brake. Tail wind is certainly not one of my requirements!

The IOM is about 1800m and we had a 6kt tail limit on wet runways with our 146-200...if I can remember right. We miss you G-MIMA!

If I got no spoilers, I'd be looking at a go-around, but hindsight is no good here. I am intrigued by the engine clue though. The FCU is purely mechanically linked from the throttles with a thick bowden cable and the TMS operates actuators right next to the FCU on the engine itself.

It does sound like the wing got ripped off though. Nasty.

[teleport]

VG.no reports that the head of Stord airport wants the remains of the burnt out plane removed as it frightens passengers using the airport.
Norwegian AAIB is considering the request, and do not think a report will be ready in 2007.

[Dagger Dirk]

The spoilers and a smooth progresive pull back on the stick will press the wheels in nicely and both main and nose can take a fair old firm landing without any problems at all.
As "Anotherflapoperator" said; definitely - and it's the way to go. If you don't know what's being talked about here, do an advanced search on "backstick braking"

The best reference on pprune is: "Pulling a Stop to Runway Overruns" (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=204897&highlight=backstick+braking)
but it gets a mention in five other threads also. Works in most jets for good aerodynamic reasons. However like most handling techniques, it's for Masterful Manipulators - and not Motor Morons.

[M609]

Families of the deceased has filed a notice with the police commissioner in the area demanding the police investigation into the crash be reopened. (It was closed with no criminal finding earlier)

The N-AAIB has not concluded, and according to Norwegian law, they and other s involved. (Airport owner etc) has not turned over any evidence to the police.

(Thankfully, Police has never done any good in aviation crash investigations IMHO)

No news in English yet http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article1940010.ece

[roaldp]

The final accident report will be released one of the first days, without a definite conclusion as to the cause of the braking failure.

Google Translate (http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=no&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tv2.no%2Fnyheter%2Finnenriks%2Fflyulykken-paa-stord-blir-trolig-aldri-oppklart-3752258.html)

[ATC Watcher]

Producing a (possibly inconclusive ) accident report nearly 6 years after the accident , and this coming from one of the most advanced and richest country on the planet is not sending a very good signal I would say.

Accident investigation does not seem to have higest priority /adequate funding anymore in many countries. If one can perhaps find excuses for States like Lybia Commorros or Ivory Coast, I am surprised to see Norway on that list.

[roaldp]

I don't think the delay is caused by insufficient public funding. The Investigation Board has been heavily criticized for the delay in this special case and a few others. A spokesman for the Board blames the delay on their internal organization.

Google Translate (http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=no&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nrk.no%2Fnyheter%2Fdistrikt%2Fhordaland%2 F1.8068180)

A preliminary report was released in October 2007 and can be downloaded in English here:
http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporter/06-470?iid=7630&pid=SHT-Report-Attachments.Native-InnerFile-File&attach=1

The final report of 150 pages to be released next week is not expected to give any new dramatic conclusions, but several theories.

[Oluf Husted]

In a mail, from November 24. 2006, the former, then brand new, leader of the norwegian accident board Grete Myhre promissed me, that she would do her best to be a speedy authority.

In a mail, from May 2. 2011, Grete Myhre told me, that the final report on AA-670 (at STORD) was almost ready for internal use.

I have no writen promise, but I have asked twice (2006 and 2011) that the blood of the crew, should be testet, for alcohol and nerve-gas, and publisted.

The BAe-146 engines have a very bad history of leaking oil-seals.

Grete Myhre is no longer head of AIBN (since June 1. 2011) and I expect no answer to blood-content of alcohol and nerve-gas.

I hope to be wrong!

[roaldp]

From the report released today:

At the time of the accident, the runway was 1,460 m long and 30 m wide. Both thresholds 20 were 130 m from the asphalt edges. The landing distance available (LDA) was stated to be 1,200 m for both runway directions and the take-off distance available (TODA21) was stated to be 1,330 m for both runway directions. This means that at both ends of the runway there was a paved safety area of 130 m. Beyond the safety areas, there was a steep downhill slope in both runway directions. OY-CRG ran off the runway at the north-western end.

SUMMARY
During normal approach and landing at Stord Airport Sørstokken OY-CRG ran off the runway and plunged down a steep slope. The aircraft sustained considerable damage and caught fire immediately. The fire spread so fast that there was not enough time for everybody to evacuate the aircraft. Four people died and six were seriously injured. In its investigation of the accident, the AIBN found that several factors contributed to the accident. The accident was initiated when none of the aircraft's six lift spoilers were deployed after landing.

The AIBN believes it has found two possible technical reasons for this. The wings continued to produce lift, so that the weight of the aircraft was not sufficiently transferred to the landing wheels. Hence, the main wheels did not get sufficient contact with the runway and the braking effect was reduced. The pilots perceived this as wheel brake failure and the emergency brakes were engaged. The emergency brakes do not have anti-skid protection, and the wheels locked. In combination with the damp runway this led to 'reverted rubber hydroplaning' (the rubber in the tyres started boiling), and the aircraft was unable to stop on the runway.

The AIBN believes that the lift spoilers’ failure to deploy in isolation would not have caused the aircraft running off the end of the runway. The aircraft could have stopped within the available runway length if optimum braking had been utilised. The AIBN therefore considers that the excursion could have been prevented by a better system understanding related to failures of the lift spoilers and the effect that it has on the aircrafts’ stopping distance.

The AIBN also believes that grooves in the runway surface could have improved the braking action in this case. The accident has shown that the safety margins at Stord Airport were insufficient. The paved safety area did not extend far enough past the end of the runway in accordance with the requirements of Norwegian BSL E 3-2 and ended in a slope that was steeper than prescribed. These deficiencies were major contributors to the severity of the accident.

The topography caused the aircraft to catch fire. Moreover, the steep terrain was an obstruction to the fire-fighting and rescue work. The AIBN sees this accident as the accumulated effect of three factors – the aircraft design, the airport and operational factors, which, seen as a whole, may have been unacceptable at the time of the accident. The AIBN submits two safety recommendations on the basis of its investigation of this accident.

[Dream Buster]

This report has taken 5 1/2 years to be published.

1.13.2 There have been incidents with the BAe146 aircraft type in which air contaminated with organophosphates from the engines have entered the cabin and people are believed to have become unwell or sick as a consequence. On the day of the accident, the AIBN therefore requested that the authorised medical examiner at the Norwegian CAA aeromedical section was consulted before blood samples were taken. No medical findings indicate that there was any contamination of the cabin air prior to the accident with OY-CRG.

Organophosphates are not BELIEVED to have caused sickness to countless people - it has been PROVED in a High Court Judgement:

East West Airlines Limited v Turner [2010] NSWCA 53 (http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/scjudgments/2010nswca.nsf/09da2a0a2a27441dca2570e6001e144d/d8e672e1e209410dca2576f000030b49?OpenDocument)

This only took 18 years.

Many people will be pleased to know that there is now unsurprisingly a blood test which can PROVE exposure to organophosphates - plus it's NOT only the BAe 146:

Accident: Germania B737 near Milano on Nov 18th 2011, first officer partially incapacitated by fumes (http://avherald.com/h?article=44a16688&opt=0)

Germania B737 Flight: First Officer Partially Incapacitated By Fumes (http://www.aerotoxic.org/news-and-articles/fume-event-incident-reports/676-germania-b737-near-milano-on-nov-18th-2011-first-officer-partially-incapacitated-by-fumes)

[PEI_3721]

English language version: http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporter/2012-04-eng?pid=SHT-Report-ReportFile&attach=1

Well worth reading the report (particularly section 1.15.2) for aspects of flight and cabin crew emergency evacuation. Things don’t always go as planned; well done this crew.
Also, note issues with the locked flightdeck door - life saver or ... .

Any further info on the differing views on the applicability of dry/wet/damp landing performance discussed at para 1.6.5.5.
Is this a follow on problem from EU-OPS 1.475 (d) “for performance purposes damp may be considered dry” and 1.480 (a) 3, “a runway is damp when it is not dry”,i.e. it's wet; operator view vs certification (manufacturer) view … [EU OPS 1 vs CS 25].

[safetypee]

We might assume that if the ‘dry/wet/damp landing-performance’ issue was a problem then a safety recommendation would be made, i.e. EASA to resolve any ambiguity.
Alternatively, comparing the report with most operational practices might suggest that the investigators do not have the same understanding of the operational / certification requirements as operators / manufacturers.
Of interest the UK CAA published guidance on a related subject - damp grooved runways (FODCOM 3/2009 now cancelled, but see CAP 789), which IMHO is interpreted as there is no such thing as a ‘dry’ damp runway, even if grooved.

Also of interest the Norwegian authorities have published considerable research on related contaminated landing performance; which has a striking observation that “The involved parties do not realize that existing rules and regulations are based on simplification of the actual physical conditions.”

Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions - Executive Summary (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/content/bookDetails.php?bookId=1492)
Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions - Main Body (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/content/bookDetails.php?bookId=1493)