Comair CRJ crash in Kentucky

[Lost in Saigon]

Many people have questioned why they took off from an unlit runway.
I think it is quite possible they were cleared for take off prior to entering the runway. With all the landing lights on, in the early pre-dawn, it would been very difficult to notice whether or not the runway lights were on. (or even if runway lights were even present)

[newarksmells]

I'm glad you enjoyed the reference to SLF noticing if there was something wrong. I am SLF and in this case at this airport would have noticed something wrong, namely the lack of a terminal while rolling down the runway !

I've read all about the lighitng, the markings and taxiway signage, lack of current maps but I said this earlier and I'll say it again, how in God's name did neither pilot make a comment regarding the absence of the terminal while on take-off roll? At 6:00am the terminal would be well lit and extremely difficult to miss.

As airports go, this isn't a difficult place to navigate. There are no obstacles on approach. It's literally situated in the middle of the Kentucy horse farms. Up until the accident, I would imagine the biggest problem facing this airport would be coralling the odd horse now and again. That's how rural this place is.

Newarksmells

[DK_FCI]

The maps may have been outdated, however the compass systems were fully functioning. RWY 22 equates to 220 degrees and 26 equates to 260 degrees.

Does anyone know if the CRJ in question had AHRS or IRS?

If it was equipped with AHRS, there is a possibility that it played a part in the chain of errors in the accident. Because the low positioning of the flux valves makes them very susceptible to any kind of magnetic disturbances in the ground or around the aircraft.

Being a CRJ captain in a company that operates a mixed fleet of AHRS and IRS CRJ's - I can not over emphasize the importance of an accuracy check of the AHRS HDG before any takeoff is attempted, on the ground we can often see an error in excess of 40 degrees, and what is most worrying is that occationally AHRS1 and AHRS2 are in agreement about this – so you get no EFIS COMP MON.

Even with a HDG error of less than 40 degrees, say only 20 degrees, somewhere along the lines of a heading of 240, it is possible that the crew just slewed the heading to what they expected to see, rather than actually verifying the heading by other means.

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

.. the position of the terminal might have felt odd in the periphery of the crews sight ….. if they operated from there only!
.
.. in other words .. the amount of different airports and airport layouts the average commuter pilot/s would see … I personally doubt that would have triggered a response with any non-local crew!
.
It is obvious where the visual attention of a pilot (particularly at night) is during line-up and the take-off roll!!

[Ignition Override]

The Captain was probably glancing around and double checking his flap setting, various trim indicators, that the spoiler handle was down and engine gauges looked normal, in addition to other things.

Also mentally reviewing that there was plenty of fuel and that all checklists had been read and completed.

Who knows? One quick radio call about the switched off runway lights and the tragedy might never have happened.
Captains with a serious lack of rest and have 'get-home itis' or are very "mission-oriented" have less time to double check various items (allow the FO time to question things) and sense that something is not right. I don't know if they were in a big hurry, other than to make a 'wheels up' time.

As a side note, airlines also keep internal safety reports on crews which missed either the flap setting or forgot to do part of a critical checklist. We rarely hear about these because there is no accident.:oh:

[HotDog]

This crew had adequate and legal rest.Who knows? One quick radio call about the switched off runway lights and the tragedy might never have happened.

One quick glance at his compass heading and the tragedy might never have happened.:sad:

[westhawk]

This crew had adequate and legal rest.

Anyone who has flown both sides of the clock within a short period of time knows that "legal rest" is meaningless where physical and mental fitness for flight is concerned. The complete duty logs for both flight crewmembers have not yet been disclosed to the public. How do you know that any rest prior to the accident was "adequate"? Perhaps you'd care to elaborate on just what you percieve to be "adequate". Just because they may have been "legal" in terms of regulatory rest requirements prior to duty does not necessarily imply that they were fit for duty in terms of their cognitive functionality at the time of the accident. The US rules are full of holes, require revision and we all know it. I'll be interested in reading of the crew's activities in the days leading up to that fateful day, in addition to the CVR transcript and many other facts not yet disclosed. A clearer picture of the dynamics involved in enabling this accident to occur will begin to form as more information is made available. Informed speculation relies on credible information, a resource which is presently in extremely short supply for the purposes of this discussion. Patience.


One quick glance at his compass heading and the tragedy might never have happened.:sad:

Perhaps so. Wouldn't we all be interested in gaining some insight into why this last chance to avert the accident wasn't taken? Was there some extranious stimulus or other distraction involved? Were these guys just knackered from schedule disruption, confused by contradictory cues such as the recent changes to the taxiway, charts and NOTAMs? Something else perhaps? I would like to know the answers to these and several other questions, but realize that this is not possible until many more facts are made available for review. If the crew were just careless, that will become apparent. It's still a bit early to be satisfied with that as an answer at this time.

In all likelyhood, by the time the final report is released, it will become apparent that several factors enabled the sequence of failures that led to this accident. Speculating now about the possible roles the factors presently known may have played is understandable and serves some purpose. Reaching any conclusions without further evidence than is presently available is shortsighted and illogical at best, and at worst, is likely to create insurmountable and incorrect biases of opinion which will be difficult to overcome later when more facts are known.

Please understand that even though I have quoted the above statements in my little rant, it is not my intent to single any one person out for criticism. Instead, I simply wish to illustrate the point that too many posters here are either promoting their own agenda by supporting unsustantiated conclusions which happen to support their agenda, or simply lack the patience to wait for more facts before reaching conclusions. In this world of instant gratification and yellow journalism, it may be understandable, but not really excusable in my view.

It's important that we keep an open mind at least until such time as the factual reports of the field investigation findings are released to us. The soonest this usually happens is if and when the NTSB chooses to hold a public hearing. If this occurs, it will likely not be for some time yet.

Thanks to the many regular posters who have attempted to act as the voice of reason on this thread. Your professionalism and calm logic is recognized and appreciated.

Best regards,

[DifferentVector]

According to some press accounts, the Captain had dinner with his family the prior night, and his daughter, 3 months old, had her very first "cold" and was up fussing all night. Possibly he had seen his family on Friday as well.

The reason that may be relevant is that he could have had a viral infection that wasn't yet full-blown, but was interfering with his performance. (Or, he took an antihistamine - a class of drugs banned in Sweden for drivers as doing more damage to driving than alcohol, but legal in the USA.)

In either case, one unresolved issue for all pilots is pre-flighting the pilot. It is very hard to tell, without an objective external test, how badly one is impaired or fatigued. I saw a video of a patient with half his brain shut down chemically, and he reported that he "just felt a little bit sleepy."

So, question to the esteemed list members. If there was a 1 minute test you could take, totally private from big-brother, that would tell you how fit or impaired you were before that first flight of the day, would you take it?

This isn't just a question for pilots. It's relevant for bus-drivers, industrial equipment operators, ATC staff, the first-responders, the military, and managers as well. It's maybe more relevant 4 hours into a flight or emergency-response as it is at the start.

Anyone can get hit with a virus, and before it becomes clinical it can still be dragging you down. Should there be some way to test fitness versus impairment? Would it work if it were secret, or would big-brother destroy it? What do people think?

[jondc9]

DK FCI

thanks for the interesting stuff on the details of this type of aircraft. having flown at KLGA many times, there are magnetic anomalies which bother all aircraft.

does the CRJ have an old fashioned alcohol damped compass in plain view at all times to the pilots? (whiskey compass as it is called).

And to the VIRUS poster...illness is often under reported by pilots...even recognizing it in one's self is very hard.

if your ideas were used, flying would be safer and I applaud you for it...sadly, the bean counters, treat pilots as numbers and not as human beings


safe flying for all

jon

[DK_FCI]

jondc9

The CRJ has a stby compass on the center window post, its easy to see from both sides - but it has a seperate light switch, and is allmost impossible to read in the dark if the light is turned off.

[HotDog]

Westhawk, my assumption that crew had adequate rest is based on the following. Originally Posted by Check 6
The crew landed at LEX Friday night, had Saturday off, and went back on duty Sunday morning.
Crew rest is not likely an issue.

I am well aware of flight time and duty limitations having operated 33 years of long haul.

[jondc9]

DK FCI

thanks for the stuff on the compass and light. a hurried line up on runway and the whiskey compass might not have settled down, the flux valve compass/dg etc may have been wrong or right, we won't know unless the FDR's show heading and even if a FRACTION of a second showed somewhere near 220 degrees, we can throw that fact into the equation.

what is annoying to me is that if the cockpit and instrument lights were set for a night takeoff, the seperate light switch for the compass really shouldn't exist, if the other gauges can be seen, so should the compass.

another part of the equation.


however, still the biggest factor will be: WHICH PILOT REMARKED about the runway lights being OFF. As I said in previous post, CRM, a tone in the cockpit allowing for questions and ANSWERS is vital.


Add in that the copilot was 9 years older...you can all see where I am going with this one.

there has been enough time that the NTSB could release FDR data and a prelim cockpit voice recorder transcript.


I believe that the copilot lived to tell us what happened and that HE was the one who asked about the runway lights(no proof, just a "gut" feeling). Sadly, the response was to take off.


j

[Ignition Override]

Westhawk: Those are valid questions about adequate versus legal crew rest. It 'allegedly' makes no difference at all to some of our 'friends' with the FAA (check the accident at LIT which 'motivated' the FAA to give standby crews a daily period of rest...), or to many of our management personnel. How little do many of the "suits" realize that an accident might seriously affect the stock price...and are lawsuits getting much cheaper for corporations?
Different Vector: That is a common scenario. And when we also are tired from a lack of sleep, it is much more difficult to be sure that we are run down by a common cold etc.

Also: you definitely don't want to report to a briefing room for a check ride if this could be the case. := It can really relax your decision making abilities, a bit like a little hypoxia. They can find a seat-warmer pilot somewhere in the building, such as the superb, good-looking lady from reindeer country.

If you are flying a real trip, call Crew Sched. before you takeoff and let them replace you at the hub after this leg, or if need be, at a spoke airport. Even if you are fortunate enough to fly in a 3-person c0ckp1t.

[westhawk]

Westhawk, my assumption that crew had adequate rest is based on the following.

Originally Posted by Check 6
The crew landed at LEX Friday night, had Saturday off, and went back on duty Sunday morning.
Crew rest is not likely an issue.
I am well aware of flight time and duty limitations having operated 33 years of long haul.

Thank you HotDog, I suspected so. My point is that they got in Friday late and started Sunday early. 28 hours OFF IIRC. Look, we've all had to do it, and I don't offer it as an excuse, but most people don't go right to sleep immediately after a late duty shift and will not go to sleep early the next day after sleeping late. The body just doesn't adjust it's circadian rythyms very well in one day. This leaves a strong possibility that very little sleep was had by one or both crewmembers in the hours before arising at perhaps 04:00 and reporting at about 05:00 for that flight.

At least consider the effect that altering your work/sleep cycle by about 12 hours in just one day. I've had to live with and adjust to this nonsense as I'm sure you and most other working pilots have. Operating at some reduced percentage of your normal cognitive abilities due to sleep disruption is par for the course for many in aviation. Most pilots adjust to this over time and compensate for their degraded state by the practice of structured SOP and well established habit patterns.

Sometimes this is not sufficient to prevent an accident under just the wrong set of circumstances. Fatigue induced degradation of cognitive capability is not prevented by the duty rules as they currently exist and you know this very well from your own personal experience. With that being the case, why not consider that, in spite of duty reg compliance, fatigue may still have been a factor which contributed to the accident? That's all I'm saying. Just one more link in the chain, hole in the cheese, or whatever other illustrative analogy you might happen to favor.

Along with many of the other considerations previously mentioned, it may be possible, perhaps even likely IMHO, that fatigue could have played a part in this chain of events. I don't believe there is ample evidence to suggest that the idea can be dicarded just yet. Of course, there are still too few facts known to us to reach any solid conclusions. I will happily dismiss this, or any other possibility as the facts come to warrant it. That's why I say keep an open mind and don't be too quick to dismiss any reasonable possibilities until the known facts have eliminated them from consideration. I do not believe that compliance with the regulations alone is enough to dismiss fatigue as a factor at this time. I further believe there are at least a dozen or so of the possibilities posed on this thread so far which are still worthy of consideration. I feel it is safe to predict now that several of them will end up being cited as contributing factors and in analysis section of the final report. The effects of seemingly separate events often act in concert with each other to create outcomes.

We probably won't hear much more in the way of substantiated fact until such time as a NTSB public hearing is convened. Meanwhile, the press will occasionally prattle on as the public relations campaigns of the lawsuit originators proceeds. Don't count on any unbiased content there. That part is about $money$! Sorry, but for the lawyers and the press, it is a business.

Best,

Westhawk

[HotDog]

Westhawk, you are right. They could have well been fatigued. In spite of legal requirements and the best efforts of crew scheduling, it is up to the individual as to what he does with his assigned rest period. However I do hope it was something more tangible than that, as you can not legislate against the lack of rest within a rest period. Looking forward to the NTSB findings. Cheers, HD.

[westhawk]

DifferentVector:

You bring up a very interesting question. One I have given thought to in the past. What if your test was the standard for all safety sensitive activities? Would attempting to operate motor vehicles or airplanes while found cognitively impaired by the test leave you subject to criminal charges in the same way as alcohol impairment currently does? It could never be kept out of government's arsenal. Look at traffic cameras and smog testing. I'm very surprised that DNA testing for genetic disease markers has not become the standard for medical insurance acceptance yet.

I don't believe people really want an objective test if there is any possibility that the results may be used against them in any way. But a trustworthy test which could be correlated with actual performance would be a handy research tool indeed.

Best regards,

Westhawk

[westhawk]

HotDog:

That's a good point about what one does during their rest period. We are responsible for that, and it is our duty to show up for duty in decent shape to fly, or call in sick. Unfortunately, pilots are human too, and have an historical propensity for "toughing it out", perhaps because we tend to believe that is what is expected of us. Ego, peer pressure or just a desire to go with the flow, I don't know. That CVR would tell us quite a bit if we could hear the raw recording I believe. Thank you for your responses.

Best,

Westhawk

[jonny dangerous]

I was on annual leave when this incident happened, but regularly followed the reports and PPrune. I was determined to be extra vigilant...

So on my first day back, (after 35 days off), I'm teamed with a new-hire FO. Good chap, but only 50-odd hours in the seat, 1st post-line indoc pairing. He flew the first leg, whilst I got caught up on brekkie and some housekeeping details.

Leg 2. My takeoff brief was routine (however, omitted reference to permanently displaced threshold on planned departure runway), and we requested the longer runway (circuit traffic was on the shorter one, due to light favourable winds).

Cleared to backtrack to position, we carried out the Before Takeoff C/L. Here's my SNAFU: Passing the displaced threshold (Big numbers, big white lines, arrows pointing to it), I turned to line up there. Force of habit, distraction, aircraft on approach 10 miles back, complacency? Pick one...
Tower advises: "Lucky flight 764, you realize you're not at the end of the runway?"

Shock. There's still 1600 feet to go...(8400 disp thrsh vs 10000 full length).
New F/O guy thought about saying something, then didn't based on suppposing I knew what I was doing.

We turned around. Our thrust setting, flap, and speeds all based on 10000 feet. Not 8400. Obviously very long runway in either case...throw in contaminants, an engine failure, whatever, I would have still been fine. I think. However, with ACARS generated (I mean "optimized") calculations, whatever gravy that was there in the good ole days, isn't there in our modern era. (minimal thrust=minimal engine overhaul cost)

Let the same thing happen with shorter runway...you get the picture...

So I put in a company safety report. Then I beat myself up for a few days, and then realized it could happen to us all, and went back to work the next day, a better, professional pilot.

Fly safe fellow colleagues.

Note: in this example the full 10000 ft is available for t/o, but only 8400 for landing...

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

.... the human condition .. :\
.
.. a timely example of exactly the sorts of things that can 'trick' us ... in this case, thankfully some of the system defences working also!
.
.. sight, sound (or lack of), smell, feel .... they can all individually make the unbelievable seem absolutely believable!
.
... much appreciate your candour jonny!
.
... cheers! :ok:

[ChristiaanJ]

An NTSB "update of factual information3 has just been published. I assume nearly everybody here has subscribed to that, so no need to reproduce it here.

Nothing new or surprising at first sight, but clearly all isuues are being pursued.

[barit1]

An NTSB "update of factual information3 has just been published.

Available here (http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2006/060925.htm)

[jondc9]

jonny dangerously


good for you, for telling us of your pseudo screw up. there is an old saying>

If I take a week off from flying, I feel it.

2 weeks of and my copilot feels it.

3 weeks off and my passengers (not SLF, we don't even use that term in america) feel it.


I know what a new copilot has to cope with, but somewhere your company and you should encourage the new hires to speak up on ANYTHING. Sadly, when the stuff finally comes out, that will be part of the comair equation IMHO.

The fact that you admit to a mistake means you will be a better pilot and you certainly have my respect(FWIW).

Should I ever be made King, I would change the way training is structured, to teach pilots where the road leads to screwups. And how to turn off that road.

regards

jon


PS. When you all read the update from NTSB, NOTE THE COPILOT HAD BEEN TAKING SUDEFED...while not an antihistamine, a previous poster may be right about someone feeling under the WX....SUDAFED is normally a bit of an UPPER, but may have allowed a poor night's sleep.

[jonny dangerous]

Comments appreciated fellow airmen (airpersons?).

Scurvy, thank you. To be completely fair, only one of the system defences worked, monsieur le controlleur. I have re-examined my role and discovered some areas to which perhaps more attention to detail is required:

Explicit discussion of LDA/TODA and especially any difference between them (and the reason for it) during appropriate brief. As well, for me anyway, note if any tiny rectangles located along runway on Jepp 10-9 (indicating the above noted variance).

Jon, agreed on the 3 points. And as well, a discussion (not too focused on that part) took place regarding FO's vital contribution to safety, starting with first ever takeoff...(post incident).

As jondc9 mentions, training and awareness in potential traps is vital. Important now, with automation, as it ever was, (if not more) than when 411A started his airline career.

"edited for navel-gazing"

[jondc9]

question about 32 seconds from brake release.

as in previous posts concerning passenger realizing something wrong...I indicated that about 30 seconds in all jets is about right to reach Vr with exceptions for high altitude, high weight, high temps etc.

with this information I am quite convinced that the pilots did not realize what was happening even at the last possible second to rotate early. considering that they were about 10 knots short of regular rotation speed, had they realized the problem they might have staggered into the air below safety speed...

also quite concerned that heading after takeoff was assigned 220 degrees according to NTSB...perhaps there was a heading indicator problem? otherwise the heading bug wouldn't have made sense.


and it is the low hanging fruit which can kill us, or at least bang us on the head if we are too tall.



j

[RobertS975]

Unfortunately, it appears that he required a leg to be amputated. That's the first I have heard about the FO in quite a while.


http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/K/KENTUCKY_CRASH?SITE=OHTOL&SECTION=US&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

[DifferentVector]

jonny dangerously
PS. When you all read the update from NTSB, NOTE THE COPILOT HAD BEEN TAKING SUDEFED...while not an antihistamine, a previous poster may be right about someone feeling under the WX....SUDAFED is normally a bit of an UPPER, but may have allowed a poor night's sleep.

An unvalidated test of one antihistamine I saw showed two effects: 1) reaction speed increased, (2) awareness of errors decreased. A decrease in the self-awareness and error-monitoring might increase speed in motor response. I don't know of published literature in the US that has studied this so you can't base much on it, except to note that being an "upper" doesn't solve every possible problem. Driver safety literature in Sweden might be informative, as I think they studied this.

[averow]

These 'non-sedating' antihistamines often do have significant effects on alertness. I have had more than a few patients tell me that they use Sudafed (US trade name) as a sleep aid ! Regards,
Tony Verow, MD

[jondc9]

sudafed isn't by itself an antihistamine...it is a decongestent...there are however medicines containing both an antihistamine and a decongestent...it is possibly too early to know which type this pilot took, and at what time.

this may have nothing to do with the crash, but it might be some small part of it.


and many pilots do use antihistamines as a sleep aid...many use sudafed alone to keep clear enough to fly...after coal miners, the largest group of people with sinus problems are air crews.


more training, better rest, more and better signs, and countless things that cost more money could have prevented this accident.

j

[Ignition Override]

JonDC9: Forget the notion that more money will be spent on problems, unless the FAA is held accountable for cutting major corners on staffing, which translates into safety. The FAA is under budget pressure and so are most US airlines. Many US passengers only look at price and convenience. They have no comprehension of what safety is, as long as their flight is not too rough and the landing (correct runway? right airport?) is not bumpy. Many of them can be illustrated and exemplified by the audience, or stage guests on the classy :hmm: "Jerry Springer Show".

The non-flying (non-pilot) PPRUNERS need to be constantly reminded that in the US, many corners are being cut on safety. Some are minor and subtle. Almost all jobs on the ground are undergoing wrenching changes and constant training. Thousands of highly-experienced staff at large and small airports are being forced to soon leave: replaced by part-time very young people. An agent at a major airline's hub in the Great Lakes finished high school last spring.

An interesting aspect safety perspective is that brand-new ramp personnel are being trained for not just aircraft push-backs, but soon for de-icing. But at least the more senior ramp guys will be in charge of de-icing. Let's hope that these changes don't multiply ("snowball" ;) ) into serious problems when the snow and ice appear. Will many of these new people stay on the job and freeze when the only job benefit is discount travel?

[jondc9]

ignition override:

I agree with you completely. Indeed, less experienced, new hires at alaska's ground crew caused damage to a jet which later had pressurization problems.

the almighty dollar has taken front seat and safety the back seat.

very sad and it will certainly happen again.

the FAA is leading the way to a low cost aviation future and not a high safety aviation future.

regards and thanks for the excellent post.

jon

[captjns]

Rest, training, and signage? Sure all are great in the scheme of things.

These guys are beyond the private pilot days of training when they were taught to ensure the compass matches the runway heading prior to continuing the takeoff run. Further when being trained, with a glass cockpits use the extended runway centerline as an aide to ensure you are on the correct runway. While I am glad the F/O will survive his injuries from this accident, the pilot in command in the one that is ultimately responsible... that comes with the fourth stripe.

Better rest and traininging? American Airlines Cali Columbia accident. Crashed into a ridge. Crews both trained by an excellent training academy, and their first flight of the day. I'm sure all have read the NTSB report.

The Columbian Airlineer 707 that ran out of gas? You all have read the report on that.

Swissair 101 that crashed into the Atlantic? You all have also read the report on that.

Seems that when peoples backs are against the wall, or pressured thats when the mistakes come out of the wood work.

You can blame rest, training, and poor signage just so many times.

[Ignition Override]

Human factors studies have indicated that when two men are flying together, instead a man and a woman, there is less chance that somebody will admit to the other pilot that "Man...I'm feeling too rushed-can we delay the takeoff just a minute? I'm trying to remember what that NOTAM said :O , and it is bothering me (during this early/late/operation with fatigue). Is the last 2,000' of the main runway still closed? The ACARS says that we can make a ('legal') normal flaps 15 takeoff, but it rained a good bit and our weight is 98,000 pounds...

You do not always hear about it, but during certain nights "your" First Officer's neighbors somewhere in the hotel drink a bit and let their doors slam until at least 0200 :( . Especially during bitter, bleak winter weekends in the upper Midwest (they 'camp' in hotels with inside pools/hot tubs and bring or escape from their children, i.e. "...oh yah, are they coming with [mit]?" "I dohhnt knohhw Greta"). Or your Captain, with the stimulus of two coffee refills, appears to feel ok despite the noise in his distant hallway.

[jondc9]

ignition over rirde

all of what you say is true.

especially those hotels with play parks, pools, etc all indoors and YOUR room over looks the pool...no cute babes in bikinis mind you, just kids making a racket and you having to takeoff at 0darkthiry.

j

[discountinvestigator]

Dear Aviators,

According to the airport, it complies with all FAA regulations. This is most interesting as I have seen some of the technical reports and photos from the various inspections that have been carried out.

Firstly, as I have said before, the charts are wrong, wrong, wrong. The current FAA chart shows what the airport will build in the future, not what is there now. They do not show the current "temporary taxiway" which appears to be called Alpha, but show a taxiway in a different location called Alpha Seven. Where Alpha Seven is shown on the chart is actually blocked off by the famous red lights.

However, if the charts are wrong, the airport appears not to care. Is there really no duty of care for the airport operator to check what the FAA publishes?

Secondly, there are numerous signage problems. Several signs along the runway/Alpha taxiway do not have complete letter/numbering. Therefore, it is possible for an aircraft to land on 22, vacate on Alpha Three (such as I did recently) and then be directed to turn left and back across the runway as they have missed the 4 out of A4. You just get an arrow with A written on it. I am not sure if this is an FAA standard or not. Certainly it would explain why you have runway incursions.

The holding position signs on most of Alpha are so close to the taxiway that you cannot see them and they are mounted at 90 degrees to the taxiway centreline. They need to be turned to increase their visibility.

There are several holding positions with the same name. I am not sure if this is an FAA "requirement" but it sure as hell is confusing. There are at least three holding position Alphas prior to entering various runways.

The ground markings are pathetic. Just some yellow lines. At the last holding point where the aircraft made the fatal left turn onto R26, there is a lead off line from 08, no lead on line to 26, a line taking you into the old taxiway (now shown as A7 but with the red lights) and a line taking you across to the "proper" taxiway. No information signs to say which to follow, no painted information markings to tell you which to follow. Is this really FAA standard? These yellow lines are not blacked in on either side, although in other areas of the airport, they are.

I love the FAA notice to taxi with extra care. How about fixing the problems? Of course, the airport has a Part 139 certificate, but the sign at the entry to the security area informing the passengers of a security deficiency in Bali takes precidence over inspecting a regional airport for safety.

LEX is a registered international airport according to the FAA, so they have a duty between them to register the differences from ICAO Annexes. They are way behind the drag curve on this one. Even the FAA cannot manage to work out that PANS ATM is the new abbreviation for PANS RAC.

If you need to know any more, just ask. I will see what I have managed to gather.

Happy landings, and safe take-offs.

[HotDog]

I was most impressed with my type training of the L1011 at Palmdale and the 747 at Seattle. I also believed that the FAA was No.1 in the world of aviation regulations and safety. Perhaps I was young and naive but I still believe, taking off on RW26 instead of RW22 has more to do with the operating crew than the FAA, wrong maps and poor signage at LEX.:sad:

[PaperTiger]

I was most impressed with my type training of the L1011 at Palmdale and the 747 at Seattle. I also believed that the FAA was No.1 in the world of aviation regulations and safety. Perhaps I was young and naive but I still believe, taking off on RW26 instead of RW22 has more to do with the operating crew than the FAA, wrong maps and poor signage at LEX.:sad:Yes, what the crew did or did not do on the flightdeck prior to brake release is unquestionably the main cause. What we have been discussing in this thread is whether there were other 'links' in the chain which contributed. The changed configuration, the signage and the lighting at LEX certainly bear scrutiny.

As to the FAA, it's like the Curate's egg - good in parts. The operational staff are for the most part first class, the bureaucrats not so much. Ever hear of "Tombstone Philosophy" ?

I can't comment on the competence of the LEX Airport Authority.

[discountinvestigator]

By using words such as "main cause" then you are beginning to display emotional personal bias in relation to the chain of events.

A cause as opposed to a contributory factor is merely the personal judgement of the investigator. This sort of phraseology dropped out of modern safety thinking in around 1990. A pity that aviation has yet to catch up.

The role of the investigations are to identify all of the deficiencies and then set about repairing them. By describing something as a "cause" then you are saying that the flight crew are more blameworthy than others. This is not necessarily the case. For example, if the crew followed their standard procedures (and I do not know what they are) which did not require a check of compass and navigation display heading, then are they at fault? Was it not the company which should have defined that? After all, Comair makes a big thing about being a pilot training academy as well....

So, let us get rid of "cause" and "contributory factor" as words with emotional bias. Let us try and work out what went wrong on the day, and also, what could go wrong in the future at the airport.

I am not after flaming the previous poster, far from it, but we must all learn from what went wrong. Indeed, the purpose of my previous post was to alert those still flying in and out of the airport to the problems which may still exist.

[Anti-ice]

Is not the runway number printed on the end of the runway ? ( I would guess that they would start the t/o run from the very end of it)

Would it be an idea at certain airports to 'check' your heading with the runway you are supposed to be using or that both pilots confirm they are on the correct one?

Would it also not be prudent at (certain) airports (where confusion could arise) to have a clear illuminated sign with the runway number on it too?

[forget]

Is not the runway number printed on the end of the runway?
See post 153. Page 8.

[PaperTiger]

By using words such as "main cause" then you are beginning to display emotional personal bias in relation to the chain of events.Actually I'm not; you're reading that into it.
I am not after flaming the previous poster,Nothing caught fire here. I did deliberate about the wording in that post, but couldn't find a suitable fit. So if not "main cause" or "main factor", then what would you suggest ? Or is it your position that the crash was actually inevitable before the throttles were advanced for the last time ?

[punkalouver]

While there are no doubt lessons to be learned here in perhaps airport signage charts and runway confirmation in company procedures, it is pretty difficult to justify taking off on a runway with no lights on only to discover that there were no lights on because that runway is closed.

[discountinvestigator]

you do not cross the numbers 26 when you enter runway 26 because most pilots would follow the lead off line only. you get close to the numbers when you follow straight across to the closed A7 to be taxiway.

In the dark, with the red flashing lights ahead of you and the none too bright CRJ lights, you would be pushed to notice them. As you look towards the "numbers" then you also get light in your eyes from airport car parks, roads etc.

There are no lead on lines for Runway 22 either, in case you were wondering.

There were several elements which could have stopped the crash after the throttles were pushed forward for the last time. All of these must be investigated by NTSB. However, the throttles were pushed when the crew had convinced themselves (probably with internal confirmation bias) that they were on the correct runway. The red signs about runway numbers are slightly confusing at the intersection, and with the CRJ light patterns you would be too focused on centerline to have that external a view of the periferal signs.

You do get the runway lights for 22, but again even wider periferal vision. Remember that you will see the reduced intensity side filters, not the straight ahead high intensity light when you cross runway 22.

The aircraft crossed two primary runway side stripes. Did the crew know about runway markings? The crew also crossed an aiming point white block. Same comment.

The aircraft passed by a 2000 and 1000 foot to go marker boards. Again, very periferal stuff and not lit by the aircraft lights to any extent.

The crew now have absolutely no chance. The end of the runway comes up, with the profile of the runway and a big white spot is the 8 on centerline. Run at that at 130+ knots and you would not get the nose gear off.

Drag of the gear on the grass?

How much damage did the security fence do?

If I was convinced that I was on the right runway at the point of throttle push, might I have detected it. Yes. But that is because I spend all day looking at runways and accidents. Would I expect an "average" regional jet pilot to detect the difference. Actually, no. Especially as the charts were non-compliant with international standards and give no information about runway markings at all.

As for the terminology, well, the best that we do at the moment is associated with "events in the accident sequence". We let the lawyers work out which were the more important in terms of liability. In terms of responsibility, well that is laid down in the individual Safety Management System of each airport operator and integrated with the ATC service provide and aircraft operator. (well it should be...)

[ChristiaanJ]

Or [is it possible] that the crash was actually inevitable before the throttles were advanced for the last time ?PaperTiger,
You've awakened a memory from very long ago.....
"The Pilot Who Died Before Take-off".
It's a story about a Super Sabre (F-100 ... that should date it !).
In theory, he starts his engine with enough credit on his "runway remaining" balance. In reality he's already dead.
The story then goes through everything that finally puts him into debt.... air temperature reducing thrust, higher than expected fuel weight, change of wind, etc.
The story ends with a fireball at the end of the runway.
It's likely over 40 years since I read it, and I honestly don't know if it was Ernest Gann, or an obscure article in an obscure flight safety magazine. Maybe somebody remembers the story?
I've never forgotten that one. It was the classic case of what we are now calling here "the holes in the cheese lining up".
When that happens the only sane answer is: "how do we stop it from happening again?".
Putting "blame" is singularly pointless. Maybe a human made a mistake. If so, another human will make the same mistake sooner or later, unless we do the necessary to help him/her in every way not to make that same mistaek again.
Personally, I still remember the Eastern 401 crash in the Everglades in 1972. Luckily we didn't have to wait for the final report to find out that one of the contributing factors could have been the AP alt hold being disengaged by pressure on the controls, without this being clearly indicated to the crew.
We looked, and yes, on Concorde we had the same situation. The necessary modifications weren't long in coming.
In 2000, a Concorde crashed. Everything was done to fill every single hole in the cheese that lined up that day, and she was brought back to service.
One can only hope that this time, too, everything will be done to fill every single hole in the cheese, rather than just blame X or Y. Having read this thread..... pigs will fly first......

[MercenaryAli]

. . . I say again; when you professional pilots line up to depart surely to God you look down the runway, you look at your heading bug which I presume you have set on the correct runway heading and your check you are taking off on the correct runway. Because if you dont and you run off the end of a runway that is way too short for your airplane's performance YOU are going to be held responsible. Who else is in charge if not YOU the Captain?

[flynverted]

From Yahoo! news:

By BRETT BARROUQUERE, Associated Press Writer Fri Oct 13, 8:39 PM ET

LEXINGTON, Ky. - Comair sued the federal government and the Lexington airport Friday over the deadly crash of a commuter plane that mistakenly took off from a too-short runway. Forty-nine people were killed in the accident Aug. 27. n a statement, the airline said it intends to reach fair settlements with the victims' families but is suing to ensure other parties that bear responsibility pay their share.

Full story http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061014/ap_on_re_us/comair_crash

(http://us.bc.yahoo.com/b?P=2qbfZUSOwhVnhAHPRTDFXQI.0x_0l0Uw.6gADrlp&T=19suu3r1d%2fX%3d1160838056%2fE%3d8903239%2fR%3dnews%2fK%3d 5%2fV%3d2.1%2fW%3d8%2fY%3dYAHOO%2fF%3d1361408676%2fH%3dY2Fja GVoaW50PSJuZXdzIiBjb250ZW50PSJnb3Zlcm5tZW50O2l0O3ZpY3RpbXM7V 2FzaGluZ3RvbjtyZWZ1cmxfd3d3X3lhaG9vX2NvbSIgcmVmdXJsPSJyZWZ1c mxfd3d3X3lhaG9vX2NvbSIgdG9waWNzPSJyZWZ1cmxfd3d3X3lhaG9vX2Nvb SI-%2fQ%3d-1%2fS%3d1%2fJ%3d1847BFD1&U=13ak8ncbl%2fN%3dls1oDESOxIU-%2fC%3d553050.9320267.10143594.1414694%2fD%3dLREC%2fB%3d4018 943)

[411A]

To be expected, in our 'lets blame everyone' environment of today.
Generally speaking, most folks are unable to come to terms that they, and no one else, screwed up, big time.
Comair is certainly no exception.

[Two's in]

To be fair to Comair, this will be an instruction from the Corporate Lawyers to mitigate the cost to them when the settlements do get paid. It's not so much a question of blaming everybody, so much as not getting hit with the whole cost. Not excusing it, but that's what the "suits" get paid to do for the airline business.

[PaperTiger]

To be expected, in our 'lets blame everyone' environment of today.
Generally speaking, most folks are unable to come to terms that they, and no one else, screwed up, big time.
Comair is certainly no exception.Unless the FAA and/or LEX are guilty of dereliction. Yes the crew screwed up, but just maybe they had "help" doing so.

[Sqwak7700]

I have flown with so many people that think airport signage is confusing, my self included. I think it is not very intuitive and the system needs to change. It might be cheap, and maybe even logical when you sit there and look at it from an engineer's point of view...but it just doesn't work very well otherwise.

I'm not blaming this accident on airport/taxiway signage; but this accident does bring it into question. I believe this was crew error; no matter what the circumstances and surrounding factors.

What should be done about signage? Of all places in the world, I was flying in BOM recently and they have a very good system. The taxiway signage is painted on the actual taxiways, right next to the centerline light, where your eyes are focused most of the time. I'm sure there are many airports arround the world that do this, but this is the last one in which I've noticed it. What a difference it makes. This should be the standard at every airport. I'm sure the paint wears out often, but the extra maintenance is worth the effort.

[jondc9]

I am glad to hear about the first lawsuits.


Once the lawyers get involved, change will happen. ALPA for the longest time has said words to the effect of: an $8.00 bucket of paint would fix many airports.

put blue paint down to lead to one runway, green to another, purple to still another.

ATC says, follow the blue line to RW 22, report holding short.

Rocket science? Hardly...I've seen it in hospitals...follow the red line to X ray!

Pilots are tested for color blindness.


There have been crashes in the past, where the FAA has had to shoulder the lion's share of the blame.

Could the crew have done better? YES

Could the system have done better? YES

Could the passengers have done better by staying home that day? Sadly, yes.


I like that Royal Bank of Scotland ad on TV...too much talk...not enough action.

[MercenaryAli]

The bottom line is this (sorry to repeat myself - sign of old age)

When you line up on your departure runway SURELY you align the HEADING BUG to the nose of the aircraft? and having done so SURELY you check the actual magnetic heading the aircraft is on? You do don't you? Well if you DON'T then I suggest you start doing so in future!

Old Pilot :ugh: But still alive!

[SEAN911]

"The taxiway signage is painted on the actual taxiways, right next to the centerline light, where your eyes are focused most of the time. "
Fine at airports where it never snows.

[MercenaryAli]

. . .what do you suggest - paint that shows through snow?

For goodness sake people when did old fashioned AIRMANSHIP get taken out of the syllabus? Line up; centre your heading bug; check the magnetic heading and if it is NOT what you expected ie the Runway Heading then FOR GOODNESS SAKE ASK WHY? :ugh: BEFORE you push those power levers forwards!

[jondc9]

fine at airports where snow is cleared frequently and everyone slows down and makes sure of things when conditions are rotten


indeed, the only runway one might taxi to at a snow covered airport is one that has been plowed, etc.

[TheSailor]

Hello,

Any news...?

Regards. http://smilies.sofrayt.com/%5E/a/bye.gif

[jondc9]

hi sailor

haven't heard anything recently...I do expect the transcript of the CVR to be available before the end of the year.


I do PREDICT that the copilot will be the person who questions the lack of runway lights...but it is only SPECULATION.

have you heard anything?

jon

[HowlingWind]

The latest news seems to be that the NTSB announced (rather quietly, it would appear) it will not hold public hearings on the crash. Supposedly they will release major documents (including the CVR transcript) early next year and could rule on probable cause by spring.

Source: Louisville Courier-Journal (http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061109/NEWS0104/61109034)

I can understand that the NTSB wouldn't conduct public hearings for every investigation, but doesn't it seem a bit odd to omit such a step in a high-profile event such as this? :hmm:

[jondc9]

it concerns me greatly that the NTSB isn't making an attempt on a public hearing on this crash.

I went to the NTSB public hearing on the rudder hardover crash near KPIT back in '94.

Interesting, depressing, but I did look one of the NTSB members in the eye and told him not to blame the pilots on this one.

[Neekburm]

This post was a great read.

I was recently in differences training and we got to talking about this accident. The instructor mentioned that the CVR/FDR info would be released shortly and from what he had been told the CVR wasn't pretty. Plenty of non-standard, makes you embarassed to be a pilot kinda stuff.

I certainly hope that isn't the case.

[cole26]

Anyword on how the fo is doing?

[Neekburm]

Last I heard he was expected to recover. When asked about the crash he said he doesn't recall anything.

[ChristiaanJ]

Any word on how the f/o is doing?The newspaper article quoted just above said:
"The co-pilot, James Polehinke, was the sole survivor and is undergoing rehabilitation at a Lexington hospital."
I think we all hope he'll make it....

[barit1]

New NTSB recommendations (http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061212/NEWS0104/61212066) :ugh:

[Lost in Saigon]

I find this comment interesting:
“The board is concerned that, in the case of the Comair flight 5191 accident, both pilots recognized the unlighted runway during the takeoff roll but did not use that information to reevaluate whether they were on the correct runway for takeoff,” the letter says.

[Sawbones]

Regarding the health of F/O Polehinke..
Business and Commercial Aviation magazine reported in the November 2006 issue, that his family said that his left leg has been amputated and he faces several more major sugeries.
A low level of an "over-the-counter" decongestant was detected in his blood, but no other illicit substance or alcohol. As stated, he has still no recollection of the accident.
I wish him the best in what will no doubt be a long difficult road to recovery.

[PaperTiger]

The easiest thing in the world to do, says the 35-year-old widow, is "blame the dead guy."

http://kentucky.com/news/state/story/153138.html

[Flight Safety]

Sadly, this response from the pilot's widow was expected. It must be very hard for her.

[two green one prayer]

Silly question from non-pilot. Why not mark the bearing and possibly distance remaining at intervals on the runway? It's cheap, never goes wrong, and is used extensively by road engineers.

OK. Steel helmet, flak jacket, entrenching tool.

[Mullah Lite]

TGOP

Simple explanation:

http://www.pilotfriend.com/training/flight_training/communication/rnwy_mark.htm

A little more informative:

http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/ATpubs/AIM/chap2toc.htm

[bomarc]

you see, many airports do have distance remaining signs...they are very nice

as far as bearing, the numbers at the beginning of the runway are the bearing with the "0" left off the end...

all takeoffs should be made with the plane sitting on top of the "NUMBERS", but they aren't always that way.

the answer to "why don't they"...MONEY.

Its all about money. Pilots are encouraged to move things along by their company, by ATC...time is money...so why taxi back 200 feet to start from the numbers...that would take an extra 2 minutes.

Aviation knows the right thing to do, but sadly its all about cost


Cost like making sure pilots from day one check compass to runway bearing

(when I was an active flight instructor, even my newest, lowest time students knew: TLC upon line up, cleared for takeoff

T=transponder on
L= lights on
C= compass...check with runway bearing.

and these students were with some 10 flying hours...not thousands.

Rant is through...put away your entrenching tool...a spoon will do.

[the_hawk]

ML, at least in the first link I find absolutely no answer to TGOP's question (?)

[Mullah Lite]

:confused:

I always thought those big white stripes and fat white numbers on the runway meant something. I'd better write a damning letter to ICAO and tell them they've got it all wrong

[the_hawk]

we are talking about

bearing and possibly distance remaining at intervals on the runway

in which way does your (tongue in cheek) remark about "big white stripes and fat white numbers on the runway" (which the pilot steering Comair 5191 could not see) help answer the question?

[Mullah Lite]

:ouch:

The top of the page for the first link has a diagram of some basic distance markings on the runway. If you're being directed to another webpage with different information then my apologies.

The question asked by TGOP has nothing to do with whether the pilots saw the markings or not, but what information exists on any runway to denote distance remaining. Your typical FAA standard precision/non precision approach runway in the States will always have distance markers running alongside the centreline to tell you how much runway you've eaten up and once you're past the midpoint, how much is remaining (unless either end has a displaced threshold, in which case, a little maths is needed). So for TGOP's benefit, I put up that first link to show a simple diagram that illustrates one part of his/her question. The second link is there if he/she feels like expanding on that first diagram.

By asking about 'bearing' of the runway I'm assuming the question is with regards to the direction of the runway. Though it's not strictly the correct term as a runway has a 'heading' and is not considered 'bearing' from anything, unless you're using it as a navigation reference in relation to something else. I've heard plenty of non aviators/maritimers use the terms bearing/heading interchangeably, so if i've misunderstood TGOP's question then please feel free to add substance here.

Anyone, jump in here anytime if I've kakked up. TGOP, if you revisit this page please let me know if I've misunderstood your question.

[bomarc]

1. actually the runway has a static bearing...but we call it a heading as a short cut.

2. Those nice big ICAO markings are reserved for instrument runways...the shorter runway that the plane took off from was a day vfr runway only and didn't have the big fat stripes etc.

And if any pilots on this forum went to the same flying school/flight training that the captain and copilot went to, could you please let us know if checking runway alignment with compass was SOP prior to crash?

And did they ever get instructed in using the Localizer receiver to verify centerline of ILS equipped runways?

both are used, I've taught both.

just would like to know.

[galaxy flyer]

SMall correction, ML, they are always distance remaining, it does not change at the mid-point of the runway.

GF

[two green one prayer]

Thank you ML for the runway marking links. I was using "bearing" in the nautical sense as shorthand for magnetic compass bearing. Of course heading is the correct term. Such are the dangers of using jargon when one is not familiar with the subject.

As TH says, the pilots did not see the markings that would have alerted them to their mistake and considering the extraordinarily high level of safety in aviation training and equipment I wondered if the obvious had been overlooked.

My post was prompted by the poster who mentioned of the Honeywell ground GPS guidance system which would be very costly and slow to adopt. The saying; "to a man with a hammer all problems look like nails", came to mind.

Right, back to the bunker.

[Mullah Lite]

TGOP hope it helps; GF, oops, thanks for the correction!

[bomarc]

the heck with it...just buy a bucket of high visibility paint and make darn sure you put it in the right places on the airport.

[jet_noseover]

Factual Report from the NTSB:

http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2007/AAR0705.pdf


And the media:

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/...ucky-Crash.php

[barit1]

It could have been deja vu all over again (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20070927X01453&key=1) :ugh:

[Ignition Override]

Mullah Lite:

Those are valid questions, but if those pilots were in a hurry (they had begun a preflight on the wrong aircraft, then switched to the correct ship number) or did not use their taxi lights until they were pushing the throttles forward and reading their "Lineup" or "Before Takeoff" checklist fairly quickly, they would not be looking much outside.

But heck, they did not mind that the runway lights were off. Why did they not ask the Tower to switch them on? This might have prevented a tragedy.

By the way, at our hubs, many pilots leave their taxi lights off much of the time. I guess that is a symptom of being cool. But I really don't know. It goes way beyond courtesy. It must be some sort of fashion-it has happened for many years.
Some of the original 727s never had taxi lights installed.

[ATC Watcher]

Ignition :

By the way, at our hubs, many pilots leave their taxi lights off much of the time. I guess that is a symptom of being cool.

Recommendation # 7 from USALPA Report after the Tenerife crash in 1977 :

Landing lights must be on, if practicable whenever and aircraft is moving

[applevid]

I would really like to know how Comair trains their pilots and whether the training had line up compass check...does anyone know???

[silvioMK]

I would really like to know how Comair trains their pilots


It seems that they don't:)

[flyboyike]

I would really like to know how Comair trains their pilots and whether the training had line up compass check...does anyone know???


Comair trains their pilots rather well, IMHO. And yes, the training does include a heading check at lineup.

[applevid]

flyboyike...does the written checklist include words to the effect: compass heading/runway alignment check?

[flyboyike]

flyboyike...does the written checklist include words to the effect: compass heading/runway alignment check?


Negative, at least not yet.

[applevid]

Flyboyike:

since before comair existed:

TLC has been my line up checklist:

Transponder:on

Lights: on

Compass: check

fly safe.

[flyboyike]

Flyboyike:

since before comair existed:

TLC has been my line up checklist:

Transponder:on

Lights: on

Compass: check

fly safe.


As it has mine and every CA I've flown with so far. However, the written checklist still doesn't mention it, neither here, nor at a few carriers that I've had a chance to jumpseat on.

[Sqwak7700]

flyboyike...does the written checklist include words to the effect: compass heading/runway alignment check?

You can't have a checklist response for every single threat that we deal with in avitaion. If that was the case, why don't we have a "check weather" or "check for traffic on runway" readout on the checklist? That is because we are profesional pilots and hopefully we are of the caliber to think of these things when we are at work. But even profesionals mess up sometimes.

These guys royally f****d up, and it should serve as a reminder that we should be paying attention as we get ready to blast off. That is the only lesson we can take away from this tragedy.

[applevid]

You can have a checklist item for threats...it is a choice by those who run the airline.


When I taught flying, I explained what had to be done on taking the runway for takeoff...checking final for traffic was one of them

checking the compass/dg/heading indicator was something also part of the training.

IF pilots are checking things because it is a part of their training, the checklist might be shorter.

Who really forked up? Look at the training department for the real answer...and both pilots first instructors.

[kansasw]

"These guys royally f****d up, and it should serve as a reminder that we should be paying attention as we get ready to blast off. That is the only lesson we can take away from this tragedy."

Hi Sqwak, first off I am neither pilot nor aviation professional, only interested observer and occasional pax. That said, I have followed the thread with interest and disagree with some of your statement.

Certainly they messed up royally, agreed.

That is the only lesson, disagree. Consider the swiss cheese model, it has many holes, but the event only occurs when they all line up. In the instance at hand, there was runway construction, lights absent, possibly ambiguous or obscure or unread or unremembered notifications, possible lack of required ATC personnel, possible inattendence or poor attention of ATC, possible poor signage or runway markings, possible weather or time of day factors, and I could continue. All these have been mentioned.

My point is that absent any one of these possibles, there would be no incident and no discussion here. ALL the factors were in place, and some of them were beyond control of the pilots. Yes they should have observed factors beyond their control, and yes they had ultimate responsibility in which they failed. The other factors were also mistakes in the system for which the pilots were not prepared, despite their extensive training, and which should not have been operative. They fell victim to a combination of circumstances including but not limited to their own inattention. JHMO.

[Dream Land]

IMO you can't make aviation fool proof by adding more BS to a checklist, it's not on my checklist and I seem to make it to the right runway despite. I feel that a lot of the responsibility falls on the way the FO is weighted down with paper work during a critical phase of flight, we need to free up crews on the way out to the runway so they are both in the loop, rant over. :}

[411A]

IMO you can't make aviation fool proof by adding more BS to a checklist....

Ah, no, but what one can do instead is have the checklist properly constructed, to wit...

Last item on the before takeoff check list....

Configuration check.
1. Flaps.... Set, and agree with the takeoff data
2. Spoilers ...down
3. Stab trim....Set
4. Compasses...compared, and checked for runway alignment

It really is that simple folks...as PanAmerican learned a long time ago, after a rather serious accident.

Sadly, most in aviation don't (won't) learn from others mistakes.

[barit1]

411A may have overstated...Sadly, most in aviation don't (won't) learn from others mistakes.

It's not QUITE that bad, but in aviation (as in every other endeavor):

1) There are those who learn from the mistakes of others

2) There are those who learn from their own mistakes

3) There are those who never learn

:(

[applevid]

411A

you make a fine point about learning from past mistakes...one very sad thing is there is no real mechanism other than personal study, on how things came to be in flying.

why we do things.

I'll wager that a number of people can't tell us why the low altitude airway structure is called Victor airways.

What the airways were called before they were Victor airways.

how the runway markings came about.

and why we check the compass on runway line up.

There is an old axiom about how to remove your bayone from your rifle in the US Army. There is the Army way, and the obvious way. The obvious way is to grab the rifle barrel and pull off the bayonet. The army way is to put the rifle stock between your legs and pull off the bayonet.

If someone explains why the army has you look dorky to take off your bayonet, then you realize how smart the old ways are.

And if you can't figure out this bayonet drill, then you might learn the hard way.

Sadly, the modern "ratings factory" method of producing pilots often leaves gaps in Airmanship and Aeronanutical knowledge.

[brain fade]

FWIW.... 'not much' I hear you say.:}

I think OVER reliance on checklists is what causes stuff like this to happen.

Folk have it drummed into them that they MUST follow the C/L at all costs.

This leads them to think that as long as the DO follow the C/L ,that all will be well.

People need, ABOVE ALL ELSE, to think-and to be aware of their surroundings.

Also to realise that Airmen, above all else, rely on Airmanship and NOT checklists or slavish adherence to SOP's (invaluable tho' they certainly are) to keep themselves alive!

[ATC Watcher]

Applevid :
'll wager that a number of people can't tell us why the low altitude airway structure is called Victor airways.
What the airways were called before they were Victor airways.
how the runway markings came about.

I, for one, would be interested to know the history behind.
Off topic :
Until after 1st World War, there were no airports and runways, just airfields , where you always took off and landed against the wind. I guess the price of land near large cities and that of concrete dictated the design of runways.

[brain fade]

ATC watcher

I don't know about the 'Victor' ones but the 'Alpha' ones were 'Amber'

the Bravo ones were 'Blue' and Golf were Green.

'Violet' maybe?

[ATC Watcher]

Brain fade : I spent 30 years of my life controlling the Green 1, one of the first airways designed as such I was told by the " inventors of ATC" as we called the UK back then. Besides the Amber, Red and Blue ones that we also had, I have practiced occasionally the famous " Purple airway" but had not heard of "violet" ones , and even less about " Victor ones " . therefore my curiosity.

[applevid]

I didn't mean to make a fuss, I assure you.

The point being we could all be better off with the lost knowledge of our ancestors.

I can understand why you Europeans seem confused about VICTOR airways.

Victor of course is the phoentic for V

V for Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range. The first airways with VOR's as the navaids, instead of the old range stations, ndb's etc of the colored airways.

fly safe,