Situational Awareness

[flyingmogul]

Hi All,

I've been asked to give a 20min presentation to some ab initio students on situational awareness, next week.

Does anyone have any tips of main focus areas for relevance and being only 20mins the crux of SA for me?

Thanks in advance

FM:)

[davedek]

I know this probably wont help much, but I think the main tip to mention when discussing situational awareness is how REALLY important it is.

Like I said, im sure you already know that, but you should really stress that it is just as important as actually flying the plane (no good flying a perfect 100 knots at exactly 2000 feet if you are not paying attention at the glider on a collision course from the right).

Very basic I know, but really hit it home to them.

[paco]

You're welcome to work something round this:

"Part of the decision-making process, you start with the awareness of a situation, which means having some idea of the big picture (similar to the continual updating mentioned above). Situational awareness here refers to your awareness of all relevant information, past or present, conscious or subconscious, which includes your cultural background (and given all that, it's no wonder people react to situations differently). Of course, you have to know how things should be to recognise what's wrong! You need vigilance and continual alertness, with regard to what may happen on top of what is happening, which is difficult at the end of a long day. Being a pilot, most of the information you will base a decision on comes from your instruments and navigation equipment, but this can be affected by your physical state. Reading the paper on the flight deck is not conducive to situational awareness!"


Phil

[Hobbit]

The Australian Transportaion Safety Board in their human factors course spend a full hour trying to explain situational awareness. This is a lecture by a trained aviation psychologist at probably the finest accident investigation body in the world, how you are supposed to do it in 20 minutes is beyond me!

That said, the crux of their discussion was that situational awareness involves knowing where you have come from, where you are now and where you will be in the future. Simplistic but true. The difference between surface vessels and aeroplanes is that we in aviation have to keep all that in mind in three dimensions not two. Therein lies the problem.

Good luck with the lecture!

[SMOC]

This would only work if the Ab Inits had operated out of the same airfield that you are familiar with.

Our Instructor gave the following example after drawing a RWY 36/18 on the board.

You take off from RWY 18 climb straight ahead in nil wind at 100kts climbing to 1000' then turn left hdg 080 climb another 1000'.........

He basically radar vectors us all over the place with climbs and descents due to weather, ATC or traffic etc. at certain times he then gets us to show him on the board where and what altitude we were at, he continues this to a landing at another airfield near where we took off.

After the whole class predicts where we landed, he points out we are all dead because turning left onto 080 and climbing to 2000' smacks you right into a ridge that climbs to around 2600'.

Now we were all new to flying, we knew about the terrain but had only flown west to the training area at that time at 2000'

The exercise had me thinking of time and space but we all forgot about terrain and how familiarity can make things seem fine.

This might be a good way to get your point across, with some good class participation rather than just talking, if not it'll blow 20mins.

[flyingmogul]

Great work guys/girls!

I REALLY appreciate the input. I find this an excellent tool for furthering flight safety discussions and there are some really positive and great suggestions to my question.

I have been involved in flight safety and lectures for 4 years now and there is never a dull moment. I have learnt from all the replies and will apply them all too. Only trick is to fit them into 20 mins:ok:

It is good to think outside the box and my own airspace!

Much appreciated
Alex

[Ignition Override]

An experienced Texas International Convair 600/640 crew decided to fly VFR from Little Rock (LIT), AR, US, westbound. There was a bit of weather on their route. As to why they were not on an IFR clearance in a Part 121 plane, I have no idea.

These guys were based south of there, in Texas. Many people assume that you find no large hill or small mountain in Arkansas unless you are in northern Arkansas. Little Rock is about in the middle.
Their CV-640 with flight attendants and passengers almost cleared the top of a small mountain, Petit Jean, which is about 50 miles west/southwest of Little Rock. But they all died, about 300 feet below the top of the mountain. This hill is all by itself and is far south of the Ozarks.

Can any old-timers who flew in the early 70s tell me why a crew would choose not to operate IFR?:(
Supposedly the last words on the voice recorder were something like " the minimum enroute altitude is ****". Crunch.

Little Rock Airport is about 256' MSL and Petit Jean goes up to about 1800' MSL or so. LR Air Force Base (LRF) is north of LIT. When I lived in Camden and flew small turboprops, a pilot from not far away (Arkadelphia) described to me the crash, and I had assumed that the hills were all in the northern areas.

[Hobbit]

If you are still looking for information for your talk, I found a quote by a fellow called Endsley. He is a psychologist interested in this kind of thing and produced this gem in 1988:
Situation awareness is "..the perception of the elements of the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status into the near future".
That sums that up then!

[bussy]

If you go to the CAA website you can download CAP737 which is the UK CRM guidelines. From that in one of the Appendices you will find a section that should fill your 20 min slot

[alf5071h]

Hobbitt I think that you are referring to is Dr Mica Endsley. You can download information from ‘her’ website SA Technologies – Publications. (www.satechnologies.com/html/overview.html)

Perhaps more relevant to the request, see the RAeS conference proceedings. (www.raes-hfg.com/)

Niel Krey’s CRM Developers Resources Situation Awareness. (http://s92270093.onlinehome.us/CRM-Devel/resources/crmtopic.htm#sa)

Enhancing Safety through Situation Awareness Integration in training. (http://hosted.nlr.nl/public/hosted-sites/index.html) (web page intermittent)

Effective Thinking. (http://edwdebono.com/course/index.htm)

[paco]

I haven't read the BALPA article (not being a member), but I have questioned the stuff we are supposed to teach more than once. For example, one of the traditional "decision making" models:

G ather all relevant information, using your senses
R eview it
A nalyze alternatives, keeping situational awareness (big picture)
D ecide and Do - make your choice and act on it
E valuate the outcome - be prepared to start all over again

only actually covers decison making in the last two steps - the first three are to do with problem solving, which is something entirely different. You can only make decisons when you have the alternatives.

If, as Mike Jenvey, says, DM is flawed in the first place, due to SA, we could be working on the wrong premise.

Phil

[Cornish Jack]

Notice anything about the replies so far?
They are all concerned with SA while AIRBORNE. To paraphrase an exemplary piece of advice from the best instructional presenter I've come across - "We need SA ALL THE TIME!! We need SA even when we're taxying; THAT'S WHAT WE'RE PAID FOR!!
For simple, but tragic, examples, recall PANAM/KLM in the Canaries or the Shorts at CdG - there are MANY more:uhoh:

[flyingmogul]

What a great forum!

I have noticed the trend of all being airborne, it is the first thought for most pilots when emergencies are dealt with. A very good point to make regarding the Clipper and Pan Am disaster, I've researched and compiled a report on in it in the past and, funnily enough, did not think to tie it in with SA. But I think I'll do just that.

20 Mins will "fly" past very quickly (excuse the pun!)

Thanks all
FM:ok:

[machone]

What ever you do. Keep it simple.
If in a classroom use the classroom.
People will have preconceived ideas, change them.

I.e. set up the room as normal (flip chart etc at the front). But run the talk and explain things from the rear. Those who are aware will turn round; those who are not will continue to face the front.

[paco]

Since one is clocking flight time from chocks off to chocks on, I take it for granted that time on the ground is included.

phil

[shuttlebus]

My favourite example of SA is based on drivng the car. This is maybe something everyone can relate to?

Imagine you are driving along in your car during rush hour traffic in a built-up urban environment. The road has two lanes in each direction with numerous roads to the left and right.

You are in the left lane. The person in front suddenly indicates and brakes to turn left.

If you have no SA, you will run into them.

If you have any SA at all, you will brake behind them.

If you have good SA you will already be aware that they are going to turn left. Their road positioning, loss of speed, etc will have clued you in.

If you have excellent SA, then you will already be aware that they are turning left and wil have a strategy for changing lanes, including being aware of where cars in the right lane are located.

Any comments?

Regards,

Shuttlebus

[SFI145]

I think one of the most important concepts with respect to SA is an appreciation of the terms 'reality' and 'perception'.

[shuttlebus]

Mike,

Thanks for the comments! And Male of course:p

Perhaps I should have summarised my earlier post. The essence of being SA is IMHO being aware of the"knowns" so the the only things affecting a decision are the sudden unexpected "unknowns" i.e. conflicting traffic (air or ground), unexpected weather, requested changes in course etc.

Good SA will reduce the unknowns in the decision set.... if you are really good the solution may just be obvious.

As Paco points out the decision making only comes at the end - SA is based on observation and a continual thought process....

(and you will be in the right lane if the gap was big enough:cool: )

[flyingmogul]

Some more great ideas, I like the one about presenting from the back of the class room! Brilliant

It is a little difficult to identify loss of situational awareness, due to the lack of situational awareness, any tips on how this can be solved, discussed or other??

FM

[jet1104]

So I wold say them, that situational awareness is complex function of ideas when we are trying to now who and where we are now, and what, who and where we want to be in next 10 seconds and having idea where we are going to be in few next minutes. And than I would express real examples when I have been on edge of the limits and several seconds behind the airplane. Because such real examples from my recent experience combined with well known stories from mine recent captains are very useful for me now. (having 6000 hours on 737, 1500 in-command):)

[Keygrip]

Mogul - what's the chances that after all the help the assembled masses gave you for your twenty minute talk......you post the script and/or powerpoint presentation somewhere for all to see, learn from and, just maybe, teach others with in the future?

[flyingmogul]

I'll sure do that!

It's been postponed for 2 weeks, but I did have it all ready.

I'm sitting at Cathay Pacific City, final interview tomorrow, when I'm back home in SA, I'll post the SA briefing!

Thanks for all the inputs from all.

Mogul

[KAFO]

Have a look at www.crm-devel.org

Under the title Tiger Teams, Situational Awareness Management there is a paper written by Dr. Sherry Chappell. It is quite good.

KAFO

[vagabond 47]

[quote=Hobbit]. The difference between surface vessels and aeroplanes is that we in aviation have to keep all that in mind in three dimensions not two. Therein lies the problem.

quote]

NOT TO MENTION THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN GROUND SPEED?

[Centaurus]

A simple but effective test of a pilot's situational awareness can be conducted during type rating training or proficiency training involving various manoeuvres within (say) 25 miles from the departure airport. At an appropriate time, simply freeze the simulator and pointing to the instrument approach chart clipped on the pilot's control column, request the current position of the aircraft with reference only to the RMI needles and DME and not to the MAP mode. It gives considerable food for thought to see the number of pilots who are unable to instantly pin-point their position correctly without the availibility of the MAP mode. Once the aircraft position is ascertained (correct or otherwise) ask the pilot to compare present altitude with MSA for that quadrant and ask if it is safe. It is my experience 30% of pilots tested got confused with sorting out which radial or bearing the aircraft was on.

[flipster]

Great idea Centaurus,
And whilst it is vital to know where you are, it is also very important to know where you are going. I used to use the 'Flipper Cycle' with my studes (who were ab initio Multi Engine pilots) to help encourage them to communicate when PF (or PNF). I think the cycle embodies problem appreciation, decision making, effective communication, leadership and 'teamsmanship' and was designed to help my studes retain SA - as long as they kept it going. If they found it difficult, I emphasised the that the most important aspect is the continual review of the decisions and situation. They seemed to like it and find it helpful! What do you think?

THE ‘FLIPPER CYCLE’ ©

FLIGHT PATH -Where will we be in 10 mins (minimum)?
LEVEL -At What Flight Level/Altitude?
IMPLICATIONS -How will this affect us? (eg Controlled Airspace,ATC restrictions, Terrain, timing, other ac etc)
PROBLEM* -Is there one? If so, define it.
POSSIBILITIES -Check ALL your of the crew for input and discuss all possible solutions.
EXECUTION -Action decided by the Captain/PF (including delegation)

“Questions or suggestions?”

REVIEW -EVERYONE mentally reviews the plan. Concerns voiced early.


GO BACK TO THE START OF THE CYCLE!

* NOTE. If the captain/PF does not perceive a problem, he checks with the crew anyway – they may have spotted something he hasn’t!


Any link with my 'handle' is purely intentional and I have 'copyrighted' it. Please feel free to use the Flipper Cycle but anyone caught not acknowledging the source will be hunted down, stripped naked and abused by my legal enforcers (4 x Swedish netball players (36-24-36) - male or female - your choice!). Once you have been tortured and admitted your intellectual crime, you will asked for a £20 donation to the RAF Benevolent Fund......otherwise, the netball players will leave you alone!!!!!
Flipster:cool: :cool:

[gigi116]

I suggest to discuss an aviation disater where lack of SA conduct to CFIT (e.g. AA965 at Kali -Colombia, year 1995). Can use slides of jeppesen maps and radiocomunications with Powerpoint software.

[SlowDescent]

Hadn't really experienced it till the other day - VOR/DME approach into an airfield in Turkey with lots of terrain and broken cloud close-ish to a high minimum. Both VOR receivers were tuned to the airfield beacon when, at approx 7 miles out the Captain's DME reading was still counting down as normal, while mine started increasing - within about 10 secs got to a reading of 10 miles. Then we started to wonder if we really knew where we were. Considered going around but then went visual. Not an altogether comfortable experience while it lasted.

Might be something to get people thinking about... What do you do if the information isn't consistent?

[Ignition Override]

Slow Descent: even at a major airport (DTW), your ADI might indicate that you are on the glideslope-a few miles before you get to the actual glideslope intercept point...but the HSI repeater might not show it.

Shuttlebus:
Are you assuming that the aircraft has some automation, or that it can have the older technology, and with two or three c0ckpit crewmembers? The subject can become ultra complex.
The twin-turbofans planes which we fly have no map mode-an ADF, 2 VORs and only two pilots, plus altitude hold.

Read up on an incident at Las Vegas (LAS), which involved a highly-automated aircraft, if you can find it. They almost crashed and apparently there were no system malfunctions. It is possible to imagine, especially if partial automation is used. When I went around at LAS years ago in a 757, due to Approach control abruptly squeezing in a B-737 on final, I told the Captain, "let's stay over the valley lights, no matter what vectors they give us, there are no mountains there".There have been many major incidents, due to the lack of understanding newer c0ckpits, and with partial automation engaged.

This type of confusion was supposedly much less common with "classic" aircraft.

[av8boy]

Supposedly the last words on the voice recorder were something like " the minimum enroute altitude is ****". Crunch.



Read it here: http://www.atcmuseum.org/museum/AAR74-04.pdf (http://www.atcmuseum.org/museum/AAR74-04.pdf)

The quote is...


33:40.0: "Minimum en route altitude here is forty-four hund..."

33:42.0 Sound of impact




Dave

[Air Defender]

I realise that as a Military Pilot our ideas of CRM differ a little but a lot of the previous reminded me strongly of Military decision making, well in theory anyway. Boyd's OODA Loop, (Observe, Orientation, Decide, Act), covers a lot of the previous SA decision making from a slightly different angle. You may find it interesting.

http://www.mindsim.com/MindSim/Corporate/OODA.html

[Draven]

Monitoring
Evaluating
Anticipating


In other words Staying ahead of the aircraft. :p

[ssg]

SA: Knowing where you are, and where you are going at all times.

[Genghis the Engineer]

SA: Knowing where you are, and where you are going at all times.
And everybody else in proximity...

G

[Dream Land]

Great thread, my thoughts take me back a couple of days ago on a trip to a high altitude destination (6200ish), my first time there, my focus of attention was centered around the approach, expected gate, single engine maneuver. Well anyway, never considered once that there may be a performance problem on a nice (26C)day. Didn't have to defuel but it was very close (all other destinations at sea level), wasn't doing a very good job on my SA. :\

[flyingmogul]

As can be seen from the previous 2 pages of replies, it is a large subject matter that can be tailored to suit any safety briefing. There are many examples of airlines that have crashed due to low SA, some have pulled finger at the last minute and got away with a cold sweat!

I like the suggestions from some early posts regarding a map with the stud drawing in the aircraft track and altitude changes. The briefing, still on standby, probably next week, is aimed at the very low time, ab initio studs.

For those interested, a saw a great documentary on a New Zealand airline having ILS problems, at night, assuming and eventually fighting there way out to safety. Picture didn't look or feel right, but the continued, most of us have been there. Was an error with the GS fault alerting due to runway work in progress.

Keep the SA flag flying high... I'll post the ppt briefing once completed.

FM

[wheelbarrow]

You're welcome to work something round this:
"Part of the decision-making process, you start with the awareness of a situation, which means having some idea of the big picture (similar to the continual updating mentioned above). Situational awareness here refers to your awareness of all relevant information, past or present, conscious or subconscious, which includes your cultural background (and given all that, it's no wonder people react to situations differently). Of course, you have to know how things should be to recognise what's wrong! You need vigilance and continual alertness, with regard to what may happen on top of what is happening, which is difficult at the end of a long day. Being a pilot, most of the information you will base a decision on comes from your instruments and navigation equipment, but this can be affected by your physical state. Reading the paper on the flight deck is not conducive to situational awareness!"
Phil

I'd go with this one from Paco: it'll put them to sleep and you can say anything at all for the next nineteen minutes, as long as you maintain a nice soothing drone.When you wake them up at the end you have a perfect example of a lack of situational awareness to illustrate how important it is.

[Ignition Override]

And what surprises can cost you too much fuel to be safe?
The other day at a major airport in the New York "area", just east of a long line of weather, a jet's crew had declared an emergency due to their fuel quantity. We were parked on the ramp and watched the rescue vehicles go by.
I would guarantee that neither one of the pilots had less than about five or six years working for the company, and the Captain probably three or four times that many years there, if not many more. And many airports are in the area. Think about it-near New York City. Very congested airspace too, especially with weather.

As a contrast, how do we avoid a situation where you are on approach into an airport, even with weather which is reported good, and unforecast fog comes in from a nearby lake or ocean, i.e. Kalispell, MT, by some large mountains? You don't have enough to climb back over to another airport. A foreign pilot's knowledge of MET forecasting might help you in this case? Maybe, but I doubt it.

Maybe we should first call our Dispatcher and tell him to give us fuel for an alternate, because the destination is remote? Many highly-experienced (each with 20 years+, flying transport category and or tactical planes) crews are reluctant to do this when the latest observation forecast looks good. Some of these airports leave on your own-the control tower is closed, with no current braking action reports (in this case, mostly in winter, definitely have reasonable fuel for a suitable alternate with an operating tower and an ILS approach for the forecast winds. Want to gamble on a VOR or NDB approach to save you?).