'F15 Board of Inquiry Report - Support Group Response

[PPRuNe Radar]

Posted on behalf of Dick Doleman and the Support Group.

As many Ppruners will be well aware, the legal proceedings following the F15 accident have now been ongoing, in one form or another, since 2001. The Ppruners response and support for Flt Lt 'Spot' Williams and his family, during the Court Martial, was absolutely fantastic; it was also a great tonic for all of us who were there with him and it helped to give us hope when things looked bleak. We all hoped that the just result of the 'not guilty' verdict would be the end of the matter for Spot and his family. Unfortunately, this doesn't appear to be the case. We feel this Board of Inquiry has come to the wrong conclusion on the cause of accident and has also unjustly apportioned blame to 'Spot'.

Please read the following report which focuses on 'cause'. If you would like to comment, please bear that in mind. Other threads have plenty of discussion on the semantics of RIS and RAS which are not central to our argument in trying to prove that Board of Inquiry has come to the wrong conclusion. Many thanks for your support.

Dick Doleman

Response to the Board of Inquiry Report. F15 Accident. Cairngorms. 26 March 2001

1. Introduction.

This report has been prepared by the support group that attended the entire Court Martial of the controller concerned in this incident. We speak from the knowledge of hearing all the evidence and we have the full findings of the USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Report dated 15 April 2003. Firstly, we wish to draw your attention to the RAF's decision to release this Board of Inquiry (BoI) report to the press and into the public domain before informing the Air Traffic Controller concerned of their intent; it is a most discourteous to treat an employee in this manner. Secondly, it should be appreciated that the Terms of Reference for a BoI are specific and clearly state that the process is not designed to apportion blame; it is designed to be a process from which lessons can be learnt.

We have now had a chance to read the BoI findings and the comments and recommendations made by higher authority. There can be no objection to the BoI making safety recommendations and we have no wish to demean their work in this regard, however, we take issue with them and the subsequent reporting chain over their conclusion on the likely cause of this tragic accident. We do not believe the cause of this accident was related to any advice passed by the air traffic controller at RAF Leuchars. We remain convinced that this accident was controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), in probable whiteout conditions, while BITE 21 flight (2 x F15 aircraft) was engaged in low flying in Low Flying Area 14 (LFA 14) and possibly trying to regain their pre planned route having been diverted by weather.

2. It is our belief that the BoI has stuck rigidly to the premise that this was a straight line 'Instrument Met Conditions' (IMC) descent into terrain. We dispute this finding. We note that the BoI also had access to the USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report dated 15 April 2003 and all other relevant documentation available to both the original BoI and the General Courts Martial (GCM). There are several areas in the BoI report which are either contradicted by the USAF report or differ from testimony given under oath at the GCM and we shall now cover these points in the order in which they occur in the BoI report.

3. At page 2-3, para 10, the Board states:

At 1314, the formation reported that they were in cloud at FL60.

The USAF report ('Statement of Opinion' page 23) contradicts this statement. They interpreted Bite21 as saying;

'Bite's in the climb to six thousand' and not 'Bite's in cloud at six thousand'.

This seemingly minor point is actually very important, as, at no time did BITE 21 flight ever report to ATC that they were IMC, or, request a change to Radar Advisory Service (RAS); a request that would have indicated a change of flight conditions. Why did the BoI choose to ignore the USAF interpretation of this transmission or not mention that there was another interpretation of what was said?

4. At page 2-5, para 16, the Board states:

A Tornado formation callsign AXIS, that had transited the area at approximately 1235, reported a very low cloud base with severe whiteout condition.

This is not quite the story told to the GCM. Under oath, the member of AXIS formation told the court that the formation had flown in 'loose trail' along the Dee valley and had encountered severe whiteout conditions necessitating a turn-about just east of Braemar; they reported the visibility as good outside of isolated showers. A 1:50,000 ordnance survey map with their route drawn on it was presented to the GCM as an exhibit (we have a copy of that map). This map shows quite clearly that after the turn-about, the formation backtracked the Dee valley to a point where they then continued northward up the Lairig Ghru passing only some 2kms to the west of Ben MacDui and the crash site. There was no mention of further bad weather or deviations from the Dee valley on that leg of the flight. It seems very strange then that at page 2-6, para 22 of the report, the Board says:

The members of AXIS formation could describe their route towards Braemar where they were forced to turn about onto west due to deteriorating weather and can recall a northward transit up the Lairig Ghru before turning east to route to the north of Ben MacDui. However, they were uncertain of their exact route between Braemar and the Lairig Ghru because of poor weather. The Board found that all the eyewitness statements were consistent with a route that could have been followed by the Tornado formation as they routed between Braemar and the Lairig Ghru.

We find this very strange, because AXIS formation had only just come from that direction. The leg between passing the turn towards the Lairig Ghru and Braemar would have taken just over a minute at 420kts. Surely the weather couldn't have changed significantly in that time and, if it was that bad, why turn back towards it? That the crew might have deviated from the Dee valley but couldn't recall how they then got back to the Lairig Ghru seems inconceivable, particularly as such an event wasn?t mentioned at the GCM. This amendment of east-to-west track conveniently places AXIS flight closer to where the eyewitness reported sightings the F15s but only by forgetting how they might have got there. However, the amended track would have meant AXIS formation turning north up Glen Quoich for some 6km before over-flying the first witness at Dubh Ghleann and then turning west and taking a contour-following route to regain the Lairig Ghru somewhere south of Ben McDui; all of this in weather reported by the BoI as very low cloud base and whiteout conditions. We think AXIS formation would have remembered that particular detour, when flying in loose trail ! It is very important to note that none of the eyewitnesses could have seen AXIS formation if they tracked their original route, following the Dee valley, just as the member of AXIS formation had informed the GCM under oath.

5. The next statement made by the BoI is of equal concern. At page 2-6, para 23, they say:

Three of the witnesses were positive that they had seen twin-tailed ac, not Tornado ac. The Board judged that, if they were correct, then the F15c formation would have had to have avoided the imminent collision with terrain indicated by the last radar plot. The Board believed that this would have required an extreme manoeuvre. Such a manoeuvre would have required a sharp climb that would have undoubtedly have split the formation and, probably, have placed the ac back into radar coverage.

We have read this statement many times. It first struck us that the BoI had invented new eyewitnesses but now we believe this to be a very obscure way of trying to say that the eyewitnesses never saw the F15s. The BoI seem to be following their theory that the F15s never deviated from the track recorded by the radar until impact in IMC. In their view, the only place an eyewitness could have seen F15s would have been close to the last radar contact. That theory being correct, then the aircraft would have suddenly become 'Visual Met Conditions' (VMC) beneath cloud, in close proximity to these (hypothetical) eyewitnesses, and then be seen 'in an extreme manoeuvre' to avoid hitting the ground that they (hypothetically) suddenly saw ahead of them; ergo (in the BoI's view), the eyewitnesses never saw F15s. This seems to be a most unusual way of trying to discount 4 eyewitness and their reported positions (which were not disputed) between 5km and 8km to the south east of the crash site.

At page 2-7, para 23, the Board go on to say:

'In conclusion, the Board judged that, despite their certainty that they had seen twin-tailed ac, the eyewitnesses had been mistaken as to the type of the ac, possibly due to a range of factors such as the angle of view, the proximity of the ac to each other, the prevailing light conditions and changes in aspect as the ac flew past while manoeuvring'
This is a very strange conclusion to make, bearing in mind that the F15s were in close formation, while the member of AXIS formation (Tornado aircraft) reported to the GCM that they were flying in 'loose trail'. There is no mention of the important fact that the Tornados landed some 30 minutes prior to the assumed time of crash. While it is conceded that the time of sighting by all the witnesses were approximations, the margin of estimate of time between all the 4 witness groups was small. It should be appreciated that seeing low flying aircraft flying in 'loose trail' would appear to a casual observer as though he were seeing 2, possibly unrelated, aircraft . None of the eyewitnesses reported such a sighting. Concerning the BoI's inference that eyewitnesses were mistaken in their recognition of twin-tailed aircraft, one eyewitness stated under oath at the GCM that he was adamant that the aircraft he had seen were not Tornados; he had seen many of these in his hill walking experience. Moreover, two of the eyewitnesses were directly over-flown, by their estimate of 40yds; even if this was at 250ft, it was a an extremely close sighting of 2 large aircraft in close formation and could hardly be confused with the sighting of a single Tornado (as it would be seen in 'loose trail'). It is very important to understand that these particular eyewitnesses, standing at a spot height position on the eastern side of Dubh Ghleann, first saw the aircraft as they approached them head-on from the south and their first comment to each other, on seeing the aircraft, was about the twin tails. The aircraft then banked over them, turning from a northerly to a westerly heading, presenting the witnesses with a tail-view aspect. Within a matter of seconds the formation over-flew a solo skier from behind, presenting him, also, with a tail-view aspect.

As a result of the BoI report, the Station Commander, RAF Leuchars
comments at Part 3, page2, para4:

'The Board's consideration of the statements of the eyewitnesses had been thorough and provides a reasonable explanation of what they saw; that, despite remaining discrepancies, there was a high probability that the aircraft reported were Axis formation; Dr .........'s credible evidence concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimony offers a satisfactory explanation of the remaining discrepancy over the number of tails on the aircraft observed. I did not find the 'Alternative Cause' put forward by Flt Lt ...... persuasive.

We note the Station Commander has used the phrase 'high probability' in referring to the type of aircraft seen; this seems to suggest that there was also a probability that the eyewitnesses had, indeed, seen the F15s as there were no other aircraft in the area that day.

6. Weather Factors and Situational Awareness.

The USAF report (page 14 Summary of Weather sub para C(1) ) states:

Forecast weather for the route of flight was for scattered to broken cloud layers at 2500ft to 8000ft, enabling VFR flight, even though it is likely that the tops of mountains would be obscured. With the weather as forecasted, some manoeuvring would likely be required to avoid clouds and remain VMC.

At the GCM, the crew-member from AXIS formation reported much the same, with scattered showers moving through the area and localised severe whiteout conditions; he reported that visibility was good outside of the showers. In our recollection, there was no mention at the GCM of a very low cloud base that the BoI says AXIS reported to them in para 4 above. The USAF summary was in accord with the information given to the GCM and it was conceded by the USAF aircrew-witness that at Flight Level 80 , BITE 21 flight would have had unlimited visibility and would likely see up to 5/8th of the surface. The BoIs view is somewhat different and neatly fits their theory of straight line descent into terrain.

The BoI state at page 2 '23 , para 46:

The Board was confident that the formation entered cloud shortly after commencing the descent and, having descended through 4000ft, was in the process of levelling off when they impacted the ground.

In their summary, the BoI state on page 2-23, para 46 :

The leader asked for a descent in a position that would take the formation down towards Ben MacDui but it is not clear if he realised this.

We are very surprised by this statement, the BoI seem to question the navigational skills of the leader of BITE 21 formation . The BoI acknowledge that they were in possession of the same documentation and evidence that was presented at the GCM.

The BoI state at page 2-19, para 45b :

The mission was correctly planned with an adequate level of detail present on the Mission Data Card. The weather forecast was fit for low-level and the formation was correctly booked into LFA 14. A topographical map was found at the crash site and the RAA, at 5700ft for the area, was calculated in accordance with the extant USAF regulations. Overall, the Board assessed the sortie as properly planned and therefore rejected planning as a factor.

At page 2-21, para 45f they state:

However, the Board also believed that if the lead pilot had had a fuller situational awareness, he would have realised that the descent was taking the ac directly towards high ground in the vicinity of a peak standing at 4296ft. The Board, therefore, concluded that the lead pilot's lack of situational awareness was a contributory factor in the accident.

At page 2-27, para 47 sub para c(2) they state:

In this accident, the F-15Cs had adequate navigational means to monitor their position and were aware of their RAA, but nevertheless, the aircrew must have lost situational awareness with regards to the exact position of the high ground that they impacted. The Board believed that, had the pilots had knowledge of the minimum heights that ATC could safely descend them down to and had they known exactly where they were in relation to high ground, then they might not have been so trusting of the ATC instruction to descend to 4000ft. In summary, the Board felt that the practicalities of pilots complying with current regulations were not directly a causal factor in the accident, but nevertheless, identified that it is an issue that should be addresses in order to minimise the risk of pilots accepting potentially unsafe ATC descent instructions.

We are not sure what the BoI actually mean in the last sentence of the above para but they do seem to be contradicting themselves before that in their other statements. They are completely intent on discounting the evidence from weather forecasts and R/T tape transcripts that BITE 21 flight were descending in VMC, in order to satisfy their view of the cause of the accident; this is hardly a balanced view. Let us not forget that the lead pilot was very experienced on the F15, with 1,700 hrs on type, and had previously been an Instructor Pilot and Evaluator Pilot on the same type; he would have had immense experience in determining situational awareness from the navigational aids available.

His sortie was correctly planned, he was weather briefed, he was carrying a Low Level map on which he had marked his RAA of 5700ft (the annotation was made close to Ben MacDui). Additionally, he was on his own navigation following his pre-planned route using INS to his next waypoint (Aviemore. W/P 10) which took the flight very close to Ben MacDui. We suggest that the leader of BITE 21 flight knew exactly where he was and that he was flying in the weather conditions he would have expected from his pre-flight brief. During the stage of flight from top of descent, the flight leader should not have been under a particularly heavy workload and we can see no reason why he should have lost 'situational awareness'. Furthermore, there is no evidence for the BoI to conclude that he lost situational awareness. They simply refuse to accept the possibility that, this immensely experienced pilot, passed his RAA of 5700ft because he was in sight of the surface. The theory put before the GCM by the defence QC was, that as the flight approached the Ben MacDui area, their descent into low level on their pre-planned route using INS was blocked by visible cloud. We see no evidence to contradict this theory. This is completely in accord with the USAF Report page 14, para
7,sub para c (1) which we re-state:

Forecast weather for the route of flight was for scattered to broken cloud layers at 2500ft to 8000ft, enabling VFR flight, even though it is likely that the tops of mountains could be obscured. With the weather as forecasted, some manoeuvring would likely be required to avoid clouds and to remain VMC.

We believe that leader then elected to continue descent avoiding this cloud and entered low level and went below radar cover and out of R/T contact. Whilst in low level flight, the leader was attempting to regain his pre-planned route when BITE 21 impacted terrain in probable whiteout conditions that were prevalent throughout the area. It was while trying to reposition to the planned route that the flight was seen by several very credible eyewitnesses. This theory was put forward by a very experienced Test Pilot who had much low level experience, was current on the Typhoon and had completed an exchange tour on the F15.

[PPRuNe Radar]

7. Board of Inquiry Procedures.

The terms of reference for a BoI state that the process is not to apportion blame. We assume that the Station Commander Leuchars, AOC 3Gp and the CinC are considered to be part of this process. If that is the case, then they we believe they may have exceeded their remit by making the following comments which we construe as apportioning 'blame'. The controller concerned is mentioned by name in parts of both the Station Commander's and CinC.

Station Commander on Cause:

I did not find the arguments over "instructions" wholly germane to the question. I accept that the "instruction" from air traffic to the formation was not an order but it was reasonable to assume that the crews would comply with the "advice" given and doing so placed the aircraft and crews in an unsafe situation. I am therefore content that the Board's determination of the cause of the accident is soundly based. Indeed, I would go further and suggest that the word "potentially" should be deleted from the Cause, as the "instruction" given was clearly unsafe.

Comments by the Air Officer Commanding:

A BOI does not apportion blame and I note that none has been apportioned in this case

and later,

I support the Board's analysis of causes and factors other than finding myself in agreement with the Stn Cdr that the cause of the accident was that the formation accepted an unsafe ATC instruction rather than one that was potentially unsafe.

Comments by Commander in Chief

I am therefore in no doubt that the Air Traffic descent information " BITE 21 descend initially 4000ft on the Portree 29.62" was unsafe, and I agree with my Stn Cdr and AOC 3Gp that the word "potentially" be removed from the Board's Cause for the accident.

8. BoI Conclusions.

We are of the opinion that the BoI conclusion was formed very early on in the process and that a disproportionate credence was afforded to the favourable evidence. Evidence contrary to their conclusion was either discredited or discarded. Their report lacks the balance that would suggest a fair investigation. We cannot understand how the BoI can come to a conclusion as to the most likely cause of this accident without proving the balance of probability. As an example of their approach, they say in their Summary of Causes and Factors at page 2-31 para 49c that one of the contributory factors was:

The Pilot's lack of situational awareness with regards to his position relative to high ground.

This is an assumption, not a fact. Where is the proof to warrant this statement ? It is not in this report.

9. Summary.

We can find no evidence to support the BoI's conclusion that:

This accident occurred because the formation accepted a potentially unsafe ATC instruction and descended without sufficient references to avoid hitting high ground.

Although we can see the BoI's line of enquiry linking the crash site and a very close last radar sighting, it is inexcusable, without an established time of impact, to discount very credible eyewitness reports that demonstrated a very definite flight path and formation flown by the F15s that could not be associated with the Tornados in the area earlier and which had landed some 30 minutes prior to the estimated time of the crash. The compelling evidence, from known weather conditions and tape transcript information suggests that the aircraft descended in VMC conditions; they never reported that they were IMC. In support of their theory, the Board insinuates a lack of professional navigational skills by the flight leader that does not accord with his proven experience and ability. The subsequent eyewitness statements indicate that BITE 21 flight had made a successful transition into LFA 14 before crashing, in probable whiteout conditions, close to Ben MacDui, possibly while trying to regain their pre-planned route. The report by this BoI was sometimes factually incorrect and contrary to evidence in the USAF report or to that given under oath at the GCM. Their investigation lacked balance and failed to provide a satisfactory balance of probability to support their theory as to the cause of the crash. Furthermore, we believe that the higher authority has exceeded the remit given to the BoI procedure, by apportioning blame. This occurred when the actions of the Air Traffic Controller were highlighted as a contributory cause. We shall be lodging an appeal against these findings.


Dick Doleman
GCM Defence Support Group
12 Feb 2006

[SID East]

Well done that man. You have summarized all the points and questions that sprung to mind when I took the time to read the BOI report in full last week. Having followed the CM in detail also.
I do believe that the Board have made the evidence fit the crime – by ignoring the vital evidence by eye witnesses they have made a mockery of their process and report. How the hell can they just do that on the basis of nothing more than it fits their theory?

The whole process stinks, this farcical BOI report is a joke (ignoring the few sound recommendations that were made). As if the "blame-throwing" was not bad enough:

“On 26 Mar 01 2 USAF F-15C ac………”

The day of the crash

"Capt K T Jones USAF, the wingman………. He had qualified as a 2-ship flight lead in Dec 01”

9 months later!

This is the opening section of the report and they didn’t even notice that they were crediting the man with achieving a qualification 9 months after his death! This to me sets the whole basis on which I read the rest of the contents.

I fully support the appeal.

SID

[air pig]

Do I detect another BoI scandel on this as happened with the Chinook crash. Do we see a pattern emerging or am I just being paranoid ????

[Johnwil]

I was an eye witness at the Court Martial. I fully support Dick Doleman in his rejection of parts of the BoI report. I agree with him that the crash scenario put forward by the Board is wrong.

The Board accepts that the eye witnesses were out walking in the southern Cairngorms that day. It accepts that they were where they claimed to be to the south east of Ben MacDui. It accepts that they saw two jet aircraft. The Board does not accept that the jets seen by the eye witnesses were the F-15s that crashed on the east side of Ben MacDui's summit. The Board maintains that the two jets seen by the witnesses were Tornados.

There were three sets of eye witnesses at the GCM. They had no knowledge of each other until reading press reports of the trial. Some of the witnesses made statements to the police before the jets were found. These statements were considered by the GCM and deemed to be compatible with the evidence they had given to the court.

There are several pieces of hard evidence in relation to the eye witness accounts which are at variance with the Board's view that the witnesses did not see the F-15s.

* All of the witnesses stated they had seen two jets flying close to each other. The Tornados were not in close formation but flying in 'loose trail'. I take that to mean there would have been at least 100 yards separating them - much more probably. There is no opitcal illusion that could transform a low level loose trail so that it appeared to be close formation to ground observers.

* The Tornado pilots gave an account of their route from Braemar to the entrance to the Lairig Ghru at the GCM. The path described by the pilots did not go over or near the eye witness positions when they observed the jets. These positions are accepted by the Board.

* The times the three sets of witnesses stated that they saw the jets were all signifiicantly later than the time at which the Tornados were approaching the Lairig Ghru.

* Three eye witnesses were certain they saw twin-tailed jets.

Individually these pieces of evidence are sufficient to discount the Board's crash hypothesis. Taken together they make an overwhelming case against it.

[Flap40]

Has the FL43 been corrected for temperature? If not and the temp at 4000ft was around 0c the then a correction of 290ft is required.

I.e. Altimeter (or encoder in this case) says 4300 (on 1013) and OAT of 0c then actual altitude is 4010ft.

There may not have been any descent in the last 6 seconds.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

Flap40's comments refer to an earlier post by me that has been removed. We now have all the data required from the particular question posed. Many thanks to Flaps40 and all FJ input on the other thread (now closed).

DD

[mike rondot]

You know this, but for others it might be worth restating the obvious:
Re: Altimetry.
I have not read the BOI. I don't know what the temperature was at the time of the crash but I have read SAR reports of temperatures at the crash site being as low as -18ºC, which is ISA -25ºC at 4000ft. Altimeter temperature error is 4ft/1000ft/ºC difference from ISA. This could cause an altimeter set to Regional QNH to overread by 400ft at an indicated 4000ft. I gather the prosecution produced an "expert" to explain the "complicated" altimetry but he overlooked temperature error among other factors and got himself in somthing of a muddle.
Re: Terrain avoidance and ATC "Instructions".
This is very simple. The pilot is always responsible for terrain clearance under RAS or RIS.
ATC is only responsible for terrain clearance when the aircraft is under radar control. This has always been the case as far as I know.

[1in1]

It seems that the eyewitnesses are crucial to the Support Group’s theory as to ‘cause of accident’. It is also very apparent that the BoI has realised this and their findings indicate an unhealthy bias in the use of available information towards their own, seemingly, pre-determined conclusions.

I don’t buy into this new evidence from Axis on the route they followed in the area of the crash site. The news of the crash would have been ‘hot poop’ in the crew-room not long after they had landed. Human nature says that the crews would have discussed how close they had been to the crash site ( it looks to be no more than 1nm!), the route they followed and the weather would have been principal points of discussion. If the weather had been as stated by the witness to the 2nd Board of Inquiry, then the route should have been clearly remembered, particularly if it caused the formation to take a significant re-route to get back to the Lairig Ghru. I would suggest that the bad weather and whiteout conditions mentioned by the crew to the 2nd Board of Inquiry were obviously not around Ben MacDui at the time that Axis flew by on their first account of the event.
I’m sure that such crew-room discussion formed the basis of the evidence that the Axis crewmember gave to the Court Martial; he would have also given the same evidence to the original Board of Inquiry shortly after the accident; no excuses about the Court Martial being a long time after the accident, please. Things now start to get more than a little ‘smelly’.

1) Was the Axis witness to the 2nd Board of Inquiry the same one as at the first Board ? If not, why not ? More than ‘dodgy’ if the 2nd Board has used another crewmember to refute the evidence of the original crewmember.

2) If it was the same witness, was his new evidence admissible? He has now given evidence that is inconsistent with what he said previously at the Court Martial.

3) If the same witness, was he reminded of his original evidence given under oath ?

4) Does ‘not remembering’ a route constitute evidence that should be used by a Board of Inquiry’ to contradict or refute eyewitness accounts given previously under oath at a Court Martial.

5) Was he coerced by the Board of Inquiry to change his statement?

6) Was a route suggested to him by the Board of Inquiry that might have tied in with eyewitness statements?

7) Has perjury been committed?

Personally, I think this Board of Inquiry and it’s findings are on very dodgy ground. Notwithstanding the above, it appears that they have ignored or disregarded relevant material and come to a conclusion that is not based on evidence. I have read the comments made by the Station Commnder, AOC 3gp and the CinC. I am in no doubt that they have apportioned blame, intentionally or otherwise. The controller has already been found not guilty by a Court Martial.

Yet another MOD conspired travesty of justice is in the making !

Could someone give the full sequence of events relating to the eyewitnesses please?

[Pierre Argh]

i'm getting confused (but maybe that's the intention?)... This is very simple. The pilot is always responsible for terrain clearance under RAS or RIS.
ATC is only responsible for terrain clearance when the aircraft is under radar control. Absolutely, and that's still the case despite some tweaking of the regs after this accident... However, I still believe the descent instruction wasn't the wisest instruction a controller has ever given; and would go so far as to say I don't have a problem with it being thought unsafe.
But did that instruction kill the pilots... answer NO, which is why the Court Marshall found Not Guilty... and it is wrong for a BoI to try to blame the controller.

[KENNYR]

Thankyou Dick, a very concise and very welcome break down of the facts.
Perhaps it is time for the Air Force to take a look at how these BoI's are presided over and by whom. This incident and the Chinook incident are eerily alike in the way the board approached its decision.

In my humble opinion the ATC chap is totally blameless with regard to the cause of the accident. Keep up the fight and if there is anything I can do to help (writing to MP's etc) please let me know.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

I have no wish for this thread to be side-tracked into legal argument or the semantics of RIS/RAS but I think it might be time to remind folk of the actual charges levied against Spot at the Court Martial. As you know, he was found NOT GUILTY on all charges. I also enclose some notes taken from the Court Martial which relate both to eyewitnesses and causation.


Charge 1 & 3 (One for each pilot, Lt Col Hyvonen and Capt Jones): Causation
Doing an act in relation to aircraft causing the loss of life to a person contrary to Section 49 of the Air Force Act 1955, in that he, at Royal Air Force Leuchars on the 26th day of March 2001 when on duty as an air traffic controller providing a radar information service and in radio communication with Lt Col Hyvonen USAF, the lead pilot of a formation of two F15C aircraft, having been requested to provide a descent to RAF Leuchars' minimum vectoring altitude, it being his duty, as the aircraft were outside RAF Leuchars' radar vector chart, not to descend the pilot below 6500 ft, said to the Lt Col to descend to 4000ft, which act caused the loss of life of the said Lieutenant Colonel.

Charge 2; Negligence
Negligently performing a duty contrary to Section 29A (b) of the Air Force Act 1955, in that he, at Royal Air Force Leuchars on the 26th day of March 2001 while on duty as an air traffic controller providing a radar information service and in radio communication with Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth John Hyvonen, United States Air Force, the lead pilot of a formation of two F15c aircraft, having been requested to provide a descent to RAF Leuchars minimum vectoring altitude, it being his duty, as the aircraft were outside RAF Leuchars radar vector chart, not to descend the pilot below six thousand and five hundred feet, so negligently performed his said duty as an air traffic controller in that he said to the Lieutenant Colonel to descend to four thousand feet.
The charges against Spot are based on Causation (the most serious) and Negligence. On the Causation Charge (under Section 49 of the RAF Act) Spot is charged on two counts (mirror charges relating to the two individual pilots) of committing an act summarised in the followng phrase from the charge sheet ‘which act caused the loss of life’. It appears that these charges could have included the underlined phrase ‘which act caused the loss of life or is likely to have caused the loss of life”. This was not the case in the charges made against Spot.

Extract from daily summary:
The Defence objected to a Prosecution question that intimated an act that was “likely to have caused” the deaths of the pilots as this was not in the framework of the charges.
The JA ruled in favour of the Defence, stating that the cause of the accident must be a “direct cause”. Furthermore, the cause must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and it must not be a “trifling cause”.

Extract from the daily summary:
The eye-witnesses. Without going into the full detail, of which you all fully aware, Mike Jones QC dealt with very eye-witness account and summarised their evidence to being clear, both in direction, identification of twin tails and that the ac were not Tornados. He could not see any reason for the Crown to discredit the eye-witness evidence.
Crucially, he directed the Board that:
1. Belief of all of the eye-witness statements = AQUITTAL.
2. Belief of only one of the eye-witness statements = AQUITTAL.
3. Any probable belief of even one of the eye-witness statements (or inability to completely discount the witness) = AQUITTAL.
Extract from daily summary:
In getting to the crux of the charges, Mike Jones QC then covered the causation aspect (charges 1 and 3). He said that, if the Board saw no causal link or that if they had any doubt of the link (the link must be more than a slight or trifling link), then this must mean acquittal. He said that charge 2 referred to negligence and, whilst negligence must be a factor in all 3 charges, it was a separate charge under Section 29 of the RAF Act 1955. For negligence to be proven, the Board must be content that "harm" had been caused by Spot’s actions. Mike told the Board that acquittal on charges 1 and 3 may lead to acquittal on charge 2; that said, he also told them that they would be led by the JA in relation to this topic. Mike had raised this point of law in closed session yesterday.
On the question of negligence, Mike directed the Board that they would have to be sure that Spot was criminally responsible for his act and, if they had any doubt, they must acquit. Mike accepted that, if negligence were to be proven, that Spot would have to break his Duty of Care to the pilots, i.e. as set out in the contract of RIS. Duty of Care states that an individual must avoid acts which are likely to injure your neighbour etc. For negligence to be proven, the Board would have to be sure that Spot could have reasonably foreseen the probable consequences of his act (the RT descent to 4000’). Mike was adamant that, in law, this must be viewed at the material time and not with the benefit of hindsight.
He also said that the Board must view the question of negligence from the perspective of an ATCO. It had been suggested by the prosecution that a measure of responsibility rested with the pilot for the accident; Mike refuted this and stated that he was wholly responsible for his terrain separation. He further stated that controllers have no responsibility for terrain clearance while providing RIS. Furthermore, by regulation, pilots are not to descend below their safety altitude without being either visual with the surface or using a Terrain Following Radar ( TFR). He contended that Spot was working on the above basis and was entitled to believe that the pilots would fly in accordance with known UK regulations. This being the case, Spot could not have foreseen the probable consequence of his action in descending the ac to 4000’. This led Mike to the conclusion that, without foreseeability, there can be no question of guilt

I hope the above information will give you all a clearer picture as to why the Support Group take exception to both the latest Board of Inquiry findings and the finger of blame pointed by the senior officers in their comments on the findings.

[drunkenwasp]

Having been the officer that defended the Sgt in the Kosovo BOI, I know how utterly appalling RAF BOIs can be. I feel sometimes that I could write a book on what went on during that BOI. I never believed that I was naive - but I had no idea as to what lengths the Service would go to to apportion blame where they wanted, not where it should have been. The sheer mendacity was simply breathtaking.

Dick, whilst it was a while ago that I was involved in BOIs, let me know if I can be of help.

[KENNYR]

Perhaps BoI's should become the responsibility of an independant review board consisting of Officers and Civilians from all walks of military life, people who can DISPASSIONATELY look at evidence and come to an UNBIASED opinion of events based on testimony of eye witnesses and experts in the field.

For this BoI and the other one involving the Chinook, how could the presiding members reach the decisions that they did? How could they totally ignore, discount and forge the evidence of eye witnesses and radar traces in the way they did, AND GET AWAY WITH IT.

AAAAAAGGGGHHHHH...........The mind boggles and reels with revulsion.

Sorry, got carried away, but I feel so passionately about these particular injustices.:*

[Lima Juliet]

My two-penneth? Yes, the pilots should've known better that 6500ft is a good safety alt in the Grampians. Yes, they should've known that RIS does not offer them any terrain clearance. Yes, they should've known that Min Vectoring Altitude (MVA) is not available in the UK (even though it was mentioned in the FIH (yellow book) at the time).
However, giving out information of "Bite 21 descend 4000ft on the Portree" is unsafe even if it is not a mandatory instruction. Look at the catchall at the front of the then extant JSP318A inferring that a controller has a responsibility to pass safe information. Also, not replying for a request for MVA left the contract requested between the controller and the pilots horribly open.
Who is to blame for all this? Too many to list to single out any individual.
Also, I seriously question the eyewitness business. I have taken a long time to positively VID a Tornado instead of an F15 (well inside 3000ft); I've even watched a wingman shoot an F3 because he thought it was an F15 and he had 3000hrs+ on Lightning, F4 and F3.
So all in all, what's my point? Stop turning this sorry catalogue of errors into some crusade to defend a controller that was having as bad a day as anyone else involved. It won't bring back the pilots and it won't do anything to patch up a deepening distrust (IMHO) that appears to be prevalent between aircrew and ATCOs.
Rant over and out...
LJ

[DICK DOLEMAN]

So all in all, what's my point? Stop turning this sorry catalogue of errors into some crusade to defend a controller that was having as bad a day as anyone else involved. It won't bring back the pilots and it won't do anything to patch up a deepening distrust (IMHO) that appears to be prevalent between aircrew and ATCOs.
I'm sorry you see it that way. The "crusade",as you call it, started when the original charge contained the word 'wilfully'. In my interpretation, that is with 'intent'. I am not defending a controller that was having a "bad day"; I am attacking a system that refuses to acknowledge that there is another view as to how this accident might have occurred and has always seemed hell bent on having a scapegoat. I have no wish to demean the loss of life and all those involved acknowledge that this is the greatest tragedy in this sorry saga.

I hope that your final comment on a "deepening distrust" isn't well founded from the aircrew perspective; I haven't had any evidence of that from my controlling experience; the system relies very heavily on mutual trust for it to work.

[Say Again]

I have been following this case for over four years and have never heard anyone make such a comment. I cannot speak for everyone but most of the comments I have seen or heard from those that have followed this case (some from around the world) seem to concur with the view that what the ATCO did, or did not say, is a red herring, as the aircraft at the time of the crash were established at low level. Therefore it is only right and just to defend him from wrongly apportioned blame.

Methinks you have come to an instant conclusion without fully looking at the facts.

As to your comment on the deepening distrust between pilots and ATCOs, I have done a staw poll of current RAF ATCOs and they are mystified as to your comment. I personally find it very sad.

[Ginseng]

If I may give a personal point of view, based on nearly 25 years of flying experience including many an IMC letdown, both with and without the aid of TFR:

We as aircrew are wholey responsible for our own safety in the first instance. We may seek help from controllers where approriate, but we are under no compulsion to accept blindly any instruction they may give if we consider it to be unsafe. The safety altitude procedures are there for a good reason - the ground nearly always has a Pk of 1. It is not good enough to shift the blame elsewhere when things go wrong.

Ginseng

[Mmmmnice]

The various responsibilities of aviators and ATCOs notwithstanding; the responsibility for keeping track of whether the ground is becoming a bigger threat than everything else, ultimately rests with the Aircraft Captain. You only get older, and perhaps bolder, if the hairs on the back of your neck start to twitch when you are pushing your luck. Personally I find it easier to fly something that can go lower and slower when it starts to get gloopy - unfortunately many do not have that option (but they can usually climb in a quite spectacular fashion) Sorry if I've strayed rather a long way off the thread. but I thought a break from the mud-slinging was in order.

[southside]

This ATCer gets my full support. We all know the rules and fly by the rules. When a CFIT is conducted it is the responsibility of the aircrew. Not the ATCO. If you are flying in cloud and you hit a piece of Scotland then you and only you are responsible. They should have known where they were with regard to the piece of rock and they should have avoided it.

[Ginseng]

Good god, we finally agree on something. I am just off outside to shoot myself!

Regards

Ginseng

[CBrough]

This ATCer gets my full support. We all know the rules and fly by the rules. When a CFIT is conducted it is the responsibility of the aircrew. Not the ATCO. If you are flying in cloud and you hit a piece of Scotland then you and only you are responsible. They should have known where they were with regard to the piece of rock and they should have avoided it.
I utterly agree with you southside:ok: , but another key fact to me is the BOIs ignorance when dealing with eye witnesses' accounts. I can understand some scepticism when noise complaints contain aw my gawd, that plane was just above my chimney that was....etc:} ; however, I believe that most sane-minded individuals can count (1 or 2 tails), or see if the Eagles were in a echelon or arrow formation instead of GR-4 lead trail. Why do the BOI choose to discount such evidence, even though it was accepted by previous procedings???:eek:
Is it not about time that this issue was put to bed and some belated common sense prevailed:ok: ? Those individuals involved could be getting on with their lives if it wasn't for those with a scapegoat-hunting license. I am stunned when I consider what goes through the tiny minds of those so intent on punishing the ATCO, and lets NOT forget any family.:mad:

[Say Again]

I utterly agree with you southside................................... and lets NOT forget any family.:mad:

You agree with Southside and I agree with you (this is getting far too agreeable!) especially your last comment about family. Of course the families who have lost most have been the families of the pilots but let's not forget the two teenagers of Spots who have had almost their entire teenage years messed up by the incompetence of the Blue Mafia!

[Brian Young]

THIS IS A COPY OF THE THREAD THAT I POSTED ON THE ATC SITE BUT I REALISE THAT MOST PEOPLE ARE UPDATING THEMSELVES ON THIS THREAD SO HAVE COPIED IT HERE

With reference to the continuing saga of the two USAF F15s that crashed into Ben Macdhui on 26 Mar 01, and the subsequent exoneration of Flt Lt 'Spot' Williams of all charges laid against him at his Court Martial in Feb 03, some of you probably know that the RAF has only recently published its findings.

It is the contention of the support group to Flt Lt Williams that the recently published findings of the RAF Board of Inquiry are severely flawed in that they attribute cause of the accident to the actions of Flt Lt Williams. For information on this go to www.pprune.org and look for Dick Doleman's statement on Other Aircrew Forums / Military Aircrew. The thread is titled: F15 Board of Inquiry Report - Support Group Response.

Members of the support group have contacted, or are about to contact, their MPs about this. Dick Doleman the support group organiser has asked me to co-ordinate this for him. Should any other member of the profession wish to help in this way, by contacting their MP, would they please contact me so that I can inform them of the issues and the best way of going about it. This is also being done so that the MPs involved know of other MPs being contacted. In the first instance send me a short personal message on the pprune site, if possible with a contact number so that I can phone you.

Brian Young

[endplay]

I'll say from the start that I'm not aircrew but I'm a bit confused over something here. The much maligned Southside seemed to spark a veritable flurry of agreement when he said

"If you are flying in cloud and you hit a piece of Scotland then you and only you are responsible"

This seems to be saying that it was the pilot's fault and no one has disagreed with this sentiment, yet had he posted this on the Chinook thread??

As I say I'm not aircrew, I am RAF and I'm not trolling. Just curious as to what appear to be double standards and happy to be educated.

[Brian Dixon]

Endplay,
I had hoped to stay out of this thread.

With regards the Chinook issue, the BoI had to obey the RAF's own rule that "Only in cases where there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligence. There are many issues surrounding the Chinook accident that raise doubt, (no ADR or CVR for starters!), and therefore negate the apportionment of blame against the pilots. (However, in this instance, the negligence verdict was apportioned by the Reviewing Officers and not the BoI members).

With regards the BoI involving Flt Lt Williams, the RAF's rule in place at the time was (and still is) that no BoI will apportion blame to an individual. Sadly, it would appear that the RAF have, again, chosen to ignore their own rules governing the conduct of a Board of Inquiry.

That, in my book is where the double standards lay.

I wish the campaign to support Flt Lt Williams every success.
Kind regards,
Brian

[Ginseng]

You have asked a valid question, and it deserves a reply.

In the Chinook case, my own opinion is that it is possible that the pilots were "to blame", at least in some measure, but that the evidence available does not prove that that is so, even beyond a reasonable doubt. Much of it is mere speculation, or at least "informaed" speculation based on modelling, after the event, of parameters that cannot be established as factually accurate. Since the pilots are not here to give their version of events, and none was recorded at the time, we should not hold them to have been negligent. They were responsible for their own terrain separation, but why they did not maintain it we are simply not able to say.

In the F-15 case, we likewise do not know for sure why the aircraft crashed. We do not know for sure whether they were in cloud when the en-route clearance was requested, or if they intended to convey this to the controller. The RAF Board and the USAF Board use different interpretations of the voice recording. Even if they were, we do not know for sure whether the pilots achieved VMC before impact or not. Once again, they were responsible for their own terrain clearance, and failed to maintain it for whatever reason. They should not be held negligent, but on the same evidence neither is there any case for the controller to answer.

Regards

Ginseng

[endplay]

Ginseng, Brian Dixon.
Thanks for the replies. The nuances appear subtle but the essence is, as far as I can see, that if you can't prove it don't say it. In the Chinook case that covers it completely. It couldn't be proved so the "judgement" was flawed. It seems that the same rules should aply to the F15's in that we can say with certainty what happened but not with certainty why. Therefore we can't blame the aircrew.

It seems to me that the BoI didn't want such an open verdict so only heard what they wanted to hear. I have a 5 year old grandaughter who applies the same logic. It can be quite cute in her case.

[UKRIO]

I'm fuming. I'm very close to a member of the BOI and I know just how long they took to complete the inquiry. They left no stone unturned and were 100% professional in their deliberations, including keeping an open mind and certainly not setting out to find blame. A BOI does not apportion blame; full stop!
Sadly, the facts were as stated in the BOI. This is nothing like the Chinook BOI and any one who tries to link to 2 is kidding themselves. Yes the Court Martial, coming when it did was a mistake but the BOI is out now and the man still has his life and his job, something that 2 poor F15 pilots do not have. Let's move on and hope that the mistakes are never repeated.

[Ginseng]

No one here suggested that the Chinook and F15 BoIs were "linked", other than by the obvious fact that they both inquired into (different) circumstances in which aircraft had flown into the ground and the aircrew involved had not survived. There was a valid point made, that some of us might be seen as applying a double-standard between the people involved in each case. That point could not be answered without referring to both cases. I don't doubt for a moment that the F15 BoI members did their very best and kept an open mind, as did those involved in the Chinook BoI. Sadly, the remaining similarity between these two inquiries is that the some of later reviewing officers changed the original Boards' interpretation of what could be established as fact. I am sorry that you are fuming, but I don't think that you really have any cause to.

Regards

Ginseng

[DICK DOLEMAN]

I'm fuming. I'm very close to a member of the BOI and I know just how long they took to complete the inquiry. They left no stone unturned and were 100% professional in their deliberations, including keeping an open mind and certainly not setting out to find blame. A BOI does not apportion blame; full stop!

I am genuinely sorry that you are so upset but I would ask you to read the following extracts from the BOI process concerning the issue of blame.

The first extracts are from comments made by the Station Commander:

CAUSE

3. The Board have assessed the available evidence thoroughly and I believe that they have offered a coherent and rational explanation of the events leading to the accident. In particular, I found the evidence of the radar tracks compelling. Moreover, I did not find the arguments over "instructions" wholly germane to the question. I accept that the "instruction" from air traffic to the formation was not an order but it was reasonable to assume that the crews would comply with the "advice" given and doing so placed the aircraft and crews in an unsafe situation. I am therefore content that the Board's determination of the cause of the accident is soundly based. Indeed, I would go further and suggest that the word "potentially" should be deleted from the Cause, as the "instruction" given was clearly unsafe.

I am somewhat confused by the mixing of 'advice' and 'instruction' but, in the next paragraph, the controller is named before the following comments are made:

In particular, I am satisfied that: the accident occurred at the bottom of a straight line descent from FL72: the request to descend to "your min vectoring altitude" and the aircrafts subsequent flightpaths were consistent with the Board's coclusion that the pilots were flying on instruments; the Board's consideration of the statement of the eyewitnesses had been thorough and provides a reasonable explanation of what they saw; that, despite remaining discrepancies, there was a high probability that the aircraft reported were Axis formation; and that Dr*******'s credible evidence concerning the unrelaibility of eyewitness testimony offers a satifactory explanation of the remaining discrepancy over the number of tails on the aircraft observed. I did not find the "Alternative Cause" put forward by Flt Lt ****** persuasive


It seems to me that there is no doubt that the Station Commander refers to a cause of accident (not a probable cause) in determining that the aircraft followed a straight line descent in IMC into the ground . Moreover, he links a "clearly unsafe instruction" to the aforementioned cause and goes on to name the controller concerned. It seems like 'apportioning blame' to me.

The next reporting officer is the AOC and he notes that "A BOI does not apportion blame and I note that none has been apportioned in this case". I concur with him in as much that the BOI itself did dot apportion blame. However, he then goes on to say in para 7:

I support the Board's analysis of causes and factors other than finding myself in agreement with the Stn Cdr that the cause of the accident was that the formation accepted an unsafe ATC instruction rather than one that was[I]potentially[I] unsafe

The final reporting officer is the CinC Strike Command who states:

I am therefore in no doubt that the Air Traffic descent information "BITE21 descend initially 4000ft on the Portree 29.62" was unsafe, and I agree with my Stn Cdr and AOC 3Gp that the word "potentially" be removed from the Board's Cause for the accident

Please note again that 'cause' is used and not 'probable cause'. Between three air ranking officers the words 'advice', instruction' and 'information' are used to describe the actions of the controller. However, in my book, they all apportion blame to the controller concerned and I do consider them to be part of the BOI procedure and not divorced from it.

I attended the entire Court Martial and unlike this BOI, I was very struck by the eyewitness statements. I have yet to receive further documentation from this BOI which will give me the detailed information on how the eyewitnesses could have been so confused as to what they saw and when they saw it. Please don't forget that the original BOI never bothered to interview a single eyewitness; it is hardly surprising that one can become slightly sceptical.

There are two sides to every story.

[UKRIO]

The original BOI didn't have time to interview the eyewitnesses as the Court Martial proceedings halted the inquiry. Once the BOI was reconvened, the original board members were used, with the exception of the President due to Op Telic.
As a result of all of the publicity, they were keenly aware of the sensitivities and did all they could to find doubt in a fellow air trafficker's actions, whilst remaining utterly professional and impartial to the best of their ability. The written report is the result of a lot of soul searching, hard work and anguish. It should not be written off as a white wash and an agenda to lay blame at one person's door.

[Lima Juliet]

UKRIO

I concur with you 100%. :ok:

LJ

[Brian Young]

The original BOI didn't have time to interview the eyewitnesses as the Court Martial proceedings halted the inquiry.
I don't really understand what point you are trying to make. I am no expert on BoI procedure but no matter what processes exist between the BoI and the prosecuting authority for the transfer of the investigation between the two, the net result is that eyewitnesses were not interviewed prior to the Court Martial (they were called by the defence counsel) and the evidence that they supplied at the Court Martial has been discounted by the second BoI. Five individual witnesses from more than one location south east of the crash site gave evidence which consistently supported the defence case, yet the second BoI chose to discredit or ignore the evidence of all five.
As a matter of interest, the USAF also concluded their Accident Investigation Board Report without interviewing any of the known eyewitnesses: a strange parallel.

[Ginseng]

Sorry, but you can hardly expect me to be placated by your use of the words
"didn't have time to interview the eyewitnesses". An inquiry is thorough, or it is not. If the CM intervened, then completion of the inquiry after the CM would surely have included independent interviews with the eye-witnesses, even if the CM had previously thrown doubt on the reliability of their testimony. Yes of course the reliability of eyewitness evidence can be problematic, but it should be considered and judged on its merits. I put it to you that the inquiry could not be complete without hearing the evidence, and discussing whether it reliably shed any light on events.

Regards

Ginseng

[Ginseng]

D**n, you beat me to it by seconds!

Ginseng

[DICK DOLEMAN]

The original BOI didn't have time to interview the eyewitnesses as the Court Martial proceedings halted the inquiry.

You have me baffled with this comment. You obviously have inside knowledge as to how this BOI was conducted and you infer that the original BOI had the intent of interviewing the eyewitnesses. I think the following comments are worthy of consideration; please correct me if I am wrong.

The BOI was in progress but at some stage the process was handed over to the prosecuting authority which led to the decision to hold a Court Martial. I identify that point as sometime shortly after the RAF Police warned the controller that charges might be brought against him. I listened to the entire transcript of the RAF police interview of the controller being read out at the Court Martial; I, amongst many other observers, could not identify a reason for the interview terminating with the controller being warned that they (the RAF Police) had sufficient evidence for charges to be brought against him. It seemed very pre-determined. I assume that the RAF Police, not being expert aviators or air traffic controllers, were not acting independently of the BOI and would have been briefed by the President of the Board prior to the interview taking place. One must assume that the RAF Police would have reported back to the President before a decision was made by him to place the proceedings in the hands of the prosecuting authority who then decided to formulate the serious charges and hold a Court Martial. If my theory is correct, it was not the Court Martial that prevented the interviewing of eyewitnesses, it was the BOI decision to hand over the proceedings to the prosecuting authority before important due process was complete. After all, the eyewitnesses may have determined that no charges should be brought to bear and the importance of this is not just a trifling matter in what should be a fair judicial process. I just can’t imagine a civil case of equivalent magnitude being handed from the police to the CPS without known eyewitnesses being interviewed and I wouldn’t expect the CPS to let such an oversight pass without question; obviously, the RAF prosecuting authority didn’t chose to question the BOI ,or, were not made aware that there were any eyewitnesses. There seemed to be an unseemly haste to bring very serious charges and convene a Court Martial and there has to be an identifiable chain of responsibility in this process somewhere. I note that your first post on this matter included the statement “yes the Court Martial coming when it did was a mistake”. Can you expand upon this ‘mistake’?

[UKRIO]

The BOI did interview the witnesses, once the CM had completed which was well over a year since the accident by this stage. The BOI were as surprised by the CM investigation as anyone and there was little or no interaction between the BOI and the police.
Once the BOI had been reconvened, they had the CM evidence but chose to interview the witnesses themselves in order to gain first-hand accounts.
As for my 'inside knowledge', if refer you to my original post.
As for 'mistake', it is my opinion that the decision to go to CM so early was a mistake. We are still living with that decision and it is hurting a controller as well as the RAF as a whole in a time when we need the support of the public more than ever.

[Johnwil]

Quote: Posted by UKRIO at 12.16 March 4th
" Sadly, the facts were as stated in the BOI."
No, not all the facts are as stated in the BoI report.
On the 26th March 2001 I saw two twin-tailed jets, in close formation, flying towards where I was standing on Carn Allt na Beinne ( 077963). I viewed them in profile as they were only slightly below me. They banked to their left in front of me providing me with a very close view of the under side of the large F-15 wings. They flew away from my position in a westerly direction across the southern shoulder of Beinn Bhreac. The jets were less than 200 feet above the ground. As they disappeared they were flying over snow covered ground just below the cloud. The light conditions were such that it was impossible to be certain where the ground stopped and the cloud started - classic white out conditions.
If the only F-15s in the area at that time ( after 1 pm ) were the ones that crashed then those are the ones that I and my companion saw.
I made a statemant to the police in Braemar on the night of the crash. At this stage the jets were missing but the crash site had not been found. What I have written above is consistent with what I told the police at that time. It is clearly consistent with the site of the crash and with the proximity of the aircraft at the moment of impact. There were three sets of eye witnesses. We were the most easterly pair, we were separated from the others by at least a mile. The three sets of eye witness testimony dovetailed together satisfactorily at the GCM.
The initial hypothesis that the F-15s descended directly from 7,300 feet to impact Ben MacDui near the summit should have been discarded at the latest by the time the eye witness testimony had been rigorously tested at the GCM.
I would like to have seen the psycologist that the Station Commander finds so credible cross examined at the GCM by Michael Jones QC - the defence barrister. I suspect he might not have appeared so convincing after half an hour of Michael Jones's forensic questioning.

[Ginseng]

Your theory is, I hope, wide of the mark as regards the process. The BoI president works on behalf of the convening authority, and would not communicate directly with the Service police or the prosecuting authority. If a decision was taken to proceed to formal proceedings, the inquiry would have to be suspended pending the outcome of those proceedings; the president would have been instructed accordingly. Statements given to the BoI are not themselves directly admissible at CM, so the disciplinary investigation process would start from scratch.

Like you, I think it would have been better to await the completed deliberations of the BoI, and then make any decision on further proceedings in the light of the completed inquiry. A good deal of time and heartache, not to mention money, might have been saved.

Regards

Ginseng

[crashsite]

Chaps, you do make me laugh. People who have skimmed through a document and are expert in very little except writing complete twaddle on a whingers website, giving their 'expert opinion' to each other. Anyhow, if it keeps you happy keep on going. It is the most profound and entertaining case of chinese whispers.... :=

[DICK DOLEMAN]

Thanks Ginseng, nicely explained.

DD

[Ginseng]

You are, of course, entitlrd to your opinion, but if you think this is a whingers website full of complete twaddle, why have you been a registered member for over 2 years?

Regards

Ginseng

[DICK DOLEMAN]

Before it gets buried in the thread, I urge those just joining to read the recent post by the above gentleman, one of the eyewitnesses at the Court martial.

He doesn't mention that, apart from his companion, the next witness was a solo skier in the valley beneath him (2km to the west) who was overflown only a matter of seconds later (approx 15 seconds on speed calculations).

I can fully understand the eyewitness feeling aggrieved at how his testimony has been dismissed by the BOI.

[Brian Young]

.............to this sad affair. It looks like people are really realists after all. No matter that people every so often spout off (out of an inbuilt prejudice) at the bottom of it all they truly are human beings. One person, and one person only that has contributed to this site has witnessed what actually happened. After what he had to say, people have, thankfully, respected the obvious truth. What a glorious silence. Well done everyone. Well done the eyewitness.

[Lima Juliet]

Eyewitnesses can be mistaken (ask any Human Factors expert or psychologist - eyes are about 70% efficient let alone considering any mental processing errors) but the radar evidence looks pretty good to me - the last plot a couple of seconds before impact, in the same axis of direction and the wreckage consistent with 2 jets in close formation (as they would be during a bad weather letdown). Furthermore, from this radar evidence it would be very unlikely that could have achieved the Lairig Ghru without pulling a significant amount of G which would be very dangerous and inconsistent with the bad weather letdown that they were attempting.
From that point of view I am afraid I agree with the Board's "Most likely series of events" that they have come up with and would tend to weight my views on the radar evidence as the Board have. By the way, the radar evidence presented at the GCM had apparenty been misplotted - rather fortunate for the poor old controller (whom IMHO should never have been taken to GCM anyway).
It's just a shame that the ARTF recovery team didn't find a watch or clock of some sort - that would have sorted both sides of the story once and for all. As the radar tapes could have been corrolated with the time of crash.
So after all that I am saying that the eyewitness does not convince me, the radar evidence does.
Soz
LJ

[short&shapeless]

Leon, from what I remember reading during and after the CM I didn't think there was a radar plot to within seconds of impact. I thought that this was an issue in that a straight line descent had been assumed and drawn in because there was no radar track available.

If that is the case then surely the eyewitness becomes more credible than an arbritary line on a display, particularly as there were corrobarating eyewitness accounts.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

There was indeed a radar plot presented to the GCM. The most accurate was the Allanshill radar information which pointed a little to the west of Ben Macdui and not directly at the crash site. A supernumerary member of the BOI had also drawn a line on the map which aligned with the crash site. It was only under questioning by Mike Jones QC that it was admitted that this was not radar derived information but had been drawn because the particular member considered that in, his considerable aircrew experience, it wasn't possible for the F15s to have manoeuvred from their last seen position on radar to the impact point. This was one of the points that the QC referred to as 'fudging' of evidence to fit the case.

Leon refers to a recalculation of the radar data. I see no mention of this in the body text of the BOI report; he must have inside information or it lies in the annexes which we still await and he has access to. Even if new data suggests that the track is now aligned directly with the crash site, it is not proof of how the aircraft crashed. Leon is correct in stating that there was no definitive time of crash; it has always surprised me that no aircrew watches were recovered, that the aircraft had no ADRs or timepieces and that we couldn't get seismology information. Any one of these might have given a vital clue.

Without that clue, we must consider the very convincing eyewitness statements and their positions relative to one another. Furthermore, from top of descent the aircraft never reported that they were IMC and their rate of descent was indicative of a VMC descent (conceded by the USAF witness at the CM). The forecast weather supported a VMC descent (also conceded). As they approached the 'advised' altitude of 4000ft they were still descending at a rate of 2000fpm or greater; yet a further clue that they were visual with the ground and pressing on in to low level. Incidentally, when the aircraft were in their initial descent towards the Leuchars overhead, they flew in trail. It was only when they got VMC beneath that they joined to 'close' formation. They remained in 'close' formation in the subsequent climb and descent; they were still in 'close' formation when seen by all the eyewitnesses and were still in that formation when they crashed. The BOI report makes no mention of the differing formations flown by the F15s (close) and the Tornados (loose trail); is this an oversight or something else hidden in the annexes? The difference in formations is crucial in understanding that the eyewitnesses didn't see Tornados.

I expect we will remain in our two camps of 'probable cause' but, without hard facts, I can't agree with the comments and conclusions of the air ranking officers who have shifted the emphasis from 'probable cause' to 'cause'. I also don't agree with the BOI presenting hypothesis as fact in some parts of their report.

[drunkenwasp]

Eyewitnesses can be mistaken (ask any Human Factors expert or psychologist - eyes are about 70% efficient let alone considering any mental processing errors)

What an arrogant and unsupportable statement that is! If the evidence doesn’t fit what you want then ignore it or change it eh! Or bring out wild generalisations to support a nebulous statement.

Unfortunately, such unacceptable ideals and actions seem to be the norm for BOIs - they were only too obvious in the BOI that I mentioned earlier in which I was involved. Fortunately, as the Controllers 'friend' or adviser or whatever the term was, I was present for most of the evidence gathering and witness statements. At times , I was utterly staggered at the whole proceedings. Evidence was ignored or forced to fit the facts, witnesses were allowed to alter statements etc etc. Thus, when the 1st BOI report was published, it was little more than a fabrication that pointed unequivocally towards the conclusion that best suited the RAF, not the conclusion that was true. Only after our concerted and detailed response, which included the very real threat of further (including legal) action, was the BOI re-convened. Even then, it was a constant battle to get evidence properly reviewed. Ultimately, we were successful but even at the death, the RAF would not fully accept its responsibilities or liabilities.

Dick – was Spot present when the BOI interviewed witnesses or gathered evidence? If needsbe, we can talk 'off-board' so to speak.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

A little harsh on Leon but I understand your frustrations.

Leon has emphasised the unreliability of eyewitnesses generally and his opinions would have more validity if we were judging the statement of one eyewitness alone. In this case, we are not; all the eyewitneses saw twin tailed aircraft flying in close formation and the correlation of their positions supports very credible evidence.

It seems the BOI used a psychologist to cast doubt on the reliability of eyewitnesses in such situations. Did the same psychologist have a view on the BOI using a different member of Axis formation (Tornados) to give a different account of their route to that presented by the original witness at the CM? I would like to hear his opinion as to who would give the more reliable witness statement; the one who gave his statement shortly after the accident or the one who gave his statement some 2 years after the event. It would be cynical of me to suggest that the BOI favoured the latter as it was a means to try and discredit the eyewitness statements.

I assume that this new witness from Axis formation hasn't also changed the account that they were flying in 'loose trail'. My notes from the CM mentions 2nm but this is not from transcript of evidence. Even if we bring this down to 1nm, I reckon they would be trailing in excess of 7 seconds. Could all of the eyewitnesses have been that wrong in confusing this with close formation?

[Sven Sixtoo]

Try counting 7 seconds and think, if you were observing from the ground, would you describe two aircraft passing with that separation as being "in formation"?

Sven

[ExRAFRadar]

Intresting point Sven..

I recall seeing many formations on radar and on radar they looked like a formation. Similar heading, airspeed, altitude. Albeit seperated by lateral distance.

I saw individual a/c in what I knew to be in formation with other a/c but saw no sign of the others except as black dots flitting through some distant valley.

Looking back in all those cases, unless I was aware of miltary procedures and formations I would not have thought the a/c part of the same formation.

[keepin it in trim]

I hesitate to get involved in this but for what it is worth, the conditions in the area during the initial search were such that it was possible to be vmc south of the crash site, running northbound and be unable to tell where the ground started and the sky stopped, and we knew this area very well from the air. The wind at around 4000' was also about 60 kts. The snow in the area, which was quite deep, was completely undisturbed, as it was foot and mouth time and very few people were on the hills. The summit of Ben Macdui was solidly in cloud for 4 days.

Also, interestingly and highly unusually, sar assets were launched by the rcc very rapidly, with the comment that the aircraft had been lost off radar descending to low level, not that ple had been passed with no contact. When asked why a sar launch was considered necessary for aircraft descending into low level, the comment was that leuchars had lost radar with the aircraft passing 4400', northbound, just south of Ben Macdui.

The state and position of the wreckage suggested the aircraft were level or descending at very slow rate at the time of impact, and were in fairly close formation. The wreckage was also unusual in being in large pieces and recognisable from some distance as F15s.

For what it's worth I feel it was wrong to court martial the controller concerned.

But from what I saw those aircraft probably crashed at the end of a straight line descent in close formation and I think the eye witnesses on the ground may have mis-identified the aircraft they saw. There were no people visible during the initial search within several miles of the crash site.

The whole incident was very sad and i think that like many other aircraft accidents it is unlikely that the full facts will ever be known. The above is merely my view based on what I experienced at the time.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

Thanks for your observations. The weather conditions on the day were very changeable and whiteout conditions were prevalent in the area. From the log of events:

1318. Ac last seen on radar
1339. RCC informed
1410 Rescue 137 scrambled from Lossiemouth

From the above and assuming a 20 minute transit for the helicopter, the first time on scene would have been approximately 70 mins after the ac were last seen by radar; remarkably quick but the weather conditions may have been totally different 1 hour before. This is supported by the fact that Axis formation reported transiting up the Lairig Ghru some 2 km west of the crash site without needing to weather abort.

There is nothing new in your comments that alters my views on the credibility of the eyewitness reports. My opinion is that the F15s may have turned up Glen Quoich by mistake; the next valley to the west, Glen Lui, would have been a more obvious choice. For the eyewitnesses to have seen the Tornados would have meant the same route being followed; with twin crew and the equipment advantage of the Tornado, I think this route and scenario most unlikely.

[AGEDMIL]

To those who support the BOI findings - how can you go against the evidence that was tested in court? The decision to prosecute at CM is taken in the knowledge that the prosecution evidence would be challenged fully by the defence, and likewise any evidence submitted by the defence being examined and challenged by the prosecution. The same independent examination of the evidence can not be leveled at the BOI. Why? 1. They are all aircrew for one - why no current controller as a BOI member? 2. The BOI know that the Service have a very particular slant on the whole issue of the accident - and knowing that Stn Cdr, AOC, AOC - in - C were going to make their comment....unbiased and independent - NO.
The RAF Board of Inquiry system has now twice been called into direpute - the Chinook crash, and now the F15 crash. The Secretary of State must now thoroughly review the whole BOI process - independently of the RAF. It is patently obvious that the BOI system is required to be independent and unbiased - and in this case it patently has not been.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

The BOI was not all aircrew; it was comprised as follows:

President: Wg Cdr GD/P
Members: Sqn Ldr (ATC). Flt Lt (ATC)
In Attendance: Sqn Ldr GD/P; Sqn Ldr GD/N; Lt Col USAF Pilot; Psychologist.

[Lima Juliet]

Why is everybody so hung up with the GCM evidence and the BOI evidence? The BOI, which was convened twice, the first had to stop when the Grampian Police started and then when the RAF Prosecuting Authority started bungling along, utilised new evidence and older material - hence they came to different conclusion to the GCM and the part-finished initial BOI.


I would like you all to think of the BOIs (the final finished one and the unfinished initial one) and the GCM as 3 seperate events. Now wouldn't that be unbiased? :ok:


On my understanding the final BOI (the finished one) did some pretty good RADAR interpretation work using a civil outsourced, and totally unbiased, company. The results of which I believe point to a very high possibility of the plots being the final few seconds of the US Airmen's lives; the RADAR data in the GCM, as I understood it from my source that it was in error by a mile or so (a misplotted RADAR head - I believe). Secondly, some altimetry calculations that were also in error in the GCM.


All of these facts are, I believe, in the main text of the Board's final report. Maybe, Mr Doleman you should ask for details on these from the FOI team - if they don't appear in the copy that you have.


I personally still remain unconvinced as to the Larig Ghru routing. To get into low level and fly a circuitous route and then crash at the height, in the formation, at the same point, on the same vector as the final radar picture - seems a little too unlikely. But hey, I'm just as in the dark as anyone else as to what happened and stand to be corrected.


LJ

PS I still can't understand why there is no ADR and RADALT on the F15C, even after this tragic event!!!

[Barndweller]

A slightly stupid question perhaps, from one who has read this thread with care and interest - and no particular initial opinion... Why would it be in the interest of the BOI to lay the blame at the door of an RAF controller rather than the USAF crews. I agree that there does seem to be some odd conclusions drawn, i'm just not sure why that might be the BOI intent? Am i missing something here?
As an aside - i've dodged about in those mountains in bad weather - it was not fun and i could hover. Can't imagine what it's like if the slowest you can go is a few hundred knots.

[green granite]

As a non pilot, non forces person (who has also read this thread & the C.M.
summaries with great interest) perhaps I might be allowed to put this theory
forward in reply to barndwellers question:

No reason other than an atempt to justify the bringing of the Courts Marshall
in the first place.

[Barndweller]

Intersting thought an scarily plausible sadly.

[Pontius Navigator]

Dick Dolman have a look at your PM.

[Brian Young]

Dick Dolman have a look at your PM.

.........that it's Doleman. A Dolman is a Turkish robe open at the front. Oddly enough I have seen Dick wearing such a thing on more than one occasion!

[Brian Young]

.........that it's Doleman. A Dolman is a Turkish robe open at the front. Oddly enough I have seen Dick wearing such a thing on more than one occasion!

Just remembered. It was a dishdash Dick wore (probably still does), not a dolman.

Brian

[FJJP]

I may have missed the reference to it, but before a court matrial takes place, there must be a summary or abstract of evidence. This is usually a mini-inquiry, where witnesses are interviewed and then the DLS decides what charges should be brought and whether or not to proceed with a court.

Has anyone seen the summary or abstract paperwork?

I cannot believe that a CM was started during a BoI. I have never heard of this happening at any time since I joined in the mid-60s. Is this the first time? If so, was it an almighty screw-up? The whole administration of the legal side of this incident, never mind the procedings, stinks to high heaven. It strikes me that the terms 'indecent haste' and 'fall guy' should be seriously considered.

[cazatou]

FJJP

Although it is now more than 10 years since I took Redundancy I think I may be able to provide an insight.

A BOI/ Unit Inquiry is an administrative procedure to investigate and make recommendations following an accident or incident. Evidence is taken on oath so that it can be used in subsequent disciplinary proceedings if these are deemed necessary.

If the BOI uncovers evidence which indicates that a trial (either by Civil Courts or by Courts Martial) may become necessary the Inquiry will be suspended until such time as a decision is reached by DLS. If DLS decides a trial is required then the Inquiry will be held in abeyance until after the trial.

Even if an aquittal is the result of any Court proceedings it is still possible for the BOI to find negligence in regard to the actions of personnel involved.

[FJJP]

cazatou,

I see the point you are making - as happened in this case. However, if during a BoI the president considers that legal procedings may result, he formally warns those involved. Thereafter, the individual is permitted legal representation and can cross-examine witnesses through the president. I would consider it highly unusual [and I have never heard of it happening before], that legal procedings were instigated before the board has reached a conclusion.

The point I make about CM procedings is that a summary or abstract of evidence is FORMALLY conducted before each CM. I merely query in this case why there has been no mention of either throughout this thread. It may well be relevant, considering the mess that both procedings seem to have made of witness evidence.

[drunkenwasp]

cazatou

Not quite - a BOI is indeed an administrative procedure (same for UI) and cannot be used for disciplinary action (in theory). Evidence is taken under oath to ensure accuracy and truth - not for subsequent investigative action. Again referring to the case that I was involved with, the BOI decided at an early stage that criminal action might have taken place (negligence) so, in consultation with the RAF legal services, they halted the BOI and handed the investigation to the police. A RAFP SB investigation took place and they forwarded their report (recommending a prosecution in fact). Fortunately, the legal services (in conjunction, as I recall, with the CPS) decided that there was no case to answer - at which point the BOI re-commenced.

There were a number of contentious issues which, I believe, cross-over into the case in hand. Firstly, the BOI made the decision to call in the RAFP early on in the inquiry - long before any proper or detailed evidence had been presented. The BOI (with the legal services) recommendation was not that the RAFP investigate the whole matter, just the actions of my Sergeant. Thus, by any manner, they were pre-judging the issue.

When the decision was made not to prosecute, the same BOI member were re-instated to continue the investigation - this was wholly unfair because their impartiality was open to question. The rest, as they say is history.

Therefore, from my experience, BOIs can and do pre-empt and recommend police investigation, based on , IMHO, a basic knowledge of the case in hand and at far too early a stage. I must point out, I don't know if this is what happened in the F15 BOI - just that it does happen

[SASless]

I question any system of ATC that allow a controller to issue a descent clearance below a known safe altitude for that location...and not be held liable for the maintenance of clearance from terrain/obstacles.

You can argue RIS/RAS/Radar Control till you are blue in the face but the old saying about "The amount of time and effort you have to spend proving there is no problem only confirms the magnitude of the problem" applies here.

Simply put....if that clearance to 4000 feet had not been given (2500 feet below the minimum safe altitude) (1700 feet below the pilots planned safe altitude)...in all liklihood the flight may not have hit the hill. With absolute certainty....if the clearance had been to go no lower than 6500 feet....the accident would not have occurred.

The 6500 foot altitude was known...it was SOP for Radar Control....what the fecking difference does it make whether the alititude clearance given is part of RIS/RAS or Radar Control?

If this controller's conscience is bothering him....he holds some blame and rightfully so in my book.

Never mind the GCM or BOI, his real penance is knowing the role he did play in this.....and my heart goes out to him. We are all human and we all make mistakes. There were plenty of them made that day by several folks....and since....and before.

It would seem a slight change to the procedures used in the UK could prevent similar lapses in vectors and altitudes. If in radar contact and receiving any level of service....ATC should have the absolute requirement to offer only "SAFE" guidance to include altitudes.

It just defies imagination to believe a system could operate any other way.

If not in radar contact....offer canned safe altitudes that work for the area.

As to the AXIS flight's routing....what USAF/RAF pilot is going to admit he did not know exactly where he was while blasting around Low Level? Everyone takes and extra turn now and then when things start getting a bit dodgy.

Anyone really look up and see a low flying aircraft, do a spotters check, then note the time.....while hiking or skiiing? Third party eyewitnesses are notorious for being inaccurate about details. I would be surprised if at least one of them had not told investigators the aircraft's engine was sputtering as it passed over them.

[Pontius Navigator]

SASLess,
I was trained as a navigator to navigate the aircraft either to the overhead for a QDM approach or to an entry point where the aircraft would be guided in on an ACR7 azimuth only approach with procedural height clearance. TAPs was an unknown word only in the pilot's vocabulary.

Below transition altitude I was not employed as a vertical position consultant either as my altitmeter did not have a sub-scale.

That there was a technique to use an altimeter without a sub-scale for terrain avoidance was never explained and probably beyond the skill of several of our nav instructors at the time (apologies if I am wrong).

A little later, in the real world, we would even do internal radar approaches down to decision at about 500 feet. Even when we were not doing the approach we would monitor the ATC, not least in case of radio failure. Any clearance, en route or terminal was always checked to see that it was safe.

If given a clearance below safety altitude, when IMC, we would not penetrate unless on an approach to an airfield under positive control. The corollary was we would not accept a controlled approach into the ground away from an airfield. While the PK of the ground is 1 the risk is not shared equally.

[SASless]

Two responses that avoid the question...why should an ATC system have no liability for passing unsafe information?

I am well aware of the UK system....have flown there for years....and have done my own radar approaches....and did so on your license...not an American license.

[KENNYR]

I do not think that getting into pi**ing matches will help the situation. Lets concentrate on the facts. The main fact is, irrespective of any advisory instruction given by the controller in question, the crew of the receiving aircraft has the ultimate decision whether to accept the ADVISORY information given or reject it. The crews of the aircraft accepted the information and paid the ultimate price. It surely cannot fall on the controllers head if the crews accepted it.

The point that I find so hard to accept is the Courts Martial unwillingness to accept the eye-witness reports, even though they were quite definite in what they saw.

[Johnwil]

The principal issue is not whether the advice to the F15s to descend to 4,000 feet was acceptable ATC procedure but whether this advice caused or contributed to the crash.
The overwhelming evidence from the GCM was that the ATCOs advice to the F15s to descend to 4,000 feet had no bearing on their crashing. The GCM evidence includes the following points.
* The F15s descended from 7200 feet at a rate of up to 4,000 feet per minute. The prosecution's expert witness from the USAF, Major Scott Chamberlain, accepted that this rate of descent suggested that the pilots could probably see the ground. No experienced pilot would be expected to descend at this rate through cloud when unable to see the ground.
* The three radar plots - from Aberdeen, Allens Hill and Lowther Hill -collectively indicated that the jets were transiting to the west of Ben MacDui's summit. The BOI adviser who analysed the Allens Hill plot, the latest one, could think of no possible manoeuvre that would take the F15s from the last radar position to the crash site. To overcome this obstacle he invented a plot that fitted in with the direct descent hypothesis.
* The RAF Tornados were flying in the area about 45 minutes before the F15s. They decided to perform a 360 degree turn due to the prevailing weather conditions and then to transit the Lairig Ghru. If making a 360 degree turn was appropriate action for the Tornados why should the F15s not have done something similar ? Major Chamberlain accepted this was possible.
* The Tornados were in a two mile trail. All the eye witnesses described the jets as being close together. It is absurd to maintain that the eye witnesses saw Tornados. There are only two credible points of view on this. Either the five witnesses saw low flying F15s or they were collectively lying or deluded.
The definitve summary of the evdence is Michael Jones's concluding statement to the GCM. This can be found in summary on the " F 15 Court Martial updates " thread messages 9 and 10.

[CBrough]

Deliverance: * How does that avoid the question? The fact is a RIS a useful service below SALT. It was a useful reminder that ATC are there to help, but the buck stops with the crew, however unfortunate.

I agree with you. :ok: I have, on many occasions, taken a RIS below safety altitude, but only VMC; I would be foolish to accept such a service IMC. I would never descend IMC with a RIS, and I would never descend below my own safety altitude whilst IMC without first informing the ATC agency of my flight conditions. Then it would be up to me to request a suitable service to permit the sortie to continue, or curtail the mission.

The information passed by the ATC officer is just that!!....INFORMATION. That information could then be used to deconflict with any other traffic in the vicinity, it would not allow me to abstain from my terrain/obstacle clearance responsibility.

Deliverance: * There are so many what ifs in this case. Were they VMC? Did the controller think they were VMC? They were on a RIS.

As for whether they were VMC, we can conclude one fact with a high degree of confidence......they were VMC at some point before CFIT, as per the eye-witness accounts.

from Johnwil: * The Tornados were in a two mile trail. All the eye witnesses described the jets as being close together. It is absurd to maintain that the eye witnesses saw Tornados. There are only two credible points of view on this. Either the five witnesses saw low flying F15s or they were collectively lying or deluded.

Deliverance: * Could they see the ground but not the horizon?

It is quite possible they could see the ground, but not the horizon. We will never know how compelling the visual illusion may have been.

Deliverance: * I for one think they could not have been intentionally flying at low-level, nobody would fly low-level in close formation. As for eye-witnesses, how many noise complainers get the aircraft type correct?

I am sure that 2-mile trail could never be misinterpreted as close formation. :8 However, whilst manoeuvring during a low-level entry, the wingman may have been close enough to be observed as "close formation" whilst giving his leader enough room to navigate freely around the weather without fear of hitting his wingman. I am not familiar with USAF formation SOPs, but it this would appear to be a likely explanation.

I am not privy to statistics of complainers' aircraft recognition abilities however, I'm sure these people would be a little miffed to hear their evidence dismissed based on their ability to count. TWO TAILS…ONE plus ONE is TWO. CLOSE FORMATION….NOT 2 miles from each other. :confused: I am sure they have been questioned on what they observed, and they understand the gravity of the situation. := Give these people SOME credibility. Anything less would credit them with a monkey-like level of intelligence.

[gumbyswa]

The prosecution's expert witness from the USAF, Major Scott Chamberlain, accepted that this rate of descent suggested that the pilots could probably see the ground. No experienced pilot would be expected to descend at this rate through cloud when unable to see the ground.

* The RAF Tornados were flying in the area about 45 minutes before the F15s. They decided to perform a 360 degree turn due to the prevailing weather conditions and then to transit the Lairig Ghru. If making a 360 degree turn was appropriate action for the Tornados why should the F15s not have done something similar ? Major Chamberlain accepted this was possible.
.

Your putting words in my mouth John, I said in answer to the question "could they have seen the ground", I said "that was possible", I also said "it was not probable", additionally, the descent rate "was just fine for the conditions, AND, that they slowed the descent to level at 4000'". Same for the 360 turn and flying willy nilly down low for unknown minutes WITHOUT enough gas to get back to the point with the gas they had on impact. I said anything is possible, like monkeys flying out my butt, but it's not probable.

Please don't take this response wrong, I do not hold Spot chargable, my last comment to him was hoping this whole thing ended and he could get on with his life, evidently not. That is a shame and it is wrong.

So i would like you casual observers to get two things straight, it was not pilot error, and it was not controller error. Thats all I am saying for right now.

How is Spot? Whats his future look like, what can I do to help, oh, i have some info he may want.

Scott Chamberlain, Maj (Ret) USAF
First Officer Southwest Airlines

[gumbyswa]

Has the FL43 been corrected for temperature? If not and the temp at 4000ft was around 0c the then a correction of 290ft is required.
I.e. Altimeter (or encoder in this case) says 4300 (on 1013) and OAT of 0c then actual altitude is 4010ft.
There may not have been any descent in the last 6 seconds.

You are exactly correct sir, this is something that the defence tried to show how poorly the pilots were flying. It is also the same 6 seconds used to show enough time for the manuever to low level. Not. What it does show is that for the last six seconds they were level, like at the time of impact.

[matkat]

You are exactly correct sir, this is something that the defence tried to show how poorly the pilots were flying. It is also the same 6 seconds used to show enough time for the manuever to low level. Not. What it does show is that for the last six seconds they were level, like at the time of impact.
Scott check Your PMs Please
DM

[gumbyswa]

I just completed a cursory review of the BOI report and am concerned it notes in numerous locations a reference to the term "Cloudbreak". Where in any MOD, RAF, ATC, ICAO document is this defined? From my research, it is not a defined procedure nor technique. Does anybody know of it's origin? I think I do but I'll wait for replies. Thanks.

Scott

[BEagle]

I vaguely recall a 'cloudbreak' procedure of about 20-30 years ago. It was a way of descending through overcast cloud to VMC below, but never below Safety Altitude. You called the ATCRU, identification was then established either through SSR or via 'Identification Turns', then you descended as advised to VMC.

A bit Stone Age, but it worked back then..... However, surely it disappeared when RIS/RAS came in?

[nigegilb]

Forgive me for intruding here but I used to be an ATCO at SCATCC (Mil). Cloudbreak was a term used quite frequently. Few cobwebs here but I recall it just meant a pilot wanted a radar service as low as we could take him, til he got VMC below. Remember, the radar heads at an ATC Centre are dotted around the country. I cannot remember if we used a sector safe altitude like you might see on a radar vector chart or the emergency safe altitude. Seem to remember that USAF often used the term.

[gumbyswa]

I vaguely recall a 'cloudbreak' procedure of about 20-30 years ago. It was a way of descending through overcast cloud to VMC below, but never below Safety Altitude. You called the ATCRU, identification was then established either through SSR or via 'Identification Turns', then you descended as advised to VMC.
A bit Stone Age, but it worked back then..... However, surely it disappeared when RIS/RAS came in?

thanks, i think you are correct, it is outdated, undocumented, why then did the BOI reference it and not define it???

[gumbyswa]

Forgive me for intruding here but I used to be an ATCO at SCATCC (Mil). Cloudbreak was a term used quite frequently. Few cobwebs here but I recall it just meant a pilot wanted a radar service as low as we could take him, til he got VMC below. Remember, the radar heads at an ATC Centre are dotted around the country. I cannot remember if we used a sector safe altitude like you might see on a radar vector chart or the emergency safe altitude. Seem to remember that USAF often used the term.

Thanks for the info, i find it interesting you use the word "term", as in it was a defined procedure. The only place I could find it written down was in a USAF document, and then it was not defined.

Any more out there???

[Argus]

'Cloudbreak' was a term in common RN ATC usage at Lossiemouth in the 1960s. Not sure if it was ever defined with precision in any publication, but it was certainly well understood by both aircrew and air traffickers.

It was used to describe a procedure for decent by RN, RAF and USAF (F4s and FIIIs) aircraft into LFAs 14, 15 and, for 2TAF Canberras, Tain Range.

If memory serves me correctly, after a positive radar ident (turn or IFF), ATC issued a decent 'clearance' to a minimum safe quadrantal level based on the safety altitude within 100nm of Lossie and the RPS. I'm fairly certain that the term 'clearance' was used as part of the procedure.

In those days, RAF Canberras based in Germany flew direct to Tain Range, descended either VMC or under limited radar control or advisory service provided by both ‘Highland Radar’ (the GCI radar at RAF Buchan with a chinagraph GEOREF overlay) and ‘Moray Radar’ at Lossiemouth (with an electronically generated one), dropped the ordinance, enjoyed lunch at Lossie and returned to Germany in the afternoon.

In early January 1966, a 2TAF Canberra crashed into mountains west of Inverness whilst on a radar controlled descent into Tain during a ‘white out’ blizzard. Both the pilot and navigator were killed. Because of the weather, the wreckage wasn’t found for three days – and only then by a ground party. Aerial searches were impossible.

I recall that there was always a problem with visiting aircraft descending directly into Tain Range or the then Low Flying Areas 14 and 15 because of the adjoining high terrain. The RN had installed 1960s state of the art radar at Lossie (I think it was the Marconi S264). My recollection is that the radar was as good as it got at that time. On the day of the accident, the Canberra was descending in IMC towards high ground west of Inverness under 'limited radar control' from Moray Radar. The decent clearance was, I think to an altitude below the minimum safe in a perceived expectation that the pilot would report VMC below and proceed VFR to the range. But on the day in question, there were snow blizzards and low cloud. In the prevailing 'white out' conditions (that were known to ATC), VMC below eluded the crew with fatal consequences.

Sounds familiar?

After the accident and subsequent CM of the RN air trafficker, the let down procedure for 2TAF aircraft into Tain was changed to a radar controlled decent for a GCA pickup to Lossie, preferably to runway 23 so that aircraft could let down over the North Sea, overshoot and then proceed VMC across the Moray Firth to the Range.

And a revised procedure was introduced for aircraft working Moray Radar, Moray Approach or Moray Director descending either into the LFAs or recovery to Lossie or Kinloss (including descents into Tain), that without exception, pilots were to be told that if not under positive radar control, they were responsible for terrain clearance, that they were descending towards high ground, that the minimum safe altitude/level was ....ft, and if they were IMC approaching that height/level, they were to climb immediately to the next higher quadrantal level and contact Moray Radar/Approach/Director on .....freq.

I'm not sure what happened to this procedure but it seems to have not survived the passage of time. And neither it seems have the dedicated landlines that in my day used to exist between Lossie, Leuchars and Buchan for handovers etc. Elgin Trunk Sub 4 rings a memory bell, as does the telephone network that each station was connected to via Prestwick.

It might be worth making some enquiries as to why the above process was discontinued; as this might go towards an argument that the Crown had constructive knowledge, and thus a duty of care which it then breached by not maintaining the above arrangements.

[nigegilb]

I used the word "term" to describe cloudbreak because that is exactly what USAF used to ask for. This was in the days of Mildenhall, Lakenheath and Upper Heyford sending hoards of jets to low fly in Scottish LFA's, on hi-lo- hi profiles. I worked at Scottish between 1985-88. We used to limit radar service as they got close to radar heads or close to radar coverage.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

I have gradually been working my way through the various annexes to the main BOI report which we have obtained through the FOI Act.

What I quote now, I find very disturbing. The following are extracts from Annex F to Part 2A (dated 30 APR 04) headed Board's Detailed Response to XXXX (name blanked) QR 1269 (7) Comments.

A question is raised by Spot and his solicitor on BOI findings as to the change of the AXIS formation route given to the Court Martial:


It is noted that XIS formation was “uncertain of their exact route”. Arising from this uncertainty, two routes have now been proffered:

1 Route 1 - The route exhibited by Sqn Ldr XXXXX under oath at Court Martial.

2 Route 2 - The new route that has been provided to the Board.

[/QUOTE]


The Response by the BOI was:

The Board has included the route produced and signed by the 4 members of the formation shortly after the accident rather than the route produced by only one member under the stress of cross-examination


Extraordinary !! I was at the Court Martial. The evidence given under oath by the leader of AXIS formation followed the introduction of a pre-prepared map of their route given as an exhibit. There is absolutely no question that this was drawn under the "stress of cross-examination"

It is now suggested by the re-formed BOI, that a route was produced and signed by the all members of the formation, shortly after the accident, that was totally different to that produced at the Court Martial.

It would seem blindingly obvious that the RAF Prosecutor would have been aware of such vital contadictory evidence, so why was it never challenged at the Court Martial ?

I remain convinced by the eye-witness statements and less convinced by every effort to undermine them. Please bear in mind that Route 2 (above) now conveniently aligns with the previously ignored eye-witnesses.

[green granite]

Did it also say that they were in close formation, and not the trail that was
stated at the court marshall?

[DICK DOLEMAN]

For some reason, the different formations flown by the F15s and the Tornados does not feature at all in the BOI report. Why not ? This is highly significant in both what was seen by eye-witnesses and how the aircraft impacted (very Close formation). The thrust of the entire BOI report (including all annexes) is that there was only one way that this accident occurred.

I can not stand up and categoriacally say exactly what happened in this tragic accident (unlike the BOI). I would guess that the accident occurred in 'whiteout' conditions.....not necessarily in strict IMC as it is an optical illusion. Please read the BOI report in detail and you will find that they often present assumptions as fact in how the F15 crew flew and conducted their descent profile to a straight line impact in IMC despite contrary Met information both from ground and airborne observation.

Without the vital timeline to associate the accident, we will never know what occurred. So where does that leave us ? In my very humble position.... where we should not be pointing the finger of blame........ on either side. Major Scott Chamberlain (USAF Ret'd) is absolutely right.

How strange that the USAF has never done this but the RAF hiearchy continues to do so (please read the comments written by the Air Ranking officers as part of this BOI procedure). I read these comments as attaching blame to the controller involved and being contrary to BOI procedure.

The fact that this very tragic accident occurred very closely after a similar accident in Pristina leads me to assume that certain pressures were applied.......hence the Court Martial that almost everyone seems to concede was completely unjustified. Will the guilty man stand up ??

[green granite]

Dick
It is interesting that the formation flown by the tornados is'nt mentioned,
? deliberately? after all, its one thing to say there was confusion over the
route at the CM, but to say he was confused as to the formation flown
as well would rather stretch credibility I think.

I have indeed read all the higher ups comments and I also waded through
the CM daily reports.

I felt in the published BOI summary, they spent a lot of time, and gave a
very high profile to the fact that the controller had been off sick for 2
weeks, had not been interviewed on his return to check he was ok to work,
plus one or two other minor issues, to what end? I can only assume to
give the reader a certain 'mind set'.

As I said in an earlier post I can only assume that the BOI findings had to
justify the bringing of the CM in the first place. If true that would be a
terrible state of affairs, but that is how it seems to me.

I'm probably totally out of order saying that if you think I am let me know
and I'll edit it out

[gumbyswa]

I still sit here years later and think of how in awe I am for the men and women who were up on that mountain searching in whiteout conditions in the faint hope of finding survivors. I thanked them then, I would like to do it again.

So how did they know were to look, who told them to start looking on that peak?

[gumbyswa]

As I said in an earlier post I can only assume that the BOI findings had to
justify the bringing of the CM in the first place.

Did anyone ask why a CM was started before a BOI?? I know of no pressure to get either one completed. Can BOI info be used in a CM?

[green granite]

Did anyone ask why a CM was started before a BOI?? I know of no pressure to get either one completed. Can BOI info be used in a CM?

The first BOI was stoped when it was decided to start Court Marshall
proceedings, and then reconvened afterwards.

Can BOI info be used in a CM? I'm not certain about the rules of evidence
but I would imagine not directly but I stand to be corrected on that

[gumbyswa]

The first BOI was stoped when it was decided to start Court Marshall
proceedings,

But why??

//////

[DICK DOLEMAN]

Scott,

See Ginsengs explanation at the bottom of page 2.

DD

[Johnwil]

I apologise if I misrepresented your expert testimony to the GCM. My source of information is the daily report written by Dick Doleman et al for the PPRuNe forum. I have not read a transcript of the GCM and only attended the trial when I was appearing before the court as a defence eye-witness.

One extract from this report states in relation to evidence given by you :

" It was elicited from the witness that the descent profile prior to impact indicated the likelihood of a descent in VMC". ( Post for Day 9 ).

I understand this to mean, in layman's terms, that the pilots probably had some visual contact with the ground through broken cloud.

In recording Michael Jones's concluding summary the report states :

" Maj Chamberlain conceded that the rate of descent towards Ben Mc Dui (as put forward by the prosecution ) did not support the prosecution case of a formation descent in IMC straight to the point of impact ". ( Post 9 )

Clearly these extracts are relevant to the argument I put forward in Post 73 on the forum - that Craig Penrice's hypothesis is the only tenable one. I would be grateful if you would correct any factual errors in the extracts I have quoted.

I have not heard mention of the aviation fuel evidence before. If you have any details of the calculations with respect to this matter I would be interested to read them.

I agree totally with your observation that the blame for the crash should not be attributed to pilot or controller error. I have no first hand knowledge of piloting an aircraft or of air traffic control. I can only compare the risks of low level flying at high speed with those that go with mountaineering. Both are activities sometimes carried out at the limits of what is humanly possible. Just occasionally tragic accidents happen to even the most experienced of practitioners. A rock hold may suddenly break or a section of snow unexpectedly give way. Unless all the details of an accident are known with near certainty then facile judgements, such as pinning the blame on pilot or controller error, should never be made.

[gumbyswa]

[QUOTE=Johnwil]
" It was elicited

" Maj Chamberlain conceded that


/QUOTE]

No worries John, I didn't mean to make it sound like I was snapping back at you, stupid internent:) , as for "elicited" and "conceded" I think you will note these were BASED on my answers to very direct questioning and I always said "improbable or unlikely" when answering these same questions. I am pretty sure I never said I concede nor you have elicited a change of heart from me:).

Interesting how years later through the fog of time that some still think I said "they probably were descending visually" when in reality the most I said is "they may have been", it was "a possibility that", but based on the evidence, they were not descending in VMC conditions (closing formation to close position, engine heat on, asking for descent to MVA, you don't do any of these things if your visual).

Now I guess I go into ramble mode,

The gas thing. At the CM, I had a rough compilation of fuel used with associated errors, which I presented and was shot down quickly, good. I had not finalized it and did not have the means to do so while in Scottland. Once I returned to home, it was easy through simulation to determine that the fuel quantities on the guages matched within %1/2 of what simulation showed as a straight line descent into the mountain, flying a low level, even a simple 360 at power would have used in excess about %10 more fuel than tolerances in the system could acount for, ie, they did not fly around low level.

Lastly, how did they (the mountain rescue guys) know where to look? They knew because someone in the USAF told someone in the RAF that an IR signature was created about 8 seconds after the last radar plot at the crash location. Not minutes later as if they would have been flying around, this also did not come out because we did not have this information at the CM.

Bottom line, the aircrew were flying under the impression they could ask for what they asked for, MVA clearance, they did not have this right. Why did they think this? Because they were taught it in training. The training was in error, the publications were in error. That has been fixed. I even believe some of the RAF controller rules were changed shortly after the crash, even before the CM. Why? They were in error??

Is the UK a signator of the ICAO rules/regulations? I think they are, then how come the RIS/RAS thing is not detailed, or at least at the time it was not detailed in the appendixes of the ICAO documents as required of ICAO? Anyone?

Ramble complete.

Spot is not to blame, now lets get him off the hot seat, please.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

I am totally blown away by this statement:

Lastly, how did they (the mountain rescue guys) know where to look? They knew because someone in the USAF told someone in the RAF that an IR signature was created about 8 seconds after the last radar plot at the crash location. Not minutes later as if they would have been flying around, this also did not come out because we did not have this information at the CM.

I have read both the USAF and RAF BOI reports on this accident. There is absolutely no mention of the IR signature to which you refer. The RAF BOI goes into some detail on how they researched for seismological and AWACs evidence to establish a timeline for the accident (with no result). Please bear in mind that the RAF BOI was reconvened after the Court Martial and the IR signature data to which you refer would then have been available to them.

If what you say is true, I would have thought that any report would have simply stated that the Search and Rescue teams were directed to the precise scene of the crash by satellite(?) information revealing an IR signature shortly after loss of radar contact.

I respectfully request that you provide the proof to substantiate your statement. If you cannot do so, I think it must be withdrawn.

[DICK DOLEMAN]

Further to my last post. I have re-read Annex L to the BOI Report, titled 'Search and Rescue Report on the 2 X F15c Accident' and dated 25 Jun 03.

It is a very detailed summary of events and makes no mention of the USAF passing on information about an IR signature. Furthermore, the report makes it very clear that there was considerable confusion as to where the aircraft might have crashed and that the search area was only refined after a replay of the radar data.

[Johnwil]

Thanks for responding quickly to my last post and for the new information concerning fuel calculations and the time at which IF signals from the crash site were detected. More on this later.

I would like to recap the situation as I and others in the Support Group see it. My interpretation of the BOI conclusion in relation to the cause of the crash is this. Irrespective of whether the F15 crew were following correct procedure in descending below their predetermnied safe height the crash would not have happened if the pilots had not received advice from Leuchars ATC to descend to 4,000 feet. It seems probable that had the jury at the CM reached a similar conclusion Spot would have been found guilty on all charges. I consider this conclusion to be wrong. It is unjust that Spot, his family, friends and many well wishers should have to live with this conclusion on the public record. The aim of the Support Group is to correct this injustice.

My overriding reason for rejecting the straight line descent hypothesis is that my companion and I saw two low flying F15s within 200 feet of us. Our evidence to the CM was corroborated by a lone skier two Kms to the west of us and two hill walkers a mile or two west again. There were very few other people walking or skiing in the area on that day. We were the only people in upper Glen Quoich. As chance would have it we were standing on a rocky outcrop at 2,500 feet admiring the winter scene when the jets came into view. We watched them approach then bank to the left in front of us. Like many people I can recall exactly where I was and what I was doing when told of President Kennedy's asassination in 1963. The memory of seeing the F15s is etched on my memory with equal clarity.

It is my firm view that the F15 aircrew descended below their safe flying height because they had decided the conditions looked suitable to carry out the low flying component of their mission and that we saw the jets as they were flying towards the entrance to the Lairig Ghru. It is also my opinion that this view is supported by evidence from the CM. This evidence includes the jets rate of descent from FL80. I accept that you reject this.

As a consequence of holding this view I believe that any calculation which is claimed to rule out this scenario has to be wrong.

In relation to the moutain rescue and infra red data. I spoke to the coordinator of the mountain rescue on the phone on the evening of the crash. He asked to speak to me following a statement I had made to the police in Braemar. I suggested to him that the pilots may have been attempting a transit of the Cairngorms through a pass to the east of Ben MacDui ( Lairig an Laoigh ) and that a possible crash site was near the narrowest part of the pass. He told me there was a rescue team searching near that area. At the time he was coordinating several rescue teams who were located at various parts of the Cairngorm plateau area. At that time he most certainly did not have an exact location near Ben MacDui's summit on which to focus rescue efforts. If IR related location data was available to him it was far from precise. i.e. not accurate to within two miles.

In relation to the fuel calculation I assume it is based on measurements of fuel prior to take off and data of fuel levels recorded on instruments recovered from the crash. I am surprised that it is possible to estimate, from this data, the distance an aircraft has flown to plus or minus 2.5 miles in 500 miles. I am also surprised that the exact route flown by the jets from Lakenheath in Suffolk to Ben MacDui is known to this degree of accuracy. I estimate the Craig Penrice hypothesis involves a loop of between 25 and 30 miles.

John W.

[gumbyswa]

I am totally blown away by this statement:



I have read both the USAF and RAF BOI reports on this accident. There is absolutely no mention of the IR signature to which you refer. The RAF BOI goes into some detail on how they researched for seismological and AWACs evidence to establish a timeline for the accident (with no result). Please bear in mind that the RAF BOI was reconvened after the Court Martial and the IR signature data to which you refer would then have been available to them.

If what you say is true, I would have thought that any report would have simply stated that the Search and Rescue teams were directed to the precise scene of the crash by satellite(?) information revealing an IR signature shortly after loss of radar contact.

I respectfully request that you provide the proof to substantiate your statement. If you cannot do so, I think it must be withdrawn.


As I was, blown away. But it was told to me, by whom I cannot recall. I cannot retract, sorry. This info does in no way change the fact that Spot should not have been culpable.

Oh, and like I said before, the correct questions were apparently not asked.

[gumbyswa]

It seems probable that had the jury at the CM reached a similar conclusion Spot would have been found guilty on all charges. I consider this conclusion to be wrong. It is unjust that Spot, his family, friends and many well wishers should have to live with this conclusion on the public record. The aim of the Support Group is to correct this injustice.
My overriding reason for rejecting the straight line descent hypothesis is that my companion and I saw two low flying F15s within 200 feet of us. Our evidence to the CM was corroborated by a lone skier two Kms to the west of us and two hill walkers a mile or two west again. There were very few other people walking or skiing in the area on that day. We were the only people in upper Glen Quoich. As chance would have it we were standing on a rocky outcrop at 2,500 feet admiring the winter scene when the jets came into view. We watched them approach then bank to the left in front of us. Like many people I can recall exactly where I was and what I was doing when told of President Kennedy's asassination in 1963. The memory of seeing the F15s is etched on my memory with equal clarity.
It is my firm view that the F15 aircrew descended below their safe flying height because they had decided the conditions looked suitable to carry out the low flying component of their mission and that we saw the jets as they were flying towards the entrance to the Lairig Ghru. It is also my opinion that this view is supported by evidence from the CM. This evidence includes the jets rate of descent from FL80. I accept that you reject this.
As a consequence of holding this view I believe that any calculation which is claimed to rule out this scenario has to be wrong.
In relation to the moutain rescue and infra red data. I spoke to the coordinator of the mountain rescue on the phone on the evening of the crash. He asked to speak to me following a statement I had made to the police in Braemar. I suggested to him that the pilots may have been attempting a transit of the Cairngorms through a pass to the east of Ben MacDui ( Lairig an Laoigh ) and that a possible crash site was near the narrowest part of the pass. He told me there was a rescue team searching near that area. At the time he was coordinating several rescue teams who were located at various parts of the Cairngorm plateau area. At that time he most certainly did not have an exact location near Ben MacDui's summit on which to focus rescue efforts. If IR related location data was available to him it was far from precise. i.e. not accurate to within two miles.
In relation to the fuel calculation I assume it is based on measurements of fuel prior to take off and data of fuel levels recorded on instruments recovered from the crash. I am surprised that it is possible to estimate, from this data, the distance an aircraft has flown to plus or minus 2.5 miles in 500 miles. I am also surprised that the exact route flown by the jets from Lakenheath in Suffolk to Ben MacDui is known to this degree of accuracy. I estimate the Craig Penrice hypothesis involves a loop of between 25 and 30 miles.
John W.

John, I am really here to help Spot. I do not mean to throw rocks into the support groups plans, if what i am saying does, i'll stop, but they are the facts as I know them. I am willing to ceed aspects and focus on the one area I know makes a difference, and that is the documentation of the rules as they were, I am now not constrained in arguement as I was while active duty.

That being said, I agree I have no right to say you did not see F-15's.

However, the corrected radar plots, the comm during descent, the formation at impact, the instruments at impact, including fuel level, lead me to only one conclusion, they hit shortly after leveling. As an asside, yes we can be that accurate on fuel, we knew thier starting fuel, taxi time, type of takeoff, climb rate, altitude, time of descent, speed etc. It's all on tape. taking all this into account inlcuiding tolerance of fuel sending units and guages, I have a quantity that exactly matches that found at the site. Adding a minimal low level jaunt adds about 1000 more lbs of fuel used, how do I account for that not being used?

As the defense laywer so deftly stated in question to me, "do you know what the scientific process is" of course, he stated that the hypothesis needed to be tested by trying every means to disprove. Well, the reverse is also true. Einstein still thought E=MC2 was pretty self explanatory, yet it has exceptions to it's rule:)

I would recommend we not get into further discussions of low level flying here, maybe offline. I am still willing to engage in other aspects.

Again, I'm here to help, to be truthful, if thats hurting the cause, please let me know.

Scott

[DICK DOLEMAN]

I think our recent posts seem to be pitting friend on friend and I am probably the most guilty party in taking an unecessarily aggressive stance.

Confusions can easily occur and I apologise to Scott if I have caused any offence in tackling the issues raised as I know he was a true gentleman during the CM and has continued to be so.

Naturally, we have differing opinions in some areas and that will probably continue to be the case.

We (the support group) can only try to fight our particular corner on the facts known (or made known) to us.

[gumbyswa]

Precisely, well said, :) let me know how I can help.

[possel]

The first BOI was stoped when it was decided to start Court Marshall
proceedings, and then reconvened afterwards.

Can BOI info be used in a CM? I'm not certain about the rules of evidence
but I would imagine not directly but I stand to be corrected on that

Having done a good number of legal RAF cases (as an engineer!), I can say with certainty that MAFL states that the proceedings of an inquiry may NOT be used in any legal proceedings.

[gumbyswa]

Having done a good number of legal RAF cases (as an engineer!), I can say with certainty that MAFL states that the proceedings of an inquiry may NOT be used in any legal proceedings.

Pardon but whats a MAFL?

thanks in advance.

[Pontius Navigator]

Had me there for a moment, haven't thought about it as the Manual of Air Force Law (MAFL) for 40 years (when I thought of it at all). It is probably equivalent to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (If I guess right).

It was full of case law and study and an essential part of our promotion system. The early edition was hard bound, as in keeping with legal documents but kept updated with amendments such as "insert the following 3 paragraphs between esential and part above." It was full of marginal notes, stick in notes, extra tabs, pencil cribs etc from countless unknown officers in the past all seeking promtion to flt lt.

Now it is a pristine loose leaf book, same size and format as QRs (which is Queens Regulations (Air Force) and rarely read at all and usually only by the legal eagles.

[possel]

Pardon but whats a MAFL?

thanks in advance.

Sorry - "Manual of Air Force Law"

I once had great pleasure in sending a charge back to P1 as it said "witnesses - see attached Board of Inquiry". This just isn't allowed as you have to hear the best evidence, not the views of someone else's inquiry.

[possel]

Had me there for a moment, haven't thought about it as the Manual of Air Force Law (MAFL) for 40 years (when I thought of it at all). It is probably equivalent to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (If I guess right).

It was full of case law and study and an essential part of our promotion system. The early edition was hard bound, as in keeping with legal documents but kept updated with amendments such as "insert the following 3 paragraphs between esential and part above." It was full of marginal notes, stick in notes, extra tabs, pencil cribs etc from countless unknown officers in the past all seeking promtion to flt lt.

Now it is a pristine loose leaf book, same size and format as QRs (which is Queens Regulations (Air Force) and rarely read at all and usually only by the legal eagles.

It was once hard bound? I thought I was old but...

Perhaps I did more than my fair share of legal work but any sub-ordinate commander had to have one of these on his bookshelf and use it!

[Pontius Navigator]

Possel, on reflection, it was Vol 2 that was hard bound. Vol 1 was loose but they did not re-issue pages but simply cut and paste and that, as I said, was virtually impossible.

It may well have helped give people the benefit of the doubt as no 2 copies would be the same <g>

Also most junior officers in those days were aircraft. Engineers and other FOFL were very thin on the ground compared with 200 odd fofl aircrew on a bomber wing.

[FJJP]

Pontius, IIRC the pubs section used to keep 2 or 3 'CM' editions of MAFL and QRs that were bang up-to-date [and amended correctly!].

[PPRuNe Pop]

With this thread having seemingly run it's course I will shortly unstick it. That does not, of course, mean that you cannot still read it.

PPP