Ryanair spinoff from R+N

[Jambo Buana]

Classjazz,

What do you know about the "fire at STN?"

This incident was caused by a bearing failure which resulted in smokey oil being vented thru the engine. The captain was a highly experienced ex KLM UK pilot and he and his crew handled the emergency with skill and professionalism. The subsequent evacuation which was recommended by the STN fire chief was carried out well within the mandated timeframe. The only point that may be of interest to pilots is that when the chief recommended the evacuation and both start levers were placed to cutoff, COMM box 2 went off due to the a/c now being in SBY power. The chiefs next comment of, "Evacuate port side only" was never heard by the flight deck crew. That is why some pax were redirected into the a/c at the starboard overwing exits by the fire crew. The other overwing exits were surrounded by smoke that was drifting under the fuselage and that is why those exits were not used either.

Nobody was injured and the plane flew again a couple of days later!

Is this not a successful outcome classjazz? It is in my book.

PS The fire chief must have also learnt a valuable lesson too, dont recommend an evac when you are standing just under a door!

[GGV]

jambo b I'm confused by your post. You might want to go back and read classjazz's post again (and the title of the thread). I think you may have misunderstood what he was saying.

[Jambo Buana]

Thanks GGV,
I suppose I am trying to understand from the post why there is any issue regarding the STN fire? How does this particular incident have anything to do with the IAA or Ryanairs attitude?:confused:

[bacardi walla]

Without wanting to drift from the main thread topic, it's interesting that 2 doors were hard to open. Or were the cabin crew not strong enough ?

[Cough]

No APU on landing = no back-up electrical power? Money saving, MEL'd or SOP?

How would an APU help? Evacuate => shut down the APU. So that doesn't help one bit.

My lot prohibits us from starting the APU in flight unless working IAW the QRH or MEL. Not unsafe in my book at all.

[Cough]

So the evac checklist you propose would have the capt select the apu on bus, then chop the engines. Whilst the FO pulls the fire handle for the APU which negates action 1.

Not worthy.

What about a boeing action to make com2 powered for 5 mins on standby power (similar to the No.2 IRS?) would prove a little more worthy than bashing carriers for not starting APU's for approach.

[Cough]

I see...The 737 is quite different. If you shut down the engines with the APU available then the cockpit will go dark. It can even go VERY dark depending on the mod status of the aircraft, because to get full standby power on the ground you have to select the standby power switch => gnd (73 classic - prob not the NG in this case). There is no automatic take up of the load, the busses simply go unpowered.

The evaculation checklist prompts for all power units to be shut down including the APU. So by following SOP's the crew WILL loose VHF2 and there is nothing that can be done. I think that you will agree that given the electrical arcitecture on the 737 (different from your Hawker) then there is nothing to be gained from having the APU operating. This is why I suggested standby pwr for VHF2...

[BOAC]

This is why I suggested standby pwr for VHF2That would certainly be a nice mod, Cough!

This 'event' has been 'nit-picked' too far, IMO! It was an unfortunate combination of events that cannot be planned for - and worked out ok.

IF the crew had had the fire chief on box 1 (NB then no ATC contact)......IF the Fire Chief had uttered the advice BEFORE shut-down........IF he had been 'plugged-in' to the interphone............

You cannot provide for every eventuality in life. There was no fault as far as I can see from RyanAir - this could have happened to any 737 operator.

[Cough]

BOAC - I can't see any fault from Ryanair either. The Standby pwr for VHF2 was just me trying to think a little outside the box...

Sorry Mike Jenvy, but the piece that got my hairs a little on end was the bit in your first post suggesting that by having no APU on landing carriers were trading safety for money. (maybe I read a little too far into your post?) Just on the 737 (being a little too clockwork) it isn't (IMHO) appropriate.

[BOAC]

nope, awareness not nit-picking - sorry, MJ bad choice of word!

As Cough says, Boeing (I think it is) have forbidden the use of the APU in this situation until the a/c has landed, and I suspect it was far from the Captain's mind at that stage to have yet another potential fire source start up.

Regarding radio selection - I'm not sure I could cope with that dilemma as well as everything else:)

IMO the Captain was 'between a rock and a hard place' with line-training and an 'unusual' failure.

[Swedish Steve]

Without wanting to drift from the main thread topic, it's interesting that 2 doors were hard to open. Or were the cabin crew not strong enough ?
I find the B737 doors hard to open normally, They must be harder with a girt bar attached. I think its amazing that they have no power assistance, but then they were certificated in the 60's!

[xetroV]

I find the B737 doors hard to open normally, They must be harder with a girt bar attached. I think its amazing that they have no power assistance, but then they were certificated in the 60's!
Very true. The same comments about the 737 doors being difficult to open in an evacuation can be found in several other accident/incident reports, but the door design apparantly remains unchallenged by the aviation authorities.