Ryanair High Speed approach

[The Southend King]

From Todays Irish Independent..Landing scare pilot 'had marital problems'

A RYANAIR pilot who landed his plane too fast in what an air accident report describes as a "serious incident" told investigators he had marital difficulties at the time and had been suffering from "physiological and psychological fatigue".

The 38-year-old pilot was on his last trip for Ryanair before leaving the company, flying between London's Stansted airport and Skavsta near Stockholm on July 21 last year when the incident occurred as he landed at the Swedish airport.

He had begun his descent to approach the airport too late, and as a result flew the Boeing 737 with 184 passengers and six crew on board "outside normal operator and manufacturer's parameters' as he came in to land.

Despite the mistake, the pilot landed the plane. The pilot said his lack of concentration "was directly attributable to physiological and psychological fatigue", the report said.

"He added that he was having marital difficulties during the previous six months and his family had returned to Australia. He was based in the UK at the time and this separation event played heavily on his mind, affecting his ability to eat and sleep normally."

A Ryanair spokeswoman said they had co-operated fully in the report and agreed with its recommendations which have already been implemented.



the full report can be read HERE (http://www.aaiu.ie/AAIUviewitem.asp?id=6946&lang=ENG&loc=1652)

Sobering reading.

TSK

[G-CPTN]

In the late 60s I believe that airlines would only accept single men for pilot training. Maybe that was just SOME airlines?
I guess that nowadays (!) marriage isn't the commitment that it used to be, but it is still possible to be physiologically and psychologically fatigued by the failure of an emotional relationship, be it a marriage or not. Or maybe the Ryanair pilot was worrying about the cost of the settlement?

[jmc-man]

Sobering reading indeed.

Looking at the FDR trace, at about 2000ft he had 12 decgrees pitch down and a peak vertical speed in excess of 5000fpm.

For a guy under so much " stress", to pull a smooth landing out of that AND stop without use of reversers is an incredible ( if foolhardy) piece of flying. Wonder how hot the tyres were.

Obviously the stress wore off on the turnaround.

[WHBM]

I don't want to detract from the aviation side of this report but we have had exactly the same experience at our company with married personnel coming from our Australian office to the UK with their families, then things breaking up badly and the family returning to Australia, to be followed by the husband.

It seems that the higher European salaries and job opportunities that initially seem attractive are more than outweighed by expensive housing of significantly poorer standard than professionals would have in Australia, and other lifestyle issues as well. Schools, weather, overbearing traffic, crime, everything gets blamed.

[HI'er]

A disgraceful display of unprofessional, dangerous airmanship.

He sideslipped the aircraft, exceeded Vfe by more than 20 knots, landed with only FL10 (instead of the usual Fl30 or FL40), ignored the F/O's callouts, set up a dangerous sink rate close to the ground, made no report ot the ground engineers of having exceeded max flap speed - the list just goes on and on.

There is no place in aviation for an individual displaying this sort of irresponsible, dangerous behaviour.
His licence needs pulling right NOW - permanently! :mad:

[PPRuNe Radar]

I haven't read the report yet (download problems) ... and I might sound a bit harsh ...but was this single crew ?? If not, did the second crew member just sit there and do his crossword ??

:uhoh:

[Doors to Automatic]

No but his numerous call-outs/expressions of concern were ignored.

Add appalling CRM to the list of misdemeanours. I agree his licence should be taken away for ever.

[jmc-man]

Hi'er and Doors,

I couldn't agree more...but the unprofessionalism didn't stop there.

No reporting of the overspeed. No taking himself sick due to stress after such a dangerous display. First Officer who got back in the aircraft with him. No report after an uneventful flight back home. What happened to the concept of a Safety Culture? Or maybe that is an alien concept to this carrier.

[Final 3 Greens]

First Officer who got back in the aircraft with himAs a pax, I am interested in the dilemma facing the FO in a strict command hierarchy.

Presumably the FO was young as well as inexperienced.

How big an ask is it to expect the FO to refuse to fly with the captain on the return leg?

The consequences would have been (a) severe financial impact on the airline, (b) official investigation, (c) possible dismissal of the captain or FO .... and ending of career etc.

In no way am I condoning what happened (which appears to be a disgraceful incident), but working in the human factors area (in another sector), I sometimes wonder how realistic are our expectations of young and inexperienced co-workers asserting themselves over older and more experienced colleagues.

After all, the FO has been trained in a system that acknowledges the capts superior skills (e.g. capt only landings) and if the FO makes his calls and the capt says "its okay, I can do this", then there must be a considerable dilemma and mental turmoil (a) the SOPs say this is wrong, but (b) my captain is experienced and he says he has it under control.... and he achieves a "safe" landing. How safe would a young and inexperienced (and highly replaceable) FO feel putting his neck on the line by walking away?

Add in a business model that mandates very fast turnarounds and tight schedules and that must increase the pressure to conform.

And to make it very clear to any Ryanair lawyers reading this post, I am not suggesting that the business model is inherently unsafe or that is encourages dangerous behaviour, I am just looking at the potential dilemmas facing a young person in a very difficult situation.

[Avman]

So, if nobody filed a report, how did it all come out then?

Although not condoning his actions in any way, I do respect the Captain for his honesty in the investigation. That HAS to be commended.

[michaelknight]

As in all FR -800s there's equipment recording many flight parameters, anything that's out off the ordinary is flagged. There's a chap in STN looking at this. So the captain couldn't hide from the evidence.

Speedy approaches!? Read the report, it wasn't the 'Low Drag' approach technique that caused this incident. Low drag works everyday, 24/7/365.

MK

[Wizofoz]

As for the F/O, it was covered here in some detail that a Ryanair F/O had previously refused to fly after a very emotional and stressful altercation with a captain (in which, being familiar with the story, I consider the Captain was completely in the wrong).

The outcome? F/O was sacked the next day for refusing to fly, subsequent unlawful dissmissal claim settled on the courtroom steps.

Would LHR or any other FR appologists care to speculate what would have happened to this FO if he had refused to get back onto the (Now technically U/S!!) aircraft??

[theWings]

F3G,

Agree with you that this is a real area of concern. When things like this happen (sadly, they always will), one of the responsibilities of the other crew member is to act positively and assertively. We all realise that the inexperienced FO would need to feel very confident if he/she is to, albeit constructively, criticise an experienced captain. But the FO would also need to feel just as confident that the company would back him/her.

I've been in a similar situation and it is horrible right up to the moment that you actually open your mouth and say something and then there is (there was in my case) an amazing outbreak of reason on the flightdeck.

I'm sure this company realises that these capable but inexperienced FOs are the last line of defence against the kind of "physiologically and psychologically" impaired judgement displayed by this captain. It needs to take a very hard look at why this FO didn't speak up during or after the flight.


the Wings

[His dudeness]

Quote:
There is no place in aviation for an individual displaying this sort of irresponsible, dangerous behaviour.
His licence needs pulling right NOW - permanently!


Never made a mistake, HI´er ?



If Wizofoz´s statement is true, NOBODY should wonder about this story.

A climate of fear, created by management lunatics especially, never does any good...

[Col. Walter E. Kurtz]

How many limits and violations have to be exceeded before an FO says "Taking over"?

[36050100]

Is there anything in FR's Ops Manual to prevent the FO making a tech log entry regarding the flap speed exceedence if the Capt wasn't prepared to do it ?

It would have meant he wasn't refusing to fly (at least until the flaps were inspected)............or would FR sack him anyway for not preventing the Capt from doing it ????

[TDK mk2]

I was given a similar scenario on a CRM/MCC course at CTC Dibden in 2000.

Ours was thus: Landing at Bristol in a 737 with flaps limited due to hydralic fault. Captain pilot flying, runway too short with malfunction increment but Captain determined to land anyway with no discussion of alternatives. What to do?

After much deliberation we resolved to make strenuous representations to the Captain to divert but if he would not agree then to back him up on the controls on the landing roll.

This course of action was endorsed by our instructors.

[gliding777]

Forgive me, but the question has to be asked - why did the Capt leave the aircraft in ALT HOLD - surely if he had descended at T/D the whole incident could have been prevented? Having said that I don't know what FR use as descent speed (ECON/something else, whether they leave the FL100 transition in etc) which might have subsequently caused a few problems for him?

[michaelknight]

It looks like the days of the Romanians landing on the grass are coming back or are the back already?

Long days, 3000 hr captains and low houred F/Os combined with destinations with minimal equipment and come one wet and windy winter day, they could make the papers.

Aviation is a reactive business, action is only taken when blood is spilt. 101 check lists and onboard flight data monitoring, I'm not fully convinced that's protection enough from an accident.

Over to LHC......

MK

[Wing Commander Fowler]

saskatoon999 you lose yer bet - taxi speeds ARE incorporated into FR's OFDM!

[HI'er]

Never made a mistake, HI´er ? Plenty. But I've either gone around, or requested some face saving alternative(s) from ATC.
We ALL make mistakes - it's how you recover the situation that shows one's suitability to the profession, isn't it.

The Captain was an asshole - no "If's" no "But's".
He ignored EVERYTHING that is supposed to be evident in an aircraft commander.

RYAN AIR has a reputation of being a company that runs on FEAR, so M. O'L ought to be PROUD that his Captains are now following in His footsteps, by ignoring the callouts of an F/O who is too AFRAID to back up these warnings with POSITIVE ACTION, for FEAR of being bypassed for Command.

You've reaped it M.O'L.
Now you're sewing the fruits of your own seeds!

[unwiseowl]

What pressure were that crew under to make such an extreme attempt at landing, off what any sane pilot would call an unlandable approach? It would seem he was desperate not to go-around. Why? Why didn't he just go-around? What was he worried about?

[jmc-man]

Just to clear up a couple of bits and pieces.

It appears some of you havn't been able to read the report.

The ALT HOLD element is a red herring. The Captain either decided to leave it on, or forgot to descend. There is no way of determining which.

A Visual approach was requested and granted form a long way out. So the Captain went for a straight in.

Normal SOPS would dictate that a series of challenges from the NHP to the HP ( SPEED, HEIGHT etc) that are not responded to should involve the NHP in saying very clearly " I HAVE CONTROL".

No report was filed by either the crew,or the engineers who did the reset in Skavsta or the airline. The incident came to light following the Swedish Authorities getting a copy of the radar printout. The printout is diagram 1 of the report.

In my opinion, the Captains explanation lacks any credibility. Surely after landing, on realising that he had flown the aircraft in excess of the flap limiting speed, had touched down with flaps 10 and about 180 knots , that he should consider whether he was genuinley fit to fly. And even if he decided to let the FO fly the aircraft back rather than strand the passengers, he was on his last flight. So reporting the incident would have had no implications for him anyway, and might have stopped the FO getting in the sh*t.

No, I think it is reasonably clear that this cowboy was almost proud of his achievement, brushed it off as a non-event.. and went on his way. Only when challenged some time later did he realise he " might" have been under stress. Lets face it, he was going home..surely the stress was gone.

[Mac the Knife]

It's interesting that the question of whether the pilot had one glass or wine or two the night before occupies people's minds so much, whereas the fact that he may have had a row with his wife, or his kid might be in hospital, or the IRS might have written him a nasty letter (etc.) somehow doesn't get mentioned.

I'd suggest a lot more incapacitating that being a few picogrammes over the already very low limit.

[SR71]

Normal SOPS would dictate that a series of challenges from the NHP to the HP ( SPEED, HEIGHT etc) that are not responded to should involve the NHP in saying very clearly " I HAVE CONTROL".


I've always wondered how this works?

A pilot who is obviously in the zone (for whatever reason) and who continues to fly with scant regard for operational or procedural considerations is expected to relinquish control just because you say:

"I have control!"?

If he doesn't, what do you do?

Punch him on the nose?

Whilst IMHO this particular aviators actions are indefensible, its the classic victimless crime. No "What ifs?", no "Buts?"

Like speeding. I'm sure all those who are quick to point the finger are also in favour of revocation of your driving license on initial conviction?

The aircraft is quite capable of landing clean at 210kts - if for instance you had a failure that warranted it and the performance allowed.

However, amongst others, having significantly exceeded a limitation, done enough to provoke a GPWS warning, alienated his fellow pilot (and scared him as well perhaps?) then been subsequently "well enough" to fly home...hmmmm....I'm thinking along the lines of jmc-man.

Nevertheless the authorities make only four safety recommendations?

[FS-chick]

What pressure were that crew under to make such an extreme attempt at landing, off what any sane pilot would call an unlandable approach? It would seem he was desperate not to go-around. Why? Why didn't he just go-around? What was he worried about?

Hey this is Ryanair, time is money.
Go arround is a waste of money.
Live on the edge, fly fast.
Dont charge mobile phones at work.
Poor guys. :yuk:

[Riverboat]

Amongst many issues, three things stand out. Firstly, as I understand it, there is "pressure" in Ryanair, and it affects their whole operation: pressure on airports (50p a pax etc), pressure on ground staff, pressure on flight crew, and especially pilots. This is the sort of "commercial pressure" always frowned non in the past. It was labelled a "bad thing". (In fact I accept that an element of commercial pressure brings the best out of us all, but there is a limit.)

Secondly, there is a view, probably held by the accountants running so many companies, that flying a go-around is another bad thing. Absolute rubbish, of course, as going around when one hasn't got things quite right, is a sound and sensible and honourable thing to do, and really the pilot should be congratulated on the decision, not scorned.

Thirdly, the FO probably didn't abandon the aircraft because it was his leg going home, and he knew he'd do a better job of it than the Captain. I can't blame the FO for continuing, and if the flap speed was exceeded by 10 kts, well, I've seen a lot worse. Not good enough, I agree, but taking everything into account (and not worrying about my job) I think I'd have flown back with the aircraft and that captain. At the same time, if the FO had refused to fly back with that Captain, he'd have been in the right.

[the grim repa]

riverboat,he may well have been right.

let me tell you a tale of an excellent female ryanair co-pilot who refused to return on a flight with a management captain,who was in her mind acting unsafely and it has been acknowledged abused her while on approach to pik.the guy was known to be an abuser of his position and young co-pilots.the flight was delayed due to unavailability of crew.what was the outcome.
a full enquiry?
plethora of safety notices?
ammendment of training practices?
barrage of crm training?

you got it buddy,SHE WAS FIRED!

that is the position in which this young lad found himself,great whack of a training loan,just payed for his rating.was he going to risk his job?

this young co-pilot is a good operator and a nice guy.

marital problems my ass!tell the truth,that report is a complete fudge.

[arewenearlythereyet?]

Thirdly, the FO probably didn't abandon the aircraft because it was his leg going home, and he knew he'd do a better job of it than the Captain.Don't think so. This Captain then decided that he'd take the last leg home as PF too. See page 3 of the final report:The last flight of the PF for the Operator was the return leg to Stansted, which he also flew as PF. The PNF recalled that this was a normal flight which complied with the Operators Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), including a Flaps 30 landing at Stansted.

[Bigmouth]

Manufacturers spend fortunes providing their aircraft with sophisticated and reliable back up systems, in case of malfunctions with the primary system. This is one reason why modern aircraft are as safe as they are.
And all this time and effort and expense may be negated by the authorities and the ignorant flying public permitting the most important back up, the one in the right cockpit seat, to be nothing more than a warm body.

[the grim repa]

farrell - the dogs on the street know the truth.i have as much evidence as he has of marital problems and "physiological and psychological stress".why did it take nearly one year for this bozo to fess up to his crime.leaving the young co-pilot in the dock.some leader of men,eh!
somethings it is better for the public not to know(i.e. the truth).
would it have taken fatalities for the truth to come out?we all make mistakes,but it is becoming too much of a regular occurence here.
why did he not call in sick,because the culture within fr is that if you are in the top five sick day takers,you are hauled over the coals at a disciplinary meeting.
fill the seats as cheaply as possible,including the two up the front.

[Clandestino]

I was given a similar scenario on a CRM/MCC course at CTC Dibden in 2000.

Ours was thus: Landing at Bristol in a 737 with flaps limited due to hydralic fault. Captain pilot flying, runway too short with malfunction increment but Captain determined to land anyway with no discussion of alternatives. What to do?

After much deliberation we resolved to make strenuous representations to the Captain to divert but if he would not agree then to back him up on the controls on the landing roll.

This course of action was endorsed by our instructors.


Errrrr.... was that runway shorter than 1.67 ALD or 1 ALD? I' m talking about ALD with malfunction increments. Sadly, there's gray area between 1.67/1.43 and 1 ALD but landing below 1 ALD is plainly illegal (and stoooopid) and if something nasty happened, insurance company could refuse to pay the damages or, more likely, pay but increase premiums severly. Not to mention that the licences of pilots involved would pay a visit to document shredder.
What can you do by backing your CPT up on controls on landing roll? Pull out the drag chute maybe? If the guy has made fast landing he's probably using maximum braking and reverse and there's nothing you can do to make the plane stop quicker.
What your CRM instructors endorsed was flying in unsafe manner and hoping for the best; not getting caught nor bending the machine. I know that there's school of thought that advocates that it's beter to have one pilot in control of the aircraft than two fighting over it, but just think what would have happened if Schreuder simply cut engines to idle after van Zaanten set them to take-off power. He might have get sacked by KLM the next day, but at least he'd live to see the next day and not just next thirty seconds.

[Leo Hairy-Camel]

That this was a very serious incident indeed is not subject to discussion, but what I find unspeakably repellent is the boundless glee with which certain sticky-fingered individuals fall over themselves in attempting to point out that this event is somehow immutable evidence that Ryanair is inherently unsafe. It is nothing of the sort, as can be learned with an examination of the cause of the incident as determined by the AAIU Field Investigation.

(b) Cause
This serious incident was precipitated by the temporary aberrant behaviour of the PF in disregarding the Operator’s SOP’s/CRM requirements and compounded by the inability of the PNF to counteract this behaviour in the unusual circumstances of the approach to Skavsta.

This individual, for whatever reason, departed from SOP’s and the requirements of CRM. The results are now documented and on the public record. What precipitated this “temporary aberrant behaviour”, though, make for an interesting Human Factors examination. A contention may very well be advanced that there is something associated with flying 900 hours per year, or more specifically limiting, 100 every 28 days as we at Ryanair are compelled to do, is in and of itself, a Human Factors issue. Having adapted to it over the years, I don’t think so. It’s odd, don’t you think, that the vast majority of Ryanair pilots seem to manage without adverse incident? Odder still, that the investigation casts a pall over this individual captain, and not any inherent weakness or deficiency in Ryanair SOP’s or CRM.

I usually find it more peptic to ignore the histrionics of Dim Repa, but even by his usually low standard of propriety, he’s sunk to a new depth of scurrilous dribble.
this mutt of a captain had been on the piss for three days to celebrate his departure back to oz and was shagging some hostie in stn.marital problems my ass!tell the truth,that report is a complete fudge. Once again, Didimus, you radiate inadequacy because, once again, the evidence fails to adequately support your agenda that Ryanair is institutionally unsafe. I’ve noted, with tedium, that you’ve made your signature whirlwind visit, excreting diatribe from every orifice, as is your custom every time Ryanair makes it into the news, and on every occasion you resort to hearsay and innuendo in support of your claims because they are consistently at variance with the facts. Lets say, for the sake of argument, your offensive prattle about this captains social activities preceding his departure are true. How is that that an experienced professional feels compelled to present for his last day of work, having resigned, in an unfit state? If ever there was a time to take a sickie, surely this would be it? Is this a Ryanair related problem, or an individually explicit one?

Ryanair SOP’s call for a go-round if an approach in unstabilised at 1000’ in the case of IMC, or 500’ in VMC. Its digital; stabilised means land, unstabilised means go-round. The company has a non-punitive policy for all go-rounds and in the event they take place above 500’, no supporting paperwork is required. These are facts, Dim Repa, and yet our man decided to ignore SOP’s. No commercial pressure at work here, Didimus, personal choice. Sounds very much to me like intentional non-compliance, or perhaps some form of subtle incapacitation. Once again, is this a Ryanair related area of deficiency or an individually explicit one? Perhaps there is much for all industry professionals to learn from the Human Factors aspects of this incident, or perhaps it was as the investigation found. Much more interesting is the examination of how this man embellished his story from the initial post incident interview with our Chief Pilot to the version given to the investigator. Could it be that after consultation with our would-be champions at IALPA, he was ‘carefully guided’ to divert as much of his personal responsibility away as possible? Could it be that Evan Cullen saw this as yet another glistening opportunity to hoist the black ensign over Ryanair? You might very well think so, Dim Repa, but I couldn’t possibly comment.

One of the things that identifies Ryanair as unique in our industry is the implicit level of trust invested in aircrew in general, and captains in particular. Had we the bloated, gargantuan management structure of British Airways, world’s second favourite airline, then perhaps some sort of additional oversight would be possible, but as it stands captains at Ryanair have an enormous responsibility, both professional and personal. The simple fact is, some individuals are, for whatever reason, unsuited to this responsibility. Ryanair has in place a number of checks and balances far exceeding industry standard, to ensure our people are the best trained, best paid and best motivated. Our business model is predicated on it, and our expansion plans depend on it. The offensive, inaccurate and highly subjective doggerel offered by the likes of Dim Repa every time Ryanair appears on the radar of the tabloid press is indicative of many things, perhaps, but least of all that Ryanair is an unsafe airline. Dim Repa and others so cravenly committed to ad-hoc muck spreading would do well to realise that minds are always at their most inventive when fleeing from the truth.

[the grim repa]

we well know who is fleeing from the truth.where is the evidence of marital stress and "physiological and psychological stress.you are wrong and you know that you are.you can try to convince yourself with your idiotic bleatings and big words,doesn't work on the pro's little boy.i suspect we will be revisiting related topics in the near future.

[Wizofoz]

Leo,

True to form you have made a reply long on bandwidth, whilst happily dodging any question you don't like.

I made the specific query of you asking, in light of the experience of the FO who was sacked for refusing to fly in what she considered an unsafe situation, what the FO in this case could have expected had he grounded the flight either because he considered the Captain unfit or the aircraft US?

[Sector 7G]

Happily, the FO who was dismissed is now flying for the worlds favourite airline, where she is safe in the knowledge that BA operate a no blame culture and reporting of such incidents is encouraged.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Ryanair has in place a number of checks and balances far exceeding industry standard, to ensure our people are the best trained, best paid and best motivated.

They did hire this Captain, did they not?

[Wing Commander Fowler]

Yes manadsystem they did! Just like BA employed all those pissheads as did virgin et al! The list of cock ups made by employees in companies is unending! For christs sake I don't think FR are perfect but give them a break here NO-ONE IS PERFECT NOT EVEN YOU!!! That's not meant as a personal insult by the way but let's be fair here eh lads? FR employed a guy here who for the majority of his time was, I believe, a profesional individual who got the job done. One day he flipped. Had it NOT been his last day working from them I can absolutely promise you it would have been!

Mods - any chance of an FR bashing filter here?

[bentover]

Leo , since you seem to have all the answers, what about Beauvais what about Rome.
Is it a coincidence in both these cases also,or could you even begin to accept some responsibility for your management culture. Both of these occured after the above incident.

[FlapsOne]

Beauvais..........Rome.................what have I been missing??

[Wing Commander Fowler]

Thankyou bentover - proves MY point....... THEY won't be doing that again - not in Ryanair anyway! :ok:

[bentover]

If that's what you do then you've only yourself to blame.
If I receive a verbal from a changeover captain, it goes straight in the book. If I'm outstation or mid rotation,likewise.

[Vizcaya]

Beauvais..........Rome.................what have I been missing?? I heard a rumour of a rather interesting Go Around (very large bank angle) at Rome Ciampino about a week ago... Anybody knows more?

[Speedpig]

Forgive me if I'm being naive, but didn't ATC, either approach or tower, notice that this approach was unusual?
At a rate of descent of 6000 fpm it must surely have appeared out of the ordinary, let alone the high speed of the final and touch down.
Wouldn't ATC have called for some kind of enquiry...... asked the PF to call the director at least?
What about other traffic in the area?
I know that FR fly to "secondary" airfields but the Stockholm airspace must be pretty busy even so.

SP

[jmc-man]

Speedrig,

I think you'll find it WAS Air Traffic Control who initiated the investigation. There was probaly littel extra traffic in the area as the main Stockholm is a lot further North. The Tower controller might have thought it was a bit fast but compared to what..other RYR flights?

LHC's diatribe has contributed little. Conveniently for Ryanair, the fact that this incident was not reported by the crew meant there was little opportunity to get a full Flight Recorder Readout ( mentioned in the report) , nor a copy of the CVR. So what the investigators have is limited information, and a captains version of his " stress". And as for the mention of IALPA, wouldn't it be great to blame everything on RYR's greatest enemy.

The Investigators might have had a much better idea what really happened but couldn't put it in the report as they had no "tangible" evidence.

I have seen radar traces of RYR aircraft clocking along at 320knts, having been TOLD to fly at 250kts. I have had RYR aircraft flying behind me repeatedly told to reduce speed as they were catching me up on the approach by refusing to fly the speed given by ATC. Whether LHC, or anyone else cares about it or not, RYR have built up a reputation in UK and Irish ATC for rushing everywhere , often in contravention of ATC instructions. And don't get me started on their taxying antics on the ground.

With that sort of a reputation, this particular approach was probably not a real surprise to either of the crew on the day. It was probably passed of as , " that was a bit tight eh?" With no CVR to listen to, it's impossible to ever know what the first officer really said ( if anything). Naturally when it became an investigation , and having been abandoned by his captain to face the music, he would have made sure his story was good.

Hopefully RYR will see this as a warning. There is no room in this industry for cowboy antics.

[Speedpig]

Thanks jmc-man.
Reminds me of a flight I took on Southwest between KLAX and KPHX some time ago.
I was genuinely concerned about the handling of the aircraft on the ground and in the air. My letter of complaint earned me a Parker pen and the wisdom never to set foot on Southwest again.
From what I hear and read, many are doing the same with Ryanair.
Long live full service carriers.

SP

[HI'er]

Blame whom/what ever we like, but at the end of the day the Captain (and F/O) are the ones who bear the full responsibility for the safety of their passengers, the aircraft, and whatever else the aircraft might come into conflict with.

O'Leary's aggressive style of management is possibly affecting many of the crew who work for him.

How to stop it?
Have the civil aviation checkies start making their presence more obvious on the flight decks, and at airports.

[CAT1]

As an unbiased outsider I find it amazing that every time there is any sort of incident at Ryanair it immediately gets blamed on the management. Are flight crew brainwashed during training, thus losing free will? True, there is usually no smoke without fire, but how the actions of a captain having a brain fart can be blamed on anything except himself and his own circumstances is beyond me. Whether or not he was having marital problems is irrelevant: if he knew that whatever problems he was having would interfere with his duties as a pilot, he should not have been flying. He obviously was not worried about losing his job if he called in sick, as he was leaving anyway. The scariest part of this incident is the breakdown in CRM. If anything is to be lernt from it then this is the issue that needs addressing.

[MPH]

And, lets not forget the numerous amounts of incidents, accidents and fines, not only majors but, by cargo, business and charter airlines that have had all the above happen to them. Does this mean that management, personal problems and the like were also involved? The last hull lose in Canada by a major, was not the first for them, at landing long and running off the end of the runway. Does this give them a bad reputation? They have clocked millions of hours without incident or accident. Yes we are all not perfect but, we strive too! Give Fr a break!:hmm:

[Wizofoz]

CAT1 and MPH,

I have not been critical of the captain in this incident. He made a BIG mistake, as can any human being given the right (wrong?!?) set of circumstances.

What I do lay firmly at the feet of FR managment is the actions taken in the relative calm of the turn-around. The FO, clearly presented with an aircraft that required a maintenence inspection for the overspeed, a captain who admitted he was unfit to fly, and no doubt just a little shaken up himself- GOT BACK ON AND FLEW HOME.

Why? Refer previous posts. An FR FO, faced with a similar situation decided it was unsafe to fly, AND WAS SACKED ON THE ORDERS OF THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF FR MANAGMENT.

That is not error, that is not a mistake, that is a deliberate policy of intimidation, leading to a culture of "shut up and fly".

[Faire d'income]

Well said Wiz.

Just another point, there are very few of us in the industry that would continue an approach with 5000fpm rate of descent below 2000'.

For non-flyers this picture would look horrendous in the cockpit and all your instincts would be to forget it. Unless of course there is a greater force at work in this event that we ( non FR ) don't understand.

But of course according to Leo it's all Ialpa's fault.

[unwiseowl]

One reason why airline safety is much improved over the last few years is the widespread practice of analysing flight data traces for any non-standard events and interviewing the crew afterwards.

Do Ryanair have such a policy?

[Barzha]

Guys ! Are you talking about one crazy individual or Ryanair ? There are hundreds of pilots in RYR with different experience and background .
That insults me a little bit because I have not done such approaches and I have never been under any pressure to do something like that .

[yotter]

What about the famous story concerning the Heathrow controller and the BEA first officer. Apparently the captain was flying a manual approach and getting a bit overloaded.
ATC: " Bealine XYZ, are you OK for speed and height?"
FO;" Yes sir, we have an abundance of both!"
Not sure what the skipper said, or the flight manager if they landed off it.
Cheers, Y

[Wizofoz]

Barzha,

Please find one quote in this thread that insinuates all or even a great many Ryanair pilots are anything other that good and reputable pilots.

May I also suggest YOU refering to your former collegue as "Crazy" IS very insulting to someone who made a mistake.

What is being discussed here is the whether the cultural pressures put on FR pilots by their management is detrimantal to flight saftey, and I have pushed the personal barrow that Ryan FOs are under pressure to fly when they don't consider it safe, as one who didn't was made an example of.

Would you or any other incumbent at FR (Gone a bit quiet there Leo...) care to dis-agree?

[mr lancaster]

Well if all Ryanair pilots are crap. God bless British Airways and Virgin and all the other so called big names which is where some of the fo's and captains are going and don forget to bless the Airbus A340 pilot in Canada , obviously an Ex Ryanair pilot..

[Wizofoz]

Mr Lancaster,

I guess I'll have to say it to you too! Where is ANYONE saying Ryanair pilots are crap? Certain of them seem to have a problem with reading but NO-ONE is suggesting there is anything wrong with FR pilots!

What we are saying is put good pilots in a bad culture, and the results can be tragic.

[essexboy]

I am more than a little confused by some of the arguments being put across in this thread. It is my understanding that this incident was brought to light by the Ryanair management after analysis of the flight data. The ATC radar trace came after the investigation was initiated. So how is this the fault of the company.

As for the comments about CRM and safety practices within the company I have never heard such a load of bull in my life. As a Ryanair captain I speak with some authority when I say that the CRM and safety culture within the company is second to none. After this incident the 6 monthly CRM training package was developed to cover, not only this type of scenario but the very incident was discussed including a computer simulation of the event. Every pilot in the company had to watch it, discuss their thoughts about it and state what they would do in the same situation.

True there are aspects of the company management I would like to change but safety and CRM are not amongst them. In resent years at least 2 captains that I know about have been dismissed or had their contracts revoked due to poor CRM following reports from FOs.

If I ever did something stupid and I pray to God that it is not on this scale, I would hold my hands up and take it on the chin. Which ever company you are with you are going to get a roasting so you might as well demonstrate a little integrity.

[CAT1]

The general argument of the company bashers seems tobe that flying for FR makes you a cr*p pilot. How ridiculous. Grow up.

[normal_nigel]

I'm sure most Ryaniar pilots are as capable as anyone else (well, I do stress most).

However, this guy is a f*****g disgrace and thank God he is now on the other side of the world.

Look out those who have to fly to Aus.

He may have had a row with his wife and decide to nearly kill everyone in sight.

ps LHC, you are obviously some sort of deluded O'leary pillow biter.

[the grim repa]

a number of posts here concern ryanair pilot body as a whole or ryanair versus other airlines.the majority of pilots are great operators and top guys,unfortunately there is a culture building and a minority who are not good.whether ba,virgin or others have incidents,we don't care we are ryanair and we are responsible for our shop.

safety is not for accountants!

[Nick NOTOC]

Normal Nigel,

That a serious error was made does not need any more attention.
But that the pilot concerned gave us insight into the reasons behind his admitted poor airmanship deserves in my opinion a medal.
It's reactions like yours that make it damn difficult for people to come forward and admid their mistakes.
Maybe you should stop re-acting on the basis of your emotions and start using your brain so that you may now understand why pilots make serious errors.
I think all managers of airlines should read this incident report especially the hairy camel guy, maybe he can then understand that he is playing with safety in the way he treats his pilots.

[normal_nigel]

Stop being so pompous

I'm afraid that this comes under the "more serious than an error of judgement" file.

And he didn't come forward and admit it. He got caught trying to cover it up.Or did he think that it was all normal on the ground in Sweden?

No tech log entry or report.

[bacardi walla]

The bottom line to the whole issue is that the PIC should have elected to go around and make another approach. As to why he made such a bad decision remains to be seen.

One more serious mistake like this and no doubt the UK CAA will pay a visit to FR. EGSS is afterall FR's largest base and on English soil.

To all FR crews: FLY BY THE RULES & FLY SAFE

[blackwatergoblin]

I'm confused here, this wasn't an error but wilfull chosen behaviour. This alleged "Commander" chose to ignore both visual and audible warnings from his machine as well as his F/O!

He didn't have the ball's to stick his hand's up on the day. The idiot only fessed up because he was forced to many months later when he was half way around the World.

I would not give credence to excuses formulated over many months by a coward who has run away from the scene and left a junior colleague to take some of the heat for his actions on that day.

BWG

[VR-HFX]

Very sobering but a lot of pompous posts to add fuel to the fire.

I have been in this biz for over 30 years and have seen worse with my own eyes. Nearly lost my job for becoming intolerant of one poor performance that nearly dragged the flaps off a 707.

I would bet London to a Brick that while most of the FR guys would have less hours than their equivalents in major carriers they would actually have much much more experience.

For my money this was 'stunned mullet ' bad judgement but not worthy of the wrap that I see on this thread.

Stress and accumulated fatigue can do strange things to the best of aviators.

If anything I would be pushing a more forceful F/O culture. Its the single pilot IFR environment that will ultimately kill people.

[normal_nigel]

I have been in this biz for over 30 years and have seen worse with my own eyes. Nearly lost my job for becoming intolerant of one poor performance that nearly dragged the flaps off a 707.

Here we go.

The "we did worse on the Trident/707 brigade".

Those days are over, old bean.

I would bet London to a Brick that while most of the FR guys would have less hours than their equivalents in major carriers they would actually have much much more experience.

Resulting in such actions??? If that is the result of such experience then I worry.

I doubt you would see many other FR pilots either acting in such a way. They must also be appalled by his actions that basically border on the criminal.

This guy is obviously a wild card that should never have been near the LHS.

[One Step Beyond]

If anything I would be pushing a more forceful F/O culture

Unfortunately when an FO tried to be forceful in the past on a similar matter, she got fired. The nub of the matter is the obvious pressure put on pilots to keep the mouth shut and the show going on.
Needless to say, the FR apologists, specifically LHC, ignore the real questions and instead engage in bluff, bluster and spin. So what about it, Leo, lets have some backbone and answer the questions:
Do you think the FO’s decision to continue in a U/S aircraft with an unbalanced skipper was in any way influenced by CD’s dismissal? Would Ryanair or would Ryanair not have stood by the FO had he taken the correct course of action and insisted on both an engineering inspection of the flap and a new captain?

Not that I expect an answer; what LHC once again fails to understand is, if you truly believe in something, you will be prepared to answer any and every question presented to you. And anyway, what is there to fear from your inquisitors Leo? If Ryanair is indeed the Shangri-la you claim it to be, you will have no problem answering EVERY question put to you.

As for trying to incriminate IALPA in all this, utterly preposterous. A strong union to stand up for the FO refusing to fly back with that skipper would have been a massive extra layer of safety.

[RogerIrrelevant69]

One Step Beyond,

You are right to expect no answer from LHC. He never answers questions. He merely issues statements on behalf of his hallowed employer Ryanair. Very long statements usually. The content of which, makes me suspect that he is actually part of their management. He comes across as that special type of manager that only understands one way communication. No discussion, just his increasingly boring and irritating version of events, laced with what he probably thinks is colourful prose.

Well if he is in Ryanair management it really doesn't say much for them. Good typist though.

[Daysleeper]

Not that I'm supporting Ryanair but they are not alone in the non reporting of incidents.

AAIB UK DHC-8 Incident (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/september_2005/dhc_8_311_dash_8__g_nvsb.cfm)

This is just as bad and has had no publicity on PPRUNE.

[Ranger One]

Interesting thread. I think what rankles with the 'shred his license' people is:

1. It wasn't just that he screwed up the approach, it's that he wilfully and in full knowledge of his situation, and against multiple warnings, persisted with an approach that was so screwed up it should have been thrown away long before.

That was bad. But for me the killer (and not many people have touched on this) is:

2. He knowingly and substantially exceeded airframe structural limits (Vfe) and did/said nothing - covered it up in fact.

Would *you* like to be the one suddenly facing assymetric flap at a critical stage of flight a few hundred hours after this guy had finished with the aircraft? This kind of behaviour has killed people before now.

R1

[36050100]

I still maintain that the FO could have dealt with this by making a tech log entry regarding the flap speed exceedence at Skavsta.

If it's in the book, the FO can't be pressured into flying an aircraft that is tech, the worst accusation that could be levelled at him/her would be poor CRM and I'm sure that would sound especially rich !

[hollywood285]

Anybody know what the Captains doing now??? flying smelly people round the outback in an Aztec I hope!!

The "we did worse on the Trident/707 brigade". LOL!!! Was there not a similar incident back in the good old days werethe young F/O did not speak up to the captain killing all on board a trident??

[Doug the Head]

I still maintain that the FO could have dealt with this by making a tech log entry regarding the flap speed exceedence at Skavsta. Lemme get this straight: so you´re expecting an F/O (intimitdated through a ´the show must go on´ company cuture) to say "gime the tech log old, ´cus I wanna ground this aircraft?" You gotta be kidding!!! Even in EZY (which is according to the Brits ´supposedly´ better than Ryanair) F/O´s rarely get to touch the Tech Log, let alone make an entry in it! :rolleyes:

Nobody during the whole "second to none" CTC/EZY training course has explained me how to make an entry or how the tech log works in the first place! All I know about it is through self study and asking questions to sympathetic captains!

I can hardly see any F/O (no matter which company) grabbing a tech log and grounding an aircraft!

[brain fade]

What a lot of horse sh*t

This chap was on his last day with Ryanair.

He decided to give it a bit of.....well ..........whatever he chose to.

He decided that he'd do as he pleased and ignore his FO.

So he did. Got a bit hot, a bit high and frightened his FO.

Now he's got to apologize and make up some **** 'cos he made a 'James Hunt' of it and his FO plainly filed an ASR.

Basically the guy landed 30kts fast due a poor approach.

Whoopeedoo!

Now if he'd burst a tyre or scratched the paint ......................:rolleyes:

[bacardi walla]

brain fade I assume by your comments that you're not a pilot? If you are, god help anyone who flies with you.

SOP's are there to be followed NOT ignored.

Both crew members are to blame here. The Captain for obvious reasons, and the FO for not filing an ASR and not entering anything in the tech log.

The FO should have reacted better in hindsight. Surely Boeing or the leasing company would have something to say if their aircraft was operated beyond it's limits?

The picture would be different if this aircraft had gone off the end of the runway........

[Daysleeper]

There is a shade of Kate Moss here, its not so much I'm sorry I endangered the lives of 120+ people, its I'm sorry I got caught.

[RogerIrrelevant69]

Eh no, if brain fade is serious, he has not got a point. Not one point in hell.

There is absolutely no excuse for the way that plane was flown. None.

And there was no excuse for letting it up in the air again without a proper tech inspection.

This is not being anally retentive. This is flying. These are the rules.

[brain fade]

Chaps

I'm not excusing him and I don't think I'll try the same trick myself!

No one hurt. No paint scratched. Bad flying. Bad CRM.

An incident not an accident.

The point I was trying to make is that they were fu**ing around on purpose. The marital stress stuff had sod all to do with it.

To hear some of the holy holies on here you'd think he'd killed someone.

As far as going again without getting the flaps looked at, the FO implicated himself in the incident by not pressing for the engineers to have a proper look.

[RogerIrrelevant69]

No holy holies about it.

Basic stuff for PPLs or CPLs:

- You do not exceed Vfe.

- You do not pitch the nose down 12 degrees when you should in fact have established a stablised approach.

- You do not land 30 knots above landing speed.

- You do not f**k around as you suggest whether you have 1 passenger or 120.

Basic basic basic stuff. If you fly, you would know this.

[brain fade]

Roger
You're correct. He made a giant idiot of himself by behaving so stupidly, bust a shed load of rules and limits and should have known much better.

He was on his last day and wound himself in too deep trying to make it memorable.

Stupid stupid stupid.

Worse he tried to cover it up (after such stupidity it's no wonder!)

All I'm saying is I've seen folk who DID wrap the a/c round a hill or similar , killing hundreds, have an easier time on pprune than this clot!

Give the poor geezer a break. He fu*ked up but he got away with it.

Hope he learn't something tho'.

[bacardi walla]

Most people who wrap themselves around a mountain don't get the chance to speak up for themselves. This Captain should be banned from flying commercially, anywhere in the world. He IS an accident waiting to happen.

[jonseagull]

Hope never to f**k up quite as dramatically as this gent but if this is the way the pilot community and more specifically the pprune community are going to disect ASR's this whole website is taking one big leap backwards in flight safety.

It's supposed to be a rumour site not a kangaroo court. Leave this sort of "Holier than thou" clap trap to the bar when the parking brake is well and truly on don't put this sort of rubbish down on print.

[Right Way Up]

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think the whole point of this thread is that there was no ASR filed by the Captain, and that there was no tech log entry. He was caught by ATC reviewing radar plots. Being suckered into an approach like this and then continuing when all the warning signs are there to go-around can be debated until the cows come home. The problem is that the individual brushed it all under the carpet and flew an aircraft thats airworthiness was in doubt. That is the decision that borders on criminal.

[brain fade]

Bacardi

You say he IS an accident waiting to happen

How do you know that? Are you psychic?

Maybe he learnt his lesson:rolleyes:

[RogerIrrelevant69]

Luckily most pilots do dissect these reports when presented with them. Hopefully some learn from them.

However regarding: Vfe, stabilised approaches and landing speed, I think most pilot's jaws would just drop when they look at this report (in particular that green line showing the pitch angle). Like me they would have picked up these essentials fairly early on at the PPL stage and somehow managed to hold on to them for good. These basic limits may get get temporarily exceeded for a few seconds or degrees but never in such a deliberate or persistent fashion.

For those of you who have not bothered to read the report it's here:

www.aaiu.ie/AAIUviewitem.asp?id=6946&lang=ENG&loc=1652

This guy f**ked up royally in a multitude of areas and he is lucky to still have his license. That's about it.

Just don't say "ah sure it doesn't matter, better luck next time" and expect to get an easy ride here. A lot of people on this forum are actually pilots.

[feet dry]

Afternoon chaps,

Well since this thread seems to have run it's course, here is a question from a lowly PPL on jet transport category aircraft handling.....

Looking at the report it is clear that some mighty large control inputs were made (kind of like a kay-san I witnessed from the flight deck of a C130 one time.....Ho hum!!)

Anyway, one technique I was taught for short field/emergency landings was the forward slip and jolly fun it was too practising whilst cicuit bashing in the good ol' 152, so my question is; is it possible/desireable to forward slip an aircraft of this category? If so, would this be preferable to loose the required height rather than the large (and impressive!?!) pitch inputs evident from the report?

(P.S. Before anyone mentions it, the aircraft should not have been in that position in the first place I know I know I know)

Ta

[bacardi walla]

brain fade I am assuming he will carry on down in Oz, that's all.

Having worked for FR, I know that a very high percentage of their crews are well trained and good aviators. Those with low hours need to start somewhere but I'm starting to worry about the overall level of experience in the flightdeck and the fact that not one, but two crew members can brush an incident like this under the carpet and hope they don't get caught ! It's beyond belief really.

[RogerIrrelevant69]

Most preferable in a C152 feet dry. But I guess any FI will tell you that. A 737-800 - don't know if it's preferable but anything is better than those pitch inputs on that graph unless you are dodging rockets.

You're right on the other point, this thread has run it's course and has become a right royal pissing contest with much participation from me! Ta.

The pilots here know what is important about this case.

The wannabees here will no doubt find out in due course.

- Roger

[Konkordski]

An incident not an accident



Read the report. It specifically says: "It was fortuitous that the landing was carried out safely."

The word 'fortuitous' doesn't mean 'fortunate'. It means 'accidental, by chance, without apparent cause'.

In simpler terms - this aeroplane landed safely by chance, not as the result of any airmanship skills.

[36050100]

Lemme get this straight: so you´re expecting an F/O (intimitdated through a ´the show must go on´ company cuture) to say "gime the tech log old, ´cus I wanna ground this aircraft?" You gotta be kidding!!! Even in EZY (which is according to the Brits ´supposedly´ better than Ryanair) F/O´s rarely get to touch the Tech Log, let alone make an entry in it!

I don't condone what the Captain did. Even if he resigned I'd still sack him.

I agree that preventing someone behaving erratically in the air could be close to impossible. On the ground is different.

The F/O knew there was a defect with the aircraft and has a duty to report, first to the Captain. If the Captain ignores it, the duty to report does not go away.

The F/O was prepared to get back in an aircraft he knew needed an inspection with cabin crew and passengers and a Captain who had recently shown scant disregard for SOP's, the AOM, CRM, airmanship etc. I'd be tempted to sack him also, he's not there for ballast!

F/O's need to know what they would do to break the chain of events unfolding and if they're not prepared to act why do they bother turning up ??

[Airbus Girl]

Three things.

One. I know of another Captain who did something not a million miles different from this incident, who was also going through divorce.

Two. Some aviation sayings which those of us who fly know are true!
Never trade luck for skill.
Never fly in the same cockpit with someone braver than you. Basic Flying Rules: Try to stay in the middle of the air. Do not go near the edges of it. The edges of the air can be recognized by the appearance of ground, buildings, sea, trees and interstellar space. It is much more difficult to fly there.

Three.
FO should have done more. Why didn't he put full power on and call a go-around, then they at least would have had the time to talk about it and it would have got a reaction. That FO didn't know that they were both going to survive had it run off the end of the runway. At the least, once on stand, he should have called the Chief Pilot at Ryanair and told him of the incident and ask the CP to fax him permission to return the aircraft, with passengers, without a tech inspection.

[brain fade]

Koncordski

Knickers! ;)

I've never seen an aeroplane landed 'by chance', and neither have you.

[Gary Lager]

'Getting away with it', as you describe the FR Capt in question as having done, is sometimes as much to do with chance as skill.

The times I have made mistakes and 'got away with it' have often involved their fair share of luck, as well as the better exertions of my colleagues.

Unfortunate circumstances for the chap concerned, important lesson learned for many. However, am I alone in cynicism when I see the old 'HF' angle being wheeled out (I was tired/stressed) only after the pilot was confronted with evidence of his reckless behaviour?

The whole point of CHIRP/ASRs etc. in allowing 'blame-free' safety culture is that you 'fess up on your own initiative; waiting until you get caught then finding a CHIRP-style 'explanation' (excuse?) for your actions leaves me a little sore.

Flying that aircraft again without proper maintenance action and a serious crew debrief was exceptionally reckless, stupid, and makes a mockery of those of us who try to promote our industry as 'professional'.

Does FR have a JAR-compliant FDM scheme in place yet? I don't think they're mandatory until next year, but I stand to be corrected on that.

[SR71]

No-one has answered my question yet...

Lets assume the FO did say:

"I have control!"

but the skipper didn't relinquish it.

What would you do?

Curiously.

[Greek God]

"Unless you Go Around I will raise the gear"
or just raise it and say "Go Around"

[Single Flasher]

To the tower; "Ryanair 123, Going round"


SF

[Final 3 Greens]

To be clear, I'm not a professional pilot, but I wonder (like SR71) what would happen if the FO tried to take control and the capt wouldn't relinquish.

There seems to be a devils alternative (a) two people doing different things - ie one trying to land, the other to GA and the risks that this involves and (b) an unstabilised approach and operation out of limits and the risks that this involves.

I only hope that I'm never in the back if such a scenario plays out in the flight deck.

[DOVES]

Is'nt it simpler to say, earlier, when the approach path has gone, thousands feet below, 'why don't we perform a 360°?'
Fly safe
DOVES

[ElNino]

Is'nt it simpler to say, earlier, when the approach path has gone, thousands feet below, 'why don't we perform a 360°?'

Rumour has it another FR tried this recently in BVS with a less than satisfactory outcome. Another report in the offing?

[maxalt]

Gulf Air tried it and ended up in the sea.

[Right Way Up]

But they were doing the 360 at 600 ft at night!

[unwiseowl]

How many flights did the aeroplane do before receiving the proper inspection for flap overspeed? Hundreds?

[Konkordski]

I've never seen an aeroplane landed 'by chance', and neither have you


I didn't say 'landed by chance'. I said 'landed SAFELY by chance'. That's not the same thing. This could all have gone very badly wrong, and it's a shame to see (some) of the (alleged) professionals here trying to excuse it.

[maxalt]

But they were doing the 360 at 600 ft at night!Its not SOP.
A GA is SOP.

[brain fade]

Konkordski
No ones trying to excuse such a crappy bit of flying.

As long as we entrust piloting to humans there will be stuff like this. Thankfully not as frequently as in the past.

EVERYone f**ks up from time to time.

He'll have learned some things that he ought to have known that day. Good. The fact that he plonked it down and stopped it neatly after such a crappy approach wasn't luck despite what you say.

Time to move on methinks.:rolleyes:

[SR71]

I think what certain posters are trying to say Brain fade is that it is one thing executing such an approach wilfully and in contravention of certain protocols that we all ought to adhere to when operating commercially. If this approach was shot as an act of parting machismo/bravado - call it what you want - frankly, I'd be pretty pissed off, if as a fare-paying passenger, I got some aerobatics thrown into the equation as well. I didn't sign up for that when I clicked on www.expedia.com.

It is quite another if it was a temporary aberration.

IMHO, the anecdotal and circumstantial evidence suggests a whiff of the former.

I do agree though that landing at 180kts flaps 10 and doing a good job wasn't luck. After all, I'd hope that I put it down nicely at 210kts flaps up if circumstances demanded it and the runway was computed as long enough.

Exceeding Vfe though is pretty silly. Departing subsequently without a check is inexcusable regardless of what interpretation you chose to attach to the actions of the crew prior to touchdown.

:mad:

[brain fade]

SR-

Frankly, I agree.

[Faire d'income]

Two. Some aviation sayings which those of us who fly know are true! Never fly in the same cockpit with someone braver than you.

If we assume that no two people are the same and that they are unlikely to have exactly the same amount of bravery, then basically no two pilots should ever fly with other.



Back to the thread. It seems the unfortunate co-joe had a classic Catch 22 situation.

If he grabbed the tech log and refused to go he would most likely have gone the same way as the girl who refused to fly with a skipper, i.e. fired.

If he did nothing there are those here ( from other operators )who want him fired.

Its seems he found the best solution for the situation ( company ) he found himself in. Do nothing say nothing and for God's sake keep the show on the road. He still has his job.

[DOVES]

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But they were doing the 360 at 600 ft at night!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Its not SOP.
A GA is SOP.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Then, to make maxalt happy, I can change my suggestion in:
"Is'nt it simpler to say, earlier, when the approach path has gone, thousands feet below, (with MEAs, Wx, etc.; well ahead of the possible future GA) 'why don't we perform an holding pattern over...?"
Fly safe
DOVES

[RAT 5]

The question of F/O interaction/intervention poses a pratical consideration.

1. F/O is brand new on line, a new boy on the block, not yet steeped in the experience of others, which would breed confidence to say something. Thus says nothing, or not enough, in timidity. I'm sure he said plenty, but to little effect. Looking death in the face is scary.

2. The F/O is senior with lots of confidence and is coming up for a command course. He speaks up, tries to take control, fails and grounds the a/c so disrupting the schedule. Is this being "not company minded" commercially? or showing good command initiative? In the cut throat world of these companies it would be a difficult thought process.

3. What of the F/O inbetween, semi-senior, perhaps less to lose and have the nouse to step in?

I'm surprised someone hasn't opened the male/female F/O can of worms. Would one have behaved differently from the other? Either way, "shut up gringo." is sexless.

Hm?

[bentover]

The Beauvais guys finished their 360 turn at 200 feet 1/4 of a mile off centreline and the g/a calls for straight ahead climb.
When they commenced it, the nose was pointing at the tower so they buzzed it.

[SIDSTAR]

This whole issue beggars belief. First, the Captain knew full well what he was doing and continued with the "get in itis". Second the F/O, no matter how junior, did little to stop it when he could simply have pushed the TOGA button. It would have been very difficult, even for this clown, to have landed an 800 with TOGA thrust!

There are two major issues arising from this.

One, any F/O who isn't prepared to speak up when his own life is in danger doesn't deserve to be driving a pram let alone an aeroplane. They BOTH conspired to fly a possible unairworthy a/c back to STN and then allowed others to fly it for how long we dont know.

Two, the invisible culture at FR certainly has contributed to this incident and to the 'hear no evil speak no evil" culture as espoused by our friend, the Hairy Smelly One.

We all know that CD (who DID have the balls to question an asshole Capt) was sacked on the direct instructions of MOL five days after MD, chairman of the IALPA branch, was sacked. In those five days FR laid down the law to all its pilots that nobody was safe (CD was the Chief Pilot's daughter, remember?). The LHC culture was set in stone that day and nobody has had the balls to really challenge it since then, John Goss an honourable exception (but even he didn't win his case.)

There are many hundreds of excellent pilots in Ryanair. However, the culture they are working in stinks to high heaven and the IAA is utterly spineless in doing anything about the situation. Don't think they don't know what's going on, as they certainly do. If any evidence of their attitude is required just see the letter in Flight from their PRO a few weeks ago. For example, didn the IAA investigate the issues leading to the MD and CD sackings? We all know they did, but they never reported? I wonder why?

However at the end of the day all this can be stopped right away by the FR pilots. All they have to do is to report ALL issues to the company and copy same to the IAA. Even those jellyfish would be forced to act then. Isn't there a Freedom of Information Act in Ireland?

[sleeper]

Sidstar:

Manual flight in a boeing 737 is without autothrottle. Thus pushing TOGA only changes flightdirector mode.

Sleeper

[Placido]

A simple & effective way for a FO to pull a Captain back into safety is to make a RT call to ATC.

State: Flight no., Rank, - Objections to flight profile & Captains actions.

This also serves as a recorded backup for later claims.

Regards.

[captplaystation]

It might be worth considering that the F/O didn't notice the 270KT with flap 5 exceedance.Rushed stressful approaches can max-out the most accomplished experienced operator and this guy,don't forget, was way outside his comfort zone and may well not have noticed an exceedance of only a few seconds in duration. I know most info is IRS derived but,if the sideslip was of any magnitude would the IAS be 100% accurate,maybe no exceedance was visible? Not trying to defend anybody but the poor guy was less likely to rock the boat and strand everyone in Skavsta for "only" a Cowboy approach followed by a flap 10 landing.When the monitoring system first came in pretty much everyone knew that a breaker behind the F/O marked WQAR meant watch your ass if you had a "hot" approach;they all have it now, but it amazes me they could have niavely believed they would get away with it if they knew the system was in-situ.Incidentally it is possible to land safely from where they started down without any abnormal control inputs/exceedances and respecting the RYR" approach-gate"( ie configured/spooled up/stable 500' VMC)it merely requires the application of the correct technique,( dirty&down not down &dirty or worse still half&half,which is what they tried).Seen it in the sim,wouldn't recommend it as a normal technique, but yes,they could have got in with no histrionics if they had applied a better method of flying the damn thing.I never met the Captain so have no idea if the boozing&fornicating(oh yes please!) accusations have any foundation, but those who pooh-pooh the broken marriage scenario obviously aint been there. . .yet.Command of an aircraft is not the place to be with a troubled mind ,but how many of us really call in sick if we are distracted/pissed off/ angry? and no I'm not just talking about RYR.Hell there are guys I have flown with who seemed to be having a crisis every day. . .what do you do? phone the CAA/IAA and ask to have them grounded/commited? I suspect most of us try and get through the day as pleasantly/normally as possible and leave it at that,unless it is someone we regularly fly with and it starts to grate.

[captplaystation]

As a last resort,and I do mean a LAST /"you ain't gonna kill me you son of a bitch" resort, a call to ATC that you are going around/deviating to avoid a storm/whatever, is infinitely preferable to wrestling for control.I have only had to do it once in my career when one a**-hole(and that is believe me a kind description of the Captain concerned )wanted to fly straight through a line squall over the Pyrenees and ignored my pleas that I most certainly didn't want to ;it worked, but the ambience for the remainder of the flight and subsequent sector was in itself a pretty big flight safety hazard.I never filed a report,and neither did he,which kind of said it all.I'm happy to say that no F/O has felt the need to do the same to me,in spite of my best efforts on occasions. . .

[tom de luxe]

762
"less than perfect" my :mad:

I think SR 71 has it right:
Exceeding Vfe though is pretty silly. Departing subsequently without a check is inexcusable regardless of what interpretation you chose to attach to the actions of the crew prior to touchdown.
So maybe these guys didn't know what they were doing while airborne (or the FO didn't know just how bad the Capt was handling the approach or whatever). But they knew perfectly well what they were doing on the ground, namely prioritising a timely departure after a v short turnaround over basic mandatory checks or at the very least mandatory log entries. And they knew perfectly well what they then did at STN, namely keep their mouths shut and let their colleagues fly the plane, which they knew shouldn't have flown before appropriate maintenance had been carried out. "Own up later", well that's not a very brave thing to do if it happens after your're being confronted with the evidence, which in this case can only be described as the aviation equivalent of the proverbial smoking gun.
:yuk:

[captplaystation]

Everyone is crucifying them for leaving Skavsta having exceeded VFE for flap 5; as I've said before the Captain may have stretched/stressed the F/O (and possibly himself)so much on this sh*t approach that no one noticed what may have been a (relatively)short excursion over the limiting speed. They probably took time to enjoy the wonderful unaccustomed view afforded by 12° nose down AND a bit of side-slip.It must have looked quite gob-smacking.Boeing's are a bit tougher than come apart at the seams because of one exceedance 10% over a limit so lets stop fixating on them"intentionally leaving Skavsta/leaving the A/C for their fellow pilots "in an unairworthy state p l e a s e . . . Personally I would be more worried by the side-loads they generated on the fin by the Tiger Moth sideslip attempt.If CSA is a bit bent when I next fly it, guess I'll know why.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Another FR Captain?

So 10% is hardly worth mentioning then? When would you make a log remark? 15%? 20%? Why have they put speed limits on the 737 in the first place when it's a "tough" aircraft?

Some replies are almost amusing. Scary, but amusing.

[SR71]

catplaystation,

270kts @ Flap 5 sounds a little more than a 10% exceedence in my book. The report says PNF noticed this albeit he was unsure about the pitch attitude.

I quite concur with you that it would be possible to get in off this approach without compromising SAC at 500RA. It looks like they were at FL100 about 20 out.

Anyone coming into CWL from the south knows that you're often left high until north of EGTE. On this particular VMC occasion, closely followed by a Britannia 76, we were both left 9000ft above profile at ~FL150 with 25 to run.

When asked whether he'd continue to prefer vectors, the 76 driver quipped

"Yeah....via BHX."

Back at 210kts, drop the gear, speedbrake out, accelerate to 300kts, V/S ~5-6000ft/min, level off and get the flaps out and both of us got in no drama whatsoever.

Unusual. Not pleasant.

But no need for any histrionics.

[Flyingsand]

SR71

270kts @ Flap 5 sounds a little more than a 10% exceedence in my book

Not sure what book you're reading, but the placard max speed for flaps 1,2 and 5 on a 737-800 is 250kts. so 270kts would acctually be an exceedance of 8% if you're being picky ;)

[bacardi walla]

Just curious as to whether any of the punters down the back, or cabin crew even, noticed an odd approach angle and if any of them said something to airport/airline officials ?

I guess the cabin crew were also under the impression of "keep a low profile - say nothing".......

[SR71]

My apologies.

Forgot it was a 738.

:\

[Gary Lager]

In SR71's defence, the book he is reading is probably the 737 Classic POH - Flap 5 VFE is 225 knots so 270kts = 20% exceedance.

(oops he beat me to it)

Anyway, the fact that one can pull off an eventually stablised approach from 20nm @ 10000' is not really the issue - the techniques SR71 describes are quite legitimate (although probably only suitable in relatively quiet airspace where some flexibility exists with speed and descent rates) - the fact is the chap in question didn't use valid techniques, and exceeded the operating envelope of his aircraft.

I do NOT call that 'good' flying. Anyone can plonk an aeroplane on the TDZ of a runway, at whatever speed and flap setting you happen to have; that's not flying, it's just steering.

Flying which would be worthy of our admiration would be to land with the aircraft correctly configured, at the right speed, with the landing performance calculated and with the second crewmember adequately 'in the loop' to monitor the flying pilot, and all this from a 'non-standard' profile. None of those things happened in this example.

A useful mnemonic (sp?) I was taught (as I recall) for FO/PNF as an 'intervention strategy' (and sometimes you do need a 'strategy') is to have a 'PACT' in the cockpit.

P - Probe: "Do we need to start slowing down soon?"
A - Advise: "I think we should slow down now"
C - Correct: "We're too fast. We have to slow down NOW."
T - Take Control

...so the Captain/PF is given ample opportunity to explain/re-brief/correct his actions throughout, and bring the crew back into the comfort zone.

Of course, sometimes it'd be prudent to leap in at stage 2, or even 3, but RARELY straight in at 4 unless you've tried at least 2 of the earlier stages.

[jonseagull]

Back at 210kts, drop the gear, speedbrake out, accelerate to 300kts, V/S ~5-6000ft/min, level off and get the flaps out and both of us got in no drama whatsoever.

Oh my, this thread is getting scarier and scarier. Boys, I would just stop talking now if I were you and save the cowboy stuff for the airshows !

[amos2]

Well, I'll be!...this thread is getting stupider and stupider!

Struth!...you guys should have been around when I started flying on Gooney birds with all the WW2 guys off Spits, Hurricanes,B25s etc.

Those guys could toss the Dc3 around like a rag doll and the SLF would be none the wiser!...and neither was I!

That was a sight to be seen, and what a lot it taught me for the remainder of my SUCCESSFUL 40 year career!

What are you?...a bunch of wimps?

[unwiseowl]

Boeing's are a bit tougher than come apart at the seams because of one exceedance 10% over a limit

But a 10% increase in airspeed does not equate to a 10% increase in stress loads, does it?

[ZQA297/30]

In all the discussion of the "right and wrong" of what took place, I think I am getting the impression that there is no widely accepted procedure for safely recovering from "too high, too close" without resorting to go around.

There seem to be no guidelines as to what is recoverable without exceeding sensible parameters, and what is not.

Even the recommended general technique for max angle of descent profile is somewhat murky.

Then again, maybe I missed it and it went right over my head...too close, too fast this time!

[Chronic Snoozer]

Errrrr....

'Tower, request one right hand orbit to lose altitude' might work.

'Approach, request extra track miles to facilitate descent' could also.

[captplaystation]

Gentlemen(or ladies?) please try and listen. . . I am not,and I repeat not ,defending exceeding any limit by 8% (thanks Flyingsand!)but please please, let us stop fixating on (and I repeat) a relatively small exceedance on an aircraft that is 5 years old and fairly robustly constructed.Far more worrying is side-slipping (where is that in the Boeing flight-training manual?)and landing with Flap 10 by accident because you were too fast to deploy any more.Why do you think the flap load relief only works at normal landing flap settings? Probably because "relatively small exceedances"at the lower settings are not seen as a major problem by Mr Boeing.ManaAdaSystem & Unwise owl. .YES I am a "typical" RYR Captain (whatever that is meant to mean/imply) but I have worked in enough other companies to know that this could happen anywhere,its not for nothing that BA produced a lovely video I saw a number of years ago called something like"how F/O Nigel reacts in rushed approaches"; some "great"acting,laugh-a-minute stuff!Oh and jonseagull, what is your objection to using the aircrafts capability? assuming the crew are aware/ WX suitable/cabin prepared etc,I believe using (and I repeat for the LAST time NOT exceeding )the aircraft's capability should be within the remit of any properly trained/current/motivated aviator.Your nannying fixation on one aspect of a wholly shabby performance only type-casts some of you as FR bashers or wannabees.

[JW411]

"Far more worrying is side-slipping"

Why is this more worrying?

I freely admit that I have never flown a Boeing but most other aircraft that I have ever flown (including the DC-10) have been wonderful wing-down-techinque aeroplanes in a strong crosswind.

Now then, when I have a lot of left aileron and a lot of right rudder on at the same time when I am landing in a 35 knot crosswind, are you telling me that this is overstressing the aircraft when all I am actually doing is a side-slip as recommended by the manufacturer?

I do appreciate that the 738 might not be a great wing-down aircraft becauase of its geometry but does Boeing actually forbid wing-down technique?

[captplaystation]

JW411 I was actually thinking more in terms of a 270kt bootful of rudder effort,methinks more sideload than a bit of crabbing before landing.Landing a 738 with much bank angle does nasty things to the trailing edge flaps when they hit the R/W first(so Boeing reckons).

[Greek God]

Would the crew not have got a "Too Low Flaps" EGPS warning if trying to land with flaps 10?

[captplaystation]

Greek God,yes;you can of course silence it if,in the heat of the moment,you have the mental capacity as a maxed-out F/O to reach down and flip OFF a guarded switch.It is of course a pretty big hint that you didn't plan,and therefore ideally shouldn't be doing,that which is giving you the verbal aggro!Unfortunately they didn't take the hint.

[jonseagull]

What are you?...a bunch of wimps?

No, just professional pilots !!

[Greek God]

Further to the EGPWS warning would they also not have got a configuration warning horn below 800ft ? Which cannot be cancelled.

[jetrider757]

Well, I've only just picked up on this thread but what a corker ! The anger it's provoked in some is fascinating. I hope that airlines will use this example for years to come in their pilot crm training, after all that's how we learn - by studying the most appalling and difficult examples. I've seen similar examples from airlines other than Ryanair, so they don't stand alone here.

The unfortunate soul in the RHS of this one went as far as he dare and short of getting physical with the capt, was scuppered. If someone is hell-bent on screwing it up, it's a difficult job to get him to accept it and fall back in line or relinquish control, especially when happening in real time. I hope that both the f/o and his colleagues now have a game plan for the future in that, if flight data monitoring exists and you've been faced with an example such as this, then don't fly another sector without speeking to your fleet manager / duty manager, as you can back up what you say with FDM proof. If your management are unreasonable, then this isn't the airline for you and your sense of self preservation will lead you away, regardless of your training loans.

I'm LHS flying into Greek islands ( no ILS's ) at night, possibly thunderstorms, tired from summer roster disruption, being told not to carry too much fuel etc., so before anyone has a go at me, I've seen most things and know what pressure is. The capt. who flew the flight in question shouldn't operate for any airline in my opinon. I'm pleased he's no longer in Ryanair, although it concerns me not, as I refuse to passenger with them anyway.

[Finman]

It is reassuring to know that Ryanair doesn't have a monopoly on ar*eholes. Reading this thread and some of the comments is adequate proof that there are still plenty out there.

[Yacht Man]

"Far more worrying is side-slipping"

Why is this more worrying?


Significant intake disruption 'might' lead to compressor stall.

Examples around for example I recall the early 747's (think GE engine varients but cant remember), were vulnerable during strong x-wind take offs. CFM 56 is much less suseptable but guess its possible.

I would be concerned about this problem during a significant side slip (...as opposed to forward slip).

YM.

[pakeha-boy]

Just look at American Airlines MD-80/SouthWest Airlines 737 incidents.The roles and actions of both F/O,S,piss poor at best.A physical confrontation in the cockpit,is definitly not the way to go.The company I work for has tried in scenario format to try and resolve this issue of "taking command"from a rouge pilot.For as many people involved in the disscussion ,there are as many ideas and ways to deal with it.I still dont think weve got it right!!! :(

[SIDSTAR]

OOps! Sorry about not knowing that it's amnual throttle! Look at it this way. There were any number of ways the F/O could have stopped this cowboy many of which have been aired already.

However, even IF he didn't have the balls to do anything about it in the air, there is no excuse for not sorting out our John Wayne once they got on the ground.

Neither pilot should be alowed fly any public transport aircraft again - not for the approach which was appalling, but for the lack of backbone afterwards. Has the spineless IAA done anything to affect their licencing status? Of course not.

[normal_nigel]

although it concerns me not, as I refuse to passenger with them anyway

That makes two of us then, and all friends and relations, no doubt

[Rananim]

The reason we get incidents like this is that manual raw data flying is no longer compulsory.Many pilots engage the AP at 1000' and disengage it again on final approach at 500'.Some pilots today can not fly their airplane without being vectored for an ILS approach with AP and FD on.Its pitiful but so true.
The airline culture that breeds such a pilot is really to blame,not the pilot himself.

[normal_nigel]

The airline culture that breeds such a pilot is really to blame,not the pilot himself

With all the respect I can muster

B*llocks.

His handling has got nothing to do with it. Its all about judgment, and he lacked it on this occasion.

Many/most airlines promote autoflight particularly in bad weather, busy airspace etc.

Most of us manage to muddle through without endangering passengers crew and the aircraft.

If we did get caught out and screwed up, I dare to say most of us would not try and cover it up.

You can't in BA and many others anyway.

Its called SESMA

I've also heard that if it is who people think it is, it was totally in character.

[Arans]

Having marriage problems ? Leave the plane in the A/P and perform a auto-landing ! It is safer !

Arans.

[West Coast]

"The airline culture that breeds such a pilot is really to blame,not the pilot himself"

Then the airline should receive the credit for the 99.9% of the rest of us who are safe. No airline to blame here. That type of attitude rests with the individuals themselves. A good SOP may show those individuals for what they are, but it won't change them.

[Bigmouth]

The captain's head, for whatever reason, was somewhere else entirely. The FO, being the back up system for exactly this kind of situation, failed miserably.
When you stick 700hr guys in the right seat, this is exactly what you'll get.
What the f$*% do you think you're gonna get for a £19 ticket?

[Rananim]

Normal Nigel,
With all due respect,your remark about judgement tells only half the story.When the pilot failed to stabilize by 500,then his decision not to pull up shows poor judgement.However,his inability to recover from being high or fast,or both,is more indicative of his inability to fly the plane(or perhaps his mental state at the time we dont know).A commercial jet of this size is quite recoverable at 10nm at 300 knots if you know what to do and act quickly.I dont of course recommend such a procedure on a regular basis but you must know what to do when you find yourself in such a position.

Incidents like this are symptomatic of the malaise in the system,not the individual.SOP overkill,not enough sim and line time devoted to the fundamentals,and a general misunderstanding of the true nature of crm by many airlines;all these factors are changing our industry for the worse and its very sad.

Today,a pilot may have logged 1500 hours on his shiny new B737 but he is quite likely never to have:
a)flown an ILS on raw data down to minimums for real
b)flown a traditional visual approach(In the FAR EAST they are banned)
c)been shown or instructed on how to recover safely from a hot/high approach
d)been shown or instructed how to fly his airplane based solely on attitude and thrust settings
e)flown a manual FD off,autothrottle off departure
f)flown a bad weather circling approach with a simulated AP failure

If they cant do it as PF,then they sure as hell cant act as PM when the left seat pilot does it.

[Wing Commander Fowler]

Err......

A commercial jet of this size is quite recoverable at 10nm at 300 knots

.......hum - generalising there a little IMHO. This one would take 3nm approx LEVEL ATTITUDE to bring the speed back from 300 to 250 big ones (depending on the weight) leaving you at 7 miles, 900 feet above the profile and only just able to ask for flap. Oh and the FR OFDM stores any flap extension above 230kts.

Recoverable at 10nm at 300kts? Can only think you were referring to a track mileage extension in yr recovery procedure!

[vfenext]

A commercial jet of this size is quite recoverable at 10nm at 300 knots if you know what to do and act quickly
Yes it is and the recovery technique is called a go-around if I'm not very much mistaken. Take the cowboy hat off Rananim.

[Rananim]

Vfenext,
Listen I understand where you're coming from believe me.I would never advocate reckless or carefree flying but a pilot must know what his aircraft is capable of;he must also know his own limitations.A 737 decelerating from 300k at 10 nms out at no higher than 1800' agl and with NO tailwind is definitely a recoverable situation.Now if a pilot feels in his best judgement that it is not recoverable,then he must make his own decision and that is perfectly understandable.I also totally understand why some airlines with Big Brother watching would not wish to pursue such an approach.BUT PLEASE dont tell me its not possible to do and do in a safe and controlled manner,because it is...

[catchup]

Maybe it is possible.

But the question which had been raised is, what to do if it doesn't work out....?

For my opinion, the prescribed approach shouldn't be the answer.

regards

[RAT 5]

"A commercial jet of this size is quite recoverable at 10nm at 300 knots if you know what to do and act quickly. I don't of course recommend such a procedure on a regular basis but you must know what to do when you find yourself in such a position."

This thread has drifted away from the original title, and has now entered a more technical phase. (I'm sure the FR bashing has blown itself out, thankfully.)
I would thus like to respond to the above, and a couple of later points made by Ranamin.

"...but you must know what to do when ....."

Rule number 1. DO NOT get yourself in this position, NOR ALLOW yourself to be sucked into it by outside influences. God forbid ATC would do it to you. There in lies the skill; keeping away from such 'positions"!!!

Regarding the other points. I can agree that some piloting skills have been eroded in recent years, but in many airlines manual handling is encouraged when & where appropriate. (Deciding those parameters is also a skill, and with a SID at 3000' in London TMA on a stormy night is not a good idea). In the past (not necessarily good old days) the skills you mentioned were quite often required. That was because the a/c were very unsophisticated and the ATC infra-structure also. A B737-200 with only 1 DME and a 60's basic A/P & no A/T was a good learning machine around the Greek islands on a dark s$%ty night. You had to do it, and we were taught to do it 'on site'.
When I graduated onto the wizz bang glass cockpit & 80's autopilot, life became more relaxed, but you could always switch it off. However, the skill requirement changed slightly. If I ever offered the F/O the chance to follow suit, some tried and enjoyed it, others declined and missed the fun.
However, when I was doing conversion training, in the sim, I always tried to find time to cover the very manoeuvres you mentioned in a) - f).
A) B) D) & E) can be shown on the a/c, and I often still encourage them. The others are best left to the sim, but there is precious little time for anything extra there.

I still believe that in todays modern enviroment of higher tech a/c and infrastructure, it is best to learn how to avoid some of these areas, than to dilute, (by thinking you get away with it), the good self preserving prickly back of the neck hairs feeling that has saved many of us.

By the way: The demonstrated figure for 300 -210 kts + speed brake is 7nm. A further 3nm to get to gear down F15 would leave you at 1800' over the threshold. I suppose you could throw the gear out at 250kts and do a 1:1 descent at F40. It might work, but HOW DO YOU KNOW? Have you really done this, and if so, how did you get yourself into that position? You say it is not recommended on a regular basis. I would go further and say NEVER. (Surely you didn't spend time in the sim trying this crazy stunt? and if you did, WHY?)

[jetrider757]

The plot has most definitely been lost guys. Talking about recovery from 10nm at 300kts - this is a commercial airliner with paying passengers on board, so let's get out of test pilot thinking, eh?

I do believe that this is a good case for a crm type discussion and not a good deal else. To any of us who do this for a living, it's painfully obvious to see that a go around was the only option or ask for extra track miles before it gets to that stage. To those who keep blaming the f/o, I'd be interested to know what you fly and how long you've been doing it. For an inexperienced pilot to deal with this in real time is a classic crm dilemma - how far do you let it go ? This type of problem has been around since the very beginning of 2 crew operations with an experience gradient on the flight deck. Maybe the f/o concerned is a complete muppet but then I wasn't there and I don't know him.

We all get checked on our flying ability in the sim and a limited amount of crm, mostly relating to 'stock' scenarios. How anyone reacts when it goes wrong for real is a different matter. Whilst some intervene asap, others sit on their hands and may well do so until the self preservation alarm bell starts ringing.

300kts at 10nms !!!! Oh dear.....

[Shaka Zulu]

300kts on 10nm final is quite doable (on a 737), I have done it not too long ago.
Although not my favourite passtime, I do like a bit of flying once in a while....especially when the F/O dares you...
and for all those people that now say I'm unprofessional, on the contrary my friends, I chose this profession for the flying not for the tea and biscuits, so try and keep it safe.
If not certain of a stable approach at 500' then go around.
Take the blame and correct it for your next endeavour.
But for all these Willy Wonka's that never do anything remotely close to real flying, keep reading pprune in your 4x4 office, since there is no sense of reality

[normal_nigel]

But for all these Willy Wonka's that never do anything remotely close to real flying, keep reading pprune in your 4x4 office, since there is no sense of reality

Good point. I suppose most things are possible on Flight Sim or at least have no consequences.

[RAT 5]

Shaka Zulu:

First I have to ask if your pseudonym is indicative of a macho philosophy; and secondly, how far in your cheek was your tongue when making your comment?

I can't believe you are serious.

You let your F/O DARE you into such a manoeuvre??!! If it was a freighter in the darkest bundu, then perhaps it's not a hanging offence, but with a cabin full of pax and crew it has to be a questionable action. If you want to fly for fun then the place to do it is at the local club. There you can turn yourself inside out to your heart's content, as I do. Any passenger will be there for the thrill as well, but not the fare paying punter down the back of their flying gin palace.

The decision of a stable approach at 500' is made at 1000'. Most airlines in this day and age would take a grim view of 600kgs of fuel and 15 minutes of time being wasted due to such dramatics. And further, what are you teaching the future commanders by such action. I know I'm a hero & wizz bang jet jockey, I don't need to keep proving it.

The most relaxed training captain and superb operator I ever flew with was an ex-Red Arrow from the old days. Nowt to prove with a C.V like that. Everytrhing to lose if he went gungho.

[Arkroyal]

Shaka
300kts on 10nm final is quite doable (on a 737), Which model 73 are you talking about?

I simply do not believe that a CFM idling at 30+ % NF can do this.

[RAT 5]

Arkroyal:

Don't encourage him: but I did forget to include in my prognosis that I was talking of an NG. However, even a classic would be hard pushed. Perhaps he was talking of an old -200 with the Thrust Reversers disconnected from the squat switch; but then again not, as he said it was controllable. Ha!

[SR71]

Rananim/Shaka Zulu,

I concur. 210 to 6 on ATC's request into 24L @ PMI was more of a struggle.

You can pull the gear at 270 on the 733/4/5 and the speedbrake can be left out to F10 - our SOP.

To be at 1800AGL on the GS & 210/6 from 300/10 you need to lose 90kts in ~1min = 1.5kts/sec. Quite possible with a level segment + speedbrake =~ -1kts/sec from 300 - 270, followed by gear down + speedbrake =~ -2kts/sec from 270-210. Then start down the slope...

Bit noisy though.

All within limitations.

Just like my CAP371 roster.

Next time ATC ask you for "210 to 6", the detractors now have a choice to make...rather than spit out their dummy! Make sure there isn't a tailwind.

;)

:ok:

[Final 3 Greens]

Next time ATC ask you for "210 to 6", the detractors now have a choice to make. With the very greatest of respect, from a PPL who knows that he does not have the handling skills or experience of a line pilot, deciding that an aircraft is technically capable of delivering a performance is not the same as deciding that this is an appropriate decision.

And I once "flew" the Trident 3 sim from BIG at FL330 into 27L without an orbit or extra track miles and achieved a stabilised approach at 10NM, all under the beady eye of a TRE, who had several 000 hours on the real thing.

Speedbrake, reverse, gear down etc, -15k per min for a while ....

But I wouldn't have liked to have sat in the back on the real thing.

Neither would I have liked to experience the Skavsta approach, even though it ended happliy.

[SR71]

Final 3 Greens,

I totally agree - on all accounts.

:ok:

[flown-it]

Stabilised by 1000ft IFR or 500 ft VFR is what I teach and that means fully dirty on speed and on profile and never more than 1000ft/min ROD below 1000ft AGL. That way the gin stays in the glass and the punters come back for more. Remember, most modern aircraft will either go down or slow down but not both at the same time.

[jetrider757]

210 til 6nm you certainly can't do on my machine unless you've donned a stetson and spurs, in fact, the company expects us to be no more than 180 til 6nm and 160 til 4nm, the reason being obvious - safety. I'm always fully configured by 1000', even if the f/o's flying.

Any of the nonsensical flying talked of above doesn't figure in my outfit and how glad I am. If I put one foot out of line the flight data monitoring guys get to see it and the balpa rep. will ring me to discuss and if it warrants, take it further. This all makes for sensible and hopefully a much safer operation.

[ifleeplanes]

I find it interesting that the people who are advocating the 300kts at 10nm being a 'do-able' situation are the ones who are hanging the Skavsta crew and shooting the Ryanair so called 'Cowboys' down. The Skavsta incident was dreadful but it is not indicative of the culture as a whole within Ryanair.

Strikes me as pot calling kettle black here.

You shouldnt be pushing the envelope with passengers lives in your hands, you should not be putting yourself into situations that are 'just' do-able. Aircraft are built with multiple redundancy built in, shouldnt we be flying that way? With options open at all times? I certainly do....

[Shaka Zulu]

Well looks like I stirred up some comments.
Just to clear up one thing: I'm Not Advocating UNSTABLE approaches.
The cut off point for me is 500 feet.
Final Flap, Vref+20, Approach Thrust and Normal Rate of Descent.
If not achieved then go-around.
But dont think for one moment that I like sitting with tight bum cheeks seeing if we are going to be stable or not.

However I do take the approach that it is VERY useful to know that your aircraft is capable and indeed you know how to RECOVER from a rushed approach. You'll be amazed how many guys won't go for the gear when they really do need to/

Just the other night, No4 with 35trackmiles, ended up being No2 with 15trackmiles. Did we get it in: Roger that.....
and yes 300kts till 10nm is fine if you have that level segment, it's the preambule

SZ

edit:

Rat 5: no it has no bearing on my name whatsoever
ArkRoyal: -300 is easier than the -700, prefer at least a mile more on the NG (depending on weight of the aircraft). Lightweight 700 on a 3degree slope doesnt even slow down with gear over 210kts

[Rananim]

I dont think anyone here is advocating 300 knots at 10nm as an ideal scenario.But pilots must know how to adapt to an ongoing situation.He knew speed was the key,not the profile.Speed first,then recapture the profile.If you take off with the wrong runway in the FMC and go for LNAV and it turns you right when you should be going left what do you do?You adapt to the situation;the failure to see that the FMC was incorrectly programmed was a small procedural error.However,if you then religiously follow the FD commands,your error just got very big.

Same principle applies to this case;it would have been a small procedural infringement to forego the profile in order to control the inertia.The bigger and far more dangerous error was doing what he in fact did,ie.maintaining the profile because thats what the book says you must do.

[738Capt]

184 PEOPLE. You fly a plane with just one other person and you take NO risks, when your talking 184 people, and 7 crew then you go-around, no matter how ****ty your day, week, has been.

Does it need to be re-stated, this pilot was in command of a plane with 184 people onboard.

Small errors can be accounted for, but failing to follow even the most basic safety procedures when landing a 737-800 is criminal.

The man should have his ATPL pulled. A 737 is no place for cowboys.

What follows is CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE:

The PF recalled that the PNF “brought the excess in speed to his attention several times”, but that “his call was to continue thinking at the time he would be able to rescue the approach”. The PNF made the comment that the PF was “fixated on trying to fly the aircraft on to the runway”. Because of the high speeds, he recalled, he could only select Flap 10 for the landing, at about 210 kt (standard landing flap setting is Flaps 30). At no time did he call for a Go-Around (GA). His inputs of “too high” or “too fast” were effectively being ignored. Consequently, he said, a stabilized approach was not achieved, as is required by SOP’s. In the event, a relatively smooth landing was effected in the correct touchdown zone of the dry runway at a speed of 178/180 kt, which is some 30/40 kt above the normal touchdown speed. The aircraft stopped at the end of the 2,878 metre long runway using manual braking and normal reverse thrust.

Gross negligence.

[Right Way Up]

Be interesting to know how long their turnround was. Landing at 180 kts with a 20 min turnround could have worrying consequences for the next sector.

[100BMEP]

A lot of bashing sure going on in here over this one. Unfortunatley in the real world things like this happen.
Lets see...as I understand it he stopped (on the runway)did he not?
I used to brief on approach into Burbank..if we overshot the runway to be sure and grab a 6-pack as we went by the filling station at the end of the runway.
A few years later SouthWest did just that...as he stopped "in".
That is what the "I can make it mindset can get you!":E

[4dogs]

Folks,

Nobody has answered a very important question - where is he now and what is he doing?

If he is still actively flying, then a bunch of people have a right to know about this episode.

Stay Alive

[Pegasus77]

1. Ofcourse the pilots are responsible for their own actions, but interestingly it was an incident from Australia which introduced "management and corporate culture" to accident causes in investigations. Ofcourse the FO was under a lot of pressure, and I have no doubt at all about it that he would have lost his job if he would have single handedly grounded the airplane. That is company culture, or management tactics, I don't care what it's called; it is dangerous and most certainly contributing to the incident/accident. Yes Mr. O'Leary has his own responsibility of letting the pilots make their own decisions, and thus keeping his flights safe.

2. To SR71: I was in a similar situation once where during a departure a captain unexpectedly decided to wander off the SID directly towards some high mountains.
a. I called for an immediate right turn;
b. then I told ATC "XYZ turning right now"
c. then -the cpt still didn't react- I told him "I am taking over control, and if you don't let me, I'll punch you in the face"

then he let me take over and I initiated our right turn. He didn't comment on it during any stage of the rest of the flight. But he did have to speak to our fleet managament a few days later.

But indeed, if he doesn't let you take over? The only solution is to hit him, or call for the purser to the cockpit and work together.
I will do everything to prevent myself -and my crew and pax- from flying into a mountain.

P77

[calypso]

What about if you are the one that is mistaken about turning right? are you so sure that you judgement is always perfect?. Punching somebody in the face hardly seems a failsafe method of error management....

[Pegasus77]

Calypso: If someone does not respond to any CRM, the final result is that CRM does not work. In my case he did not respond to anything: in fact, he did not say a word to any of my callouts and comments.
I don't need to go into detail about EGPWS and the different colours on your NAV-display, nor into green lines and programmed routes and GPS Primary, nor into ATC clearances, MRVA's etc. etc., do I?

Would you let your captain fly the airplane into a mountain, because there might be a slight theoretical chance that he could be right?
The question was: What happens if someone does not let you take over control? Answer: If things get serious (i.e. lifethreatening), I not only would, but I actually once have considered hitting my captain, as my previous post shows.

P77

[the_hawk]

Do you know now what led to the Captains misbehaviour? Illness or what?

[Pegasus77]

I do.
After the flight he called in sick. I still found it necessary to go to my chief pilot with the story. He said something like: Oh him... well another chapter for his big file.
He was invited to drink tea upstairs, and got kind of a reprimand.
And they did try to fire him once, some years before this flight, but did not succeed, because they could not prove clearly enough for a judge in labour court, that he broke SOPs on a daily basis; for the (layman-) judge the case was too weak.

So he wasn't ill, he is one of the very few rotten apples in the cockpit.

P77