Improving flight safety in the future

[5206]

How do people perceive their influence on flight safety?

From the Lynham threads, there is obviously considerable concern about the engineering processes going on, but how does this fit with ‘breaking the chain? While I entirely sympathise with these concerns, when there is now more talk about ‘risk acceptance’ than ‘breaking then chain’, where are we? -

The accident rate since say the 50’s has dropped markedly – eg more planes were being lost in a year then than are now in the whole inventory and despite the Lynham problems, aircraft aren’t falling out of the sky (so I believe that, as ever, people there are working harder and harder to maintain standards to the detriment of their quality of life, with little recognition). Even compared to the start of 1996, when we lost a handlful of jets in short order, things don’t seem that bad.

In the future, safety targets are going to be getting tighter for the platform safety management. As technology reaches a limit of improvement, the only avenue left for a ‘return’ is in operating more safely (ie approx 4x as many accidents caused by some form of human error vs technical failure during flight). But how are we going to implement the required improvement, and then measure it so that the required levels can be demonstrated?

5206

[Safety_Helmut]

5206

One thing we have always been good at in Mod is causing confusion with alternative definitions. I don't have the publication to hand, it's Sunday and I'm at home, but look up the definition of Flight Safety in JSP553. I believe that you are really talking about improving is what the MoD now (officially) refers to as Aviation Safety, the definition of which is:

Aviation Safety. The scope of aviation safety covers every activity that could impact on the ability to deliver safe aviation. It includes:
- The design, manufacture, build, maintenance and support of aircraft
- Operating aircraft
- Support to aircraft operation including, for example, infrastructure, air traffic management and emergency services
- Provision of appropriately trained and competent personnel.

Aviation safety is achieved when the operation of aircraft poses no significant risk to aircrew, ground crew, passengers, other airspace users or to the general public over which such aircraft are flown.

According to 553 Flight Safety IIRC is about the process of review and continuous improvement.

Any Help ?

Safety_Helmut

[5206]

S_H, thanks.

Okay then,

Isn't the 'review and continuous improvement ' bit about
'- Operating aircraft
- Support to aircraft operation including, for example, infrastructure, air traffic management and emergency services' ??

If not, how do you think 'aviation safety' can be improved, and measured to be improved as per the future targets. I don't see much point in those at the top looking back and saying 'yep, we met our target last year, we must have done the right things' when it could so easily be 'B*gger, that accident, which we could have done something about, messes up the target. Oh, and how do we explain that to the widows?'

5206

[tucumseh]

“Aviation safety is achieved when the operation of aircraft poses no significant risk to aircrew, ground crew, passengers, other airspace users or to the general public over which such aircraft are flown.


In practice, “during peacetime” should be added to this. I don’t entirely agree with this, just an observation based on experience of what is permitted to enter service and reasons given for ignoring risks. My own opinion is that the purpose of most military aircraft is warfighting, so they should be fit for purpose, including safety. Others may not agree, but my view is that of someone who has to sign for that safety.

[4Greens]

Flight safety is equally if not more important in wartime. It is no use losing your assets before they arrive at the action.

[Safeware]

An operational safety case will require thought and input from many 'operational' people unused to having to justify why what they do is safe. So, they'll need some training first.

While the upcoming targets are numerical, it will be harder to provide a quantitative answer to the probability of 'hazardous situation x' occurring, but a qualitative argument of a ball-park figure will go some way. Then, a reasoned, compelling argument as to why the risks associated with 'x' have been mitigated will be needed.

Biggest problem will be the cultural change in having to think hard about these things and produce an acceptable argument. (not that I'm suggesting that the risks aren't thought about now, just that it isn't all joined up)

sw

[engineer(retard)]

The other problem with trying to clear wartime safety cases is categorizing the risk. You have to consider the effects of a range of weapons, with different lethality for varying modes of operation and delivery (assuming you can get this detail) on the weapon. The "safe route" would probably be to armour and over design everything, the end effect may be a flying tank or something that can outfly Janes book of weapons.

Alternatively, you lower the threshold to gain an acceptable design.

Regards

Retard

[Safeware]

It's also a problem when considering systems developed such as IFF - the integrity requirements are much higher in wartime than in peacetime.

sw

[BEagle]

"In the future, safety targets are going to be getting tighter for the platform safety management. As technology reaches a limit of improvement, the only avenue left for a ‘return’ is in operating more safely (ie approx 4x as many accidents caused by some form of human error vs technical failure during flight). But how are we going to implement the required improvement, and then measure it so that the required levels can be demonstrated?"

Enough of your engineering w@nkwords, number 5206.

One of the RN's best ways of ensuring that technical failure was minimised was to invite the spanner-wielder who did any engine change at sea to sit in the back for the resulting engine air test when fired off the front of one of Pusser's flat tops. A thoroughly good idea, to my mind. Some of the shabby old wrecks I used to air test might have perhaps have been inspected rather more carefully by the alleged engineers if they'd been told they'd be flying with us on the subsequent air test.....

'Platform safety management' indeed. Good grief.

[5206]

Beags,

There I was thinking you were quite astute, right up to Enough of your engineering w@nkwords Some of us have to live in the real world.
And your comment on putting the engineer in the back is a good idea (getting an FJ flight is generall morale +ve with the troops), while valid in focussing the minds of the maintainer, has no +ve effect on either design or operational safety

5206

[Sven Sixtoo]

Design safety - in the helo world we are making huge strides. The next generation will have icing clearances that actually mean something, OEI performance most if not all of the time (OK the Wokka usually has it now at the push of a button), true duplex AFCS and hydraulics, crashworthy structures, redundant load paths in primary components, proper engine response, controls with some design input from the ergonomics people, decent seats and harnesses ...

Operational safety - I think we are again doing OK. Despite the ever-expanding environmental envelope, we are approaching the limits in a considered manner, with more focussed training and a much more mature attitude across all experience levels than I remember as a 1st tourist.

Where I fear it may come apart is that the operational pressure will increasingly lead to either "Managed" (=accepted) risk, or risk carried because the formal "managing" process is just too difficult. The engineers seem to be drowning in paperwork to the detriment of concentration on the important bit, the continual battle for spares for our old and knackered aircraft is debilitating to aircrew, engineer and supplier alike, the admin support is on a 3 1/2 day week which really annoys the 24/7 bits of the Service, and the balls to shout STOP (or AVA-A-AST if you are dark blue) seem to be scarce indeed.

When I joined I calculated the odds on living through 16 years on FJ (based on the recent accident rate at the time) as about 4 in 5. By the end of those 16 years that had gone up to about 99 in 100 for the next 16. So we were really succeeding on the safety front. I am unconvinced that we are maintaing the rate of improvement, and right now there are bits of the Service where I fear we may be going backwards.

I'm mildly worried, but that may just be onset of old age. I hope so.

Sven

[Devil's Aardvark 8]

Flight safety is on the way up. Good show to all who recognise this.

Its all about breaking the chain, whether it be from aircrew during walk round or engine starts to, crew chief, armourer, rigger, loadie, the chap in the caravan at the end of the runway or the controller during on task.

An area where we might fall down is the 'can do' mentality. In the military we are (creditably) prone to making the most of a situation and doing the best we can given the resources we have. In the deployed operations that exist now, we are ever more isolated from our aircraft home bases, with fewer working eng shifts and fewer operating crews and far less in the way of command supervision. The upshot is that all sides of military aviation and aviation support, especially in deployed operations, are stretched and it is only a matter of time before a major incident that can directly be attributed to aircrew, groundcrew or supervision occurs. Self preservation is a natural reaction so maybe the answer has to lie in the supervision chain with regard to flight safety.

Comments chaps!

Retirement is great but it can be dull!

[Kengineer-130]

In my humble opinion, the human factors side of things are taking a turn for the worse :( . Yes, technology, operating procedures and experience have all improved rapidly over the last few decades, but at the moment we seem to be asking more and more of engineers, crews and most other people in the flight safty "chain"., and being asked to do so with less and less resources.
With the current engineering set-up at lyneham, as I have mentioned in other threads, we are VASTLY undermanned, and as a result more and more frames are being presented to the crews with long lists of ADF's and LIM's, neither of which can be conducive to flight safty.
The other problem I forsee is now that multi-skilling is taking place, people are going to assume that twice the work can be done, by half the number of people, and manpower will be cut accordingly. A huge number of experienced tradesmen are applying for redundancy, and if they don't get that they are going to PVR, which is going to have a big dent in the engineering skillbase, which again is going to cause long term problems. As all other areas of flight safty have moved on so well, it is about time someone called time on the beancounters, and made sure that the most vunerable area of flight safty , ie human factors, is taken care of properly, and stop expecting miracles from under-equipped, over stretched engineers. Somthing somewhere has to give soon, and it could so easily be prevented........

[C130 Techie]

I agree wholeheartedly with most of your last post. However

long lists of ADF's and LIM's, neither of which can be conducive to flight safty.

The whole point of ADFs and LIMs is that aircraft can be flown SAFELY whilst awaiting rectification or spares etc. They should never be used in any situation that compromises flight safety.

[Safety_Helmut]

The other problem I forsee is now that multi-skilling is taking place

Please use the "find and replace" facility in MS Word to replace multi skilling with deskilling.

Safety_Helmut

[4Greens]

Have a read of "Human error" by James Reason. It is a bit of a Bible in modern safety analysis.

[Kengineer-130]

C-130tecchie, yes I see your point about ADF's and LIM's, but IMHO they are there to allow the aircraft to fly when it is paramount to operations, NOT to keep the aircraft flying locals etc untill it is so broken that it is useless. Stuff like minor cracks, broken anchor nuts nuts, fine, but IMHO stuff like ATM's and aircon packs should NOT be LIM'd, as they are important items.

[Safeware]

4Greens,

Nancy Leveson is also good to read, esp on the 'management oversight' of safety. She has some very interesting info/views on how organisations like NASA get into trouble. And it doesn't take any stretch of the imagination to see parallels in this country.

sw

[Role1a]

I agree with most of the statements on this post and it is true that, per flying hour the incident rate has fallen.

However would the rate not fall further still if recommendations from BoIs were actually implemented rather than just looking good in print?
R1a

[Safeware]

R1a,

True, but a BoI recommendation isn't made on the basis of having carried out a cost benefit analysis, but purely on identifying issues that would have prevented 'that' accident from happening again.

sw

[5206]

So, if it is a case of purely on identifying issues that would have prevented 'that' accident from happening again Doesn't that, as discussed earlier, just mean that safety improvements are retrospective rather than forward looking?

5206

[Safety_Helmut]

I should have replied earlier to one of your previous posts 5206, but the break has given me chance to read all of the other posts too.

A lot of very valid points have been made on this thread so far. But for me, in my few years of experience, I think the most disconcerting thing is the almost total lack of consistent and robust policy and guidance that spans the whole of defence aviation and its interfaces. IPTs are unsure of the boundaries of their responsibilities and hence their SMS and Safety Cases, communication between commodity IPT/platform IPT and FLCs is at best, inconsistent, and at worst, non-existent. It's been recognised that for a long time that there have been communication problems between DPA and DLO, have they improved ? Formal education and training in safety management is almost non-existent, if you don't believe me, go and ask your average safety manager what training they have received and what is available.

How have we got ourselves in this position, and more importantly, how do we get ourselves out of it ?

Safety_Helmut

[5206]

SH,

Education and training - isn't that the way out of the situation, even if it is a slog in some areas? The only other way is through bitter experience, and we don't want to go there. Given the difficulty in getting engineers to take safety seriously is bad enough, how do you think it would be on other branches?

Or, lights touch paper, stands back, do you think that branches which have had to adapt to a changing environment, eg those in Ops Spt, would be able to get a grip quicker?

5206

[dervish]

5206

The only other way is through bitter experience, and we don't want to go there.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


I’m afraid it may be too late. I have been retired for some time now, but recall accidents where the precise cause was predicted in advance, but more senior staffs refused to mitigate the risk. There were usually two reasons. Lack of funding (easy to blame someone else) or the person having the final say had, as S-H says, no training or knowledge and therefore could not assimilate the facts. His default position was the status quo.

From what I gather the criticism of DLO and DPA is justified. Individual staffs with the necessary experience and knowledge are often great, but the IPTL and his “management team” are invariably those whose practical knowledge and vocabulary does not extend beyond what they hear at management seminars. As for lack of funding, I believe the Armed Services are reasonably well served, it’s just that it’s spent on the wrong things. Brown is probably right not handing out more when waste is so evident.

The solution is much the same. Get rid of the people who condone and practice the above and give rein to those who know.

[Safeware]

5206 / dervish,
The only other way is through bitter experience, and we don't want to go there

I think 'we don't want to go there AGAIN

But if you look at the threads on Lynham, we may be closer than we want to be.

Contrast this with the Chinook vs horserider thread where there is a complete over-reaction to a low risk (in terms of overall overflown population)

Put together, do they represent effective safety management?

sw

[dervish]

According to the MoD’s website:


The Defence Aviation Safety Board direct.

The Defence Aviation Safety Centre advise, formulate, regulate and validate as directed by DASB.

DPA and DLO implement.


Who verifies and audits? It seems this is down to DPA and DLO themselves. Such self regulation is fine, but within these organisations one would expect an independent body overseeing the IPTs. This would ensure a commonality of process and procedure. To my knowledge, no such body exists, leaving safety to the whim of individual IPTs who are apparently not obliged to employ the requisite experience or knowledge. The demise of specialist departments some years ago, with their responsibilities devolved to IPTs, meant that few IPTs had a full-time posts for safety and Quality Assurance specialists. Therefore, these important subjects became a miniscule part of the job of many, instead of the specialism of an independent few. Few would be sent on safety courses if safety was 2% of their job. The training budget would be concentrated on their primary tasks. It wouldn’t surprise me if there was no longer an aviation safety course for DPA or DLO to attend.

Does anyone remember the Aircraft and Radio Mods Committees? Run by experienced but independent specialists whose c.v. had to include the practical repair/overhaul/management of the systems or platforms they were deliberating. They carried airworthiness delegation and were selected for their experience and proven ability; not by rank or grade. Disbanded long ago, but they were the nearest thing to what I’ve discussed above.

[Safety_Helmut]

Safeware, a good comparison.

Dervish, I suppose an organisation can say whatever it likes on a website about what it does, but as for actually doing it........?
Such self regulation is fine
in theory, I think many would agree, in practice, I think those in the know would not !

Owner, Operator and (self) Regulator, is this a good thing ?
It wouldn’t surprise me if there was no longer an aviation safety course for DPA or DLO to attend.
That would be the Airworthiness of Military Aircraft Course (AMAC) at Cranwell. A series of presentations that range from the excellent, to downright cr@p, no consistent theme, no formal objectives, an attendance 'course'. A prerequisite by the way to get one's LoD.

Has anybody got any thoughts on that half baked mish mash of presentations.

Safety_Helmut

[dervish]

Safety-Helmut

“(self regulation) I think many would agree, in practice, I think those in the know would not !

Owner, Operator and (self) Regulator, is this a good thing ?”


I wouldn’t mind, for example, DPA having a department whose job is to oversee the practices of their own staff. Similar to self certification in aircraft maintenance, it is a case of where you draw the boundary of responsibility. I would draw the line at the same person being customer, supplier and approving authority. Unfortunately, I believe that is now common practice, it being the whole point of the decision to disband the independent bodies I mentioned. This arrangement breaches the MoD's own rules on independent scrutiny.



”That would be the Airworthiness of Military Aircraft Course (AMAC) at Cranwell. A series of presentations that range from the excellent, to downright cr@p, no consistent theme, no formal objectives, an attendance 'course'. A prerequisite by the way to get one's LoD”.


But who attends this course? I doubt if many graduates actually have to sign to say something is airworthy. As discussed, airworthiness is delegated to many nowadays, who are mostly civilian DLO/DPA civilians. There used to be a civilian equivalent course at Portsmouth University under the auspices of ADRP. I suspect attendees on both courses fell into two categories; those who would never be called to put it into practice and those whose practical experience put them miles ahead of the tutor, who was just reading from a script.

[C130 Techie]

AMAC ......... Hmmm

Death by powerpoint in some of the most uncomfortable seating ever.

A forum for individual organisations to stand up and tell you how good they are. 75% of it was an absolute waste of time. But as stated it was a means to an end, i.e LoD

I have to disagree though with the idea that the IPTs are poorly managed and waste money.

IPTs work extremely hard to provide the end user with exactly what it needs. They are however often frustrated by red tape, financial constraints and even the user units themselves. Countless hours are spent chasing units trying to get Engineering Instructions complied with properly and Mod programmes completed.

[tucumseh]

C130

“I have to disagree though with the idea that the IPTs are poorly managed and waste money”.


Whenever waste is talked about, it’s usually a result of a Committee of Public Accounts report or a Select Committee bashing. Knowing that these bodies never follow up, DPA and DLO usually ignore them.

A lesser known fact is that the MoD has its own auditors. Now these guys really go to town and are never less than scathing about waste of money. Unlike aforesaid bodies, they don’t give advance notice of topics or questions. They pitch up, dig deep and tell it as it is. They say MoD wastes money, and they’re right. However, nothing changes as they’re still ignored.

I’m a civvy. An old boss had a favourite promotion board question for PTO4 > PTO3 i.e. to the grade below the most junior project manager in DPA. “How would you save 10% on any avionics project?” Less than 10 seconds to answer and you haven’t been paying attention. We all knew the answers (as should any Requirement Manager). Many years later the MoD auditors picked upon this and issued a report recommending full implementation. PE rejected it, a stance later reaffirmed by DPA.

That 10% would go a long way spent on safety!

[C130 Techie]

I have to agree that money is wasted in the DPA/DLO.

However my point was made in defence of the assertion that IPTs do not make enough of a contribution to the maintenance of flight safety.

We are as commited as everyone else to the issue.

[tucumseh]

C130

Apologies if I misinterpreted. I agree, the majority of aicraft IPTs (as opposed to equipment IPTs) are good at safety. The Design Authorities also keep them right and refuse contracts if the necessary safety clauses aren't there. My main beef would be when SEMs enter the equation. Too many major mods are now schemed as SEMs because of lack of funds.

But I concur with other posts highlighting the lack / dilution of experience. There are long standing safety procedures to follow and I find that equipment IPTs often completely ignore them. Worse, they are allowed to, even after BOIs or audits highlight it. That is a senior management failure.

[C130 Techie]

I wholeheartedly agree with the point about experience. I believe that I am something of a rarity being in an IPT with 16 years type experience behind me.

Why do we still move officers every 2 or 3 years? In this day and age experience counts for an awful lot.

[Safeware]

C-130 techie,IPTs do not make enough of a contribution to the maintenance of flight safety. We are as commited as everyone else to the issue.

For those that care, true, but there are those that don't (and need to be counselled accordingly) eg on our project, twas commented by one that he wasn't going to get in the way of the timescale because of a safety concern. This was because 'lateness' was the more visible issue to him. :hmm:

sw

[southside]

Why do we still move officers every 2 or 3 years?

But if we didnt then we wouldnt gain any experience would we...?

I.E. Lets say the MOD allow you to remain in your IPT until you reitre. Then who is going to take over from you?

By changing people every 2/3 years we maintain that level of experience across the board, rather than that level of experience and knowledge being concentrated on one fella.

Besides, isnt a posting to an IPT considered a sideways step, bit like a sentence or punishment.

[C130 Techie]

Southside

Its a fair point but it seems to work for the non commissioned types. Sensible spacing of posts should address the retirement problem.

As far as being a sideways/punishment move. I guess it depends on the job and your attitude to it. I considered my move to be a step up the ladder and a chance to work in a different aspect of military aviation.

Safeware

Sad but true unfortunately. Hopefully these individuals get spotted and weeded out before they cause problems.

[tucumseh]

C130 / Safeware

“he wasn't going to get in the way of the timescale because of a safety concern”


These people do get spotted. In my experience, they are not weeded out, they are earmarked for greater things. They are a protected species within DPA. They protect and cover for each other. Their actions have been raised at the highest level and are condoned. They are well known to the staffs who have to pick up the pieces and who, thankfully, are still in the majority. But the disease is spreading. New entrants quickly assess the benchmark. They see people rewarded for precisely what Safeware describes. And they are DPA's future.

However, the saving grace in all this is that engineers sign for airworthiness. And because DPA - and the MoD in general - seldom promote (civilian) engineers beyond a certain level, the people I speak about almost never have to actually sign for airworthiness. And, because non-engineers cannot delegate airworthiness, they have no say in what their staffs do in this respect.

[Impiger]

Tucumseh said:

However, the saving grace in all this is that engineers sign for airworthiness. And because DPA - and the MoD in general - seldom promote (civilian) engineers beyond a certain level, the people I speak about almost never have to actually sign for airworthiness. And, because non-engineers cannot delegate airworthiness, they have no say in what their staffs do in this respect.


Something strange has happened in the last 2 years then. When I was involved in this business AIRWORTHINESS was a two-part definition one part was the inherrent safety of the flying platform (sorry BEags no offence) and all its associated equipment (including software) and the other was the competence of the operators and the regulations covering their employment of the platform. In the Royal Air Force the responsibility for the first part was vested in ACAS (and delegated in my time to the Director of Air Operations) and for the second part responsibility lay with the chain of command - in effect the CinC and group commanders (or for SH in COM JHC - see how joint the RAF are) ACAS also held the same 'platform' responsibility for naval and Army fixed wing; although those two Services retained responsibility for their helicopters.

Of course in producing Service Deviations and Release to Service authorities the specialist input of a number of engineers was taken into account. In essence engineers sign off on serviceability not airworthiness - on the latter they present a safety case which is then balanced with the operational need to come to the airworthiness decision.

Hope this helps - there are any number of APs which together define the totality of the process.

[tucumseh]

Impiger

I entirely agree with you. My comments were aimed at the practical, working level implementation of airworthiness at IPT level. i.e. the platform and its associated equipment. The second part (competence of operators and regulations) is of concern to IPTs, but they have little day to day input. Also, my comments were made in the context of a post (quite rightly) bemoaning the minority who will happily bypass safety to further their career.

I, like many colleagues, hold formal airworthiness (and type approval) delegation. To attain the level of trust such delegation implies, I was required to have previous experience of 2nd/3rd line servicing and hold full QA certification, followed by some years experience as project manager on relevant aircraft and equipment. I know standards vary, and are almost certainly more relaxed these days, but that was the criteria I and my contemporaries had to meet.

So, having responsibility for serviceability and airworthiness are not mutually exclusive; it’s just that one (usually) follows the other in career terms. In the same way financial delegation is dripped down to the minions, so is airworthiness. At the working level, it is a competence based delegation and I have never known a non-engineer in an IPT to have delegated authority. Having said that, I know competent engineers that have delegation but are scared rigid of putting their name to paper, and never use it. I know others that use their delegation having never set eyes on the kit they’re signing for and couldn’t explain how it works. And I know quite a few non-engineer IPTLs and project managers who resent the fact that their junior staffs actually have more responsibility and authority than they do. These, I suspect, are the people Safeware was referring to.

I think we agree, it’s just that I look at the subject from a day to day work perspective. The system is not perfect. The one thing I’d like to see change is the status of Boscombe Down MAR recommendations. We all know they are recommendations to the project manager and are not binding. But I’d like a system whereby a PM who ignores the recommendations MUST give written reasons. That would soon weed them. Any BD trials officer like to comment?

[engineer(retard)]

Tuc

I've had the (mis)fortune to have had all three, much like safeware, as well as unit experience.

On a unit, even when you lack type experience there was a robust chain of engineering and flying expertise to refer to.

In my time in DLO in an aircraft IPT, I had no-one with direct airworthiness experience between myself as a 2nd tourist and gp capt for about 2 years. This being the days of MDGs and suppliers were put in dual hatted posts and the civilianisation was making in-roads. No safety training of any sort was available. Retrospectively, I know we were making some bad decisions with the best intentions because we did not grasp the complexity. Looking across other IPTs since, I think that the effectiveness of the safety system is dependant upon where the aircraft started from. To retrospectively introduce modern standards to an airframe that was procured under loose regulation or enforcement is near impossible, they are left holding some very difficult babies. Do you ground the fleet, or get given pots of money that do not add to capability. I've yet to see anyone succeed in either path.

At BD, training again was patchy but the peer review system kept everyone honest and there were centres of expertise to call upon. You also had the advantage of making the call without having to suffer the financial or project impacts and that does make life easier.

DPA, I worked in 2 non-aircraft IPTs. In the first I was the only one who had ever held any delegated responsibility and still have forehead lumps to prove it. The other was better but had a core of people who had been around aircraft for a while. ADRP appeared ro be introspective perhaps because maintaing the system sucked up all their resource and they did not have the ability to police the system.

That said I have also seen some shabby safety case work come from DAs as well. There is a dearth of real safety engineers around, and those that do not have domain knowledge flounder outside their own field.

regards

retard

[Safeware]

tuc,And I know quite a few non-engineer IPTLs and project managers who resent the fact that their junior staffs actually have more responsibility and authority than they do. These, I suspect, are the people Safeware was referring to. Unfortunately, no. Said person was an engineer who just felt it 'career limiting' to be seen as the one who's system wasn't going to be 'ready' in time if the safety issues raised were to be effectively addressed.

As for IPT's having to justify why the haven't nb'd the advice from BD, the safety case presented up the line should cover areas where the IPT is taking responsibility for the risk in not implementing recommendations.

But therein lies more cans.

sw

[5206]

tucumseh,
a PM who ignores the recommendations MUST give written reasons But given that IPTs are to be deciders, not providers, surel the rationale for ignoring each piece of advice would be as detailed as the advice itself, thereby perpetuating the paperwork mountain?

5206