Air Transat loses A310 rudder inflight

[CGTSN]

FROM CBC.COM

Air Transat took some of its A-310 aircraft out of service on Sunday after an incident involving one of its planes en route from Cuba to Quebec.

On Saturday, an Air Transat Airbus 310 flying from Varadero, Cuba to Quebec City developed what the airline is calling a "mechanical problem" about 25 minutes into the flight.

A spokesperson for the airline said the plane's rudder "partially fell off."

On Sunday three Airbus planes in Toronto and two in Vancouver were suspended from flying until they are thoroughly inspected.

Air Transat has a total of 10 A-310 models.

The airline had to make alternate arrangements for affected passengers.
------------------------

Air Transat : Status on Flight TS961 of March 6, 2005
Monday March 7, 12:28 am ET

MONTREAL, March 7 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Transat Flight TS 961 that left Varadero, Cuba, for Québec City, had to return to Varadero approximately 30 minutes after take-off, due to a mechanical failure. There were 261 passengers and 9 crewmembers on board the Airbus A310 aircraft, which landed normally in Varadero at 4:18 p.m. local time on Sunday. Deplaning occurred normally through the loading bridge.

Passengers were sent to hotels in Varadero. Passengers will arrive in Québec City in the early morning hours of Monday.

Preliminary observations indicate that a portion of the rudder detached from the aircraft, as the flight was progressing under normal conditions at its cruising altitude.

Air Transat operates 10 Airbus A310s. The Company immediately carried out a thorough visual examination of all its Airbus A310s. The inspection was completed in the following hours and no anomaly was detected. The inspection caused delays on certain flights but no Air Transat flights have been cancelled. The Company expects to be back to a normal schedule on Monday.

Following the incident, Air Transat immediately advised Airbus, Transport Canada and the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Based on available information, an investigation will be conducted by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, with support and participation of Cuban authorities, Air Transat and Airbus.

The aircraft involved in Flight TS 961, an Airbus A310, was put into service in 1991. It had an A-Check inspection on March 1, 2005 and its next major C-Check inspection is scheduled for 2006.

Flight TS 961 left Varadero at 2:48 a.m. on Sunday, March 6.The problem occurred sometime about 3:15 a.m. and the aircraft landed normally at 4:18 a.m. in Varadero

[Sleeping Freight Dog]

Was reading through A.net and came across a very interesting topic regarding an Air Transat A310 that lost most of the rudder
after take off from Varadero this past weekend. The photo shows the rudder almost completely gone. Sorry dont know how to post it on here. My question is, this is a significant incident. How come it hasnt been throughly dissected by the experts on PPRUNE?
This is much worse than the Concorde delamination problems.
Any comments greatly appreciated.

[catchup]

Do you have the link?

regards

[eight iron special]

----------------------------------------Occurrence 4----------------------------------------

Occurrence No. : A05F0047 Occurrence Type: ACCIDENT
Class : CLASS 2 Reportable Type:
Date : 06-03-2005 Time : 07:15 UTC
Region of Responsibility : HEAD OFFICE
Location : VARADERO (MUVR), CUBA


Aircraft Information:

Registration : C-GPAT Operator : AIR TRANSAT
Manufacturer : AIRBUS Operator Type: COMMERCIAL
Model : A310-300 CARs Info: 705 - AIRLINER
Injuries: Fatal : 0 Serious : 0 Minor : 0 None : 268 Unknown : 0


Occurrence Summary :

A05F0047: Air Transat 961, an Airbus A310-300, registration C-GPAT, serial # 597, departed Varadero, Cuba for Quebec (Quebec). While in the early enroute phase of the flight, aircraft control problems were encountered. The flight then returned to Varadero, and On arrival at Varadero, it was discovered that the aircraft rudder was missing. The TSB sent 2 investigators to Cuba, accompanied by a Transport Canada Technical Advisor. It appears that the occurrence commenced over international waters. In accordance with Annex 13, Canada, as the State of Registry, will be investigating. Cuba has offered assistance.

[Longtimer]

There is a picture posted of the Verticle stab at:

http://www.avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopic.php?p=53588#53588

[bizflyer]

different angle (for what it's worth)

here (http://epgv1.europeanprescriberguide.com/rudder.htm)

[catchup]

What's x-wind limit with this config?

[hobie]

the plane's rudder "partially fell off."
a portion of the rudder detached
might qualify as the understatement of the year ....

[Sunfish]

Looks like hinges are still there

[Sleeping Freight Dog]

"Understatement is definitely putting it mildly"
How about a freakin miracle. Reminds me of the
drawings of what happened to the JAL B747 that
had the fuselage bulkhead rupture and tear off the
rudder. We all know what happened with that.
How lucky was this aircraft to get back down to
terra firma with out becoming shark bait.
I read a report that said the aircraft came out of an
"A" check on Mar 1st. Usually that is just routine maintenance.
Is a rudder check usually part of an "A" check?

[VC10 Rib22]

Well done to the pilots, but please can an A310 pilot or a design engineer state whether it would be expected that the aircraft be landed safely every time in this rudderless condition, or could this easily develop into a full loss of control situation?

Thanks in advance.

[Ranger One]

Comments in the avcanada forum suggest that, if they had diverted to Florida (as might seem reasonable given their position when they turned around), there would have been Big Trouble due to contravention of Cuba embargo; even in an emergency situation, it's suggested that a landing in the USA would result in aircraft being seized and crew jailed.

I've never operated in the Caribbean so have no personal knowledge; would someone please tell me this is BS, and a flight originating in Cuba can make an emergency landing in the US without legal problems?!

IF not, surely ICAO could and would throw the book at the Americans...?

R1

[Wino]

Its complete BS.

Cheers
Wino

[Globaliser]

Sleeping Freight Dog: Reminds me of the drawings of what happened to the JAL B747 that had the fuselage bulkhead rupture and tear off the rudder. We all know what happened with that. How lucky was this aircraft to get back down to terra firma with out becoming shark bait.Slight difference - the JAL 747 lost its entire fin, IIRC.

[Dockjock]

Boy, those Transat crews sure are building a great reputation for their superior stick and (ahem) rudder skills. :cool:

[ive348]

Well done to the pilots for putting this plane down safely.

Although I'm not a pilot or engineer, I would think losing the rudder completely should actually be less of a problem than having it stuck in "full left" or "full right" , provided the rest of the fin is big enough to provide longitudinal stability. Still looks like Airbus should have another carefull look at the tail of the A300/310 series, as this seems to be the weak spot on this aircraft

[MarkD]

BoeingMEL

I suspect you would be comparing a 767 to the 310 for the same capacity, but since it was obviously just a kneejerk fanboy comment I'll just mention the sardine can/convertible 737 and leave it at that.

Ratherbeflying - well put

Amazing that some here want the A300/310 dead for tail issues when Concorde lost tail rudder parts with quite interesting frequency and yet other folk want them resurrected!

[A3Sneezer]

I would think that a flight from Cuba would be allowed to land in the US due to an emergency without much problem. I have flown charter flights from JFK to Havana and Guantanamo so it is possible. I'm not sure what hoops my company (JFK based) had to jump through for these flights but apparently it isn't too difficult.

[justplanes]

There are daily charter flights between the US and Cuba... including American, United, Continental etc... so there is absolutely no reason Air Transat would not be allowed to land its Cuba flight in the US under normal circums let alone if they declared an emergency... fact is that Air Transat released the following this afternoon :

MONTREAL, March 7 - Air Transat wishes to point out that the decision to return to Varadero rather then land in Florida was made by the captain together with the Operational Control Center because the Company has access to maintenance staff at this airport. It is untrue that American authorities were opposed to allowing the plane to land on their territory.

[BEagle]

I've always thought it a bit odd that the A310 has a single section rudder with 3 hydraulic actuators - what if top and bottom say 'left' and middle says 'right'?

Older a/c, such as the VC10, had multi-section rudders with each section driven independently from separate actuators and each had its own yaw damper.

[catchup]

@BEagle

Yes, I remember the 727 which was build that way. Upper and lower rudder.

What, if upper says left - but lower says right?

;)

regards

[Low-Pass]

Catchup, it's called a BAe 146 ;)

But seriously, the Japanese 747 indeed lost it's entire fin as well as hydraulics to the elevator and the pilots kept it in the air for a while by changing the power settings to control pitch. With this, I suspect that neither directional nor pitch control would have been so adversely affected. Regardless, well done to the crew:ok:

ive348, i suspect you may be correct....

[Rainboe]

Crosswind limit about 1 1/2 kts I should think!
I've only just learnt of this myself. A bit disingenuous to start implying because it's Yoo-ropean we don't want to discuss it. Conc had rudders fall off- not surprising at 2000mph with delamination problems. A technical masterpiece God Bless her.
Now the Aibus- how many rudder problems in history? Can't think of many. Looks like this one will be easily solved. Meanwhile, 737s are flying around with potential hardover problems that have never really been explained. Should a Lauda 767 have had a full power reverse inflight leading to breakup? How many 747s have fallen apart due to unsatisfactory repair jobs on the rear pressure bulkhead? I would like SAFETY to be the main issue, not making political and nationalistic points out of each incident, presumably to support a desperate attempt to make more of the Airbus JFK incident than just an overcontrol situation.

[chimbu warrior]

I saw an A310 in Darwin about 5 or 6 years ago with a hole in the fin about 18 inches square. As I recall, crew did not realise anything was amiss until they landed in DRW for fuel.

Aircraft belonged to an Egyptian operator and was on a military charter from Nadi (I think) to somewhere in the Middle East.

Anyone else recall seeing it?

[farsouth]

Don't know the circumstances, but if you put "B52 tailless landing" in Google image search, you will see a B52 that managed to land with virtually no tail..........

[Biggles Flies Undone]

A friend sent me this (http://www.airdisaster.com/forums/showpost.php?p=309023&postcount=17) link with more pics.

[CosmosSchwartz]

Rainboe - I'm sensing a slight bias here.

the Aibus- how many rudder problems in history? Can't think of many Well, how about the fatal crash at new york a couple of years back? Whether it was the pilot or the equipment at fault, the problem was most definitely the rudder.

Meanwhile, 737s are flying around with potential hardover problems The word here being potential.

You say we shouldn't make political or nationalistic points out of incidents, and then proceed to do exactly that!

All aircraft will have faults, nothing and no one is perfect. The important thing is how the manufacturers react to those faults.

[Rainboe]

Em...not 'potential'. Two violent 737 crashes plus other events. I would like to see complete neutrality in the investigation of such incidents- safety is the issue, not US v Airbus. Someone else raised it first.
At the risk of kicking off the whole AA discussion again, previous history and the manner of the event satisfies me that the JFK accident was reasonably caused by overcontrol during a wake encounter. Aeroplanes are not designed to have full rudder applied in that manner. There is obviously a rudder problem here- whether there is a whole fin problem is not at stake- this incident has nothing to do with a fin problem.

[Shore Guy]

I believe that the A-310 Vertical Stab is metal...rudder composite

The A-300, both vertical stab and rudder composite.

Can anyone confirm?

[Captain104]

Nope.

"The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes with Airbus Modification 4886 is manufactured of advanced composite materials. The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A310 series airplanes with the same modification is manufactured of the same materials."

Regards

Edit for history:
"The original A-300 design had this primary structure as aluminum. Then Airbus designed the A-310, which was actually the first airliner with an all-composite vertical stabilizer. Later, Airbus rolled out an improved A-300-600, which basically used the A-310 composite tail design." Hope that helps. :ok:

[Wino]

Also the original A300 with the aluminum fin had a ratio changer rudder load limiter that worked in the conventional manner.

The A310 and the A300600 have a fixed ratio rudder load limiter that is a trap for an oscilation, and is a VERY bad design.

Whether you break the whole fin off or just the rudder would be a function of the speed of the incident.

Cheers
Wino

[Flight Safety]

The A310 has the same overly sensitive rudder limiter system that the A300-600 has. Since this failure occurred 30 minutes into the flight, the aircraft should have been at cruise speed when this happened, thus the rudder limiter would have been fully activated (i.e. in the configuration creating the highest sensitivity).

It will be interesting to see what "control problem" was encountered that initiated this event.

I would also imagine that this aircraft cannot possibly be put back into service without the vertical fin being thoroughly inspected (including all 6 attactment lugs).

[hobie]

I would also imagine that this aircraft cannot possibly be put back into service without the vertical fin being thoroughly inspected (including all 6 attactment lugs).
Surely the Fin in question will never fly again? .....

[six7driver]

I see a very important story here, first for this airline, secondly for the manufacturer and Boeing, NTSB, and FAA, and third for all non US operators that fly in this part of the world.

First Air Transat's maintenance practices were shown to be questionable after the dead stick landing by one of their A330's into the Azores. Of course the Azores incident, which could have so easily turned into a disaster, was also blamed on the captain's poor judgement in monitoring his fuel state and properly excuting checklists. None the less the incident began with a maintenance error, and transport authorities in Canada will not forget this.

Secondly all those who have followed the story of AA A300 loss in New York shortly after 9-11 know just how important this story is, given that the NTSB conclusions from this accident clearly pinned the blame for the structural failure of that A/C's tail on poor piloting techniques induced by poor training practices at AA. The findings of the A300 accident caused a huge wave in the way that large jet operators train their aircrew, as Airbus and Boeing issued new documents on how aircrew should use the rudder in jet upset conditions. At the same time and in the same documents both manufactures took great pains in defending the strength of their rudders. However judging by the images posted clearly the strength of composite structures and in particular on Airbus aircraft will be questioned, and this in turn could very likely affect the findings of NTSB about the AA300 accident.

Third, the aircraft turned back to Varedero, and judging by the statements that have been made by the airline it could have landed in Florida, but turned back to Varedaro at the PIC's discretion. A sound desicion and absolutely not as benign as people percieve. Any non US aircrew that has operated into this part of the world know the consequences to all involved if the A/C would have landed on US soil. The A/C had departed from Cuba, was not a US carrier, was registered to a state that is having it's share of a differing political opinions lately with the US so that would have surely set off a less than hospitable reaction. I remember that on a flight for a non US airline I operated into the US from Panama a few years back, a crew member had bought a $5 bottle of cuban rum IN PANAMA and unwittingly declared it to US customs in Miami. The reaction by US authorities was incredible in its zealousness, as we waited for the crewmember to pass customs a squad of customs officers arrived, the bottle was confiscated and put in a hermetically sealed box, the crewmember was reprimanded verbally, and later sent a letter from the US state department that any additional violations he commited to the "trading with the enemy" act would result in a massive fine, deny him of his right to enter the US ever again and or land him in jail. I know that the PIC of the Air Transat flight made his decision to turn back to Varedaro considering these kinds of potential problems, but it also makes me wonder just how different this story would have been if the Air Transat flight had not made it back or had crashed on landing at Varedero?

[lomapaseo]

six7driver

I see that you went to great pains to develop your Tom Clancy immaginative story to get us to believe in the nationalistic jingo being a causal factor in this incident.

I believe that we should be searching for facts and answers rather than making them up to serve an obvious agenda.

[six7driver]

lomapaseo, I don't know how how you drew the conclusion about a "Tom Clancy story" out of my comments. I challenge you to tell me where I state any causal factors of this incident in my comments? All I say in my comments is that this is an important story, for the reasons I believe it is. All I express is my opinion. Tell me just were I have made up a fact? and what agenda you are refering to that is so obvious in my comments? The only thing I understand from your reply is that YOU read Tom Clancy books.

I'll leave the searching for the facts and answers to those investigating the incident.:cool:

[BEagle]

"Yes, I remember the 727 which was build that way. Upper and lower rudder.

What, if upper says left - but lower says right?"

Errm, you turn the faulty one off?

To make the point to a pilot who had failed to notice a PFCU red warning light (in the VC10 simulator) below V1 (mandatory abort for that type) - we gave the crew a middle rudder PFCU failure and a lower rudder hardover. Stupid sods then spent the next 10 minutes fannying about trying to get the failed middle rudder back instead of first attempting to turn off the 'hardover' lower rudder (electrohydraulic servo - the fault was an input signal error)....

But they worked it out eventually - and the pilot in question never missed a 'below V1 red light' again!

But if all 3 PFCUs are driving the same surface, I can well imagine it breaking up if 2 say one way and the 3rd says the other. Unless there's some other protection system, of course...

Is there?

And the AA accident was down to inappropriate and ultimately fatal mishandling. All a/c have their quirks - you don't leave flap down above Mach 0.9 in a Hunter, you don't select airbrakes with flap in a VC10 - and you don't pedal the rudder of an A300/310 like a demented harmonium player!

[catchup]

@BEagle


Errm, you turn the faulty one off?

Indeed, and it's much easier if two say left and one says right, isn't it?

Regards

[junior_man]

A couple of things:

737 rudder problem is not a mystery. They know what caused the accident. Secondary slide jammed in the PCU. There is a new rudder PCU that fixes the problem. They also have a mod that reduces the A system pressure most of the time with the old PCU (lowers rudder travel and therefore crossover speed). Also being shown a rudder hardover in the sim and the procedures for recovery, makes it much easier to deal with. Aluminum structure is easier to inspect than composite.
I have over 5000 hours in the 737 and am satisfied with the solutions to the rudder PCU problems. I am currently an A 320 driver and think that both Airbus and Boeing make good airplanes.
As far as the missing rudder, looks more to me like the upper hinge came apart or something of that nature, not a plastic airplane part failure initially.

[Shore Guy]

Captain 104 and Wino, thanks for the response and info.....

[Krueger]

The way the rudder system is designed makes it difficult for one servo control to be pulling one way and the others the other way. Of course, it could happen if maintenance makes a mistake when connecting the cables, but in that case shouldn't it jam the"bad" servo?
I, also, don't like to drivel before a thorough investigation is done. But my experience and the images incline me to look at corrosion problems on the composite material.
Most of all, I would like to congratulate the crew for the excellent job on putting this baby on the ground.:ok:

[RatherBeFlying]

Far, far better to have the rudder depart the hinges than for the hinges to hold and allow the rudder to take the fin off.

My compliments to the structural engineers.

[Ranger One]

six7driver:

given that the NTSB conclusions from this accident clearly pinned the blame for the structural failure of that A/C's tail on poor piloting techniques induced by poor training practices at AA.

I would beg to suggest that is by no means the whole story as regards the NTSB conclusions. Yes, they (justifiably) had things to say about AA training, and the handling skills of the PF.

But they also (justifiably) had criticism for the Airbus rudder system, in particular the breakout forces and difficulty achieving progressive response/control inputs at speed.

R1

[six7driver]

Ranger One, you are entirely correct here's the quote from directly from the NTSB

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident [AA 587] was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program. "

Regardless, I'm sure this incident will highly interest those that were involved with AA587 investigation.:cool:

[HotDog]

six7driver, you obviously failed to read the preceeding threads;

MONTREAL, March 7 - Air Transat wishes to point out that the decision to return to Varadero rather then land in Florida was made by the captain together with the Operational Control Center because the Company has access to maintenance staff at this airport. It is untrue that American authorities were opposed to allowing the plane to land on their territory.

[Ignition Override]

I've only skimmed over the first and second pages of replies, but wonder whether the same "experts", even those who write to the editor of "Aviation Week and ST" will still insist that sections of the rudder or vertical stabilizer can ONLY come off when a pilot does so-called "bicycling" on the rudder pedals.

Let's not clarify the reported fact that increasing movement on a A-300/310 pedal seems to cause a disproportionate increase in rudder angle (increased sensitivity?), or whether Airbus tested the composite materials throughout the temperature and pressure ranges of actual flight conditions. Heaven help any Air Transat mechanics who could have made a mistake.

Let's rest assured that there can never be a connection between the AMR 587 disaster and the Transat incident? No chance of that..... I suppose.

[Zeke]

Ignition Override,

It was predictable that a handful of ppruners would automatically jump in and suggest that there is a correlation between this event and the AMR587.

Yes there is a correlation, they are both Airbus aircraft, that’s about where it stops. I have seen nothing else to suggest there was a wake turbulence encounter, or inappropriate control inputs, or a loss of life.

AMR587 was caused by inappropriate control inputs of the rudder leading to the whole of the vertical stabilizer detaching from the aircraft. If the causal factors were low breakout forces and inappropriate training, so be it, still at the end of the day was ultimately caused by inappropriate control inputs.

To put things into perspective there have been something like 3 million flights in A310s, with 6 hull losses, it has an accident rate less than that of the 747. As far as I am aware it was the first time a rudder detached from an A310.

Thinking out loud, with nothing to back me up, I could see this sort of event occurring from ice in the control surface leading to flutter. But as I said I have nothing to suggest this is the case, just the look of the photos.

I trust you are mature enough to know the difference between a vertical stabilizer and a rudder.

:rolleyes:

[admiral ackbar]

six7driver, you obviously failed to read the preceeding threads...It is untrue that American authorities were opposed to allowing the plane to land on their territory.

Let me try to explain because some people are having a hard time wrapping their head around what six7driver said. He never said that the US refused clearance.

He stated that since no US airline can fly to Cuba, and this was a Canadian plane coming from Cuba, if it WOULD have landed on US soil, a potentially very messy situation for AT could have happened. Given the relation between Canada and the USA at this point, i would not have been surprised if they would have confiscated the plane, I'm not kidding.

[Tan]

What crazy speculation that could only imamate out of France and Quebec... Paranoia comes to mind.

[admiral ackbar]

Maybe my tone was a bit too conspiratorial, I apologise. I was merely trying to clarify what six7driver said.

Although I have to thank you for the automatic assumption that I am French and/or Canadian. Glass houses and everything. By the way, it is 'emanate'.

[Flight Safety]

Zeke, we do not yet know whether there is any correlation between this event and AA587.

The rudder separation damage does appear very similar to the separation damage seem on AA587. I looked for a good photo of the AA587 vertical stab to compare with the photos of this event, and the best AA587 photo I could find is in the NTSB AA587 final report. It is figure 11, pdf page 64, document page 50 at the following link:

AA 587 NTSB Final Report (http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf)

The physical rudder separation damage (on the vertical stab) does appear very similar.

However, in the AA587 accident, the vertical stab separated from the aircraft BEFORE the rudder separated from the stab (as indicated in the Final Report). The interesting part is that the force required to remove the rudder from the vertical stab, appeared to be greater than the force required to remove the vertical stab from the aircraft.

We don't know yet what happened in this event, and we don't know what force was required to remove the rudder from the vertical stab. But if the rudder attachment points were not faulty in some way, then it's still possible that a large amount of force was applied to the vertical stab in this event.

[Ranger One]

six7driver:

Regardless, I'm sure this incident will highly interest those that were involved with AA587 investigation.

Again I beg to differ. 587 involved a wake turbulence encounter, inappropriate control inputs (perhaps exacerbated by the 'on/off' nature of the Airbus rudder at the speeds involved), leading to overstress and failure of the entire vertical fin.

To my knowledge none of these factors are involved in the present case; no-one has suggested there were any relevant control inputs, overstress, or any form of upset or departure from controlled flight. The Transat investigation will have to discover why the rudder fell off during an otherwise unremarkable (so far as we know) flight!

R1

[Ontariotech]

I would not think US customs would be breaking out the plasti-cuffs, at the thought of a Canadian aircraft, departing Cuba, and needing to make an emergency landing at a Florida airport because it's rudder fell off. That is complete dung as far as I am concerned. I am not an expert in US policy towards Cuba, but I think an aircraft in distress is an aircraft in distress. And I think in those circumstances, the US would be more than willing to render assistance.

Back on topic, with those pictures, It would appear that the rudder has actually shredded away from the hinges. And, I am surprised to see that it is made of composite, honeycombed material. Would this essential flight control surface not be made of a metalic material? I would have thought the elevators, ailerons and rudder would have all been produced out of aircraft aluminum?

[Charles Darwin]

Is this rudder made of the same material as Boeing intends to use on the entire B-787 fuselage? :E

[Skylark_air]

So the luck hasn't run out as Air Transat;

Rememeber when one of their A330's had a fuel leak in it's wing, and the Captain thought the computer was just generating a random error message?

But if it was a random error message, why did he divert fuel from the other wing, thus causing the aircraft to loose all it's fuel, and turn a daft mistake into what could have become a major air crash.

It's a good thing Air Transat pilots are lucky, and that on this occasion they were flying so close to the Azores when this happened.

But luck is a fickle mistress, nobody's luck holds for a lifetime, and at some time or other, Air Transat will loose the last lucky charm from the bracelet...

I think it is naive to just look over an aircraft, say it's ok then send if off packing, epecially with a potentially leathal problem like this. If I were the brains behind the head, I would take the time to find out more about precisely what has happened. Otherwise you could be left with an accident waiting to happen.

Accidents don't just happen. They are a series of events in which each fail-safe measure, fails. Thus bringing about a chain of events which triggers a disaster.

[jonny dangerous]

Mr Skylark, I'm having "a bit of a go" trying to decipher exactly what your message is, other than Air Transat pilots are, on occasion, lucky.


Point 1. The leak was near the engine, not the wing.

Point 2. The Captain didn't think it was a random error message, he thought the computer was wrong (rightly or wrongly, his call)

Point 3. He didn't 'divert fuel', he crossfed, and therefore he had both engines 'feeding' from the 'good' side.

Point 4. What is your point with regards to stating that:

"it is naive to just look over an aircraft, say it's ok then send if off packing, epecially with a potentially leathal problem like this. If I were the brains behind the head, I would take the time to find out more about precisely what has happened. Otherwise you could be left with an accident waiting to happen."

Like I said, what is your point, and who implied whatever it is you're trying to say?

About the only thing that makes sense in your post is the last statement. Perhaps we've been into the grape?

Respectfully,

Jonny D

[barit1]

This is really a question: How many hinge brackets are there holding the A310 rudder? The photos I'm seeing of the Air Transat fin suggest that there should be another bracket attached near the top of the fin/rudder. Did this top bracket get carried away when the rudder departed? If so, it could have been loose on the fin to begin with, and that looseless permitted flutter to develop, which precipitated the loss of rudder.

Again, this is speculative - I DO NOT KNOW how many A310 hinge brackets should be there. Details welcome.

(Ever read Gann's "Fate Is The Hunter" with the DC-4 elevator unporting episode?)

[jonny dangerous]

barit 1, would you agree that reading 'Fate is the Hunter' should be required reading for any professional aviator prior to posting here?

JD

[barit1]

Absolutely! The first half-dozen pages will do you in.

And the foreward is an amazing tribute to how far the industry has come. The first name there, AA's Capt. Al DeWitt, was a friend of my uncle.

[jonny dangerous]

well how about that! Maybe more than a few stories came your way as a young fella...

JD

[Zeke]

Flight Safety,

Despite what my collegue Captain104 has said, the A310-300 vertical tail is 0,5 m shorter than the A300-600. It also has a different aspect ratio, taper ratio, tail arm, and its aerodynamic properties are also different to the A300-600. They do share the same 1/4 chord sweep and overall area.

Aircraft sharing the same type certificate such as the A300/A310 do not need to have parts that interchange, for example the A345/A346 has a vertical tail 0,99 m longer than the A343/A342. The suggestion you have made is true with Boeing aircraft, eg the overall dimensions of a B774 vertical tail is the same as a B741, however as far as I am aware the parts are not interchangeable either.

I am not an expert in forensic analysis of photographs of aircraft failure modes. I would suggest you are not either. I see no basis for your unqualified comments “The rudder separation damage does appear very similar to the separation damage seen (sic) on AA587” and “The physical rudder separation damage (on the vertical stab) does appear very similar.”

Again, for the benefit of those naive enough to take your line of thought, the initial failure mode on the AA587 was the vertical stabilizer.

The failure mode in this event is the rudder, everything I have seen suggests that the vertical stabilizer is undamaged and still attached to the aircraft.

The rudder is an aeroelastic structure, no one is suggesting at this stage any dynamic or static loads (i.e. in your vernacular “force”) were exceeded to cause the failure. Structures can and have failed without and design loads being exceeded.

For example with metal structures corrosion can lead to failure of fasteners or the interface between fasteners well before design loads are exceeded. Aircraft are designed “damage tolerant” if such a failure does occur, in the case the crew returned to base without being aware of the extent of damage until after landing.

The airframe is over 13 years old. I am unaware that the maintenance or modification status of that part in that aircraft has been released, nor the results of testing of samples and detailed analysis of FDR/QAR/CVR devices.

As I said above, there is a correlation, they are both Airbus aircraft, that’s about where it stops.

I welcome any and all sound postulations as to the cause of this event, however to draw any correlation between this event and AA587 is unfounded.

:uhoh:

[Ignition Override]

Zeke and 'Gang': Good guess. Flew ten years on an old machine as FO ( now five as captain), whose speed-controlled rudder limiter engages from about 170-300 knots. It has some (right) hydraulic assist but this only reduces the Vref speed several knots. Depending on the weight, naturally. This does not include the flap-rudder stop on most of them, to reduce the chance of excessive sideslip. We don't design, build or maintain them-we just fly them..somebody's got to do it...

Apparently, anyone from the US who even suggests a connection between various A-310/300 accident/incidents is clearly out of bounds. My company operates a large number of other Airbus products. This gets so tiresome.

Is this still not the case on Pprune? The same old cross-Atlantic chickens#it. We've read it on Pprune for years. The same old defensive verbal fortresses are built on the spot to quickly defend against just the questioning of any Airbus product or sometimes against a Boeing or McDonald Douglas product. I do enjoy the actual information which results from idle speculation.

But if those who question are from east of the Atlantic, then any such topic is fair game. As a reminder, the AMR A-300 went down in the US. There were reportedly also some damaged vertical stabilizers on A300s or A-310s operated by Interflug and Air France. Somebody else reported this on Pprune, weeks or months ago. Maybe none of it is true. Happy hunting chaps at Angels 15.

[Zeke]

Ignition Override,

I welcome any and all sound postulations as to the cause of this event, however you are only coming up with conspiracy theories.

If you have a sound connection between the two events come up with it, no one has so far, come and collect your prize.

I should add that I was also on the team that designed the 777 composite rudder, now that either makes me a puddle jumper or someone who something about the design of composite rudders.

Your experience of from a flight crew perspective is welcome, I just hope that you reciprocate my experience as a design engineer and as a pilot, irrespective of where I sleep at night.

:hmm:

[Captain104]

@ Zeke

Could it be you just enjoyed a bottle of Cahors Prince Probus Reserve at sunrise? I simply stated:

1) The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes with Airbus Modification 4886 is manufactured of advanced composite materials. The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A310 series airplanes with the same modification is manufactured of the SAME MATERIALS.

2) The original A-300 design had this primary structure as aluminum. Then Airbus designed the A-310, which was actually the first airliner with an all-composite vertical stabilizer. Later, Airbus rolled out an improved A-300-600, which BASICALLY used the A-310 composite tail design.

IMHO all correct. Nothing said about same dimensions, same aerodynamic specifications or even interchangeability!!! :(


Regards

Edit for spelling.

[jmjakob]

About the question done before on how hard it could be to land the A310 without rudder I can tell you that this type of aircraft is quite forgiving in that aspect.

I still mean the crew did an excellent job but the 310 is rather short and quite stable along that axis during the approach. I've only flown 737 and 310 but I have about 4000 hours on each type and all the execises we simulated with jammed rudder or other similar flight control problems were easier to solve on the 310 than the 737, especially the streched 400, 800 and 900s.

After the DHL A300 misile attack in Irak we reviewed all types of scenarios affecting flight controls and I tried a few on the A/C during test or ferry flights, (ldg without yaw dampers + no rudder input, etc.)

I actually believe that the rudder problem is more critical during cruise at high altitude than on approach. The 310 has a trim tank with 5000 kg in the stabilizer and flies with the most aft cg position permitted. That makes it very unstable at high altitudes and we once had a fright at FL 390 with a double yaw dampers failure in turbulence. Unpleasant and I'd think the boys from Air transat had more trouble at high speed, high altitude than later.

[Flight Safety]

Zeke, I don't understand your position. No one's speculation is any better than anyone else in the absence of facts. All ideas are on the table until the facts begin to steer us in the right direction for understanding what happened here. You have as many facts available to support you as I have, which is none.

Let's just wait for some facts to come in, before we start rejecting everyone else's ideas but our own.

[A310GUY]

AA587 + Air Transat Connection: Some speculation:

I certainly hope that the investigators of the Air Transat incident will probe deeper and give a possible link to these two incidents - or at least give the NTSB investigators thought to reconsider AA587 findings.
The Air Transat rudder event occurred when the aircraft was in cruise flight at FL350. There was a strong initial yaw motion. A flight attendant standing in the flight deck was thrown to one side. The event was not precipitated by pilot input and was not reacted to (no counter input). It is possible that the rudder started to delaminate on one side causing the rudder to push over. In this case the rudder subsequently disintegrated due to air loads and drag as is evidenced by the pictures. The vertical stab did not fail because there was no rudder reversal input nor any preexisting weakness in the stab.
In the AA587 incident it is possible that the same or at least similar failure occurred. The aircraft entered an area of turbulence caused by a preceding aircraft. I speculate that coincidently the rudder started to delaminate at that point. There was an initial rudder hard over which was countered by a rudder input by the First Officer. The flight data recorder showed two inputs and Airbus has latched onto the idea of rudder reversal causing stab failure. I contend or at least ruminate that the first rudder input was a feedback from the delamination rudder hardover and the second input was the FO's correct reaction. The stab failed due to a preexising weakness caused by some other event or engineering weakness.
The American crew was up at the controls as they were in the initial climb phase and reacted correctly. The Transat crew was in cruise and in a more relaxed state. Different mode of flight and different reaction and preparedness. That is a fact of airline flying.
The A310 and A300-600 are very similar machines. One of the exceptions is length. The increased length of the 300 and the greater moment arm force on the tail in combination with the rudder input could be the difference in the two cases.
This is just my opinion. But in respect to the American crew and the victims of that accident it is worth looking into.

[latetonite]

just replace `A310` with `A300` and vice versa and you are pretty close..

[UNCTUOUS]

Lightning (scorched disbonded composite), grease-blocked drain holes, trapped moisture, condensation etc etc

Just another theory

At this LINK (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/others/rudder-sep.htm)

[Captain104]

latetonite

just replace `A310` with `A300` and vice versa and you are pretty close..

I do not get your message. Do you mean a A-310 is longer than a A-300-600? Must be a joke.

Regards

[planemad2]

IMHO there ARE very scary similarities.

I have my own theories on this, after that A300-600 crash out of New York, and remembering what we used to find on A checks in New York on our A300-600 which was operating in exactly the same environment as the American A300-600, and in a very similar environment to the Air Transat A310.

I have mentioned my concerns before somewhere else, and they were ridiculed by "experts" in composite technology.

However these incidents convince me even more of the "possible" dangers with water ingress into these composites.

Water is trapped in the tails of these Airbuses operating throughout the Caribbean, freezing and thawing on each flight, and I fear it must affect the integrity of these composites.

[Zeke]

planemad2,

Water ingress into honeycomb leading to delamination as the water expands into ice as an aircraft climbs to altitude is a very real problem. This is what I thought may have occurred in this case myself.

As I said above structures can and have failed without design loads being exceeded, in terms of composites I see this a method how this can happen. The delaminating normally occurs between the honeycomb core type material and the skin.

I am not aware of this type of delamination being a problem in areas where you have multiple layers of composites, such as what is used for attachment points, like the rear lug on AA587. Multiple layers of composite are basically a mixture composite (or other) fibers and an epoxy type resin matrix, this does not ingest water like honeycomb.

On skin panels, like on control surfaces honeycomb is used as a spacer between layers of composites, to keep the layers separated and provides the stiffness. If this was to delaminate it would do so between either/or the inner or outer skin and the honeycomb, and is not structurally that significant. The delamination would not extend to the bond between the attachment point and the skin, or solid ribs as these would be layers of composites.

Whilst it may not be structurally significant, it can be aeroelastically significant as it changes the mass distribution over the hinge line which can lead to other aeroelastic phenomena.

The presence of delamination is easily checked whenever an aircraft returns from a flight with a thermal camera, cold spots on control surfaces will remain cold after landing indicating the presence of ice inside the surface.

I agree that the OAT was +6 deg C when AA587 took off, and the wake turbulence occurred at 3300 ft, which would put it at about 0 deg C, however one must also bear in mind what Dr Matthew R. Fox said in his materials investigation to the AA 587 enquiry. He said that the composite fractures were examined at high magnification using scanning electron microscopy. The lug area fractures were photographed at more than 300 locations, and over 500 square inches of crack surfaces examined at high magnification, with no observed pre existing defects, including fatigue.

Some of the pilot community use the term “rudder reversal”, I do not believe this was actually stated, “rudder reversal” is an aeroelastic phenomena like flutter.

A310GUY

Don’t forget the wake turbulence was correct by the F/O with a recorded control wheel inputs of over 62 degrees right, and 78 degrees left, combined with numerous recorded rudder pedal inputs (more than the two you stated) with over 6 inches of rudder pedal displacement. The sole use of rudder did not induce all the loads on the airframe, as the secondary effects of roll also played a part.

To quote the AA A300 fleet standards manager at the NTSB “Most pilots think that a limiter on some system will protect…the pilot from exceeding whatever parameter that limiter is limiting. And in this case…and it’s not unique to Airbus aircraft…the pilots think that the rudder limiter will protect the aircraft structurally, and if it can’t…they think…that there would be a limitation or a warning or caution or a note that would indicate…that the rudder limiter couldn’t protect [the aircraft] structurally.”

Flight Safety,

As I said in a previous post, I was unaware of facts being made public, that does not preclude them being available elsewhere. The aircraft was largely intact on arrival, crew are able to give statements.

:ok:

[Flight Safety]

To all, I've re-read this entire thread, and A310 has supplied the closest thing to publicly or privately available "facts" for this incident so far. He said:
The Air Transat rudder event occurred when the aircraft was in cruise flight at FL350. There was a strong initial yaw motion. A flight attendant standing in the flight deck was thrown to one side. The event was not precipitated by pilot input and was not reacted to (no counter input). It is possible that the rudder started to delaminate on one side causing the rudder to push over. In this case the rudder subsequently disintegrated due to air loads and drag as is evidenced by the pictures. The vertical stab did not fail because there was no rudder reversal input nor any preexisting weakness in the stab.
Is there any other factual information (related to cause) available at this time?

[Wino]

From Zeke

combined with numerous recorded rudder pedal inputs (more than the two you stated) with over 6 inches of rudder pedal displacement.

You are quite wrong in that statement.

If there was 6 inches of displacement of the rudder pedal, then the problem with 587 was the aircraft, not the pilot.

The rudder pedal travel is 4 inches on the ground. At 250 knots allowable travel of the pedal by the rudder load limiter sisytem on the A300600/A310 is 1 inch ! Furthermore, the breakout force to start the rudder moving is the same as to reach the stop. So at 250 knots the rudder pedals are effectively toggle switches.

The rudder load limiter on the A310/300600 works by restricted the range of motion of the rudder pedals, while maintaining the same ratio of motion to degrees of travel on the tail.,

If what you are saying is correct, then there was more rudder travel then available when the aircraft is stopped at the gate. What was really recorded was that not once did the pedals move more than 1 inch! from a controll input point of view with the aircraft not behaving as you would expect, its a guarantee of confusion.

Face it, it is Airbus's opinion that they have NEVER made a mistake, and it is an opinion in which they are saddly wrong.

And you are wrong, in your contention as well. The plane is a trap for a Pilot Induced oscilation, which is what may have occured in 587. A POI is a DESIGN fault!

Cheers
Wino

[catchup]

@Wino

PIO on an A300 on take-off/climbout ?

Where do you got that from?

Regards

[stagger]

The following story in this week's edition of The Observer suggests that journalists are monitoring discussions on "pilots' bulletin boards" such as this one.

What made an Airbus rudder snap in mid-air? (http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1436374,00.html)

[Wino]

Catchup,
Do you reall think that the pilots of 587 MEANT to go stop to stop on the rudder? I knew them both, and flew with them both, and have a LOT of time in that particular make and model.

If they didn't mean to do it, its a pilot induced oscilation. The need for coordinated rudder at 250 knots is a once in a career item, that most people will never experience in real life. If you give it a try in the A300 you will be in for a rude shock.

I was involved in the investigation, and did a lot of research on the subject and the aircraft, including climbing up inside the tail of its sister ships.

Cheers
WIno

[Zeke]

Wino,

You are quite wrong in that statement.

If there was 6 inches of displacement of the rudder pedal, then the problem with 587 was the aircraft, not the pilot.


You are correct I understated the recorded movement of the rudder pedal, page 6 figure 1 of the NTSB report pedal position inches shows over 6 inches of movement, thank you for pointing that out to me.

What was really recorded was that not once did the pedals move more than 1 inch! from a control input point of view with the aircraft not behaving as you would expect, its a guarantee of confusion.

Please refer to the NTSB report, page 6 figure 1, FDR of the pedal position at 09:15:57, over 2 inches left, 09:16:01 4 inches right, total displacement over 6 inches.

The graph above shows the wheel position in degrees which varied twice from 80 degrees left to over 60 degrees right in a 10 second period. There were 10 control wheel movements through the neutral position within 10 seconds. Similarly, five rudder inputs through neutral in 10 seconds.

I would suggest airmanship dictates not to even attempt a control check with such rapid movement on the ground, and that’s when they are aerodynamically unloaded.

For coordinated control inputs the number of times through neutral would the same, for example at 09:15:54,5 shows 30 degrees of left wheel position, and 1,8 inches of right rudder position.


Flight Safety,

From Aibus to operators ... this OIT had ten (10) photographs attached.

FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526F

TO : ALL
A300/A310/A300-600/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A318/A340-500/A340-600 OPERATORS




OPERATOR INFORMATION TELEX - OPERATOR INFORMATION TELEX


Subject : Incident - Loss of Rudder Surface In-Flight


OIT classification : Information


Aircraft affected : A310


OUR REF.: SE 999.0017/05/AB dated 08 March 2005


1. Purpose :

The purpose of this OIT is to provide operators with first
details about the loss of a rudder surface during flight and to
give information on the actions taken by Airbus.


2. Event description :

An operator has reported the following incident on an A310-308.
On Sunday 6th March 2005, after departure from Varadero (Cuba),
in cruise at 35000 feet, the crew reported that a loud bang was
heard. The pilot took manual control and returned to land safely
at Varadero.

Visual inspection after landing revealed that a large part of
the rudder surface was missing. A portion of the rudder
structure remained attached between the lower hinge and the
three servo-control attachment points.

There were no injuries reported to passengers, crew or on the
ground.


3. Status :

At this time very few details and no detailed inspection reports
have been received. The event will be subject to a formal
investigation involving the Canadian and French Investigating
Boards. Airbus has sent a team of specialists to Varadero to
assist the authorities with their investigation.


4. Further action :

Based on the information we will receive, appropriate action
plan will be defined and operators informed accordingly.


5. Follow-up :

Follow-up of this OIT will be provided when further details
become available, or in any case not later than 16th March 2005.

My understanding is that a replacement rudder is now being fitted.

[Squibs]

March 16?

I would want some course of action before March 16 if I was operating A310's.....

Loss of a portion of the rudder....did everybody see the pictures?

How is 94% of rudder was lost sound to you?

I dont know but am I the only one nurvous about this?

[Wino]

Its a mistake Zeke,
it is simply not possible,
Either that or they really did hang the wrong man, and there is your smoking gun of an Airbus coverup.

Are you aware of HOW the rudder load limiter works in the A300600r?

Cheers
Wino

[PickyPerkins]

Zeke

When I first read the words in the Airbus statement that you quoted "... the crew reported that a loud bang was heard. The pilot took manual control and returned to land safely at Varadero. ....", I rather assumed that Airbus was implying that the bang was the rudder departing. However, the words "loud bang" rather rang a bell in my head because I seemed to remember the same words in a previous PPRuNe thread being used where the rudder did NOT depart the aircraft. Searching back I found the following. It describes one of four incidents under the heading, "Survey Of 4 Yaw Incidents BEFORE AA Flight 587.":
---- Start quote -------
6/27/00. Airbus A300B4- 605R, Reg. N14065. As the aircraft was approaching FL220, at a reported airspeed of 325 KIAS, the aircraft experienced an abrupt disturbance which was perceived by the flight crew to be a disturbance in yaw with no attendant lateral motion evident in the resulting manoeuvre. They believed that the yawing motion had been caused by an uncommanded rudder input. The disturbance was accompanied by a loud bang which was noted by both the flight crew and some of the cabin attendants. They all reported the noise as being coincident with the disturbance. At the time of the event the aircraft was configured as follows: flaps and slats 'IN', landing gear 'UP', auto pilot 'OFF', pitch trim (systems 1 and 2) 'ON' and yaw damper (systems 1 and 2) 'ON'. The aircraft was clear of cloud and there were no other aircraft reported in the vicinity. Following the disturbance the aircraft appeared to behave normally. However, the commander decided to return to London (Heathrow) rather than commence a transatlantic flight following a suspected uncommanded flight control input. An uneventful, overweight landing on Runway 09L was completed at 1624 hrs. Ref. AAIB Bulletin No: 2/2001, ref EW/C2000/6/10. No cause attributed.
--- End of quote ----

This sounds to me like a loud bang caused by a rudder hard-over WITHOUT the rudder departing.

The quote above came from an early PPRuNE thread on Flight 587, but I have not been able to find the original.

Cheers, http://home.infionline.net/~pickyperkins/pi.gif

[Zeke]

PickyPerkins,

Thank you, keep up the good work, AAIB report below.

AAIB Bulletin No: 2/2001
Ref: EW/C2000/6/10 - Category: 1.1
Aircraft Type and Registration:
Airbus A300B4- 605R, N14065

No & Type of Engines: 2 CF6-80C2A5 turbofan engines

Year of Manufacture: 1989

Date & Time (UTC): 27 June 2000 at 1547 hrs

Location: 10 nm North East of Filton, Gloucestershire, UK

Type of Flight: Public Transport

Persons on Board: Crew - 13 - Passengers - 191

Injuries: Crew - None - Passengers - None

Nature of Damage: None

Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot's Licence

Commander's Age: 52 years

Commander's Flying Experience: 10,500 hours (of which 3,426 were on type)

Last 90 days -178 hours

Last 28 days - 62 hours

Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation

History of the flight

The aircraft was planned to operate a scheduled flight from London (Heathrow) to New York (J F Kennedy). The aircraft mass at take off was 377,738 lb with the centre of gravity (CG) calculated to be at 32×5% of mean aerodynamic chord; this represents an aircraft operating close to its maximum mass at an aft CG. The serviceable aircraft had a flight deck complement of three pilots, of whom the first officer (FO) was the handling pilot. The aircraft took off at 1534 hrs from Runway 09R and was cleared to follow the Compton Five Juliet standard instrument departure prior to routing to the west.

During the departure and climb the FO flew the aircraft manually. As the aircraft was approaching FL220, at a reported airspeed of 325 KIAS, the aircraft experienced an abrupt disturbance which was perceived by the flight crew to be a disturbance in yaw with no attendant lateral motion evident in the resulting manoeuvre. They believed that the yawing motion had been caused by an uncommanded rudder input. The disturbance was accompanied by a loud bang which was noted by both the flight crew and some of the cabin attendants. They all reported the noise as being coincident with the disturbance. At the time of the event the aircraft was configured as follows: flaps and slats 'IN', landing gear 'UP', auto pilot 'OFF', pitch trim (systems 1 and 2) 'ON' and yaw damper (systems 1 and 2) 'ON'. The aircraft was clear of cloud and there were no other aircraft reported in the vicinity.

Following the disturbance the aircraft appeared to behave normally. However, the commander decided to return to London (Heathrow) rather than commence a transatlantic flight following a suspected an uncommanded flight control input. An uneventful, overweight landing on Runway 09L was completed at 1624 hrs.

Flight recorders

The 30 minute, tape based, CVR had overwritten the recording of the event. However, the solid state FDR was successfully replayed at the AAIB and the data were available for analysis.

Following the departure from Runway 09R at London (Heathrow) the aircraft turned towards the west and climbed. Thirteen minutes later, with the aircraft being flown manually and climbing through FL220 at 327 kt, the values of normal and lateral acceleration, which were recorded from the accelerometer mounted at the aircraft's centre of gravity, showed a small disturbance. There were no observable changes in the recorded values of heading or rudder deflection but the aircraft rolled from wings level to 2.4° left wing down. All engine parameters remained constant.

Within one second of the onset of the disturbance roll, right aileron was applied and the discrete parameters for right roll spoiler panels 4 to 7 indicated deployment for one second. (It should be noted that the roll spoiler panels only have to extend by approximately 2° for the FDR discrete parameters to indicate deployment.) The aircraft rolled to 1.4° right wing down before roll left aileron was applied with simultaneous deployment of left roll spoilers 3 to 7 being recorded. The recorded value of rudder position showed a momentary deflection of 0.3° left from its normal position, indicative of yaw damper operation. The nose up pitch attitude increased by 1° to 3.5° during this time. The roll to the left continued to 4.2° left wing down before corrective roll right aileron was applied and right spoiler panels 6 and 7 indicated deployment. Rudder deflection of 0.3° right from normal position was recorded and a small amount of down elevator was applied to reduce the nose up pitch attitude back to 2.5°. All of the control surface deflections recorded after the initial disturbance were consistent with the control inputs demanded by the crew. The complete event lasted no more than seven seconds,

The aircraft continued to climb on its heading of 284°M at a reduced speed of 310 kt. It levelled off at FL280 and the autopilot was engaged before a left turn back towards London (Heathrow) was initiated. After landing ground spoiler deflection on all 14 panels was recorded as the aircraft slowed during the rollout.

Engineering investigation

Over the following three days the aircraft was examined for damage and any failure or defect that could have been implicated in the in-flight disturbance. The aircraft completed a test flight before re-entering service.

An external examination showed that nothing had detached from the aircraft and there was no evidence of anything having struck the aircraft. Detailed inspections of the ailerons, spoilers and rudder and their attachments found no damage. One spoiler actuator rod end was found to have excess play and its liner was replaced. A BITE (Built in Test Equipment) fault was reported from one of the two Electrical Flying Control Units (EFCU). This concerned the '5 ft' warning from the Flight Warning Computer involved in the arming of the ground spoilers. This was found to have cleared on further inspection and did not re-occur. Given the behaviour of the spoilers during the incident this was not considered to be relevant. Functional checks of the primary and secondary flying controls and BITE tests of the associated computers revealed no anomalies.

Special equipment was installed to mimic the in-flight conditions to the aircraft flight control systems. The control systems were operated and the electrical looms serving the flying control computers were shaken and manipulated in an attempt to reveal any break in a conductor or connector fault. The looms were examined for any indication of possible screening defects. Mobile telephones and a laptop computer were operated close to the avionics racks but this is acknowledged as not being a systematic or scientific test of the vulnerability of the aircraft's systems to such effects. Current avionics installations do not necessarily provide protection against radio frequency emissions from mobile telephones. Close attention was paid to the rudder system and the yaw damper but no defects were found. No movement of the rudder was seen when it was operated from a single hydraulic supply or when switched between systems and there was no sign that the input mechanism on any of the three actuators was stiff in operation (which could cause the input spring strut to collapse).

The loud bang reported by the crew could have been directly associated with the cause of the upset or could have been a secondary result of the movement of the aircraft. In trying to identify the source of the noise, which was heard on the flight-deck and in the cabin, the freight and baggage holds were examined for any sign that a load had been unsecured or had moved. The ground crew who unloaded the freight reported that there was no sign that any freight had moved. The equipment areas alongside the holds were opened and examined for anything, such as the disconnection of an air conditioning duct, which could have caused such a noise but none was found.

No anomalies in the operation of the aircraft were found on the test flight during which it was manoeuvred vigorously whilst being operated in the same manner as on the incident flight.

Air traffic control

The London Area and Terminal Control Centre was controlling the aircraft during its standard routing from London (Heathrow) prior to the flight across the North Atlantic. As it approached the Bristol area, climbing through FL220, it was directly behind a Boeing 777 (B 777) that had passed through exactly the same airspace (as derived from radar data) some 4 minutes and 18 seconds earlier. When it passed through this point the B 777 had been at FL229 and was at an estimated mass of 243 tonnes. No other aircraft had recently passed this location, close to this level, either along the same track or across it.

Meteorological conditions

The disturbance experienced by the aircraft could be attributed to a localised severe turbulence event. Assistance was requested from the Meteorological Office at Bracknell for an analysis of the atmospheric conditions in the area of the disturbance encountered by the A-300 aircraft. The synoptic situation at 1200 hrs on 27 June 2000 indicated that an area of high pressure was centered to the north of Scotland with a substantial ridge of high pressure extending over all of the United Kingdom. Radio sonde ascents indicated a subsidence inversion associated with the ridge of high pressure. Above this inversion the air was dry and relatively stable until at very high altitude where some cirrus cloud may have been encountered. A comparison of the visible and infra red satellite photographs confirmed that any low cloud was well broken and there was some cirrus at high level. However, satellite photographs taken at 1424 hrs indicated that in the area of interest there was little or no high cloud. The local wind at altitude was estimated to be a light westerly between 10 to 20 kt, wind data from the inertial navigation system recorded on the FDR was 280°/08 kt at the time of the disturbance.

In order to define what may have caused the localised turbulence the following meteorological phenomena were considered:

Clear Air Turbulence. Clear air turbulence is often associated with large horizontal wind shears in the vicinity of jet streams. In this instance the nearest jet stream was over the North Sea and the horizontal wind gradients in the area in which the disturbance was encountered were very small.

Breaking Gravity Waves. Clear air turbulence can also be associated with breaking gravity waves. Gravity waves can be generated by surface topography or convection and then require suitable stability conditions to allow the waves to break. In this case the surface winds were extremely light and the atmosphere very stable, it is therefore considered to be unlikely that gravity waves will have been generated. Furthermore, there was no evidence from the satellite photographs of the presence of gravity waves.

Convective Turbulence. Turbulence can also be associated with strong updrafts in convective conditions. The atmosphere was stable in this instance and there was no evidence of any convective activity.

Turbulence at Cloud Tops. On occasion moderate turbulence can be encountered at the top of layer clouds. This is normally widespread and not localised. There was no evidence of any such clouds that may have affected the aircraft in this manner.

Wake Vortex Encounter. In the prevailing conditions of stability and light winds the wake vortices from heavy aircraft can be relatively long lived. Furthermore, the vortices would be expected to slowly sink and decrease in altitude. It is therefore considered that the most likely meteorological reason for any localised turbulence would be an encounter with a wake vortex generated by another aircraft.

Wake vortex encounters

All aircraft in flight leave behind them wake vortices with characteristics that are a function of the generated lift and are thus dependent upon: gross weight, wing planform, airspeed, configuration and attitude. These characteristics are then altered by interaction between the vortices and the ambient atmosphere. Studies suggest that, at medium level and in still air, the shed vortices tend to drift slowly downwards at a rate of approximately 400 feet per minute and level off, usually not more than 1,000 feet below the flight path of the aircraft. However, their behaviour is not predictable, particularly in the aspects of their trajectory and decay.

In general wake vortex encounters tend to occur close to airports where the density of operations is high and where aircraft are manoeuvring after take off or prior to landing on prescribed tracks at relatively slow speeds. Suitable separation minima are applied in these areas with the aim of reducing the probability of a vortex wake encounter to an acceptably low level, and to minimise the magnitude of the upset when an encounter does occur.

Wake vortex encounters during the climb or cruise are relatively rare since the airspeed is high and it is less likely that aircraft will be directly behind each other. Furthermore, with a standard vertical separation of 2,000 feet it is unlikely that the vortex will descend far enough to disturb the following aircraft. Finally, vortices require specific atmospheric conditions to enable them to persist. However, the use of modern navigation aids increases the likelihood that aircraft will follow specific tracks more accurately and thus the possibility of flying directly behind another aircraft is increased. Also, the introduction of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima can reduce the vertical separation to 1,000 feet. It is therefore possible that wake vortex encounters during the cruise may become more prevalent.

The Boeing Commercial Airplane Group have conducted extensive wake turbulence research during which a B 737 was purposely flown through the wake of a B 727 in order to study the behaviour of the aircraft during a wake vortex encounter. During this research a sound was sometimes associated with the wake encounter when the aircraft centreline intercepted the descending wake. It was estimated that the sound (described by the flight test crew as a \'thump\') can occur when the fuselage of the aircraft touches the centre of the vortex where the pressure is at its lowest. Research is continuing into a system that could disrupt the vortices generated by the wing. This might be achieved by moving some of the flight control surfaces in order to interrupt the flow over the wings but without diminishing the wing\'s lifting ability. At present this research is concentrating on the approach profile where the problem of wake turbulence is currently at its most intrusive.

Discussion

The aircraft was established in the climb, in seemingly quiescent air, with no aircraft apparently in the vicinity when it encountered a sudden disturbance, which the flight crew perceived as a yaw excursion. The value of the lateral acceleration, recorded from the accelerometer mounted at the aircraft\'s centre of gravity, showed a small disturbance but it is probable that the flight crew, being seated in the cockpit, perceived a higher level of lateral acceleration, which they interpreted as uncommanded rudder input. Extensive engineering investigation did not find any reason for the disturbance to have occurred and no anomalies in the operation of the aircraft were found during the test flight. Furthermore, there was nothing from the engineering investigation that could explain the loud noise reported by both the flight crew and the cabin attendants. A number of meteorological phenomena were considered. It is most probable that the reason for any localised turbulence was an encounter with the wake vortex generated by a B 777 aircraft which had passed through the same airspace some four minutes and 18 seconds earlier. Research into wake vortex encounters indicates that a loud noise can be associated with entry into the core of the vortex if the geometry is appropriate.

Sorry I cannot find the original myself. :ugh:

[Wino]

A loud bang was also heard on 587

Cheers
WIno

[India Four Two]

AAIB Report here (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/february_2001/airbus_500754.cfm)

[catchup]

@Squibs

No, you are not the only one...:(


@Wino

I know that aircraft by some extend, have also flown with various guys in the left and right seat. In contrast to A320/340 I've never experienced a situation with the lightest touch of PIO on that ship.

Regards

[PickyPerkins]

“… Research into wake vortex encounters indicates that a loud noise can be associated with entry into the core of the vortex if the geometry is appropriate. ….”

Surely there is a difference between a “loud noise” and a “loud bang”? Does anyone really believe that wake turbulence could cause a loud bang 258 seconds after its formation?

The excerpt below is from the cockpit voice recorder transcript of American Airlines Flight 587. As Wino says, it includes a reference to a “loud bang”. However, it is not the first unusual sound heard, and max power was called for before the “loud bang”.

0915:28.5 HOT-2 [sound similar to yawn] thank you.
0915:36.4 DEP American five eighty seven heavy, turn left, proceed direct WAVEY.
0915:37.3 HOT-1 [sound of brief squeak and a rattle]
0915:41.0 RDO-1 uh, we'll turn direct WAVEY, American five eighty seven heavy.
0915:44.4 HOT-2 left turn direct WAVEY….
0915:44.7 HOT-1 little wake turbulence, huh?
0915:45.6 HOT-2 …yeah.
0915:47.3 HOT-2 [sound similar to five sets of stabilizer trim switch clicks]
0915:48.2 HOT-2 two fifty thank you.
0915:51.8 CAM [sound of a thump]
0915:52.3 CAM [sound of click]
0915:52.9 CAM [sound of two thumps]
0915:54.2 HOT-2 max power. [spoken in strained voice]
0915:55.0 HOT-1 you all right?
0915:55.3 HOT-2 yea, I'm fine.
0915:56.3 HOT-1 hang onto it. hang onto it.
0915:56.6 CAM [sound of snap]
0915:57.5 HOT-2 let's go for power please.
0915:57.7 CAM [sound of loud thump]
0915:58.5 CAM [sound of loud bang]
0916:00.0 HOT-2 [sound similar to human grunt]
0916:00.2 CAM [roaring noise starts and increases in amplitude]
0916:01.0 HOT-2 holy #.
0916:01.0 CAM [sound similar to single ECAM chime]
0916:02.0 CAM [sound similar to single ECAM chime]
0916:04.4 CAM [sound similar to stall warning repetitive chime for 1.9 seconds]

HOT Crewmember hot microphone voice or sound source
RDO Radio transmission from accident aircraft
CAM Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
# Expletive

Cheers, http://home.infionline.net/~pickyperkins/pi.gif

[RRAAMJET]

"...a replacement rudder is being fitted..."
Good grief - I hope they do a thorough inspection of the fin structure and aft fuselage, and particularly the engine mounting lugs, before it's flown again. There is surely no rush....

Zeke, I have read with interest your postings on this topic and hope I have learned from your technical briefs posted here. I retain an open mind into this rudder failure until the facts are known.

My concern is Airbus' past history of dubious investigations....

I was at CX when we had all manner of problems with the intro of the 330, to the extent that we had to ground them voluntarily because Airbus would not admit a problem with the gearbox scavenge system design. Other problems at the time plagueing the aircraft were well known ( including the wreck of the demo example during an engine-out climb involving the test pilot and a dodgy altitude capture, mismatched ADC's on another involving conflicting warnings during the cruise, the radar-reflective paint coating used on the radome by mistake, etc ). Then there's the A-320's early history and Airbus investigations.... Let's not forget that the 340 currently has upper-wing crack problems, less than 10 years into service.

These are aircraft designed in the age of C.A.D - not slide rules such as the 747 and 737.

There simply seems to me no excuse for these problems. How many serious technical probs have there been with the introduction and structures of the most recent new designs from Boeing, ie aircraft designed post-formation of Airbus Industrie? 757? 767? 777?

Very few.

Why is that, Zeke? You've worked on both.

When you speak to pilots around the world about Airbus products, they are very, very polarized: they either love 'em or absolutely hate 'em. Odd....
Every pilot I've met who flies the new Boeings absolutely loves them. No complaints.

Why is that?

Airbus' behaviour, rightly or wrongly, always seems to reek of extreme protectionism of future orders foremost, rather than honest factual reporting. This may not be true, but it's the way it comes across. It's bad PR, and it probably could be avoided.

[planemad2]

Airbus to Recommend Inspections of A300, A310 Planes (Update1)


March 14 (Bloomberg) -- Airbus SAS, the world's biggest planemaker, will tell airlines to inspect the rudders of 400 aircraft worldwide after most of a tail part fell off during a flight earlier this month, a company spokesman said.

Airbus will take the action for A310 and A300-600 planes ``out of an abundance of caution'' after most of the rudder came off an Air Transat plane at cruising altitude, the spokesman, Clay McConnell, said in an interview. The plane, an A310 carrying 261 passengers and nine crew from Cuba to Quebec City, was forced to return to Cuba about 30 minutes after takeoff.

Airbus will tell airlines to conduct inspections, usually done every five years, within a few weeks, McConnell said. The carrier is recommending visual inspections and a so-called ``tap'' audio analysis to determine whether there are internal flaws in the carbon-fiber rudder, he said. A310 and A300-600 planes have identical rudders, he said.

``We don't know yet what happened'' with the Air Transat plane, McConnell said. ``We feel that this event is so unusual it really does require that we do something to be sure that there's not a problem out there.''

McConnell said Airbus will make the recommendation in a bulletin to operators, probably on Wednesday. French regulators will probably require the inspections, and other aviation regulators around the world, including the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, are expected to follow suit, McConnell said.

Examinations

Canadian aviation investigators are still examining the Air Transat incident and haven't determined why most of the rudder came off. The rudder is a movable part of the plane's vertical tail fin used to push the aircraft's nose left and right during cross-wind landings and engine outages.

Air Transat inspected all 10 of the A310s it operates on the day of the incident. They were released back into service within hours, said spokeswoman Rachel Andrews. Air Transat, Canada's largest charter carrier, is a unit of Transat A.T. Inc.

U.S. operators of the A310 and A300-600 planes include FedEx Corp., AMR Corp.'s American Airlines and United Parcel Service Inc. McConnell said he didn't know how much the inspections would cost or whether the evaluations could be done as part of routine maintenance. Airlines will pay the cost of the inspections, he said.

Canadian investigators examined the Air Transat aircraft last week in Cuba and so far have found no problems with the hydraulics that operate the rudder, said Marc Fernandez, senior investigator with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. The rudder that detached hasn't been found, he said.

Structure

``Structure-wise we don't have much left of the rudder there, so what we've decided to do is remove the whole tail of the aircraft,'' Fernandez said. Airbus investigators will return to Cuba Thursday to remove the tail section for further analysis, he said.

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board last October ruled that an American Airlines pilot caused a fatal November 2001 crash of an A300-600 in New York with ``unnecessary and excessive'' rudder movements that resulted in the plane's vertical tail fin snapping off.

The sensitivity of the A300-600 jet's rudder control system contributed to the accident that killed 265 people, as did pilot training by American, the board said. Flight 587 crashed less than two minutes after leaving John F. Kennedy International Airport on Nov. 12, two months after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

The tail fin remained on the plane in the Air Transat incident, which is unrelated to the New York accident, Fernandez said.

[Ignition Override]

Zeke-that is reasonable.

This topic is quite interesting. I jumpseated once on a FEDEX A-300 and was impressed with the c0ckp1t and instrument/overhead panel design, and would have enjoyed the opportunity to fly it. Never mind the desire to have more job security working for a package/freight carrier.

Is the carbon material used in the rudder the same as that in the vertical stabilizer?

It must be a nightmare to inspect the tails with x-rays or anything else, and spot tiny cracks in composite materials.

Are the structural members all made of aluminum? How about in the 319/320?

[DaveySimon]

Just check out the photos. The aft rudder surface or whats left of it is obviously some kind of composite. The forward section looks like aluminium (check the yank using the correct spelling!) but one will have to crack in 2 and have its photo posted for me to tell ya.

[planemad2]

I find it hard to believe the forces that are involved in these incidents, IF there is nothing else wrong, particularly the American A300.

To rip off a rudder, or much worse a whole tail, from a servicable Aircraft, they must be huge.

This is an identical Airbus A310, that was towed at speed into a hangar roof at JFK, and the hangar roof won. :(

Despite all this damage, the tail was still firmly attached.

http://members.optusnet.com.au/~holgatedc/mypic40.jpg

[Zeke]

PickyPerkins,

I would hear several loud bangs each flight, most of the time it’s associated with cabin crew moving about carts etc. I have heard bangs also when going into turbulance, again this was found to come from the galley.

RRAAMJET,

Airbus does not do the public investigations, or the reports, they maybe an "expert" used for assistance, however they do not publish reports. Information from all reports I have shown here are from various government bodies.

They dont make engines either, something another manufacturer has been saying about the number of failures its had, including one on a demo flight for a customer.

In most cases Airbus do not even do the FDR,QAR,CVR analysis, they might get a copy of it, but don’t do analysis like in AA587 which the NTSB did.

I am not aware of any aircraft entering service that has not had it problems, including the ones you mentioned are good aircraft. Cracks in aircraft structures are not an airbus only problem.

The A330 crash during flight test in my view was due to people being a little to inattentive flying around single engine. From memory the aircraft did everything it was supposed to do.

As for aerospace engineers, like pilots they are industrial prostitutes working on contract going from A to B back to A back to B depending on who has the work on at the time. The software used at A and B these days for designing stuff (CATIA) is the same, it’s originally a French product. Most of the computers its runs on are American. If you trash one product your really trashing both, at the end of the day the same people design them, and the source from the same or similar sub system providers (i.e engines, wheels, brakes, tyres, avionics, FMC's, pumps, electronics etc)

By the way, I have never heard a pilot yet that cannot complain about something. Just ask them how much they think they are worth.

Ignition Override,

I would think they are, the fibers are essentially the same, what tends to vary if the epoxy matrix, and the process of curing the part, i.e., the temperature, pressure, and time required in the autoclave.

"Are the structural members all made of aluminum" if you mean the spar in the tail etc, no not metal, try and keep composite with composite, biggest problem with composites is how to join them to metal, or use of fasteners.

"spot tiny cracks in composite materials." Tiny cracks are not anything to worry about, you have tiny cracks in wodden aircraft, they are the first true composite material. You could say we are going around the full circle, from kittyhawk where it was mainly a composite aircraft to the 787 which will have a composite fuselage.

When you buy the rolls of the material, it already has broken fibers in it, where composites has its advantage over metal is that the expoxy matrix will transfer the load from the broken fibre to surrounding fibers retaining structural integerity, cracks dont propergate in composites like they do in metal, no grains in the metal for the cracks to develop.

planemad2,

Your jumping the gun a little, no has said that the rudder came off due to excessive force. Many ways to weaken a structure without people knowing about it, like lightning.

[planemad2]

I didn't say it did, and certainly DON'T believe it was the cause of EITHER of these accidents/incidents.

From my experience, I believe the MAIN cause is that these composite components on both Aircraft were weakened by water/ice ingress over a long period of time into these components. :(

[Zeke]

planemad2,

Sorry if I mis understood what you said, I cannot say at this stage if that was the cause.

This photo gives you an idea of what severe turbulence can do to the vertical stabilizer with delamination not being a factor.

http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/research/bombers/b4/b52h-5.jpg

In flight with extensive tail damage - B-52H-170-BW S/N 61-0023 From a famous series of photographs taken after severe turbulence sheared off most of the vertical stabilizer. The aircraft had been specially instrumented for air turbulence research after some operational B-52s were lost. The tail was lost after a severe and sustained burst (+5 seconds) of clear air turbulence violently buffeted the aircraft. The Boeing test crew (Pilot - Chuck Fisher & Copilot - Dick Curry) nursed to aircraft to Blytheville AFB, Arkansas and landed safely. Also note the (inert) AGM-28 Hound Dog missiles still attached to the wing pylons. The dotted line shows the normal outline of the vertical stabilizer and rudder.

[cwatters]

Someone asked about different types of carbon. Slightly OT but..

Yes there are different grades of Carbon. Carbon fiber doesn't stretch much but within limits it's possible to adjust it elasticity (Modulus) when it's made. You can also weave cloths with mixtures of Carbon, Kevlar and other materials to make hybrids with very specific properties.

Photo (http://www.acp-composites.com/r2f1a_1s.jpg)

There are more exotic materials around (eg Boron fiber) but Carbon is reasonably cheap these days.

For more info see a Guide to composites (http://www.netcomposites.com/education.asp)

Later Edit: I forgot to add that....

In the event of two similar crashes, the use of the same type of Carbon would not constitute a really significant link (any more than the use of the same type of aluminium would).

[PickyPerkins]

Zeke

Seems like we need some calibration on "loud bangs" here.

The ultimate sideways load for failure of the tail fin for American Airlines Flight 587 was, I believe, about 37.5 tons. The sound of the fin failing under this load seems to have been described on the CVR as either the "sound of snap" or as a "loud bang". At the same time we have pilots such as yourself describing the sound of carts moving about in the galley as "loud bangs".

Surely these sounds must have been of a different order of magnitude?

Cheers, http://pickyperkins.home.infionline.net/pi.gif

[Zeke]

PickyPerkins,

If it were to fail, it is outside the aircraft, the length of the aircraft away from the cockpit, with the aircraft moving away from the noise in relative motion, and a cockpit door that is closed, and well insulated. Think about how quiet it is in an aircraft with the engine noise just outside. Can you hear the APU running whilst on the ground with a cockpit door open ?

The term "loud noise/bang" I would suggest could only be something relatively close to be heard in a closed cockpit.

[PickyPerkins]

Zeke

I was assuming that the sound would be transmitted through the structure if the aircraft, but maybe it does not work that way. The whole fuselarge must have twisted when the fin snapped off, presumably followed by a torsional oscillation. I agree about not hearing the APU, but one does hear the flap extension mechanism operating and the gear being lowered. The loudest bang I ever heard in an aircraft was a tyre blowing after retraction, seemingly right under my feet.

Cheers, http://pickyperkins.home.infionline.net/pi.gif

[Halfnut]

How many times did the Concord lose part of it's rudder?

Dates, locations and photos?

[planemad2]

Seems some people are coming around to my theory.

Unless they have been reading this site.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The Airbus rudder: Compromised composites?


Pittsbburg Tribune-Review
Friday, March 18, 2005

The rudder of an Airbus A310 fell off at 35,000 feet on a March 6 flight from Cuba to Quebec. The crew maintained control and returned to the island.

A former Airbus pilot, who now flies Boeings, told The Observer of Britain that rudders just didn't fall apart like that -- until now.

The fates were kinder to the 270 people on board this month's flight than the 265 who died in November 2001 when a nearly identical Airbus A300 crashed after takeoff in New York.

Pilot error was blamed for the loss of the rudder and tail fin. It is disputed whether pilot "overcorrections" occurred before or after the plane started falling apart.

European manufacturer Airbus has overtaken Boeing as the top jetliner-maker. Its A380 superjumbo will be carrying passengers next year.

A key to the Airbus success has been use of carbon composite materials -- used on the A300, A310 and A380 -- valued for their lightness and strength.

Fins, flaps and rudders on some A300s and all A310s are made of these composites. Some say only ultrasound instead of the typical visual inspections can detect possible structural failures because of water condensation between layers.

Airbus says it will ask for (ask for?) airline inspections (of what kind we don't know) in light of the March 6 debacle, but it stands behind the crafts' safety.

One hopes no more planes drop parts before Airbus starts acting more responsibly.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[BEagle]

Whereas Boeing's new plastic plane, the 7E7, is made entirely from such materials.....

Probably why they've been rather quiet about the A310 rudder failure?

[Captain104]

A former Airbus pilot, who now flies Boeings, told The Observer of Britain that rudders just didn't fall apart like that -- until now.


My grandma also had a serious scientific dispute with my dachshound and they fully agree. Sorry-they never flew concorde. :p

Regards

[Zeke]

A former Airbus pilot, who now flies Boeings, told The Observer of Britain that rudders just didn't fall apart like that -- until now.

Rudder structural failures have happened before, can think of a number of times with early jets in the UK, a number of times with the Concord, B52's, and the FA18 is well known for it. Most of the time the aircraft survives.

Rudder control malfunctions resulting in crashes are not unheard of with B707 and B737. Most of the time the result is aircraft loss.

[pigboat]

I know one of the pax on the flight. He says there was a loud bang, followed by vibration serious enough that some doors on the overhead bins opened.

[Flying Mech]

I have followed this Thread with Interest as an A300/310 Engineer. Some of the posters have made some very good points which the Incident Report may back up in due time. Does anybody know if the A/C is still in Varadero or has it been returned to service with a new V. Fin & Rudder + Test Flight while Airbus examine the old Fin. Does anyone know if the old rudder has been located or is the Sea too deep in the area of the Incident for Diving?Maybe some of our Canadian Ppruners can shed a little more light on this.:ok:

[Safety Guy]

Last I heard, that aircraft is going to be on the ground at VRA for several months. It needs a major rebuild in the rear end, so to speak, including a totally new tail and mounting assembly.

[KATLPAX]

The 'experts' in the press.....from ETOPS to delaminiation, and grounding...

Sun, March 20, 2005

A-300s, 310s likely flawed

By Eric Margolis

Good news/bad news for air travelers.

First, good. The world has grown smaller.

Boeing just rolled out its new 777-200 Longer Range passenger jet. This twin-engine transport can carry 301 passengers 15,000 km, meaning non-stop, direct service between most cities on earth.

Alas, as is the case with existing aircraft, passengers will still be denied adequate fresh air or moisture, a serious health risk on long flights.

Pakistan International Airways is one of the first 777-LR launch customers. It will use the 777 on a direct Karachi-Houston route, the limit of the plane's range.

The 777-LR, Boeing's 787, and Airbus A-350, both under development, will allow travellers to avoid congested hubs like London Heathrow or Frankfurt, and fly direct to less heavily trafficked destinations. The 777-LR and its sister, 777-ER, compete head on with my favourite aircraft, the superb, comfortable four-engine Airbus A-340 series.

Now, the bad news. Last week, the 9-metre-high tail of a Canadian Air Transat Airbus twin-engine A-310 outbound from Cuba fell off. That's right: Fell off.

Its superb pilots managed to use wing and tail flaps to return to Cuba safely. In 1985, pilots of a Japan Airlines 747 whose tail controls were wrecked by an explosion lost control and crashed.

Last week's incident was Transat's second aeronautical miracle after a 2001 flight ran out of fuel at mid-Atlantic, and its pilots managed to glide to a safe landing.

The Airbus A-300 and A-310s should be grounded until their tails can be proven 100% safe. When these aircraft were introduced 15-20 years ago, their tails, made of lightweight composite fibres, were a radical innovation. It's now clear the 300-series tails might have defects, perhaps along their hinge joints.

In Nov., 2001, the tail of American Airlines flight 587, an A-300 bound for the West Indies, disintegrated over New York City, killing all 260 aboard. Investigators blamed pilot error, turbulence, and the plane.

It now seems more likely the culprit was delamination of the A-300 tail.

Soon after, 20 American Airlines pilots flying A300's asked to be transferred to Boeing aircraft. Since then, I have refused to fly A-300 or A-310's, about 800 of which remain in service. For full disclosure, I was hijacked aboard a Lufthansa A-310 in 1993. This event did not influence my judgment of the aircraft.

My next concern is twin-engine jets flying long over-water routes. Airlines save great amounts on fuel by using two-engine planes. Over water, I prefer a four-engine aircraft, like the magnificent Boeing 747-400 or the newer, sexier Airbus A-340 series.

Airlines and manufacturers insist engine technology is so advanced that long over-water flights are safe. I disagree.

On March 17, 2003, a United twin-engine 777 outbound from New Zealand with 225 aboard lost an engine over the mid-Pacific and had to limp for three hours against strong headwinds on a single engine to reach Hawaii. If a problem had developed with the over-stressed second engine, disaster would have ensued.

Insist they're safe

According to Aviation Week, Boeing's 777s have had 16 in-flight shutdowns since May, 1995. Airlines insist the aircraft, which have flown 2.3 million miles, are safe even on a single engine.

Call me old-fashioned, but four engines are always better than two. Two pilots and a flight engineer are always better than a two-man crew. Automation means you don't need a third crew member -- until things start going wrong.

The 1998 crash of a burning Swissair MD-11 off Nova Scotia, and the 1995 crash of an American 757 in Colombia might have been averted had there been a flight engineer to help the confused pilots.

Government regulators, not airlines and cost-saving, should determine safety.

I'd rather pay more and know there is backup when I'm flying at 39,000 feet in pitch blackness over the icy North Pacific.

[MarkD]

that's funny, I read in the paper yesterday the air industry was never safer, based on fatalities per pax carried, and that the total is much lower than 2002 and 2003! The way that guy goes on, with all these two crew cockpits replacing the last of the three crew, planes should be dropping like flies! Someone should ask him why having a FE didn't save AF001. Idiot. Which rag published that?

[Safety Guy]

He's actually a writer for the Toronto Sun, and the sensationalization of distorted facts is his trademarked writing style.

[woderick]

Airbus issued, about four days ago, an AOT specifically aimed at several (about six) A330-300 airframes, all early MSNs, with a specific rudder Pt No, as fitted at the factory, calling for a detailed NDT inspection (tap test and ultra sonic). They refered to the TransAt incident but it was NOT urgent IIRC within 850hrs.

[Few Cloudy]

This Margolis wants to be careful what he writes.

The case of SR 111 has been well (you could say brilliantly) researched and documented by the Canadian authorities and he should read the report.

This was no standard failure but a complicated chain of constructional and material events with aggravating circumstances. No standard available checklist or procedure was of any use.

The part which impressed me is that the time taken to the point where the cockpit was no longer occupiable (fire in the ceiling) or no longer useable (complete electrical failure and smoke) occured 5 to 6 minutes before the aircraft - even on a direct course - could have reached the field.

At no point is there a suggestion that a third crewmember could have had any influence on this.

He won't fly far in the future with his growing list of banned aircraft. But Hey! it sells newspapers - for a day.

[Nopax,thanx]

Emergency AD issued today by the CAA for CFRP rudders.

[RRAAMJET]

Mr Margolis should get some kind of award for writing the most inaccurate aviation article I have ever read. What a hoot....

Canadians - please write to your local editor and tell them to censure this guy. :yuk:

[UNCTUOUS]

Emergency AD issued today by the CAA for CFRP rudders.

NOPAX, thanks

Would you have a URL for this AD please. Darned if I can find it.

UNC

[aerolearner]

Would you have a URL for this AD please. Darned if I can find it.
http://213.30.153.174/GSAC/ad_cns.nsf/0/05703CEEC7AF6D89C1256FC80062091F/$file/UF05_048.pdf

[Capt.KAOS]

Last week's incident was Transat's second aeronautical miracle after a 2001 flight ran out of fuel at mid-Atlantic, and its pilots managed to glide to a safe landing. Transat seems to employ extraodinary skilled aviators.

[barit1]

Transat seems to employ extraodinary skilled aviators.

Either that, or they operate Airbuses, which need neither rudders nor fuel.

[gwillie]

I just followed aerolearner's link to the French site to read that AD...and........noticed that, yesterday, they issued a SECOND AD...expanding the scope TO INCLUDE A330'S AND 340'S.

Reason: "The CFRP rudder PN fitted on the A310 aircraft involved in the reported event is also installed on certain
A340 and A330 aircraft."

hmmmmmmmmmmmm.....the plot thickens

[Few Cloudy]

Seems that no amount of testing can stress up an airframe as continuous line flying does.

Things come to light down the road of experience and get "fixed" rather than designed out.

Remember the fuse pins holding on the 747 engines - the rear pressure dome on MD-80 and 747 - the screw jack on the MD-80 -the geriatric effects of regular short range flights on the Aloha 737 - you can go right back to the DH Comet, which showed us the effects of metal fatigue with continued pressurisation cycles.

I think this will be one more thing in the long list of items which will have to be checked frequently on ground stops. Thank goodness that it didn't take an accident this time to show it up. Thank goodness that the manufacturer is acting quickly and responsibly.

FC.

[Captain104]

If I understand that AD right, there are
6 A-330-300 and
34 A-340-200/300 concerned

http://213.30.153.174/Gsac/ad_cns.nsf/accueil_FR?OpenPage

open first line: U F-2005-053 (B)

Regards

Edit for reference

[catchup]

Thank goodness that the manufacturer is acting quickly

The incident happened at march 7th.

When "acted" EADS?

regards

[Flight Safety]

The attention from Airbus seems to be focused on one part number A55471500 for the rudder on all 4 aircraft types. This rudder part number is fitted to many (if not most) of the A300-600 and A310 fleet, but appears to be fitted to only certain earlier models of the A330 and A340.

I wonder if this part number is still current on new A300-600s, and why was it replaced on later production A330s and A340s? What is different about the rudders fitted to later A330s and A340s compared to this part number rudder? What design changes were made?

Safety Guy said:
Last I heard, that aircraft is going to be on the ground at VRA for several months. It needs a major rebuild in the rear end, so to speak, including a totally new tail and mounting assembly.
Does anyone know what other damage was done to this aircraft when the rudder came off?

[Few Cloudy]

Hi Catchup,

Have you ever seen a pilot rush into some wrong action in a sim check?

When you consider that the part has to be examined, the problem found and then action taken, I would say it has been done quickly and positively.

FC.

[catchup]

When you consider that the part has to be examined, the problem found

To my knowledge, neither the part has been examined nor has the problem been found.

regards

[Few Cloudy]

Well that is a pretty serious allegation. Do you mean no-one from Airbus has seen the damage?

As far as the AD goes they are checking "structural Integrity" of the part which I agree is a pretty broad canvas but is a positive step to catching further damage before an incident or accident happens.

I say thank goodness, because there have been other occasions on which very little action has resulted and rather late.

FC

[Irish Steve]

As far as the AD goes they are checking "structural Integrity" of the part which I agree is a pretty broad canvas but is a positive step to catching further damage before an incident or accident happens.

True, in as far as it goes. However, there's what looks like a contradiction here. The check is within the next 550 flight hours, or 3 months, so apparently not a panic, but in the body, it then says "in case of findings..or if damage to the rudder exceeds..... refer to Airbus structure engineering Customer support for an approved repair solution before next flight

Somewhere, the timeframes don't quite tie in for me. Either there's damage that means it's not airworthy, or there is not, and to allow up to 3 months before finding out that it's not airworthy seems to me to be contradictory, or at least questionable.

[Capt.KAOS]

the AA587 tail:

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/transportation/587crash/splash_image.jpg

[Irish Steve]

the AA587 tail:

Not having seen this pic till today. and in the light of this latest incident, I am forced to wonder if there is any significance in the fact that the pic only shows the fin, and there's no visible evidence of a rudder anywhere. We'll never know, but did the rudder part company with the fin before the fin then separated from the airframe, or did it all come off together?

Pause for thought!

[barit1]

I think that there's enough trapped air in the honeycomb that the rudder will float, and may eventually wash up on the beach somewhere. IIRC the AA587 fin & rudder were found floating in the bay.

[stagger]

The AA 587 rudder was found. In three big pieces. There are some pics here...

http://usread.com/flight587/Coast_Guard_Pix.html

And an attempt to "reconstruct" the rudder here...

http://usread.com/flight587/RudderReconstruct.html

The above site belongs to someone who has some theories of his own about the AA 587 accident (he thinks the tail wasn't the first thing to fail). I'm only posting this link because it's the only place I could find the pictures - not because I am convinced by (or have even really read) his theories.

[SaturnV]

Thanks for the reference to the pics of the AA587 rudder. The NTSB report stated that entrapped water was detected in the lower portion of the rudder, and the locations of the water appeared to correspond to areas where the facesheet had separated from the honeycomb. It was the opinion of investigators that the water was most likely water from Jamaica Bay.

The NTSB considered five possible scenarios for the cause of the initial failure, before deciding that fracture of the right rear main attachment lug was the most probable one. Two other scenarios (for which there is no detail) were rudder skin fracture, and actuation of a bent rudder hinge line resulting in rudder fracture or rudder hinge line failure.

[planemad2]

FAA Orders Inspections of Airbus Rudders (AP)

By LESLIE MILLER Associated Press Writer

Posted: 3/25/2005 2:22 PM
WASHINGTON

U.S. airlines will be ordered to inspect the rudders of certain Airbus jets following an incident in which most of the rudder fell off an A310 in flight, a spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration said Friday.

The FAA directive, to be issued Monday, affects A310s and A300-600s. American Airlines and FedEx, the only U.S. airlines that fly those models, have a combined 112 of those planes.

A plane operated by Canadian-based Air Transat lost nearly all of the rudder _ the vertical moving part at the back of the tail fin _ soon after leaving Cuba for Quebec on March 6. The pilot was able to control the aircraft and returned to Varadero, Cuba. None of the 270 passengers and crew was injured.

"No one knows for sure what really happened, but we feel this is a prudent measure," FAA spokesman Les Dorr said of the order. "The basic idea is to get somebody up looking at the rudder to see if there are any problems that can be detected visually or with the tap test."

A tap test is a way to inspect parts by tapping a piece of metal or a coin against the surface while listening for dull spots. Bill Waldock, an aviation safety professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Arizona, said it's an extremely time-consuming process. "You got a mechanic out there who's going to spend a lot of time tapping."

The FAA directive follows a similar order by French civil aviation authorities on March 18. European aircraft maker Airbus SAS also asked airlines to inspect the planes last week out of what it called "an abundance of caution."

Airbus spokeswoman MaryAnne Greczyn said the Airbus request speeds up the regular five-year inspection cycle.

The Air Transat incident has prompted discussion about the aging characteristics of composites, a relatively new building material which the A300 rudders are made of. Composites are man-made materials made of at least two different kinds of substances; the Airbus rudders are made of carbon fiber and reinforced epoxy.

Composites have been used in aircraft manufacture since the 1970s, first as smaller components and then as larger parts. Airbus was the first manufacturer to use composites extensively on large commercial aircraft. Boeing also uses them.

An Airbus A300-600, which has the same rudder system as the A310, crashed in New York in November 2001 after its tail fell off and killed 265 people. The National Transportation Safety Board blamed pilot error, inadequate pilot training and overly sensitive rudder controls.

Investigators conducted extensive tests on the tail and found no evidence of fatigue, which occurs in aging components and can cause cracking.

Dorr said U.S. airlines have to inspect the plans within 550 flight hours or three months.

French civil aviation authorities also told airlines to inspect A330s and A340s because the rudders are the same or similar to the A300-600 and A310. The FAA didn't order A330s to be inspected because the planes used in the United States have different rudders. There are no A340s registered in the United States.

[hobie]

A tap test is a way to inspect parts by tapping a piece of metal or a coin against the surface while listening for dull spots. Bill Waldock, an aviation safety professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Arizona, said it's an extremely time-consuming process. "You got a mechanic out there who's going to spend a lot of time tapping."
Surely there must be a more sophisticated test than this? :confused:

[planemad2]

Apparently not, that is the problem with composites.

[BEagle]

And when you make the whole aircraft from composites, Mr Boeing?

The 'plastic plane' 7E7, for instance....in which the majority of the primary structure, including the fuselage and wing, will be made of composite materials... :confused:

[MikeKnight]

Coming from a composite/plastics boating background, I must say there are literally millions of combinations of reinforced plastics. There is also continuous research being conducted by hundreds of university educated technicians every week.

With that in mind, I should think the plastics technology that Boeing are employing today are somewhat more advanced than the technology employed by Airbus when designing the A310.

No diss on Airbus but, there you go.

[planemad2]

The same would probably apply to Airbus.

These problems/inspections seem to be confined to their A300-600s/A310s and early models only of the A330s/A340s, their composite technology has also improved greatly since then.

[arcniz]

What hasn't seemed to improve over the years is the diagnostic technology for evaluating the soundness of Airbus composite parts and structures.

[Ignition Override]

Let's not even suggest whether there could be a possible connection between the Air Transat incident and the AA crash. This type of thinking is clearly 'out of bounds' on Pprune.

Even to bring up the question is too much for some who debate technical topics on Pprune. Check previous pages.

If Boeing uses materials which can not be inspected and evaluated in the 7E7 etc, then they have somehow screwed up. Aside from that, does the 7E7 have a yoke or a stick?

[planemad2]

Why is it out of bounds. :confused:

In my personal opinion as a Professional Engineer, and one with considerable A300-600/A310 experience, in exactly the same environment as these 2 Aircraft, I think there could well be a big connection. :(

Continual water (ice) ingress into these composites over a long period. :(

[HotDog]

I'm not familiar with the test schedule of aircraft composites but would imagine that extensive immersion tests would have been carried out prior to certification and release of the materials.

[Zeke]

Ignition Override,

That type of thinking is not out of bounds, just come up with a sound justification.

I cannot speak of the 7E7/787 program, on the 7J7/777 project the most critical environment expected in airline service in areas away from local heat sources the thermal analysis predicted a maximum inflight temperature of 71°C and a minimum temperature of -54°C. The effect of moisture on the material systems applied in the empenage (the 777 has a carbon-fiber-reinforced plastic (CFRP) horizontal and vertical stabilisers, elevators, and rudder) and determined that it is highly unlikely that a moisture content of 1.1 % by weight will be exceeded in service.

FAR and JAR 25.571 and FAA Advisory Circular 20-107A, composite aircraft structure, and the JAA, ACJ 25.603, composite aircraft structure (acceptable means of compliance) describe two primary damage tolerance requirements... damage growth characterisation and residual strength capability. As in the case of static strength damage tolerance certification is based on analysis supported by tests at element, subcomponent, and component levels.

Considering the applied strains, a "no-growth" approach was selected for the 777 empenage similar to that used for the 737 graphite-epoxy horizontal stabilizer. This philosophy states that any damage that is visually undetectable is not critical. Structures with this type of damage must be capable of carrying ultimate load for the operational life of the airplane. For the tests saw cuts were made to the front and rear spar to demonstrate the capability to sustain continued safe-flight loads as per FAR/JAR 25.571e.

No growth behavior was exhibited in numerous subcomponent tests and two full scale cyclic load tests, the 7J7 horizontal stabiliser and the preproduction 777 horizontal stabiliser. I During test theyh were deliberatly damaged so that visible damage was inflicted on the test article that underwent repeated loading (representive of flight loads), and underwent inspections of the damaged sites for growth during the test sequence.

The end result of the tests it was found that manufacturing anomalies allowed per the process specifications will not grow for the equivalent of more than two design service lives. Visible damage due to foreign-object impact will not grow for the duration of two inspection intervals. The structure can sustain specified residual strength loads with damage that can reasonably be expected in service. The structure can sustain specified static loads ("continued safe flight loads") after incurring in-flight discrete-source damage.

Further information on the certification of composites and material and process specifications can be found in the FAR/JARs
25.603 Control of materials
25.605 Fabrication methods
25.613 Material strength properties
25.615 Design properties
25.619 Special factors
25.305 Strength and deformation
25.307 Proof of structure
25.571 Fatigue evaluation, residual strength, discrete source damage
25.581 Lightning protection
25.609 Protection of structure

The technology employed by Airbus when designing the A310 is similar to that used today. There are two main difference in the use of composites today, the resins available, and the software.

The resins now available are toughened more and generally less dense, meaning that service life for parts increases and it is lighter, for example the 777 rudder design life is 40000 flights of 1,5 hours duration, 25000 flights of 3 hours duration, or 10000 flights of 9 hours duration. Older aircraft with earlier resins have lower design lives and heavier parts, meaning cost more to maintain, and less payload.

Improved software allows for improved geometry, improved automatic manufacturing, optimized lay-up of carbon-fiber-reinforced plastic direction, and improved analysis like of woven composite materials. Meaning stronger and lighter parts.

From my understanding the 787 can be ordered with either stick of yoke. Why anyone would want to go 14 hours with something between their legs is beyond me. Worked for the F16.

Advanced diagnostic techniques for composites are available and are used at the manufacturing quality assurance stage. For example I remember seeing some color ultrasonic scans of a part that was hand manufactured consisting of several layers of carbon fiber material layered in different geometries. The part was rejected as the scan clearly showed the outline of a human hand, apparently of the technicians forgot to wear a glove when laying up one sheet of material and the fat from their hand prevented the two associated layers to bond showing up as a void.

The AD that has been raised is to establish if there is any statistical basis that the structural integrity is inadequate fleet wide, it a precautionary AD and a prudent course of action as it will either establish or diminish the integrity of the part with higher and lower cycles and hours than both AA587 and TS961.The aim of this Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) is to check the structural integrity of the rudder and its attachment by means of a one time inspection (general visual inspection, detailed visual inspection and tap test inspection), as a precautionary action.

[cwatters]

..it is highly unlikely that a moisture content of 1.1 % by weight will be exceeded in service.

That strikes me as a very strange figure but I can't put my finger on why exactly....

For that much water to get into a composite part aren't we talking about water getting into voids? I mean, I can't see that much water being in the resin when the part is being made!

If we are talking about water penetration into voids or hollow parts why would there be such a precise expectation as to how much that would be limited to?

Any experts out there know where this figure comes from?

[DOVES]

ZEKE:
Quote:
... for example the 777 rudder design life is 40000 flights of 1,5 hours duration, 25000 flights of 3 hours duration, or 10000 flights of 9 hours duration. ...
Will you please be so kind to tell me:
1) What is, more or less, the stress on the root of the rudder of a 747-400 flying with one internal engine, exactly number 2, inoperative, the others running at MCL, and the trim displaced to compensate the yaw?
2) And the stress on the fuselage for the same conditions?
3) And how many flights of 12 hours duration in the above conditions are needed to fulfil the 747-400 rudder design life?
I admire your knowledge and I'm anxious to have your precious answer.
Regards
DOVE

[stagger]

Dove

Trying to merge threads here by any chance?

Is the 747-400 rudder composite?

[gwillie]

UPDATE

http://www.newsday.com/news/local/longisland/ny-litail044203026apr04,0,4706002.story?coll=ny-linews-headlines

"American acknowledged Friday that its inspections of two Airbus 300-600s found "minor delamination""..............

Like, just a little pregnant?

Surely, there's someone out there with an ear to the ground....any rumblings?

[planemad2]

They are slowly coming around to my theory. :(

[Volume]

Talking about "the composite material that made up the rudder and tail of the two planes" is like talking about the metal material that makes up the kitchen wrap foil and the wings.

Although fin and rudder are made from carbon fibre epoxy composites, that is all that is common.
The rudder is made of sandwich material with thin (less than 1 mm) carbon fibre skins on nomex/phenol honeycomb, while the fin is made of integrally rib and stringer stiffened thick (up to more than 10 mm) monolitic carbon fibre shells.
I´m not 100% shure, but I also think the rudder is made from bidirectional woven fabric prepregs while the fin is made from unidirectional fibre tape prepregs.

Finding "minor delaminations" in composites is like finding dents, loose rivets, small cracks or minor corrosion on metals. It weakens, but not below the tested strength level.

It´s a long way from pregnancy to maternity ;)

[planemad2]

The common point is all the water (ice) trapped in these composite tails for long periods. :(

[gwillie]

"....probably not an operational problem...Investigators are also curious about a small square hole and several smaller holes found in the tail section...Maintenance records showed...only some minor work on composite material bonding."

then, the rudder falls off?

http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/31/news/rudder.html
(2 pages here)

[gwillie]

New species:

http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/DSCF0107b.JPG

airbus tailless

[gwillie]

The silence on this topic is deafening!!!!!!!!

There has to be someone out there with a reliable info source for something....ANYTHING.....maybe?????????

I'd even stand for a 9 in a 1-10 scale of "reliable" sources!

-how 'bout an 8?

[Rollingthunder]

(grounded for months waiting for a new tail)

Months? We had a ground vehicle strike a vertical stabilzer on an A320 once upon a time. Made a couple of phone calls and next day there was a Beluga on the ramp outside with a new tail inside. Was quite a show getting it off the Beluga.

[MarkD]

rollingthunder

I imagine given the differences in production rates for 310 over 320 the chances of a fin being "to spare" is rather higher for a 320! God that Beluga's ugly though...

[Flyingphil]

When you made it for the 320 within a few hours this does not mean that everyone makes it so well in that time:ok:

I assume that rudder was from XLW where a few A321s destinated for US Airways have not been completed so there was a rudder avaible just by call;)

Sticking back to the topic, maybe I didn't see it, how about the investigation.
Is it possible that the acft is stored without tail for further examination of the fuselage, tail-section...?


Regards

[Wino]

At AA, In the ensuing aftermath of 587 they found ANOTHER vertical stab that needed to be replace. They were waiting over a year for it... They were pretty sure that damage had been in the stab for several heavy maintance checks and undiscovered by the Airbus procedures in place (and still recommended) at the time.

There was a lot of damage around the lug, that turned out to be undectable untill the entire stab was removed from the airplane, somthing that Airbus had strenously objected to American doing.

Cheers
Wino

[Globaliser]

Wino: At AA, In the ensuing aftermath of 587 they found ANOTHER vertical stab that needed to be replace. They were waiting over a year for it... They were pretty sure that damage had been in the stab for several heavy maintance checks and undiscovered by the Airbus procedures in place (and still recommended) at the time.Was that the aircraft that had been in the stall incident near MIA several years back?

[Wino]

Yeah, I think so.

It MIGHT have been the one with the autopilot problem however. There was a case where the autopilot didn't declutch from the rudder axis when it disconnected, causing continous violoent and rapid swings back and forth for the balance of the flight. Was a very exciting landing (also in Miami as I recall.)

That lead to the warning to try the opposit side autopilot should that sort of thing happen in the future....

Cheers
Wino

[darkbarly]

hobie

Composite structure can be examined using a number of non destructive inspection methods which provide much more reliable and less error prone results than 'tap testing' surface areas the size of small countries with a coin. Even if the engineer inspects with total discipline he/she will only find damage near the surface.

A better method is X-ray, a technique already widely used for matallic structures. Unfortunately there are few of these techniques available for composite as they tend to be driven by 'in service' experience.

Hopefully this incident will drive the industry to find sound and reliable solutions to a long awaited request from maintenance engineers to be equipped with something more elaborate than percussive interpretation.

[Volume]

darkbarly

x-ray is the least favorable method to detect damage in composite structure. It is OK to find water ingress in honeycomb sandwich, but useless to find delamination in more or less flat panels. You have to use x-ray in the same plane as the delamination to see it, but normally you are just able to apply x-ray perpendicular to the surface. As long as no contamination has filled the delaminated area, you will see nothing. If you are looking for delaminations close to metallic bushings, they will hide the damage due to the high x-ray absorption of metals compared to composite.
Ultrasonic is most effective for inspecting monolithic composite structure for delaminations.

To give a simple statement, you could say : If the damage is large enough to be harmful, it can be found by visual inspection and tap testing. If you need ultrasonic or x-ray to detect it, it is most probably not dangerous at the moment.

[gwillie]

25/04/2005
Canadian Transportation Safety Board releases first report.....among other findings, DELAMINATION DAMAGE TO THE TWO REAR ATTACHMENT LUGS OF THE VERTICAL TAILPLANE (STABILIZER)................very interesting when compared to the AA587 findings!!!!!!! No wonder there are strong rumors about the re-opening of that investigation. There are also suggestions being heard in the industry of a design flaw in the stabilizer/rudder.

Investigation Update on the Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigation into Air Transat Flight 961 Loss of Rudder Occurrence (A05F0047)
(Gatineau, Quebec, 04 May 2005) - The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) provided an update today into its investigation of Air Transat Flight 961.

Aviation Investigation Update
Loss of Rudder
Airbus 310-308
Air Transat Flight 961
Varadero, Cuba
06 March 2005
Investigation Update Number A05F0047

Investigation Organization
On 06 March 2005, Air Transat Flight 961, an Airbus 310-308, Canadian registration C-GPAT, serial number 597, lost the major part of its rudder while in flight from Varadero, Cuba, to Québec City, Canada. The flight returned to Varadero where an uneventful landing was carried out.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) was notified of the accident at 11001 and responded by deploying two investigators from the Dorval, Canada, regional office and one investigator from the TSB Engineering Laboratory in Ottawa, Canada. Because the event occurred over international waters, Canada, as the State of Registry, is conducting the investigation.
The investigation team is composed of the following five main groups: operational, air traffic control (ATC), human factor, technical, performance, and recorders group. Four subgroups under the technical group have been established; a system group, a structure and maintenance group, a maintenance records group, and a manufacturing group. The Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA) of France, the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States assigned accredited representatives to participate in the investigation. Technical advisors from Airbus, Transport Canada, the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the German Aerospace Center (DLR), and Air Transat are also participating and assisting in the investigation.

Factual Information
The A310-308, operated by Air Transat, was on a charter flight from Varadero, Cuba, to Québec City, Canada, with a crew of 9 and 261 passengers on board. While at an altitude of 35 000 feet, the flight crew heard a loud bang with simultaneous vibrations that lasted a few seconds. The aircraft entered a periodic rolling and yawing motion known as dutch roll that decreased as the aircraft descended to a lower altitude. Once the aircraft reached about 19 000 feet, the flight crew had no indication of any abnormalities from systems monitoring. The flight crew considered landing at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, but elected to return to Varadero where an uneventful landing was carried out. It is only once on the ground that the flight crew noted during a visual inspection that a major part of the rudder was missing. There were no fatalities. One flight attendant sustained minor injuries.
The investigation team observed that only the lower rudder spar and the base rib of the rudder were remaining. Less than five per cent of the total rudder surface actually remained attached to the spar. The rudder is attached to the vertical fin through seven A-frame hinges, numbered one to seven, starting from the bottom. The remaining parts of the rudder were attached to the vertical fin's rear spar by the actuators and the four lower rudder hinges. Hinges five and six were were still in place on the fin spar, but only the attachment fittings of the rudder were attached to them. The rudder position sensor was still attached to the remaining piece of the rudder. Rudder hinge number seven was torn off from the fin spar.
The panels that cover the rudder are made of carbon fibre reinforced plastic (CFRP). The panels were manufactured in 1991 by Soko in Mostar, former Yugoslavia. The rudder panels (serial number 1331) were assembled at Airbus facilities in Stade, Germany, and then installed on the aircraft in 1992. The aircraft had accumulated 49 224 flight hours since manufactured in 1992.
The flight data recorder (FDR), the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and the digital AIDS (aircraft integrated data system) recorder (DAR) were sent to the TSB Engineering Laboratory for downloads of all data recorded to determine the sequence of events and the contributing factors of this event. The work is still in progress.
On 19 March 2005, the vertical tailplane (VTP) and the rudder were transported from Cuba to Bremen, Germany, for further examination. The VTP, to which the rudder is attached, is bolted to the top of the fuselage by six attachment lugs. The VTP was subject to ultrasonic inspection, which revealed delamination damage to the two rear attachment lugs. Loads and aeroelastic models are being formulated to evaluate the noted damage. An elasticity laminate checker (ELCH) test on sample in-service rudders is also in progress to check rudder panels in depth, from the outer skin to the inner skin. This test will provide information on rudder skin and core damage over a sampling, ranging from 13-year-old rudders to more recent rudders. At this time, one test has been carried out on one of the selected rudders, and no discrepancies have been found.
The rudder control systems were checked and tested in Varadero with no anomalies found. The three servo-controls that control rudder movement were inspected and tested at Goodrich facilities in Paris, France, during the second week of April. Rudder servo-control spring rods were also investigated in Airbus facilities in Hamburg, Germany, and no deficiencies were found.
Maintenance and technical records of the aircraft are being reviewed by the maintenance and records group to determine if any past maintenance activities on the aircraft, or if any past reported operational events may have played a role in the detachment of the rudder.

Safety Action Taken
Following the event, a number of actions have been taken. On 17 March 2005, Airbus produced an All Operator Telex (AOT) to verify the structural integrity of the rudder and its attachment by means of a one-time detailed visual inspection and tap test inspection as a precautionary measure. On 18 March 2005, the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC) of France issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) that includes mandatory actions and compliance times to perform inspection and apply corrective measures if necessary in accordance with the instructions specified in the Airbus AOT. On 28 March 2005, the FAA issued a similar Airworthiness Directive (AD). All results and feedback from these mandatory inspections are being compiled by Airbus.
Once validated safety deficiencies are identified during the course of an investigation, the Board can, at any time during the investigation, recommend action designed to reduce or eliminate such deficiencies from the transportation system.

Investigation Plan
There is still a considerable amount of work to be done to bring this investigation to a conclusion by the Board. In the following months, further ELCH tests will continue on other rudders of the defined samples to check rudder panels in depth, from outer to inner skin, and to measure rudder structural rigidity. The preparation of the draft report will take months to be completed with emphasis on the analysis of collected factual information gathered by the detailed examination of the failed rudder, the fin box lugs, the AOT and ELCH test results and any appropriate investigation work.
When the investigation team's draft report is complete, it will be reviewed by the Investigation Branch Standards and Performance section, and approved by the Director, Air Investigations. The draft report will then be submitted to the Board for its approval and released as a confidential draft report to designated reviewers. The Board will consider the representations of the designated reviewers, amend the report if required, and issue the final investigation report.

http://www.news.gc.ca/cfmx/CCP/view/en/index.cfm?articleid=143369
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2005/A05F0047/A05F0047_update_20050504.asp

[barit1]

On 10 Mar. I said:

This is really a question: How many hinge brackets are there holding the A310 rudder? The photos I'm seeing of the Air Transat fin suggest that there should be another bracket attached near the top of the fin/rudder. Did this top bracket get carried away when the rudder departed? If so, it could have been loose on the fin to begin with, and that looseless permitted flutter to develop, which precipitated the loss of rudder.

and now:

The rudder is attached to the vertical fin through seven A-frame hinges, numbered one to seven, starting from the bottom... Rudder hinge number seven was torn off from the fin spar.

My father maintained his flying skills for over seventy years, and was the most thorough preflight inspection guy I ever knew. He must have taught me a thing or two.

[gwillie]

Photos may aid rudder investigation....

"Probably there was damage to the rudder prior to the separation"....international plane spotters' photos appear to show abnormalities...

http://www.sptimes.com/2005/05/05/Worldandnation/Photos_may_aid_rudder.shtml

[CD]

NTSB ADVISORY

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

May 5, 2005

**************************************************

NTSB CONTINUES TO ASSIST CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S INVESTIGATION INTO AIR TRANSAT ACCIDENT

**************************************************

The National Transportation Safety Board continues to assist the Transportation Safety Board of Canada as it investigates an accident that occurred March 6, 2005, when an Air Transat Airbus A310-308 (C-GPAT) lost most of its rudder in-flight while en-route from Cuba to Quebec City, Canada.

The NTSB has dispatched a team of investigators to participate in the readout of the aircraft's flight recorders and the development of aircraft performance studies; to participate in the examination of the aircraft's vertical stabilizer, remnants of the rudder, and rudder actuators; and to work with the TSB's chief investigator in developing the issues to be addressed in the investigation.

Canadian authorities issued an investigation update on May 4 that can be accessed at www.tsb.gc.ca, under "What's New."

Based on information released by the TSB, NTSB investigators have noted significant differences between the circumstances of the Air Transat accident and two previous accidents investigated by the NTSB that also involved structural damage to composite components on Airbus aircraft.

On November 12, 2001, American Airlines flight 587, an A300-605R (N14053), crashed shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, killing all 260 persons aboard and 5 persons on the ground. The NTSB found that the vertical stabilizer separated from the aircraft in flight after experiencing aerodynamic loads beyond the plane's design strength following the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. On May 12, 1997, American Airlines flight 903, an A300-600 (N90070), experienced an in-flight loss of control near West Palm Beach, Florida. The aircraft landed safely. During the recovery of the aircraft, the significant rudder pedal inputs led to aerodynamic loads that caused damage to the vertical stabilizer. The damage was not discovered until an ultrasonic examination of the stabilizer following the crash of flight 587.

In both of those cases, significant rudder inputs by pilots played a major role in producing the aerodynamic loads on the vertical stabilizer. Preliminary indications from the Air Transat event data show that the pilots were not manipulating the rudder before the events leading up to the loss of the rudder.

Furthermore, NTSB investigators note that in the flight 903 accident the rudder remained attached to the vertical fin and no significant damage was found on the rudder after the event. In the case of the flight 587 accident, the data indicate that the rudder remained intact and attached to the vertical fin until the fin separated from the airplane.

The NTSB will continue to participate and assist the TSB of Canada's investigation into the reason for the loss of the Air Transat rudder, and will continue to compare data from the earlier accidents to determine whether there are any similarities between all three events (beyond the fact that all three aircraft experienced damage to rear lugs of the vertical stabilizer).

All media inquiries about the Air Transat investigation should be directed to Mr. John Cottreau, Public Affairs Advisor, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, (819) 994-8053, [email protected].

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NTSB Media Contact:
Ted Lopatkiewicz
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]

[ORAC]

New Scientist 14 May:

......News that the CTSB plans to test the rudders emerged last week in an interim report on its investigation into why a Canadian owned Airbus A310 lost its composite rudder in flight from Cuba to Canada on 6 March.......

The CTSB found that two of the six composite lugs that held the A310´s composite tail fin onto the fuselage had "delamination damage". The agency hopes that its series of tests will reveal whether the delamination caused the rudder to fall off or vice versa....

[junior_man]

Just spoke today with a buddy who flys the A 300.
Apparantly Fed Ex pulled a rudder off for repairs and a bunch of delamination was found where there shouldn't be (near the lugs) possibly due to skydrol. Now there may be an effort by the FAA or Airbus to have a better look at the rudders on the A 300 as this one had passed the inspections before it was damaged.

[gwillie]

http://www.ccnmatthews.com/news/releases/show.jsp?action=showRelease&searchText=false&showText=all&actionFor=586181

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/communiques/air/2006/comm_a05f0047_20060327.asp