BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)

[catchup]

Now it's getting strange.

Regards

[28L]

>>It would be interesting to know how many accidents are caused by mistakes made when distracted by a seemingly minor problem<<

So do you want us to land ASAP for all "seemingly minor" problems? I think that's unrealistic.

[barit1]

Wasn't there a famous case where a crew spent so much time trying to resolve an UC problem they few into terrain?

N310EA (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=66756&key=0)

The captain forgot to fly the airplane.

So do you want us to land ASAP for all "seemingly minor" problems?

Certainly NOT if the "seemingly minor" problem is UC:rolleyes:

[HOVIS]

As a long time BA Licensed Engineer, now with one of their subsiduries, can I just say that there is an awful lot of utter drivel on these thirty-odd pages!

The FACTS of this case have NOT been fully discussed here.

That is because the AAIB/CAA/NTSB etc like to keep them to themselves so that a judgement can be made without emotion and based on detailed analysis of FACTS and accurate testimony.

I do know several of the BA Engineers who were involved in this "post flight". Assesing the aircraft systems and preparing a three engine ferry.

Those same engineers were also involved with a certain eastern carrier who recently had to cope with a three day AAIB investigation at MAN after an undercarriage fire and full evacuation!
RESULT? the AAIB told all in no uncertain terms to keep their mouths shut or find a good solicitor.

The point I am trying to make is that second guessing any investigation is always going to be just that-a guess.

Let the AAIB do their job.

Some of you so-called professional pilots are just making yourselves look very,very silly.:ouch:

No one was hurt here (unless you count the tech who walloped his knee when he slipped up in the 'c' duct during the three engine prep) let's keep it real eh?:ok:

[woodpecker]

mmmm.

Remind me to do a search of each thread and ignore any references to "Mayday" and not make comments regarding the facts.

Utter drivel?

very,very silly?

let's keep it real eh?


I think not!

PS

Can I have my pen back? I left it in the Capts pen holder on "Papa Alpha" ex the Irish-Backup (the one that went before the front line service) from LHR back in '82!

[MarkD]

Hovis

You're right.

If only the FAA "source" running off to the papers had the same respect for AAIB as you do.

[lomapaseo]

The very length of this debate just goes to show that there is no 'right or wrong' verdict which can be applied to this case.

....... at the end of the day the sole concern shown by most who do not support the ba view is that it is the overall level of risk exposure which ba is prepared to inflict on its customers which needs to be re-examined. That level is the product of degree of risk multiplied by the time during which that risk applies.

......

Exactly. In order to assess this dispassionately one needs to understand that no 2 flights operate with the same level of risk. The risk is made up of known problems which have known statistical probabilities, which have not been totally eliminated but are being managed (engine reliability and/or blown out windshields as divergent examples of numerous others). In addition there are known risks associated with air-turn-Backs, heavy landings, diversions etc. by placing the crew into higher than normal workload for a flight. Then there is the biggie, which is latent but unknown risk like the fuse pins in the engine mounts were before they were identified and managed.

The regulatory agencies are aware of the relative contribution of these risks and do permit time limited exceedences of identified risks based on their expected overall contributions to the historical total risk. Each of these identified risks are accepted on a day-to-day basis on the presumption that they will be managed over a time period so as not to seriously degrade over affect overall risk.

Thus you have required inspections retrofits and managed operations

The issue, as I see it, is how pervasive or widespread is the continuation of flight with and engine shutdown and what level of increased risk is abosrbed, if any, compared to Air-turn-back, fuel dumps, diversions etc. if an alternate course of action is chose.

If this level of risk is so small that it does not appreciably contribute to the overal avergage level per flight and that if its pervasiveness is so unlikely that it doesn not occur on a daily basis to the extent that increases overall fleetwide risk to the product, and if it is not prohibitied by the FAR/JARS, then it is acceptable

Of course there will be some squirming to be done in order for BA to answer those ifs

[ManagedNav]

Can any of our 744 pilots tell me if this flight were to lose a second engine at any point along the route flown over the Atlantic, that there would be no risk of running out of fuel before making it to an alternate? Would this have been considered?

I know everyone contends that it is considered very unlikely for this to occur; all I want to know is if it did happen at any point along the track was there an alternate within range should it happen? Without knowing the intended route, weight, or performance wrt fuel flow and achievable flight level on two engines, I was curious.....was there any segment of the flight plan that could have been unprotected should a second failure have occurred?

[barit1]

Running out of fuel on three crossing the pond?

Worst case might be if your destination were way East like Moscow or Cairo - after you've overflown dozens of alternates.

More specifics, please.

[ManagedNav]

Read again...

Running out of fuel on 2, two, dos....

Was it determined or could it be inferred that if they had lost another engine at any, I repeat, any point along the route while feet-wet, that they could still be assured of a safe landing?

[Rainboe]

Yes. If you are operating on 3, you plan for a 2 engined operation. It's normal to come back across the Atlantic from LAX more southerly than the route out to catch the jetstreams from Newfoundland eastwards. At the worst place to lose a second engine, you would have around you Gander, Sondrestrom (not nice, but useable), Keflavik, Prestwick, Dublin and Shannon. In addition there are some emergency airfields that may be available, Macrihanish (western Scotland), Knock (Ireland). The crew would have ensured they could have landed the aeroplane on a second engine failure at any time. Then, being on a 747, you could even lose a third engine! I'm not saying it flippantly- it wouldn't be at all pretty, but you would still be flying and still be alive- this is the difference from Trijet ops.

Now compare that to losing one engine over the Pacific and being straight away down to one for over 3 hours! Not at all healthy, is it?

[cwatters]

So do you want us to land ASAP for all "seemingly minor" problems?

No but an unexplained engine failure doesn't count as minor in my book.

[Rainboe]

When a surge is a well known quantity, has not been known to cause any ongoing problems, and the engine is happily windmilling away, then it is a minor problem.
What is your 'book'? What makes you, an electronics engineer, experienced in model electric flight, a better expert to decide than the well experienced crew? You've flown a few twin engined models and assessed the performance degradation on one engine?

[hobie]

I sure hope some of the more "Agressive" posters are not taking this thread with them onto the flight deck (metaphorically speaking) .....

[Slickster]

I am a 747 pilot with BA, and am amazed that this thread has gone on so long, and at some of the pompous posts. Just to clarify:a) I don't think that I am the greatest because I fly for BA, b) I can't comment on their procedures compared to any others, because I haven't used any others. The CAA seem happy enough with BA's Flight Contiuation Policy, else it wouldn't be allowed.

I can say that I've had an engine failure (over Riga, on the way to Hong Kong), and that all 4 flight crew were happy to continue. It is in essence, just a case of monitoring weathers more closely, monitoring the drift down over high terrain (not a problem for us), and therefore always making sure you have the option to land somewhere if the unthinkable happens and you lose another engine. If that happens it just ain't your day, but the 747 flies on 2 happily enough, although it's a bit of a handful if they're both on the same side. We landed without incident, a little late, in Hong Kong.I'm not sure the passengers ever even knew.

So why all the fuss over this LA flight? Granted an unforseen problem occured very late in the flight, and to be extra safe the dreaded mayday word was used, and the aeroplane landed safely. I say again, why all the fuss?

[Rainboe]

The problem here, and I think this is why it is a waste of time, is there are either totally inexperienced people who know nothing of the business, or people with limited aviation experience or experience in different areas, suddenly feeling they can make public pronouncements of their verdicts of the actions of the crews who have been working in 4 engine long range operations almost all their working lives. In effect, Pprune Rumours & News now seems to be a 'Court Martial Forum' where you will be judged not by your betters, but by people who know little or nothing, firing shoot from the hip judgements and verdicts. Their motives seem to be based on either a dislike of the airline in question, or the fact there was no diet soda when they took their particular flight with that airline.

I have to say I have been trying my best to explain concisely the issues involved, and it has been an utter waste of time. People don't read or understand the explanations, nor try to. The responses raised seem to be teasing, abuse or jingoistic nonsense. I've tried to explain the same things again and again to people who won't try and see, but still fire daft comments or inappropriate experience- the latest being an electronic engineer who 'has had some experience with electric powered models'! What on earth gives such people the right to pontificate on matters far over their heads I cannot imagine! It's a total waste of time- most of the pages of this thread are duplicated by people who can't be bothered to read it, but want to stick their inexperienced oar in anyway! I give up!

[Globaliser]

Rainboe: The problem here, and I think this is why it is a waste of time, is there are either totally inexperienced people who know nothing of the business, or people with limited aviation experience or experience in different areas, suddenly feeling they can make public pronouncements of their verdicts of the actions of the crews who have been working in 4 engine long range operations almost all their working lives.
...
I have to say I have been trying my best to explain concisely the issues involved, and it has been an utter waste of time. People don't read or understand the explanations, nor try to. ... It's a total waste of time- most of the pages of this thread are duplicated by people who can't be bothered to read it, but want to stick their inexperienced oar in anyway! I give up!There is always the saying about the number one rule of Internet bulletin boards: Never participate in the expectation that you will change anyone's mind. ;)

But seriously, I don't think that the input from you or from the other 744 drivers on this thread has been a waste of time. For every difficult person who has piled in, refusing to listen to the people with experience and weighing in with their "highly relevant" experiences of flying twins or trijets, there may have been one or two or more of readers like me who:- Know virtually nothing ourselves about the business of flying jet airliners; Appreciate that not everyone on the Internet will be who they claim to be; Nevertheless see a consistent trend of posts from people who are (or at least claim to be) 744 drivers who have calmly explained why there was nothing wrong with the continuation of the flight, and why the low fuel state when the aircraft was nearer MAN can't be used to impugn the earlier decision; Have been persuaded that this is correct, even though we do not have the knowledge or experience to positively pitch in and say we agree.To you and your 744 brethren, thank you for the time you have spent explaining the realities and trying to refute the hysteria.

[Rainboe]

Thank you. That is common sense. It is frustrating to me that so many people feel they have to deliver a verdict on the actions of a flight crew on the sparcest of information. I am happy to await the deliberations of the CAA and AAIB which will be used as a basis for future reaction by the industry. The shoot from the hip mouthing off delivered by the FAA is plain incompetent and ill considered, but then they want all the world to play by twin engined rules for obvious reasons.

[Capt Fathom]

I give up!
Rainboe ... you promised!

[Anti-ice]

Perhaps 'all the fuss' is about the fact that deep down, probably most of the passengers onboard were stressed by the situation/possibility of something else developing, and for safetys sake would rather have diverted , and flown on a fully fit aircraft.

Yes,the dreaded mayday word was used, and despite their skill in making the crossing and landing safely in Manchester, a larger margin for error being allowed in the process.

Now BA pride themselves on 'safety being our main priority', but perhaps these 'untrained' passengers rightly felt that they may have been put in danger and that the 'safety priority' was being conveniently sidelined.

It's a hell of a big plane, and an engine out landing is only practised in a simulator - lifelike as it is, nothing beats the real thing... supposing their approach had 'become unstable' in their new found first 'real' experience of this situation, or the weather at Manchester had suddenly closed in - as it was doing over those few wintery days ?

People don't deny your skill or interpretation of an emergency situation, just the fact that things may have 'sailed a bit to close to the wind for comfort' ....

If the engine had failed on pushback 15 mins earlier, they woudln't have continued the flight... so would it not have been prudent to divert to somewhere else heading East rather than make an ocean crossing ending with an emergency diversion ?

[lomapaseo]

hank you. That is common sense. It is frustrating to me that so many people feel they have to deliver a verdict on the actions of a flight crew on the sparcest of information. I am happy to await the deliberations of the CAA and AAIB which will be used as a basis for future reaction by the industry. The shoot from the hip mouthing off delivered by the FAA is plain incompetent and ill considered, but then they want all the world to play by twin engined rules for obvious reasons.

Now let's be fair. You castigated all the people other than pilots who shoot from the hip, mouth off without the facts and now you castigate the FAA for the same thing.

Now maybe you have a valid point or two among your other posts, you seem to express yourself well. But just because a newspaper quoted hearsay from unattributed FAA folks who obviously don't have the grade level to speak for the FAA, you castigate the whole organization.

That certainly is not anymore correct than castigating the whole B747 pilot community because of all the differing opinions expressed on this forum.

back to lurking mode again

[Carnage Matey!]

and for safetys sake would rather have diverted , and flown on a fully fit aircraft.

There's no such thing as a fully fit aircraft. We are paid to assess the risks once the aircraft is airborne. Perhaps we shoud also refer MEL or fuel decisions to the passengers as well. Perhaps for safetys sake we should all take an extra 20 tonnes of fuel each flight? We could have a vote on it at the departure gate.

but perhaps these 'untrained' passengers rightly felt that they may have been put in danger and that the 'safety priority' was being conveniently sidelined.

No, they wrongly felt that they might have been put in danger. Thats rather the point of this whole 35 page thread in case you hadn't noticed.

an engine out landing is only practised in a simulator - lifelike as it is, nothing beats the real thing... supposing their approach had 'become unstable' in their new found first 'real' experience of this situation, or the weather at Manchester had suddenly closed in - as it was doing over those few wintery days ?

If a three engine approach in the simulator wasn't very close to the real thing then they wouldn't be allowed to train pilots in the simulator. The whole point of the simulator is that it is a very close approximation to the aircraft, it's not just an expensive video game. And so what if the weather had 'closed in' at MAN. What do you thing the aircrafts autoland capability is with an engine out? (You evidently have no idea, so I'll put you out of your misery and tell you its excatly the same as with four engines).

If the engine had failed on pushback 15 mins earlier, they woudln't have continued the flight... so would it not have been prudent to divert to somewhere else heading East rather than make an ocean crossing ending with an emergency diversion ?

You really haven't read the thread, have you? Once you're airborne you don't need the fourth engine for take off requirements, it is perfectly safe and feasible to continue on three, but not to commence the take off roll on three. Thats the difference.

[Slickster]

probably most of the passengers onboard were stressed by the situation/possibility of something else developing, and for safetys sake would rather have diverted , and flown on a fully fit aircraft.

Indeed, I guess they should have put it to the vote, and gone with the expert majority! How do you know how many wanted to do what?

It's a hell of a big plane, and an engine out landing is only practised in a simulator - lifelike as it is, nothing beats the real thing... supposing their approach had 'become unstable' in their new found first 'real' experience of this situation, or the weather at Manchester had suddenly closed in - as it was doing over those few wintery days ?

The aeroplane was going to land on less than four engines regardless of where they went. So most of the above could have happened, regardless of where they went. To wit, it is irrelevant. Needless to say, there must be something in that simulator practice, because it all worked out.

[Valve Kilmer]

Rainboe wrote:To repeat again, all was going to the new plan until a fuel feed problem occured late into the flight.
Rainboe - what difference would a fuel feed problem make in this case. I mean, 5Ts of onblock fuel at MAN, is 5Ts of fuel - or am I missing something? Are you saying that there could have been considerably less fuel available than the 5Ts? Or - if that fuel feed problem you are talking about wouldn't have occured, are you then suggesting that the flight might have pressed further on to LHR instead, and landed with even less than 5Ts of fuel?

Please enlighten me and my 747 fellowpilots(although you don't give them much credit, I think they deserve an answer. Granted, I know they are not BA aces, and on top of that, some of them even have less that 10000 hrs on 747).

[Rainboe]

Bit heavy on the sarcasm, aren't we? I have tried to answer concisely and accurately on the information so far out. I am not aware of numbers. If you chose to take offence, that's your business, but I will not answer sarcasm, neither do I have a duty to proved answers on demand. I can help with seeking explanations or reasons, but as far as answers are concerned, they will come from the CAA and the AAIB.

[Tallbloke]

Probably old news now, but this weeks Flight reports the same aircraft had another number 2 engine shut down due to "oil pressure problems". The crew shut the engine down 3.5 hours after take-off from Singapore, returning to Heathrow. Captain elected to continue to Heathrow.

[SLFguy]

Two points before I start..

(1) I chose my name precisely so that peeps would know that I'm not pretending I'm something I'm not, (there's a fair bit of that about lol).

(2) I've kept up to date with this thread from Day 1 but may have missed something so forgive me if I'm about to reapeat a previous post/statement.

When this thread kicked off I did have the knee jerk PAX reaction - I wanna get on the floor asap, (er in a controlled stylie I hasten to add).

Having reached page 35 or so I have to say that I have been converted. If the crew assess and continue, I would now have no qualms. (Apparently we can even lose another one same side!).

What really interested me was the mention of statistics and it appears to me that it may in fact be MORE dangerous to dump and return to LAX...

The statisical chances of losing another engine is minute and you then have a fraction of this minute event being the statistical probability of it leading to an accident.

However, if you dump and return to LAX you are going to add one EXTRA landing and one EXTRA take off to the journey.

So the 'dump' option adds two of the more dangerous phases of flight.

Anyone able to quantify the stats?

Dons headgear...

[cavortingcheetah]

That article in this week's FI, page 4, also says that, and I paraphrase: The FAA is staying tight lipped about reported comments of one of its officials that the agency is preparing to take action against BA for careless and reckless operation of an aircraft. The article then goes on to say that BA is surprised at the FAA's quoted comments because the 747-400 is certificated for flight on three engine. Just another Tristar?;)

[JW411]

This week's Flight International also contains a safety letter from a BA captain who retired in 2002 after 34 years service and who spent his last 5 years on Boeing 747s.

He reckons that the 747 burns 5% more fuel on three engines and 10% more on two engines. I quote from the letter:

"But what about mid-Atlantic or Greenland? Losing a further engine at this point would cause the fuel flow to increase yet again. Did the 747 have sufficient fuel to make the designated destination? I doubt it.

The trouble is the flight management system two-engine page does not open up until you are actually on two engines. For this reason I believe the flight was irresponsible".

[Pinkman]

Rainboe, its not been a total waste of time. Apart from anything else it has confirmed that the general public don't understand 'risk' as applied to aviation, and for the most part don't want to, any more than the risks involvolved in eating peanut butter or barbecued food (surprisingly significant). It also confirms that you may all be ace at flying, but you're pants at communicating in a way that Joe and Jane Public are comfortable with. Thats not a criticism; I'm a scientist - I should be better and I'm just as bad.

If you make a list of (say) environmental risks in order of the amount of people they kill every year and then get Joe or Jane to list them again in order of how alarming they are, you'll end up with two completely different lists; the things that alarm and frighten us are not necessarily the things that kill us, which is why people continue to smoke cigarettes but refuse to board an aircraft if presented with a sign telling them the same numerical risk factors for their flight. Although they are told that the risk is the same, the immediacy of the issue is diffuse in the cancer from smoking issue - they can do something about it tomorrow.

Peter Sandman, the great risk communicator, identified over 20 of these factors which defines attitudes to risk and there is at least a half dozen here that explain why people are getting so upset, including the immediacy of the risk, the lack of control (passenger vs driver), the voluntariness of the risk. In this case there is an (unrealistic) expectation that every aircraft on every flight is 100% serviceable. Joe and Jane dont want to hear about MEL's, but Joe and Jane got their information from the media, who got outraged on their behalf. When you and/or your airline fail to communicate the risk adequately, there is no way, as pilots, that you can stuff that cat back in the bag.

And I suppose me telling you all this doesnt help much either.

[Rainboe]

I saw the Flight letter. I disagree with it- is he any more right than anybody else? I'm happy to wait for guidance from the CAA. OK the Flight management 2 engine pages don't open until you are on two- there are actually 2 Performance Manuals behind the Captain with all the information there- driftdown and fuel flows.
Pinkman, I'm not sure what you are asking. My experience is it does not help to tell everybody everything. Unnecessary explanations seem to cause more alarm that enlightenment. Everybody is nervous getting on an aeroplane. I don't like it (unless I'm flying it). It's one of those things bringing out disaster thoughts even though it is outrageously safe. It's safe because of the professionalism and skill and training of the people employed to fly you. It's a high speed environment, there is not time for explanations, votes or excuses. Sometimes you just have to trust your crew to do their best on your behalf, and let them get on with the job. BA/BOAC has never yet lost an aeroplane through lack of fuel or running out of engines.

Now I ask you again to examine flying 3+hours over the Pacific on one engine- and this is accepted as a normal risk of ETOPS (twin) over water, with 300 passengers. What is your opinion of a comparison of the risk?

[Hotel Mode]

Well i dont think he has a very long memeory or he didnt fly the -400. You dont need an FMC for the 2 engine figures they are in tyhe performance manual and would have been checked by all 3 pilots and no doubt people on the ground to confirm they would get the aircraft to a suitable alternate from the critical point.

[Valve Kilmer]

Rainboe wrote:.I have tried to answer concisely and accurately on the information so far out. - well then please keep up the good work captain, and answer the question regarding information you have given to us yourself!

Rainboe - I notice however with great interest, that you fail to answer the simple question I adressed to you. Instead YOU chose to take offence. You don't have to answer to sarcasm, no way, but an answer to my very simple question:"What difference would a fuel feed problem make in this case?", would be much appreaciated, if it is not too much to ask from you.

[Rainboe]

I need to see the fuel figures confirmed. I don't know what the landing fuel figure was, all I am aware of was there was a potential unuseable fuel problem to do with Main Tank 2. It is possible they carried out the Low Fuel checklist and didn't like the reaction. Whatever, they took the sensible decision that LHR was too far and elected to land earlier at MAN. This whole question of what happened at the end of the flight was totally irrelevant to the course of the flight up until then. The word filtering down is that it is not as critical as was anticipated, but this is not confirmed.

[Valve Kilmer]

It is possible they carried out the Low Fuel checklist and didn't like the reaction. Ahaaa - if so, then it might have been a sensible thing to stop the show a little earlier I suppose.

Nevertheless, thanks for the reply! I got the answer I was looking for.

VK is holding fire...

Out

[Rainboe]

It's also possible you are leaping to conclusions. The only 'answer' will come from the CAA and AAIB! Try holding your breath until they deliberate.

[MPH]

Yes, indeed, we will just wait for the investigaion! Let's see what the CAA dictates on this 'incident'.

Just thought that on the 'forums' we, could voice our opinions.

Agree with 'val kilmer's' last comment. I am still of the opinion that the 'outcome' at the 'end' of this flight could have been 'less' of an 'incident' than it was!!

Happy landings!!!;)

[nicholasw]

A guy I know is a maintenance engineer for United.

He claims to me that the mere characterisation of the engine failure (compressor stall, large flames with sparks, high EGT at idle...) should have been enough by itself to convince the crew to land.

He seems to posit that the crew could not know the aircraft was not suffering from some latent damage and that this is the basis of the FAA's ire.

I am interested to hear responses to this.

[Carnage Matey!]

My response is to say your engineer is talking out of his rear. As has been covered previously in response to someone who made similar spurious claims about NWA mechanics, engine surges are fairly regular occurences. There are checklists to deal with them, Boeings own QRH states that if the condition clears the engine may be operated as normal. There are countless parameters being continually measured and assessed by the EECs, the onboard maintenance computers and the flight crew themselves. The idea that a surging engine spits debris out left right and centre, damaging the aircraft with no indication of vibration or control problem is simply garbage. Can anybody point to a situation where an RB211 surged, ejected debris and damaged the aircraft with no indication to the crew? Ever?

[maxy101]

Should be interesting to see if any BA Flt Ops manager loses his job over this , if eventually BA's SOP's are seen to be incorrect/dangerous. Will the same people calling for the Captain to be brought to account call for the JAROPS signatory to lose their job?

[exvicar]

Engine has sparks coming out of the back, engine shutdown......no more sparks! I would far rather fly across the atlantic on a 4 engined aircraft with one shutdown, after all the 747 is certified to fly on 3, than undertake a 3hr plus ETOPS diversion on the one remaining engine (aka US airline across the Pacific). Personally, I would say thanks to the BA crew, better Manchester than an extra night in LA!

[Rainboe]

Carnage has raised a valid point. If the engine surges and the Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) stabilises itself, then it is operated normally, nobody gives it another thought! According to your 'expert NWA Mechanic', it should be shut down and the flight relanded! I regret to say he does not know what he is talking about (or he is aware his airline's long range ops rely on twin engined operations, and it isn't fair that 4 engined aeroplanes don't have to follow the same rules!). He shouldn't be let loose on an aeroplane without a helmet on!

A surge may look quite spectacular- at night it is amazing- flashes of light, sparks flying around- I witnessed multiple surges close up once, at night. If the EGT recovers itself, operate normally! If it doesn't, cut the thrust lever, then if still needed, cut the fuel. In consultation with Maintenance, it is possible they may even suggest relighting it. On the Classic, we used to relight them all the time.

All it means is that a pressure relief valve in the engine is not operating correctly- sticky or something, and suddenly, the engine 'burps'.

[DOVES]

First of all I’m not exactly a spotter (try to figure out!)
Second: Perhaps I am saying, among the others, the same thing like sombody else:
ETOPS are to be revised some way.
From the BIBLE:
In modern turbofan engines, compressor surge is a rare event. If a compressor surge (sometimes called a compressor stall) occurs during high power at take off, the crew will hear a very loud bang, which will be accompanied by yaw and vibration. The bang will likely be far beyond any engine noise, or other sound, the crew may have previously experienced in service.
Compressor surge has been often mistaken for blown tires, or a bomb in the airplane.
The flight crew, may be quite startled by the bang, and in many cases, this has led to a rejected take off above V1, which have sometimes resulted in injuries, loss of the airplane, and even passenger fatalities.
Compressor stall may be caused by engine deterioration, or may be the result of ingestion of birds, ice, or foreign objects. Its effects may be the final sound from a “severe engine damage”.
In a turbine engine compression is accomplished as the air passes through the stages of the compressor. The air flowing over the blades can stall just like the air over the wing. When this occurs, the passage of air through the compressor becomes unstable and the compressor can no longer perform its duty. This means that there is no more the correct relation between the fuel and the air in the the engine.
Engine surge can be accompanied by visible flames forward out the inlet and rearward out the tailpipe. Instruments may show high EGT, EPR or rotor speed changes.
Depending on the reason for the compressor stall, there many types of surges:
- A single self-recovering surge (the only one I have ever experienced a few times in 40 years, during landing on an MD-80 and the reverse was still deployed by 60 kts)
- Multiple surge prior to self-recovery
- Multiple surges requiring pilot action in order to recover
- A non-recoverable surge
When a compressor surge is not recoverable, the engine will decelarate to zero power as if the fuel had been chopped. This type of surge can accompany a severe engine damage.
Now I am asking:
Who told the crew of BA268, that:
1) There has not been an ingestion of bird/s, pieces of tyre or any other foreign object by the engine number 2?
2) The engine had not been severely damaged?
3) The flames (many feet long) and the sparks (incandescent pieces of metal) did not invest some vital part of the aicraft?
4) One or more of the tyres did not blow out?
5) The cause of the explosions had not been an explosive device?
And all of this is only regarding the beginning of the decision making.
To criticise the rest of the flight is like to shoot at an ambulance.
It is admitted all over the world that a Captain can only claim a stricter airworthiness of his airplane, when it comes to analyse the MELs, to refuel and refill the liquids, to decide if to de-ice or not, etc, than viceversa.
And excuse my ignorance, can I ask if the aircraft and it’s content were still granted by the insurance after the decision to continue to the destination with an engine out? And what about ETOPS license to BA? Safe flight!
Safe flyght to everybody

[lomapaseo]

A guy I know is a maintenance engineer for United.

He claims to me that the mere characterisation of the engine failure (compressor stall, large flames with sparks, high EGT at idle...) should have been enough by itself to convince the crew to land.

He seems to posit that the crew could not know the aircraft was not suffering from some latent damage and that this is the basis of the FAA's ire.

I am interested to hear responses to this.

I believe that this falls under a non-engine seizure and non-severe engine failure checklist.

The pilot has access to his intruments, sounds and aircraft feel (continous vibration etc.) He is guided to make his judgements based on the symptoms in the cockpit and not some eyewitness imaginative descriptions from the ground.

Second guessing by hear-say does a diservice to the proffesionalism of the flight crew.

Again, I am happy to hear the revelation of facts as discerened by the AAIB or CAA.

[Carnage Matey!]

Who told the crew of BA268, that:
1) There has not been an ingestion of bird/s, pieces of tyre or any other foreign object by the engine number 2?
2) The engine had not been severely damaged?
3) The flames (many feet long) and the sparks (incandescent pieces of metal) did not invest some vital part of the aicraft?
4) One or more of the tyres did not blow out?
5) The cause of the explosions had not been an explosive device?


1) No visual sighting of birds on the take off roll, normal tyre pressure indications on EICAS may have been a clue. You could assume FOD, but in flight and on mulitple engines? Unlikely.
2) Absence of vibration is a big clue. These things windmill at high speed, physical damage to the engine tends to lead to abnormal vibration levels.
3) Such as what? The engines are out on a pylon. Fuselage damage would lead to pressurisation problems. Fuel tank damage would lead to fuel loss. Hydraulic damage would be evident from EICAS. Damage to the flaps/slats would only be evident on extension, so does it matter whether that occurs at LAX or LHR?
4) See one. EICAS would indicate a tire blow out. Damage to the stab would only be revealed by stab/elevator control problems or fuel leakage from the stab tank.
5)Now you're stretching credulity. Multiple explosive devices? In the engine? Leading to repeated explosions? With no visible external damage to the engine? And no damage to engine probes so no loss of engine data to the EICAS? C'mon.....!

People need to be realistic here. Surges were commonplace in the past. They still occur. People are trained for them. Just because something is less common doesn't mean it's become more dangerous, nor does it give us a reason to start fantastic thought processes about sabotage, FOD, or other weird .

[Rainboe]

And excuse my ignorance, can I ask if the aircraft and it’s content were still granted by the insurance after the decision to continue to the destination with an engine out? And what about ETOPS license to BA?


DOVES- you need to read the definition of 'ETOPS', then go to www.Airliners.net and get a picture of a 747 and then count the number of large lumps hanging below the wing!

As the aeroplane was already operating under 3 engines, I don't expect any additional insurance problems occured!

[Plastic Bug]

Well, I was GOING to stay out of this as so many opinions have already been offered, but there is one thing I am not seeing.

Here's the deal: In all honesty, how many of you out there who actually leave the ground in control of an aircraft for a living would even THINK of continuing a flight of 10-12 hours after losing an engine just after rotation?

I mean really, just what would the conversation be?

Hmmm....

...Aircraft XYZ, Cleared for takeoff...

Roger, XYZ rolling...

V1....

V2....

Rotate..

KA-BLAM!

Positive Rate, Gear Up, what was that noise?

UM, looks like we lost number 2!

Engine failure checklist....

Hey, what say we see if we can continue home on three?

Hmm, well, if the base says it's OK, why not?

Do any of you see my point? Losing an engine on takeoff, this has to be the FIRST time I ever heard of anyone actually CONTINUING, let alone actually thinking about it.

To those of you out there who are banging the drum that the 747 is certified to fly on three, you have exposed the loophole that will get the crew off the hook.

Yes, the aircraft is certified to fly on three. Three scenarios.

Scenario 1: The aircraft loses an engine on takeoff and returns to the departure airport (after lightening the load).

Scenario 2: The aircraft loses an engine enroute and continues to destination.

Scenario 3: The aircraft has an unserviceable engine and is dispatched on three engines. This is called a ferry flight and requires regulatory approval and the carrier may not carry passengers.

So basically, these guys considered themselves "enroute" and continued after their ground people agreed it was a splendid idea.

Wonderful.

Ten years ago, these guys would have been taken out and keel hauled. Now they are being praised here for their ingenuity.

It comes down to this. Some truths are self evident. The 747 has 4 engines because that was the number that Bill Allen and Juan Trippe agreed on. It is the required number of engines that the engineers designed the aircraft to operate with on a normal basis.

Continuing on three is acceptable so long as one is within a certain envelope. Losing the engine on takeoff is within the envelope for a safe takeoff and subsequent landing at a suitable airfield, but NOT continuing to your destination 10-12 hours away.

Continuing on to your destination after that is bad MOJO. You have ten thousand pounds of sudden extra freight out there and I'm sorry, that just ain't in the plan.

So what it all comes down to is common sense. You lose an engine on takeoff, it's gone, don't work, possible not even there anymore, you return to the departure airport, unless of course, you're in Bahgdad, where these rules do not apply, but that's another topic.

Sorry for the rant folks, just trying to make sense of this one.

PB

[NigelOnDraft]

PBWell, I was GOING to stay out of this as so many opinions have already been offered, So was I, but after your post...Losing an engine on takeoff, this has to be the FIRST time I ever heard of anyone actually CONTINUING, let alone actually thinking about it. Well - that shows how ignorant / unaware / nothing to do with aviation (or certainly this aspect of it) you may be - I do not know. It has long been an established SOP at BA to make a further evaluation after losing 1. Not only has this been done frequently after the last 5+ years, the CAA are fully aware throught the MOR system ands seem happy.

In addition, a long post here recently about a (non BA) -200 (or -300) from MRU that lost one on take-off, and continued to CDG (ORY?) - albeit nearly diverting to NCE for fuel.

And a well publicised CX flight LHR-HKG that lost one over Russia somewhere. Flew 5 hours back to LHR, because that was the best Maint option. Presumably they coud not make the 3 eng Altitude or Fuel reqts for destination, but they still flew past many perfectly good airfields to get back to LHR.

Try reversing the scenario. A 4 Eng aircraft needs 4 Engines to takeoff, because only in that way can it afford to lose 1, and still fly (because basically a 4 Eng aircraft losing 2 on takeoff is not certified to make it in all circumstances). Having got airborne, the situation changes according to weight / speed / altitude / MSA. At this stage, 1 of your engines becomes almost superfluous - because you can go to 2 Engs and maintain a safe altitude, and plan a suitable approach and landing.

It is a "fundamental" of multi engine flying that you always "plan to lose 1" (except in very special circs e.g. 3 Eng ferry) - one which I trust you follow. They followed this. Having "lost 1", the situation was re-assessed, and they could still comply with this basic rule.

The events at MAN were entirely unrelated to the engine failure, or the principle of continuing. They might be interesting, worth evaluating / investigating. However, they do not back up, or denigrate, the decision to continue. However, what they did do was "publicise" the policy, so that people like yourself, and DL at FI, suddenly became aware of something that you previously were not. Whether either you or him you qualified to comment is a moot point.

I am more than happy to debate sensibly such things, and might be convinced that such decisions are not wise. However, after many pages of rants here, I have yet to see 1 decently construted argument as to why they should not have continued... and your post is typical:how many of you out there who actually leave the ground in control of an aircraft for a living would even THINK of continuing a flight of 10-12 hours after losing an engine just after rotation? Well - most 4 Eng pilots... So basically, these guys considered themselves "enroute" Well - what other position did they find themselves in?!*! Continuing on three is acceptable so long as one is within a certain envelope Agreed.... and my definition of the envelope is above. but NOT continuing to your destination 10-12 hours away. So at what exact point on an LHR-LAX flight does the envelope suddenly become acceptable, in your opinion? 1 hour? 2? 4?

As I say again, there may be good reasons not to have this option / SOP. But nobody has yet presented them here, rather a series of personal "instincts", "insults", "accusations" and uninformed rants, which largely show an ignorance of ULH Ops, but worse, also some blinkered approaches to the basic concepts of multi engine aviation.

Maybe you could just add your qualifications and recent 4 Eng ULH experience... (me - A340 rating some 8 years ago, more recently twin LHS). I note that the airline I flew the A340 for (not BA obviously) had a similar policy - on a transatlantic e.g. ex JFK, if we lost one, the decision to continue or not was based on MSA (not critical) and fuel (maybe critical) on losing a second...

[DOVES]

Rainbowe:
quote:

DOVES- you need to read the definition of 'ETOPS'.

This is exactly what I’m meaning (as you have written so many times: “Now I ask you again to examine flying 3+hours over the Pacific on one engine- and this is accepted as a normal risk of ETOPS (twin) over water, with 300 passengers. What is your opinion of a comparison of the risk?”):
Perhaps time has come to review ETOPS rules”.
Carnage Matey!:
quote:

1)No visual sighting of birds on the take off roll

How do you know? Were you there?

2)Absence of vibration is a big clue. These things windmill at high speed, physical damage to the engine tends to lead to abnormal vibration levels.

I don’t know if tey had vibrations, but for sure it was a ‘non-recoverable surge’ otherwise they didn’t have 1200° EGT and the need to shut down the engine.

3)Such as what? The engines are out on a pylon. Fuselage damage would lead to pressurisation problems. Fuel tank damage would lead to fuel loss. Hydraulic damage would be evident from EICAS. Damage to the flaps/slats would only be evident on extension, so does it matter whether that occurs at LAX or LHR?

You are shooting so many autogoals! What happened if one or more of those problems (a failure to the adjacent engine, a severe fuel or hydraulic leak, a separation of a section of flap, a depressurization) would have happened in the middle of nothing: by the point of ‘non return’ ?
And I have to ask everybody why nobody has commented my assertion:
… that a Captain can only… RISE THE MINIMA, NOT LOWER THEM
DOVE

[BA268passenger]

2)Absence of vibration is a big clue. These things windmill at high speed, physical damage to the engine tends to lead to abnormal vibration levels.
I don’t know if they had vibrations As a passenger on the plane, I can confirm that (apart from the times at which the surges were actually taking place) I could feel no unusual vibration. Once in normal flight, the plane seemed (to me) to handle exactly as other flights I have been on with all 4 engines operating.

But please bear in mind that, as I said in my first post (on page 27), I was sat over the right wing, not the left wing where the affected engine was. From my side I could neither feel nor see evidence of unusual wing or fuselage vibration, but I don't know for sure about the evidence from the other side of the plane.

[Terraplaneblues]

Considerable thread this....

Damage sustained during a full power engine surge does not limit itself to rotating assemblies in the engine, items may be damaged that do not register on vibration measuring equipment.

It should not be assumed that all engine casing damage would exude flames or even gases hot enough to register on the fire/overheat system

A surge at high power after take off is a more considerable event to the engine than a throttle up surge and is rarely caused by compressor bleed valves not opening - at high power they would be closed.

Engines that experience a surge, are subject to internal examination (& external if EGCC) prior to further flight, that is, a surge is not an insignificant event.

[Capt Fathom]

Yes Terra, there would certainly be too many unanswered questions for my liking!
As the saying goes...I would prefer be on the ground wishing I was in the air, rather than be in the air, wishing I was on the ground!

[NigelOnDraft]

As the saying goes...I would prefer be on the ground wishing I was in the air, rather than be in the air, wishing I was on the ground! Best you get yourself a job that does not involve flying then :)

[rossma]

i would liken the vibration to going over a cattle grid or rumble strips in a car - about 1 or 2 seconds worth of deep vibration. This happened 2 or 3 times over the course of a few minutes and was accompanied by loud bangs.

[Rainboe]

Right time to stop this nonsense! Terra, if you are going to talk like an engine expert, I'm afraid you have to put in your profile exactly what your expertise is please and where you obtain such specialised knowledge. I lay my cards on the table as an 34 year airline pilot and 747 Captain. You are just letting us know you are 'UK'!

Where does all this 'wobbliness' come from all of a sudden? According to some of this nonsense here, even a birdstrike anywhere on the fuselage can do some damage 'you might not be aware of', damaging flaps, slats, engines....whatever, so in any birdstrike event we should all dump fuel and re-land? Mr. Boeing makes tougher aeroplanes!

This sounds very convincing until you know more about them:
A surge at high power after take off is a more considerable event to the engine than a throttle up surge and is rarely caused by compressor bleed valves not opening - at high power they would be closed.
By the nature of operating a jet engine nearer its limits, surges are more likely. In my experience, they have almost always occured at high power settings, and they have always been absolutely harmless in that although the valve problem may preclude further ooperation, nothing has ever broken during the event. It is simply a 'backfire', 'burp', 'cough' or whatever you wish to describe it! I wouldn't pretend to know whether valves were closed/open when they should have been open/closed- it is immaterial.

If this crew was quite happy to continue, I would place my confidence in them. In exactly the same circumstances, I would continue if the self same happened to me. What we have is a lot of people who don't understand piloting horrified that such things happen (they do), and many twin/trijet pilots with experience of being prepared what a high drama it is losing an engine (especially in a twin, and less so in a trijet) being ready for urgent diversions.

Listen to this- a 747 on 3 engines is equivalent to a trijet. It probably has even more than the standard redundancy of a trijet. It is a positive luxury. We know surges and how to handle them. Why is everyone getting so wobbly about nothing? I'll tell you what would make me wobbly- 1200 miles from a dry landing on one engine working a max power! There is a reason why some airlines operate certain routes with less fuel efficient 747s, and we a have been examining one of them minutely here! Direct your anxiety to operating twins across the Pacific! Do you think it right to fly 300 people on one engine for 3+ hours? Is it acceptable to licence ETOPS operations knowing this will be the outcome of losing just one engine? I tell you, I will never travel that distance from diversions on a twin- that is where the FAA should be examining sensible risk, not a 747 flying on 3 engines. But then I think we understand that the FAA has a very vested interest! 747s are 'old hat' now. Built with strength and redundancy for long ranges like this. The fashion now is twins for everything because they are more fuel efficient. When the first one takes a swim with 300 people, people will be demanding to fly on 4 engine safety. ETOPS is getting beyond sensible risk now....but then it is far more fun to tease here, isn't it?

[fireflybob]

Rainboe - well said.

At this rate we will be consulting the tea lady about surges and flying on 3 engines in a 4 jet.

I have been getting more and more concerned about ETOPS operating 3 hours from an airport - in my opinion, it is only a matter of time before somebody gets their feet wet!

[under_exposed]

Is ETOPS still limited to 180 minutes? I thought it had increased to 207 minutes.

[Globaliser]

DOVES: What happened if one or more of those problems (a failure to the adjacent engine, a severe fuel or hydraulic leak, a separation of a section of flap, a depressurization) would have happened in the middle of nothing: by the point of ‘non return’ ? Speaking purely as (regular) SLF, may I suggest the following? If one or more of those problems manifested itself later even though it was not present at the time of the initial occurrence, it would then be time to divert. A trans-Atlantic flight is never in the "middle of nothing": there are many diversion fields. The airline even handily displays them to pax on the Airshow in front of every seat.

I'm happy with that. Flying is safe enough to allow for some things to go wrong and still be safe enough to carry on. I'd really rather have my flights interrupted only when necessary, thank you.Rainboe: Why is everyone getting so wobbly about nothing?Two reasons:- It's fun to sex up air safety incidents even when they're nothing to write home about. Some journalists even have to scratch a living out of it. It's fun to kick BA. If it had happened on a VS, you can bet that the media would have portrayed the crew as heroes, and it would have been a "story" that never got off the ground.

[SLFguy]

The other point I don't think I've seen here is that before they were 'in the wild reaches of the Atlantic/Polar regions etc" the a/c would have been in the air for the considerable time it takes to overland west --> east USA during which time if any problem manifested itself there were multiple diversionary options.

Having flown that far for that long without the "fan damage/bird ingestion/explosive damage" causing any symptoms, they, I presume, felt 100% safe to continue.

[Sky Wave]

Rainbow

Well Said. I can't see what all the fuss is about.

SW

[lomapaseo]

Doves wrote:

Doves wrote:
First of all I’m not exactly a spotter (try to figure out!)
Second: Perhaps I am saying, among the others, the same thing like sombody else:
ETOPS are to be revised some way.
From the BIBLE:
In modern turbofan engines, compressor surge is a rare event. If a compressor surge (sometimes called a compressor stall) occurs during high power at take off, the crew will hear a very loud bang, which will be accompanied by yaw and vibration. The bang will likely be far beyond any engine noise, or other sound, the crew may have previously experienced in service.
Compressor surge has been often mistaken for blown tires, or a bomb in the airplane.
The flight crew, may be quite startled by the bang, and in many cases, this has led to a rejected take off above V1, which have sometimes resulted in injuries, loss of the airplane, and even passenger fatalities.
Compressor stall may be caused by engine deterioration, or may be the result of ingestion of birds, ice, or foreign objects. Its effects may be the final sound from a “severe engine damage”.
In a turbine engine compression is accomplished as the air passes through the stages of the compressor. The air flowing over the blades can stall just like the air over the wing. When this occurs, the passage of air through the compressor becomes unstable and the compressor can no longer perform its duty. This means that there is no more the correct relation between the fuel and the air in the the engine.
Engine surge can be accompanied by visible flames forward out the inlet and rearward out the tailpipe. Instruments may show high EGT, EPR or rotor speed changes.
Depending on the reason for the compressor stall, there many types of surges:
- A single self-recovering surge (the only one I have ever experienced a few times in 40 years, during landing on an MD-80 and the reverse was still deployed by 60 kts)
- Multiple surge prior to self-recovery
- Multiple surges requiring pilot action in order to recover
- A non-recoverable surge
When a compressor surge is not recoverable, the engine will decelarate to zero power as if the fuel had been chopped. This type of surge can accompany a severe engine damage.
Now I am asking:

Who told the crew of BA268, that:
1) There has not been an ingestion of bird/s, pieces of tyre or any other foreign object by the engine number 2?
2) The engine had not been severely damaged?
3) The flames (many feet long) and the sparks (incandescent pieces of metal) did not invest some vital part of the aicraft?
4) One or more of the tyres did not blow out?
5) The cause of the explosions had not been an explosive device?


Good research you have found the words that I wrote several years ago.

However in regard to the bolded questions above, the engine experts also considered the symptomatic response, to the crew, of combinations of those events that you question. These symptoms taken together with the likelihood of a serious degradation of the aircraft's airworthiness were embodied in the recommended actions to the flight crews regarding continued operation of the aircraft.

I am not saying that we recommended the operation of the aircraft to its original destination, but only that the aircraft is likely safe to fly for an extended period of time with proper consideration of all the symptoms or event conditions to the crew.

Again and again in this thread I am not making a judgement about the crew's actions (I leave that to the CAA) but only am pointing out that the decision making process can be soundly performed with the data and ground advice available to the crew.

[cargo boy]

I have to agree that there are far too many 'experts' (not) posting on this thread. Having flown ETOPS in the past and now in the middle of a conversion onto the B744, I can see why those of us who operate that a/c are getting frustrated with some of the comments coming from the 'experts'.

From now on, I propose that we let the pilots of the B744 post on this thread. The obvious lack of understanding about 4 engine LROPS by some people on here is truly amazing, especially considering that some of them are, allegedly, pilots too!

In the meagre hope of preventing any more wild speculation and hand wringing from those who are not 4 engined qualified or experienced, especially about how the crew identify whether an engine has actually 'failed' or is just surging after take-off AND when the decision to shut down the engine takes place AND how they then come to a decision as to whether the engine has suffered damage that would warrant an immediate landing OR how the crew would figure out whether they could continue on 3 engines and still make an alternate should a second engine have to be shut down because they still have a performance manual available in the F/D library... I think it is time to ask those who obviously don't fully understand the difference between what happened after take off, the decision to continue and the separate situation that developed towards the end of the flight to please refrain from posting any more statements or pronouncements with regard to their opinion unless it is a question to experienced 4 engined LROPS pilots. (phew!)

The number of statements from what appear to be either enthusiasts trying to impress the rest of us or 'PC Sim experts' that have no in-depth understanding of actual 4 engined LROPS, such as questioning about secondary damage or bird strikes or fuel-tank leaks or burst tyres is getting to be a bit too bothersome. If you are not able to understand how pilots assess these situations after reading through this whole thread then please leave your inane questions to yourself as all you are doing is pi$$ing the rest of us off and fueling the media luvvies who thrive on this kind of ignorance.

[BEagle]

"Listen to this- a 747 on 3 engines is equivalent to a trijet."

Listen to this. You are talking utter nonsense.

[Hand Solo]

Quite right. You've still got more redundancy on a 747 on 3 than a trijet on 3.

[Captain104]

Well well well.........
2 days later the show is still going on. How about all "true" pilots keeping their mouth shut? Could the drivel die without fuel? :ok:

Regards

[Rainboe]

Sorry BEagle, I stand by that! A 747 can go down to one engine (less sweat if it is an inboard) just as a trijet can go down to one engine. At least it is still flying. The difference is when it starts the journey, your 747 is on four to begin with!

[DOVES]

Thank you very much 'Cargo boy':
'Referrals: 0; Occupation: pilot.'
You gave us, with your arrogance, a perfect lesson on Crew Resource Management.
"What not to do in case of abnormal situation. How not to gather all the available information (i.e. 'do you think Hoskin if it's the case to call the tower and ask them if they found any debris, bird or rudder on the runway... Can you please call the purser and ask him if they saw anything wrong with that engine? And how's the passenger mood? Is it necessary to make a low pass over the tower to make them assess the landing gear/flaps situation? Did ,via the ACARS at home base, they noticed anything wrong with the huge number of data they have collected? etc.).
For you ther's a very simple solution: "Shut up your trap! You boy let me work alone!".
I think that I was flying over the Atlantic when you were not yet born and with those people from WWII used to talk to the people from the heights (just like you). For instance: did anybody out there, in the USA ATC, know Captain Drago? A real generation gap.
And before I close my mouth wide open, I want to remember that an accident is seldom caused by a single cause.
And it's silly to open the first ring of a chain of events. I beg everybody of You to excuse my bad English, and now I'm looking forward to read a report, recommendations and suggestions from the Authority to learn something more.
Regards
DOVE

[hobie]

I thought this thread was all about why the flight in question turned into a "Mayday" situation? .......

loosing an engine on a 747 doesn't create a "Mayday" ...... BA's IFSD SOP's don't create Maydays .....

[Rainboe]

DOVES- I can't believe you are saying all that!
<if they found any debris, bird or rudder on the runway>- how do you know it came from your aeroplane?
<Can you please call the purser and ask him if they saw anything wrong with that engine?>- I don't think any pilot would trust a cabin crew member to assess damage on an engine! Would they know where to look? Would they be looking at the right engine? Would they know what to look for? The only way is for a pilot to go look himself.
<And how's the passenger mood?>- who cares? It's MY mood and MY safety I'm always most concerned about! The passengers will be OK if I look after #1. I think the best way to look after #1 would be to get my ass back to LHR.
<Is it necessary to make a low pass over the tower to make them assess the landing gear/flaps situation?>- I'm sorry, but you cannot be serious! What would they see from 1000'? Nothing! It is NEVER recommended to do a pass of the tower- they cannot see anything.
<via the ACARS at home base, they noticed anything wrong with the huge number of data they have collected?>- I have little doubt they would have done this already.

I get the feeling you are a nervous flyer. At the slightest possibility of any damage whatsoever, you seem to want to dump fuel and return. Birds hit wings and damage flaps, bits break off, tyres deflate. You do your best to work around these things and follow advice. Advice here was to continue. The crew would not have done so without being happy it was safe for them and their passengers. I would do exactly the same. Our job is to get you there, not to find a million reasons not to.

[JW411]

I know I shouldn't encourage you but I will do it just one last time. In the last few days you have let us all know how much you hate:

Cabin Staff
Security Personnel
Diabetics
Passengers
Me
DC-10s
The FAA
McDonalds Employees
And many other lesser mortals

I don't know whether you are aware of it but you come over as someone who undoubtedly preceded the Wright Brothers by four good years.

[Anti-ice]

Well, JW411 , hating cabin crew (particularly BA's) is the norm on here ...

We're used to it now,its very disturbing, but in a way sort of amusing :ugh: ;)

[Rainboe]

What am I meant to say to that? I mean I've heard of thread creep, but that is ridiculous! Aren't you making this a bit personal? You were the one who made your comments a personal diatribe against BA- presumably from the point of view that you knew the right way and BA was wrong because they were 'indoctrinated' was the expression! You made your post a personal attack on the professional standards of another company- don't expect to be treated with kid gloves as a result!Having got past 30W the crew must have had a very good idea of how the "Howgozit" was going. I would have thought that it would have been obvious that Heathrow was already an impossibility to any sensible person.
So why did this hard-working crew that had done their level best for BA go past PIK/BFS/SNN etc and end up with a "Mayday" at MAN?

With 11 hours to think about the problem, I would certainly not have got myself in a situation like this.

Perhaps the big worry here is the the way the BA crew were trained or indoctrinated. I have already seen on this thread (and others) ample evidence from BA pilots that they think such situations are perfectly safe and that any criticism is superfluous. Indeed they dismiss the FAA as an irrelevance.

This, having done both with big aeroplanes, is a very arrogant statement. I can say that with a great deal of confidence that the numberof US-registered aircraft exceeds the the rest of the world put together.

Therefore, the posting from "BA God Help Me" should be seen in context.

[Auto Backup]

We were in California a couple of weeks ago when this item (it actually happened in February I believe) hit the news. It appears that the details were leaked to the press and it appeared that the FAA was forced to put out a statement, which was carried in most of the major newspapers and the TV news bulletins.

I seldom frequent Pprune, however the coverage in the US piqued my curiosity and the 'opinions' I have read have varied from the defensive to the aggressive to total ignorance (including sarcasm!!) as to the rational behind the safe, expeditious and commercial operation of heavy 4 engined aircraft and how the pilots in the 'hot seat' approach their profession. Dismissing the opinions of contributers because ' they aren't pilots smacks of high arrogance indeed, after all, these are the people that have kept food on my table for 35 years. Pacificum (enough!!)

The facts that I saw reported in the US are slightly different from the various 'opinions' that I have read posted by others in this thread however, being now retired, I have no verification one way or another as to the correct details of this particular incident, however I thought that I would offer my thought processes as to how I, as a Captain, would approach handling a similar situation - I would hope in a comparable way to my peers.

It was reported in the US that the engine in question suffered a compressor stall(s) shortly after take off but recovered only to bang away again on the noise abatement power reduction. The decision to shut it down therefore became a 'precautionary' and not an 'emergency' course of action.

Basically when I was a Captain on the 400 there were 3 possible courses of action

1. If an engine either failed on TO (fire/failure etc) or catastrophically during flight requiring an immediate full mergency shutdown the procedure was to call an emergency, carryout an emergency engine shutdown, dump fuel and land ASAP - end of story

2. If an engine exhibited worrying signs - loss of thrust, loss of oil, high temp, overspeed etc leave it to a safe height and throttle back - if it is running OK, but if there are still problems there are then two further 2 options :-

Option 1
Shut it down, possibly dump fuel and then land at a suitable enroute airfield - in this case, to my mind, somewhere (JFK?) in the continental US - with available BA engineering cover and multiple onward flight options so as to disrupt the pax as little as possible

Option2
Have Engineering interrogate the onboard engine real-time parameter database via SatCom - both prior and subsequent to shutting it down - and THEN, and ONLY THEN, decide whether it would be possible (and/or sensible) to continue on 3 engines to destination (which incidentally MUST be a main base) after consultation with both Maintrol and (if possible) the Duty Flight Manager.

It happened to me personally twice in my almost 9 years on the 744, but, in both cases, luckily at a much later stage in the flight - each time it necessitated a 'precautionary' shutdown for an engine low oil warning which, in both cases, subsequently turned out (happily) to have been an indication problem. We continued in one case on 3 engines for seven hours from the Far East

The first question that I always asked myself (and, if possible, always asked Engineering) when a similar situation occurred was :-

"If I shut this engine down - would it be possible to restart and use the engine in a future emergency?" (Eric Moody's incident springs to mind!!)

If the considered answer was 'yes' then I would continue provided that my crew and I were happy there was no structural integrity issues and they ALL agreed to continue to destination. In this situation on my flightdeck democracy reigned and with even just ONE pilot vote against continuing it immediately became re land or divert time!!

If the answer was 'no' then, before deciding to continue, I and my crew would consider the fuel state, predicted fuel burn, achievable flight level, possible enroute alternates, enroute terrain, enroute/destination weather and crew state (lack of sleep, tiredness? etc) in much greater detail before deciding whether or not to continue with the flight

One other point to make (as has been made in several previous posts) is that the B747-400 is in fact certificated as a 3 engined a/c, in fact both the manual and autoland parameters are the same for both 3 & 4 engined approaches (full flap, crosswind, minima and no minima autoland etc etc)

[Flying Fiona]

Nothing wrong with what the Captain did. He had another 3 engines remaining. How many do you want?

[cavortingcheetah]

:) Before I depart to a far, far, better place; from whence I shall continue to contrive to contribute to Prune; I would just like to second the suggestion of Intrepid Birdman on page 38.
In all my aviating; I have never met so many, so nearly so egotistical as myself, as I have on this thread.:p

[Rainboe]

And nice to meet you Sire! Now, on your way please, you are obstructing the pavement on the superhighway!

[DOVES]

Rainboe:
'I get the feeling you are a nervous flyer'
If you mean that I am afraid to fly : Yes! And I have to thank That Prudence if after
almost 40 years and 19000 hrs I'm still flying.
So you want me to shoot at a corpse.
Here you are.
Let's admit that it was permitted, legal, logical and economical not to dump fuel and go back to the departure airport, (after having ascertained that all, I say again 'ALL', resources on board were enough to keep flying). But how do you understand the:
'Land to the First Suitable Airport'?
They overflew so many perfectly organised airports and had so many alarm bells... They even ignored the one by 200 NM from Gander (last chance they had to land before facing the Atlantic): when they received the Oceanic Crossing Clearence with a lower Flight Level than the one they had planned/requested (were they allowed to fly a variable Mach Number according to a Long Range cruise?).
So much they were affected by 'Homitis' that they decided to continue.
And it was between 40 and 30 west that they were in the middle of nothing.
I suppose that they were almost 3 hours to the destination with circa 35000 Kgs of fuel left.
But they had rended many pages from the emergency/abnormal check list, in this sense: in case of one of those situation would have arisen they had to descent to a lower level with
F/F increasing to 200 Kg/min (correct me if I'm wrong, I flew DC-10 and MD-11 not the 74) instead of 150 having not many chances to arrive to an airport. I try to figure out some:
- A second engine failure
- Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- One pack trip off
- Fuel temperature low
- Cracked Windshield
You name others.
Don't say that statistically nothing could happen to them, otherwise I tell you: "Why we let so many people bore us with all those numbers and diagrams to take into account an engine
failure in the worst moment of the Flight: V ONE?
And at the end of the Oceanic crossing they still ignored many others hospitable airports, one for all: Shannon.
And as a matter of fact the final bell rang after they declared May Day to Manchester:
2000 of 5000 Kg of fuel ramained trapped on tank number 2,
reducing the endurance to less than 30 minutes.
Do you imagine if they had had (in order of severity):
- Unstabilized approach (all of them were tired)
- Runway incursion
- Bad weather
- Some kind of Hydraulic failure
- Some kind of problem with flight controls or landing gear
In short if they had to go around or simply make a 360°?
After what I said I hope that somebody will extract honestly from this experience the best teachings and spread them among us modest Aviators.
Best Regards
DOVES

[cargo boy]

Oh give us a break! (correct me if I'm wrong, I flew DC-10 and MD-11 not the 74)And here we have the problem... another 'expert' on the B744 and FOUR engined LROPS giving everyone the benefit of his 'experience' of operating the type... NOT! :*

Here we have someone who considers every option... did anyone suggest that the crew involved didn't? Looks to me that they arrived at MAN and apart from a declaration of a "mayday" as required by their SOP's everyone got home safely.

Why do we have to keep on having your almost paranoid suggestion that you would have done it so differently? We know you would have dumped fuel and returned for an emergency landing if you'd been flying your tri-jet or twin-jet. Please give some credence to the fact that the crew on the FOUR engined B744 took into consideration all the factors that you keep harping on about. The rest of are knowledgeable enough to know that had there been another problem en-route that they would have been able to divert to an en-route alternate. :rolleyes:

[Globaliser]

DOVES: Let's admit that it was permitted, legal, logical and economical not to dump fuel and go back to the departure airport, (after having ascertained that all, I say again 'ALL', resources on board were enough to keep flying). But how do you understand the:
'Land to the First Suitable Airport'?
They overflew so many perfectly organised airports and had so many alarm bells. Doves, just so I can understand what you're trying to say, from where do you get this requirement to "Land at first suitable airport"? As I've understood the discussion, the whole point is that this was not a requirement, but people think that the crew should have done it (or something similar) anyway. If they're not required to land at the first suitable airport and there are no other problems, why shouldn't they carry on?I try to figure out some:
- A second engine failure
- Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- One pack trip off
- Fuel temperature low
You name others.I understand the additional problems which a second engine failure might have caused. But how would one engine out contribute to any of these other potential problems. For example, fire is a big problem. But flying a quad with one engine out doesn't make it any more likely that you're going to have a fire on board, does it? Or change the way that you deal with it if it happens?

[Auto Backup]

I still can't get past the fact that so many posts seem to be missing the point - as I understand it in this particular case this engine shutdown appears (until, at least, further details emerge!) to have been a PRECAUTIONARY shutdown NOT an emergency shutdown.

Compressor stalls are spectacular and noisy - especially at dusk/night - and consist of large flames usually from the back but also occasionally from the front of the engine concerned. A sort of giant hiccup or backfire usually caused by a sticky relief valve.

Occasionally one is caused by the fuel management computer (EMC) getting its 'knickers in a twist' and can be sorted by stopping and restarting the engine (for those familiar with the Rolls powered 744 I don't need to harp on about the various problems that a shutdown and restart can solve).

If the engine settles down, other than a note in the tech log, the engine is fully serviceable, in this case judging by the reports that the a/c circled LA for 20 minutes before continuing I would assume that Engineering interrogated the engine by the ACARS SatCom datalink (a/c parameters are continuously monitored by the BA engineering computers using burst technology) and they probably advised a PRECAUTIONARY shutdown. This would not have precluded a relight in the event of a second engine failure (please note DOVES - unlike the DC10/MD11 the 744 is extremely robust, has 4 engines, 4 of everything else (hydraulics etc) AND has MUCH MUCH better systems redundancy built in!!).

After all I asume that pilots of 3 engined a/c were happy to fly these sort of routes? Statistically the chances of a second engine failure (excluding for fuel contamination reasons) on a 4 engined a/c is much lower that a single engine failure on a 3 engined a/c and the 744 can continue on one engine if necessary.

Basically what I am trying to convey is that prejudging this decision is neither rational nor fair - the aviation community condemns the press for doing just that - applying experience of a different a/c type to make an (ill informed?) judgement in this case is plainly stupid, as is armchair pontificating.

I think that it would be sensible to wait for the report from those who actually KNOW what decisions were made (and why) and what ACTUALLY happened to the a/c.

Pax vobiscum!

[TURIN]

DOVES,
And as a matter of fact the final bell rang after they declared May Day to Manchester:
2000 of 5000 Kg of fuel ramained trapped on tank number 2,
reducing the endurance to less than 30 minutes.


Where did you get the idea that 2 ton of fuel was "trapped"?

Slow to transfer, maybe. But not necessarily trapped and unusable.
The flt crew, perhaps, took the most prudent option and made the worst case assumption that it was unusable and declared a mayday. Makes sense, yes?

Rainboe and co have been trying to explain in considerable detail to all and sundry why the events of BA268 were handled correctly and within SOPs.

Methinks this is all a bit of a wind-up now.

Rainboe, let it lie they will never understand and your keyboard must be knackered by now.:ok:

[Sky Wave]

But flying a quad with one engine out doesn't make it any more likely that you're going to have a fire on board, does it?

Must be less likely. You have one less engine to blow up!!!! ;)

[DOVES]

Sky Wave

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But flying a quad with one engine out doesn't make it any more likely that you're going to have a fire on board, does it?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Must be less likely. You have one less engine to blow up!!!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I shouldn't be so sure on that:
1) Did they pull the Engine Fire Warning Switch? So were fuel, Hydraulic, Air, Electrical still flowing to that powerplant?
I guess they didn't, just because they had decided that it was not "Severe Eng Damage"
2) Was, during and after hours and hours, the oil still lubricating enough that engine turning for windmilling?
Think it over... Think it over!
And what about those idiots that go to the toilet to smoke: did those 300 souls and more refrain from smoking such a long time and in such a freightening situation?
I am still waiting for any AUTHORITY to tell me:
- Diagnosis
- Well/Wrong Done
- Causes/concauses
- Recommendations
Fly Safe
DOVES

[Rainboe]

Turin is right, we are going around and around the same points and it is time to leave it with a parting shot at DOVES! They did a Precautionary engine shutdown- are you saying that is not enough? The Rolls doesn't have any problem with windmilling for ages. They even leave them windmilling when parked overnight- it causes no problem.

If you are now going to raise dangers of fire from smoking in the toilets, fuel temperature low, one pack tripping off (well- there are 3 to start with), what has that got to do with it? Maybe we shouldn't fly aeroplanes on long range flights at all? Why are you so nervous? This is what you are expected to handle if you fly these routes!

Please answer my question- what is your opinion of B777 being accepted for ETOPS when they may have to fly for 3+ hours over the Pacific on one engine? I keep asking, but nobody who is so critical of BA over this will say how happy they are with that ETOPs operation over the Pacific! Why will nobody answer?

[Sky Wave]

1) Did they pull the fire shutoff handle? So were fuel, Hydraulic, Air, Electrical still flowing to that powerplant?
2) Was, during and after hours and hours, the oil still lubricating enough that engine turning for windmilling?


Not sure what the BA SOP states but I would doubt they would pull the fire handle in this case as they did not suspect any damage.

Whilst I agree you do have electric and hydraulic services in the engine I am suggesting that there is much less risk of them catching fire when they're not working and just sitting there in the -56 degree airflow. (please don't bother posting to tell me that the airflow will be warmer due to friction)

[wiggy]

Sky Wave
Not quite right - If the decision was made to shut the engine down prior to the Flaps being up ( for whatever reason, damage suspected or not) then the crew should have used the "Fire Engine, Severe Damage or Separation Checklist", which does indeed included the item "Engine Fire Switch....Pull".

[lomapaseo]

.... - If the decision was made to shut the engine down prior to the Flaps being up ( for whatever reason, damage suspected or not) then the crew should have used the "Fire Engine, Severe Damage or Separation Checklist", which does indeed included the item "Engine Fire Switch....Pull".



I sure hope not. That kind of action can lead to the wrong switch being pulled at a most inopportune time.

I've seen the results of this first hand in the simulator. In fact the recommendation is to take your time even when the fire bell has been illumunated seeing as there have been extremely few if any engine fire bell warning that having been delayed have ever resulted in the loss of a big jet. twin, tri or quad.

The aircraft has redundancy (multiple extinguishers in the pylon as well as fire shielding to give you at least 5 minutes to collect your thoughts.

I now note that the arguments pro and con for BA are winding down to a few final contestents and the what-ifs are still with us. I will welcome the silence unless new facts are revealed. :}

[Captain104]

Danny, are you with me?

Well well well.........
2 days later the show is still going on. How about all "true" pilots keeping their mouth shut? Could the drivel die without fuel?

Regards


Please,help us. :\
Regards

[Plastic Bug]

OK, having been thoroughly smacked upside my head by Nigel on Draft, I must beg to differ.

I still can't see the logic of continuing on to the initial intended destination 10+ hours away when losing an engine immediately after takeoff.

Athough the 747 is certified to fly on 3, that number is for either ferry or survival purposes. To lose one right after liftoff opens a can of worms that we are experiencing here right now.

What IS the right decision?

Well, from my comfy chair in front of my super PC, the decision is easy. Land now and sort it out. Obviously, the crew, having left the ground had other ideas.

I am of the opinion that the ground staff screwed the pooch when they elected to go along and in fact, assist the crew in their idea to continue.

Before you all start screaming at me, think about it for a minute. There was no plan to leave LA for London on three engines. What happened was in fact a flight from LA to London on three engines. The failure scenarios depicted on all the checklists are for engine failures that happen when you are going somewhere from altitude. Not from takeoff. Maybe I'm wrong there, but I don't think the slide rule guys figured that someone would lose an engine, climb out and continue to their planned long range destination.

Considering the outcome, the decision to continue the flight and overfly suitable airports where repairs could be made is telling. There is also the idea that the aircraft left a station where repairs could not be made.

Los Angeles, an airport located in the United States happens to have at its disposal numerous maintenance facilities and in fact, happens to have on the property Engineers in the employ of.. British Airways.

I read a post earlier that had me rolling: "Suffice to say that this crew, and all the other professionals involved (engineers, ATCOs etc), did an excellent job in getting their customers to within 200 miles of their destination in a safe and professional manner."

Hardy har ha! That's our new goal. We don't need to get them where they're going! Within 200 miles is fine!

Oh please.

Now I see a post from a 747-400 Flight Engineer/Engineer who believes the crew did everything right.

Who wants to tell the guy there are only two seats in the -400 cockpit? OK, not counting the jumpseat.

Whoops! I guess I just did.

Anyhoo, everyone lived, the only thing injured was maybe somebodies pride, so overall, no foul. But I have to ask, why would anyone lose an engine on takeoff and consider flying the rest of the day?

And stop comparing the 747 to ETOPS! Different kettle of fish entirely!

PB

[Final 3 Greens]

Hardy har ha! That's our new goal. We don't need to get them where they're going! Within 200 miles is fine! Speaking as a FQTV, under the circumstances, Manchester would be a good outcome, with options to continue by air, rail, bus or hire car and an excellent motorway connection to the rest of the UK. Not perfect, but that's a function of a tech issue.

Where would I rather be Machester or LAX????

So sir, you are talking out of your a**.

[Aloue]

Surely the consequence of running an open forum is that every idiot on the planet gets to tell those with expertise that they are wrong? Is it not something we must endure by virtue of having an open site? So it is up to us to let the nonsense die by not coming back.

That being said, I do keep coming back, for some of the nonsense spoken here is truly amazing - even entertaining. We have the full spectrum of human reasoning(!!) and some idiotic nonsense is spouted.

What is telling is the general lack of respect for those who do the job and fly the aircraft in question - very little polite questioning (and thus learning) that might indicate something other than a desire to leap to a conclusion and preach to all about the maddness of those involved.

I can take that from the "civvies" but to see some pilots engage in this game is mighty depressing. Their competence might sometimes strike one as being the issue!

But there is some good training material on this thread. For example, take the post just two above, by Plastic Bug, give it to your trainees and ask them to identify the assumptions, biases and points of ignorance it contains. Would make for an interesting discussion to tease out each step of the argument he presents.

[Globaliser]

Plastic Bug: I read a post earlier that had me rolling: "Suffice to say that this crew, and all the other professionals involved (engineers, ATCOs etc), did an excellent job in getting their customers to within 200 miles of their destination in a safe and professional manner."

Hardy har ha! That's our new goal. We don't need to get them where they're going! Within 200 miles is fine!I'm only SLF.

But I ask myself, what if the crew had known immediately that there wasn't enough fuel to reach London, but there was to reach MAN or GLA or wherever? What would I have preferred.

Given the choice between piddling about near LAX for an hour or two to dump fuel and then return to LAX for goodness only knows what length of delay, or a safe continuation, even if it was already known that it would only be as far as MAN, GLA or somewhere else in the British Isles, I'll go for the continuation every time, thank you.

I have a life to lead, and if continuing the flight is safe, I would like to get the flight done and dusted so that I get on with the rest of the things I have to do, thank you. It's easier to get home by alternative means from MAN or GLA than from LAX.

[sky9]

Enough said. Lets have some silence.:rolleyes:

[SLFguy]

Golden innit.........

D'oh!

[Rainboe]

Plastic Bug- I wasn't going to involve myself anymore, but the ignorance of your posting is breathtaking! How can you be so arrogant as to know nothing about the industry yet be so criticalof experienced peoples inputs? What has the number of seats on a 747 flight deck (4 not 3) got to do with it? Who's pride got 'injured'? Yours for making such an utterly daft posting? You have said nothing new- in fact I don't think you've even read the preceeding 40 pages. Why not zip it and let the CAA decide what is right?

[Globaliser]

Rainboe: Why not zip it and let the CAA decide what is right?I have this sinking feeling that if the report concludes that the crew didn't do anything wrong, and that the ultimate result of the flight was a demonstration of safety processes going right not wrong, many of the posters on this thread will simply conclude that the AAIB doesn't know what it's talking about either.

As someone else has pointed out, that's the reality of the Internet.

[Rainboe]

Yes, you're absolutely right. But it is fascinating isn't it that not one person who seems to be critical of this decision to continue on 3 engines following an engine failure has dared take on my repeated question, which for their benefit I will now repeat yet again!

What is our opinion of ETOPS regulations that allow an airline like United to operate with 300 people on board for 3+ hours ON ONE ENGINE at max continuous power over the Pacific wastes to nearest diversion?
Instead we have every opinion from people who know very little criticising a crew for flying on 3 engines!

What on earth is the problem here?

[elektra]

Look, the crew, and ulitimately the PIC, made their call and continued.

For the whole flight they had multiple other safe options available. So maybe they weren't smart, or maybe the dispatchers weren't on their game...but the bottom line is they were never in a position where the passengers were at risk.

Forgetting a few idiocies, the bulk of the posts here would be good reading for a LOFT style CRM program....we could all be caught like this one day.

What if this was a 777 with a dodgy surging engine 2 hours out from Cold Bay or King Salmon (WX on minimums and totally unfamiliar), but 3 hours from Anchorage where all is OK? Tough call...I know what I'd do and I'd trust that Boeing and GE/Pratts/RR would get me there. And I'd be right if it all worked and wrong if it didn't. That's what happens when you put on those shiny new 4 gold bars.

[Danny]

Danny, are you with me?...

...Please,help us.

I think I agree. Having flown ETOPS on the B757 and B767 and now in the middle of my B744 conversion, I have to agree that those who are experienced in actually flying and operating the B744 have got a point when the likes of Doves and many others who have never operated the type keep chipping in with their pronouncements that this flight was not handled safely.

All I can say is that the B744 is a wonderful machine and has so much more redundancy built in than anything else I've ever flown. Still, what do I know? I don't start line training until next month! :{

Perhpas I'll close this one until I get out of the sim tomorrow. By then I'll have experienced double engine failures! :eek:

[cavortingcheetah]

:) This thread is in response to a 'challenge' posed by Rainboe in the Manchester/747 thread. I hope that he will excuse me for, as it were, jumping on his bandwagon.
I have never flown large twin jets and now, almost certainly never will. But, speaking as both a Pilot and a frequent passenger; I would be jolly frightened at the prospect of three hours on one at MCT over The Pacific waterland. So, while I do not personally think that there is any direct connective parallel between a four engined jet on three over The Atlantic and a twin jet on one over The Pacific; wild horses would not get me, as crew or me and my family on a 777 ex LAX for SYD. This, in spite of the fact that I consider it to be one of the finest aircraft ever constructed.
Where in this lies the correlation between ETOPS, common sense and commercialism-or anything else that springs to mind ?
That'll do for now. Standing by, with great interest, to receive boarders!

:confused: Very.

[411A]

In reality, there are really quite a few diversion airports available, especially in the south Pacific.

UAL, as I recall, has already had at least one 777 diversion, a three-hour plus affair, not all that long ago.

[Animalclub]

3 hours plus seems a little over what is allowed for ETOPS isn't it?

[VeeBee]

There have been ETOPS oerations through the Pacific for at least 15 years. The number of single engine diversions over that time is not surprisingly less than the IFSD diversion rate for quads. The single engine diversions can probably be counted on the fingers of one hand.

[ETOPS]

Animalclub

3 hours plus seems a little over what is allowed for ETOPS isn't it?

Remember the whole ethos behind ETOPS (or EROPS) is that of pre-planning.

Thus before take-off, suitable diversion airfields are nominated, alternate minima are "stepped up" etc etc. In the same way the aircraft is certified for 120/180mins diversion but on the day you have to fly to your nearest airport regardless of how long it takes. You can't "clock off" at exactly 180 mins into your diversion if that leaves you a few miles short!

[oldebloke]

As the other gents have been saying ETOPS twins have been traversing the Pacific foryears....2 co's I know of with B737's(aloha+)from CYVR-HNL..Alot o'the traffic is only twins,and not too much has beenreported of the occasional 'shutdown'..The widest part ,I believe,is between the west coast and Hawaii..
Once your by HNL enroute to SYD one has lots o'diversion points..
:ok:

[Tallbloke]

I think the United diversion exceeded 3 hours because they encountered stronger than forecast winds on the diversion. Proposed rules will mean that operators will update the weather and therefore the route in flight, apparently.

What I have asked in the past is, given that the majority of engine failures occur at high power settings, what captain will set his one remaining engine to MCT when he has a failure at the critical point? ETOPS preplanning assumes best single engine speed at MCT. Is it not more sensible to continue at some lower setting (but at a lower cruising speed)? This would however have commercial implications.

[Offchocks]

Tallbloke & cavortingcheetah

ETOPS does not have to mean flying continuously at MCT when you loose an engine.
It does mean targeting a higher TAS at a slightly lower altitude rather than MCT at max single engine altitude and step climbs maintaining MCT.
On an ETOPS diversion with an engine shut down, you descend to your ETOP's altitude at your ETOP's diversion speed and cruise at that speed (TAS). You may need MCT to start off with but as the weight reduces so does the thrust.
This is quicker and less demanding on the remaining engine than when operating at MCT at max single engine altitude, the cost is a little more fuel burn.
Of course engine failure is not the only thing that will cause an ETOP's diversion.

[Rainboe]

The whole 40 pages of that dreadful thread about the B747 engine failure has made us all think more about preparation for an engine failure. I have to say I was very frustrated by the abuse thrown at a pilot for continuing on 3 engines when you compare that to current accepted ETOPs practice whereby one may find oneself flying for 3 hours on one engine over the ocean. I know which is 'safe' and which is not! It's actually made me review what I would do were I to fly my own carcase as passenger on one of these routes, and I would be questioning the reservations department damn hard!

Offchocks- if you are down to one, with up to 300 on board, and a long way from home, you will need damn near MCT to keep as much altitude as you can for speed and fuel economy!

[phillipas]

This thread is in response to a 'challenge' posed by Rainboe in the Manchester/747 thread.

And thanks for starting it. It was for the purpose of chipping in that I registered, and then i found the thread had been locked.

Answering the question of how happy I would be flying across the Pacific on a twin jet, the answer is 'pretty happy'.

Speaking sltictly from the SLF perspective I accept that there is no such thing as an absloutly 'safe' flight. Everytime I get on a plane I'm taking a chance, however small it might be.

The whole question of 2vs4 engines isn't to my mind very relevant, it's more a case of 1vs3 which is the situation you find yourself one has given up for the day. Certainly 3 is prefereably to 1, but the chances of getting into the 1 engine situation are extremely small, and the chances of that 1engine also giving up is extremely small again.

And I'm just talking about the multiple unrelated engine failure way of meeting my maker from 30,000ft. There's obviously a mulittude of other ways - fire, contaminated fuel, failure of wing spar, etc.

I'll accept though that if you ask me whilst sat 3 hours from an airport on a 777 with an engine out my answer might be slightly different!

Few people, I believe, choose flights according to some rational safety related thought process. People tend to choose on a combination of price, service and schedule. As far as selecting a flight based on safety people tend to work accoridng to whther the media has generally deemed a carrier to be 'safe' or 'unsafe' (think Korean or Aeroflot a few years ago).

In summary I think the example to quote is a flight I took last year. LHR to SIN. I choose LH based on them offering a good price. From a safety perspective the decision was a stupid one - flying LH from LHR to SIN is basically TWICE AS DANGEROUS as flying BA on the same route.

Why?

2 flights instead of 1.

But hey, I'm lived through the experience and saved myself a few quid compared to BA.

[sky9]

Tallbloke.

You might be right that the majority of engine failures are at high power settings however a number are at max rpm for the N1 which is around the 20,000ft level.

[BusyB]

Rainboe,

I had sympathy for you on the previous thread as I felt you were correct. Now I see you making crass comments about ETOPS ops about which you are obviously less well informed.

[hobie]

What the $$$$ has ETOPS got to do with this thread? :confused:

..... absolutely nothing !!!! :sad:

[Rainboe]

hobie- You've obviously missed the point of the later 20 pages of this thread! I have been asking again and again, why so much abuse thrown at a pilot for continuing on 3 engines when we accept the premise of ending up on 1 engine for 3 hours over the Pacific as an 'acceptable risk'? Compared to this, why so much castigation of pilot A on 3 engines?

BusyB- I accept you may disagree, but pray tell me where I am incorrect please?

[cavortingcheetah]

:) Thank you Offchocks.
hobie: I believe that this is a merged thread. The 747/Manchester line with one I started on ETOPS over The Pacific. I am not guilty for the merger but I suspect that there may lie the confusion. Be not muddled any longer:D

[lomapaseo]

I am sorry to see this thread now expanding into even more imaginative what-ifs about ETOPS and/or engine failure conditions.

ETOPs discussions have been haggled to death elsewhere on this forum, why reopen them here.

The speculation on more likely engine failures at MCT conditions is not supported by data and certainly has been discussed before under ETOPs.

[DOVES]

RAINBOE wrote so many times:
Please answer my question- what is your opinion of B777 being accepted for ETOPS when they may have to fly for 3+ hours over the Pacific on one engine? I keep asking, but nobody who is so critical of BA over this will say how happy they are with that ETOPs operation over the Pacific!
He deserves an answer:
Thanks to GOD I've never flown ETOPS so I had to make a bibliographic research on that subject; I'm inviting you to correct me if I'm wrong:
A twin engine aircraft has to meet many criteria/limitations to be allowed to fly ETOPS.
Company, Maintenance (in terms of more stringent MEL etc.) and Flight Operations have to be certified to conduct such an operation on a certain type of aircraft, with a maximum diversion time, in a useable geografic area, with qualified and recurrently trained crews.
Once a twin was requested not to be at any point of her route at a distance greater than 60 minutes flight time, with one engine out, in Long Range cruise, from a suitable airport. And that hour was already a gift we 'brave aviators' had given to Manufacturers and Carriers. I’ll show you why.
We all know that without engine thrust, from normal cruising altitude, we are going to meet somewhere, someway mother Earth in no more than 20-25 minutes.
And: 60 minus 25 makes 35. The point is: Who is signing the Guarantee that in those 35 minutes after the first engine failure we won’t have a second one? “Statistics!” Someone has answered. “Engines are becoming ever more infallible. So the chance to have a second engine failure is 1/ fantastilions”. It reminds me a story TOTO’, a famous Italian comedian, used to tell a long time ago: “Statistics say that we eat a chicken a week. But there is someone for sure who eats two...: also mine”.
So who’s next?...: don’t complain!!!
Then those 60 minutes became 120; and now somebody dare to stretch it to 180????
“Appetite comes eating”. When will they stop? I fully agree with you: RAINBOE.
They are pulling too much the rope: “USQUE TANDEM CATILINA ABUTERE PATIENTIAM NOSTRAM?”
But I think that all of this has nothing to do with this thread.
Let's go back to it:
JAR–OPS 1.505 En-route
– Aeroplanes With Three Or More Engines, Two Engines Inoperative
(a) An operator shall ensure that at no point along the intended track will an aeroplane having three or more engines be more than 90 minutes, at the all-engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome at which the performance requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met unless it complies with sub-paragraphs (b) to (f) below.
(c) The two engines are assumed to fail at the most critical point of that portion of the route where the aeroplane is more than 90 minutes, at the all engines long range cruising speed at standard
temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome at which the performance requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met.

Have they always been no more than 600-700 NM from Gander, Prinz Christian Sund (if my memory don’t fail), Shannon? Uhhmm????

And:

SECTION 1 JAR-OPS 1 Subpart D
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.375
In-flight fuel management
(a) In-flight fuel checks.
(1) A commander must ensure that fuel checks are carried out in flight at regular intervals. The remaining fuel must be recorded and evaluated to:
(i) Compare actual consumption with planned consumption;
(ii) Check that the remaining fuel is sufficient to complete the flight; and
(iii) Determine the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination.
(2) The relevant fuel data must be recorded.
(b) In-flight fuel management.
(1) If, as a result of an in-flight fuel check, the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination is less than the required alternate fuel plus final reserve fuel, the commander must take into account the traffic and the operational conditions prevailing at the destination aerodrome, along the diversion route to an alternate aerodrome and at the destination alternate aerodrome, when deciding whether to proceed to the destination aerodrome or to divert, so as to land with not less than final reserve fuel.

From the very first moment when they got the Oceanic crossing clearance they knew they couldn’t make it to London, and they kept going.
But over Shannon they were compelled to land ASAP.
Fly Safe
DOVE

[Idle Thrust]

Having experience flying 2, 3, and 4 engine aircraft on long haul ops, I have found all 42 pages of this thread to be very interesting reading. Of particular note is the fact that most supporters of the BA crew’s decision to continue are experienced 744 long haul pilots whereas the opponents would appear to have little or no experience on either the airplane or the route.

I have asked myself, “What would I do in the same situation?” and the answer has always come up a qualified “Continue”. That's in a 744. In another airplane, I think I would dump and return, or at the very least plan an east coast operation of some sort. In a 340, for instance, the redundancy in the hydraulic system is just not as good - any time you have to assess the consequences of a second engine failure in terms of which one has failed and which one goes next, there’s a message for you. The 744 on three is lacking the thrust produced, nothing else.

Having said all of the above, I’m sad to say that were it to happen tomorrow, I would perforce return if only to avoid being pilloried in forums like this and, even worse by regulatory bodies that are looking for trouble where none exists. Even if safety is not compromised, PR sometimes rules.

[BusyB]

Rainboe,
Offchocks was being honest and when you made your reply I don't really think that you meant your comment seriously.

[Max Angle]

Even if safety is not compromised, PR sometimes rules. It's a sad fact but very true, this is not the first time a BA 747 has come from the West coast of the US on 3 but may well be the last.

PS. I know it's happened before coz. a collegue of mine nearly got dumped back into LA a few years back. All he could think about after the bang was how he was going to get on the next flight with an ID90 and how he was going to explain it to crewing. To his intense relief the crew announced about 15 minutes later that they carrying on.

[frangatang]

I do recall a BA 744 some years back suffering an engine failure
out of lax and they continued to JFK. The company staff there were peed off for more hassle heading their way and made it clear they would appreciate it in future if a diversion went elsewhere. Picked on the wrong FO, he could swipe your head off with one blow of his japanese stick.
On another subject, more than one engineer has said that if you knew what goes on in engineering you would never fly again.
Just remember planes are mechanical and mechanical things fail

[poorwanderingwun]

Been away for 10 days in the bush...get back and ....what is top of the list...... ?????....was at least hoping that a report had come out and the discussion had moved on....

Groundhog Day :*

[Rainboe]

Thank you Doves- that was most interesting. Are those JAROPs 1.505 (a) current? I read that as giving even Trijets a form of ETOPS limitation? The nor,al route back from LAX goes over the Great Lakes, up to near Gander, then out across the Atlantic. This is more or less the route even Trijets follow. The 747 was, in effect, a 'Trijet', thus had no more limitations than an MD11 doing this route.

As far as fuel reserves go, the way it was reported was that they were on course for LHR landing, but because of fuel feed problems, it became apparent that a large quantity of the remaining fuel may become unuseable, therefore an earlier landing at MAN was carried out.

Inexperienced people have voiced opinions that they should have returned. Returning would have involved extensive fuel dumping, something that adds additional risk and time, and pollution, to a station with ordinary engineering cover. We don't do that unless we have to. Another opinion is that a diversion to JFK should have been carried out. Again, no special engineering cover, no great access to spares, and big parking problems.

To those divorcing this from the ETOPS problem, so you are still very unlikely to lose another engine having already lost one? Explain that to the Eastern Tristar Miami! The replacement engine on this aeroplane failed next trip. Now I have an idea about possibilities, and this was not coincidence. The replacement engine may very possibly have had an engineering woopsie. That is why in this case, the crew would have closely examined the possibility of their actions if another was to fail. They had thousands of close diversions possible for the width of North America to satisfy themselves that all was well for the crossing. Travel on that- anytime. On two engines across the Pacific (to allegedly save a few pounds!)? No thank you!

[Stan Woolley]

Rainboe

Are you saying people should think twice about travelling on BA 777/767 aircraft if they will be operating an ETOPS sector?

It seems hypocritical to have a strong opinion about something you have no experience of while castigating others for expressing similar concerns about the 744 flight.

Perhaps it means that some things can seem 'instictively' wrong whether we are type rated or not. Maybe we should all listen to the 'inexperienced' a little more, they may have some useful input.
:ok:

[Rainboe]

What it means is I have no understanding of people here who so freely personally abuse and criticise a crew following guidelines and carrying out a process that to my mind has no risk whatsoever, 'FAA spokesperson' included (who evidently has little natural aptitude for the job) when they remain so stunningly silent about a procedure that I feel does carry significant risks to the travelling public in relation to the events we are talking about. Sometimes people worry about the wrong things.

What relative risks people are willing to undergo on a journey (for some, 'to save a few pounds'!) is completely up to them. I think I have to feel some misgivings about the ever upward pressure on ETOPs limitations 'because that is the aeroplane you are building'. There is a reason for more than 2 engines. To achieve the savings of just having 2 engines then to try and remove all the limitations of that sort of operation may be a step too far, especially in the light of its ever increasing range. With increasing range will come longer over water flights.

[phillipas]

...they remain so stunningly silent about a procedure that I feel does carry significant risks to the travelling public in relation to the events we are talking about. Sometimes people worry about the wrong things.

I agree entirely that ETOPS does, as far as multiple unrelated engine failure goes, carry substantially increased risk in relation to flying in a twin. But I'm going to attach more weight to me agreeing with your comment about people worrying about the wroong things.

Typically for a passenger the thing they should worry about most is the car journey to/from the airport at either end. I'm firmly of the impression that, in the GLOBAL scheme of things, spending as much time as possible in a plane is probably the best way to avoid accidents (overall rather than aviation!).

Finally I consider it a great testimony to the professionalism of the pilots here that, despite the incredible level of flight safety that currently exists, you are constantly looking to push safety levels higher.

[mutt]

Rainboe,

In this era of fuel conservation, i cannot see how a 4 engined aircraft with a planned fuel to LHR could have hoped to reach that destination on 3 engines.

Would you care to educate me about the differences in fuel allowances for 4 and 3 engine flight that would have made this destination possible?

Mutt.

[Rainboe]

There are a number of extra considerations that may apply. I have no hard information, but these would have been examined:
1- Carriage of extra fuel above normal reserves and contingency is common if any factors like adverse weather or holding delays are anticipated. It is not frowned on in BA.
2- Nomination of diversion fuel for MAN is frequent. We don't use LGW fuel as a diversion for LHR very often. Thus you could decide en route to make LGW your nominated diversion after reviewing the weather forecast, saving yourself that excess of diversion fuel.

There are a few tricks for replanning in flight to 'stretch' a LH operation. Many people seem to think cruise flying is sitting back looking out of the window- it is very dynamic sometimes with constant reviews on critical flights. When you are close to destination, you can throw away your alternate if there is another runway as long as there are no weathr problems. All these things would have been kept in mind as the aeroplane was planning to overfly MAN en route to LHR. From what I understand, fuel reserves were planned to keep within safe paramenters when the possible fuel supply problem cropped up. I think I would have followed the safe procedure they apparently carried out by diverting to MAN with appropriate calls for the condition they suddenly found themselves in.

Longhaul operations can inevitably end up using fuel significantly outside plan due to factors such as:
lower cruising levels over many hours
worse than forecast winds
higher or lower speeds due to ATC constraints
extended delays before takeoff
worse arrival holding than expected.
Sometimes the fuel may not be enough on the day. We work to a formula of burning 3-4%/hour of extra fuel carried. So over a 10 hour flight, if you nominated 5 tonnes extra, you would burn about 1.2- 2 tonnes just taking that extra fuel. At $250+/tonne, it is a luxury you should try and avoid without good reason- for the vast majority of flights it is plainly being extravagant. We all have infrequent low fuel events. Many of us have had 'Pan' calls when you may end up with close to Reserve fuel (about 4.4 tonnes on a 747), 'Mayday' with less than that.

I see the operation as well planned, with correct procedures being followed when an additional problem occured late in the flight.

[L337]

Mutt:

At its simplest. Get to your 3 engine cruise level. Make sure Long Range cruise for 3 is selected. Put all the winds into the FMC. Put in any expected FL changes. Crossing levels etc. Sit back for 10 seconds and look to see what fuel you are left with at destination. in almost all situations you are left with about 8 tonnes at destination. (You can do this on 4 for planning purposes without pressing the execute key)

8 tonnes is just about enough....

It would normally be about 13 - 15 tonnes at destination.

Then you sit for 10 hours constantly going, "what if".... The plan is the stepping stones method. Safe alternate to safe alternate. Till you get home. If the fuel begins to head south, or a further problem develops, you go to your stepping stone safe bet.

L337

[AN2 Driver]

Rainboe,

sorry for the late reply to something you posted a few days ago, but here it goes.

Thank you Doves- that was most interesting. Are those JAROPs 1.505 (a) current? I read that as giving even Trijets a form of ETOPS limitation? The normal route back from LAX goes over the Great Lakes, up to near Gander, then out across the Atlantic. This is more or less the route even Trijets follow. The 747 was, in effect, a 'Trijet', thus had no more limitations than an MD11 doing this route.


Effectively, yes. That is how I recall dispatching the MD11 vs the A330/767. The A330/767 was much less complex to plan with ETOPS 180 mins than the MD11 which had to stay within the said limits. If you strayed outside, a complex calculation followed to satisfy the limits for 2 engine out ops.

Basically, there were problems on the weekends with BGSF out of action if you loose Keflavik as well as a viable alternate, things can get interesting. ETOPS however, is much more flexible to plan as you are allowed 180 mins. Basically Shannon/Prestwick and Gander/Goose/St.Johns or any combination of those would do nicely, and if you throw in Bermuda and Lajes or even Halifax, you can deal with most weather scenarios the NATL can come up with. On the 3Jets however, things could turn into loads of paperwork and/or rerouting fairly quickly if some combination of enroute alternates went foul on you.

Best Regards

AN2 Driver.

[Rainboe]

I had no idea that Trijets were effectively limited by a form of ETOPs limitations at all!

[Irish Steve]

I had no idea that Trijets were effectively limited by a form of ETOPs limitations at all!

Not sure about anyone else, but in the good old days before 9-11, when flight deck visits were not a problem, I was on a longhaul DC-10 from LGW to DFW heading for a flight simulation conference, and we ended up routing a long way north over Greenland. There were a couple of us visiting at the time, and we got talking about some of the restrictions on the 10. At that point, one of the more dusty manuals came out, and the FE and ourselves retreated to the front galley area to look at the book in some detail, and allow the cabin crew to rotate some younger visitors into the flight deck.

The relevant section got found, and it transpires that there's a limit on the DC-10 that it can't go above ( I think, it was a good while back now) 70 or 75 N, as in the event of a pressurisation failure, it can't get clear of the FL170 sector safe altitude limitation before the oxygen generators expire, and if they've no pressurisation and no oxygen, they need to get down to FL120 or less. I have to admit, that little nugget gave us some pause for thought when we sat down to think about it in some detail.

Suffice to say that the conversation on the flight deck was sufficiently stimulating to all concerned that we were still there enjoying the view, ( it was a rare VFR day) and the conversation as we passed over the home of Flight Simulation, Chicago Meigs, some good while later.

[BYOD]

Read the article in a aviation magazine. Eng fail at take off at 100ft. Then flying LAX to LHR on three, declaring a fuel emergency at MAN. Whats unbeliveable is the comment made by BALPA President Capt M Grandshaw "Thats standard operations"; Guess who's sleeping with whom?
Guess now that the FAA is on it, BA maybe regretting the decision, as the line of Yank paxs and their lawyers are growing, having suffered "terrible mental trauma".:\

[mutt]

Humbug..... I'm gonna start writing my responses in wordpad and posting them here..... Lost the last one due to losing the phone connection....

Irish Steve... Most old INS's had problems aligning themselves above 70°N/S, so that might be a more realisitic reason for the DC10 restriction.

L337 & Rainboe. Thank you for your patient responses..

So what are we left with..


[1] Continued flight permitted by JAR
[2] Continued flight permitted by SOPs
[3] Sufficient fuel for intended flight.
[4] Professional flight planning.
[5] B747-400 Aircraft.


So where is the problem???


Mutt.

[BEagle]

As was said earlier:

Just because it 'can' is not a valid reason for assuming that it necessarily 'should'.....

A bit philosophical, perhaps, but the outcome will be most interesting.

[BBT]

Even worse BEagle:

- "should" is perhaps not the right word

- "acceptable in the circumstances" comes to mind (very different from should)

- "defensible" also comes to mind

- or, "falls within the sphere of acceptable judgment"

- mainly because the decision cannot be demonstrated to be "wrong" or "unwise" or "unsafe" - without an "opinion" being offered

In other words, this interesting case has thrown up the contrasting basic assumptions underlying ETOPs, 3-engined and 4-engined operations - and their consequences / impact when it comes to risk management and in-flight operational decision-making.

As someone above said, whatever about the non-pilots, the willingness of some pilots to pontificate here about things of which they know little has easily been the most depressing part of the entire thread.

I am really looking forward to the respective wisdom and findings of BA, the CAA and, especially, the FAA. We can then all redo this entire thread, but throw additional insults at our target of choice!

[SLFguy]

IMHO Danny should turn this into a poll.....

(1) Dump and return to LAX
(2) Continue to LHR



....proviso... ONLY Pilots of 4 engined a/c can vote.

[woodpecker]

Ignoring the 3-engined continue debate for a moment; look at why the mayday was declared. Personally I feel, if it had not been for the "spotter" (or the equivalent term for a VHF spotter) hearing the Mayday there would have been the normal Pprune... Why was there a BA747 parked at the engineering base at MAN yesterday? thread. The three engined operation from LAX may never have reached these pages!

Back to my post, the Mayday was declared as the commander thought he was going to land without the required minimum fuel. He did the right thing, informed ATC of his plight and received the corresponding level of service (sterile runway etc.)

Why did he feel he was not going to land with the minimum fuel, surely the FMC had been telling him (them) for the last ten hours what the arrival fuel at MAN was going to be, updating it with every change of wind, TAS or FL.

If ever the "plan" was going to operate direct to LHR this must have changed early on to MAN [one of the passengers inputs it was suggested an extra aircraft (no shuttle backup aircraft sitting at MAN with nothing to do nowadays!) had already been sent from LHR to meet our arrival].

Could I suggest that during Fixed Base simulator details, if not on the Full Flight simulator the areas of operation with low fuel state would have been explored. As per the QRH the crossfeed is opened, with all pumps (tanks) being able to feed all engines.

The design of the simulator would have all the pumps producing the rated pressure such that the "balanced" fuel state prior to opening the crossfeed would continue.

But in the real world, with any pump producing higher pressure (and able to satisfy the total demand on its own) would result in that pump (tank) providing all the fuel consumed until the tank was drained empty (less any unusable) when the flow /pressure would drop off, the NRV close, and the next highest pump/tank would continue the fuel feed to all engines.

Have many of us actually had to open the crossfeed in flight due to low fuel levels? The odd MEL requirement "on the approach" for fuel pump failures, or "normal" balancing where the plan is to feed from a specific tank, but for low fuel level I would suggest very very infrequently.

Imagine for a moment, this commander as per the QRH drill opening the crossfeed. From that point on he sees all the fuel coming from one tank (pump with the highest fuel pressure). Have they a situation with one tank (which is not feeding) that has unusable fuel? Are they going to sit there with the other (feeding) tank quantity reducing towards empty and do nothing? I suggest not. Err on the safe side, assume the worst, transmit a Mayday and keep that runway clear!

Perhaps in hindsight OPS should have routed the spare aircraft (and the 747) to GLA/BFS rather than trying to stretch the operation to MAN. Also, if only there had not been the circling out to sea (and using that valuable fuel) at LAX before deciding on continuing .......

Crew 10/10, Operational support ?/10

[LYKA]

Thats an interesting one,

I wonder what 'may' have been done differnently if a US Dispatcher style of operational control had been in place...any ideas?

[Speedpig]

Well, I will confess that I have only read about 50% of the posts in this thread. I got tired of the bitchy comments and doing down of other posters by some who should know better.
Woodpecker's is, so far, the most sensible. Many of the rest are pure BS, speculation and BA bashing.
Just like reading the Mail (haven't rad anything about this there but I'm sure it would have been a narrowly averted disaster).
Had this been a Virgin flight, there would probably never have been any mention i any papers or criticism of the crew's correct decision to continue. They would be a hero crew.
Have we heard from the operating crew themselves?
None of us really has a right to criticise or judge as we weren't there.
Having made the decision to continue, there must be 100 or so airfields within very easy diversion range OVER LAND before you need to decide to cross the Atlantic.
At decision to cross time, you'd be at optimum 3 engine cruise and know you will reach at least EGCC comfortably, so you make the crossing with the met available for EGCC at the time.... you could always turn back or go to Iceland before the point of no return... the company then has time to dispatch one of it's dozens of idle aircraft and ample spare crew(scoff) to EGCC to pick up the pax to continue to EGLL.
I believe it is standard op for ATC to call local standby for engine out approach?
What did the cursed spotters actually hear? Have we heard from them in this thread?
Speculate away but post carefully.
I'm off now to recreate the flight in FS2004:yuk: :p :D
I agree it should be a poll but only B744 captains should vote. They are the only ones I believe qualified to even comment. The rest of us are just "The General Public"

[BEagle]

Perhaps I was too philosophical?

What I meant was, just because a Perf A a/c 'may' continue under such circumstances, that is not sufficient justification in itself.

As for "What's unbeliveable is the comment made by BALPA President Capt M Grandshaw "That's standard operations"", I agree entirely. The famous words of Mandy Rice-Davies spring to mind!

[Globaliser]

woodpecker: Perhaps in hindsight OPS should have routed the spare aircraft (and the 747) to GLA/BFS rather than trying to stretch the operation to MAN.I seem to remember someone doing some amateur but highly entertaining statistics somewhere earlier in this thread about the number of spotters per movement at various airports. Maybe in hindsight, the true mistake was that ops should have kept the aircraft away from the spotter-land that is MAN. :D

[qwerty2]

It's clear that the debate over this 3 engine ferry rages on.
As a pax I feel the 3 engine range was too far and if I'd landed on 2 engines I would have been ready to sue.

[hobie]

Perhaps in hindsight OPS should have routed the spare aircraft (and the 747) to GLA/BFS rather than trying to stretch the operation to MAN.

I suspect Woodpecker has just posted the likely conclusion of any official report to be published on the Incident ..... bless him :ok:

[barit1]

qwerty2, I trust that you have found a safer way home from the aeroport than motoring on the public highways. That risk far exceeds crossing the pond on three.

Of course, your chances of finding "deep pockets" may not be so great... :ugh:

[L337]

qwerty2:

I assume then when you next have an engine failure on a 777 mid Atlantic, you will sue for landing only on one.

L337

[Rainboe]

qwerty- you really know nothing of the subject, do you? Why do you think you have anyhting to add? Would you ever be happy flying on a twin across the Atlantic? Would you have been happy flying on a trijet across the Atlantic? Because a trijet is what this aeroplane effectively became!

Mervyn Granshaw quite rightly pointed out what are standard 4 jet operational procedures in the case of an engine failure. To cast aspertions that he has other considerations in making his statement is unfair- he is simply saying it like it is.

[MPH]

Speedpig:
Thanks for considering anybody whom does not fly the B744 'general puplic'. After having crossed the north,mid and south Atlantic more than 6oo times, I find that rather amusing!
Well, on the trijet question their are no ETOPS considerations and the real limits are related to Fl/Alt when you lose two engines and are pushing along on one! The point of the matter on this loong forum is, whether or not this flt. operated safely? Yes, it did according to that operators SOP's and policies and in fairness the B744 redundancie in systems. Whether, I would have done it, as said befor, no! Respects to this crew as, they are the only ones whom where up there, (apart from the CC and Pax!).
Why I would not have continued well, I think that you are exposing yourself to more probalities of something going wrong. And, from the start of this flight I would have imagined that fuel consumtion would have been the biggest concern if I had decided to continue.
note: Apart fromTrijets also the Dc8's and B742 are also under the belt!!! So, no more joke's on the good and noble D10 and the formidable MD11!!! :ok:

[Rainboe]

So- I if I understand correctly, in fact there are no limitations on routing for a trijet across the Atlantic in the form of ETOPs-type route limitations? Therefore this aeroplane turned effectively into a trijet flying the route from LAX-LHR. as thousands have happily done so over the years.

So where is the problem?

People are coming up with suggestions of routing 'standby' aeroplanes- quite some suggestion at $200 million a throw. And of course whole crews are just lying around waiting for a call!

[VR-HFX]

I liked Beagle's comment....

It can but should it?

With over 10K on type I feel it's time to make a comment.

This is a very interesting thread and believe me some of the takeaways will be written into SOPs.

London to a brick the skipper was young...at least by BA standards...let me guess...early 40's. Now why do I say that?

Quite simply because that is what I would have done 10 years ago.

Would I do it today? In short NO. The a/c can do it but should it. Simple answer is NO.

This case is a classic text book example of limits.

Years ago I was taught to understand where you had toolboxes, spares and some engineering talent. If you had them in proximity then return. If not then push the envelope.

In this case general knowledge and a few questions would have been in order. LAX...what have we got...CX,QF and BA with the Rollers...spare engine...spare bits??...quick call. What else have we got? Seattle, Vancouver, Chicago, Toronto, JFK...no 400's with Rollers. Logical answer is go back.

The 400's are getting on in years just as were the 1011's when I started. So...you have the book which says one thing, you have the commercial pressure and above all you have your own rear end.

Ten years ago the tea and biscuit factor would have had an influence. Now it does not.

In short, the Old Girl can do it but common sense says don't push her to prove she can.

Beagle is right on the money. The operation was safe and theoretically justified but was it philosophically correct?

Would I have done it. NO esp[ecially heading for HKG. But then I can sit through a tea and bikkies and afford to get fired...unlike most of my brethren.

[Rainboe]

So, to cut through the gumpf- it can do it, it's safe and theoretically justified, and it is within operational procedures?

Mon Dieu! Il n'est pas un problem then? What are we talking about except trying to assure some hand wringers who don't know anything about it that
1-there is no problem with it
2-there are ten thousand different opinions, but from 747 pilots, there is broad agreement that there is no problem with it!

Excuse me, but despite agreeing, the 'feeling you get in your water' is totally irrelevant!

[VR-HFX]

Except would I want my wife and kids on the flight...???? Short answer is NO.

[normal_nigel]

blah blah blah.

Sanctimonious know alls

[VR-HFX]

N-N

In fact ...just the opposite.

Sure you didn't type that after looking in the mirror?

[lomapaseo]

I am sorry to still see that some of the pilots on this forum continue to feel that debate about their decision making should only be among themselves and to exclude :

The designers of the aircraft and its engines

The regulators who crafted the rules and their basis

Accident investigators who have access to historical comparisons

Recognized and published aviation safety proffessionals.

So far the owner of this site has seen fit not to exclude this broader base of discussion.

The problem with limiting the discussion is that the outcome will continued to be second guessed by the public and there will be nobody to defend your decisions or the right to make them.

[TURIN]

WOODPECKER
Why was there a BA747 parked at the engineering base at MAN yesterday?

Sorry to be pedantic but there is no BA engineering base at MAN!!:mad:
The a/c was parked on a remote (read;cargo) stand.

I apologise for the thread creep but it is a very sore subject for the 120 that were made redundant a couple of years ago.

[JW411]

Are we more likely to be considered to be professionals (as in "Professional Pilots Rumour Network") rather than proffessionals?

[GlueBall]

Well Said VR-HFX!

Yes, obviously the airplane can do it. It did. ...Almost to destination.

It would have been quite "normal" as a planned 3-engine ferry flight.

But it was neither clever nor smart to demonstrate that the airplane can safely be operated 10+ hours on 3 engines across an ocean with revenue passengers.

:ouch: :ouch: :ouch:

[MPH]

Rainboe:
For a trijet to cross anywhere with 3 engines running is, normal..that's why it's called a 'TRIJET'!!
To continue on two engines for 10 hours is, not really contemplated. You would probably and certainly be looking for a 'suitable' airport.
Now, to consider that a B744 is equal to a trijet, just because it lost 1 eng is not very realistic...me thinks? (systems,fuel consumption, etc).
If a 'trijet' lose a second engine, it becomes an emergency situation as, is in the case of the B744 on two engines.
As I said before, this crew made the decision to continue, and that was their prerogative. The opinions, although varied and controversial for some of you on this forum, have validity and are not without consideration.
I think it's time to wait for the final outcome of this investigation on this 'incident'. Over and out!!!
:ugh:

[SLFStuckInTheBack]

As a lowly SLF person who has flown from LAX to LHR many times I have been following this thread with great interest - and perhaps the time is right to register and make my first post.

Not being a pilot - I cannot make any comment on whether it was the correct descision to continue or not, but I have been thinking "if I was on the flight as a pax what would I have wanted..." I would have wanted the flight to continue onto the UK. If my wife and family had been on the flight - I would have wanted it to continue. Even though it might have to divert to Manchester or any other UK airport.

I recently spent several years living on the West Coast - with my family remaining in the UK (due to the childrens age/schooling), and when choosing their flights to visit me - I would always make sure that they were on a 4 engined aircraft - even though the ticket would cost a little more. I have always felt that it is like putting all my eggs in one basket - and I want to put my family in the safest basket I can (perhaps that is why I drive a Volvo?).

So as a PAX, on a 3 engined 747, I would be happy for the flight to continue if the guys at the pointy end felt it was safe to do so. If this continues to be BA SOP and other airlines would chose to dump fuel and land ASAP, then I guess that BA will be my airline of choice.

I seek not to ruffle any feathers or cause upset, but I feel that if the if most PAX understood how much redundancy etc. the 747 had (and its only due to this thread that I now know a 747 can still fly on just 1 engine) - then most PAX would be happy to continue.


Thanks to PPRUNE for being such a wonderful source of information and entertainment.

[Rainboe]

Two sensible posts gentlemen! Compare with this from a pilot:
But it was neither clever nor smart to demonstrate that the airplane can safely be operated 10+ hours on 3 engines across an ocean with revenue passengers.
I have to agree, it was not 'clever or smart', it was sensible, even you admit it was safe, it was following standard procedures, it was done with the agreement and assistance of main base who would have inspected the parameters of the engine.

Just a reminder. The engine was an inboard, therefore reduced trim requirement (and minimal trim drag). The aeroplane effectively became a Trijet. It then had 3 alternators instead of 4. It had the full complement of 4 hydraulic systems as the failed engine's hydraulic system can be air driven by air from the other engines. It still had its full complement of 3 airconditioning packs. All other systems operated normally. It could still do an automatic landing in fog to the same limits as on 4 engines. It could still fly as fast, though not quite as high. It really was a very untraumatic experience once it was established that there was no leakage or damage evident. I would be amazed if a visual inspection was not carried out by the pilots (as long as it wasn't dark). In short- once established there appeared to be no extraneous problem......there was no problem.

There has been criticism of the motivation of the pilots actions. I can tell you that the recent changes to delay compensation would have had zero influence on a pilot. They don't apply to delays of this sort. What those pilots were considering was where the pax wanted to go, where the spares were located, how best to get the aeroplane fixed earliest, but all these would be after considering the number 1 issue- what was safety! The safest option is not necessarily to go back, over weight for an extended fuel dumping into LAX where spares would not be available, nor to JFK- way off route home, tight for space and limited engineering, not anywhere else in N America where the crew would be out of hours and 300 people trying to get hotel rooms in Winnipeg. Those pilots have their own skins to worry about too,mortgages to pay and kids to bring up. Neither they nor the airline would ever wish to place them at any hazard. They almost got them to their desired destination- they got them to within coach distance. They followed procedure and didn't hazard anyone- admitted by many 747 pilots although they might have said their water would suggest they should go back.

Hence the frustration at some of the insulting comments and abuse thrown at my colleagues- it seems to be getting too common for laymen here not just to question, but to make their own critical comments coupled with abusive namecalling about things they don't understand.

[barit1]

There's an interesting (if imperfect) parallel here. In the case of many jetliners (DC-10, L-1011, 747 to cite examples I'm aware of) there's and option to "fourth pod" or "fifth pod" a spare, inoperative, not-even-hooked-up engine on a special pod in close to the wing root. It adds weight, and parasitic drag of course, and special performance tables must be used, but it's a fully certified configuration. If passengers load through a jetway they're probably completely unaware of the "extra" engine.

That said, there's a loose analogy to a 747 in cruise on three, compared to a trijet carrying an external spare.

Except the 747 has more redundancy.

[cavortingcheetah]

:) The man who wrote the book: 'Handling the Big Jets'. Compulsory reading for all you poor guys going for interviews with BA et al::::
Davis? Davies? What hydraulic redundancies.
What a machine, I only flew the 400 for a few hours in the SAA simulator.
I know full well where I would rather be. A 747 on three or an Airbus on eight or whatever else the silly Europeans think is necessary to propel another ghost ship through the skies.?
Rainboe, this for you: Have you any thoughts on The Helderberg, the SAA 747 SP that went down in, I think, 1975. I only ask because, like me, you have an opinion on most things and I would, in all politeness, like to have the benefit of your exponential expertise on this matter. Regards. cc

Upon reflection, I suppose that my idea merits (?) another header.

[BEagle]

"It really was a very untraumatic experience......"

Clearly not so for many of the passengers who were obviously concerned about being flown half-way around the world on 3 engines after a somewhat dramatic event at 100 ft.

Puff up your wonderful ba SOPs all you like, rainboe, but the fact is that this flight pushed things too far in the eyes of many contributors to this thread.

Just because it can doesn't mean it should.......

[Plastic Bug]

Rainboe said some things that I would like to highlight for further questions. This is not meant as a diatribe nor in a nasty manner. There is no malice intended. Rainboe just said some things that I would like to clarify, or have clarified. Think of this as a discussion in the Pub over a fine pint (or three)......

"I have to agree, it was not 'clever or smart', it was sensible, even you admit it was safe, it was following standard procedures, it was done with the agreement and assistance of main base who would have inspected the parameters of the engine."

What standard procedures? And just when did it become totally acceptable to abdicate the Captains authority to someone on the ground?

"Just a reminder. The engine was an inboard, therefore reduced trim requirement (and minimal trim drag). The aeroplane effectively became a Trijet. It then had 3 alternators instead of 4."

Aside from the understatement that the airplane became a "TriJet", there are no "alternators" on modern jets. Electrical power is supplied by generators that provide 3 phase power. If you think the inboard failure was minimal, take a look at the numbers for a fifth pod flight. You now have ten thousand pounds of freight hanging off the left wing.

"I would be amazed if a visual inspection was not carried out by the pilots (as long as it wasn't dark)."

Full daylight, how does one inspect the bottom of the wings, the undercarriage, the horizontal stabilizer from the cabin?

"In short- once established there appeared to be no extraneous problem......there was no problem."

Aside from the non-operating engine.............

"There has been criticism of the motivation of the pilots actions. I can tell you that the recent changes to delay compensation would have had zero influence on a pilot. They don't apply to delays of this sort. What those pilots were considering was where the pax wanted to go, where the spares were located, how best to get the aeroplane fixed earliest, but all these would be after considering the number 1 issue- what was safety!"

Here is the slippery slope. Delays of this sort? What delay? An engine was lost at 100 feet after takeoff.

"The safest option is not necessarily to go back, over weight for an extended fuel dumping into LAX where spares would not be available,"

You do not know that spares would not be available.

"nor to JFK- way off route home, tight for space and limited engineering,"

May be tight, but you insult the Enginering staff.

"not anywhere else in N America where the crew would be out of hours and 300 people trying to get hotel rooms in Winnipeg. Those pilots have their own skins to worry about too,mortgages to pay and kids to bring up."

That slippery slope again, the money thing.

"They almost got them to their desired destination- they got them to within coach distance."

They ALMOST got them to their destination.

"They followed procedure and didn't hazard anyone- admitted by many 747 pilots although they might have said their water would suggest they should go back."

I'll ask again...What procedure?

"Hence the frustration at some of the insulting comments and abuse thrown at my colleagues- it seems to be getting too common for laymen here not just to question, but to make their own critical comments coupled with abusive namecalling about things they don't understand."

Well, I'll be the first one to say everyone CHILL OUT!

Already gotten my dumb head taken off by N.O.D and now Rainboe, but hey, this is supposed to be a learning experience. BTW Rainboe, I mentioned the number of seats thing because the person who posted immediately prior to me claimed to be a FE "in type", ie, 747-400.

You know what I'm talking about, right?

I never said the flight was unsafe. Nope. I ALLUDED that it was not PRUDENT.

As has been stated previously, just because you CAN do a thing does not necessarily mean that you SHOULD do a thing.

I'm gonna raise the one thing about this whole deal that bugs me again. There was never a PLAN to fly LAX-LHR on three. Losing the engine immediately after takeoff created that scenario. Reconfiguring the plan on the fly like that brings to mind the Happag-LLoyd flight that went gear down and wound up short of the runway.

So that's my e-pinion. Take it or leave it. Ya leave the ground, you fly the plane. Key words: Fly the plane!

PB

[Capt Pit Bull]

Slightly off topic, I admit.

But one of the things that leaps ouit from this thread is quite a lot of folks seem to have a 'binary' view about safety, namely that something is either safe or it is not.

I don't want to talk about the specifics of this case, for whilst I am a medium experienced pilot I know nothing about long range ops or the 747.

But some people seem to think that less safe = unsafe. That any reduction in safety must mean that immediately becomes unsafe.

Well, thats just simplistic. In reality 'safety' is a point somewhere between perfection (impossible) and certain failure, and it can be subjective, especially to the layperson.

Here is the bottom line - operating aircraft is about managing risks, not avoiding them. The question here is not whether safety was reduced, but whether it was reduced unduly.

I get a bit peeved when people talk about commercial considerations as though they are a dirty word. Every one wants perfect safety, but NO ONE is willing to pay for it. You've only got to look at the travelling public voting with their feet in regards to low cost operators.

Please note I am not saying I think low cost carriers are unsafe, but rather that price is the driving factor behind a very large proportion of tickets sales. It is my belief that only a small percentage of folks even consider whether a particular carrier is safe or not. Any travel agents out there care to comment? How often does a customer walk in and say "I'd like a ticket to Timbuktoo with the safest airline you do business with"

As to whether this particuar flight represented an undue reduction in safety, I'll leave the type rated L/H ops folks to pontificate.

CPB

[Rainboe]

Bug- where to start! You repair 'em, we'll fly em. Someone 'repaired' this one and it went tits up again- I think it is more a question of engineering defending that one!

We have a flight continuation policy as standard procedure in L/H. This recommends if safe to continue to destination or get as far as conveniently possible for all concerned. This brings in Maintrol at London who have a far wider picture of crew locations, hotel availability, spares etc. It works.

OK alternators/generators- let's call them 'electric boxes' shall we and not quibble about names? Even I get tired, so 15-0 to you if you are points scoring.

You worry about damage. There are thousands of surges over the history of the 747 in BA. I'm not aware of any external damage from them. If you are such a nervous passenger- don't fly. Just keep fixing them, and I hope better then the replacement engine.

"Delays'- other people brought in delay compensation as a possible motive for what happened- which I have been adamantly refuting. Returning to LAX would be a delay, wouldn't it? The whole area is a nonsense to raise in the first place, and frankly quite insulting
.
<You do not know that spares would not be available.>...Maintrol do, and they communicated with them. What more do you want?

I've been flying to JFK for 33 years. It's gone from being a major terminal to just another station with normal engineering cover in that time. In the old days we would have automatically thought to head there, but it is no longer a major engineering station and that was advised to us years ago.

<<I never said the flight was unsafe. Nope. I ALLUDED that it was not PRUDENT.>>...who are YOU to decide what is prudent? You have no flying experience. You are a 'greasemonkey' no?

<<There was never a PLAN to fly LAX-LHR on three.>>... what is the basis of this fascination you have with
a plan? When you select 'engine out' on the FMS, you are presented with a 3 engine plan instantly, with maximum altitudes specified. Inputting the winds enroute gives you fuel at destination. What more do you want? (not fuel feed problems!). That's what they followed. You are showing the dangers of a little knowledge. The Hapag incident was due to following the FMS with the gear fixed down throughout the flight increasing the fuel flow, which was not 'known' to the FMS. Therefore it was telling porkies to the pilots. In this case, our illustrious heroes had selected 'engine out' which told the FMS that the aeroplane was on 3 engines, therefore it was telling the truth, so whatever point you are trying to make is not valid.

Your profile states engineer. I think it is more the engineering aspects of this and the following engine failure, and even the Hapag incident that require urgent investigation!
*****

CHEETAH- Helderberg went down at TOD into Mauritius didn't it? What relevance does it have? I gather it had a large load of Lithium batteries now understood to be significant fire risks (I've had to get a mobile phone out of my pocket when the battery started overheating- rapidly). There was a traumatic and fatal fire on board.

After the TRC a retired SAA employee was quoted as saying "we murdered the people aboard the Helderberg" (article). He alleged that weapons, ammunition and explosives - billed as agricultural equipment - were transported on the London, Frankfurt, Taipei and Lisbon routes. What conclusion should we draw from that- that no plane should fly more than 130 miles from an airport?
********
Beagle
Puff up your wonderful ba SOPs all you like, rainboe, but the fact is that this flight pushed things too far in the eyes of many contributors to this thread.
These SOPS are approved by the CAA and in full agreement of BA Flt Ops itself. The only people who seem to have trouble with them are laymen or non-4 engine jet pilots. They are proven, they are safe (unlike to me flying over the Pacific with people on board for 3 hours on one engine). The crew is very very highly trained- they are professionals, and they are paid to take these decisions. We do not have a 'vote now' system where passengers make the decision themselves. If some of them didn't like it, it is not to the crew to bow to the lowest common denominator! What next- passengers voting whether they would like to penetrate Cb areas? I'm afraid that decision is the prerogative of the pilots, as was this. They got there safely, with minimal disruption.

[bookworm]

Here is the bottom line - operating aircraft is about managing risks, not avoiding them. The question here is not whether safety was reduced, but whether it was reduced unduly.

I wholeheartedly agree with that. But it's interesting to note that the FAA doesn't see it that way:

121.565(b) If not more than one engine of an airplane that has three or more engines fails or its rotation is stopped, the pilot in command may proceed to an airport that he selects if, after considering the following, he decides that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport:

(1) The nature of the malfunction and the possible mechanical difficulties that may occur if flight is continued.
...
(6) His familiarity with the airport to be used.

It doesn't say "not unduly less safe".

[phillipas]

Hear, hear Capt Pit Bull. And I don't think your post is off topic at all as this whole thread is really a discussion about safety.

This whole relative safety isuue is exactly what I posted about a couple of pages ago. Flying is not ABSLOUTLY safe, there's always a chance that the plane could crash.

Certainly in this case I'm firmly of the opinion that the flight from LAX-LHR on 3 engines was less safe than on 4. But LESS SAFE does not equate with UNSAFE.

The whole issue of measuring safety is a minefield simply because the number of hazards we all face on a daily basis are innumerable.

Taking into account the comments here from the 747 pilots I'm really struggling to see anything other than that they choose best and safest option given the circumstances they were in.. though I readily accept that were I a pax on the flight the irrationality that is human nature might have had me want them to return to LAX.

[mutt]

I can see that there is a real need for someone to design a voting consol for the passengers. This would mean that the crew could explain to the passengers exactly what had happened to the aircraft, the passengers could then vote on the next course of action! :):):)


Mutt.

[Capt Pit Bull]

Bookworm,

I guess what I meant was 3 versus 4, and people crapping themselves as a result.

As for continuing or landing nearest, (which is the bit of the FARs you refer to) I just am not qualified to judge.

But surely the likelihood of a subsequent engine failure would always exist, and would always mean that continueing would be marginally less safe (even flying 200 miles instead of 150 miles say) and therefore the as safe clause could never be really exercised?

Bah, I hate air law <boggles>!

CPB

[Rainboe]

So was it not therefore 'safe' for a DC10 or MD11 to fly LAX-LHR? Boeing managed for years to sell the 747 with its '4 engined safety'. Funny now that they are trying to move 777s wholesale, suddenly 4 engines are no better than 2. And it's mysteriously 'safe' to fly 300 people on _ engine for _ hours across the _ wastes!*

*- fill in from following,:
one, three, three, one, Atlantic, Pacific, Indian.

[sky9]

Quote FAA Regs.

121.565(b) If not more than one engine of an airplane that has three or more engines fails or its rotation is stopped, the pilot in command may proceed to an airport that he selects if, after considering the following, he decides that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport:

(1) The nature of the malfunction and the possible mechanical difficulties that may occur if flight is continued.
...
(6) His familiarity with the airport to be used.

You note the word MAY , not SHOULD, or MUST. The FAA regulation therefore allows the commander to do what he considers is best. ( I won't add that the FAA will defend him but I cannot see how they can criticise him for doing what this pilot in command did).


The whole basis of aviation is that the commander is in charge of the flight, not Ops, the Ops Manager, the CAA or even the FAA. Time and time again one pilot will do one thing; another would make a different decision; neither is wrong. In this case the commander concerned decided to continue, he should be backed up. In the same situation another commander might decide to dump fuel and make an overweight landing. He too should be backed up.

We have got to get away from becoming "hindsight experts" and accept that on that day with the evidence that was in front of him this commander decided to continue. All the evidence is that safety was not compromised by his decision.

That’s what makes the job interesting and worthwhile. If you don’t like it become an accountant or better still a journalist because as we all know, they are the very best of hindsight experts. Strangely they never feature very highly in the credibility polls along with MP’s. Now I wonder why?

(edited for minor spelling mistake)

[Captain Airclues]

An excellent post sky9. The decision to continue is never taken lightly. Only after using all of the resources available to him, and considering all of the options and risks, will a captain decide to continue. The day that this decision is taken away from the operating crew will be a sad day for the future generations of pilots.

All of the technical points have been covered many times on this thread, some correct and some not so correct, so I don't intend to repeat them. I think that most people are set in their views, either one way or another. However, in my personal view, this crew did an excellent job and should be commended.

Airclues
(29+ years and 17,000+ hours on the 747/744)

[sky9]

Thanks Airclues,

In my view this incident throws up 3 questions:-

1 Should the Boeing aircraft QRH Low Fuel procedure (open crossfeed) also include a note that fuel might be consumed from one tank first if the booster pump in that tank have a higher pressure than the other pumps.

2 Does simulator software replicate the reality of the above?

3 Will pilots decisions in the future be influenced by the thought of nearly 50 pages in PPRuNe dissecting his actions; if so it will be a bad day for flight safety.

[Rainboe]

For point 3, it's dreadful, isn't it? I really didn't want to be so involved with this, but I was damned if I was going to watch the usual Pprune Court Martial try and condemn this crew (in their absence), with no defence, by a massed jury of assorted ignoramuses, swearers and expletive name callers, people who know nothing about aviation, and pilots who think they know it all because they flew a twin once, and sadly, even fellow professional pilots who've flown big things, but happy to criticise their colleagues in their absence.

Perhaps sometimes it's better to restrain from criticism or name calling until more information is known and the masters at the CAA have adjudicated? As for that dork at the FAA, words fail!

[atse]

Rainboe, congratulations for your efforts and endless patience. I think you did make a difference, because on these occasions the informed tend to give up in the face of ignorance ... which leaves the field to the opinionated ...

Your words of admonishment for the "massed jury of assorted ignoramuses.... etc." certainly rings a bell with me. A bit more humility and caution would do no harm from time to time on PPRuNe.

[Captain Airclues]

sky9

1. This was not the problem. The problem was that the fuel went below the Overide/Jettison Pump (www.meriweather.com/747/over/fuelsys.html) stack pipe level during the approach. The crew declared a Mayday because they thought that the fuel in this tank might be unusable. In fact it was, but isn't hindsight a wonderful thing? The CAA have contacted UK 744 operators about this and will be issuing a technical bulletin on the subject.

2. Yes it does. However, how often do we fail an inboard on the sim? Perhaps there is a lesson here?

3. I hope not: Yes

Airclues

[Rainboe]

Strangley enough, one of the absolute worst offenders was none other than the Editor of Flight International itself! Quite why David L took it upon himself to pre-empt the CAA review I cannot imagine, but he appears to have walked into this Pprune Court Martial holding a placard saying 'whatever the evidence.....GUILTY!' I appalled at him, and it will be revisited next subscription time. 38 years I have been taking Flight- it will stop while he chairs it.

My above post is rather more insulting that I intended. By 'ignoramuses', I essentially meant 'aviation ignoramuses', and I did not mean to cause offence. But simply when someone knows nothing about aviation risk and common practice, it's easy to make a shoot from the hip judgement from instinct without considering other factors (lesson for FAA 'spokespersons' there! The 747 is a wonderful beastie, and I would rather fly 100 flights back from LAX on 3 engines than 100 flights across the Pacific in a twin! It's not as modern or flash as some of the new twins, not as economic, but it is safe! Like most of my experienced colleagues, we spend our careers juggling risk management. Our prime motivation is to move people safely, to where they want to go.

[cavortingcheetah]

:) O Prismatic One. I thank you for the courtesy of your reply and apologise for taking so long to get back to you. Was under water for a while.
Yes it did and the CVR made for very unhappy listening. I know it is not really relevant to this thread but then, so much stuff and guff has appeared here that I tend to view this stream as a general chat show. Very imoral. Always been a lot more than just a suggestion of a cover up when talking about The Helderberg.
Do not let yourself be too concerned with David L. He is to aviation no more than is that clunkhead Jeremy Clarkson to motoring. Limited knowledge but a susidised forum for gratuitous expostulation. Whoopsie: Does that sound familiar.;)

[DOVES]

Is anybody able to explain why what happened to G-VATL on 8 February 2005, concerning an Airbus A340-642, published on AAIB Special Bulletin 1/2005 of 16 March 2005, has been considered a serious incident, while someone keeps insisting that what occurred to BA 747-400 BA268, Lax-Lhr on 20th February 2005 was:
Quote: "...Therefore this aeroplane turned effectively into a trijet flying the route from LAX-LHR. as thousands have happily done so over the years.
So where is the problem?..."
Yet both had an engine shut down and both had to divert declaring MAY DAY.
Excuse me my ignorance. I fly small airplanes and it takes 80 sectors for me to fly the same amount of hours an elephant's Skipper grows in perhaps 5 of them.
Fly Safe
DOVE

[Rainboe]

Well it is totally different! I think I would divert immediately if fuel was doing funny things in tanks, you'd already lost one engine, and a second engine started failing, with a second fuel tank showing empty! A serious incident definitely requiring the action taken. What we are talking about here is a simple engine failure with no external damage (these engines are covered by firewires in the cowling, so any breach of the structure of the engine would illuminate overheat or fire warnings. Ample protection, a simple engine failure. 3 left working healthily. No problem.

Blame Microsfot for the Virgin one!

[BEagle]

"I think I would divert immediately if fuel was doing funny things in tanks, you'd already lost one engine, and a second engine started failing, with a second fuel tank showing empty!"

Well that's most reassuring.....

[BusyB]

I've finally got p*****d off with the amateur replies on this thread.
BEagle , grow up.
Bye

[BEagle]

Good bye to you to.

And to your personal insults...

Shame that irony is lost on you.

[Rainboe]

I think the expression irony does that too much honour maybe. I'd call it cheap shot. I was trying to respond to DOVES raising another incident that bears no similarity.

[cavortingcheetah]

:Gentlemen, I tend to regard these pages as a bit of good old fun from which I, at least, have learnt a very great deal. I have monopolized many a dinner table conversation with my family, spouting another man's wisdom. Women are a trifle lacking in that respect. Whoopsie. 'Here we go, Dad's off again.' For the benefit of all your expert opinion I thank you. Actually, I know a thing or two myself.Please, cool the tempers a bit. PPrune is really just a bit of a laugh is it not?:p
I don't like Hyenas, although I have been called one in these pages. Jackass-well, that's getting a little close to the old beano bone. Lighten up. I suspect that Dove is Colomba, in Italian and that English is not his natural idiom. I think he does a far finer job of writing it than I do Italian. Let's hum something from Rigoletto.
What, Toodle Pip and Huzza.:E

[BEagle]

cavortingcheetah, yes, thank you for exerting a stabilising influence. You are indeed correct.

Let's just summarise the salient points raise so far:

1. The 747 event was operated within the airline's SOPs.
2. Some consider that to be the end of the matter, others consider the Commander's actions to have been 'legal but imprudent'.
3. A school of thought considers that FAA regulations, had they applied, would have led to a different conclusion.
4. Some consider a 747-400 which has lost an engine at 100ft to be no different to a fully serviceable tri-jet. Others regard it as an a/c which has already experienced an emergency. Yet others take a stance between these extremes.
5. Because the type of engine used on this 747-400 is the same as is also used on the same company's 767-300 a/c, some view the frequency of such IFSDs on non-ETOPS a/c as prejudicial to the company's ETOPS culture.
6. Some take the view that there is excessive pressure to increase ETOPS time beyond the current limits. However, ETOPS was not an issue in the event under discussion.
7. '4 engines for long range operations?'
8. The Virgin Atlantic A340-600 event was caused by undetected mis-sequenced fuel transfer following fuel management computer failure. The AAIB has raised several safety recommendations to address the design of the a/c's fuel system, including an independent low fuel state warning device.

[hobie]

I do feel the "Personal Insults" thrown at Aviators of great standing have no place on PPRuNe .......

This really has turned out to be a very Sad thread :(

[allthatglitters]

38 years I have been taking Flight- it will stop while he chairs it
I decided this several years ago, everytime I see him on the television, hit the off button. Discused some time ago on Pprune.

from tv forum.co.uk: -
the usual rentaquote on these occasions.

compressor stall: -
Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Those left over, consult. compressor stall.

[Helli-Gurl]

I can't believe this thread has gone on for so long, seems to me there is a lot of uniformed opinion here interlaced by those who clearly thru flying the 744 for a number of years and have the experience, and those that have clearly been in this situation before and have given us a clear insight into the necessary actions that need to be taken when a 744 goes down to 3 engines.

Therefore I can't see why there is a need by individuals to stir, snipe and dig and quite frankly has turned what should have been and interesting, insightful and informative post into a complete joke.

The BA SOP is to get the plane back to base where it is safe to do so, those doing the flying have clearly worked out what is safe and what isn't and at no point during the flts in question was anyone in any danger......why can't it simply be left at that?

[DOVES]

I wanted to release somethink like these:

To cavortingcheetah
I am shure that if you were me you'd answered:
'Look guy, my grand pà told me: "Let me make to that ill-bred grown up a proposal he cannot refuse". And I hardly calmed him down. So watch out! Be careful on what thou say!'
But I am not you. The difference between me and you is that I want to learn, also from other's errors, while you are so superb that you only spit sentences.

And to Rainboe: When you say:
"It's quite clear isn't it? Learn to like it baby- you will all be assimiliated one day!
Then Microsoft will run the world, and BA all the airline procedures, and you will all be happy again.
Now where was your confusion?"
Your opinion is perfectly clear.
But if you don't mind I'll never be assimilated.

But I won't. I'll refrain from any discussion.
I'm only waiting for a Superior Opinion to be released soon.
P.S. I am too a many decades, happy, subscriber of Flight International

[Rainboe]

I was trying to be funny!...........not very successful, was it? I was trying to say that if BA ran everybodies flight procedures like Microsoft runs the computer world..........oh well, never mind.

Actually, it does work very well you know (gunshot.............silence)

[cavortingcheetah]

:) Doves.
I am a little concerned at your last post. I had absolutely no intention of being rude to you. Believe me, when I want to be, I will be.
So, let me assuage your wounded intelect and pour water on your injured pride. These forae are not for the faint hearted and we have certainly dirfted many miles from the original thread.
All I know now is that, if I am flying a big bird out of LAX and things go-Mama Mia-Bingo Bango then:
Turn right, fly across the desert wastelands of middle America, thence across the savage oceans of The Atlantic. Do not turn left and launch into the vacuous void of El Pacifico. Remember Cortes on the heights of Darien? In the meantime, I will continue to spit the sentences. It's a turn of phrase which I appreciate. Bravo! Avanti a lui tremava tutta Roma, sort of thing, what!:E

:O Helli Girl.
Was that the ovine or the bovine?
Happy Easter:rolleyes:

[Irish Steve]

I was trying to say that if BA ran everybodies flight procedures like Microsoft runs the computer world..........oh well, never mind.

Hi Rainboe.

Congratulations on managing to keep your fur on when so many others are losing theirs.

As a long time user at very close quarters of Microsoft products, and a more than occasional observer and experimenter on flight decks, all I shall say at the moment is that the day I see the Microsoft logo appearing on anything on an aircraft other than the In flight entertainment system will be the day I start to think very carefully about if I want to fly any more.

Given Microsoft's ability to produce code down to a price, that has to be released on a date regardless of the problems that users have reported during pre release testing, and that has to be patched and updated to the level that we see on an almost daily basis, there is no way that Microsoft products could ever be certified for mission critical applications such as aircraft flight deck applications.

[thread drift]Even simulators have their moments, a while back, when we were researching handling characteristics of one of the bus family, we rented a sim here in Europe to try and get some parameters for the project we were working on. No names, no secrets, let's just say that it became very clear after about 10 minutes of edge of the envelope handling that the simulation just did not represent the handling of the real thing, or if it did, then the real thing would not have been certified. We went to another manufacturers sim in the USA, ( Yeah, we had to go that far), and tried the same tests, and got results that were more meaningful, to the extent that it was possible to fly manual reversion ( sort of like Sioux city) on that simulator. On the European one, no way, it was so unstable. That was specialised software, custom written for the job, but it was wrong. OK, the airline in question didn't train to the level of needing that accuracy, that's a subject for another discussion on another day. Suffice to say that I for one would never be happy to trust Microsoft on the flight deck.[/thread drift]

[Rainboe]

iSteve- as everybody is bored to death and quite exhausted by this thread- a bit of creep is probably in order!

Simulators- it's a complete rumour that they are 'true to life' and 'you can't tell the difference'. Garbage! I still don't know whether they are purposely made to be unstable and unreal, but they can be awful- and I think a lot of pilots hate them to bits. The Classic simulator used to be dreadful- so unstable while you were looking at your charts it would be tipping over. The handling is a pathetic representation of the real thing, the visuals quite sad. So I am amused when I see incidents being repeated for analysis in the simulator- I know how unreal it will be. With all due respect for Capt. Al Haynes in the Sioux City DC10 crash (which is undoubtedly one of the most skillful and most amazing stories of piloting in the history of aviation), much was made of the fact that nobody could replicate the survival of some of the passengers in a real simulator. Regretably some of the blame for that lies with how horrible simulators are as well as the extreme height of flying skill shown by the crew that day.

[etrang]

I was trying to say that if BA ran everybodies flight procedures like Microsoft runs the computer world..........

You wouldn't say that if you knew how often Microsoft products crash ......

[Rainboe]

I know how Microsft products run! That's why I said..........oh never mind.....just pretend I never said it!

[Irish Steve]

With all due respect for Capt. Al Haynes in the Sioux City DC10 crash (which is undoubtedly one of the most skillful and most amazing stories of piloting in the history of aviation), much was made of the fact that nobody could replicate the survival of some of the passengers in a real simulator. Regretably some of the blame for that lies with how horrible simulators are as well as the extreme height of flying skill shown by the crew that day.

So true. I've been closely involved with varying simulators over the years, and as you rightly say, some of them are "interesting" in terms of their fidelity. Even the modern recent ones have their moments, we discovered the hard way that sidelip is not correctly modelled on most sims, probably because heavy jets are not supposed to be slipped, tends to upset the G&T brigade.
We found that one out when we were trying some non standard handling on another occasion.

The real challenge is that so often, if someone wants to "explore" beyond the normal limits, that's seen as being inappropriate, or similar. If Al Haynes hadn't done some "experimenting" prior to the day it all went pear shaped, he wouldn't have had the skills needed to do what he did. With the way things are going now, a pilot that wants to develop "extra" skills is often frowned upon, which to me is a crazy way of encouraging people to be better at their job. Beancounters strike again I suppose.

[BEagle]

Following your thread drift, I'm involved with a Mission Computer System for a particular airborne application, which is mission critical (though not flight critical).

Guess which operating system it'll use?























Yes - MS Windows XP!

Agree with you about the handling fidelity of simulators. The ones I used to instruct on as part of my RAF job did not replicate the stick force gradient of the real a/c properly and were less stable at certain speeds. They were far more difficult to fly on 2 engines - a full power double asymmetric go-around was an utter doddle by comparison in the real a/c as we allowed students to experience for themselves during training. But the beancounters wanted increasingly less experienced pilots to do more of their training in the wretched sweat boxes.....

[Rainboe]

Experimenting may be fun, but it is most definitely frowned upon since the DC10 crew started pulling CBs somewhere in the automatics, and allegedly caused the famous incident of an engine spooling up and bursting its contents causing a cabin breech which sucked a passenger out!

[Irish Steve]

Experimenting may be fun, but it is most definitely frowned upon since the DC10 crew started pulling CBs somewhere in the automatics, and allegedly caused the famous incident of an engine spooling up and bursting its contents causing a cabin breech which sucked a passenger out!

Rainboe.

Appreciate your comment, and in the very clear interest of flight safety, I will only too happily confirm that any experimenting I've done over the years has been absolutely and only confined to simulators, in a very controlled environment, on occasions with the motion systems off to ensure that no mechanical damage was done.

Some of the things we've "tested" could never be regarded as safe or even acceptable in line operations. There were occasions when looking back afterwards, it might be descibed as "fun", but I can assure you that at the time, we were working very hard indeed, as it was the only way we could determine what the limits were, so that the correct parameters could then be used to ensure the fideltity of the product we were working on.

[ADS]

most of the a/c flying the atlantic today are twins, so why be concerned with a 4 holer flying around with 3. Its safer with more than less.

p.s. you still have the apu to power the galley.

[BEagle]

From today's Sunday Times:

BA accused over flights with one engine down

DIPESH GADHER, TRANSPORT CORRESPONDENT

BRITISH AIRWAYS has allowed jumbo jets to complete long-haul flights on at least seven occasions despite pilots having to shut down an engine.

On each occasion the flight had to be completed on three engines rather than four because of technical problems.

Safety concerns have been raised because the pilots of the Boeing 747s decided to continue with their journeys rather than divert to a nearby airport.

In one recent case this led to an aircraft making an emergency landing at Manchester because pilots feared it was running low on fuel after crossing the Atlantic with one engine down.

America’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has accused British Airways (BA) of “careless and reckless” behaviour although the airline says passenger safety has never been compromised.

The phenomenon is not confined to BA. Since the start of last year 18 British-registered aircraft — including Airbus A340s, BAe146s and jumbos — have been forced to shut down one of four engines in the air, according to Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) records. Several then continued their journeys.

The FAA is investigating one BA flight, carrying 351 passengers, that suffered an engine surge immediately after taking off from Los Angeles airport in February.

The faulty engine was shut down, but after taking advice from BA technicians in London, the captain continued with the 11-hour flight to Heathrow rather than returning to Los Angeles or diverting to another American airport.

Forced to fly at a lower altitude than the flight crew wanted, the plane used up more fuel than expected because of less favourable tailwinds.

By the time the aircraft reached Ireland the captain felt that attempting a landing at Heathrow would be too risky and asked for a diversion to Manchester.

Howard Ramsdale, 47, a passenger on the flight, said: “I was absolutely astounded that we didn’t return to LA. There wasn’t a single person that I spoke to on that plane who wanted to carry on. “As far as I’m concerned my life was put at risk. It was a very stressful flight and I’m not really sure that I’d get on an aircraft again, let alone a BA one.” Ramsdale, a science teacher from Gainsborough, Lincolnshire, has written to the airline, demanding compensation for the trauma he suffered.

BA has backed the actions of the pilot and points out that the 747 is certified to fly on three engines.

Given the circumstances, the CAA also believes that flying with one engine down is “a safe option”, more so if the plane is well into its journey.

This view, however, does not appear to be shared by the FAA, which could fine BA if it concludes that the airline violated American regulations.

[atse]

Thanks for that BEagle. When it comes to the discussions between the CAA and FAA I'm intrigued by the ironic possibilities to which this matter gives rise.

Would one not wish to be a "fly on the wall" for the various chats and exchanges between the CAA and FAA as they take hours and days to dissect and argue out a decision that normally has to be taken in minutes?

I mean to say, if YOU are up to your ears "in the merde" you are normally told that the regulations and requirements are clear, are you not?

Of course, what you are really being told is that the interpretation being shoved down your throat is the current "conventional wisdom" as to how the regulations should be interpreted. Individual pilots facing "the system" have an uphill battle to explain why what they decided seemed quite reasonable at the time. The system tends to win these arguments.

But what happens when two equally opinionated authorities - here the CAA and FAA - disagree? I, for one, would pay for an observer's seat as they thrash out their points of view. In fact it is the argument, not the published outcome that will be interesting - perhaps a better source of education and enlightenment than your average accident report?

[Paul_atp]

Well this my first post, and after reading some of the responses I think I'd rather be flying a three engine 747 transatlantic than waiting for the fall out from this!

It seems we need to start some new courses, I'd like to suggest PRM (Prune Resource Management) as the first class.

I'll be honest by page 10 of the postings, I'd had enough of the bickering, I began to remember all the reasons I had given up on AOL chat rooms so long ago, and went straight to the last page.


What I have gleaned from all of this is that a massive degree of professionalism was exercised by the flight crew on this particular Man diversion flight. They dealt with an everchanging situation with complete competence, I very much doubt they relaxed for one minute during this flight. They did their best for the company, their best for the passengers and the outcome was the best it could have been. They earnt their money that day, they performed as trained. They pooled all the companies resources, they drew on Mr.Boeings resources, they worked together and came up with a plan.

Not only will I continue to fly BA. I want this crew on the flight deck of all my flights.

As an outsider (former professional pilot) peering in to Prune I see disaray, failure to communicate, dissension and d*ck waving!

I don't care if all 4 are running, if I see this behaviour around an aircraft, I'm not getting on it !!

Regards,
Paul.
(Going to put my hard hat on now)