Swanwick ACC : Single Man Operations?

[Euryalus]

Do you see these quotes:
Personnel situation
It had been clearly identified that staff shortages in certain areas were placing a demand on the
remaining staff to increase their workload or on management to reduce the level of services
provided.
The recruitment of new staff often fell short of the numbers required and made realistic planning
difficult. The staff shortage made it difficult to conduct refresher trainings and had resulted in
rostering difficulties.
It had a negative effect on staff moral and the controllers perceived it as a lack of support from
the company.

and

The practice of rostering only two ATCOs had developed because of the personnel situation.
The former system had scheduled three controllers for the night shift. It ensured that two controllers were always at their workstations and the third took a break. That this controller took a
longer break during times of low traffic became unofficial practice. This practice was maintained
as the night shift was reduced to two controllers.


From the FBU report on the Uberlingen tragedy (full report at:www.bfu.admin.ch/en/pdf/ Ueberlingen/Investigation_Report.pdf ).

A colleague at Swanwick ACC London says to me that UK NATS is making procedures to reduce the night manning to only two ATCOs meaning only one on duty at one time. This is very disturbing so soon after such tragedy. Why do they do this please?

The BFU report has many recommendations as:
Safety Recommendation No. 02/2003
The FOCA should ensure that the ACC Zurich is manned with the minimum number of air traffic
controllers as follows:
• There shall be at least two controllers on active duty at all times.
• There shall be at least two controllers to manage enroute sectors; i.e.: one Radar Planner
(RP) and one Radar Executive (RE).


Do you not learn the lessons in England??

Eury.

[M609]

Sadly, they are not alone.

Last year, Avinor (Norways sole ATS provider) tried to fire a controller that set rate zero on his sector during night shift at Bodø ATCC.

He needed a brake after 5 hrs without brake on a 350x100nm sector. (Soth+Central sectors combined) There was no one to relive him. The other guy at work that night was working North+East+ Oceanic.

He did not want to become the next Überlingen, but management (SATCO at the ATCC) actually said this as a response:

"It's OK to sleep at the console during periods of no traffic"

Great.............. :mad: :mad: :mad:

Needless to say, due to this (And a lot of other things) the relation between controllers and management are cr@ap in Norway today

[Arkady]

The proposed changes at Swanwick are for use in the event of sickness on sectors that have no sick cover provided. It is not an attempt to further reduce the night staff...............yet.

Since Uberlingen I would be unwilling to work a T&P sector combined, under any circumstances. We will wait and see what transpires.

[BEXIL160]

The proposed changes at Swanwick are for use in the event of sickness on sectors that have no sick cover provided.

huh?

The required staffing is Tactical, Planner and Assistant. ALL the time. If one is not present, for whatever reason the sector must be closed. That is the procedure. Seems pretty sensible to me, post Ueberlingen.

People are at a low ebb in the middle of the night. Regardless of the traffic situation, having (at least) two ATCOs provides some sort of safety net to catch errors.

This smacks of expediency over safety. Particularly worrying after Ueberlingen, as has been pointed out.

Rgds BEX

[Arkady]

"The required staffing is Tactical, Planner and Assistant. ALL the time. If one is not present, for whatever reason the sector must be closed. That is the procedure. Seems pretty sensible to me, post Ueberlingen."

Yes that is the current procedure. However, there is a draft SI in the ops room proposing that if one of the ATCOs goes sick, and there is no sick cover rostered, the sector will be run by the remaining two ATCOs using combined T & P for breaks rather than closing the airspace. It is this draft SI that seems to have inspired this thread.

[peatair]

One would have hoped that the invariable practice post Uberlingen was 2 ATCOs + Support per sector at all times.

Of course, other factors were present in the Uberlingen collision such as the conduct of equipment maintenance etc. Also, airborne factors such as the aircrew reaction to the conflict between TCAS and ATC instruction.

[055166k]

What should be a matter of grave concern is the need for the Swanwick computer to be switched off two or three times a week for repairs and re-programming......couple that to skeleton staffing and....Bingo.
If any current rule is seen to be a hindrance to the Swanwick operation I can almost guarantee that it will be deleted.....you think I'm joking.....when the TSF's published in MATS 2 became an embarrassment they were removed.....watch this space!

[achtung]

Bugger me!.. 'S.M.O.P' Is just what the DFS in deutschland are proposing-selling to the watchdogs??!..... funny how the short term memories go heh? It's the same ole thing, they twist the facts and stats. to suit their needs..... :*

[VectorLine]

055166k

What are you talking about?

a) 'the computer' doesn't get shut down 2-3 times a week.
b) 'the computer' gets 'shut down' once a week AT WEST DRAYTON. Even then, it's not shut down. Just not available to the ATC system.
c) Swanwick computers get updated every airac cycle, requiring the centre to be disconnected from NAS approx once a month.

[055166k]

Thanks for clarification.....of course Swanwick does not have a computer of its own; however, as a user of said system, if it is not available and we are operating in emergency fallback mode then to all intents and purposes it is as though it were failed.
Our neighbouring Centres do not have to shut down their computers for even a fraction of the time that Swanwick has to cope without one.
If you question my claim then publish the number of service interruptions at Swanwick [ for whatever reason ] since "O" date.
Before we came here we were promised a 24/7 system which has never materialised; the Swanwick method of operation is so heavily reliant on computer support that in the event that it is unavailable the consequences are more far-reaching than the system that it seeks to replace.
This is probably nothing to do with anything, but as Swanwick approaches its third birthday I am reminded that we have the second General Manager and the third Deputy GM....is there something about this place?

[VectorLine]

At the risk of dragging this off topic;

I do question your claim, but I'm sorry I don't know exactly how many service interruptions there have been. You appear to have a good idea, so please tell. I still very much doubt it is 2-3 times a week. Maybe I haven't been paying attention at work.

As Swanwick approaches it's third birthday, I am reminded of the fact that we are handling more traffic with less delays than recent years.

Moaning and scaremongering aren't going to get us anywhere. We have to get on with the job.

As we were so kindly reminded in an open letter to operational staff, management do not have to consult with our trade unions at all in changing WPs. However, they realise that if they don't, they will lose any fragments of support they currently cling to.

[BEXIL160]

They may not have to consult about WP, but changing the Method of Operations does need some consultation.

Swanwick was touted not only on the basis that it could handle more traffic, but that it was inherently safer. Two people (or more) listening carefully to each frequencyfor instance.

Now although it isn't possible for the planner to listen to the RTF ALL the time, he or she can monitor it for MOST of the time, and they, and the Assistant do have a Radar display so they can actually see what is occuring.

Going to SMOPs immediately removes that carefully planned and approved (by CAA ATSSD) safet net. In some ways it makes the safety case worse. One person with many different tasks and very little support. (The LAS does not count. They ARE NOT always immediately available at the best of times... at night? Forget it)

Can't see a safety gain here myself. I can see a management looking for expedient ways to keep sectors open without the proper manning.

Following the tragic accident at Uberlingen, this seems at best ill concieved.

rgds BEX

[BEXIL160]

Some news (rumour, if you like)

A friend in the Swanwick Training and Development Unit (TDU) told me today that they have already done some simulation of SMOPs.

She pointed out one major snag though . To be realistic the simulations should really have been conducted in the early hours of the morning, preferably with the participants having already completed one shift the night before.

That way the HF people would at least have the correct data to assess and the participants would be able to report more realistically about how they "felt".

A safety case written around daytime sims is flawed. Wonder if the NATS safety empire have picked up on this yet?

Rgds BEX