MK Airlines B747 crash at Halifax

[Flight Safety]

McGintry, I tend to interpret that photo the same way regarding tire marks. The tire impressions appear to get noticably deeper going up the sloped side of the berm. That's a heck of a way to try and get a 747 airborne. The HMS Ark Royal ski jump the berm is not.

[A-FLOOR]

Thanks for the eye-opener.

It's sad to see what some people in the aviation industry (or just as well people in general) still have to put up with in the 21st century :(

[cw6]

The comments regarding the missing wing to fuse fillet fairings on the aircraft photo'd in Findel, and the so called "crew" that were walking up the stairs and were seen closing the door were in fact ground crew.The aircraft was being towed to a more suitable place of work (outside the CargoLux hanger).Please before making inacurate posting's, be sure to have a clear understanding of the facts.All you achieve to do is muddy the waters of truth to gain support for a theory that is wildly inacurate and leads opinion down an exagerated path.If you had posted that you had seen this , and that the aircraft had been towed out to the taxi way, then fine.But you say that you saw it leave.You are a liar - simply put.

[Quod Boy]

Disconnected.

You speak wise words.Words are one thing.Actions are another.MK Flt Ops,and management IF,and proved true,that the crews were/are pushed,against agreed,safe rostered agreements,in order to maintain a lifestyle choice,should be sleeping uneasily,right now.

What sad news for all involved on the a/c.QB

[wes_wall]

cw6, are you saying the airplane did not fly in that condition, rather, it was repaired prior to departure. Quite a different circumstance. Wonder what is the truth.

[broadreach]

Re the photos posted ealier today - from the tracks left on the berm by the centre gear it would seem unlikely that, even had the berm not been there, the aircraft would have cleared the forest a few hundred metres ahead.

[exeng]

That photo is quite staggering!

I was an F/E for many years on the 747-100/200/300/SP and never in those years did I see the end of the runway that closely. It did seem to get a bit 'tight' leaving NBO northbound at times on a 747-100, and 'tight' also on a 747-200 leaving JNB northbound. However I don't believe it was ever as 'tight' as shown in that photo.

I'll wait for the results of the investigation before I make any comment whatsoever on this latest tragic accident.

Sincere condolances to the families of those involved.


Regards
Exeng

[747FOCAL]

cw6,

That plane taxied out and took off.

I, myself did not realize that picture was of the downed plane from Halifax. Not until the next poster pointed it out.

Do not ever call me a liar again. :ouch:

[Fuel100]

Of all the posts that I have read regarding this tragic accident the one that stands out more than any is the one by ‘disconnected’ because, I believe, it brings out some of the underlying issues that need to be addressed.

I know quite a few of the MK personnel and from my discussions with them I can only second all that ‘disconnected’ has said. The problem comes from the top. Any airline can bring in an amount of experts to solve a problem (Ex CX crews in this case), but unless the airline is prepared to change its culture, and take on board those recommendations, the exercise becomes a waste of the CX crew’s time and effort.

The culture within MK can be exemplified by the reported comment from their Operations Manager, John Power, who, when asked about its safety record said that it was “excellent”. This known as Denial, and probably permeates throughout MK. I understand that ‘sissies’ are not welcome in MK – so they all battle on not wanting to be labeled as sissies, flying beyond the bounds of normal Flight and Duty time limitations so as to earn that extra ‘foreign’ dollar that is so valuable in Zimbabwe.

Don’t get me wrong, the line crews, are a great bunch of guys who, in my opinion, are being exploited by an unscrupulous management.

[doubleu-anker]

Agree with what has been said in previous posts as regards to the safety culture or lack of it.

It goes a little further than the man at the top. I blame the UK authorities for allowing them to operate (remember they are a UK based carrier) from the UK on a flag of convenience registration.

This goes back many years to the Trade winds days and beyond. The foreign registered carries can and do, easy under cut any UK registered operator.

Until the Uk registered operators get together and pressure the authorities, to stop this double standards system, it will continue. The operator in question are not the only ones. There is at least one other.

[b.borg]

From an earlier post9G-MKJ (FORMERELY SAA CARGO COMBI ZS-SAR WATERBERG) REGISTERED IN GHANA. BASED THERE AND IN LUXEMBOURG, NOT ZIMBABWE.MK CREW MOSTLY ZIMBABWEAN THOUGH, STRONG HISTORICAL LINKS TO THAT COUNTRY
doubleu-anker - What have the UK CAA to do with this aircraft ?
IMHO - sfa !

If it was a G-reg, and a UK operator (AOC/OS) fair do's then the UK CAA would be responsible for the operational oversight, but a Ghana 9G-reg, based in Ghana and Luxembourg :*

The only action the UK could take is through the Ministry of Transport who have powers under ICAO Annex 6, International Air Transport to inspect foreign aircraft on UK territory

However if the country of registration, the aircraft/crew/operator are in compliance with Annex 6, then there is little that any other country can do to hinder right to land, take-off and transit another ICAO member country :sad:

[Farty Flaps]

Nice one disconnected,

however the can of worms as far as the country of registration goes will be reclosed at great cost.Many officials will be having their childrens school fees paid for a very long time, not to mention continuous first class tickets to canada for them and their families to be present at the investigation, or nearest mall. Alledgedly .Boy are they gonna milk it.

Borg they dont transit thru The uk they practically live there.

As for FDR and CVR , Do they even have to be there/working if the aircraft is never in country of registration and the inspectors , if flown out allegedly may too busy enjoying hospitality, for example. Trust me this is not beyond the realms of possibility

Nothing is unbelievable when this type of flagging is done in these countries. Thats why it done.

[theorise]

if you read any post on these boards, you should read disconnected's. i know people in MK Ops and they are just as devestated, if not more so, than us. because they know the pressure those crews are made to fly under.

if the crews complain about the hours, they are told they are not 'team players' and that they either fly or there won't be a job for them. or the flights are given to those that don't 'complain'. so the pressure to fly in order to help their families survive by earning as much foreign currency is critical. if the crews leave for other positions, they get accused of deserting the company.

and this situation has been created at the top by a person who conveniently 'leases' the crews through an agency rather than having to pay them a wage with benefits. thereby forcing them into a 'pay only when you fly' situation.

nice attitude from a guy who was once one of them and now casually takes their lives for granted.

start at the top.

[snarfel]

If the safety culture of MK Airlines is as inexistent as reported by ‘disconnected’, then future might be all except very attractive for Ostend. MK has on average two visits each day on Ostend Airport (B747 & DC8). The airport is very close to the town, and not like in Halifax and other places several kilometers away. Worse, before leaving, the unfortunate plane was maintained in Ostend from 6 to 8 October, although it had a major maintenance inspection in Jakarta in September and according to the Canadian press it had ‘somewhere’ two engines replaced in the weeks leading up to the accident. Indeed, where the replacements have been done, is yet not known.
http://www.wiloo.be/mk747_9g-mkj_ebos_6oct04.wmv
If the accident had occurred in Ostend, 500 meters away from the end of the runway, the airplane would have crashed amid a residential area with unassessable consequences!
I’m not astonished to learn that Manston Airport was happy to loose MK in favour (!) of Ostend, and I wonder what Belgian authorities will decide in connection with MK Airlines landing on Belgian soil.

[A-FLOOR]

As a resident of Holland living roughly 15km from AMS, I too feel your pain. In AMS's case, this mainly concerns the white-tail CAL/El-Al 747-200Fs passing through AMS on their way to TLV from JFK.

Whenever I see one of these on the apron or departing/arriving I can't help but wonder just what it might be they are carrying over the heads of hundreds of thousands of Dutch citizens several times a day.

There has already been written a lot of text on this particular subject in PPRuNe, so knock yourself out: :ok:

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=149199

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=130565

[slot]

747FOCAL

I was in LUX at that time this A/C came in with the wing to fuesalage panel missing. And I also know that the nose cone was broken and both windshileds damaged after A/C going throgh hailstorm FLT. AMS-LUX.

The A/C was towed to Cargolux hangar for repairs did not leave LUX untill few day´s later.

So the fact is that you could not have seen the A/C take of like you say.

You should not post bull****t like this when so many people know the real story !

[wes_wall]

I guess this is no surprise.

http://www.canada.com/fortstjohn/story.html?id=b4e43b6a-8126-4e95-8271-35f1813c8226

[matkat]

A quick note about the safety culture at MK,some years ago(5) i was invited for an interview there(engineering)and was left as to no doubt about My position as to keep the aircraft flying,I have never&will never work there.As some of You may have seen Me on other threads and are possibly aware of places of My previous employment,safety was never an issue at any of those others regardless of what has ever been said about them.
matkat

[an-124]

I think that we all agree that what has happened is terrible. My condolences to the staff at MK and the families of those lost.



snarfel.

Is it just a coincidence that you have just registered now? You would not happen to be an Ostend resident would you?

*an-124 looks at snarfels profile and shakes head *

Maybe you were involved in the campaigning to ban the IL-76 from Europe which resulted in the loss of hundreds of jobs in the Ostend area. ???

You paint a dim picture of the situation in Ostend, when (you are infact a resident you should know) it is a fact that (depending on direction) take off is made out over the ocean.

Nevertheless, you just seem to be another person to jump on the bandwagon and trying to get Ostend airport shut down.

But congratulations - you seem to have your propeganda video editing skills mastered. Why not try waiting until the official findings before you cast doubt over a/ maintenance proceedures, and b/the cause of the accident.

[9gmax]

AN-124...
well done at Snarfel....I've got same impression on him, and to be honest, I was thinking of giving him a reply, but refrained from doing as he's not worth it...(I don't write a lot, merely an observer on Pprune..)
I've been flying in Ostend for the last 38 years (!) on a very regular basis and know the situation well...90% of takeoffs are made in the direction of the sea, with very limited risk for injury (provided there's no sailing or fishing boat around...)
just disregard Snarfel...he's not worth it.

[Phileas Fogg]

Whilst take-off's from OST might be over the English Channel (which is not an ocean!), the 747 in question did not get airborne and whilst on this occassion it occurred at 0400 hours, at a more lively time of day. the supermarkets, carpet store, hardware store, burger joint etc. off the end of OST's runway would be very lively!
No, I'm not an OST resident but I did work at the airport, and shop in those supermarkets some years back.

[lomapaseo]

This thread seems to have digressed into what-ifs and personal agendas.

What happened to the news and rumors on the subject crash?

[Phileas Fogg]

Well the news is a week or so old now and rumours, what rumours?

[Andries]

Snarfel is a member of WILOO !

These are not false accusations, but are facts !
Thought you should know ...

As you will see, I joined just today, because I thought this was valuable info !

Greetz,

Andries.

[A-FLOOR]

Well, judging from what came up in Google when I searched for "WILOO" I can't really say your mention of snarfel's membership of said organisation is to his advantage. Too bad most of the good stuff is in Dutch ;)

BTW: Does disconnected know they've quoted his post on their site to suit their own needs? It wouldn't be the first time unsuspecting aviation enthusiasts and professionals are quoted without their permission. :mad:

[747FOCAL]

How do you know if you were there when you don't even know when the picture was taken? :E

I know what I saw. Say what ever you like. :cool:

ps. Since your a one post wonder I think I know who the majority will believe. Or maybe I should send that picture on the the Canadian Authorities.

[wes_wall]

747FOCAL, I too would like to know when the picture was taken. Even you must admit, that picture is not a normal representation of your ordinary 747 configuration. And, yep, I agree,

Or maybe I should send that picture on the the Canadian Authorities

why not send it. Any know condition on any airplane prior to an accident would be important, particularly if said airplane was dispatched like you claim. In my opinon, this qualifies. Like you have said,

talk the talk, then walk the walk.

[Mister Geezer]

One has to ask why MK has always registered its aircraft with the Ghanian CAA when for so many years it has been based in Manston and with its main office in East Sussex.

Edited to say that I came accross an article about the accident in the Times that said the DoT asked the CAA to turn up unannounced and ramp check MK aircraft. However they relocated to OST before any action was carried out!! - however I guess that does not stop them if an MK aircraft is on British soil during a turnaround for example!

[cw6]

SLOT, I am encouraged to see you have also backed my post that the aircraft 9G-MKJ did not leave LUX with the photographed missing wing to fuse fillett fairings, and to know that the aircraft arrived from AMS having suffered hail damage, only proves you know what was really happening that day. Thank you for your support. So 747 FOCAL the time has come to come clean and admit you are wrong and appologise.

MATKAT.
As for your comments on the "interview" you had I would be interested to hear who interviewed you and quite what was said.
Every airline in the world has the one goal - to provide a safe, efficient, and economic service (in that order). So when being interviewed, you would have been asked to work towards the aim of keeping the aircraft flying. Tell me how that differs from any other airline in the world (African registered or not)?.
Are we all stupid enough to believe you if you are saying that at your interview the person interviewing you said , "break every rule, ignore the MEL/CDL, ignore the Captain, Maintrol, your own gut feeling oh and not forgetting the Maintenance Manual. Come on talk sense man.
Don't start MK bashing; if you felt what was being asked of you was unsafe did you contact the CAA, DOT, Ghanain CAA, or MK quality? I'm guessing not so why after 5 years do you bring it to the forum,you didn't have the conscience then so why now ???
Despite what is written; MK has an amazingly talented, experienced, qualified and enthusiastic team running it, it is run with pride and passion which is from the top, if you were half as successful as the owner of that airline you wouldn't be writting sh1t on here and I would be addressing you as Captain !!.:ok:

[747FOCAL]

cw6,

I stand behind my last posts. You two post wonder you.

:}

[autoflight]

Where is lead zeppelin to accuse us of a racial attack?

[cringe]

From the news update quoting investigators:

The Boeing 747-200 was moving up the runway at 240 kilometres an hour before the crash -- at least 55 kilometres slower than it should have been.

Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigator Bill Fowler says the plane needed more thrust to get up to the speed required, given the runway it had available.

Fowler has said the jet used all but the first 60 metres of its runway during takeoff. But he has also said that under ideal circumstances, the shortened run would have given the aircraft more than enough room to take off.

The plane was loaded with 53,000 kilograms of seafood, along with lawn tractors and computer gear. A 747 has a payload capacity of about 60,000 kilograms.

Fowler says the fish cargo was not weighed at the airport before it was loaded on the plane in Halifax.

The TSB issued an advisory Friday on the proper weighing of cargos -- suggesting investigators believe the plane may have been overloaded.

However, Fowler refused to speculate that the jet was overloaded, saying all the information is not yet available.

The plane's damaged flight data recorder was recovered last week. Fowler has said it indicated the 747's four engines were functionally normally.http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1098473644447_93882844/?hub=Canada

[Fuel100]

Cw6 states:

“MK has an amazingly talented, experienced, qualified and enthusiastic team running it, it is run with pride and passion which is from the top, if you were half as successful as the owner of that airline you wouldn't be writting sh1t on here and I would be addressing you as Captain!!”

What an amazing statement – I would suspect that cw6 is closely associated with MK and is also afflicted with pure Denial.

The attributes that cw6 alludes to could be applied to any number of airlines, lets try a few: Cathay, Qantas, Virgin Atlantic, VirginBlue, Ryanair, Dragonair Air Zimbabwe. Difference is that they have not written off 25% of their fleet. As disconnected said “MK just don’t get it”

Pray tell cw6, by what standard do you judge the owner of MK to be “successful”? He presides over an airline that has an appalling safety record, hardly a measure of success, nor a reason to be proud!

[RatherBeFlying]

Working from the speeds in the cited article: 240 kmh = 130 kt 055 kmh = 030 kt i.e desired speed = 160 kt The plane's damaged flight data recorder was recovered last week. Fowler has said it indicated the 747's four engines were functionally normally.Once, I could do the calculations to work out the fraction over MTOW that would produce that reduced speed. However I suspect that the speed given out by TSB is the maximum achieved just before collision with the berm instead of the normal rotation point which could indicate that MTOW was exceeded by a substantial fraction.

A night takeoff deprives you of early visual clues that acceleration is not quite what's needed -- perhaps until you're getting too close and personal with the end of the runway.

There has been discussion before that it may be useful to work out distance or time to V1 and abort if V1 is not achieved by that point or time.

[742flighty]

747FOCAL,

Despite a number of requests for you to tell the forum when the picture of the missing fairing was taken, you have not done so, also I see you have removed the link to the photo. Is there something you are not telling us.

If the picture was taken a while back, as I am sure it was, what was the point in putting on this thread?

Lets try and stick to relevant information.

[Kabullet]

Fuel 100

How many of those airlines fly to Abuja, Kano, Malabo, Sao Tome, Baku, Almaty, Kabul, Kandahar... etc to name but a few... ask Hydro about Lagos,. Ask BA and Cathay to fly to these dest with a 742....I think Not! Yes they have hull loses. Sometimes it is not up to you, some other force may contribute to the swiss cheese effect.

Yet they are still supported by the clients and agents and crew....why? Because nobody else can or wants to try to do it They do it, within the a/c limits and they do it well. Would you do it? Why not? Post accident they were checked in depth by UK officials, and found fully compliant, even commended. Do you think after all these years they would be flying in and out of Europe, USA, MES,EEU, etc if there was a problem?

Bash all you want, when your time comes, i will not slate you or your company but will wait for the official findings. I hope that never happens to any of you. Safe flying.

[HotDog]

SNAM, the last B747-200F that I operated with CF6-50E2 engines, had maximum load capacity of 101 Tonnes which gave it a range of 8150KM. The -400 has an even higher max load capacity.

[74tweaker]

Investigators have determined that the shipping company didn't weigh the fully loaded pallets of seafood, providing the airline instead with an estimate based on the average weight of each box of seafood. That total wouldn't have included the weight of the wooden pallets carrying the seafood or other materials used in packing.

It's starting to sound more like an incorrect configuration or thrust setting based on a weight that was far off what it should have been. TSB is also saying that the plane was about 25 knots (55 km an hour) slower than it needed to be.

Reports say the max payload for the -200 is 60,000 kg - can you guys confirm this?

They may have been overweight as they had tractors and other stuff, as well as a reported 53,000 kg of seafood (which is now a low figure). They don't say how much it actually weighed but it must be a significant amount - especially since the pallets and packing materials weren't counted.

[HotDog]

74tweaker, read the post above. The 742F max payload is far in excess of 60.000 kgs. Not only thet but MK carry professional load masters who are experts at producing accurate load sheets. May he with the other six, rest in peace.

[74tweaker]

The load master can only do so much with the information he is given though.

How many kg's is 100 tonnes?

[TheShadow]

<<<The TSB issued an advisory Friday on the proper weighing of cargos -- suggesting investigators believe the plane may have been overloaded.>>>

Weight-Theft of Air Cargo (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/FAA_Inaction/cargo-fraud.html)

Weight-theft of air cargo is probably difficult to prove because the manifests and loadsheets are always going to appear pukka.

Unfortunately, if the air-crew are the last to know (as in ignorant of it), then they end up taking off overweight. Figures of 20% to
30% of cargo under-statement are mentioned in the article above. They'd probably be significant for a marginal operation that's designedly runway length limited (like out of Halifax carrying a heavy load and some tankered fuel).

Allegedly there were a number of witnesses who heard the aircraft go to max power about midway through their final take-off. That may have been the point of dawning realization - where they became "the last to know".

[Rollingthunder]

100 tonnes = 100,000 kilograms

[18-Wheeler]

Reports say the max payload for the -200 is 60,000 kg - can you guys confirm this?

A -200 feighter typically will carry a maximum of about 107 - 108 tonnes.
Depends on the engines and freight loading system, as they are the major factors for Zero Fuel Weight.

[Burger Thing]

Could it be, that based on the RW- and Climblimits, that the max Load was restricted to 60 to?

:confused: And no, it is not ment as a joke, if the load was seafood, maybe it was forgotten to take the weight of the ice, if there was any carried along with the seafood? :ugh: Believe me, that has happened before....

[fourpaddles]

The point raised about perceiving rate of acceleration at night is a valid one, especially I suppose when the flight deck is as high it is on a 747.

Something to consider:

The captain of a Hercules decided to abort at Stansted because he felt that the aircraft's acceleration was somewhat slower than normal. After clearing the runway, tower advised him that flames could be seen in the main gear area. The crew evacuated and the fire was subsequently extinguished. I doubt if the aircraft was 'pulling' left or right unnoticed during taxy out, or take-off, but a brake only has to be binding slightly to build up heat. The abort was conducted at a fairly low airspeed (80kts I think) and probably very little brakes were required. This incident occured at night and with a relatively light load. If he had continued and the landing gear been retracted...

So, my question is, if a 747 had a brake binding in one of the centre bogies, would this have been noticeable on taxy out or take-off, apart from maybe more thrust being required depending on the amount and point at which it started binding - maybe at brake release for the take-off roll? Does this model 747 have brake temp. indicators, and if so does the MEL specify a requirement for them to be serviceable for all departures? The Herc has brake temperature indicators - they are fitted to the back of the FE or pilot's hand. Always a good idea to check to see if a single wheel is cooler or hotter than the other three after landing - it can tell you a lot about the state of the brakes.

Edited for clarity (or not).

[HotDog]

Does this model 747 have brake temp. indicators, and if so does the MEL specify a requirement for them to be serviceable for all departures?

The answer is yes for all 747 models but it's not a no-go item.

[digger777]

Just a quick comment on diconnected' post.I'm a long haul trucker and when I read in that post about this airline's operation "fly get paid don't fly don't get paid" and that they just do what ever maintenance is required (barely) and nothing more.This sounds to me like some trucking companies I've come across.When it comes to trailers and tractors for that matter people would be shocked at what thier running down the road next to,some of these units would just barely pass an inspection and a few probably would'nt even do that.I can't believe that some aircraft frieght companies would be the same way when it comes to thier jets.SCARY!:ooh:

[Tan]

The media are now reporting the following quote” We are trying to establish why the takeoff was attempted at a reduced power setting” Fowler says

[LatviaCalling]

My company is a storage and plug-in facility for fully loaded refrigerated containers with meat and fish in Riga, Latvia. These containers come in by ship from the U.S., UK, and many other parts of the world. We hold them, keep them cold, and then ship them onward by truck to Russia.

The maximum loaded weight of a 40' container is 32,000 kg, and the accompanying bills of lading filled out by the sender or his agent rarely state that the cargo is over 25,000 kg. Yet our electronic scale with a print-out half the time shows that the cargo weighs up to 10,000 kg past the 32,000 kg maximum.

The whole truck, once it reaches the Russian border, is weighed. Fines of $250 per ton overweight are not unusual. Overweight trucks will eat up the road they drive on, but the weight is really not that critical to safety.

However, if a sender, or his agent falsifies a bill of lading or a waybill on a weight-sensitive airplane, then I would consider it criminal.

I'm sure that in airline freight operations not every piece of cargo is put on a scale and weighed.

If the customer declares that a crated lawn tractor weighs 300 kg and a wooden crate of frozen fish 150 kg, the airline will probably take their word for it if it is so stated in the bill of lading.

The bill of lading is actually an accompanying document of "sale" which is needed for the end customer to retreive his merchandise. The wooden crate or the steel tub is probably not included in the bill of lading, because in customs, the buyer only pays duty for the product -- and not the packing.

That's how things can go wrong. There are many other tricks in international shipping which I won't go into now, since you're probably already bored.

[Massey1Bravo]

However, if a sender, or his agent falsifies a bill of lading or a waybill on a weight-sensitive airplane, then I would consider it criminal.

Well this actually happens quite often. The loadmaster/dispatcher have to trust the data provided by those agents, and some of that information can either be incorrect or manipulated.

Have a look:

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=142190


Here are 2 quotes from that discussion:

...found out that in the old fokker27 days the check in staff used to rush to the jkia waving/ observation deck to see whether the plane actually takes off with all the illegal excess baggage and cargo they received bribes for!
Just the other day we saw a 15 Ton overload out of VHHH.

[bizflyer]

Is it possible to rig some form of built in scale/weighing mechanism to an aircraft undercarriage? Has this been done before or attempted?

[Phileas Fogg]

(Is it possible to rig some form of built in scale/weighing mechanism to an aircraft undercarriage? Has this been done before or attempted?)

Even if it were feasible it would very soon be discarded or stripped-out. Anything that is seemingly uneccessary on a cargo aircraft is stripped-out to increase payload thus increase revenue.

Mentioning no names but some cargo airlines are reputed for knowingly operating several tons overweight and on a regular basis. If such a reputation is earned then shippers and/or ground staff may exploit it.

[747FOCAL]

The 747-400F and combi come standard with a weight and balance system. It is an option on PAX 747-400. There is also a dual system that can be purchased but to my knowledge only CargoLux has ever ordered it.

I think Airbus also has a system for a few of their birds.

The downside of them is that they can/will lie to you and is why they will never replace a loadmaster. Its just a last ditch insurance policy that you hope tells you the few times your airplane is terribly over weight or loaded wrong. :)

[aardvark2zz]

1st - They keep quoting the payload as being 60,000 kg; isn't that for the passenger version. The cargo version has a max payload of 248,000 lb (112,490 kg) or almost twice.

2nd - I did a quick calculation and the acceleration should have been at least 51 % higher to reach that speed which is quite a lot !!

that means that the thrust EPR settings should have been 51% higher (at least) or that the weight should have been 66% of what it was (or less) or have needed 13295 ft (at least) with that acceleration (thrust and weight). Much more than the 8800 ft available :ooh:

Big numbers !!! I can only guess wrong EPR settings and, then, some weight issues. :ooh:

[Sawbones]

When all is said and done regarding the findings of this accident, hopefully someone will look at the Halifax International Airport itself and determine that it is woefully outdated and ill-equipped.

Not to suggest that the environment necessarily caused this disaster, but as we all are familiar with the concept of "risk management" ... well there just isn't much of a safety cushion left at an airport with 2 runways with lengths of 8,800 feet, and 7,700 feet. As most of us are aware now, as I pointed out in an earlier post, to achieve the full length of runway 24 a short backtrack and a 180 is required from the intersection of 15 otherwise, you lose 300'.

From an arrival standpoint, only 2 ILS approaches are available at this airport, well known for frequent adverse Maritime weather. Until recently, the opposite ends were served by backcourse approaches, but now runway 06 has a localizer approach (no glidepath). I have often said that this issue must have been one of the many serious problems facing the unfortunate Swissair crew as they were setting up for the backcourse approach for 06. How much simpler their predicament would have been had they been able to couple onto a full ILS.

I find the facilities at Halifax to be quite appalling, especially considering the number of Trans-Atlantics that overfly and keep the airport in mind as an emergency alternate. There have been many over the years, including Concorde, which must have made the crew really sit up and take notice.

Wouldn't it be nice if some of those "Airport Improvement" fees actually went into safety improvement, and not just to build fancy airport tie/jewelry/souvenir/craft/seafood shops.

But I think I'm dreaming in technicolour.

[Random Electron]

I don't know about the airport itself, but the boys and girls at Halifax Radio 126.7 are incredibly good. Nothing is too much trouble, weathers from Timbuctou to McMurdo Sound, no problem, and even help with Oceanic Clearances when you cannot get a word in edgewise to Gander Radio VHF.

Wish we had that sort of facility in Europe.

[broadreach]

Just a note about underdeclaring weight in international transport.

LatviaCalling's comment regarding declared vs actual weights in shipping containers hits a chord when it comes to cargo that's sold by weight. Some shippers will pack as much as possible into the space available and underdeclare to avoid tax or for a host of other reasons. It happens with bagged cargo, tiles, granite and others where the weight will max out before cube does, sometimes taking the bottom of the container with it.

Whether it's on a ship or an aircraft, when it's knowingly done, it's called fraud.

Manufactured goods are likely to be declared precisely and I think you can be sure the awb for those John Deere lawnmowers or whatever they were, was within a kilo or two of their total weight.

There's no way of telling now if the lobster cargo weighed more than was declared and even suggesting as much might be legally risky. That will probably be a very sensitive subject with MK, the shippers and their respective insurers for some time to come.

[Tan]

Sawbones

Actually according to the charts departing from the intersection of rwy 15 only costs 200 feet. Although depending upon technique a heavy backtrack would only pick up an extra 100 feet or so it is always preferable to have available runway in front then behind you. Regardless I would question why any heavy would not use the backtrack unless their were compelling reasons for not doing so as that is the norm.

I’m rather surprised that you are partially blaming the airport facility for this accident, as this is a real stretch in my opinion as is your reference to the Swissair accident.

However you are perfectly correct in stating that all the airport improvement taxes that our passengers pay should be used for infrastructure improvement. But we both know this is never going to happen as the authorities view aviation as a cash cow.

Cheers

[Sawbones]

Tan

Simply stated: a better equipped airport with longer runways, and precision approaches at all ends has got to be more forgiving of whatever errors/miscalculations/mishandlings that may occur.

I do agree with you that operational people don't look on airports in the same way as do those trying to extract $$$ from the travelling public. Sad.

[bzh]

that is the probem there is no travelling public on board....

cargo is geat, ask the guys.....

pressure are constant..... sometime i w'd say no for pax because of the stupid light that jus came up, on cargo it's fine, if it is that one engine that is acting up, but it's probably a gage issue anyways...

sade but the daily life of pilot is that way....."yea i know this plane has been doing that once in a wile, it's ok just a computer issue" the number a good ....thust me...

DG

[Flywell]

I have to agree and disagree with some of the previous postings.
I feel MK is a success(to a large extent). As one posting put it, they go where most fear to tread and maybe the swiss cheese affect isn't always their fault. These guys fly to some way out places with little or no experience as to what to expect. They learn some harsh lessons as they go but at the end of the day they get the job done.
Now you have to ask why do they get the job done???
First of all they are mostly Zimbos who have lived their whole lives having to make a plan. Second they are hard working and have a pride in doing a good job. This maybe comes from a lot of the crew being ex military with a good discipline. The third reason is they have no choice but to do the job or else they don't get paid.
Lets face it MK exploit and have done for a long time the good will and hard work of the crew. I'm sure if we took at look at where all the top management of MK live and what they earn compared to average Joe the pilot we'd be horribly shocked but not surprised. I bet they don't get paid by the hour!!!
I feel it's time for the crew to stand up to MK now. I know this is easier said than done but surely they'd be better off in the long run.
How does the owner of MK sleep at night??? How does he manage to look his staff in the face knowing that by pushing them the way he has he's created a very sad state of affairs.
Maybe top management should face up to facts and stop living a dream. This might help really get things on track and put MK where it deserves to be after all the hard work put in by exploited memebers of staff (not just crew)
I really hope that one day all who have put so much into the airline reap at least a small reward.... They truely deserve it!!!

[fatmantoo]

I tend to agree with what flywell says, not only are they trying to
become succesfull in a cut throat industry, but are trying to keep
freight flying costs down to maintain customers.
I mean there are not to many other operators keen to fly to the
likes of Port harcourt, malabo, kinshasa, kano etc.
Maybe the management are exploiting the crew and ground staff
but they are still with mk and always have the choice to go elsewhere

[aardvark2zz]

The CBC corrected their news web page after I told them that they made an error !

They originally wrote that the 747 could carry 60,000 kg of payload -- which is true for a passenger plane but not for a cargo plane which is 112,490 kg (varies a bit). :D

Note: CTV and others also made that same error.

http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2004/10/22/plane_halifax041022.html

Last Updated Sat, 23 Oct 2004 20:20:07 EDT (CBC)

Keep the blue side up; wherever up is
.

[ocnus]

From today's Sunday Times

Overloading blamed for plane crash that killed four Britons
Dipesh Gadher, Times 24/10/04

A GIANT cargo plane owned by a British-based airline with one of the world’s worst accident records may have been carrying an excessive load before it crashed on take-off in Canada, killing all seven crew.

The accident in Halifax, Nova Scotia, involving a Boeing 747-200, was the fourth time in 12 years that an aircraft owned by MK Airlines has gone down. The victims, who died 10 days ago, included four Britons with dual Zimbabwean nationality.

Although the company’s fleet is registered in Ghana, west Africa, its administrative offices are in Hartfield, East Sussex, and it files its annual accounts to Companies House in Britain.

Founded by Mike Kruger, 47, a former Zimbabwean pilot who resides in Britain for part of the year, MK Airlines transports fresh produce for UK supermarkets. It has also worked for the Ministry of Defence, carrying supplies to troops in Cyprus and the Gulf.

The company’s three previous crashes — including one fatal accident — happened in Nigeria in 1992, 1996 and 2001 and all involved planes approaching landing.

Kruger said there were “extenuating circumstances” found in each case that have led the airline to fit its fleet with enhanced ground-proximity warning systems.

Nevertheless, the Department for Transport (DfT) last week ordered the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to carry out a safety inspection of one of MK Airline’s planes in Britain.

Although the aircraft was later cleared for take-off, it is the third time this year that checks on the airline have been ordered by the DfT.

Last August CAA officials were unable to complete an inspection because MK Airlines moved its operations from Manston airport in Kent to Ostend, Belgium.

The DfT had sought to act on that occasion amid concerns that aviation authorities in Ghana might be failing to ensure aircraft safety. In June the department banned two Ghana Airways passenger jets from landing in Britain.

Full details of the crash in Halifax on October 14 began to emerge last week as accident investigators from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) recovered the 747’s flight data recorder.

Although the plane’s engines were operating normally, investigators found that it was travelling too slow to lift off safely. On Friday the TSB issued a safety notice on the proper weighting of cargoes, suggesting that the aircraft may have been overloaded by a separate handling company. Investigators have refused to confirm this as the cause of the crash.

Kruger denied that his airline had ever compromised safety and insisted that Ghana’s aviation authorities adhered to internationally recognised standards. “We have an extremely strong safety regime,” he said. “The authorities are welcome to inspect us and we are willing to co-operate fully.”

[BEagle]

"On Friday the TSB issued a safety notice on the proper weighting of cargoes, suggesting that the aircraft may have been overloaded by a separate handling company. Investigators have refused to confirm this as the cause of the crash."

Hardly the same thing as "Overloading blamed for plane crash that killed four Britons" as the Sunday Times' Dipesh Gadher appears to claim?

Journos - don't you just love 'em.....

[fatmantoo]

I wonder if the cargo company in Halifax ever considered what
the consequences of estimating the weight would be, or would the price of an extra few tons of freight allow them to not even
care.
:confused:

[G-BUNZ Seeker]

Having worked at a cargo handling company at LHR in the past and been amazed at the lack of training that related what the job entailed to the effect on loading . As time progressed in the job seeing the difference between the old timers who understood both the commercial reality of the handling company and the practicle contibution to safety through check weighing all freight over 25kg to pallet/uld check weights, and the complete lack on understanding from new staff because this link had not been highlighted in training. Most of the new people thought check weighing on reciept was to check that the cargo agent had not under declared to pay a lower rate!!
Incidently the "old timers" refers to when the handling company was part of a large european airline and therefore training was much broader so even a wharehouse man understood his part in making sure that aircraft got airborne safely.

So if the airway bill said 53,000kgs, the check weight before loading on pallets should have identified this, so that the airline had correct weight figure and not being under paid!

[Breel]

A few comments on performance (a bit late perhaps) to answer a few earlier posts on flap selection ... despite several posts advising that there are too many variables and too many assumptions (... and to a point I agree). So, let me make one assumption: operations normal (as per a cargo airline - carry as much freight as possible because that's how we make money).

A B747-200 (used GE engines as no P&W JT9 figures)
8800ft runway, approx. 400ft amsl, +10 deg C, 5kts HW
Flaps 20 = MTOW 348.0T (... note: zero wind = MTOW 344.5T)
This is field limited max take-off weight.

I think I read earlier that Steve Anderson, MK rep, stated the cargo weighed 103T - so that's what I will use (note: I cannot find that reference now, so please correct me if need be).

Basic Weight = 158T (conservative after MK have stripped it)
Load = 103T (the big question mark!?)
ZFW = 261T (Max ZFW either 267T or 272T)
Fuel = 84T (assumes 6hr flight time plus an hour, 12T)
TOW = 345T (everything legitimate so far)

MAX thrust would be required - no derates.
Speeds: (V1: 147) Vr 161 V2 171
IF Flap 10 was selected in error, Vr 167 V2 178 would be the V speeds at a FLAP 10 setting for 348T. Note: V1 becomes irrelevant and to a point so does the field limited MTOW since the take-off has been continued - all we are concerned about now are the speeds required to get airborne. I am trying to show that, all other things ops normal, a B747 would, in this case, fly if flap 10 was selected instead of a planned flap 20. Rotating 6 knots early would NOT have resulted in this accident.

However, as is coming to light the aircraft never came close to these speeds with "all engines operating normally". Why?
Why are we hearing some reports of 53T- 60T cargo, and other reports of 103T? It points more and more to a gross error in weight of the cargo.
But, as with most accidents, I don't think there will be one isolated event but rather a chain of events that caused this.

Finally: to those who have been discussing the alleged missing wing/fuselage fairing (or not): one or both may be missing; T/O and LDG performance penalty: negligible!
B REEL

[cringe]

Why are we hearing some reports of 53T- 60T cargo, and other reports of 103T?53 tonnes was a reference to the seafood cargo only. The Halifax Herald on Oct 20th: The day of the crash, MK Airlines official Steve Anderson said the plane was almost half full of John Deere lawn tractors and "general freight, which is everything from computers to anything you can imagine."

After it arrived in Halifax, it was also loaded with 53,405 kilograms of silver hake and lobster destined for Spain.

Mr. Anderson has said the cargo weighed 103 tonnes and that the plane could carry 110 tonnes.

[Phileas Fogg]

SNAM,
If the shipper declares 53T then they pay for 53T.

If the shipper declares 53T but loads 63T, they still pay for 53T.

It is up to the airline or crew, if suspicious, to demand the load be weighed but commercial pressures and all that .....

[slot]

747FOCAL

Do you think that if you tell a lie 100 times, that it becomes true ?

I work for Cargolux airlines, and that should prove to you that I know what I´m talking about.

If you were realy there like you say, you should be able to tell every one when this foto was taken.

It looks to me that it was taken after the A/C arraived to the Cargolux hangar.

747FOCAL

[matkat]

Ghanian CAA inspectors are taught at AST in Perth(I have actually dealt with a few of them) and though I am no expert on Ghananian Civil aircraft regulations I am not in any doubt that their rules and regs are based on BCARs/JAA/EASA regs.

[CR2]

Never mind what the airway bill states, each pallet is weighed prior loading. Also consider that on a given flight, there are often hundreds of awbs from hundreds of individual agents/shippers.
MZFW on this aircraft was 267619KG, standard for a 200 with no extended zfw.

[Phileas Fogg]

A load is 'said' to be weighed before loading, sometimes at the airport, sometimes at the shipper's but in reality this is not always the case.

Whilst SNAM's view is understandable he probably wouldn't last for very long in the employ of many a cargo airline. Often the loading is done when the flight crew are still tucked-up in bed thus it is down to the loadmaster and if one name should 'stick out' for repeatedly delaying services, upsetting handling agents or peeing-off customers, well heads will roll.

Agreed this should not be the case but take for instance a departure from Nairobi, due to temperatures you only have a few hours each day whereas you'll get the aircraft off the ground and that's the same time as all the other cargo boys are going. You demand an offload & reweigh then you go right to the back of the queue, miss the window thus a 24hr delay.
Your load is fresh flowers, straight out of refrigeration, how are you going to explain 100T of dead flowers to your boss and the customer!

Some airline(s) have a reputation for operating overweight, on a DC8-55 it might have been 5T over, on a B747 perhaps 10T over. But, if there are 2 customers, each with a part load, and both believe they are the only one to add the extra tonnage then the situation may arise whereas an aircraft is 20T over.

[Phileas Fogg]

SNAM,
I have never said I have, nor will, overloaded an aircraft. I've merely explained what happens in the 'real' world rather than the 'text book' world.

I do not agree with such practices and for such a reason I would never apply to certain airline(s).

From your text it would appear you have become angry towards me, why? All I've done is tell the truth, I've never previously said I agree or disagree with it and I would never knowingly endanger the safety of an aircraft nor it's crew.

[sandkfir]

Not saying that it happened in this case as we shall only really know once the full investigation is complete but I know for a fact that a certain freight forwarder out of NBO whose speciality was shipping fresh produce knew that due to the dry atmosphere on the aircraft in cruise the freight would loose between 5-10% of its weight through dehydration. They would therefore overload the aircraft to a corresponding figure. The first that the crew would know about it would be a close up view of the rapidly approaching red lights at the end of the runway with the aircraft still firmly on the ground.

Obviously climb performance was degraded and fuel burn increased accordingly. However once the aircraft arrived at destination and the crew complained enough to have the cargo check weighed it would of course be down to the contracted figure. And so the process would continue.

[planecrazi]

Anyone seen the "signed" copy of the weight & balance which the Captain signed. The Captain would then have taken a copy for himself and a few copies would be left behind.

My point is, there are a few other copies of the cargo documents and weight and balance somewhere, which were left behind which would have a lot of info on it to start with.

These forms and cargo manifests would have signitures on them saying as to who prepared and loaded the pallets, and of course weighed them.

This of course would be a starting point. Considering the given weight, performance would be calculated, which the crew would've done.

From here on there may have been a big difference between what was believed and signed for, versus actual.

[RatherBeFlying]

For argument's sake, lets postulate that the seafood was 75T instead of 53T yielding an overload of 22T.

The required speeds would be:
root (370 / 348) ~= 3% over those for MTOW. From Breel's numbers, I obtain:
Flap 20 -- Vr 166 V2 176
Flap 10 -- Vr 172 V2 184

Remember also that MTOWs for a given set of conditions assume an engine loss at V1 whereas here we had all engines "operating normally" instead of the nominal 75% power after V1.

Taking the reports attributed to TSB's Fowler of 130 kt achieved (don't know at what point) instead of the desired 160 kt (in conflict with Breel's and my numbers) and postulating a linear effect on the speed achieved (until hearing from the better qualified), the full thrust overload factor would have to be something like 25% which would produce an 87T overload and a TOW of 435T -- with that kind of overload (which I do not believe), I would think that one or more tires would fail during taxi or takeoff.

Reports seem to confirm that close to the full runway was used; so we seem to be left with: the parking brake left on, or a reduced thrust setting (reports of a suddenly increased thrust when well down the runway support this), or a combination of these factors, which then brings crew fatigue into the question.

[Paladini]

SNAM!

I remember vividly my second (first successful), post-military, interview with Air Gone Wrong (AHK), when asked by Cpt Blackwell whether I considered Cargo second rate. My answer was, "I feel no differently carrying pax or cargo, my responsibility is "MY ARSE" first"! I got the job!

Operating the B742 for 8 years now, my answer is still the same. Whether you have 472+ Hadji's on board or 103.8 tonnes of "chips" out of Penang.... the answer remains.

Fighter/Recce "Pukes" used to sneer at the "trash-haulers", austensibly because they weren't good enough to fly the "fast-stuff". B.S.! I've flown both "Queens-of-the-sky", the Phantom and the Jumbo..... no difference to the professional, except the Phantom could do mach 2! Responsibility is the same.
(edited for the Queen's English)

[Few Cloudy]

Just a point about the thrust increase heard during the TO run - this is not an indication that reduced thrust had been set at the start.

The engines are never run at the rating which can be obtained by - as Boeing put it - Firewalling the throttles, even when Full thrust is used.

Firewalling gets every last ounce of thrust out of the engines and may well cause irreparable damage to them. It is a last ditch method in dire trouble - as this case appears to have been.

[cw6]

Slot.
Thanks for the back up regarding 747 "fecal"'s post about the fillet fairing's.
Appreciate it !.:ok:

[747FOCAL]

slot,

The picture was taken roughly same time last year. I have one of it taking off, but you can't see the missing fairing.

Really makes no difference as it was not the reason for the crash.

[disconnected]

Thank you for the comments on my previous post. All I did is vocalise what many of you already know.

To me this is a watershed accident. It will be the study of safety lectures for years to come. However I feel the thread is focusing on the symptoms and not the cause.

As I watch the development of the thread, there is a tendency amongst some to defend MK. I do however feel that we should draw a distinction between the crews and those who manage at a higher level. I know many of MK’s present and previous pilots. Indeed they are a very practical bunch who know the basics and in a tight spot quickly revert to a simple solution that draws heavily on a previously learnt, solid aviation background. That, combined with common sense, makes them very versatile. Some of these skills are a direct result of survival in Zimbabwe and Rhodesia.

Indeed sometimes I wish these qualities could be displayed when I watch simulator sessions go wrong purely because of lack of background in the airline trained and groomed pilots who know no other way apart from the highly proceduralised channels they have followed. Their minds are often so full of fine-print that the greater objective is blurred. These are the products of both a welfare state and a purely specialist training. This is a topic, all on its own, which I leave to the CRM gurus of the industry who are still searching for the perfect tools. I wish them well – it is very complicated.

However, I can also say with authority that these same MK pilots enter a different world when they leave MK for a more professional outfit. Almost to a man, they admit that they didn’t know what they didn’t know. The complexities of the industry, the true professionalism of an outfit that acknowledges that the pilots are only the final defence against disaster, are often a cold shower of reality. The learning curve is steep. Ultimately they settle down to be very well rounded professionals.

And yes they do often come from disciplined backgrounds like the airforce, but let us not forget that 2 of MK’s hull loses were commanded by the same airforce pilot. Again there is more to modern commercial aviation than a very capable pair of hands and discipline.

I too understand the pressure. I openly admit that I have blatantly broken the rules at the behest of a country’s dictator. Either that or I lost my job - perhaps worse. I managed my personal risks but then I was younger and also did not know what I did not know. A responsible hierarchy would never have placed me there. When the authorities don’t understand the risks, the outcome is variable. And eventually tragic.

For management there is a balance. They are responsible for watching for the warning signs and taking them seriously. They are responsible for putting up the sensors that detect these signs. They are responsible for putting in place a system that catches most errors before the crews are forced to initiate a recovery. I hope all managements, however good, take this accident as a poignant refresher.

So too must the management turn a profit. After all that keeps us all in a job. We all work hard to get the job done. However modern cargo ops are not the desperate plight of the Berlin Airlift. It’s all about money. I personally cannot condone an operation, however dynamic, that might well result in incinerated houses, mass funerals and children with their faces burnt off. You get the picture.

I admire the entrepreneur. To carve a niche is this business is no small feat. But best he know his business. Every aspect of it – including safety.

[Phileas Fogg]

Disconnected,
Very well put, there have been previous posts here about 'professional' crew members and would they do such a particular thing or allow it to happen, a crew member can only be as professional as the company, the rest of the team, he works with and/or for.

Having previously worked in cargo ops myself for 5 years operating geriatric jets on a tight budget I know such a scenario
only too well. I'm well aware of the reputation MK have and some of their operating practices.

Carelessness and/or lack of paying attention to detail seems to come as second nature, several hull losses have been well publicised but not all, what about the DC8 nosewheel retraction whilst on stand at Manston and whilst the cargo door was open, another hull lost.

The ACMI rates MK were charging when I was in cargo, well they were either operating at a loss or they were cutting corners, bearing in mind that these years later they are still in business it would appear they weren't operating at a loss!

[Breel]

Excellent post from Disconnected. P.Fogg also makes an interesting point. Economic principles about competition (in any industry) basically state that any business that cannot survive within the legal framework of the industry will go out of business. What MK has achieved over the years has been a result of twisting this principle of remaining within the legal framework, and as a result people have died. How much is a man's life worth?

"Kruger denied that his airline had ever compromised safety" (article form Sunday Times)

This sounds like the comment of a desperate man trying to wash the blood off his hands! The rot starts at the top. Kruger has from the very beginning compromised safety to "deliver the freight", everyone at MK knows that. That safety culture, or lack thereof, is still as prevelent today despite the three previous crashes and the revised operating procedures.

And whilst there have been posts on how the MK crew are being "exploited" by MK management, they are not without blame. Perhaps through denial, ignorance or naivety, or combination of such, (none of which are acceptable excuses) they have and CONTINUE to bend the rules. If Mike Kruger is holding a gun to the crews' heads, THEY THEMSELVES are the ones pulling the trigger in a "game" of Russian roulette by accepting to fly under these conditions!! It's a powerful gun, and innocent people are in the crossfire.

How much is a man's life worth? A lousy US$50 HOTAC ... sound familiar?!

[BEagle]

As someone once said:

"If you think safety is expensive, try paying for an accident!"

[Fuel100]

The 'Swiss Cheese Model' has been mentioned a couple of times in this thread with regard to the MK’s previous accidents and it seems to me that this model is being put up almost as an excuse, in defense of, or a reason for the accidents. Whereas, in reality, the Swiss Cheese Model merely tries to explain, metaphorically, a chain of events leading to an accident. The trick, if you like, is to break the chain, or close just one hole.

The fact that MK operate into some less than desirable airports would make the adherence to laid down procedures that much more imperative (because some of the holes are already lined up before they get there!). I mentioned a few airlines in a previous post that have a good track record, they religiously stick to procedures no matter where the airport. Maybe not as flexible as MK, but safer and more expensive. It is the extra expense that is the problem for these types of operators.

[Phileas Fogg]

("If you think safety is expensive, try paying for an accident!")

It's not a problem for some people.

MK's DC8-50's were becoming out of date, of the hull losses did MK re-invest the insurance payouts into replacement DC8-50's?

No, it was re-invested into DC8-60's and B747's, what a way to upgrade one's fleet!

[Dengue_Dude]

I stopped reading when I got to your comments about being angry when commercial considerations outweigh (no pun intended) safety.

Every airline I've been in/near state 'safety is our top priority'.

Would anyone go near them if they didn't say that?

Now guess how many fingers I would need to hold up to indicate how many airlines actually MEANT that.

I could indicate it easily even if I was Captain Hook.

The brutal reality is that aviation is cut throat and safety like everything else is negotiable.

I've flown with pilots that could barely get through the flightdeck door - they must have weighed 220 lb plus, then they have a nav bag. But we all weigh the same (wonder why we do a medical then huh?).

The assumption is that all the crew weigh the same - of course we do, that's why the health authorities are SO worried about obesity.

Our passengers too - especially in charter airlines have a set weight. If they fly BA they weigh 'x' lb/kg, if they fly on bucket holiday they weigh 'y' - the very same people. Yet load/trim sheets are calculated to the lb/kg.

When was the last time 'Standard weights' were updated despite input from the Health Authorities. A fatal commuter crash in the states was put down directly to being overweight recently - but what has been done?

It's complete rubbish. Standard weights are used for luggage and often exceeded as is cabin walk-on baggage.

Why? Because if actual weights were used, passengers might have to be offloaded, commercially unacceptable.

I asked for an aircraft to be check-weighed (pax load and baggage) on arrival from Spain once, due to a mix up with actual and standard weights which were tonnes different. I had three chances of that - fat, slim and none. It'll never happen. Company's don't WANT to know the answer. It never happened.

Flight Safety costs money, commercialism is what pays the bills.

Sad fact of life - and most of us that actually fly agree with your position, but the system doesn't back us up.

This perhaps explains why we have gross and net take off performance standards.

Whenever an aircraft takes off at performance limited weight (mass) you can bet in reality it is OVERWEIGHT.

The CEO will however still trot out 'Safety is our Prime Concern'.

Regards.

[bizflyer]

Re comment about insurance payments being used to upgrade the fleet!!?

I would have thought that there may be significant difficulty for the operator to insure the aircraft if some of the allegations in this thread are either true or can be demonstrated to be.

I guess if insurance is possible for them, the premiums will increase and their margins become ever more difficult to attain, putting further pressure on the operation to control cost.

A vicious circle?

[Phileas Fogg]

bizflyer,
I think you may just find that insurance is a mandatory requirement for any commercial aircraft.

[Flight Safety]

If the cause of this accident turns out to be an aircraft overloading problem, I'd like to make the following 2 recommendations regarding air freight operations worldwide.

One, make it a serious crime (felony level) to purposely understate the weight of cargo to be shipped by air, given that the temptation to lower the freight charges by understating the weight is rather great.

Two, air freight operators should derive a special shipping rate for cargo that loses weight in transit, such as flowers that lose water to evaporation during transit. At least then the weight at takeoff can be more accurately reported.

(edited for typo)

[cw6]

Philieus Fog,

Just to set you straight ," the nose wheel retraction at MSE with the cargo door open- another hull lost"

Again someone talking rubish, the aircraft had a GPS replaced. To do this on the first officers side one has to follow a simple procedure.
The engineer who had done this task had not placed the landing gear lever back in the extend position.
After the crew got on the hydraulics were switched on and the nose gear retracted.
The hull was not lost .The aircraft was towed to the crago shed at MSE and spent the next 7 weeks being repaired.
Douglas/Boeing were involved and drew a repair scheme.All above board under the scrutiny of the manafacturer.
Oh and by the way it was 9G-MKH.

Just to set the record straight .















:ok:

[Lou Scannon]

Here's a better idea that would knock the fiddles right on the head:

All aircraft on all registers should be made to fit or activate the sensors that can present an actual auw readout on the flight deck.

I remember them being discussed or offered some fifteen to twenty years ago, but no company wanted them as the calculated weight is always better, commercially, than the real one!

We have all, at some time, juggled the figures to complete a flight, trusting perhaps too much on the scribbled numbers on a load chit thrust at us just before push back.

If all companies on all registers had them fitted, the oft mentioned playing field would still be level!

[Code Blue]

When was the last time 'Standard weights' were updated despite input from the Health Authorities

Apparently the rumour is Transport Canada are about to increase their Standard weights, by approx 5% :rolleyes:

[Sleeping Freight Dog]

Ok, I can't stand this anymore. As someone who had loaded
this aircraft many, many, many times in its previous life,
I can not fathom how any body in their right mind would accept
a loaded aircraft and not verify the weight. I will tell you personally, there was not one kilo of cargo that went on that
aircraft when I was responsible that was not weighed properly, either at delivery to the warehouse or definitely upon final load out of the cargo pallets and ulds. Who on earth would guestimate the weight of a load of seafood? The handler who
processed that shipment is criminally negligent.
While it may be "common practice" in certain parts of the world to operate upon that assumption, sooner or later that turns out to be a deadly consequence.

[411A]

These sensors aren't anything like fifteen or twenty years old, Lou, more like thirty.
The 'ole B707F had 'em, and altho the STANS system had its detractors, if properly maintained and calibrated, it was quite accurate.

Of course, it requires cash to maintain, so it fell by the wayside in the headlong rush to the bottom line.

[broadreach]

From some recent postings overweight seafood as a cause would almost appear to be hardening from conjecture into fact.

That's probably because there's nothing much else in the way of fact to discuss. It may be the easiest reason to pursue and may yet turn out to be cause. But focussing on this now is wrong because it rather gossiply assumes the loadmaster was totally derelict in his duties, either turning a blind eye to gross overloading at the last loading airport or winking at what he thought was normal slight underdeclaring.

Again, that may have been the case. But SleepingFreightDog's post is a good reminder of professionalism.

Say you start from a different assumption. First, that MK are a professional outfit and, despite all the references here to pushing their crews, they actually pay salaries and can attract competent people, inlcuding loadmasters.

Then, that loadmaster jobs, demanding as they may be, are not exactly abundant and, thus, still something people compete for.

If you accept that, you would also have to accept that the loadmaster on this aircraft was a professional and, in a competitive environment, concerned with doing a good job - and keeping it. It's not just his own job - and life - on the line, so one could also assume the rest of the crew he works and flies with is as concerned with how he plays his part as he is with how they do.

There are umpteen ways any person experienced with moving cargo about sees and feels discrepancies; it's a job that fine-hones suspicion and develops a keen sense of exactly where to look for fake info. He would be watching flts lifting the cargo, listening for the load on their hydraulic systems, hefting some boxes from the pallets himself, watching pallets roll and seeing how much effort it took shove them into position, checking as much as he could. Always suspicious. He would probably have loaded the same cargo on previous flights and, if he hadn't, would likely be twice as cautious.

I find it very difficult to conceive that any experienced loadmaster, in a competitive company, with a professional flight crew looking over his shoulder and checking his figures, knowing they were close to maxing out, could possibly have been other than very concerned at the accuracy of declared weights on the last cargo they were taking on board prior to a long flight out of a relatively tight runway. So don't shortchange the man.

[aardvark2zz]

The on board computer, with a very simple software, could warn them of serious danger ahead as they are accelerating.

Use wheel velocity (or airspeed) to calculate acceleration. Add the EPR indication one can calculate mass. Further more you can calculate:

- velocity at runway length (assuming entered or from database)
- runway length used at 160 knots (or V1)
- abnormal acceleration
- etc.....

I wonder why they don't have this ??

[Dengue_Dude]

Please don't misunderstand me, I understand your comments and what's more I AGREE ENTIRELY.

I'm not excusing the practice, the attitude and the fiddles.

In past lives I've taught Weight and Balance on large aircraft, including freighters.

When I started, I thought the difference between Net and Gross Performance was just 'money' in your back pocket (for money read 'safety').

What saddens me is that not only do Companies condone (by INaction) these practices, so do the Certifying Authorities who KNOW these practices go on and do nothing (or very little of substance) to stamp them out.

Sending an AIC around once a flood does NOT constitute DOING something.

HGV's are checked (in Europe anyway) from time to time by the authorities to check that they are not overweight. It's a damn shame that this practice cannot be done at Official instigation in the the Aviation Industry - both pax AND freight.

Lou's suggestion about an indicator in the Flight Deck of our ACTUAL weight would make us (and our human/freight cargo) much safer.

Using ACTUAL weights of pax and baggage would at a stroke make the charter industry safer BUT then the inevitable consequence would be a price rise.

Ergo we are back in a circular argument.

This has been a bone of contention to me for many years, that's why I sympathise with SNAM's comments.

The only way this COULD be resolved is if ALL crews went on strike until actual, verifiable weights were used ALL the time.

How many chances are there of THAT happening - back to FAT, SLIM and NONE.

So whilst I feel better for writing it, it makes no difference to those poor sods who were killed OR (perhaps more importantly since they were volunteers) their families.

It would be nice (but naive) to think that the result of THIS particular tragedy could be improvement and a resolve NOT to allow the kind of practices that predominate. (This based upon a prejudgement that the aircraft WAS overloaded).

I would ask anyone who wants to jump in and tell me I shouldn't pre-judge (and you are quite CORRECT). Ask yourself this question,

How many times have you accepted an aircraft that you KNEW was overweight, despite what the Loadsheet says?

The answer is of course your business not mine. Sadly it's a Business we share.

Edited phor spelin - agayn

[Phileas Fogg]

Just to back Dengue_Dude's post, what's the nominal weight for hand baggage? In the old days hand baggage was exactly that but these days, being a regular traveller these pillocks, often referred to as passengers, are taking allsorts on board including clearly what is hold baggage, there ain't no way this baggage conforms anywhere near to the nominal weights but I've never been asked to have my hand baggage weighed.

[CR2]

Even the 747-400F, being a newish type of aircraft has a Weight & Balance computer. However, it's tolerance is around 2%, so at mtow of 397T there could be an over/under read of .... nearly 8T.

We asked Airbus to have a tolerance of 1% on the A380F. They said "no can do, problems, expensive, etc etc"...

[Tom the Tenor]

P Fogg: "These pillocks, often referred to as passengers."

Despair.

[Arkroyal]

these pillocks, often referred to as passengers, are taking allsorts on board including clearly what is hold baggage, there ain't no way this baggage conforms anywhere near to the nominal weights but I've never been asked to have my hand baggage weighed.Pillocks who are asked to do this by certain Locos, like Ryan and Easy.

Less stuff to check in and handle, and a lighter (on paper) aircraft in one easy (no pun) move.

Money saved all round. :yuk:

[Phileas Fogg]

I didn't mean to start an international incident, I've never flown a Loco, oh I did fly KLM the other week, they're scrimping by no longer serving alcohol in economy so I'll consider them a Loco from now on.

In my post I was referring to the individuals who are knowingly putting an aircraft over it's anticipated weight and without declaring the excess.

Accepted, the check-in staff and boarders should be more dilligent but it is these passengers that seemingly don't care if the aircraft gets off the ground or not, saving a few dollars on excess baggage or clearing the destination airport, providing they make it that far, 10 minutes quicker seem to matter more than their own lives and that of the other passengers and crew.

[Sky Wave]

If you work out the number of aircraft verses number of airports would it be easier to install weighbridges at airports? Sure it would be expensive, and airports with multiple runways would need a few however there are advantages. You could have a large illuminated sign telling the pilots the weight and this could be recorded so that the authorities / ATC Tower have records in case of incidents. It would be much easier to control calibration of the airport weighbridges than it would to control the calibration of every aircraft in the world, and an un-calibrated weight and balance computer is more dangerous than no computer at all. Also I doubt built in weight and balance computers would ever be a no go item on the MEL so any unscrupulous operators are likely to ignore failures.

Of course, you can argue that it's a bit late finding out that your overweight when you arrive at the hold, however the costs and inconvenience caused to the operator would soon make people solve the problems that led to the overweight in the first place.

Just a thought.!

[747FOCAL]

Sky Wave, The weigh bridge is a good idea though in practice under certain conditions it may give you false readings.

Imagine your at a particular airport that happens to have high winds. High enough that your actually getting some lift. Now the pilot gets concerned because he thinks he is at a certain weight and the weigh bridge says much less. It's back to the gate to redo everything all over again.

[Sky Wave]

:O Ha Ha. The obvious flaw. That'll be why we weigh aircraft indoors then.

Obviously the same must apply with an on board weight and balance system. The weight on wheels will be less in a strong wind

[CR2]

Sky Wave, I can confirm non MEL item. Some airports do have weigh-bridges. Bogota comes to mind.

rgds

[Ranger One]

I would echo the comments of a previous poster that this may well prove to be a 'watershed' accident. Especially if it's found to be entirely down to overloading.

Re. weighbridges - nice idea, although practical problems as other posters have pointed out. But look - wherever money is changing hands on the basis of weight, there are weighbridges. Every two-bit lash-up quarry and scrapyard has a weighbridge, dammit. Spot-checks for truckers at roadside weighbridges. Our industry needs to 'get with the program', as Americans say - we're the most weight-critical industry around!

A pre-departure taxi-on weighbridge is a great sanity check idea, but optional, IMHO... the way to go is 100%, certified, weighing of *everything* as it is loaded to the holds, by law - whether freight, pax, or combi ops. That would be a fitting legacy for this accident - if, as I say, it turns out to be a gross overload.

You don't guess and hope the weight of a bunch of lobsters and ice, or take the word of someone who has a vested interest in telling porkies, or trust they haven't mixed-up lb and kg, or counted the containers wrongly - you *weigh* the bloody things, and you do it *right*. And so do all your competitors, because fiddling or telling porkies is fraud at best, endangering the safety of an aircraft at worst - and you go to jail.

Or am I a crazy idealist?

R1

[Ex NAV]

Anyone out there got a email addr. for bill Fowler, the TSB investigator.
Worked with him in the 90's - excellent operator and real gent
tks:O

[arcniz]

aardvark2zz wrote: The on board computer, with a very simple software, could warn them of serious danger ahead as they are accelerating.

THIS - real-time acceleration analysis during each and every departure roll - is the 21'st century way to solve the problem, even if weighbridges and other passive controls are added as a further means to assure load limits.

The informal discussion here has clearly pointed out that quite a number of factors can influence the ability of the bird to depart her runway in the time and space available. Weight, elevation, temperature, humidity, thrust, wheel friction, winds, turbulence, runway surface contamination, etcetera. A large number of variable but potentially decisive factors affect the launch outcome. Most are hard to know precisely and uncontrollable once the roll begins. The choices mid-roll devolve to power, airfoils, and reject/braking.

Departure performance is pre-calculated with an expected weight, thrust, slope, winds, temps, etc. The calculation, as done manually, creates a few numbers such as MTOW and V-speeds. But the same information and the same calculation can just as easily create a complete moment-by moment profile curve, expressed as speed vs distance or acceleration vs time or roll distance vs time from throttle up.

Having this computed curve of expected performance at hand, it is the most natural thing in the world for a little bit of electronics to compute a moment-by moment 'actual performance' during the roll from airspeed, surface radar, gps, wheel spin, acceleration, or all of the above. By continuously comparing the projected performance with the observed values, the resulting real-time all-encompassing magical performance number would provide a very true comparison of expected versus actual progress in safely unsticking from mother earth. And the information - at least for gross deviations in performance - would be available and useful early in the roll, making an informed take-off abort possible before the uncertainty of stopping makes scrubbing the takeoff a terribly hard decision.

This evolving launch data could be plotted in detail on the FE console, if present, but a few lights would probably serve the purpose up front. Green, amber, red and brown might be appropriate.

What this bit of kit would do is add method and precision to just what a pilot does now: monitor the progress of the takeoff run and determine whether it "feels" right or not. The difference is that it would add a degree of accountable precision to a seat-of-the-pants process and work just as well in cold dark places, in rain and snow and other cases where crew sensory perception is constrained.

In an era where good electronics can be created cheaper and easier than good plumbing, this is not an expensive thing to do.. in comparison to the cost of a tragically failed departure. Certainly it can be integrated into aircraft electronic systems, but that is a long-cycle evolution. For sooner availability, the necessary bits could be made fairly cheap and reliable as an add-on black box or even as a portable unit for application on all those ageing airframes hauling heavy stuff in the night.

The history of aviation is trial and error. The best monument to those lost in the process is to SOLVE the problems that tragedy reveals. RIP.

[RatherBeFlying]

Yes, I know that it will cost a forest full of trees to republish takeoff performance tables, but the computational task is straightforward.

Having the PNF monitoring the stopwatch up to V1 as well as airspeed and engine parameters can catch all of these nasty conditions during takeoff while there's still time to stop the beast on the remaining runway.

The stopwatch has to be monitored during non-precision approaches; so, it looks like time to begin doing it on takeoffs as well.

And yes, the glass cockpit jobs can integrate time to V1 into the FMC and flight display.

[Flight Safety]

Arcniz, here are some links to research into the concept of a Takeoff and Performance Monitoring System, which you discribe:

NASA TOPMS research (http://oea.larc.nasa.gov/trailblazer/SP-4216/chapter6/ch6-5.html)

University of Saskatchewan thesis on TOPMS system (http://library.usask.ca/theses/available/etd-04242003-171306/)

NASA TOPMS cockpit display development (http://nix.larc.nasa.gov/info?id=EL-1996-00060&orgid=1)

As you can see, the concept of a Takeoff and Performance Monitoring System is being worked on by some groups. That's a good thing, because I think it's a great idea.

I also agree with RatherBeFlying, as long as the time vs speed parameters can be derived fairly easily, the stopwatch will work until a more sophisticated system can be created.

(edited to add a comment)

[Self Loading Freight]

How accurately is engine thrust known? It could all boil down to something as simple as F=MA - if you know any two of those, you can instantly derive the third. If the aircraft knows that it's putting out so many kilograms of thrust and it's accelerating at so many metres per second squared, then it's effectively weighed itself - and will be able to spot that it's operating outside the safe envelope, or if the input weight to the FMC is at gross variance with the empirically derived figure. Much simpler than arcniz' proposal of monitoring multiple factors during take-off, but perhaps useful nonetheless - and automatic, which may be a bonus if you drop the stopwatch.

Couldn't such a system be achievable with some extra software in the existing FMCs and no hardware changes at all? Not being anything other than an armchair consumer of avionic information, I don't know how the calibration would work or whether there'd be any point in trying to derive the normal operating parameters of the aircraft by routinely monitoring performance and building up a database of observed readings, but the physics is at heart as simple as it gets.

Perhaps this might be a quick yet effective first step in catching this class of accident. I could even see it being a task that something as simple as a PDA with GPS could cope with (but that's not to understate the problem of false positive alarms). A full TOPMS system has to be a good idea, but sometimes you get a lot of the benefits of a complex idea with a relatively small core feature set.

R

[ramble on]

Some Dassault products already display accelaration in G on the PFD.

In these aircraft, the expected Accelaration is provided as part of the Takeoff Data computation, but not often used day to day.

Time to 100kts used to be a stopwatch check used in my dim dark past.

A difference between calculated and actual times was a pretty good reason for stopping. Don't see it considered much in the civilian world.

[Janeee]

I am not a pilot, just a crew member. I have followed this thread avidly because I have a strong connection with one of the people involved. These questions may appear superfluous to the experienced and for that I apologise.
There are two things that I don't understand.
When flying a 747-200 there are two pilots and a flight engineer who all have to agree on the EPR, is that right?
Secondly, if it is known that the aircraft is heavy and that at the end of the runway is a bern built out of concrete, can the EPR not be set so that the engines have full thrust regardless - or are there likely to be consequences of setting the engines to full power even if it may not be required.

[Stu Bigzorst]

Janeee,

The thrust is always calculated and set so that you will be airborne at the end of the runway by a safe margin.

Something here has gone wrong. Either the aircraft was heavier than the paperwork said, or something else has happened to the same effect.

It is sometimes only apparent to the pilots that something's wrong when it's too late. They may have applied full thrust as a last minute bid to save the day, but it didn't work.

Hope this helps,

Stu

[747FOCAL]

Anybody think it should be required that all commercial aircraft have a weight and balance system installed?

[GotTheTshirt]

Reading this thread one gets the impression that the professional load master leaps out with his set of scales. weight the boxes, secures them on the pallet, adds up the total pallet weight, and loads the pallets into the correct pallet postion on the aircraft to allow for floor weight and C. of G.

I must have been in the wrong operation :)

On a 1 hour turnaround or through stop the LM had 1 hour to get the pallets off and load the new ones
on (23/28 pallets).

All he has to work on is the declared pallet weight.
If thats out he is out !
I would be interested to see how long the aircraft and loadmaster spent in Halifax and how many pallets he loaded.

If there is an error it is not likely to be the LM, it will be underdeclared pallets weights

On some of our operations we loaded the pallets in our own facility but in some cases we just picked up from the forwarder/ handling agent

[CargoOne]

Any news on FDR/CVR readout?

[GOLDEN LION]

I thought Halifax was only an en-route tech stop...

Did they pick up any load ?????

[Phileas Fogg]

Golden Lion,
Why on earth would anyone tech-stop a B747 on an 8,500ft runway when you have Bangor, Goose & Gander all available and with longer runways?
It is common knowledge that Halifax is the seafood pick-up and that's what they were doing there.

[RMBF]

More to the point,

Have you read none of the preceding 26 pages of posts???

[Fuel100]

CargoOne: “Any news on FDR/CVR readout?”

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada said the MK Airlines jet was rolling down the runway at 150 mph, about 35 mph slower than it should have been, when it crashed Oct. 14 at Halifax International Airport, the Globe and Mail reported Saturday.

"In order to get to (the minimum 184 mph) within the available runway, they needed more thrust," Bill Fowler of the TSBC said Friday. The jumbo jet was barely airborne when it rocketed off the end of the runway and crashed into a wooded area, killing all seven crew members.

He said a flight data recorder recovered from the wreckage last weekend indicated the 747's four engines were functioning normally. Fowler wouldn't speculate why the plane didn't have enough thrust.

[747FOCAL]

I was told they were at 1.3 EPR and should have been at 1.6. :(

[Shore Guy]

While not jumping to any conclusions on the cause of this accident, 747Focal’s post is what I considered a high probability cause. It has been my experience that in three crewmember aircraft where the TO Thrust setting is manually computed by the FE, rarely is there a procedural or operational crosscheck of the values presented. Now in this situation (relatively short runway/heavy payload), EPR should have been near/at MAX allowable.

Time will tell all.

[Queenslander]

How difficult/expensive can it be to modify the onboard computer to calculate weight. The aircraft has an undercarriage, the undercarriage strut requires oil at pressure, so why not put three sensors onto the strut, link the sensors to the computer and the computer calculates the current PSI which is then converted to a weight?

[Trash Hauler]

747FOCAL Stated 'I was told they were at 1.3 EPR and should have been at 1.6. '

Where did you get this information from?????

[HotDog]

Queenslander, most 747 freighters have a weight and balance computer fitted. The system weighs the airplane, computes the centre of gravity of the airplane and displays the gross weight and the MAC on indicators on P4 Flight Engineer's panel. The indications are cross checked against the load sheet and have to meet certain tolerances before flight. There are 18 weight sensors located in the landing gear axels, one for each wheel and an attitude sensor which senses the longitudinal attitude angle of the airplane. My last nine years of aviation career was spent operating 747-200F aircraft.

[Queenslander]

HotDog, is it SOP to use them or cross reference them with the trim sheet? How accurate are the readings from them?

[BEagle]

1.3 instead of 1.6 EPR sounds a large error...... But a very plausible explanation. Does it have any substance or is it just a rumour?


Some years ago, a certain Big Airline was contracted to do charter flights for the military. One day one of their 747 crews entered the RW length as 12000 ft instead of 10000. The a/c only just managed to become airborne.......

[HotDog]

Queenslander, in my Company any significant difference between loadsheet and weight & balance computer read out was investigated before further flight.

[747FOCAL]

I can't reveal where I got the information for obvious reasons. It is accurate though.

[csomesense]

As accurate as the gen you previously posted with the photo attached?:uhoh:

[A-FLOOR]

I would say about as accurate as the way you jump people on their backs in this thread :E

[747FOCAL]

:rolleyes:

[Captain Airclues]

I would be interested to know if MK operste a mix of engine types. Several years ago a major airline operated a mix of P&W powered 747-100s and RR powered 747-200s. Because of the different situation of the probes, the max EPR on the -100 was 1.44 and the max EPR on the -200 was 1.63. On a max power take-off from Miami, the engineer, who had been predominently flying the -200, set 1.63 instead of 1.44. The aircraft performed very well but they didn't use the engines again. Do it the other way round and you might not use the plane again.

Airclues

[747FOCAL]

MK's fleet is mix but they are all Pratt.

[gas path]

Airclues
I'd be very suprised at that 'cause although it's possible to get a 9D to do that, the give away is the little orange lights on the EGT guages that come on at 915c. ............I suppose they could have snagged it for an EGT limited shortfall:ooh:
1.3 instead of 1.6 EPR sounds a large error......
I believe the MK a/c had JT9D-7Q3, they have a (max) T.O EPR of 1.51 (standard day!) so to set it at 1.3 the t/l wouldn't be even half way up the 'gate', at that setting the 3.0 bleed would be barely closed.:uhoh:

[Techman]

In my company it is standard practice to calculate the N1 as well, and use it as a cross check when TO thust is set.

[Fuel100]

I have never been happy with all the overweight theories that have been brandied about on this thread because, I wonder, just how overweight would this aircraft have to be to still be on the ground at the berm? I would doubt that a slight overweight error would result in an accident – it would have to be massive, which is unlikely. A simulator or performance exercise would prove or disprove this. There are, or should be, pads built into the performance figures to cater for slight errors – I do not know if MK retain the pads in their performance data.

Bill Fowler of the TSBC said “they needed more thrust”. 747Focal has been told that 1.3epr was set instead of 1.6. A 1.3epr setting, at this weight, at YHZ r/w 24, will cause an accident. If the 1.3 setting proves to be correct then the next question is: Why was 1.3 set instead of 1.6 and why did all three miss the error? I can only think of one possible explanation: Fatigue, mind numbing fatigue.

[747FOCAL]

These guys want to beat me up and all I want to do is cry for the dead and make sure, as much as we can, this never happen again. All in favor say aye......

[TheShadow]

What could cause a high EPR gauge over-reading? (i.e. on all 4)

borescoping?

compressor wash?

p2T icing (a la Air Florida 732 - AF90 on 13 Jan 1982)

CB's tripping/left out? fuse blowing?

bleed-air selection? aircon configuration?

some pneumatic function?

Overnight parking plugs left in?

Are these EPR gauges easy to misread? The N1 gauges?

What could cause a crew to roll, become distracted and forget to get the correct power "set"?

Would sabotage show up before their t/off roll? (vaseline or ???over the Pt2 probes?)

[Arkroyal]

Aye!

Fuel100, I'm with you there. Recently been working flat out and making errors, not this big, but then, the holes didn't all line up. For these poor beggars; they (possibly) did:(

[broadreach]

Fuel 100

Agree. And I'd suspect the investigators and insurers would soon abandon the likelihood of overweight lobsters as a cause.

Unless, and please take this as pure hypothesizing to support a hypothetical overweight cargo scenario.

What percentage of the aircraft's cubic capacity would fifty tons of lobster in styrofoam boxes (an earlier poster has explained how they're packed, pre-cooled into deep sleep, no water, etc) consume? Guess: 2/3rds? The previously loaded cargo, lawn mowers/tractors, would have been pretty dense.

Next, are 50t parcels the norm? If 5t parcels are more the custom, day after day, then it might be that packing them in a little more densely might develop into one of those accepted habits that put the gross weight out by an acceptable ton or so.

Then, once underdeclaring on small parcels is accepted practice, along comes a much larger booking. Nobody's batted an eyelid over it for yonks so accepting underdeclared weights has become industry policy. Etc.

All the above is stretched hypothesis; when you sit back and think of all the possible circumstances, gross underdeclaring of weight just doesn't seem to fit anywhere. Factor into it that Canadians selling lobsters to Europe are likely to be reasonably acquainted with operational restrictions pertaining to lobsterboats and able to extrapolate onto aircraft what exceeding those restrictions might incur.

So, it just doesn't fit, with me at least.

[Fuel100]

Aye!

I must admit that I feel the same as 747Focal. There are eight good men dead, eight families grieving but where is the accountability?

It seems that the rumours are over and we are left with the reality. The aircraft took off with the wrong thrust setting. (TSBC from the flight recorder, 747Focal from an MK source). Why was 1.3EPR set instead of 1.6EPR? I would suggest that basic procedures were not adhered to because that is the basic culture of the airline, as alluded to by ‘dicconnected’. This would have been compounded by the fact that the crew would have been fatigued. As ‘Zim Crew’ pointed out this was a ‘heavy crew’, I understand that they originated in Europe flew to Bradley Int. then to Halifax were to continue to Zaragoza and terminate in Luxemburg – with possible delays along the way. How was a flight like this ever rostered? I know of no rostering practice that would allow multi sector, multi time zone change like this. The final check would have been the seat of the pants experience that tells you that things do not feel right with the acceleration rate – a feeling that would have been suppressed by profound fatigue.

Where to from here? The head of this airline and its Operations Manager are responsible for its safe operation. They have failed miserably. They need to be bought to account.

The bottom line is that this is a tin pot airline with an appalling safety record that should be shut down for the sake of the remaining crew and the people who live in the vicinity of the airports that they operate to.

[Safety Guy]

I heard they were using a laptop computer with software for calculating takeoff performance, and that there may have been a problem with the way the numbers were calculated.

[Khaosai]

With the laptop the potential does exist for errors. Garbage in equates to garbage out. Entry of an incorrect weight, i.e. ZFW instead of TOW would have potentially disasterous results. The system that i have used does not prevent you from inputting data as above. Correct use of SOP, would however, pick it up. Rgds.

[csomesense]

"crying for the dead" (747Focal): "eight good men dead" (Fuel100): "the way you jump people on their backs"???? (nice English)(A-Floor).

A-Floor - from your pm to me, you have absolutely no reason to make comments like this, especially for the immense lack of flight-deck time you hold! And 747Fecal, looking for sympathy with comments like this will only get you despised more, after the way you post a picture of the afflicted aircraft and then admit that it was taken a year prior to the accident... after it had been through a thunderstorm in Europe.

I won't be reading or responding to this site again, before you ask... I have never worked for this MK airline, but I hope that when something like this happens to you, the rest of the world is better behaved than you when speculating on the reasons for their demise. Their families DO actually know how to locate sites like this on the net, and might actually read and believe your inputs.

PS to Fuel100... Tin pot airline? I should imagine if you made such comments against the airline I fly for, you would be hung, drawn and quartered(?) by many members of your own crew (should you actually be a member of one - or are u a plumber?)

But should you actually be a member of an airline somewhere in this world - I long for the day I meet you and 747Fecal in the same room... should the Gods bless me...... I long for the day.

2 Captains, 1 f/o, 2 f/e's, 1 g/e, 1 loadie = 7

???

edited for sake of clarity and the Queen's english - to foresake all the f's, b's and c's!:yuk: :yuk: :yuk: :mad:

To those poor members of this trajedy who might read this thread,


Please remember that all airlines are not as this MK one runs! Some ae luckier than others, but then again, if we all had the ideal job, would we be working at all?

Take care, and love what you do!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[747FOCAL]

csomesense,

Nobody around here is going to give you much credit with rantings and ravings like that, but if you really want to meet I should be in London within 2 weeks. :E :E :\

[I am Birddog]

Anyone here remember NationAir Canada with the 'accident' in Jeddah?

Here is a great website that accounts the many doings of the owner of this company.

http://www.nationair-canada.com/

[A-FLOOR]

Don't go.... I'm sure PPRuNe needs more people like you!

Then again, maybe not :rolleyes:

[AL TAYARA]

Hi,

When I see the reaction of FUEL 100 about MK airlines, it really makes me
furious. The accident in Halifax is to be considered the first real accident
for MK airlines.

Swissair crashed in 1996 in the same area, was Swissair also a tin pot airline?

The 3 previous crashes of MK airlines happened ALL in Nigeria. I assume FUEL100 has never ever flown in Africa, but I can assure him that sometimes You cantrust more the Almighty One , rather than the controltowers over
there.

In 2003, Hydro Air from South Africa, crashed in Lagos because the control
tower had sent them into a closed runway, hitting several pieces of construction
equipment, with luckily no fatalities but a written off airplane.

For what is concerned the crash in Halifax, shouldn't it be better to just wait and
have the results of the investigation, rather than inventing all kind of hipotesis.

Thanks to FUEL 100, actiongroups in Belgium already use his opinion to fight
against MK airlines, really disgusting...

I hope everybody in this professional forum respects our job, at the end of the
story, it is making our living...
Luckily there are still some people like csomesense who act professional.

AL TAYARA

[Phileas Fogg]

AL TAYARA,
I don't agree with Fuel 100's rant either but you cannot claim this is MK's first real accident. Bent airframes with casualties or fatalities are accidents, real ones!

Yes, I know all about Africa, particularly Nigeria but MK are not the only freighters flying from Europe to Africa. Yes, there are accidents related to operations in Africa but 3!!! in a relatively small fleet such as MK's, I've heard of bad luck but this is taking the biscuit.

You cite a landing on a closed runway, none of MK's accidents were due to this, many African accidents are from the 'one hit wonder' airlines operating a ropey B707 or similar, MK should be better than this, unfortunately they are somewhat lacking.

[an-124]

Just heard a RUMOR (after all this is a rumor network) that MK has just had their FAA licence revoked? Anyone verify this?

[WST527]

An-124 yes but along with all Ghana registered operators. This has nothing to do with MK , as I understand Ghana Airways failed an FAA inspection in the US last week approx and they immediately banned all Ghana registered aircraft. Totally unconnected to MK or this accident.

[Fuel100]

WST527 Facts please.

The FAA issued Ghana Airways with a directive not to fly their aircraft to the US on or about the 23 July. MK continued operating to the US so it was not all Ghana registered aircraft as you assert. I do not know if MK are allowed to operate there now.

http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=62872

[csomesense]

Sorry, had to come back to ask (and anxiously awaiting comments from all those who so kindly commented on my exit)

Phileas,

"Yes, I know all about Africa, particularly Nigeria but MK are not the only freighters flying from Europe to Africa...in a relatively small fleet such as MK's"

I might be mistaken, but I often hear a MKA callsign south bound from Europe to somewhere in Central/West Africa - so maybe I don't fly there as often as you or they do, but they sure seem to go there a lot. Maybe three hull losses in Nigeria is a large number to look at initially, but how many other airlines have recorded the same number of landings in the same amount of time in that lovely part of the world? Might be an interesting stastistic to investigate? Plus I've heard that they have seven or eight DC-8's and five or six 747's - is this a small operation, in your opinion? I'm just trying to imagine how many people in this "tin pot" airline would share your views?

Rgds (until another decent response presents itself)

PS

Safety Guy

Just got back, been checking the Sharjah crash. Thank God they all got out okay. Do you know if they happened to be using the same computer data system as those poor souls in MK had - I've heard rumour it was issued by Boeing? Any gen?

[Phileas Fogg]

csomesense,
At the time those incidents occurred, well some of them anyway, MK didn't have any B747's nor indeed any DC8-60's.
Whilst MK is a larger outfit these days I was making reference to the fleet size at the time(s) of the referred to incidents.
In those days, MK were no more different in fleet size to many similar operators, just the others didn't go around bending airframes.
Such a statistic wouldn't be that interesting though, it's appalling!
Phileas

P.S. You used the description 'tin pot', not I!

[csomesense]

Phileas,

My sincerest apologies - it wasn't you who first used that comment "tin pot", it was Fuel100. My mistake. Sorry

Interesting point on the stastics though - why do you think that their crash rated is appaling? In my simple mind, if one company goes into Nigeria once a week, and another goes there five or six times a week, then multiply that over five or six years (when was their first hull loss, and when was the second), then the odds seem to multiply at extreme rates, or is my maths up to bother? Not to put too fine a point on it, but these guys seem to go there when no one else would? I know we wouldn't - at least during the period they would! I don't have the experience to figure out the numbers, I was hoping you might? Accurately?

Rgds CSS

[Fuel100]

CSS,

Using your logic:

If you apply MK’s hull loss rate per landing, in Nigeria, as a percentage of fleet size and then apply that ratio to Nigeria Airways landings, in Nigeria, then Nigeria Airways would probably write off their fleet once a year. They do not. I wonder why?

[Paladini]

Csomesense:

As far as I know, none of the AAI/Lufthansa Contract aircraft, or crew use any 'Computerised' Boeing data. All of their performance data is compiled by NavTech and all calculations on the flight deck are done using these tables...not a computer!

[csomesense]

Paladini,

Thanks for the gen - was just a question. Noteably answered. Will have to dig a bit more before answering.

Fuel 100,

I don't get your point. Because Nigerian Airways haven't written off their fleet once a year, that makes them better than MK? I don't know enough about either airline to comment. But.....

Have you ever heard " Wind 340/5 kts, visibility 7000m in dust haze, weather nil, ???????..............clouds- scatttered at 300 meters, broken at 3000m, tunderstorms in the vicinity, temperature 27, dewpoint 25, QNH 1013"? This is the standard Lagos wx issued every single time I have been into LOS in the past 18 months, and it never seems to change - be it day or night, summer or winter. And I think it might be a bit naive to assume that the Nigerian crews might not be able to gleen(?) a little bit of favouritism from the local controllers, and perhaps a bit more accommadation than a foreign crew might? Ask the crew of that sad looking 747 in LOS with no left wing gear left if they were actually cleared to land on 19R? Why do you think they took the CVR to the hotel with them? Don't assume that the MK crews don't know what they are doing, but look at the whole big picture? Things are sometimes loaded against people who don't go there as often as the locals might? A possibility, maybe? Think about it for a bit? Are you being practical, or just slinging the proverbial **** 'cos this is where you think you'll be heard? What happens when it's your airline, or your flight next time - put yourself in those guys shoes? Humour me? Don't just sling it for the simple reason that people might read and believe - put yourself in their shoes for a moment or two.

And might I hazard to add that we digress from the main topic - has anyone heard anything new on the Halifax crash?

Rgds, Css

[cringe]

Investigation update: Overloading has been ruled out as a cause of the crash. By the calculations, the 747 was within one percent of the planned weight. TSB's Bill Fowler:

The big issues is . . . the aircraft took off with the engines set at substantially reduced power from that required to take off at that weight with this runway in those conditions.

What scenario is the most plausible? Is it mechanical? Is it human error? Is there any other system error that might have led to this?

In the latter portion of the takeoff the thrust went up to maximum. We're confident thrust was available.http://canadaeast.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20041114/CPN/31935022

[Phileas Fogg]

(Have you ever heard " tunderstorms in the vicinity?)

Only in Ireland!

Csomesense,
You seem to be continuing to make excuses for an airline that you admit you don't know much about.

Regardless of the airport, the weather report etc. other airlines do not going around pranging aeroplanes to the degree that MK have achieved.

[Fuel100]

Ok csomesense, I acknowledge the fact that flying in some parts of Africa is more challenging than say, Europe, Middle East, Asia etc. However, rumor has it that MK’s last accident in Nigeria began with a crew modified VOR approach without adhering to the published minima – the aircraft crashed. This kind of behavior cannot be blamed on the country or the continent.

But, as you say, we digress……..

The current rumor is that MK has had their FAA licence revoked (an-124). WST527 said that they have - but the rest of the post was totally incorrect so do not know if to believe even that.

Anyone out there who can categorically refute or confirm the rumor?

[an-124]

Fuel 100 - It is true - but it is not just MK - It is all Ghana operators.

[Flight Safety]

Cringe, thanks for the update. I wonder why the engine power was too low, and why the pilots didn't notice it until late in the takeoff run?

[csomesense]

Phileas,

"Tunderstorms" Not trying to pull a fast one, that is they way they say it - 'dem an' de Irish! Also, although I might not know as much about these airlines as you do - I hate to see people being kicked repeatedly while they're down.

Fuel 100,

...Crew modified VOR approach...

Interesting. Any specifics?

Cringe,

Thanks for the update. A bit puzzled by the...

"Fred Chesbro, ....."Some carriers have been known to unwisely suggest to their pilots that they set lower power settings at takeoff and climb in an effort to save wear on the engines," he wrote."

I always thought that was a Boeing recommendation, not the perogative of the carrier to their pilots? Any comments?

[Phileas Fogg]

csomesense,

I hear what you're saying but having myself worked in cargo for 5+ years not only have I witnessed the cutting of corners but I mixed & drank with MK crews in the Ter Streep bar, Ostend.

I would say that MK has been like an accident waiting to happen but in their case would need to omit the waiting part.

Any airline may be only as good or bad as it's regulating authority permit it to be.

In the instance of an African registration, an airline pays a poorer nation to be registered there and that country does not want to deter such business thus they do not enforce regulations nor inspect the airline to ensure regulations are being adhered to.

Does it not concern you that such unregulated airlines and aircraft have European & N. American traffic rights and it could be your house they're flying over at some time in the future?

Regulated airlines spend a bucket load of money ensuring regulations are adhered to and often cannot compete with non-regulated airlines who may put profit before safety.

If African countries want to allow potentially dangerous aircraft into the air then perhaps those aircraft should be restricted to flying over Africa!

[Fuel100]

Css,

Sorry, bad English. Rumor has it that they took the published VOR approach “enhanced” it by adding GPS that, I suppose, emboldened them to ignore the published minima. The end result was that they could not see the runway when they hit the trees!

(above refers to previous accident in Nigeria)

An-124

Thanks for that. It is all a question of timing. The FAA issued Ghana Airways with a directive not to fly their aircraft to the US on or about the 23 July. MK were still flying to the US after that (this flight transited Bradley International on the 14 October) One can only conclude that MK no longer fly over US airspace as a direct result of this tragic accident.

[blackmail]

dear fellows,

i think this might be a case where murphy struck again at it best: good engine take off parameters caculations but wrong epr settings or wrong calculations with corresponding good epr settings to the same catastrophic result : not enough t/o thrust?

on t/o epr settings are x checked with n1,( emphasized after the air florida accident in the potomac river washington dc, iced up epr probes)but at night in a dimly lit cockpit the difference between a correct n1 or not might not so easy to be seen( murphy again) bring in another couple of the same things in (fatigue eg) & there goes the swiss cheese with all the wholes perfectly (7 à 8 according to the stat's)aligned & an accident waiting to happen at the end of an of course limiting rwy, with some bumps & other obstacle stuff in the overrun area, very sad indeed! reminds me of a similar overrun long ago, of a swiss dc-8 in former athens airport, but on a long landing this time on a slippery rwy, breaking up in a ditch in the overrun area.
pilots were later put on trial & even jailed by the greek authorities. nobody ever asked why it was necessary to dig a ditch in an overrun area!

it's all about: "situational awareness"?
there are some indications the mkcrew realized this late in the tor & put up the thrust, but too late unfortunately. ...

[Safety Guy]

The conjecture is that a glitch in the Boeing performance software may be a factor. I've never used it, but it's been said that it's possible to enter new numbers, but if you don't execute the change, the calculations will be based on the previous numbers. So, if they were alot lighter on departure out of BDL, and they didn't execute their new weight numbers out of YHZ, the computer may have given speeds and EPR for a much lower weight.

[blackmail]

hello safety guy,

it's exactly what i mean: murphy!

[320DRIVER]

Do MK crew use a laptop to perform Take-off perf. calcs?

[Safety Guy]

That is what I was told.

I don't want the information I have posted to be misconstrued. There is great value in the electronic flight bag products that are available on the market today. I fully expect to see a big shift to their use in the coming years. I'd love to see the 50 kgs of books taken out of our cockpits. They're a huge safety hazard in a sudden RTO, never mind how much fuel it costs to carry them around.

Like everything else, a shift to automation must come with a thorough study of the man-machine interface to ensure that adequate checks and balances are in place to validate the information. As the old saying goes, "Garbage in, garbage out." In the middle of the night on a quick turn around, it's easy to make a mistake.

[Rockhound]

Sorry but I'm confused. They were at max TOW. Would (should) they not automatically (without recourse to SOPs, manuals, laptops, etc.) have set max power setting for the TO? Or am I being naive?
Rockhound

[Safety Guy]

On large transport jets, takeoffs with reduced thrust are routine practice, even at maximum weight. There are specific tables and routine procedures for determining the takeoff thrust and speeds. It all depends on the available runway length and the climb requirements. According to the reports, they did not set the proper thrust for the takeoff. There must be a reason for that. The most likely cause is an error in the takeoff performance calculation, which resulted in a lower than required power setting.

[Atlanta-Driver]

Good post Safety Guy

Your explanation was right on the money.

Using reduced thrust reduces wear and tear on engines by keeping temperatures lower. Used daily all around the world, no biggie. Once again a good explanation to a someone who is perhaps not as knowledgeable on the principles of reduced thrust or flies type of aircraft where it is not used.

AD

[747FOCAL]

They also should have been at flaps 20 for this particular takeoff. You could probably make it at flaps 10 if the thrust had been set correctly, but just by the skin of your arse so using flaps 20 would increase safety margins exponentially. :)

[Rockhound]

Safety Guy and others,
Thanks for that. But for a TO at max weight, or close to it, would the appropriate reduced PWR setting not be pretty close to the maximum, so that anything significantly less would become obvious immediately? I am not a pilot, just an interested observer and sincerely appreciate learning from the pros.
Rockhound

[Safety Guy]

Rockhound:

A very good question, and the answer depends on several variables. I'm not an expert on B747 performance, but I understand that it has a pretty significant power reserve, therefore max thrust takeoffs are a pretty rare event. I fly the A330, and I've done max weight takeoffs at 30°C with a thrust reduction up to 25% of the maximum rated thrust.

Your comment regarding the lower power setting being noticeable to a crew is valid, but there are many factors which can reduce the crew's awareness of their acceleration rate (this is my speculation only). The older 747 doesn't have acceleration rate indicators like newer aircraft have (i.e. the Airbus speed trend arrow). One factor on runway 24 in YHZ is that the far end of the runway is lower than the mid point, and it may be that the crew didn't realize their proximity to the far end until it was too late.

It is sad that the CVR is not useable, as I am sure that it would have revealed much more than what will otherwise be found in this case. As always, I suspect that this tragedy was the result of a series of inductive events.

SG

[747FOCAL]

A little inside info.......

EPR was set to 1.3 at beginning of takeoff role. This is the lowest amount of derate for any takeoff under any conditions. (Why this did not appear odd to the person setting the thrust is beyond me)

Sometime around V1, someone on the flight deck set the thrust to what it should have been set originally.

At no time was the throttle firewalled. Somebody on the flight deck knew the proper throttle setting. It was set incorrectly. To move the throttle levers deliberately from 1.3 to the EXACT EPR it should have been leads me to believe it was just a simple mistake. If they had firewalled the throttles, that would have meant they realized they weren't using enough thrust but not know what it really should be.

In the end, instead of going to max forward thrust they should have went to full reverse with brakes and slid into that berm at around 50 kts. Plane would have been lost but the crew would have walked away.

[csomesense]

"Sometime around V1......instead of going to max forward thrust they should have went to full reverse with brakes and slid into that berm at around 50 kts" ???:confused:

Was it before or after V1. I suspect it was after, as I think we would all agree that once that magical figure has been reached, every fibre in your being screams that you must go, no matter what? It certainly doesn't enter my head to entertain stopping after V1. Maybe I'm not as Super-Human as you though?

[Flight Safety]

747focal, I assume you have access to FDR data. It seems to me that this takeoff was a pretty tight balanced field situation. I can't imagine that they somehow didn't grasp that approaching V1 at reduced power, shot their balanced field numbers all to heck. Maybe fatigue would explain this.

Anyway you look at it, they were in a bad fix if they didn't discover the low power settings until V1 (much farther down the runway than V1 should have been).

[747FOCAL]

Yes I have access to what the avg aviation person would not.

Flight Safety,

Your right, given the same circumstances and past V1 my training would have told me to hold fast. Hindsight is 20/ 20. On fire or not going to make it, I choose hitting the brakes. Hopefully the souls behind me will live to fly again another day.

They teach us that V1 is the no go, when in reality there is a whole bunch of buffer/slop in there. So what if you buy the field, farm or highway beyond the end of the runway. Chances of surviving increase dramatically if you never leave the ground.

The reality of our calculations is that when they went to 1.6 EPR, if they had went to full reverse thrust and brakes they would have stopped some 100 yds short of the bearm that ended up breaking off the tail.

[Flight Safety]

From this accident, I'm learning that there's something of a dark side to what "csomesense" referred to as the "magical figure" V1.

When the calculations are done for the runway, weight, field conditions, etc before a takeoff, the figure V1 is assumed to represent the "go no-go" decision speed. The V1 speed is based on the assumption that the aircraft will accelerate at a known rate for the calculated power setting, and thus V1 will be achieved at a predetermined spot some distance down the runway. The whole idea of V1 speed being the "go no-go" decision threshold, is based on the simple assumption that right when V1 is reached, so many feet of runway will be behind you, and so many feet of runway will be ahead of you to successfully abort a takeoff if needed. However the calculated V1 speed is meaningless as the "go no-go" decision point, if you reach V1 at some other point farther down the runway.

Clearly in this accident, if the power settings were too low at the start of the takeoff roll, any length of time accelerating with power settings below what was calculated, will cause you to arrive at V1 a lot farther down the runway than you intended. At this point the calculated V1 is meaningless as a "go no-go" decision speed, as you have no idea how much runway is left (though less for sure) and whether you can takeoff or stop in time.

What your options are at such a point (discovering that your power settings were too low near V1) I'm not really sure. I guess you'd have no other choice but to decide which way is the best way to break the airplane, either accelerating or deccelerating. Personally I'd prefer the lower energy impact myself. :sad:

747focal, I think we pretty much see this the same way.

[Safety Guy]

Gentlemen:

Your comments and analysis are interesting and definitely food for thought, but we must remember that this crew had little if any time to think about their options once they realised they were in trouble. Let's face it, when was the last time that simulator training included such a scenario as this one, other than in a wind shear inducing condition?

I also think that there's a slippery slope to be taken if we muddy the waters of what to do when V1 is reached. Short of an being in an un-flyable airplane, V1 should mean GO! From what is known so far, it appears that this accident is the result of very rare set of circumstances. Let's not throw the baby out with the bath water!

The focus should be on preventing a repeat of the inducing circumstances, not on changing a well documented and researched operating philosophy.

SG

[Rockhound]

747Focal,
I don't think much of your theory that, when one of the crew, at around V1, increased the EPR setting from 1.3 to (the correct) 1.6, he was simply correcting an earlier mistake. V1 being far into the TO roll, when he recognized the low power setting but at the same time intending to continue the TO, surely to God he would have instinctively firewalled the throttles to squeeze out the last ounce of thrust, get airborne and to hell with the increased wear and tear on the engines, exceeding calculated EPR, etc., etc.
Rockhound

[enginefailure]

very interesting discussion.

reg. V1:
maybe it depends on the airport whether you interrupt
your take off run after v1 (what is behind the runway should be
a main factor for such a decision ...)

i still can't understand this accident. the CVR surely would
have given the info. to my knowledge FDR and CVR are located
in the back of a plane. as the back separated from the rest of the plane before it finally crashed, i still can't see why the CVR is
unreadable. but what do i know ?

will we ever know what really happened ?

[747FOCAL]

Rockhound,

Unfortunately it is not a theory. That was taken from actual data recordings.

[mutt]

Takeoff thrust is determined between 60-80 KIAS, if A crew initially selected 1.3 EPR prior to 80 KIAS, and then selected 1.6 EPR around V1, would they actually have their desired takeoff THRUST? Or would they just have the same EPR value?

747FOCAL
Would you please expand on this They teach us that V1 is the no go, when in reality there is a whole bunch of buffer/slop in there, what exactly do you mean by a WHOLE BUNCH?

Mutt.

[lomapaseo]

They teach us that V1 is the no go, when in reality there is a whole bunch of buffer/slop in there. So what if you buy the field, farm or highway beyond the end of the runway. Chances of surviving increase dramatically if you never leave the ground.

The idea behind flight safety is to choose the safest course of action that saves the most lives. We live with risk every day and as such we make advised trades between risks every day.

The data has shown that continuing an attempted flight beyond V1 is statistically safer than attempting an abort. Of course you can cite what ifs , but lacking complete and total knowledge of the situation the crew is advised and hopefully taught to continue.

I have no problem with a crews decision making process based on knowledge of the surronding circumstances, but I would be very unhappy to be flying behind a crew that when faced with a what's going on ? circumstance decides to try an abort above V1

[747FOCAL]

Mutt,

All manufacturers and mod outifts inject confidence margins into their products. Even the FARs build a safety buffer into how balanced field length is calculated. Balanced Field Length is actually 115% of actual per the FARs. So right there you have 15% slop in the calculation. Add on the other 5-10% of what the manufacturer threw on there and your actual field length requirement is somewhere between 20-25% less than what you calculate.

In this case the runway is 8100 ft or so long. That means there was anywhere from 1600 to 2000 ft of slop built into the takeoff calculation.

I am not trying to say these guys made any mistakes by continueing the takeoff roll. That what we are tought to do. But in some cases if you had it to do over again, slamming the brakes on and maybe hitting something at a slow speed at the end of the runway was smarter then leaving the ground. The concorde crash was a good example of an instance where the plane should have never left the ground regardless of the consequence of crashing into something at the end of the runway.

The problem is, it's after the event when you figure out what you should have done.

[mutt]

747FOCAL
Would you please give me the actual FAR reference for this Balanced Field Length is actually 115% of actual per the FARs

In this case the runway is 8100 ft or so long. That means there was anywhere from 1600 to 2000 ft of slop built into the takeoff calculation. This is so ludicrous that its not even funny!

Please refer to:
FAR 25-109
FAR 25-113

An aircraft manufacturer MAY build in a greater buffer than required by the FAR’s, however flight crews are not made aware of that buffer and therefore are not in a position to count on it!

The Boeing Jet Transport Performance Manual states that the B747-100/200/300 were certified using reaction times for Brake Application plus thrust reduction and the time increment from engine failure to spoiler activation. For certification, 1 second was added to each reaction time to account for in service delays in pilot reaction

Based on how Boeing certified that particular model of aircraft, I totally fail to see where you get the idea of a whole bunch of buffer/slop

We operate B747’s from FIELD LENGTH LIMITED runways at the RTOW, it is totally wrong to give the impression that there is 1600-2000 feet built into the takeoff calculation. That luxury doesn’t exist! :)


Mutt.

[Rockhound]

747FOCAL,
I wasn't questioning your account of the crew's actions in setting the EPR before and during TO, only your interpretation of the underlying rationale for their actions. You think that the crew member who advanced the throttles at around V1 would have firewalled the throttles only if he didn't know what the proper EPR setting was. Further, you imply that he believed the correct EPR setting for TO was 1.6 , so that when he noticed at around V1 that the EPR was at 1.3, he raised the setting to 1.6. That's a 23% increase - pretty hefty IMHO.
Is it normal practice for a crew to adjust the PWR setting by such a large amount at such an advanced stage of the TO roll?
I can only conclude that the crew must have grossly underestimated the TOW.
Rockhound

[747FOCAL]

Okay I actually said that kinda wrong........

FAR 25.113 Takeoff Distance and Takeoff Run.


[(a) Takeoff distance on a dry runway is the greater of--
(1) The horizontal distance along the takeoff path from the start of the takeoff to the point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, determined under Sec. 25.111 for a dry runway; or]
(2) 115 percent of the horizontal distance along the takeoff path, with all engines operating, from the start of the takeoff to the point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, as determined by a procedure consistent with Sec. 25.111.
[(b) Takeoff distance on a wet runway is the greater of--
(1) The takeoff distance on a dry runway determined in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section; or
(2) The horizontal distance along the takeoff path from the start of the takeoff to the point at which the airplane is 15 feet above the takeoff surface, achieved in a manner consistent with the achievement of V2 before reaching 35 feet above the takeoff surface, determined under Sec. 25.111 for a wet runway.
[(c) If the takeoff distance does not include a clearway, the takeoff run is equal to the takeoff distance. If the takeoff distance includes a clearway--
(1) The takeoff run on a dry runway is the greater of--
(i) The horizontal distance along the takeoff path from the start of the takeoff to a point equidistant between the point at which VLOF is reached and the point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, as determined under Sec. 25.111 for a dry runway; or
(ii) 115 percent of the horizontal distance along the takeoff path, with all engines operating, from the start of the takeoff to a point equidistant between the point at which VLOF is reached and the point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, determined by a procedure consistent with Sec. 25.111.
(2) The takeoff run on a wet runway is the greater of--
(i) The horizontal distance along the takeoff path from the start of the takeoff to the point at which the airplane is 15 feet above the takeoff surface, achieved in a manner consistent with the achievement of V2 before reaching 35 feet above the takeoff surface, as determined under Sec. 25.111 for a wet runway; or
(ii) 115 percent of the horizontal distance along the takeoff path, with all engines operating, from the start of the takeoff to a point equidistant between the point at which VLOF is reached and the point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, determined by a procedure consistent with Sec. 25.111.]

If you read the entire section on calculating runway performance one will notice it is all based on worst case scenarios for which they build in conservatism for the pilot of avg skill. Everything is 105 to 115% of actual.

Your accelerate stop distance is based on failing the critical engine at V1. If you know you have all engines then you know your stopping power will stop you before what you calculated.

Maybe you have not noticed or cared, but most commercial aircraft rotate way before where the takeoff calculations told you it should.

Example: MD-80 has a balanced field length comperable to a 767 (~10600 ft @ MTOW 160K). I guarantee you, the MD-80 will accelerate to Vr, reject the takeoff, slam the brakes and full reverse and be stopped again in way less than 10,000 ft.

Rockhound,

If your pretty sure your going to die, I think they will try anything that helps regardless of what point of takeoff you are at.

[csomesense]

747Focal quote "Maybe you have not noticed or cared, but most commercial aircraft rotate way before where the takeoff calculations told you it should."

Mutt quote: "We operate B747’s from FIELD LENGTH LIMITED runways at the RTOW, it is totally wrong to give the impression that there is 1600-2000 feet built into the takeoff calculation. That luxury doesn’t exist!"

I'm totally with you on that one, Mutt. We are more often than not field length limited, and I don't think I've been surprised yet by the fact that our plane "rotated way before the calculations told us it would". Maybe we just fly the wrong types?
;)

[747FOCAL]

Its right there in the FARs.... How you calculate you distance to 35 ft is based on 115% of actual. Its buried in the AFM, but it is there. So no matter what runway you are on, just from the FARs alone there is 15% of buffer or slop. On 8100 ft runway that is 1215 ft or if everything is as it should the aircraft should be at 35 ft around 1200 ft before what you calculated said it should.

[Safety Guy]

747focal:

As a safety person, it is my job to identify how and why unsafe events and conditions occur. Your point is not relevant from a safety perspective. There are many safety buffers built into the way aircraft systems and performance parameters are certified. Those buffers are there to allow for minor errors and ommissions, component wear and tear, and imperfections in human performance. There is no way to quantify where you are in a given circumstance relative to a safety buffer. No professional pilot worth his salt wants to enter the ragged edge between the safety margin and a negative (and maybe deadly) result.

You are taking the focus away from the important issue, which is how and why the MK crew erred in setting the power. Remove that error, and the accident doesn't happen. You can play test pilot if you wish, but I'm not so sure your colleagues and your customers would wish to join you during your experiment. As I said before, unless I'm faced with an un-flyable airplane,when V1 arrives, I am going flying.

SG

[747FOCAL]

Safety Guy,

Your missing the point. Go back and read the previous bunch of posts. I am not endorsing changing how we look at how we operate. All I said was that sometimes in hindsight some pilots might choose to throw the brakes on after V1. But in the end at that point it really does not matter.

Your wrong about my collegues and what they will go do with or for me in a real airplane. Modification of what the OEM certified for the airplane is what I do. If I can deviate from what the OEM certified and prove it safe to the regulators I have no problem enhancing the usability of my customer's aircraft. You line pilots think you know everything about what goes into making an airplane safe. There is a whole other group of us out there that do that and it is invisable to you other than you get to go home at night. What the pilots that I deal with will do in an airplane would make 90% of line pilots shat themselves. :E

[Rockhound]

747FOCAL,
I don't seem to be making myself understood to you. If that's my fault, I apologize.
However, your last response to me (edited by me)
____________________________________________________
If you're pretty sure you're going to die, I think [you] will try anything that helps regardless what point of takeoff you are at.
____________________________________________________

exactly illustrates my point. Why did the MK crewmember not firewall the throttles instead of merely upping them a few notches from 1.3 to 1.6 EPR?

And my question remains:
Is it acceptable practice for a pilot to correct the power setting by a significant amount (or any amount, for that matter) at as late a stage as VI during the takeoff roll?
I would be really grateful for answer from you experts.

Thanks in advance.
Rockhound

[swh]

747Focal

All I said was that sometimes in hindsight some pilots might choose to throw the brakes on after V1.

Dont see any reject after V1 on a field limited runway resulting in a low speed overrun.

Think you spend too much time at zero g zero airspeed, the risks you will end up on fire dead off the end off the runway rejecting are high speed above V1 are significant, espically with an old airframe, old tires, old engines, and a tired crew.

Dont agree with your extra flap idea either, will that improve things for all segments in the case of an engine failure, or you taking about a 4 engine takeoff roll only ?

Oh well ... interested to hear what response you get Safety Guy, I guess we will never know who set those powers, the engineer or pilot

Rockhound

It is common for the flight engineer to trim the power levers at any stage, on the ground or airborne, the pilots will remove their hands from the throttles at V1

[Ranger One]

Confused ramblings... confused due to the very recent arrival of an 8lb 1oz Junior Ranger :D :D :D

V1...
I can see merits in the views of both Flight Safety and lomapaseo - perhaps there *is* some room for a pre-briefed consideration of the options in the event that a problem occurs at or just past V1. The statistics which lead V1 to be considered an unconditional 'fly or die' speed can't be argued, as others have pointed out, and there are dangers with interfering with this mindset. But perhaps there should be a field-specific briefing item to cover the eventuality that the MK crew encountered: a problem that occurs at, or isn't noticed until, V1, and the question that requires a millisecond answer is 'what kind of an accident do we want to have today?'...

EPR...
Not familiar with type; perhaps someone who is can answer this. The MK guys are reported to have set 1.6 at V1. How much more would they have got if they had firewalled it?

EFB...
I use an ADR EFB. JeppView, Jepp FliteStar, Exxon Avitat database... very useful. But not a replacement for common sense.

R1

[GotTheTshirt]

B747.
Does MK use an FAA or CAA AFM ?
Just that Ghana is ex CAA:)

[Tan]

Safety Pilot

Your quote; “As I said before, unless I'm faced with an un-flyable airplane, when V1 arrives, I am going flying.”

Hmm I lost an engine on a 767 at V1 max wgt and did a RTO and safely stopped with 4000ft remaining. The ‘go’ ‘no go’ decision should also depend upon the circumstances and that’s why maintaining situational awareness is so important. I would question your judgment if you went flying with 7000ft of runway remaining after an engine failure.

[Safety Guy]

Tan:

I accept your point, but you said the failure occurred at V1. There's a little room at V1 for a judgement call. Some days there may be lots of room, as in your situation, but on most others there's not enough for me to even consider stopping once the speed needle reaches the V1 bug, unless I have reason to believe the airplane may not fly.

I have to ask how long that runway was to begin with? If you got a fully loaded 767 to V1 and stopped with that much runway left, I believe you were on a very long runway. Hardly a typical circumstance that most of us find ourselves in on most long haul takeoffs.

I hope that you make a habit of briefing your First Officer that you may reject a takeoff once you've reached V1. It's doubtful that he's expecting it otherwise.

swh:

For the record, I am not involved in the MK investigation. Like all of you, I wait with baited breath for a reasonable explanation.

[747FOCAL]

swh,

Would you rather be in the air on fire or on the ground? In some cases as has been pointed out, going off the end of the runway into the grass and ending up on fire...........

Its already been calcualted, at max reverse thrust at the point this flight went to 1.6 EPR, they would have ended up with the airplane hitting the bearm at around 60 knots. If the gear had sunk into the mud they would have never made the berm.

Like I have said before this is all hind sight. No fault of this crew. They followed the rules. Sorry to see them go.

Rockhound,

I don't know why the crew only moved the thrust levers to 1.6 when they realized something was wrong. All I have is the data. Death has coverd his tracks on this one. :(

[mutt]

747FOCAL,

You may have read the FAR's but you didnt understand them:(

(ii) 115 percent of the horizontal distance along the takeoff path, with all engines operating, from the start of the takeoff to a point equidistant between the point at which VLOF is reached and the point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, determined by a procedure consistent with Sec. 25.111.

Note the part about ALL ENGINES OPERATING :) I will admit that in the 747, this is usually the most limiting factor, however that doesnt mean that its an automatic 15% buffer!

Rockhound

It is common for the flight engineer to trim the power levers at any stage, on the ground or airborne, the pilots will remove their hands from the throttles at V1

Trim??? that certainly doesnt include advancing the throttles from 1.3 to 1.6 EPR! IMHO, trimming means that the PF has set the takeoff power, the FE is making sure that ALL four engines are at the same EPR!

Tan.

We operate flights out of a 15,000 ft runway, based on our normal sector length and aircraft type, crews could very easily get to 100ft, abort the takeoff and land again! Do we teach this? NO. Each situation is different, especially in this world of reduced thrust, so the safest option for 99% of crews is to follow SOP's.


Mutt

Mutt.

[swh]

747Focal,

Unless I am missing something[list=1]
No fire was present in this accident whist the aircraft was on the runway
Your zero g zero airspeed hindsight analysis of saying "max reverse thrust at the point this flight went to 1.6 EPR, they would have ended up with the airplane hitting the bearm at around 60 knots". It was dark, you have no or little depth and speed perception, and cannot see obstacles.
As already pointed out, 747 classics dont have an easy way to determine speed trends.
[/list=1]

As for being on fire and coming back, yes get airborne, sort it out and land, thats exactly what a Cathay 744 did at LAX earlier this month.

There has been 7 incidents involving 747's in the past 2 months. 38 747 hull loss to date, which are increasing in frequency.

If you have any constructive facts to add that will shed light as to why this aircraft crashed please let us know, all I am seeing is speculation from the soap box.

[411A]

In one particular airline where I worked (and many, if not most of the Flight Engineers came from a large UK airline), the 'standard' procedure was for the handling pilot to stand the throttles up (to about 1.3 EPR) and ask the F/E to 'set takeoff thrust'...which he would normally promptly accomplish. MK's procedures perhaps?

Being of a slightly different mind (and briefed accordingly) I would set takeoff thrust approximately, and ask the F/E to 'set takeoff thrust'...which he would promptly do.

Now, if the F/E was a bit pooped, along with the rest of the crew, I can well imagine that the throttles were advanced to 1.3 EPR by the handling pilot, but it was never noticed (until a rather long time had passed), that the correct EPR was not set.

If this was the case, as I outlined....it sure was very unfortunate.:(

I wonder if we will ever know?:{

[ShotOne]

It's obvious pilots like discussing EPR's and v speeds but there has been little on the airline here. Is the fact that MK have lost four aircraft over the last 12 years significant? How many a/c do they operate? I'm pretty sure that if any passenger airline lost the same proportion of its fleet it would be headline news.

[GotTheTshirt]

B747'

I am afraid that your 15% "slop" is very hypothetical.
Initial performance is carried out by the manufacturer in order to compile the AFM which everyone then uses for ever:D
The question about FAA v UK CAA was because if you take an FAA AFM for a given aircraft ( by serial number) and then take a UK CAA AFM ( if issued) for the same aircraft you will come out with different limitation figures.

These initial figures are compiled with a new aircraft ( no dents or dings and full fit and fair) with new engines ( adjusted, per the manual for that specific flight test) with all new components including brakes and using test flight instrumentation and accurately measured distances.

The 15% "slop" is there to take care of deterioration in service which most certainly happens.
Therefore the "slop" theory is true on a new aircraft but most cerainly is not there on a 20 year old machine.

A good example of this is MGWRTO.

We used manuals for many years that said if you perfom like this and abort at this speed you will stop before the end of the runway.
It took the DC10 RTO in New York that went off the end to show that this is not true if you have worn ( but perfectly legal) brakes.
The result was an AD that reduced brake wear allowance.
This was a shortcoming that was eventaully highlighted bercause of positive in service proof.
This is not the case for take off performance where if the take off is made sucessfully no one ever queries if the obstale was cleared by 35 or 55 feet.

I have been involved ( after the event !) on several RTO's including a manufacturers test program. On the test program the wheel fuse plugs did not let go until right at the end of the landing run.
On the ones I have seen in service the fuse plugs blew very early on in the abort, ( a worn brake cannot absorb the heat as efficiently as a new one) which resulted in loss of braking in service that did not occur on test.

In the UK the CAA require we do test flights on in service aircraft to try to determine any perfomance degradation. (Not an FAA requirement). We obviously cannot do any definitive take off performance but we do do MTOW engine out climbs.
While we have no set limits we just compare with the book and believe me not many 20 years old aircraft exceed the book figures.

[Tan]

Safety Guy

My company’s SOP requires a briefing and the normal call of “at or above V1 I will continue the T/O etc.” On every T/O I practice all the ‘what ifs’ because the biggest factor is the element of surprise followed by the identification of the problem, things that should, but can’t all be taught in the simulator.

You would be surprised at how fast the auto braking system can stop a 767 on a cold winter morning and yes you do coast past V! due to the reaction time.

In this business many life and death decisions are unfortunately made in the grey area and that is why situational awareness is so important. On occasion you have to step outside the box to save the day.


Mutt

No one was suggesting doing a RTO once in the air. The SOP’s are designed to cater to the lowest common denominator and do not take into account ‘situational awareness’. However it is rare that everything abnormal happens according to the book, wish they did but that’s not reality. If you really want to teach your troops a valuable lesson demonstrate to them the element of surprise...

When you’re in the simulator your candidates are expecting failures, in line operations there’re not. Big difference…

[Safety Guy]

Tan:

I'd still like to know how long the runway was! Cold or not, that's quite a feat in a loaded 767.

[enginefailure]

and i still would like to learn why the CVR was damaged:



TSO Date Impact requirements Fire test requirements
C51 Aug. 1958 100G for 11ms The recording medium shall remain intact so that intelligence can be analyzed after the recorder has been exposed to flames of 1100 C, enveloping at least 50% of the outsuide area of the case for 30 minutes.
C84 Nov. 1963 100G for 11ms [same as TSO C51]
PLUS: Any cracks or holes resulting from the impact shock test be included in the 50% flame envelopment, and that the recorder be allowed to cool naturally.
C51a Jan. 1966 1000G for 5ms [same as TSO C51]
PLUS: Impact shear ~ 500lbs. from 10',1/4" pin adn Static crush ~5000lbs. 3 sides, 5min.
C123 May 1991 1700G for 6.5ms 1100 C, flame enveloping 100% of the outside area of the case for 30 minutes, 50000BTU/h thermal flux.
Note: does not require TSO C124 fire test protocol. (Ref. EUROCAE Doc ED-56)
C124 Feb. 1992 3400G for 6.5ms [same as TSO C123]
EXCEPT thermal flux must be measured by a water calorimeter of the size and shape of the recorder. (Ref. EUROCAE Doc. ED-55)



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
References:
NTSB Safety Recommendations A-92-45 through -48 / National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), May 28, 1992


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



If i assume that the cvr was located in the back of the plane
which separated from the rest of the plane while still on the runway two questions come to mind:

1. How hard was the impact when the tail separated ?
I assume by far not as hard as coming down vertically from
some 1000 feet ....

2. Was the tail exposed to fire ?


or was the CVR simply not working ? i'm not sure whether
the CVR is an item in the MEL.



sorry if this was discussed anywhere in the 30+ pages before ...

[747FOCAL]

GotTheTshirt,

I would agree that the "slop" is larger for new aircraft, but your going to have a hard time convincing me that commercial aircraft degrade performance by anywhere near 15% over their lifetime.

The manufacturers use about an 80% confidence margin. That means they use some percentage less than what was actually tested when they make guarantees.

Do you really think an operator would tolerate a 15% degredation in performance over time?

[RatherBeFlying]

There has been a large volume of doctrinal discussion about the decision to take at V1.

The unspoken premise in decision making at V1 is that the a/c has accelerated normally to V1 -- did not happen here.

This accident is closer to what the winch glider folks call a "slow launch".

In both cases, if you let it go too far, you run out of runway before you are ready to fly.

[Flight Safety]

411a, your theory about what might have happened in the cockpit could be verified with MK's SOPs. Anyway it sounds like a reasonable possibility.

The debate over V1 and when you might possibly consider violating it, shows the gray area that the events of this accident happened in. I agree with RatherBeFlying, as this was the equivalent of a glider winch "slow launch". Because V1 was reached late in the under powered takeoff roll, the V1 the pilots calcuated was NOT the V1 they actually arrived at.

At this point, the decision that has to be made, when you discover at V1 that you arrived at V1 under powered, gets very murky. What you should do at this point really depends on the runway and where you are on it. In a situation like this accident where it probably wasn't easy to quickly determine the remaining distance down the runway, the "go no-go" decision that has be made very quickly is going to be a guess at best.

I can't imagine without more situational awareness (electronic or othwerwise), that the murkiness of this type of decision will ever get any clearer.

There was a thread running for a time in the Tech forum that discussed the development of TOPMS (a Take Off Performance and Monitoring System). While ongoing efforts may eventually provide a system that will communicate to the pilots that the takeoff is "off the numbers" early in the takeoff run (so you can really do something about it), such a system will not be available on all airliners for some time.

Until this happens, it seems to me that the best "performance monitoring system" commonly available, that would help a pilot to avoid getting into this dangerous "gray area" of an "off the numbers" V1, is the good old stop clock. Used properly, the stop clock can let you know early enough to make a good decision. SOPs would be needed to avoid false RTOs, etc, since this doesn't appear to be a very common practice.

The best thing to do is to never get into the situation these pilots were in, in the first place. Once there, without good situational awareness to help with this critical decision making, you're in very deep weeds with no obvious way out.

[Rockhound]

747FOCAL,
We are still not on the same wavelength. You say:

I don't know why the crew only moved the thrust levers to 1.6 when they realized something was wrong. All I have is the data. Death has coverd his tracks on this one.

Yet in an earlier post you said:

At no time was the throttle firewalled. Somebody on the flight deck knew the proper throttle setting. It was set incorrectly. To move the throttle levers deliberately from 1.3 to the EXACT EPR it should have been leads me to believe it was just a simple mistake. If they had firewalled the throttles, that would have meant they realized they weren't using enough thrust but not know what it really should be.

(By EXACT EPR I presume you mean 1.6). You now seem to believe that Crewmember X advanced the throttles to 1.6 because he realized something was amiss, rather than to simply correct a mistake (throttles set too low) that he happened to notice at around V1.
It still seems to me that the crew massively underestimated their weight and were confident that a setting of 1.6 EPR was more than enough to get them airborne, i.e. there was no sense of panic at V1.
Do you now think one or more of the crew sensed something was amiss at V1?
BTW has someone calculated what the correct thrust setting was for the conditions? Surely it was higher than 1.6?

As regards my question about throttle adjustments during TO, Mutt has provided an indirect answer. As I understand it, adjustments other than fine-tuning (trimming) the setting so that all engines are developing PWR equally should not be undertaken. Correct?
Rockhound

[747FOCAL]

You don't think pulling the nose up below takeoff speed does not indicate somebody was panicking?

[Safety Guy]

Up to V1 and stopped again in 3,700 ft! I don't care how cold it was, that's impressive!

[Smurfjet]

Its clear that V1 is critical only if reached before a certain distance on the runway. We have had odometers in cars for a long time, why not a simple 'Distance measuring counter' hooked to the landing gear to measure the actual t/o run?

[GotTheTshirt]

B747, Performance degradation.
Well the RTO certainly degraded by 15 % when the DC 10 AD came out.
:)

I have had aircraft on UK test flights where we have re-rigged flight controls to improve performance.
This became apparent on a Cof A test flight but prior to the test flight the aircraft was flying in service.

How many times have you gone back on a test/handling/ ferry flight and have seen spoiler float or flap droop.
This inspection does not happen on revenue flights but as a pax I have seen these anomolies.

One other point is that , using derated power take offs does not guarantee that the engine will give max power when firewalled.
;)

On maintenance checks we do check the engine slam acel times and on occasions have to ajdust them.
If we have to adjust this it indicates that the engine did not perform per the specs prior to the check!


All I am saying is that aircraft do degrade in service but hopefully stay within the "slop":D

[411A]

Smurfjet,

BA had these 'distance to go' indicators on their TriStars....and along with PVD, worked like a charm.
Sadly, when 'other' airlines got the aircraft, these were the first items to be deactivated.:uhoh:

[Safety Guy]

Tan:

The mathematical result in my last posting was wrong because I turned the 4,000 ft you said you had left into 6,000. I made a mistake, okay? :O I didn't mean to be a smart ass, honest.

As far as I know, there are very few people on this forum who've had your particular experience, i.e. a real engine failure at a critical point of the takeoff. I asked a question so that I (and others) could benefit from your experience. I don't fly the 767. The aircraft I fly operates at or near max TOW most of the time, and I know that it won't duplicate the performance you had that day. Your V1 that day is one I would only see with half a load on board. Believe me, I wish it would perform like the 767! :mad:

I agree that maintaining good situational awareness is important. You've stated that the reject was completed once V1 was reached. Thanks to a good result with no damage or injuries, you are able to justify your actions on that day. I would argue that continuing the takeoff would probably have brought a similar result. I hope neither of us ever has to find out.

The Captain has the ultimate authority in deciding how to proceed in an emergency, including use of deviations from the SOPs and training. When a deviation from standard practice leads to a positive result, everybody wins. When it doesn't, we also get to answer for it.

SG

[punkalouver]

Could a 747 driver tell us what reduced thrust takeoff numbers for the takeoff out of Hartford would have been?
I think you will find that they are similar to what was used in YHZ. The airspeed indicator bugs if not destroyed will show if the Hartford V-speeds were used. If the old takeoff data card was used accidentally instead of the newly calculated numbers this would explain a lot.

[Rockhound]

747FOCAL,
I presume your last post is a response to mine. This is the first I've heard that they pulled the nose up at V1. I was merely reproducing what you wrote earlier, i.e. at or around V1, a crewmember advanced the throttles from 1.3 to 1.6 EPR to correct a "simple mistake". This reported action does not sound panic-stricken to me.
Rockhound

[747FOCAL]

Rockhound,

Even though it has already been discussed in this thread, the crew pulled the nose once and set it down, then pulled it again as they left the paved runway.

You can lie to yourself all you want, but at V1 at least one person on that flight deck knew they probably were not going to make it.

:(

[MichaelJP59]

Article about this in today's Times:-

Times MK Article (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1365857,00.html)

[Fuel100]

A little African airline starts up in 1990 and ends up in one of the UK’s top newspapers – but for all the wrong reasons. But isn’t it so typical of the owner of that airline to put it down to “an element of bad luck”. I suppose he would say that it was bad luck that he allowed the Captain that crashed one of his DC8’s, to remain in his airline so that he could do it again (but he was an old Air Force mate so it is OK). Is it bad luck that he allows, condones, his crew to travel from their bases in South Africa and Zimbabwe and then immediately operate his aircraft without an intervening rest period? Is it bad luck that he only pays his crew if and when they fly? Is it bad luck that MK’s flight and duty time limitations are probably amongst the most onerous in the world? Is it bad luck that those onerous FDPs are not adhered to? Is it bad luck that procedures are not adhered to?

No, it is not bad luck – it is bad management, pure and simple!

[bugg smasher]

Fuel100,

A little history may be in order here.

In the not too distant past, the Zims were fighting tooth and nail for their very existence. Their country, all of the things they built, scratched tooth and nail out of the African countryside over many generations, were summarily expropriated by a murderer-politician whose name is all too familiar.

Despite that, from little more than a paltry vacuum, Mike built an airline that exceeded most people’s wildest expectations. And for that, my judgmental friend, he deserves at least that modicum of respect not normally accorded to lesser men. There are those that build, and those that bleat; my personal preference lies with the former.

Mike, I am truly sorry mate, this one may very well sink you. Your route to continued operation seems to point to reregistering to Euro tail numbers. That would not only require a complete rewrite of your ops specs, but put you on a head-on collision course with the mega-carriers, something I am not certain you can survive.

In the inscrutable way of this world, however, if anyone can find a way forward, it must surely be you old son.

[Kep Ten Jim]

Bugg -

I agree.

I've known Mike since he was a FO in Affretair. And to start an airline from scratch, operating a fleet of some 20-odd aircraft worldwide is some achievement. I also know and have flown with many of the MK pilots in years past - all of whom were capable, competent operators. There obviously were weak links and mistakes made, which I'm sure, the management would readily acknowledge. But there was also, no doubt, an element of bad luck.

I hope MK recovers from this. A flood of job-seeking pilots onto the market doesn't do any of us any good

[GotTheTshirt]

Having been involved a little with Affretair I agree that what has been built is great achievement against alot of adversity that many here can only imagine.
However if you are going to keep saying that the Ghana standards are the same as the EU standards ( or even the FAA standards:) then why not go onto an EU register :O

I am sure that fixed fees must be cheaper:D

[Tawny Eagle]

Affretair stopped activities in 2001, when it was not able to settle its debts with DHL Aviation and with the Sudan Civil Aviation Authority. In its whole carreer, it operated 8 aircraft, four of them propeller “oldies”. One of its DC8 collapsed in Harare in 1996, when reverse thrust appeared not to be available on two of the engines. In earlier times known as AirTrans Africa, Affretair was formed by the controversial Rhodesian Captain Jack Malloch, well acquainted with Mike Kruger, who served as a TO in Malloch’s company. One of Affretair’s DC7 was impounded after illegal use of registration, Malloch’s DC7 aircraft reportedly known as often being used for sanction busting flights during the Nigerian civil war.
It seems that Mike Kruger and MK’s management have partly been influenced by the history and the questionable culture of Affretair, the African way of dealing with reasonable standards and regulations. So, reregistering to Euro tail numbers and accepting European standards might eventually be the best option.

[jumbodrvr7]

I do not like your assumptions about what happened in the cockpit during the takeoff. You may well have access to more information than most of us but your rantings demonstrate a lack of understanding and a clear anti MK bias. Now I am not defending MK in any way but am interested in promoting the facts as they are known and suppressing speculation such as yours.

You place a lot of importance on the fact that the thrust was reset to the correct setting and that therefore "somebody must have known" the correct setting. The fact is that if you knew anything about 747s you would know that the max thrust EPR (in this case the correct EPR) can be displayed next to the EPR guages at the touch of a button by the FE.

Another thing you seem to be missing is that if the take-off thrust had been calculated incorrectly then so would the speeds. Therefore Vr as far as the crew were concerned would have been considerably lower than the actual Vr. Pulling the nose up "well below flying speed" was probably not an act of "panic" but simply a normal rotation at what the crew thought was Vr. The increase in thrust was more than likely a conscious decision by the captain to abandon the reduced thrust procedure due to a feeling of uneasines, not "panic".

I believe that the first time this crew knew just how much trouble they were in was when it would not fly at the original rotation.

All this discussion about events during the takeoff roll is diverting attention from the main error made in the calculation of the take-off data. When you place the aircraft at the holding point with the wrong data set you are relying on the last line of defense to save the day and that is never good safety wise.:(

[747FOCAL]

I am neither anti MK nor have I been ranting. You want to see ranting look at some of the other posts. This thread is all about speculation and that is what I have been doing. Just normal human curiosity to solve a mystery. :rolleyes:

ps. I know a lot about the 747, but some of the things you said make sense. thanks.

[Rockhound]

Sorry, but I am getting more and more confused. Am I alone in my confusion?
To review:
I am of course open to correction but, as I understand him, 747FOCAL has written or implied
1. A crewmember advanced the throttles from 1.3 to 1.6 EPR at or around V1.
2. The pilot raised the nose at or around V1.
3. The pilot raised the nose, set it down, and raised it again.
4. At or around V1, at least one crewmember realized they probably wouldn't make it.
5. The pilot raised the nose at Vr.

Even I, a mere item of SLF, know that V1 does not equal Vr.
I fully realize we are speculating and perhaps we should desist from this and wait for the accident investigation report to be released. However, 747FOCAL appears to be in possession of some inside info. Could he please set out in plain English and in a logical sequence what he knows of the events that took place during the takeoff?
Rockhound

[FaPoGai]

To all who mourn their loss.
Please just give up on this one. Have any of you seen the insurance assesment? If you had, you might not have been so quick to assume that you could have worked out what went wrong.
And by the way I HAVE seen the insurance assesment.
FPG.

[Fuel100]

Rockhound, I agree with FaPoGai. Why don’t you gust give up, or desist as you so rightly say.

747Focal has merely given his interoperation of the data that he may or may not have actually seen. Someone else may interoperate it differently. The accident investigators are far more qualified to give their assessment given that they will have most of the information before them. Why not wait until their report is published, then learn from that.

[hobie]

quote ....

"Have any of you seen the insurance assesment? If you had, you might not have been so quick to assume that you could have worked out what went wrong.
And by the way I HAVE seen the insurance assesment"


FPG, that sounds very mysterious?

whats the Insurance Value got to do with it?

[Rockhound]

Fuel100,
I gotta admit, you're probably right. Now that yet another factor, the "insurance assessment" (whatever that is exactly), is coming into play, perhaps we'd better leave off. Seems a shame though. The causes of air accidents make a fascinating topic.
Rockhound

[747FOCAL]

Fuel100 is correct. We have debated this one. I hope in some way the knowledge will help alleviate another disaster. I think the ones that passed on this one would wish that.

Maybe I made a mistake by revealing what I know. When I started at PPRUNe this place was nothing but OUR people. Somehow, through NO fault of Danny (who I respect dearly), this place has deteriorated dramatically. (at least in the public forum) Now our house is riddled with fools and those that would strive to be fools.

Now they are desecrating the remembrance of these men.

We just want to know why they died so their death was not in vain. Maybe it is just me.
:(

[punkalouver]

I think you will find that Hartford takeoff thrust was used. Rotating at hartford Vr would likely result in a tailstrike. Then it was seen the trouble they were in an rotated forcefully and gunned the thrust but it was too late with the tail creating a two foot deep trench off the runway end and hitting the berm which I believe may have only been as high as the runway. Just a rumour.

[Captain Airclues]

Whenever there is an accident, pilots congregate in bars around the world to discuss it and speculate about the cause. Throughout my time in aviation I have never heard a pilot say " Let's not talk about this until the report is published". Many lessons can be learned even from incorrect speculation and many accidents have been prevented by information gleaned during these discussions.
I have no idea whether it was the cause of this accident but there have been many cases of crews using the performance data for the wrong runway or airfield. I have done it myself but fortunately in my case it was picked up by the other pilot.
If you use performance charts then there are a couple of things that we can do to help prevent this;
1. Having completed the T/O card, do not leave it in the page that you have used. If you place it in a random page, the checking crewmember will have to locate the correct page rather than just use the one that you have used.
2. Ensure that the airfield locator is clearly shown on the card. I can (but won't) name several airlines that do not have a space for this information on their T/O card.
We can either act now to prevent incorrect data being used in the future or we can wait until the report is published.

Airclues

[Rockhound]

Ah, finally, we have it - the standard put-down: not one of US, y'know. An interloper - Shock! Horror! (Danny, I love you but why, oh why do you allow outsiders (yecch) onto OUR site?). Not only an interloper but a fool. Actually, not only a fool but someone who desecrates the memory of those who lost their lives in the crash.
It's OK, I've had put-downs on other threads in other forums but I've also had plenty of support, publicly and privately, from professionals who appreciate debate and discussion with a non-professional with a modicum of knowledge of, and a whole lot of genuine interest in, matters aeronautical.
So, taking my cue from Captain Airclues, I would respond to Punkalouver.
You may well be right but 747FOCAL, in one of his numerous conflicting posts, asserted that at no time were the throttles firewalled; power was merely adjusted higher (from 1.3 to 1.6 EPR) relatively early on, at or around V1, to correct a mistake (according to 747F).
Rockhound

[747FOCAL]

That is exactly what the data recorder says. At no time during the takeoff run where the throttles firewalled. Granted 1.6 EPR is about as close to firewall as you can get.

[FaPoGai]

Hobie
I did not use the phrase "Insurance Value"
Rgds. FPG

[hobie]

FPG, you are correct, it was my choice of word .....

I'm still lost though re the importance of the "insurance assesment" ?


"assesment" .... an amount(value) determined as payable