- The Canberra - Unsafe in 1950, Still unsafe

[2 Liter Peter]

So a Canberra has killed another 2 fine RAF aviators.

Wearing their country's uniform with pride, despite some of the best flying training the world can give, they flew a fifty-year old aircraft type, and it killed them.

The Canberra was unsafe when it entered service, and is still unsafe now.

Ground them all. They belong in museums.

Fine pilots deserve fine cockpits, not funerals and graves

[Tandemrotor]

Staggering to think, this type has been in service for more than half the life of the Royal Air Force!

And they were saying that some years ago!

[highcirrus]

2 Liter Peter

Do you have a url link or details of what happened? With the right information, the rest of us might be able to provide theories on what could have happened.

[G-ANDY]

Here is the url highcirrus:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/norfolk/3623430.stm

[McFunkletrumpet]

Try this for local news;

new.edp24.co.uk and then all get your heads together on this forum and deliberate. Post your findings to the MOD who I'm sure will be pleased to review your speculations.

[insty66]

Less than 12 hours have passed since the accident and you want to start speculating.
Why must it be that we have to blame something/one without having a clear grasp on all the facts?
Let the board of enquiry do it's job and then lets comment.
Is it not enough that two people have lost their lives? do we need to invent stories as well?

My thoughts are with the families of the two lost crew.

[surely not]

I can't quite see the Canberra as a widow maker in the same way the F104 Starfighter was. If it was such a death trap, as opined by 2 Liter Peter, how come it has lasted 50 years in service?

I note that on another thread someone produced crash stats for the Meteor, does anyone have any similar stats for the Canberra?

[rej]

Do you not think that so soon after this tragic accident that our thoughts should be focussed on those involved and helping them to cope with their grief - and not to add to this grief.

It is little comfort to start using phrases such as

"The Canberra was unsafe when it entered service, and is still unsafe now."

Show some thought - please.

[rivetjoint]

Even the biggest lovers of gallows humour respectfully wait before trying to make the best of a bad situation. Trying to suggest that this accident should never have happened so soon is just wrong in my book.

They were brave souls regardless of the situation.

[keithl]

As one who had 3 wonderful tours on the Cranberry, and inevitably lost mates during that time, I am very sorry to hear about this.

But on those occasions in the past, after the shock and sadness it was nothing more than natural to ask "What the hell went wrong?" both so we could learn from it for our own safety and understand for our peace of mind. So we were "speculating" almost immediately, knowing that speculation was different from certainty, and I don't see anything wrong with it. Or rather, I know what's wrong with it, but see it as natural and instinctive.

And I can think of at least one BoI whose findings were most unlikely - speculation in fact, even if it was informed speculation.

[Milt]

Learning from Crashes.

If I have a fatal crash tomorrow I know that all of my aviation friends will be sad and think of the effects on my family.

But I want you all to learn as quickly as possible from any mistakes I may have made and to ponder on the possible causes as much as you can and to construct possible scenarios from the bits of information you have.

This has to be the best way to have those coming along behind learn as much as possible from the failings of others or of the aircraft we love so much.

Too often on this forum we let the opportunity fade into nothing and forego the learning process.

I'll speculate that the Canberra went in because of inexperience of the crew with its asymmetric viciousness.

And I know of a pilot of a Canberra Down Under who may have second thoughts about his ability to handle that aircraft adequately for a recovery from an actual asymmetric. We may just end up saving HIS life and the aircraft.

NOW let us learn a bit about that.

It is a vital part of preventing future accidents/misshandling/running into rock filled clouds etc etc.

[rudolf]

Let us rest this thread for 48 hours. I understand your sentiment but now is not appropriate. Let us drink to fellow aviators and celebrate their achievements, they are hero's. There by the grace of God go I. I raise my glass to them!

Where we go in 48 hours is a different matter. All spillen mastikes difinlately alcofrol indiced.

R

[Jackonicko]

Oh for Pete's sake.

We all know that the Canberra is an ageing airframe, but let's not get whipped up into a frenzy.

A modern aircraft with the Canberra's assymetric handling characteristics probably wouldn't get a release to service, but then nor (I hope) would an aircraft with the 737's rudder problems, or the Classic 747's fuel tank problems. And that's fine, as long as all reasonable steps are taken to ameliorate these known issues, in which case the operator is, surely, diligently exercising his duty of care to the crews. It would be different if this was a catastrophic new fatigue failure, directly related to the aircraft's age.

But you can't ground every aircraft type that doesn't entirely meet today's safety standards, and especially not for a problem that has been known about and managed for decades, and where training has been revised and refined to make it safer.

People are aware of the Canberra's lethal reputation with an engine out, and its accident rate now is modest (probably no worse than the Harrier accident rate). Statistically, an assymetric Canberra crash was probably due. What a shame it had to be a fatal one (some have not been, including one at Marham IIRC). Just as another Harrier must, statistically, be likely to fall out of the hover and damage itself, and just as eventually, some young Harrier pilot will again muddle his nozzle lever and the throttle.

In view of the fact that one of the occupants did get out, I wonder whether zero zero seats would have made any difference? Does anyone know whether the escapee was the nav, the p u/t or the instructor?

[GotTheTshirt]

How on earth did the Americans manage with the Canberra ??
(Martin B57 - 308 built:D )
:confused:

[rej]

Jackonicko

From the BBC website

RAF probe training crash deaths


The crew were flying a Canberra-type aircraft
Accident investigators are trying to determine how two RAF pilots died and another was injured while practising emergency landings at a fighter base.
The accident happened on the runway at RAF Marham, Norfolk, at about 2230 BST on Thursday during landing.

An RAF board of inquiry has been convened and investigators will examine the damaged aircraft, say senior officers at RAF Marham.

Investigators will also speak to the navigator, who survived the crash.

The injured crew member is being treated in hospital after being hurt when ejecting from the aircraft.

Base officials say the two pilots who died were also thought to have attempted to eject

[NURSE]

may the dead rest in peace and may the surviving crewmember make a speedy return to health.

[bizflyer]

Re Zero Zero seats

I took a look earlier at this grainy picture on Sky's story about the crash (if it doesn't show as a link cut and paste to your browser)

http://www.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30000-1149995,00.html

I did think at the time - to a untrained eye - it looked like they all had tried to punch out, in fact my first reaction was maybe if they'd sat still the outcome could have been different (easy for me to say after the event but that's what I'm sure others will think when they see the pic)?

I'm not military, but am familiar with Marham and the Canberra story, I'm afraid I disagree with those that feel it's acceptable to allow our military forces (regardless of Navy/Airforce/Army/Marines) to use obsolete or elderly equipment, it is a shocking practice which no doubt will play some role either large or small in the sad loss of these crew members. 50 years for any Aircraft, is simply beyond reason and is purely due to a lack of funding - nothing else.

Sincere condolonces to all concerned. God rest their souls.

[Jackonicko]

Presumably you'd ground every remaining Moth, Dak (DC-3), Spitfire and Stearman?

The age of the aircraft is IRRELEVANT.

Unless you ground any aircraft which would not gain a release, or be certificated, if submitted as a new aircraft type today, then you have no case whatsoever.

Moreover, the Canberra is still in service because it is uniquely well fitted to fulfill a vital role, and indeed does so better than the U-2R/U-2S.

http://static.sky.com/images/pictures/1237377.jpg

1) Seats fired on impact?
2) Ejected outside seat parameters? (in which case would more recent seats have helped?)
3) Cost of retrofitting zero-zero seats to any remaining types not already so equipped?
4) A survivable impact?

What a tragic waste of good men.

[MarkD]

The best respect these crew can get is BAe or someone else get off there ar$e and persuade the Airships to get going on a new PR aircraft which will do the job going forward. Once Canberra goes, the capability goes. But capability loss seems to be the new fad at Treasury/MOD, especially now they think drones are all singing and dancing...

[MrBernoulli]

Cheerio fellas. RIP. Thoughts with all the families.

[Brain Potter]

He was my best mate

RIP Reichmann

[Flatus Veteranus]

The best PR aeroplane ever made (Lockheed U2) first flew in 1955 and is, I believe, scheduled to remain in USAF service "indefinitely", because it is relatively simple, cheap to operate, and much more flexible than satellites. It has only one engine. The Canberra has two and so should be safer in most flight segments. If you lose an engine on T/O in the U-bird, you keep straight ahead and take your chance. Same with the Canberra if you lose one below safety speed. Or so it was when I instructed on them at CFS.

The accident looked survivable

Only one Ess and two Emms, Jackonicko - and you a journo!

I suppose fatal accidents are so relatively rare these days that all these expressions of grief and sympathy to the N of K are inevitable. But to my generation, when fatals were a regular feature of service life, they seem somehow OTT. A little bit of the "Diana" syndrome seems to be creeping in. Our repects to the deceased and condolences to their family should go without saying. Their fellow squadron members will no doubt, in the old tradition, sink a pint to the deceased and move on.

[wheelbarrow]

Milt, before you start speculating on what may have occured take a little time to think! You comment on inexperienced crew being unaware of the Canberra's asymmetric ahndling was far off. One of the pilots was an old colleague of mine, he began flying the canberra in @ 1989.

All canberra crew practised regularly for an engine failure, in fact the statistics show that more died practising than in the real case. Due to the nature of the role the curent canberra pilots are all very experienced on type.

In future save your speculation for the stock market.

In answer to another post; a survey was prepared on refitting the canberra with Zero / Zero seats but as usual the cost was felt to be too much, I hope the person who came out with that felt the two lives that were lost were worth it, they both ejected but due to the antiquated seat did not get out within the seat's boundaries.

I suspect that this may be the end of the canberra, it led a wonderful life but it's about time that it went to a museum.

Rest in peace to the 2 that died.

[Spotting Bad Guys]

FV, I have to disagree with you - why should expressions of condolences go unsaid? This is especially true of those of us currently located in some far-flung corner of the world. I knew both of the pilots; one of them very well, having spent considerable time with him at Marham, deployed on various ops and in the pub. Due to my location I will be unable to express my condolences directly to his family, and if a post on this board gives some small shred of comfort to them - or to me - then surely that is better than the 'stiff upper lip' attitude of days of yore. Things have changed and your 'Diana Syndrome' comment does you no service.



SBG

[2 Liter Peter]

Thanks for some really interesting points of view in this thread, thoughtfully put. My heart goes out to those of you who are close to or right inside the news.

Do hope you have all forgiven me for being so forceful on originally opening the topic - felt it deserved more than just a meek expression of sadness.

Here's the latest:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/norfolk/3624896.stm

-----

Those of us who went to Paddy Thompson's funeral in the early 80s know that the beast bites the very best of us. Those of us back then who got caught to be qfis - they seem to be "Instructor/ Invigilators" now, apparently - who had to do night-flying in the T4 every week because the wheels knew it was too dangerous for the ordinary chaps on the squadron to do night asymmetrics on their own, know that even the smartest among us can get into trouble. Every accident we hear of since then seems to bring back the same frustration that what we knew was true then, is still true now.

The role of the Canberra PR9 is for others to decide. Actually, some of us feel immense pride viewing recent press pictures of a PR9 over Afghanistan, as pictures of exactly the same airframe over Aden or Singapore 30 years ago still grace our dining-rooom or office walls. Those brilliant new sensor gadgets and data-links are really impressive, and quite an investment. Of course purse strings might be an issue for any replacement programme.

But the T4 training accidents are beyond belief. They have to be unnecessary. We simply don't have problems killing pilots on night asymmetric training on the Boeing or Airbus products some of us may have moved onto.

Not just because the modern aircraft are safer, certainly not because the pilots are any better - but because we use simulators for the perilous stuff. Crash? Freeze it, debrief, start again just as you were, back at 5 miles, you owe me a beer. Simulators don't cost that much, certainly the training costs of 2 modern military fast-jet pilots would probably cover one. Or a few of those sensors and data-links.

Where is the Canberra sim ? There isn't one ? WHY NOT ? Bang seats are not an alternative. Purse strings are NOT a valid argument for risking lives.

There does seem to be support among us here for the idea that pilots should not routinely be forced to fly dangerous manoeuvres in ancient aircraft. Volunteers for historic displays are something else. It would of course be unlikely for any career board-of-inquiry head to put his neck on the line and say anything so big-picture unpopular. It will be easy instead to hide behind a mass of statistics of speed and crosswind and engine acceleration and descent rate and hours on type and all the other minutiae they will go through and allocate a nice tidy cause to it.

Someone senior needs to break this particular error chain NOW, and stop it happening ever again.

[Beeayeate]

The T.4 which crashed was, I believe, the oldest Canberra still in service. It was built in late 1953 and delivered in, or about, May 1954. This makes it 50 years old this year!

But I've read this thread with growing dismay over some of the comments, especially the comment that "Canberras should be grounded". Why? It was a T.4 not a PR.9! Totally different aircraft, different characteristics entirely. And if "old" aircraft are to be grounded what about the B-52?

If you have read the BBC's web-site "fact file" on the Canberra you'll find it is totally misleading in this instance - Quote - The Canberra T4 is the training version of the plane, with the only difference from the PR9 being its dual controls. Rubbish! Any Canberra man will laugh at that. But that class of "understanding" is becoming obvious in this thread.

As for it being an "assymetric". Has this been proven? Is this the cause? If so, I apologise, because the "public" gen doesn't say that. To my mind, the fact that there is no canopy or nav's hatch and all three seat tubes are showing means that the crew had some warning of impending disaster (the nav would have gone first the two pilots almost immediately after) - an "assymetric" is sudden and violent. As other posters have mentioned on this thread, zero/zero seats might have made a difference, but the crew didn't have them. If any of you feel the need to place blame don't put it on the Canberra, put it down to the bean-counters.

[FJJP]

2LP - any aircraft is unsafe. There are 'coffin corners', bad flying, NOM's, Acts of God, and so on. Speculate all you like (I won't even give it a 'best guess') - I'll leave that to the BOI.

Meantime, can we give up this thread attacking a fine airframe that's still doing a top-rate task after all theses years of sterling service?

[Maverick Laddie]

Gentlemen :

Ive' read the following threads with interest, but no one seems to have asked the Question "why"

Why where these aviators having to operate although be it a
fine machine in its time a 50 year old aeroplane.

Where is the PR9's replacement. Certainly not where it should be in service. In fact where it should have been since the 1980's.

Yet a further screw up in Military procurement has cost lives.

They used to call it the "ASTOR" possibly gone through several name changes since.

Help's Im advise to change the name occassionally, Confuses the polititians when asking for further fundings.

Those guys should have been training in a modern jet not riding around on a seat whose limited envelope was surpassed in the early 60's.

Had chance to look over a PR9 recently in Bari, covered in speed tape. Like some South American meat hauling frieghter.

[BEagle]

Dear Mr Hoon,

"What is the average age today of the RAF's front-line aircraft compared to those of the USA and France?"

....and no cheating by counting yet-to-be-delivered TypHoons or Nimrod Y2K!

[Maple 01]

Lets see, when was the last B-52 built? How old is their oldest C-130? Old dosen't necessarily equal bad

Far point about the lack of a replacement but let's see BEags spin forty years of piss-poor procurement into another anti-Labour tirade

-Nick

[Jackonicko]

2LP, particularly,

Is it your feeling that practise asymmetrics are actually so dangerous as to be of no training benefit, especially because real asymmetric situations are so 'few and far between'. In other words that this training is killing more aircrew than it can possibly save? (As Wheelbarrow infers).

Or are practise asymmetrics at night exponentially more risky?

If it's a practise asymmetric, with the QFI in particular knowing exactly what's going to happen and when, why is it so fraught with danger? Presumably dozens of training asymmetric approaches and overshoots pass without incident every year - what is so different about the ones that end in tragedy?

Is one problem that a 'macho attitude' to the need for (and desirability of) asymmetric training has developed and that the need for it was established long ago, by older aircrew, when comparison with older types (Meteors, Hastings, etc.) the Canberra looked relatively benign, whereas in today's 'fluffier' more H&S conscious times, the damned thing looks more lethal?

Wheelbarrow,
"In answer to another post; a survey was prepared on refitting the canberra with Zero / Zero seats but as usual the cost was felt to be too much, I hope the person who came out with that felt the two lives that were lost were worth it, they both ejected but due to the antiquated seat did not get out within the seat's boundaries." - Do you remember roughly when this study was undertaken? I'm fascinated by this - it seems as disgraceful as the decision not to give V-bomber back-seaters (or Canberra B(I)8 navs) ejection seats. I wonder how many lives might have been saved by providing the Canberras with a zero-zero ejection capability.


Beagle/Maverick Lad, Bizflyer etc.,

There is nothing wrong with operating a 50 year old aeroplane. The Yanks plan to be operating 80 year old Buffs, for goodness sake. And in point of fact, the PR9s are pretty low houred, and are only 40 - scarcely ten years older than some of the RAF's Jags, and certainly not much different to the older VC10s and C-130s! Many entirely sensible people would have been happy to keep the Canberra PR9 going for another 12-20 years had we sufficient airframes (or even noses with fewer pressurisation cycles on them and a cheap, robust solution to the upper wing skin issue). Had we not thrown away so many serviceable, low houred PR9 airframes in the late 70s and early 80s, further service would be likely. And quite rightly, since the machine has performed better in its intended role than even the U-2R/S in some recent ops. It's far from obsolete. But whether it should have undergone more safety-related upgrades (new seats, even a fixed base sim) is perhaps another matter.

Beeaye8,
You say: "As for it being an "assymetric". Has this been proven? Is this the cause? If so, I apologise, because the "public" gen doesn't say that."

The Beeb say:

"The jet, a 50-year-old Canberra T4, was involved in "touch and go" training, where the crew practise landing and take-off.

'State of shock'

Squadron Leader Mike Lence, deputy commander of 39 Squadron - the Canberra squadron - paid tribute to the men who lost their lives.

He said: "The squadron is in a state of shock over the loss of two valued men. I knew them personally and they will be sorely missed. Our thoughts at the moment are with their families."

The squadron leader added that the three men involved in the accident were all experienced aircrew.

"They were practising a specific technique - and one pilot would have been acting as an invigilator or instructor", he said.

"I want to stress that these were all experienced aircrew. They were not training in the sense that they were novices. They were practising a specific technique."

I don't think it's unreasonable to infer what the 'specific technique' was.

I was puzzled about your remarks about ejection seat tubes and hatches. Wouldn't the aftermath of a 'last minute' emergency ejection look exactly the same as the aftermath of a 'premeditated' ejection in these respects?

[Chainkicker]

Wasnt an asymmetric the cause of the crash at Wyton in the late 80's ?

[M.Mouse]

But to my generation, when fatals were a regular feature of service life, they seem somehow OTT. A little bit of the "Diana" syndrome seems to be creeping in. Our repects to the deceased and condolences to their family should go without saying.

Well said.

Much like the misuse of the word hero.

[Beeayeate]

Jackonicko

I don't think it's unreasonable to infer what the 'specific technique' was.

Yes I read the beeb's report but didn't automatically infer that asymetric was the special technique referred to. Two thoughts here. The spokesman could have said that to in order to save having to explain a procedural complexity to the jurno and thereby risk having overly speculative or 'sensatational' reportage on a sensitive issue. Secondly, there are several "special techniques" that the Sqn Ldr could have meant. Such things as flapless landings practice, tailplane actuator "failure" practice, and many more. I believe that there are even some techniques that are practised only during night flying. A Canberra jocky could probably give you a whole list (if you don't know them already).

That's not to say that asymetric wasn't the first thing I thought of too as, I suspect, you probably did, and as have others here. If it turns out to be the case (as found by the BoI) then that's the way it goes. I was just trying to prevail on the posters not to automatically assume that asymetric was the cause before the findings of the BoI.

Curiously though, after seeing the video film of the crash site on Look East last evening, the T.4 looked to be amazingly "flat" on the landscape, almost like the result of a wheels-up landing. Although I realise that every crash is unique, I understand that there is a certain "wing-down" component to asymetrics which generally results in a more damaged and sideways-sloping airframe. But this is just a whimsy on my part, no more than an idle speculative thought.

I was puzzled about your remarks about ejection seat tubes and hatches. Wouldn't the aftermath of a 'last minute' emergency ejection look exactly the same as the aftermath of a 'premeditated' ejection in these respects?

Both your instances seem the same to me, all ejections would seem to be emergency and premeditated. My conjecture was that the crew seemed to have had sufficient time to 'evaluate and decide', then blow the nav's hatch, canopy and then eject. All this takes time (albeit several seconds), but it's an element that's usually sadly lacking in asymetric emergencies. A few have walked away from such crashes but more have not, hence the infamous nature of the thing.

[Pirate]

It's been thirty years since I last flew the Canberra but I seem to remember that there was an inbuilt delay in the ejection sequence so that an explosive link could allow the control column to go fully forward to clear the pilots' knees. Possibly this short hiatus was the difference between the nav's successful escape and the two guys up front.

A sad day, as always, but calling the Canberra dangerous is overstating the case. It has a vulnerability to power loss on takeoff due to an appreciable difference between (in airline terms) Vr and V2 and loss of speed on final approach was potentially fatal. These were known problems and every Canberra man trained assiduously in these areas and thought about them on every flight. Viewed against sortie rate it was no more or less dangerous than any other military combat jet. I'd fly one again tomorrow.

[keithl]

Beeayate;the T.4 looked to be amazingly "flat" on the landscape, almost like the result of a wheels-up landing.
Yes, it reminded me of the way Chris Durbs' aircraft ended up, remember that? Also Marham, must have been late '70s. They probably survived because they didn't eject. It was due to uneven engine accel times which is, arguably, a form of asymmetric.

By the way F. Veteranus and M. Mouse, I had the same reaction to the public expressions of grief as you did. If that puts us all in the Dinosaur Park, well so be it - I'll be more comfortable there.

[2 Liter Peter]

Thanks for some more good points:

1) Beeayeate & Maple 01: Why not ground the B52 ? C130 ?

Very reasonable question. An answer might be that its not just the age of the PR9s, so much as how useful they are for the lives at risk. Boeing built 109 of the late model B52H, not just 30 like Shorts built PR9s, they still have 75 B52Hs on active service together with 10 in attrition reserve, not just the 4 PR9s, and they are not afraid to spend the money needed on simulators, major technology upgrades, and even discussing 4 billion dollars for re-engine-ing the fleet for a life extension beyond year 2025 towards 2042, unlike the PR9s for which no-one wants to spend any money and which will be lucky to last beyond 2006. Meanwhile the B52s are a major capability for the projection of US strategic power abroad and cannot be replaced by Global Hawks, whereas it appears Unmanned vehicles, satellites and other reconnaissance assets could make a good stab at replacing PR9s. Similar discussion for C130s.

2) Beeayeate, FJJP and Jackonicko: "assymetric". Has this been proven? "Speculate all you like"

Hope I've not jumped the gun mentioning night asymmetrics, but the comments from the Marham staish mentioned "emergency landing techniques". Actually, it doesn't matter what any immediate cause of the accident was: if it had been a simulator, they would have walked away giggling, and as it wasn't, they died. Here is a training situation, well-known for its risk, that has caused endless heartache in the past, and here it is still causing heartache.

3) Beeayeate: blame - don't put it on the Canberra, put it down to the bean-counters.

While you are probably right that bean-counters are a dead-weight and do have a say, they tend not to make policy. One of their airships is probably responsible for these beloved machines still being in service. One of them needs to have the courage now to come forward and acknowledge what the flight safety folk these days call the "error chain" - safety follows when ALL the little things that go to make an accident, not just the one thing a pilot did or did not do, are given attention.

This particular chain can be broken at once, guaranteeing no more loss of life in training. Perhaps a policy of: don't bring out another T4: restrict the PR9 to only those already qualified on it until it leaves service: do their asymmetric training if necessary on any 2-engine simulator. By the way, an old b737 sim is not much more different from a PR9 than was a T4: you can fly it at speeds similar enough, the engines are in percent even. And the Nav could have the day off !

4) Jackonicko : "Is it your feeling that ...this training is killing more aircrew than it can possibly save?"

Yessir, it is. Asymmetric training is not required to save aircrew on bang seats - it is required to save airframes, especially as here those in short supply.

5) Pirate & keithl : "calling the Canberra dangerous is overstating the case"

Perhaps, but unsafe was the opening message and the T4 most certainly is unsafe. It has first-generation jet engines, not resistant to FOD or birds or icing, and as keithl says, prone to surge, prone to bleed valve malfunctions, prone to not accelerate together, with hugely different thrust feel from the PR9, in a very different cockpit with very different canopy, instrumentation, different throttle and HP cocks, doing asymmetric training which has a history of being a testing manoeuvre, doing roller landings which require absolute concentration on rpms to get right - yes its unsafe to do that. Worse we knew that 30 years ago, and it is still true.

And why, oh why, do pilot training with a navigator on board, knowing the history ? What can't you do from the front that needs to be done ?

6) Pirate : "I'd fly one again tomorrow."

So would I, in my dreams. Ah, the joy of racing back into the Akrotiri circuit in a T4 for a run and break with an over-confident JP, quietly closing the HP cock during his clever tight level break while he looked out of the window, then opening it again so it all looked right but the engine was out, tee hee ... However, the Canberra does not pass the John Selwyn Gummer "British beef is fine for my daughter" test - I would not want my lad posted to 39 Sqn to fly its ancient airframes.

Sorry - prudence and a bad accident history say it is time for the Canberra to leave the front line.

[Pindi]

2LP

You must have been particularly unfortunate with the Canberra
to hold the view that it was unsafe and suffered from so many inherent maladies. I flew it for close on 1600 hours in climates from Bardufoss to Butterworth and never experienced any of the engine problems you attribute to it. Nor can I recall any of my contemporaries beefing about these things either. In contrast to some of the other types in its earlier days it was a most forgiving aeroplane which needed very unsympathetic handling to make it bite.

[Jackonicko]

2LP,

I don't want to get personal. You've been there and done it, while I've only been an interested observer. That alone makes you a better man than I! But you do seem remarkably risk averse for a former steely eyed Fast Jet man. Did you do a tour with the DLO before leaving, or as a TP?

Less flippantly (and I hope less offensively) I'd ask you whether you'd agree with the following:

More of the inherently 'more dangerous' Canberra fleet flying is undertaken on the T4 (more of the take offs, landings and circuits, and more of the emergency procedures) than on the PR9. Therefore you'd expect it to have a higher accident rate. Other in service types don't have similar dedicated trainer versions, so any comparison should be between type X and the Canberra Force and not just between it and the T4.

That's not that I don't hear what you say about the suitability of the T4 to prepare blokes for and simulate the PR9 - what a pity that they didn't put T4 noses on those redundant PR7s. Presumably the resulting aircraft (and I believe it was seriously considered) would have been a much more useful trainer for the PR9. And that's not to say that I don't agree with you that there should be clever use of sims and a more considered use of what should and shouldn't be undertaken during 'live' flying. I wouldn't pretend to know enough to judge whether another T4 should be brought out of storage, though I suspect that it should, even if the decision is that the aircraft should no longer fly practise asymmetric circuits and landings, or even if the decision is that an engine failure should be followed by ejection.

But what would you say if it transpires (as I think it will) that the Cat 5 accident rate per 100,000 FH for the Canberra 4/9 is lower than for the Tornado GR4, Jaguar or Harrier, or at broadly the same level? Would you still be quite so unwilling to let your son go and fly with No.39?

You are obviously rather out of touch with what the Canberra does today, with its EO LOROP and datalinks, and clearly are unaware that the PR9 was the only UK asset specifically requested by the Spams for use in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. You say that "it's not just the age of the PR9s, so much as how useful they are for the lives at risk." The answer is that the damned things are of pivotal importance, and offer a unique capability. Useful they most assuredly are.

I think, like Pindi, that you have a disproportionate idea of how dangerous the Canberra is. My Dad flew them (almost certainly well before you were even born), and even at 81 would be first in the queue to strap one on again. Most of his generation viewed aircraft like the Meteor and Venom, the Lincoln and the Hastings as being more dangerous than the Canberra. And in recent years (the last 20, I mean) I'd wager that the accident rate was lower than it was for the Bucc or the Tornado. And while I haven't flown one or flown in one since I was a cool young UAS blade on vac attachment with No.7 Squadron, I'd happily squeeze myself through the hatch and sit on that bloody uncomfortable 'swinging' seat in a T.Mk 4 - or even on the Rumbold seat in a TT.Mk 18, while someone more current shot a few circuits.

Beeaye8,

If the Captain said 'eject, eject, eject' and the crew snatched for the handles there'd be no need to separately jettison the canopy or the nav's hatch, though they might do so (especially the latter) if there was more time available. But the view of the aircraft would be the same once it came to rest, surely? I don't think that it indicates there was much time to "evaluate and decide', then blow the nav's hatch, canopy and then eject." I believe that many have attempted to eject asymmetric emergencies, but that most have been defeated by bank angle or rate of descent. Many aircraft seem to have come to rest 'rightway up', too, though seldom in quite such a complete and apparently 'undamaged' state. It really does look as if it was abandoned during a gear-up landing, doesn't it.

[Fast Erect]

OK boys.....
Being neither an experienced Canberra pilot or indeed an RAF pilot, can i respectfully suggest a few days silence on the possible causes of this rather unfortunate accident.
Relatives and friends of the deceased can and do read these forums, and being one of the latter, I would rather read the findings of informed and qualified investigators, no matter how long it should take.
Thankyou in advance

[Bof]

Have to agree with keithl, Flatus and M.Mouse re public grief.
On the question of Canberra safety record versus more modern aircraft, I wouldn't think the Tornado would come anywhere near it, although clearly asymmetric isn't such a problem nowadays.

In times of yore, on the Meteor as FV will testify, you had it drummed into you that anywhere close to the ground, you never let the speed get below around 125 if you were on one donk (until committed to land) and on T/O you got up to 125 a bit smartish. This of course was after the dreadful early history of asymmetric crashes during traing at places like Driffield, where one or two a month were common and invariably fatal. In squadron service the message slowly sunk in. Of course the T7 and all the NF variants had no bang seats, but I don't think we lost more than a couple due to asymmetric problems from the two NF squadrons(about 32 aircraft) at my base during a three year period

There again in 1967 when we got the C-130s, during training we used to shut down engines on T/O all the time in asymmetric training until we lost two with fatal results. The edict came out that thou shalt not stop engines for real on T/O when training.

The amazing thing was nobody had really thought of banning it before. Finally, perhaps someone could confirm/deny the apocryphal story that used to go the rounds about the Canberra doing asymmetric training with one throttled back, when on finals the pilot suddenly became aware of a long plastic nav rule sliding up from the rear and nudging the dead throttle up!

[Beeayeate]

Pirate
The snatch unit is automatic, a vicious thing it is, takes less than a second to pull the control column(s) out of the way.

2LP
In reply to you, and if Jacko doesn't mind, I would like to refer you to his last post in answer to yours. He outlines my thoughts exactly.

Jackonicko
When I was on Canberras the procedure was that in the event of an impending and possibly unrecoverable situation the nav's hatch was always blown first, even if, in the end, the nav didn't actually need to bang out. Although supposedly frangible, it was not recommended that anyone try to go through it. In a continuing situation the nav would be instructed to go next, maybe seconds later but sometimes quite a while (relatively) before the end of the event, but he would be clear of the kite well before the pilot(s). (Sadly it was not like this in the case of the B(I)8 though as you know although the nav's were always got out first - maybe you can recall Ron Ledwidge's magnificent effort). As for going through the canopy, well, it was feasible but definitely not recommended, except in a dire and sudden emergency. Blowing the lid was/is a separate action to pulling the seat handle and it's an action that takes quite a few seconds to carry out and complete There's no bang-cord on a Canberra and their canopies shatter jaggedly not into small pieces (seen enough of them to know that).

Agree with you about the look of the kite. It does look somewhat recoverable from seeing the TV videos, I've seen worse being recoverd. But then we're not there and anything anybody says at this stage is speculation, informed maybe, but still speculation. Maybe we should, as FE suggests, bow out.

[Milt]

Aircraft Accident Analysis

This thread is now developing into a serious resume of the problems of a particular aircraft type which has particular undesireable attributes if the crew takes it beyond the edges of its handling/performance envelope. We all know that the Canberra is not alone in being unforgiving if taken beyond such established envelopes.

It just happens that accidents/failures trigger off the desires of the professional pilot in particular to rethink his/her options were he presented with the problem whatever it may be. There is never enough data in the mental data bank.

Every last one of us grieves when any of us becomes a fatality or is injured. We all want to commisserate with the families and associates. But that should not prevent the more experienced of us from having a forum which enables us to pass on to those less experienced the lessons we have learned or to exchange those lessons amongst ourselves. Are there really some of you out there who would not wish this to happen.

Perhaps already this thread has passed on some snippet which will prevent another tragedy. Perhaps note will be taken by those in decision making positions who are already being influenced by the wealth of experience that emerges from those having had lifetimes of experience. Where else is there a better place to give free uninhibited reign to such erudite discussion.

The moderator should consider deliberately initiating an analysis thread following significant accidents seperate from a condolence thread. Otherwise the professional pilot will be reticent to contribute to a learning and transfer of experience processing out of defference to the families and friends. What accident board finding will serve to trigger off a vigorous discussion such as we have going now? By the time the findings are released motivations for discussion have gone..

It is fortunate that two threads were initiated on this occasion and we can now see the beneficial aspects of this thread. Those without the motives to transfer beneficial aspects arising from the analyses of a prang should go back to the other thread.

I probably initiated the "speculation" on Canberra asymmetrics. Reading betwen the lines on information so far then in this thread it is not unreasonable to think that the squashed remains of the T4 resulted from recovery from a developing asymmetric departure, recovery from which is only possible by almost instantaneous closing of the live engine throttle to stop the yaw whilst pushing hard nose down. If there is then inadequate height to pull out then one can readily end up with the aircraft squashing onto the ground and a photograph as we have seen..

The asymmetric vices of the Canberra are well known and are most likely to be the cause of a Canberra prang. Some years ago I could have said that about elevator trim runaway. Was weather a factor in this case? What other failure/s may have occurred to fit the facts currently existing on this thread? One could make an interesting list.

I came close to flying a Canberra once that had been sabotaged!! I was flying one in an air display once on one engine when the live one quit. It was a good glider for a while. A story for later if there is interest.

Having had a lifetime of Canberra experience involving a few close calls and having been variously involved with Canberra flight testing on multiple variants, as a Canberra QFI and military aircraft accident investigator I do not wish to be selfish with my experience. I would hope to be able to pass on some lessons to those yet to call themselves experienced. Others contributing to this thread have extensive Canberra experience. Don't hide it - I too want to learn some more.

Please tell me if this thread or PPRuNe generally is an inappropriate forum or if there is a better way of handling the situation.

[delta96]

In the absence of a simulator for older types still in use, do they use a vertically displaced threshold (C.5000' ?) for the riskier approach/go around procedures?. An appropriately configured GPS box would provide ILS info to the 'threshold'. Only missing reference (at night) would be the app. lights when 'breaking cloud' at 200' + 5000.
I'm sure you'll tell me if I'm talking out of my Civvy hat.

[keithl]

D96 - My info 15 years out of date, but doubt if it's changed much. When I instructed on them we used to demo the effect of asymmetric power at a low speed at the sort of safe height you suggest. It was sobering to see how quickly the thing would roll.

Although it doesn't affect your suggestion, on one engine you are committed at 600 ft and your ILS DH would be increased accordingly. That also is a measure of how careful you have to be going around on one engine. .

But you know how different a real approach is over the ground, with drift changes, minor corrections etc. That has to be practiced on a real approach, I'm afraid. That's just background for you - I don't suggest it has any bearing on this accident.

For the Mods - I like Milt's suggestion of two threads, one Condolences and one Tech Speculation. You're not going to stop pilots speculating about crashes, it doesn't mean they're unfeeling, it means they need to try and understand what happened. That's quite different from uninformed and damaging press speculation, which angers me, too.

When the Nimrod crashed in Toronto, one of the first things I did was get in the simulator and start speculating with it. I had to - because I couldn't just shrug it off and say "Ho hum, I'll just wait for the BoI". For the more sensitive posters here - it's actually a form of caring.

[Instrument Ranting]

As a schoolboy I watched, horrified, as a Canberra crashed into a housing estate in Huntingdon. I'll never forget the bright orange fireball and thick black smoke. The graves of the three children and two young air crew who died are nearby. Strangely it was my captivation at the news coverage in the following days that set me on my career path, even though my father was an raf pilot with plenty of experience of the Canberra.

I believe that crash, (in May 1976) was indeed during a practise asymmetric approach, but was attributed to a 'newly discovered phenomenon fin stall'...can anyone shed any light?

Years later (93 I think), as a reporter I was sent to a crash two miles closer to Wyton. A well liked Station Commander and two of his colleagues were killed as their Canberra crashed on take off. Another practise asymmetric.

It is difficult for an outsider like me to see so many lives lost to the same type of incident without knowing that a lot of work has been done to try and prevent them. The news that 0/0 seats were considered but rejected on cost grounds is appalling

We do things on the cheap in this country (although it seems to cost us a fortune in the process).

I always thought an raf edict was that you can make a mistake once - but to repeat it is unacceptable. It's a shame that doesn't seem to apply to the procurement dept of MoD.

IR

[Jackonicko]

Like you, I was a schoolboy when the PR9 went in on that housing estate. I seem to remember that when Boscombe Down attempted to recreate the circumstances (with a borrowed PR9 being flown solo) they also lost the aircraft!

I remember the other accident, too, which cost me a former chum from UAS days - Cameron Locke, who I will always remember as a thoroughly decent and motivated bloke with an epic sense of fun.

The Canberra has killed some very, very good blokes, but then so has every other FJ type in RAF service, and so has the M4.

[Milt]

Instrument Ranting

Canberra Fin Stalling.
Good question.

Firstly fins are just double sided aerofoils that will stall given enough alpha. Not a new phenomenon.
Some aircraft in flight test come close to fin stall under the worst conditions and this is often corrected by adding more fin area which may then require a change to rudder design.

Then there is sometimes an additional complication which may occur at high fin alphas where the rudder force does a rapid decline at high rudder angles leading to rudder overbalance.
Given that this can be followed by a lock over of the rudder requiring a large force to unlock, TPs are very wary of this condition and approach the condition very warily. Often with a deployable tail chute

In my experience with multiple Mks of Canberra including flying all of the conventional aerobatics not involving negative g I feel I have never come close to stalling the fin. Flight test instrumentation would be required to determine how close and this would have been checked by English Electric and or Boscombe Down..

If I am right then the only time one will definitely get fin stalling will be following departure from a high thrust asymmetric and a slow reaction in pulling off the thrust.

This is sometimes demonstrated by a QFI showing Vmca (min speed to retain control following an engine failure) It is a normal test procedure in establishing that speed to fail an engine and wait an obligatory 2 seconds before taking any recovery action. If one does this procedure at too low a speed in the Canberra you rapidly roll inverted with an extreme angle and rate of yaw which can only be possible with a stalled fin. The fin will quickly unstall as thrust comes off leaving you to revover in the safe height you have allowed.

It's really not all that much fun.

Can someone expand on this?

[Ginseng]

You appear to be rather out of date on your T4 tech exam. The hatch is not frangible, it is solid, and jettisoned by explosive bolts. This requires no separate action, provided that the hatch safety switch is made live; the hatch is then jettisoned by the intial handle pull. As it departs, it withdraws a restrictor from the seat, allowing the seat gun to fire in sequence as the pull is continued. The pilots canopy is indeed jettisoned, but again this is automatic once the canopy/snatch master switch is set to live (as is firing of the snatch unit to sever and withdraw the control columns).

None of this, of course, tells us anything about thursday's tragic events. However, it is evident from the photographs that:

The Navigator's hatch has jettisoned and the seat has fired (I know - talk about stating the bleedin' obvious).

The pilots' canopy has jettisoned.

Both pilots' seats have fired.

Can't vouch for the snatch unit, but the BoI will know by now.

There is no command ejection system, each takes his turn in sequence by his own actions. It is recommended that the pilots avoid, if possible, simultaneous ejection. Not that you have too much time to worry about the niceties.

Posted to head off more uninformed speculation. Forgive me, but as a former colleague of one of the guys and an acquaintance of the other two, I am finding it difficult to keep my temper. Yes, of course we all want to know - but we are achieving nothing useful here.


Ginseng

[Flatus Veteranus]

As Boff implies, I found the Canberra T4 less tiring on one than the Meatbox (electric trimmers - such luxury!). But the principles were the same - you obeyed simple rules about mnimum IAS until you committed for landing. Compared to the Meatbox the Canberra only had one problem - the speed with which the idled engine could be spooled up for a touch-and-go and the risk of compressor stalls. Since I was only giving experience to ex-fighter, transport and maritime jocks going through CFS, I always used to take over control after touch-down on one and do the roller myself. Soon after I left Rissington, I believe one of the staff instructors or his stu stalled a compressor on go-round. He did the right thing and aborted, raising the gear. Two red faces but nobody was hurt. After that, I seem to remember, they had to full-stop off an asymmetric approach. :O

[keithl]

Ginseng - Please check yr PMs.

[Ginseng]

keithl - checked and replied. Good to hear from you after so long.

[Beeayeate]

Ginseng
Please check PMs.

[ACW599]

Firstly, as a humble light-aircraft pilot and long-time Canberra fan, my most sincere condolences to those left behind in the aftermath of this very sad accident.

I get the impression from reading this thread that the T4 and PR9 are decidedly different. Have I got the wrong end of the stick? If not, it would be very interesting to learn a little more about what the differences are. Is it just a matter of cockpit ergonomics, or are there major differences in handling and performance?

John

[wheelbarrow]

In answer to some of the questions asked previously:

Jackonico:

Cameron locke was not killed at Wyton (kinloss but in the same year), he suffered a common cause of one engine winding up whilst the other stalled during an overshoot, both he & his nav ejected, the nav survived albeit badly injured, unfortunately cameron's seat was outside it's limits (anyone see a common thread here). As for me infering about more being killed practising asymmetric, it is true, I spent 5 years on Canberra's, I flew all 7 types (3 different type of engines, 4 different type of cockpits, 3 different type of fuel systems, PR9's with some powered flying controls, the list goes on) as you can see there are ,many variants & most were different. The Zero/Zero seat study was last year after an incident on a PR9, but with only a few more years to go, cost was more of an issue than the safety of crews.....


Beeayeate;

What special night landing techniques do you know of that the rest of us don't?

The statement about the column is correct, part of the ejection sequence was to blow the control column connection to the "Torque tubes" running to the control surfaces, the column would then go forward under spring pressure, then the seats would fire. If it didn't happen in this sequence then the pilot/s would lose their knees.

Fast Erect, as you know nothing of Canberra's nor of the individuals sadly lost in this accident "wind your neck in". A lot of us have professional reasons and/or personal; reasons to discuss this issue, maybe something said here will one day prove useful to someone.

Inst Rating;

The Fin Stall only happened on the PR9 due to the size of the Fin against the amount of thrust. The T4 in this accident had @ 5500lbs thrust per-side, the PR9 11,250 per-side (unreheated lightning engines). When I flew it we always took off with 90% as this would help in the asymmetric case but also stop wear on the elevator. The crash at Wyton (PR9) was fin stall, the Test pilots decided to try to disprove this & took one over salisbury plain (minus it's nav); the test pilot managed to fin stall it and could not recover even given a surplus! of height & so ejected; to my knowledge he is the only pilot to have survived ejection from a PR9 - food for thought.... The crash in 1993 occured during a practice EFATO, a good reason for a sim....methinks

For those not familiar with the canberra's asymmetric handling. The T4 was the most benign with only a 15kt "graveyard" gap after rotation (The difference between rotation & V2). The E4 & PR7 had 45kt gaps!!!!!!!!! I suffered 3 engine failures & one engine fire in 5 years, 2 of them in the circuit. If you lost an engine in the circuit below @500' you were commited to land as overshooting took @450' of height loss to gather enough speed to be able to select full power, until then full power would cause loss of control due to insufficient rudder authority at low speed. In the old days all asymmetric circuits were flown at normal circuit speeds, when it was realised that adding speed made the exercise more controllabe the accident rate dropped considerably.

[2 Liter Peter]

Just wanted to give thanks for some more very good posts on this thread. One of the best things about PPRuNe is that we gain insight from each other.

Should we be mute after a fatality while grief might still hang in the air ?

Accidents are not good news, and this thread has highlighted that some would prefer discussion not to proceed, out of respect. Again I apologise for starting this thread with a forthright and provocative post at such a critical time. That was my personal reaction to the fact of the Canberra still claiming lives all these years since I flew it.

The resulting thread would seem to show considerable support for the view that a good time and place to discuss an issue is when it is topical. Thanks, Milt and wheelbarrow, for your thoughts on shared experience being of value to others despite possible insensitivity at a difficult time.

Most of us pilots seem to be able to get on with our lives during and after crises, but I doubt if any of us are totally insensitive. It is probably on balance worth continuing the discussion a little further. Sorry, Fast Erect

Canberra Engine problems

There is ample evidence of the fickleness of the Avon 100 series engines on the earlier Canberras. Not everyone met the problem - thanks Pindi for pointing out that it was possible to have a great tour without engines misbehaving. However, wheelbarrow's eloquent statement mirrors my experience. Some anecdotal evidence follows:

One vaguely remembers trying to get airborne in strongish crosswinds- you just couldn't put the power on until rolling fast down the runway because the downwind engine would just surge and blow out. One equally vaguely remembers the things going out when you decided to do a turn at high altitude, N-over-root-T surge springs to mind as the name of the cause.

The asymmetric difficulty was clear in the 70s when Bassingbourne with its shorter runway had closed, and someone had the bright idea, now that there was 9000ft available nearly everywhere, of doing all single-engined appproaches flapless to avoid any short-finals trauma, only deploying the flap when landing was assured. That they needed to change an SOP because the single-stage-flap asymmetric configuration was dangerous was recognised then.

Those of us who were later glued to the T4 every second Tuesday or Thursday night for night asymmetrics recurrents got to know just how gentle you needed to be with the throttles during roller landings. You actually had plenty of time, even on only a 6000ft runway, to get it wrong once on a roller landing, throttle back, then painfully inch the throttles open again and get airborne: if you didn't get it right the second time, you would have been glad of the rule requiring you to use a 9000 foot runway! However, if you only flew the T4 twice in 6 months, your feel for the throttles tended to be awry at first, based on how the PR9 throttles felt, not a safe situation at all. A solution was for the trainee to steer on the runway while the trainer could finesse the throttles through the roller - the start of what us civvies would call CRM. But all of this could be done completely safely in a simulator.

A classic example of the 100-series Avon's ability to cause mayhem was the early 80s low-level display practice when an engine surged without any accompanying throttle movement or other obvious cause. Unfortunately this happened during a stabilised medium-power 2G 60-degree bank turn with full flap and gear, 150kts, brilliant way to do a tight turn in front of a crowd. Except that, as the engine blew out the aircraft suddenly rolled upright even as the pilot frantically kicked in the rudder. Good job it was the upper engine that surged, the lower one would have rolled them upside down - they were only at 250 feet. And that was only the start of their problem: - with barn-door flap and gear down, on one engine, trying to do a go-around from 250 feet from what had now become an unintended approach into a set of ploughed fields. For the record, the flaps eventually came up and they proved that if you have the right speed at the start, you don't need to start your asymmetric overshoot at 600 feet MDH to get away with it.

Milt - "I came close to flying a Canberra once that had been sabotaged!! I was flying one in an air display once on one engine when the live one quit. It was a good glider for a while. A story for later if there is interest." Amazing similarity - Please tell us more, Milt !

A PR7 had engine surges on take-off during the late 70s, in the 45 knot gap that Wheelbarrow mentioned below V2, and the crew ejected, leaving behind a jump-seat junior navigator to crash into brick walls alone.

As another example of the early Avon's surge problems, during an OCU course in the 60s, a colleague, far better and smoother pilot than I, was caught by an engine surge during a Canberra practice stall recovery over the North Sea. One engine went to full power, the other blew out to none: close to stall speed anyway, the aircraft quickly spun, down into cloud. Disoriented, he ordered his Nav to eject, then after the bang and before he could eject himself, he came out of cloud with enough height and horizon to visually recover and fly home. "Sorry about that" - the poor Nav without a goon suit nearly died in the cold sea, luckily had parachuted down near a boat that saved him.

So there are a number of pointers to the unreliability of the Avon 100 series engines, which are of course the key to why there is any need to practice asymmetric approaches in the first place. In 13000 hours on Boeings and Airbus kit since then I have never had an engine out. My record on 2000 hours on Canberras was similar to Wheelbarrow's, a number of failures. To my mind, anyone who wants to dig a T4 out of maintenance and resurrect it ought to prove that it is safe and necessary to do so. No doubt all the accident stats are available, somewhere. To me, the case is beyond doubt : they were unsafe in the '50s, and they are still unsafe.

So - Unsafe ? Should they ground them all ?

Despite loving the "Queen of the Skies" as we all do, the title to this thread appears well founded.

On the whole though, we don't know what we don't know, only what we do know. So I'm grateful for well-reasoned posts from Beeayeate and Milt, Instrument Ranting and others, and enlightenment from Jackonicko who said "...the damned things are of pivotal importance, and offer a unique capability. Useful they most assuredly are."

If that is correct, Jacko, I'll happily modify my stance. I'm amazed that nothing else in our or the US inventory can carry the same electro-optical oblique sensors, but the operational requirement for PR9s is definitely beyond my pay grade. If the people who decide do so on the basis that the PR9 might save another 9/11, there is clearly a trade-off against safety. I'll leave that trade for those of you who know better than me to make. So rest easy, Sir Brian and Buff.

The T4s are a very different matter. I'm not so sure that the case has been made here for continuing to risk pilots' lives by using dodgy first-generation Avon 100-series engines in 50-year old airframes with ancient seats and instrumentation to do roller or asymmetric practice landings. And simply no-one here has made the case for risking Navigators' lives as well. The T4s seem to be clearly unsafe, and probably unnecessary.

Anyone have a nice used T4 brass starter cartridge ? Expect it to start having historic value soon.
____

ACW599 - John - PR9/ T4 differences : you might start by looking here :

http://www.rafmarham.co.uk/organisation/39squadron/canberra.htm

Cheers

[Milt]

Watch this space for the extract from memoires describing the Canberra sabotage and the adrenalin pumping when setting up for a dead stick with no engines.

Meanwhile the other major cause of Canberra losses was that infernal problem with elevator trim runaways. We flew with trepidation for a period thinking that one could occur at ANY time.

The fix in my time was a double pole trim switch with one pole isolating all electrical power to the elevator trimmer.

Was the root cause of those runaways ever determined and what was it? I either don't remember or never did find out.

Lesson from that incidently relates to anyone who somehow finds himself in an uncontrollable nose down pitch. DON'T just dive into the ground with the stick hard back. Much better to push gently under and roll out up the other side at much lower speed. OR if not enough air under you then roll hard until you are able to see the ground going away. Intent then is to get the speed down so that you can sort it or leave it.

[Milt]

Canberra Sabotage with a little Preamble
ETPS at Farnborough 1955

Such was the general approach to test flying during those days that it was considered highly desirable that as many pilots as possible, get experience in as many aircraft as possible with a minimum of prior formal conversion. This approach did much to evolve standard requirements for aircraft design and handling in an era when aircraft were developing at a very rapid rate. The constrained restrictions imposed on present generation test pilots arise from a much slower rate of development and an enormous increase in capital costs of aircraft and equipment.

So it was that one day we had a visiting RN Captain fly off in one of our Seahawks. He flew some aerobatics and during the recovery from a loop experienced a terrific bang as a goodly portion of the left side of the cockpit disappeared. He was left with little control over engine power with only a portion of the throttle linkage remaining and was only just able to limp back to Farnborough. He had not seen any other aircraft in the vicinity of the incident but presumed that he had been involved in a mid air collision. The story soon pieced together. A report was made by the pilot of a Hunter who had been flying straight and level at the time that another aircraft had plunged down on his aircraft striking it on the side of the front fuselage and taking out some of his right wing leading edge.

On the side of the Hunter's fuselage was a clear impression of a mirror image of the triangular red sign painted on the sides of aircraft cockpits having ejection seats - "Danger Ejection Seat". This had transfered from the Seahawk to the Hunter during the collision. It became an interesting exercise to subsequently use two models of the aircraft involved to attempt to reproduce the precise sequence of movement of the two aircraft as they became enmeshed for that split second of time. That both aircraft and their pilots survived is indeed remarkable.

At about this time, ETPS took delivery of a B2 Canberra No 867 which had just come through a major overhaul with English Electric at Warton. It was flown into Farnborough by one of the tutors. It was a normal practice then for the TPS engineers to do an acceptance inspection. The senior engineer was meticulous which was as well in that we all placed abnormal reliance on the reliability of the aircraft he and his team maintained and serviced.

Part of his inspection involved climbing through a hatch beneath the rear fuselage to examine the rudder and elevator control push-pull rods which ran along the left side of the fuselage through bearings at about 4 feet intervals. The rods connected directly with the flying controls in the cockpit. They were made from alloy tubing about 1 inch in diameter. The engineer discovered some metal particles scattered down the side of the fuselage in the vicinity of one of the bearings. He initially thought that one of the bearings may have seized and this may have been the source of the metal particles.

On the ground, the mass balance of the Canberra elevator control system caused the elevators to raise to their upper stops so that the control column on the ground was always fully back . The engineer used a piece of cord to tie the control column forward so that he could then inspect the complete run of the control rods. On climbing back into the rear fuselage, he was appalled to find that one of the elevator rods had been cut almost right through. The saw cut had been made so that it would be concealed by a bearing with the controls in their normal ground position.

All hell broke loose. Following an initial ETPS investigation, the police and Scotland Yard commenced a vigorous investigation at the English Electric plant at Wharton.

Some months previously, the wiring looms in the main electronics equipment bay of a Canberra being overhauled at Wharton had been extensively cut by someone using wire cutters. The culprit had not been found. Examination of work records showed that three workmen had worked on both aircraft during the periods in question. Close questioning eventually brought forth a confession by one fitter to both acts of sabotage.

Prior to the sabotage, the culprit had been working on night shifts for which there was an extra pay loading. He was transferred against his wishes to day shifts and decided to take out his resentment by deliberately damaging aircraft on which he was working. He was arrested, charged with sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment. Hope he served the full term.

I have always taken great care with pre-flight inspections ever since and it was not the last case of aircraft sabotage to cross my path.

[FJJP]

Just to set the record straight - the last crash at Wyton, where the Station Cdr was killed, was in March 1991, not 1993. It was the week after Wyton personnel returned from the First Gulf war. It was as a result of practice asy, but there were a number of unusual factors which I am privi to but do not intend to discuss.

And visual committal height [where you were committed to land following an engine failure] was 600ft agl.

[Tim Mills]

Having flown Meteors in the 50s and Canberras in the 60s, I thought 2 Liter Peter was being a bit over the top when he suggested that the Canberra was/is inherently dangerous. He, and various others on this thread, have more hours on the type than I do, but during my 1000 odd hours, on the B2 with the old Avons, and the B15 with the slightly newer ones, I never had the problems others encountered.

I do remember that only the Sqn QFIs were allowed to do roller landings with the T4, because of the possibility of surge, particularly in a crosswind. I can't remember if we did rollers in the B15s.

There have been a wealth of very informative and well argued posts from Milt, Wheelbarrow, FV, Jackonicko, Beeayeate and others, and not least from 2 Litre Peter himself. I suppose that, in the end, while we have manned aeroplanes, we will have tragic accidents.

So far as this one is concerned, all is conjecture until the BoI publishes its findings, and makes recommendations for change or otherwise to training requirements. I imagine there will still be a need for a T4 on strength until the PR9s are replaced, if ever. Though in this day and age I am tending toward 2 Liter Peters point of view.

[Jackonicko]

Presumably they will need a T4 to train up two replacement pilots, who will presumably be required if 39 are to continue to meet their commitments. Unless withdrawal is brought forward.....

[Beeayeate]

I believe they still have WJ874, the "Blue One" painted up as the prototype VN799, and WH849.

When this thread has settled, maybe the moderator would consider tacking it to the end of the previous main Canberra thread. Lots of good Canberra gen and stories in that archive.

Ginseng
Glad we're now sorted, thanks for the PM.

[Flatus Veteranus]

All is conjecture until tyhe BoI publishes its findings - Tim Mills.

Can someone tell me whether BoI findings are published these days as a matter of course, or only in response to political pressure (as in the Chinook situation)?

I do not like this publication of reports which should be confidential to the RAF. For instance the BoI might want to recommend an immediate ban on roller landings off asymmetric approaches. But this would imply criticism of the performance of deceased aircrew, which should NOT be published.

[Topsy Turvey]

Flatus Veteranus

MoD BOI are not published as intended to be internal fact finding document passed up Command Chain. That said a copy is given to NOK and the shorter Military Aircraft Aircraft Summary is published in so far as placed in House of Commons Library and media briefed accordingly.

May all have to change under Freedom of Information Act.

[Jackonicko]

BOI and accident reports should be far more widely published than they are. Even in accidents to aircraft types with very different (uniquely military) performance and handling characteristics there may be relevant lessons for us 'lesser mortals' who fly less exalted aircraft types. In other cases, there is a more direct relevance - an accident to a Canberra is of relevance to civilian Canberra and Meteor operators, and perhaps to those who operate aircraft like the 737 and perhaps to the operators of smaller, lighter twins. An accident to a Grob 115...... you get the idea.

Without being too insensitive, saving the 'feelings' of deceased aircrew who may be implicitely criticised in such reports should surely be secondary to the aim of saving the lives of other aircrew.

Can you imagine the howls of protest if civilian accident reports were hushed up in the way you suggest? And rightly so.

[DuckDodgers]

Last time i looked there are many reasons as to why BOI findings SHOULD NOT be published for all to read hence why they are RESTRICTED... should have guessed that a journo would only be interested in nothing less than a story.

"Without being too insensitive, saving the 'feelings' of deceased aircrew who may be implicitely criticised in such reports should surely be secondary to the aim of saving the lives of other aircrew."

Yes like other RAF aircrew...oh the very people the documents get seen by...I feel your swamp is calling you!

[Jackonicko]

Duck,

Why don't you grow up, or learn to read. Or preferably both.

By the time a BOI report is published, there is no story for the kind of journo you clearly despise, and they wouldn't be interested in that level of detail, or be able to interpret it, anyway. I'm sure that most of the trade and specialist press journos get to see them, probably before you do.

And in any case, I was speaking as an aviator, not as a journo. Understanding the causes of accidents to military aircraft may well be as useful to me as a pilot, as understanding the causes of civil accidents. There are also a number of Canberra operators worldwide, who would certainly benefit from being able to read this report, when it comes out.

I say again (as you were clearly too incensed or too dim to see it first time around): "there may be relevant lessons for us 'lesser mortals' who fly less exalted aircraft types. In other cases, there is a more direct relevance - an accident to a Canberra is of relevance to civilian Canberra and Meteor operators, and perhaps to those who operate aircraft like the 737 and perhaps to the operators of smaller, lighter twins."

Compromising safety in the spurious interests of security is not on (and actually it's not about security, it's about defending reputations and preventing embarrassment).

Best wishes from the swamp.

[soddim]

Jacko's points about the possible benefits of wider dissemination of BOI reports are valid but one has to remember that RAF BOIs are in-house enquiries and obtain information under special rules of priviledge as a result. If they were to be released to the wider public I doubt that the evidence they seek would be so freely given.

If the information is to be given to the public it should be obtained by an independent body and the evidence given would not be obtained in-house under confidentiality rules. I suspect the end result would be detrimental to the truth.

[pr00ne]

Was it not the case some time ago that summaries of BOI reports were carried in some of the monthly aviation mags? I am sure I remember them being there and suddenly not being there.

From a professional point of view, FOI legislation both European and domestic will make it virtualy impossible to keep these things out of sight for long, along with a whole host of info currently 'restricted'.

Is Air Clues still restricted?

[Archimedes]

'Does Air Clues still exist?' would be a more apposite query.

The 'purple-isation' ( :ugh: ) of flight safety led to the retirement of Wg Cdr Spry and the publication of a new glossy called 'Aviate' - which I keep mistaking for a Saga holidays brochure.

You can access said journal via the MoD website, but it helpfully only provides pdf documents of the front cover and index pages.

[oakworth]

FJJP,

as has been mentioned before, families do read these threads, so your comment about the 91 crash only does harm and appears to be nothing more than an attempt to get attention.

[Flatus Veteranus]

In my day the Rules of Procedure for BoIs, laid down in MAFL and QRs, were aimed at a "quick and dirty" exposure of causes of an accident, allocation of blame, and recommendations for a "quick fix". They played merry hell with the normal rules of evidence applied elsewhere in the courts. "Heresay" was admissible, witnesses could be compelled to answer possibly incriminating questions etc, etc. In recognition of this, evidence at BoIs could not be used in any subsequent legal action . The proceedings were usually classified Confidential under the OSA, and so untested evidence could not be used by the media to impugn the characters of witnesses. To the best of my knowledge the findings of the BoI on the Heathrow Vulcan tragedy have never been released. I think that was a healthy state of affairs and regret that it has been allowed to lapse.

[pr00ne]

Archimedes,

Air Clues no more?

Wg Cdr Spry no more........................................................ ....

How on earth is that progress?

Said Wg Cdr was the first 'big wig' in HMFC I ever openly clashed with, via the letters page of Air Clues, good fun at the time.

[Jackonicko]

Some helpful input on BOIs from Soddim and especially Flatus.

Thanks chaps.

But surely the answer is to release the BOI in a form in which the confidentiality of witnesses is ensured, and in which caveats are given where evidence may be 'untested' to some extent.

A blanket ban on publication serves no flight safety interest at all.

I'm also concerned as to whether the secrecy of a BOI report is more likely to protect the reputations of the crew (by keeping any blame out of the public arena - as perhaps is the case in the Harry Broadhurst Heathrow Vulcan incident?) or to allow an unwarranted attack on their reputations (as arguably happened in the Chinook Mull of Kintyre crash).

Someone once said that (especially if the pilot was killed, and therefore wasn't there to answer back!) it was always possible to attribute any accident to 'pilot error'. If nothing else it was an error to get out of bed that morning.

[Milt]

828e

You described the Canberra as 'dodgy'. It's like giving a dog a bad name and I am reluctant to discredit it that much.

Most Canberra pilots will have a soft spot for the old girl. She was way ahead of her time and missed out on some of the later evolutionary advances in design and materials.

I liked the control harmony and control forces, her stabilities and an outstanding performer in her day
Don't know why I am remembering the Canberra as a ' her' as some of the variants became quite masculine such as the BI 6 and the B8. Didn't fly the PRs. Might make an interesting survey to get votes on particular types as having male or female personalities.

So Canberras are generally fondly remembered.
But as has been mentioned in the thread she had/has some rough edges that could bite the unwary and even catch out those not familiar with the sensitivity of the engines.

Given her time over again with present know-how and hindsight she would undoubtedly have a redesigned fin and rudder. There lay her greatest ability to bite and bite hard. When heavily asymmetric the fin has inadequate area and authority to prevent fin stalling at higher speeds than would be acceptable for current criteria. Furthermore there were no discernable cues available to the pilot that the fin may be about to stall such as a buffeting felt from the rudder. And when the fin did stall it unloaded dramatically resulting in rapid yaw which had you on your back in a hurry mostly before you had time to pull thrust from the live engine.

Her other major problems were the engines which had variable inlet guide vanes to a compressor that operated too close to surging/blade stalling. There were two areas, wide apart in their performance envelope, where the engines operated close to critical. One was during maximum acceleration under the control of a hard to adjust acceleration control unit so go rounds could be a bit twitchy/iffy when the engines needed some nursing to keep them aligned particularly if you were demanding thrust in a hurry. Engine misalignment ended up causing a fair share of misadventure.

The engines at high altitude and at the colder upper air temperatures over the world's tropics would have the compressor blades too close to the stall again. There may have been a particular compressor stage which was worse than the others but I don't think the particular stage was ever determined. A little flow disturbance and bang - the compressor would unload and the fires would mostly go out. Sometimes the resulting yaw disturbance would surge the other side too. If you were not quick with a hot relight then it meant a descent down towards 20,000 ft to effect a relight. The high altitude compressor surge remains with more modern engines. The surge boundary for a particular engine is usually determined to be a particular value of RPM divided by the square root of the relative temperature. Hence higher RPM and/or lower OAT takes the engine closer to a surge

All things considered I conclude that the Canberra remains a useful aircraft today and provided its limitations and vices are well recognised should continue to give good service although I am convinced it needs a sensor on the fin to warn pilots that fin stall is imminent. Could be quite a simple device.

This is regardless of the reason for the latest loss which may not have been an asymmetric occurence at all. We professionals have not yet determined the cause but consider we should be advised as soon as possible.

RAF take note of the need for a mod.

[FJJP]

Oakworth, I am sorry you felt the need to comment. The families were fully briefed as to exactly what happened. I don't need the attention [regulars to these threads will attest to that] - I felt the need to make an accurate statement to attempt to prevent continued speculation. I was there, very personally and deeply involved in the aftermath. I will make no further mention of the '91 accident.

[Guern]

When I was in the space cadets in the mid 80's I am sure we got to read BOI reports etc when we were hanging around at Halton etc waiting for our next go in a Venture. Or even on summer camps at various other places.

[Pindi]

Flatus Veteranus

The rules of evidence don't apply in a Bof I because it's not a judicial proceeding but a device to establish facts. If those facts indicate, inter alia, that there may be a disciplinary element involved, then a summary of evidence may follow where the rules of evidence do apply. The summary then forms the basis for the disposal of the case either summarily or by court martial. At least that's how it was when I did a P1 job

[soddim]

Guern,

I imagine that what you read was the accident report rather than the findings of the board which are not normally made freely available. However, the restricted report is compiled from the boards' findings.

[oakworth]

FJJP,

I still don't see the relevance of making a comment that rather than serve to 'shut the door' would actually prick peoples curiosity. Like you I knew all 3 crew very well. We'd better agree to disagree on this.

[Flatus Veteranus]

Pindi

Thanks for the reminder.

I was once President of a BoI into a student fatality on a UAS. We were drawn reluctantly ( having explored every alternative, however bizarre) to the conclusion that the student was killed probably as a result of attempting aerobatic manoeuvres at low level, unauthorised and beyond his capability. He crashed his Chipmunk close to his girlfriend's house. We concluded that the most likely cause of the accident was a gross breach of flying discipline. We may have been wrong, so I should have hated our findings to be published or shown to his NOK.

[Milt]

Learn From My Mistakes
Don't do what I did in a Canberra !

Extract from memoirs - RAAF Air Force Week Flying Display 1962

September 1962 saw more display practice in a Canberra which somehow had become my task by default. No one else was inclined to fly the manoeuvres which I had developed for the Canberra at light weight. This particular year was to take on some different developments. A few days before the display date of 17 September, a Squadron of USAF B57s had arrived from the USA. The Commanding Officer, Colonel Tom Aldrich, was allocated a house on the base and became a neighbour and close friend. His sqadron of aircraft were based at Avalon whilst his personnel were housed at Laverton. USAF U2s had already been operating from Laverton for some two years conducting upper air sampling. The B57s were to extend this research. Colonel Aldrich readily agreed to place two of his B57s on static display at Laverton for the air display.

The B57s had marked across their tails in large letters WEATHER to show their Weather Reconnaissance Role. In view of the America's Cup yacht races, then in progress in the USA between The US's WEATHERLY and Australia's GRETEL, enterprising RAAF airmen got to work overnight and neatly painted an appended LY to WEATHER on the B57s and GRETEL across the tail of the Canberra on static display next to the B57. This was a great crowd pleaser.

The display on Sunday 17 September was a huge success and was of course attended by most of the B57 Squadron personnel. I soon found myself in detailed discussions of comparisons of the Canberra with its USAF copy during a party in the Mess that evening. The comparisons of performance and manoeuvring capabilities of these similar aircraft went on for some time between us RAAF pilots and the USAF pilots who all had much more flying experience on their aircraft than we were ever likely to accumulate on our Canberras. Ours were fitted with more powerful engines and the cockpits were much different. Theirs had fighter type canopies with crew members in tandem and their airframes were somewhat heavier. The USAF pilots, and our own squadron pilots, had never been permitted to perform aerobatics. They were rather impressed by the routine which I had evolved for the display.

My routine was to start the display, using an aircraft at light weight having minimum fuel, by lifting off the runway at a speed well below normal and immediately raising the undercarriage whilst holding down low. At the end of the 5000 ft runway I would have accelerated to a speed of about 220 Kts, at which point I would pull up sharply into a 30 degree climb whilst executing two barrel rolls at maximum roll rate to the left. By the time the aircraft was first inverted, I would still be accelerating at full power and climbing away at about 400 feet. After comfortably completing the two climbing barrel rolls, I would pull power back to idle whilst pulling up to the vertical to bleed off speed for a stall turn to the left into a vertically down attitude and a flattening turn as I came back over the airfield for a fairly slow and low steep turn. During the turn I would open the weapon bay doors to release a full load of air filled meteorological balloons. The balloons floated down onto the crowd much to the delight of all, particularly the children.

Following the release of the balloons I positioned for a short field landing using anti-skid maximum braking to stop the light aircraft in about 2000 feet on the 5,000 ft runway. Just before stoping I would have the engines accelerating to full power whilst holding on the hot brakes for about 10 seconds. The take-off could then be achieved in about another 2,000 feet leaving about 1,000 feet of unused runway. This performance even surprised experienced Canberra pilots. My fuel load was, by now, well down leaving just enough for the later flight in the last events of the display - the handicap pylon air race and a mass fly past, which I was to lead.

The air race was flown at 500 feet around significant ground marks all within view from the airfield. All aircraft types were assigned a speed to fly 5 laps and were assigned a particular time to roll on take-off. A handicapper in the tower assigned speed corrections on each lap aiming to bring all aircraft over an airfield finish line as close as possible to the same time. The air race became a popular feature of the Laverton displays. The race was also useful in getting all aircraft airborne for the finale - the mass fly past.

Two Canberras were to take part in the fly past and I wondered how I may be able to arrange for both to fly in the air race under different handicaps. I found that a single engined Canberra could be identified from the ground if an engine was closed down, allowed to cool and then made to stream unburnt fuel by opening the high pressure fuel valve and throttle.

I elected to fly the single engined Canberra in the air race following a normal two engined take-off. This was the same aircraft I had flown for the individual display and by now had low levels of fuel in its tanks. My assigned speed was 200 Kts. At this speed there was inadequate rudder to maintain balanced flight as I increased power to maintain speed while turning hard around the ground markers. I began by feeding fuel to both engines from the centre fuselage tank. The tightest turn in the race was between Laverton and Werribee and as I yawed the aircraft around this turn on the first lap the fuel in the tank must have been forced to one side away from the pick-up point for the immersed booster pump. Suddenly my only operating engine failed.

I pulled up to gain height for a dead stick landing attempt on to the airfield, declared an emergency and then started to sort through my other options. The obvious thing to do was to go for a relight on the other windmilling engine so I closed off its streaming fuel and waited a while for the fuel to blow clear. It then lit up as expected and my emergency was now over. I then joined in on the air-race again, cutting a corner to get back into my handicapped position. I now had the time to sort things out, recalling that I had seen a low pressure fuel warning light as the engine stopped. This gave me the clue I needed to deduce the reason for the engine failure. I then relit the "failed" engine which continued to perform as expected. So I then shut down the other engine again and started fuel streaming.

Little did I know but a fire had been burning in its nacelle. A gap between the engine tail pipe and the jet pipe had allowed raw fuel to dribble down into the nacelle. This had not cleared before I went for the emergency relight and had been burning whilst I relit the other engine. Nor had the fire burned out before I started to feed more fuel from the streaming engine. I had not finished the next lap before I was presented with the dreaded glow of a fire warning light. I immediately closed down the streaming, pulled up again declaring another emergency and slowed to a lower speed before discharging the nacelle fire extinguisher. I was relieved when the fire warning light went out presuming that if there had been a fire then it had gone out. I had no desire to foul up the display with an emergency landing so I called off the emergency and rejoined the air race for the second time. The handicapper was now speaking with a frantic voice while I tried my best to exhibit a matter-of fact voice showing no further concern.

A passing Sabre pilot looked me over and reported no sign of fire remaining. I could not determine whether there had been a real fire so I determined not to restart the offending engine again.

We all completed the race in a mass scramble to the finish. I cannot recall which aircraft won. My mind was already working on what to do next. I had to stay on one engine and realised that I could achieve enough speed to still lead the fly-past. I also had to be the last to land else I would block the only runway useable. I did not want to divert to another airfield. The fly-past went according to plan - the landing sequence did not, as I came in tail-end charlie.

I had to close down on the runway and have the aircraft towed away. Inspection showed there had been a fierce brief fire which had caused some wing damage. The wing was removed and replaced. Geof Wilson, the navigator, knows all about adrenalin rush. He sat on his hands for a few days to stop them shaking and even volunteered to fly with me again. I would like to hear the story again as he now tells it.

[Jackonicko]

"NEWS
Ejection seats for crash jet researched

14 September 2004 06:30

Research was carried out into new ejection seats on the Canberra that crashed at RAF Marham, killing two pilots, the Ministry of Defence revealed last night.
But the work showed that modern equipment would not have operated properly on the 50-year-old aircraft.
And the Canberra was due to be taken out of service in 2003 - before the end of the rolling programme of tests on new seat equipment.
The news came in response to a newspaper report that Treasury chiefs had vetoed fitting Canberras with £1m rocket-propelled ejection seats in place of 1950s equipment because of the cost.
An RAF board of inquiry is investigating the cause of the crash at Marham on September 2.
Flight Lt Lawrence Coulton, 40, of Stoke Holy Cross, near Norwich, and Flight Lt Paul Morris, 38, of Shelley Close, Downham Market, died while practising emergency landings.
Sqn Ldr Caroline Edie, MoD spokeswoman for the RAF, said: "We cannot pre-empt the findings of the board of inquiry into the tragedy.
"We cannot comment on whether the ejection seats in the Canberra had any issue with regard to this accident at RAF Marham.
"Speculation can be very harmful, especially to grieving family and friends."
But she added: "On the issue of the ejection seat, this was looked at very closely back in 2001.
"A modern ejection seat in a Canberra would not perform in the same way as in a modern aircraft because of the design. The hatches and canopies meant the performance of a modern ejection seat would be lost.
"The Canberra was due to come out of service in 2003, anyway, and the rolling programme was going to last three years.
"So the aircraft was due to be taken out of service before the programme would have been completed, which is why the decision was made not to go ahead."
Sqn Ldr Edie continued: "The key thing for us is that this was a complete tragedy and our condolences are with the family and friends of the two aircrew who lost their lives.
"Flight safety is something we take incredibly seriously and it is one of our highest priorities. However, we also recognise that flying is risky.
"With regard to the Canberra, we accept that it is an old aircraft. But it is also a very safe aircraft, and the last accident involving fatalities occurred back in 1991."



Hmmm. I thought the last fatalities were in '93, not '91.

How would the Canberra's hatches prevent zero-zero seats from giving a useful expansion in seat envelope?

When was the PR9 ever 'due to go out of service in 2003' - certainly not in 2001, unless they were keeping it very quiet.

What a shame to see a serving officer (albeit one in Corporate Comms) resorting to this kind of spin. Honesty or a 'no comment' would be so much better than this kind of misleading tosh.

[rivetjoint]

My un-informed guess is that the time taken to blow the hatches and canopies clear would take too long given that zero/zero seats have to have an almost instant response?

Isn't there a reason why the Nav has to go first in the Canberra too?

[Jackonicko]

While a zero-zero seat in a Canberra might not have the same performance as the same seat in an MDC-equipped Hawk (say) surely the gyroscopes and rocket packs used in modern seats would expand the safe envelope.

[FJJP]

To fit rocket seats to the Canberra T4 would require a complete re-design and enlargement of the entire cockpit area of the aircraft. If you had ever flown the aircraft you would realise that - there is physically no space to fit the modern seats, which are considerably larger than the original seats.

As it is, there has to be canopy jettison before the seats fire, and the elevator snatch blow the explosive collar round the elevator control tube to allow the control column to be pulled clear of the pilots' legs.

The last accident was March 1991. Period.

Now can we please drop this speculation that is going to go nowhere.

[Jackonicko]

I hadn't 'twigged' that modern zero-zero seats (especially the modern lightweights, as used in the various turbine trainers) were any bigger than the zero-nineties in the Canberra, and had thought that other platforms had been upgraded with modern seats.

I'm ashamed to admit that I have flown the T4 (and in the B2, TT18 and other marks) but was still too stupid to pick up this fundamental difficulty. In my defence, it was 22 years ago!

Would the same be true for the PR9?

I sense your irritation with this, FJJP, but please cut me some slack. Had other journos made the same effort to ask questions like this, the seat story would not have run in the national press. I'm just trying to understand this so that when I am told to write about it, I do so in something approaching a helpful manner.

[Worf]

Sympathies to the families of the aircrew in the crash - the effect it has is devastating. I remember clearly watching a fireball (at dusk) from a Canberra crash at Pune airbase, while I was playing with the son of the pilot. I was about 9 then - and remember being confused for years about the suddeness of the departure of my friend from the airbase - a strange sense of loss that haunted me for years.

The Indian Air Force is the only one besides the RAF still operating the Canberra and probably has as much experience operating it. It took part in 4 conflicts - 1961 in the Congo, the 1965 & 1971 Indo-Pak wars and the Kargil conflict.

The experience with the Canberra in the IAF seems to be very much in keeping with the RAF responses I have seen on Pprune - a much loved but not to be taken lightly aircraft.

Air Cdre Pete Wilson of the Indian Air Force was one of the early pilots to introduce and fight with the Canberra. (A tribute from another great Indian pilot, late Wing Co Suresh is here
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Wilson02.html) and a bio is here

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Wilson01.html

His comments on the Canberra were
"The Canberra was a strong, docile, easy to fly aircraft, but it was obsolete when the IAF bought them. It had been made obsolete by the transonic fighter aircraft, which had been introduced at the same time. She could not survive as a level bomber in the day and use at night against relatively small targets such as airfield structures required radar bombing and marking equipment, which the IAF did not have.

It was effective against specialist targets like Badin during the day, but night use like the PAF B-57's were not possible because of the very poor light transmission of the windshield. Night shallow glide attacks on unlit ranges were an exercise in bravery, which brings me to the subject of IAF Canberra B58 navigators. They were unique in the world as aircrew, who flew on operations without a chance of getting out of the aircraft in an emergency. It was reprehensible, that the British aerospace industry should sell such aircraft and that the Indian Govt., should buy them."

The Indian Air Force pilots were unanimous in their opinion that the B-57 (that our adversary Pakistan flew) - that it was a much more survivable and effective aircraft.

If the US could make those drastic changes why didnt the RAF and British industry do the same - the introduction of the Intruder version B(I)8 was surely a chance to redesign the cockpit?

Here's to my fathers pupil Wg Cdr Issar - who landed a T.54 at night after an engine out, and waited till the navigator and trainee got out, too late to save himself from the fire. Your bravery is appreciated and your loss is deeply felt.

Worf

[Milt]

Worf

Fascinating post Worf. Thanks for lots I didn't know about.

Noticed the refefence to the Canberra as a "SHE' Is this because of the way she handled?

I used she in a previous post and pondered why. Went on to call the PRs , the B8s and the BI 6s as males. More aggressive perhaps.

Then I used to think of the Sabre F86 as a male and the Hunter as the female of the then fighter world.

Makes me think I have a throwback to ships which I think are all called she.

Does everyone think of the Canberra as she ?

[FJJP]

Jacko, I apologise to you without reservation - put it down to tired and emotional. You do deserve that extra consideration - you are one of the few journos who try to understand compared with those looking for the most sensational headline [and to hell with the consequences].

Without taking a tape measure to the physical article, I cannot give chapter and verse re: specfic dimension for the various seat types. What I can say, though, is that having flow the Harrier T4, I was highly impressed by the comfort and roominess of the seat [specifically taking into account the bum-spread that has occurred since flying the T4]!

But it is also a question of airframe construction and strength - the forced exerienced on the cockpit floor during the detonation and firing sequence would have to be re-vamped and probably beefed up, for example. The floor may collapse after the first seat firing, leaving the second seat with seriously degraded structure to work with. And the whole business of clearing the canopy and control columns from the pilot's legs would need a complete re-design. In the zero-90 days, well before the technology existed to save someone from a standing start, time delays were the order of the day to make sure the sequencing was as safe as possible. And it worked for hundreds of people. And, sadly not for others.

In the context of this subject, the main differences between us and the States are:

a. Our National philosophy towards the Armed Forces [them: get the best for the boys]

b. Money [them: we have more to spend on retro-fitting, especially when our boys lives are at stake]

c. The 'B52' mentality [them: when production is complete, take the first of the first, update and apply a.]

There has always been the fact of life in the aviation industry in this country that once the kit has been procured, major innovation/development is invariably an effective re-design from scratch [eg, Harrier GR3/7], with the many years of lead time involved. You just cannot throw some drawings together, sling a few bits of metal at the workbench and come up with a new cockpit to be bolted to the original fuselage - we are talking 5-10 years here. Witness the Nim MR4 case if you want an example. New technology is usually incorporated in new-build, and hitherto not retro-applied [although this philosophy has changed in recent years].

Finally, like it or not, the Def budget is finite, and it would be impossible to justify the expense of carrying out such radical modifications to aircraft with such a limited life remaining. And that even takes into account the modern touchy-feely, fluffy-bunny, duty of care culture which cosily surrounds us now.

I think the modern term is risk analysis...

[rivetjoint]

Just out of interest do NASA still fly their "xB-57s" and if they do what seats do they have?

[Jackonicko]

FJJP,

Many thanks.

While I haven't got seat dimensions (or weights) easily to hand, I'd be very surprised if modern seats wouldn't fit in the PR9. Remembering how snug the T4 was, perhaps fitting a pair of 10Ls or 16Ls side by side wouldn't work.

But I've been thinking about the need for a new cockpit - or even for some local strengthening. Are you sure? I'd guess that the Canberra was as 'over engineered' as many of its contemporaries, while the new seats are presumably lighter than their predecessors. And wouldn't a modern rocket powered seat actually impose more progressive acceleration, reducing the danger of compromising the structure?

Haven't MB made a fortune in retrofitting new generation seats (especially 10s) to aircraft of Canberra's vintage?

I can understand that the need to jettison nav hatches and canopy might make it difficult to incorporate the capability of modern seats. But with better seat performance (and with modern seats that 'right themselves' more quickly, surely the safe ejection envelope would be considerably expanded.

Or am I missing something again?


RJ,

Nasa do still operate to WB-57Fs. Dunno what seats they have.
It's all academic if the seats wouldn't fit, of course.

[John Farley]

Chaps

At the risk of stating the obvious a zero/zero installation needs a way of clearing the ejection path (nav hatch/pilots canopy) that will work at zero IAS. Not easy.

So usually it is better (and a lot quicker) to eject through the canopy using MDC to reduce loads on the seat/occupant.

But MDC is not a simple stick on fix as so much depends on the helmet/canopy clearance and canopy thickness plus there is the lead splatter issue re occupants face and so on. Thus going to a zero/zero installation involves quite a bit more than buying a better seat off today’s line.

JF

[Jackonicko]

Haven't some Canberras had frangible hatches? Can't you eject through the canopy in extremis? Couldn't canopy breakers be fitted as they were on older aircraft? Just asking.....

[Beeayeate]

The B.2 style canopies (eg the T.4) are remarkably thick as they are double-glazed so to speak. They're blown bubbles, designed that way to simplify pressurisation problems in the early 50s, and are around a half-inch thick plexiglass (or somesuch) with an inter-bubble gap of about the same size. If you get a chance take a look at the thickness of the round, direct vision window. Not only do the canopies shatter jaggedly, as I mentioned before, but the canopy needs air speed to get it out of the path of the ejectee and clear of the aircraft - it pretty much goes straight up without it (although I can't prove this). JohnF is on the button with his comment in this case.

Re frangibles; I think the PR.9 has a frangible nav's hatch, the older Cans used to have a frangible nav's hatch too, but, as an earlier post in this thread corrected me, as far as current T.4s are concerned, this seems not now to be the case.

Regarding 0/0 seats. The action would still, I believe, have to have a definite time-line - nav's hatch, canopy and then control column (most important). I don't think this seqeunce could be made fast enough to gain benefit from modern "instant" seats. No doubt some solution could have been found if the will had been there as recently as the 80s, but the time is well past for that now. (Take the canopy with the seat and separate later?)

One point that came to me while reading the thread is this. The Canberra was designed to come apart easily at transport joints. The the nose section could be, and fairly frequently was, changed without too much trouble. In hindsight developing a nose section for the B.2 type that could accomodate 0/0 seats would have allowed a "bolt-on" upgrade. Similarly a 0/0 for the PR.9/B(I)8 canopy arrangement could have been developed. Remember though that for the life of the B(I)8 the nav still had to roll out the door. That sort of "official" acceptance was (is?) rife so upgrading the seats was probably put on the back burner. There was plans for a "Super Canberra" I believe but they were abondoned at the promise of the TSR.2.

[Tim Mills]

What a fascinating post by Worf. Particularly the comments about the Canberra by Air Cdr Wilson, IAF, who had flown it in combat. Also the two attachments about an obviously well respected gentleman.

Having been designed as primarily a high level bomber, with three bang seats for the two navigators and one pilot, and then adapted for so many other roles, LL interdictor, LABS nuclear, ground attack gun pack, 2'' rocket, and PR, it was no wonder that compromises were made. The two crew B8, and B58, must have been an opportunity to have provided a bang seat for the Nav/Observer, as has been done for the PR9, but wasn't. But what about the B16, one pilot, two navs, only two bang seats because the Nav/Observers space was taken up with sideways looking radar, so he was in the same situation as the B8 nav. Our B15s had three bang seats, and I can't now remember the seat limits, and since we spent most of our time at low level, I don't know how effective they would have been. Better than being a Nav on the B8 or Nav/Observer on the B16!

Milt: I don't remember thinking of the Canberra as any gender, but now could be persuaded to think of her as a fairly gentle and well behaved old lady, who needs watching now and again.

I do feel that this may be becoming another general Canberra thread, and drifting away from the original posting which was a heartfelt response to the tragic incident at Marham. Maybe it should be merged with the previous one, as someone has already suggested.

[Jackonicko]

I had no idea that the B16 had only one navigator's ejection seat. Even 51's odd B6s had two. But didn't the PR3 and PR7 only have two seats, too?

Wheelbarrow,

Do you have any contact details? You can't be PM'd.

[hairyclameater]

Rivetjoint - I presume you mean "W" B57Fs??. NASA still have 2 on their books flying from Houston/Ellington on atmospheric & high altitiude research duties with bay and podded payloads.

They are converted RB57s with wings the size of Brazil and I believe they have AMI seats (now owned by BF Goodrich) B57As certainly had Douglas ESCAPAC seats.

Milt - fascinating stuff- stall turning a cranberry!!?? Good gawd your mad man, mad.
Found it difficult enough to see that the privately owned "B2" in Oz (ex RAF TT18 WJ680) features 2 loops in its display sequence!

[FJJP]

Hairy - easy to stall turn. Barrell rolls, wingovers and derry turns very easily, too [with the consent of the crew, of course].....

Unexpected manoeuvre blew the minds of the Lightning and F4 jocks!

[ImageGear]

B57-F

Aircraft is equipped with parachutes and rocket-powered ejection seats for both crew members. ? :eek:

http://www.ucar.edu/communications/staffnotes/9411/WB57F.html

[2 Liter Peter]

Months have passed since this accident-inspired thread faded gracefully. It had produced some fascinating reminiscences of the Canberra, and many of us enjoyed these insights.

However - hope folks won't mind an attempt to gently refocus by considering some pertinent questions:

Do we know any more facts about what happened back in the summer at Marham ?

Has there been any follow-up report ?

Has the Board of Inquiry finished ?

Do they know yet what happened ?

Do we know what has been done since to compensate for the loss of the T4 trainer aircraft ? Is there another one flying ?

2d L Pip

[Jackonicko]

Without wishing to pre-empt anything, I understand that:

The engines are still with RR.

The airframe is still strictly quarantined in a hangar at Marham.

The airframe was MUCH more badly damaged than appeared from the photos.

The impression that it would have been survivable had the crew stayed with it MAY not be accurate.

The aircraft ended up beside the main runway facing the way it had come.

There was a 'spare' T4 before the accident (perhaps two, though hours remaining on aircraft and engines make that unclear!).

I'm not sure if the accident had any bearing on the reported decision to bring forward the OSD to June 06.

The PR9 has continued to demonstrate its extraordinary usefulness.

I've heard diametrically opposed views as to whether any extension of service would have been cost effective or even possible, with limiting factors being cited as the upper wing skins and pressurisation cycles on the cabin.

[Beeayeate]

There was a 'spare' T4 before the accident (perhaps two, . . .

The "Blue Bomber" (WJ874) is currently undergoing a Minor at Hurn and will return to the sqn in Jan 2005 to continue crew training and familiarisation. It will be the only flying T.4 left in the RAF. The other T.4, WH849, is in long term storage but, due to the demands of the service, it is a source of spares and has been used as a Christmas Tree since 2002. It is doubtful if it will ever return now to service.

[Chairborne 09.00hrs]

Bee,

Having visited Shawbury's storage facility a few months ago, I can state that the two T4s they have are partly dismantled and look most unlikely to ever take to the skies again.

[rivetjoint]

I heard last year from someone Canberra that there were two T4 airframes but only two working engines, is that actually the case?

[Fly Better!]

The family were briefed on the sequence of events recently and at that stage the engines were still with RR.

Its looking like its still going to be 4 or so months before everything is finished maybe longer.

If anyone is interested a few of his mates are going to raise a glass to his memory once again and catch up on old times near Doncaster.

Cheers

[Worf]

Another sad accident claims the lives of a pilot and navigator in the Indian Air Force.

The IAF hadn't had a Canberra accident in 14 years.

I cant confirm it yet, but it seems like this was a PR 57. The report claims that both pilot and navigator were advised to eject. The only other marks that the IAF has are T.54s and B(I) 58s. The T.54 would be carrying 2 pilots and the B(I)58 does not have an ejection seat for the navigator. I believe only 4-5 are fully operational (though there were reports of upto 12 being rotated - IAF intends to fly them to 2010) in roles similar to 39 Sqn RAF.

Putting this message in this thread not to cause controversy but because it seemed to be the one that referred to Canberra accidents.

Here is the link to it http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=4847

There are some inaccuracies in the news article but Indian journalists have absolutely no clue about the Air Force - we dont seem to have knowledgeable ones like Jackonicko.
Worf

[BombayDuck]

There are some inaccuracies in the news article but Indian journalists have absolutely no clue about the Air Force - we dont seem to have knowledgeable ones like Jackonicko.

That, sir, is an understatement.

[Jackonicko]

*blushing*

Gee fellas. Lil ol' me? Shucks!

But Pushpindar Singh (at Vayu) seems very switched on, writes extremely well, and is a top bloke. And I read a superb long piece on the MiG-27 upgrade somewhere, but can't remember the author's name.

[Worf]

Jackonicko,

Pushpindar Singh is more of an aviation historian - not so much a journalist. And I doubt that any of the Indian newspapers/media outlets even bother to contact him. Otherwise our reporting would be MUCH better.

A bunch of younger folks are emerging, including Jagan who runs the IAF portion of the Bharat Rakshak site and who has written a book on the 1965 war that is must read. (If not for any other reason than the fact that the IAF used British aircraft in post WWII war operations more than the RAF ever did!)

The Mig-27 article you talk about is written by B Harry - a mysterious writer who we believe is a tech person in the aircraft industry. The internet has allowed knowledgeable people to publish and extend their reach without having the kind of financial backing that Pushpindar Singh had. (Not to take anything away from him).

Worf

[BombayDuck]

Worf - I just got me copy of Jagan/Samir's book :D was lying un-picked-up for ages!

And I concur the part about Harry / Jagan and their accuracy. Sadly the mainstream media still consists of people who believe that new aircraft prototypes are "test fired" and not "test flown". :*

[Gainesy]

Has the nav from the Marham crash recovered?

[Lima Juliet]

What, from being too fat for his bang seat??? :E

Although his roundness probably saved his bacon, so I've heard...

[flown-it]

I was posted (appointed) to RAF Waton in late 1966 when we formed 360 out of separate RN and RAF ECM squadrons. We had to wait for the T17s to appear so flew the RAF's T4s and B2s while we waited. 3 RN crew got airborne on pilot training one evening and the pilots got the engine failure somewhat wrong. The nav ejected but it is thought tried to beat the system and was killed.
How and why?
Well, the canopy was ejected by a switch on the left side wall which was wire locked and gated. The cover had to lifted away from the switch before it could be moved up to fire the canopy. A TWO handed operation. Then you could fire the seat. When first introduced to the setup we tried to work out ways to do it one handed and it is thought that the nav (observer RN) may have tried to do just that. If so the canopy may not have fired (or cleared the plane I don't recall exactly) prior to his seat firing. His death I believe created a redesign of the system and the nav and others through the years may well owe their lives to someone loosing his.

[BEagle]

Having now read the BoI report at http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/Reports/OtherPublications/BOI/CanberraBoardOfInquiry.htm , I have a few observations:

1. In the VC10, which (the handling pilot) flew previously, an engine failure during a 'roller' landing was never cause for an abort, because the aircraft never decelerates below V1 during a correctly flown roller. Hence it would probably have been deeply ingrained into his mind to 'GO' with an engine failure during a roller purely due to previous experience on the VC10. I find the comments made by AOC 3 Gp and endorsed by C-in-C STC:

"I therefore recommend that the syllabi for all in-service aircraft types be reviewed to consider including regular expereince of aborted rollers."

to be inconsistent with operation of Perf A aircraft such as the VC10..... Are they really advocating practising aborts from above V1 on a regular basis? Even in the simulator? Such an 'across the board' recommendation seems somewhat surprising, to say the least.

2. The policy of practising such totally unnecessary night asymmetric roller landings on the Canberra does not appear to have been questioned. Asymmetric landings or asymmetric overshoots - fine. But what on earth was the point in practising rollers after asymmetric landings - particularly at night? I can understand symmetric rollers with a subsequent simulated single engine failure, but emphatically NOT a roller following an asymmetric landing.

RIP Reichmann

[LFFC]

I find the comments from C-in-C STC:

"I therefore recommend that the syllabi for all in-service aircraft types be reviewed to consider including regular expereince of aborted rollers."

Begs,

I don't think that it was C-in-C STC that said that. In fact, it's quite noticable that he didn't comment on that suggestion at all.

[BEagle]

The comment was made by AOC 3 Gp at Part 4 para 6 and was endorsed by C-in-C STC at Part 5 para 3.

I have amended my earlier post accordingly.

[LFFC]

Thanks Begs, but the way I read it, the C-in-C endorsed the board's recommendations, not necessarily the AOC's comments. Here's another thought on your comments:

Speaking as someone who has aborted a roller landing from above V1 (which of course is quite safe to do soon after touchdown if, for example, you decide to turn a roller landing into a full stop landing and simply don't open the throttles), does the V1 figure have much meaning in the context of a roller landing? I always thought that scheduled performance calculations were considered from a standing start.

[BEagle]

Converting a roller into a full-stop landing is not that straightforward in something like a VC10. In a full-stop, the handling pilot calls for idle thrust, then 'spoiler' (which includes idle reverse) as the mainwheels touch, followed if required by 'full reverse' after the nosewheel is on the RW. All those actions are completed by the non-handling pilot; however, the air engineer closes the throttles to idle. Whereas during a roller, the handling pilot calls 'roll' and initiates the forward throttle movement, the air engineer sets the briefed thrust and the non-handling pilot reconfigures the flaps. Changing the 'roll' series of actions into a 'land' sereis of actions would thus be fairly complex in a multi-crew aeroplane.*

A decison to 'abort' a roller would be even more fraught with hazard in the VC10. The LDR assumes a touchdown at a certain point and speed, followed by normal retardation processes - and there are strict requirements governing the LDA/LDR ratio which depend upon various factors such as runway contamination and landing configuration. How far down the runway would an 'aborted roller' be safe? For it to be entirely feasible, you would need to assure that it could be initiated right up to the normal rotate speed for the roller - which would require enormous runway lengths if it was to cover all feasible landing configurations.... So, because the aeroplane is always capable of flying with a single failure at any time during the roller (something which was frequently practised by the instructor pulling back an outboard throttle as the 'roll' call was made), an 'aborted roller' was never considered.

Guidance on aborting between V1 and Vr can never be specific; about the only cause we ever considered was 'if the likelihood of the aircraft taking off safely is less than that of surviving a runway overrun' - such as a massive multiple birdstrike taking out 3 or 4 engines.

I remain of the opinion that aborting a roller in something like a VC10 goes totally against established practice and is fraught with hazard. Hence a 'Roller = GO' mentality deeply embedded in an ex-VC10 pilot's long term memory could reasonably well be expected.

RIP

*over 3 years since I last flew the VC10, so I can't guarantee the accuracy of the foregoing!

[Tim McLelland]

I've only just noticed this thread - I'm not sure why it deserved any intelligent response in the first place, seen as it was based on a throw-away line which was both grossly inaccurate and rather silly.
As we all know, the Canberra has been a hugely successful aircraft and was never, ever described as "dangerous" by anyone, in fact it proved to be a very reliable airframe which serived the RAF (and lots of other forces) very well indeed. Such was the Canberra's relatively docile handling qualities, the RAF routinely posted less-able pilots to Canberra units, if they felt that they weren't quite ready to take-on the "fast jets".
Enough of the "Sun" headlines please:bored:

[FJJP]

On the question of rolling after a sim asy landing, the reasoning is simple. The asy approach in a Canberra is fairly straightforward but is full of pitfalls for the unwary or hamfisted. The final part of the approach is particularly tricky [I use the term loosley] since there is a commit to land once the asy decision height is reached [600ft ISTR]. From then on, it is a handling exercise calling for judgement. Once the wheels have touched surface the exercise is over, but the CT can continue by carrying out a symmetric roller. The trickiest part of that routine is in carefully managing the engine acceleration. The previously 'live' engine has a propensity to accelerate far quicker than the 'cold', and if handled badly, one could experience either a 'cold' engine surge stall [leading to a total lack of thrust from that donk] or an asymmetric swing due to one engine producing full power whilst the other is still accelerating.

That is why the roller was carried out by the QFI and not the 'ordinary' sqn shag. That said, the QFI would often let the more experienced carry out the roller. Latterly, ISTR the rules were tightened up even further, a night roller from sim asy landings allowed to be handled only by only GSU QFIs.

[All trawled from happy memories, subject to correction by those with more recent experience...]

[BEagle]

"That is why the roller was carried out by the QFI and not the 'ordinary' sqn shag. That said, the QFI would often let the more experienced carry out the roller. Latterly, ISTR the rules were tightened up even further, a night roller from sim asy landings allowed to be handled only by only GSU QFIs."

Were those the rules at the time of this accident?

Night asymmetric landing into symmetric roller on a dark night with no horizon? Quite WHY were such things happening? Night asymmetric full-stop and/or night asymmetric overshoots perhaps understandable (although questionable) - but asymmetric landing converting to symmetric roller? No way.

[Fly Better!]

Such was the Canberra's relatively docile handling qualities

It is my understanding (and I could be wrong, it does happen from time to time!) that Vmca is some 40 kts after unstick speed in the Canberra. If that is the case I would hardly call it docile.

Maybe it was considered docile in 1955 but not compared to modern aircraft where Vmca is often lower than the stall speed.

[keithl]

Tim McL: No-one could describe the Canberra on one engine as "docile". In all other respects, yes, but not asymmetric.

Apart from that, thanks for the link, Beagle, I've been waiting to read that report with some impatience. As I recall, (symmetric) rollers following an asy landing were done so as to achieve the required number of asy landings - the alternative being a long taxy round the airfield.

[LFFC]

I understand that it was docile when both engines were working as planned. On one engine, it could bite very badly - and very fast! Back in the 60s and 70s, the Canberra was a fast-jet posting - and only the very best were lucky enough to get to fly the PR9.

Sorry keithl, you beat me to it!

[Tim McLelland]

Well technically-speaking it was a "fast jet" posting, but speak to anybody on the selection boards, and they would tell you that Canberra postings were traditionally reserved for pilots who would probably be better suited to Jaguars, Phantoms and the like, after gaining a little more experience on the Canberra, because it was judged to be a rather more docile aircraft (with both engines of course, but I think that rather goes without saying!) than the "fast fast jets".

[Ginseng]

Thank you for that link. I read the report with an overwhelming sense of sadness.

Frankly, in my opinion, the Board were kind to describe the supposed stagnation of the port engine as a causal factor. I would have described it as a contributory factor, in that it made the final accident more likely to happen. The main cause (again, in my opinion) was the failure, for whatever reason, of the handling pilot to apply the correct recovery technique whilst still on the runway. His options were to close both throttles, stabilise the aircraft and then either to convert to a full-stop landing or attempt to achieve stable and symmetric take-off thrust again. The figures in the report suggest that there was sufficient time and space remining to attempt either option, and still to abort if necessary. What was not a viable option was to attempt to fly away in a partially-asymmetric condition at the speed he had attained. The handling techniques for this aeroplane have been derived from hard-won experience. I disagree with the premise that it is inherently dangerous, but it is not docile and demands great respect. There is no substitute for application of the correct handling technique.

In general, I agree with your comments about aborting roller landings in 4-jets, where the likelihood is that the abort would be potentially more hazardous than flying away on 3. You must realise, however, that the asymmetric un-reheated 2-jet is a different case. The per-centage loss of thrust is greater, and the asymmetric moment may be more severe. In combination these will often make a fly-away very hazardous, whilst remaining on the runway offers the use of brakes, perhaps a barrier, and perhaps gear retraction as viable stopping aids. Ultimately, you might also have a viable ejection option, if taken early enough.

Regards

Ginseng

[BEagle]

Ginseng, I agree with you.

'GO' mindedness during a roller landing may well have been a cognitive failure, in my view, with the handling pilot 'reverting to instinct' which, as you point out, was totally incorrect in this instance. I've never flown a Canberra, but for each of the 3 back seat Meteor T7 trips I scrounged at Brawdy 30+ years ago the brief was always the same - "Engine failure below *** knots and I will close both throttles and we will ride it into the barrier - above *** knots I will jettison the tanks and ask you for help with full rudder; I will be working hard!" The Meteor pilots at Brawdy never fly more asymmetric than was essential and treated the venerable old aeroplanes with great caution. Completely different techniques to those in the Buccaneer, Phantom or VC10 (the only multis I've flown) - which is why the astonishing concept of routine practising of aborted rollers in all STC aircraft I consider to be unacceptable.

I am unaware of the orders covering night asymmetric flying practice in the Canberra, so cannot comment further.

But to fly symmetric rollers after asymmetric landings in order to 'get more asymmetric landings without a long taxy round the aerodrome' seems an avoidable compromise of flight safety for expedience. Even more so at night.

[Ginseng]

On your last point, there is another factor to be weighed in the balance. Stopping rather than rolling implies use of the brakes, which will therfeore be partially heated. A subsequent taxy round would involve more braking, and therefore more heating (steering on the ground is be differential braking of the main wheels). The Canbera brake units would not take too much of that without suffering a considerable degradation in the remaining braking action available. This would invalidate the normal Stop and EMBS speed calculations for the subsequent take-off, and increase the risk of brake fade and possible brake fire if the second take-off had to be abandoned. On the other hand, there were established techniques for reacting to a thrust asymmetry during the roll fro an asymmetric approach, and it was a possibility that always had to be expected.

Regards

Ginseng

[BEagle]

A valid point, of course.

What were the 'established techniques' in force at the time of the accident? Did they mandate specifically who was permitted to handle the a/c during a symmetric roller following an asymmetric landing?

[Ginseng]

The established techniques were as previously described. Asto the rules, I will not comment as they may have changed since my time, but I note that the Board never suggested that the Captain was incorrect to allow the handling pilot to perform the roller.

The lack of any effective communication from, or between, the pilots is sad but not surprising. They would have been very busy trying to diagnose what was going on. More years ago than I care to remember, I experienced an aborted take-off (from a standing start) due to an asymmetric condition. Despite 2 violent swings to the left, there was not a word from the front until the throttles were finally closed. The first words uttered were then "The port fire light has come on. What shall I do?". My reply is best not printed here.

Regards

Ginseng

[ACW418]

Slightly flippant on a serious and absorbing thread but I seem to remember the Vulcan as having more than one engine which I believe you also flew.

ACW

[BEagle]

Bugger....

Brain fart! But it was a while ago..

There was also a horrible p.o.s. called the Jetstream.... Nastiest heap of poo I ever flew.

[Worf]

While researching an article about Indian Air Force Canberras I ran across the stunning fact (verified by 2 different IAF Canberra pilots) that the T.54s (otherwise identical to the T.4s of the RAF) did NOT have ejection seats for the pilots! The pilots just carried parachutes. The navigator strangely enough, had an ejection seat. I guess that was make the navigator feel better about not having an ejection seat in the IAF's B(I)58s!
Is anyone aware if some export T.4s were in this configuration? When the IAF bought the RNZAFs Canberra T.13s they were delivered with the pilots ejection seats.
My correspondents said they didnt feel like it was big deal because a lot of them had flown the single seat Vampire in training, which did not have ejection seats either!
Anyone here shed any light on why this was done? Financial reasons? Surely it would have cost more to modify the 7 odd T.54s to be without ejection seats than to just have them be in the standard T.4 configuration.
The mind boggles!
Worf