Emirates emergency landing in JNB

[radnav]

The fact that certain persons have deleted all their previous libellous posts speaks volumes in itself, and highlights a huge shortcoming with PPRUNE.

There is NO accountability.

People can post all sorts of inaccurate, false and damaging statements then after all the hurt and harm has been done to the professional lives and reputations of colleagues and/or companies then those same persons can just delete their posts, deny all knowledge and just walk away.

The moderators of this thread need to take a good look at themselves and what they have allowed to develop on this thread whilst a serious ongoing incident is under investigation coupled with a small matter of FACT that not all the FACTS are yet in the public domain.

Allowing the constant and continuing personal attack on the flightcrew and airline involved is quite frankly unacceptable. These guys have feelings and fears and are trying desperately to make sense of everything that has happened.

Put yourself in their shoes. Their unblemished lives and careers have been turned upside down since this most unfortunate incident. This I do know for a FACT.

Very, very little constructive, educative comment has come out of this entire thread which is well passed its "useby date" and which has itself become an unfortunate indictment on PPRUNE.

With the great power of PPRUNE comes great RESPONSIBILITY.

Best Regards.

PS: please stop deleting me. :{

[Cap 56]

radnav

I am all for a forum where posters post in their own name.

Every issue I addressed had an influence; all small ones make one big one.

The core issue here is; what do we learn from it and how would I have reacted myself.

The lessons in aviation are harsh and so is the verdict of the Airbus test pilot, that’s the way it is.

I have respect for the feelings of the crew but even more for those who dare to stand up and say "something is wrong".

I am sure if someone would have criticized the rotation technique as instructed at EK he would have been in trouble.

It is as simple as that.

[radnav]

One cannot have any respect for or confidence in any person who does not stand by all their posts and deletes them all without explanation or apology.

Best Regards.

[Cap 56]

radnav

My posts that are presently active are a summary of what I have stated before, including an explanation.

Some of the figures may not have been 100% exact for the A340-300 but that was not the issue.

My intention was to point out, the different factors that I would have taken into account or suggested that should be considered. Not out of the blue, but starting from a concise and coherent CRM model.

The response of the other posters provided more accurate data.

I accept these data, but that does not change anything, on the contrary it proves that working trough the CRM model that I suggest is a useful exercise.

You may not realise it but that’s exactly what this tread has led to.

Simple comme bonjour

[Danny]

My posts that are presently active are a summary of what I have stated before, including an explanation.

Not strictly true. I have been following this thread with interest since it first started as there was some very relevant information released on here which opened up the discussion and your comments Cap 56 were at times accusatory and often tried to convey knowledge which was evidently absent after other posters revealed the flaws in your argument. Also, you were very quick to make accusations against individuals based on your own, relaxed hindsight, but put forward as your own skill & superiority.

All those comments that were rebuked and shown as flawed have been edited or deleted by you which rather skews the debate. Because of this, I have decided to remove the option to edit or delete posts in the hope that the discussion can return to the technical and safety issues of the incident and that we can all learn something from it.

[Cerberus]

Mr Rossay's quote is interesting because, as I undestand it, the technique that was used by the pilot had evolved from an internal Airbus memo that had inadvertently found its way into the public domain.

Again, as I understand it; Airbus instructors were advised to use the Sidestick Position Indicator as a guide to whether or not the student had applied the right amount of back stick to ensure a correct rotation rate. Clearly, this was for the initial stick position, in the Airbus training configuration, at specific weights before the nose of the aircraft started to move.

With the nature of operators, it is perhaps easy to see how this memo might have been inadvertently misconstrued as providing a 'top tip' from those in the know. Perhaps, just perhaps, this lead to the inappropriate use of the iron cross in this particular incident.

Cerberus

[radnav]

A nice piece of info there Cerberus.

As has been stated before, irrespective of weight, flex etc. the Airbus FCOM recommended rotation technique is to apply " a positive backward stick input to the typical 2/3 backstick " position.

This is the same recommendation for the A332/A343/A345.

Finding that typical 2/3rds backstick position on a sidestick is not always that easy and yet it is infact pretty important given the vagueness of the sidestick, its inbuilt rotation protections particularly on the A345, and the various performance considerations / limitations which may not be quite so critical on other aircraft with higher power to weight ratios.

On the roll, PRIOR to rotation the SPI gives an accurate indication of just where that elusive 2/3 rds position is (obviously its at the same pitch angle on the PFD - pre rotate ), and I believe its still a perfectly valid AID to achieving the correct stick input PRIOR to the rotation commencing. Therafter, at least initially and within reason, just hold it there before transitioning to SRS and "seat of the pants". ;)

Best Regards.

[Cap 56]

Danny I think you are overdoing it a bit.

I have, as “none A 340 driver”, highlighted some factors that have an influence on every approach and have put some numbers “cultural Boeing values” on them. If these values combine adversely then; “as a crew” you are in trouble.

I stated that the combination of:

1. The increased speed due to the high density altitude would be an important factor, the value of which can be read straight from the instruments. I estimated it to be around 38 kts.

Using a rule of thumb, that is fairly accurate above FL 100 and well within compressibility.

The error seemed to be around 10 kts due to the drop-off in compressibility error below FL 100 and I adjusted my rule of thumb of:
TAS = IAS + FL/2 + ∆ISA/2 FL/2 in TAS = CAS (IAS) + FL/4 + ∆ISA/2 a useful value to have in mind at TOD or before starting an approach.


2. I made an estimation of 25 kts increase in V ref between T/O Flaps and Landing Flaps with Vref = 1.3 Vs.
25 kts is a very conservative value indeed, since values up to 40 kts are very common.


3. An estimate of the max tire speed of 195 Kts a fair value.

The result was that some A 340 drivers finally came up with some facts from the QRH.

1. ∆ TAS-IAS = 23 kts (Error of 15kts)

2. Increment of only 10 kts between T/O flaps and Landing Flaps (Error of 15 kts)

3. Vref of around 1.2 Vs iso 1.3 Vs a margin of 10 kt (Error of 10 kts)

4. Max tire speed of 205 kts iso 195 kts (Error of 10 kts)

A difference of 50 kts between Airbus technology and my “Boeing cultural” numbers, and a difference of about 32 kts in actual approach speeds.

I have no problem with the fact that, using the Airbus data this error margin came forward.

There have been many discussions on this forum regarding Airbus and Boeing technology. This incident and the numbers discussed highlight some of these differences.

You may argue that my comments are hindsight but I have to disagree with that statement. I referred to some factors that are relevant, not only to this approach but to any approach, one can hardly argue this to be hindsight. I have also suggested a CRM model that may show useful in managing non-normals, not out of hidsight but amodel that has proved it's value for many years.

As far as EK is concerned, I refer to the tread regarding the dismissal of their head of operations and the fact that you removed one of the posters “FUBAAR” from this forum and believe you know why you did so.

[bonajet]

I agree with you Cerebus. That technique of supervising the PF input was being used in HK.

As far as using it whilst PF, as advised by radnav, that has never been taught and is not a good idea for two reasons.

1) the PF should be looking outside at rotate and selecting the first stick input by feel. This feel can be calibrated by practising with the SPI on the taxiway or just pulling to a certain stick force position, as the stick force gradient conveniently increases just before the 2/3 rd stick position.
2) The validity of a stick angle selected on the PFD with the SPI changes really quickly during the rotate and it is very difficult to accurately get your target of say 8 degrees SPI. The danger with this has been demonstrated recently, in that the PF may be tempted to track his target with the SPI and lower the nose back onto the runway. In particular if not looking outside and struggling with a video game exercise on the PFD.

[cargo boy]

Unless there was a fire that couldn't be extinguished I would hope that the crew were referring to their QRH and not trying to outguess the manufacturers test pilots with abstract mathematical formulae before deciding on the appropriate action and which airport to use.

In this case, the crew were dealing with an 'abnormal' situation (of their own making). The suggestion that all this faffing about with trying to work out the TAS and density altitude vs max tyre speed with all these nice mathematical formuale is nothing but smoke and mirrors. The QRH will have the figures. You refer to them and if they say you have enough LDA then you can commit to that runway and carry on dealing with the abnormal situation.

You can be sure that the accident investigators will have the luxury of time and hindsight to come up with the precise numbers. In this case everyone walked away physically unhurt, ergo... a successful landing. The debate should be concentrating on the avoidance of the error that caused the problem in the first place.

[radnav]

bonajet,

you well exaggerated and misrepresented my post on using the SPI as an AID in validating the correct INITIAL sidestick input by a split second glance at the PFD before the nosewheel has left the ground.

The fact that we continue to have tailscrapes and overruns and very interesting QAR data on rotation rates indicates that not everyone is great at doing it by feel. Obviously and clearly, I never said that feel and external clues were not the PRIMARY means and intent.

I would suggest that many incorrect rotation rates and techniques are masked by the fact that there was not a critical failure during T/O.

Know your aircraft and use all available resources.

Still you are right and I am wrong and hope everyone recognizes me for the fool I am and ignores my post. :ok:

Best Regards.

[Cap 56]

cargo boy

You are 100 % right, in this case, the QRH required a length of around 1700 m, so 2800 m would cover you legally (JAR OPS) if the configuration of the aircraft is the same.

QRH values are advisory information that need correct interpretation.

In multiple failures, the QRH does no longer/ not always cover the situation. Crew should exercise sound judgement.

If for example the QRH “Flaps up landing” refers to max tire speed then I agree you’re your statement, if it does not, then you will have to think about it/asses it yourself.

The way you do that and the operational significance you attribute to that, is up to the crew.

Correct me if I overlooked something.

[Cap 56]

Situation awareness, in case of multiple failures.

Various parameters need to be considered, two questions will give you the answer.

Q1. Touchdown groundspeed?

1. Landing fuel + ZFW = Landing weight + how much will I dump and why ? How time critical is this situation + any unbalance or leak ?

2. QRH + Landing Weight = V ref + advisory landing distance corrected for JAR OPS = 2800 m if all tires available?

3. Vref + wind correction + correction for elevation and temp (from instruments or rule of thumb) = groundspeed

Q 2. What do I have to stop and how will I use it?

1. Tires, brakes, auto brake and anti-skid

Tires? Affected but no warning Runway inspection + low approachto assess ?

Brakes? Affected but no warning

Autobrake? Affected but no warning

Antiskid? Affected but no warning

2.Spoilers ? Check hydraulics

3. Reversers ?

Cultural value of distance required using reversers only down to below 60 kts from previous line experience and various groundspeeds.

From Q1 and Q2 can be concluded:

1. QRH distance is unreliable
2. Reversers only distance = 3000 m


Conclusion:

ECAM, EICAS and QRH will not always give the full picture

Landing with reversers only, no auto brakes and braking below 60 kts.

Declare full emergency

[Invictus]

Danny,

Thankyou and well done.

Invictus

[White Knight]

Cap - I`m still intrigued as to what a "cultural value" is, as it`s not a term I`ve heard used in the aviation world...

By the way, at least one major airline absolutely forbids flypasts of the tower for inspection purposes.

If you want more idea of numbers for the 340-300, max ZFW is 178 tonnes. If the crew had dumped to around 10 tonnes, as you suggested in one of your previous deleted posts, then the landing weight would be 188 tonnes. Surprise, surprise that is only TWO TONNES below max landing weight.. And out of JNB we`re usually close to max ZFW.

[radnav]

I believe the EK FOM specifically does NOT recommend a low flypast in recognition of the fact that very little accurate information can be practicably obtained by doing so.

No matter how low and slow we fly past they just can't check them tyre pressures from the ground or clean the windscreens or top up the oil........yet.

After their most unfortunate initial problem, these guys did it all by the book and did it well.

[Cap 56]

White Night

Culture basically means that you remember what happened yesterday and why. No memory no culture.

I will give you another example:

You just landed in Casablanca and the temp is 45 °C

You are about to start your engines for the next leg.

On engines that had no FADEC you had to be careful NOT to follow SOP and NOT throw in the fuel at the SOP value of 25 % but continue the cranking until EGT dropped below 100 °C to avoid EGT over temperature.

On modern planes you have full authority FADEC that will do this for you.

When starting an engine equipped with FADEC you can either fall asleep or you can monitor to see if FADEC is doing what it should be doing. Culture will help you what to look for.

Same with rotation technique and many other things.

In short: SOP does not always cover everything nor does modern technology, basics still apply, as such culture is the same as what you guys call airmanship.

A pilot that wants everything written black on white would make a good lawyer.

A lawyer would never land on a slippery runway based on advisory data only; his brain does not work that way.


Radnav

It seems that the guys had themselves pretty well covered by the paperwork. What you forget to mention is that the EK FOM has been the cause of many problems.

Hence, 3 different directors of operation in 4 years, and serious arguments with some manufacturers and legal bodies.

You can be sure that Airbus is being very diplomatic at this time but inside the office they are not at all that pleased with the recent happenings.


Invictus

You are right; I may have been a bit to patronizing. However, EK as many other airlines that are multicultural have a common problem of different cultures and pilots coming with different SOP for the same aircraft.

The challenge is to get them all on one line. This is not achieved with dictatorial management style. The only way you get that done in a credible way is to have the manufacturers closely involved and have your SOP audited by them on a regular basis.

This is basically what the B 777 management tried to do in 1998 and almost all of them except the locals were removed because of it. Recent happenings on the A 340 proves the value of their intention and their courage at the time.

[M.Mouse]

On engines that had no FADEC you had to be careful NOT to follow SOP and NOT throw in the fuel at the SOP value of 25 % but continue the cranking until EGT dropped below 100 °C to avoid EGT over temperature.

On modern planes you have full authority FADEC that will do this for you.

I am confused. SOPs for a manual start on the RR powered aircraft that I fly requires that the EGT is less than 100°C before the fuel is introduced.

Autostart takes care of this for you.

Nothing to do with FADEC.

[Cap 56]

No need to get confused.

From your post I conclude that you will monitor that FADEC does what it is supposed to do. Your SOP covers that issue, well for you.

You talked about a specific engine, my reasoning is more general and covers all engines, FADEC or not.

You actually confirmed what I mean by culture.

The day you get on another plane you will take that with you and may have a valid reason to ask your trainer why they do not require EGT to be below 100 °C during manual start.

He may explain you why and back it up with data from the engine manufacturer or he may say, that’s the way it is. He may also go deeper in the issue and explain you why FADEC does so on the ground but not in flight.

As a result it will help you remember why there is a difference, the day you need it in flight, you will be ready for it.

You now decide what you think is the best.

Some instructors my show you what the deceleration capability of the aircraft is using reversers only.

In case you loose your anti-skid, brakes for whatever reason or end up on a slippery runway you will be more relaxed about it since you know what is going to happen.

Actually you might have been doing it yourself for a long time but did not give it another operational significance other than saving your brakes or keep the temp down for the next Take Off. I do not know.

[M.Mouse]

What are you talking about?

FADEC is a system of digital engine control. It does not prevent fuel from being introduced during a manual start with EGTs greater than 100°C.

Autostart is a different system and does monitor EGT level before introducing the fuel.

[Invictus]

Cap 56,

Invictus

You are right; I may have been a bit to patronizing. However, EK as many other airlines that are multicultural have a common problem of different cultures and pilots coming with different SOP for the same aircraft.

I think you may have mis-understood me, what I said was ;

Cap56, as an outsider, you really do just look like a trouble making plonker, the problem is that because of that, I will treat any information that you provide on this and other threads as hmm ..... drivel.

Anyway, Cap56 what would You have done in the same circumstances ?


Invictus

[ManaAdaSystem]

He would probably run out of fuel while trying to teach his Effoh mathematics.

[BYMONEK]

while all this friendly banter has been 'raging',you all might be interested to know that not only has the VP of flight ops been sacked,but the head of training has 'stepped' down and will continue as a 'normal'training Captain......something to do with the fact that he is the 'boss's son in law may have saved his job!Also,NOT confirmed but heavily suspected,both pilots have/are to be sacked.I hope this is not true.not only for their sake,but for the other pilots in Emirates who will feel there is no support from the company. :sad: Makes me glad to pay the 1% for peace of mind and work for a Company that will support their Flight Crew,even if i have to fly my b*****ks this summer. Emirates...you can keep your 10 weeks profit share thanks....you might need it to pay the mortgage!

[radnav]

Extract of general media release :

EMIRATES HONOURS TOP GCAA OFFICIALS

Dubai, UAE, 16th June 2004 – Emirates has honoured top officials of the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) for their support of the airline’s lead in promoting aviation training in the Middle East.

Emirates’ Chairman, His Highness Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al-Maktoum presented Awards of Appreciation to Mohammed Al Ghaith, Director General – GCAA, and Ahmed Al Haddabi, Director Flight Safety - GCAA

Congratulations to them.

[BYMONEK]

Good one RADNAV! Are these people living in the same world as the rest of us......unBELIEVABLE B******T. Well,luckily for them they live in Dubai.......plenty of sand to bury their heads in eh?

[Cap 56]

Invictus

My fried it is extremely simple what I would have done.

1. Get the right information. ATC, runway inspection and very likely a low approach to asses the real condition of my gear as much as possible. Not to asses the pressure but to find out if the tires are there at all. I am sure the would have seen 3 tires were missing.

2. Check how urgent this situation is by verifying any damage to the wing and fuel tanks (read fuel leak)

3. Check QRH for info.Determine my v ref and touchdown groundspeed. Using no formula but look at my instruments.

4. Check if my hydraulics were intact.

5. Get the distances from the QRH and double them then compare them to my cultural value of my previous landings. Since I would have lande the aircraft many times before, includsing the day before I would know what I can do with reversers only.

6. Check wind and runway slope

7. Get my cabin and ATC ready for full emergency

8. X-check with my F/O and brief him while looking for discrepancies.

9. If none, land at JNB using:

Reverseres only till below 80 Kts
No autobrakes
Probably manual speedbrake deployment would be needed
Very likely landed with 7 tons

10. After landing, call the Dubai pilot association.:ok:

In other words, I would use everything I have learned in the past.

In case it would have been established that all tires on same gear were missing, reducing my energy, (that ie m*v*v/2) would become crucial and I may have decided to go somewhere else.

So far I do not know if this was the case since I was not there. But I would have done everything possible to caver my A***

M.Mouse

You are talking type specific FADEC. It is not sure if all FADEC\'s are the same.

My opinion was not type specific but general and puts the finger on the importance of checking EGT before starting, that is all.

On some engines you can indeed launch fuel with high EGT already present.

radnav

Not so long ago EK and the UAE CAA were classified by ICAO as not meeting the minimum International Safety Standards.

This problem was caused by the fact the EK management was not up to speed with reality.

Mr Al Haddabi has done a tremendous effort to get the whole thing back on track.

I know what I talk about since I had 3 meetings with him.

[BYMONEK]

CAP 56
"EARTH CALLING CAP 56". . . . ."EARTH CALLING CAP 56" .. "come in please....your time is up" Actually,lots of time and hindsight diagnostics from your armchair!You make it all sound sooooooh easy! Also, The reason why Emirates failed to meet safety req. of ICAO was to do with the fact that their chairman was also the head of GCAA,so there was a conflict of interest.A situation that had to change if Emirates were to be granted permission by FAA to fly to JFK.That's fact! Nothing whatsoever to do with management not being up to speed.
p.s who is this Mr.Habbadi gentleman you refer to?:confused:

[Engineer]

Analysis the fact the people involved have been sacked that is a clear indication that pilot error was a contributory factor

Understand you guys love to close ranks but may be this can not be brushed away with the mantle of poor training. When the sh!t hits the fan maybe it is time to be man/woman and accept that wrong doing resulted in poor airmanship.

[Cap 56]

BYMONEK

Youare only partly correct because I have a copy of the letter in wich the UAE CAA states all changes they will make in order to meet ICAO req and it's not only removing HH from the CA board it's much much more.

Mr Al Hadabi is the UAE CAA director of safety and security.

Hello earth do you read :ok:

There is nothing that even comes close to hindsight in my post: EK does not have a training/CRM model to handle multiple failures.

This problem was identified more that 5 years ago, hardly hindsight. Fact is that what I suggest works and so far I have heard no valid argument against it.

It\'s a method that tries to break the chain of error and was worked out in an airline with more than 75 years of experiance.

Many pilots who worked on it are now instructors with AIRBUS.

Your problem isthat it isnot British and therefore not good enough.

[BYMONEK]

CAP 56

Poor show old chap,what what,one must never jump to conclusions or to make an assumption without getting ones facts right firstly...must one? Remember,if you' ASSUME',you will make an 'ASS' out of 'U' and 'ME' and you can keep 'ME' out of your 75 year CRM model thank you.
1) You ASSUME that i am British or that i would only accept a British CRM model..................Wrong
2) You state that " EK does not have a training/CRM model to handle multiple failures"...........Wrong again
3) One of your previous posts stated EK managment was not up to speed and made no mention about conflict of interest with H.H.,so in fact your statement wasn't entirely true.
4) Point 10.."after landing ,call the Dubai pilot association".......?Do you happen to have their phone number dear boy so that i can pass it on to my flying chums out in Dubai.One loves to catch up with a few stories about the good old days of shooting down Jerry in our Spitfires you know..........come on CAP 56,wake up and smell that Arabic coffee,or are you really on another planet?
Once Again....some more FACTS for you!Emirates CRM model is A A M ( ASSESS,ACTION,MANAGE )
It's emphasis is on gathering information and being sure of the problem BEFORE taking action.Manage the problem and ensure you review the proccess ie back to the assess stage just in case things have changed or may,for whatever reason,not be delivering the desired result.
Ek manual states that ;"a low flypast should only be undertaken when there is good reason to believe that Knowledge of the state of the landing gear can be improved from such a manoevre".At night, i doubt that a low flypast of the tower will add much to the info derived from their instruments.And before you ask,yes they did ask for a runway inspection but there weren't 3 tyres there!Yes,they did Jettison fuel,ATC and Cabin Crew were briefed and yes,Captain did cross check with F/O.....in fact, for whatever reason they got themselves into that situation,their CRM was excellent.AKA...FINAL RESULT!
So,before i waste anymore of my time correcting you on the facts,please spend a little time reviewing your tried and trusted CRM model that you place such faith in.I don't know what it is and i would love to Know if this experienced 75 year airline that uses it has ever had an incident involving Human factors.One things for sure though,i;m sure it involves not making assumptions and getting the facts before you dive in with solutions.

[recceguy]

On that sort of aircraft everything is on auto mode (as on all liners now, but even more of course inside the fly-by-wire family of Airbus products)

It seems there is just the rotation which is still manual, with hand action through muscular inputs which need to be calibrated a little bit)

If unable to perform that simple tast in a correct manner, what does remain of the hand-flying ability ?

[Cap 56]

BYMONEK

Do not get so worked up, I was only answering the question put to me by INVICTUS

I am sure it involves not making assumptions and getting the facts before you dive in with solutions.

So if the facts (QRH) state that they only needed 1700 m, why did they use 4200m ?

Your ASSESS,ACTION,MANAGE model is fine and similar to mine with the difference that the asses phase in my proposition may be more pragmatic.

If you have a double failure, the QRH will state what is affected and how for that x-list only. It is of course impossible otherwise.

With a combination of failures some effects may not become apparent trough the combination of different X-lists.

My method concentrates on what do I have, how will I use it and why.

In determining the estimated touchdown speed you are forced to ASSESS all elements: Weight (ZFW + Fuel), config + Vref + additive, Wind, slope and the influence of high field and temp.

Ek manual states that ;"a low flypast should only be undertaken when there is good reason to believe that Knowledge of the state of the landing gear can be improved from such a manoevre".

That’s fine, but I would still leave that decision to the staff on the ground, question of doing everthing possible. In this case an approach to land close enough to the ground and go-around.

I realise its at night but it wasn’t IMC was it? If you can see the runway to land surely they can see you, what happens after that is:

review the proccess ie back to the assess stage just in case things have changed or may,for whatever reason,not be delivering the desired result.

Do not get so worked up about it, it is not good for your blood pressure.

The referance to the Dubai pilot union is just a little touch with reality. The primary task of a pilot union is to defend the profession and not the salary. You guys are on your own, that's all i meant by putting it in my post.

[Silky]

You make me laugh......... try and get the little details right....what runway did they land on and how much did they use???? Please try and get the facts right IF you DARE !!!:suspect:

[BYMONEK]

CAP 56
We really are going round in circles here.Where did i mention anything about salary with regards to Dubai pilots association?Also,please,please tell me who in their right mind would carry out a fly past,sorry ,a low fly past at night, followed by low level go around(that should be fun!) and leave the "decision"(your quote...not mine) to ATC.Your Assumption ( POOR CRM) that just because YOU can see the runway so THEY must be able to see you was the final straw in making me realise that ;
A) Your are most definitely a pretender.
B) You are talking complete B****CKS
C) You really are from another planet so apologies for A & B as you don't know any better!

p.s Blood pressure fine thanks but can't stop the tears of laughter.

p.p.s Ask you ' FRIENDS' in Airbus why they didn't stop in the required distance. Just imagine what NO autobrakes would have achieved!

[Cap 56]

BYMONEK

I really love this one:

I do not think that you can decide if ATC is able to make a visual assessment or not.

As a crew you can make a request and together you decide if it is feasible or not.

Basically, that decision lays entirely with ATC not you, since ATC is making the assessment.

With all runway and touchdown zone lights on, I do think it is possible and as a crew you would cover your ass. I have rather ATC decide it's impossible than me.

This is not a case of being absolutely right or wrong, any decision that can be reasonably defended is acceptable. Yours as well as mine.

I was not there and this is PPRuNeand therefore all opinions are wellcome.

Finally, with the problems at hand it was crucial to put as much deceleration as possible on the reversers that’s why I would not use the auto brakes to avoid putting unnessesary stress on my already damaged tires.

The investigation will reveal how deep the crew landed into the runway and how much tires they blew up during the landing roll without any reason.

[Flying Bagel]

My God, this thread will not die...

[Silky]

still laughing ....well....what runway did they use Crap56.... awaiting your answer......

[BYMONEK]

CRAP 56...YOU JUST GO FROM BAD TO WORSE! The crew had no indication,i say AGAIN....NO indication that there was a problem with the gear/tyres as far as i'm aware.Refer back to an earlier posting of mine and suggest you look up the word Hindsight.Further more,do you think the crew would really" blow up the tyres for no good reason".........you've been watching too much thunderbirds mate!As you never seem capable of answering anyones questions and appear determined to have the last word,i shall leave you the honours......but,before i go,just think about this.IF the Pilot flying had made an initial mistake with the rotation, the crew,in my opinion and from information available,made an excellent job in returning and landing with no injuries.That is the aim in any situation.It is not you or i that have to justify our decisions here on PPruNe,it was the guys on the day.They,unfortunately got sacked.That does NOT mean,however,that their decisions were bad.They happened to be the victims of possibly poor /inadequate training and spineless managers, more concerned with protecting their own backsides.Good decisions don't always result in good outcomes i'm afraid!:sad:

[Cap 56]

7 x 7

Were I come from, I am only average.

But in the land of the blind the one eyed son in law is king.

http://www.uaeprison.com/constitution.htm

I hope this helps the crew concerned;)

[Flywire]

Basic flying and airmanship on take-off tells me that I should be referencing myself to the runway visual cues outside the cockpit more than instruments inside. Man if you see the red lights approaching and nothing is happening after V1 its TOGA and rotate as much as you can, even if you scrape the tail.

Dunno......... running off the end of the runway when it was all available makes no sense to me. Seems like the tunnel vision thing and not the big picture thing. After all its an aeroplane, it needs enough airflow and angle of attack to fly. What on earth did the Sidestick Position Indicator have to do with no more runway left? Is this a training culture thing maybe?

[Flywire]

Gents, no matter how much of a wizard each one of us pilots thinks they are.........were not. That is the pilots downfall, they think there perfect but they are only human beings too. Forget the image, as that is of the past. Lets learn from our mistakes.

On that point forget your small nitty gritty personal "I would have" schemes with all the technical jargen after having looked at the bookes for however long.... and remember....when the chips are down it is survival for all on board and the company involved. After all weather, and all other natural happenings are not defined, and so will it be for us at times.

Companies for you too, don't consider pilots as merenaries but rather as a team, and human beings too, treat them as such, and maybe you too will reap the benefit of productivity and safety you so desire.

Let this incident be a lesson to all who wish to learn, after all we all know many brains are better than one!

Take care boyz were all in the same plane.

[Cap 56]

On that point forget your small nitty gritty personal "I would have" schemes with all the technical jargon after having looked at the books for however long....

It is not what you know but who you know, that’s were the real problem is.

[Silky]

Crap 56..... still havent had an answer to the question of which runway they landed on...... you have ducked this little question as it seems your calculations are yet again wrong along with your absurd assumptions and since danny has prevented your self editing of posts your bull **** has decreased 100 fold as it iis stuck here for all to see and have a good laugh at!! Well then.... what runway? And then please do tell how much runway they used again for us mere mortals..... :hmm:

[Cap 56]

Silky

You know very well they were only 150 m short of the end of a 4400 m runway and according the QRH they needed 1800 m.

So 1800 m is what they, according to white – night, believed they needed and they were wrong.

So tell me my friend what would have been he scenario if it would have happened in LHR.

I really get the impression you are one of those fancy EK instructors.

[Silky]

again WRONG
go away and find out the lenght of the runway involved and then spout your bull......:yuk:

[Cap 56]

Picu wrote; while defending the crew

Is stopping 150 metres from the end of the runway not sufficient, especially considering that they lost normal braking at 70kts.? I would have been happy to stop 10 metres from the end, just enough for a push-back truck to squeeze through and tow the aircraft off the runway. In fact, since this is not a safety-orientated reason, even 10 millimetres would have been enough.

Douglas Digby wrote

The aircraft, bound for Dubai with 216 passengers and 14 crew on 9 April, began its take-off roll on Johannesburg\'s 4,420m (14,490ft) long runway 21R, but did not get airborne until it had passed beyond the end of the runway, blowing three main gear tyres and damaging the flaps, which subsequently locked in a partly deployed position. It then returned to land having dumped fuel.

So silky are you trying to proof that they did not even use the longest runway available ?

[Silky]

still awaiting your answer.......... and I agree totally with picu.....just pointing out that you who proclaim knowledge on the whole thing including inside information, that of the 4 runways you cant say which one! Just proves you are a farce....p.s. I dont know eitheir.....:8

[Cap 56]

Silky

Did they use the longest runway or not ?

Your call, prove right now that these guys knew what they were doing and save their honour.

[Flywire]

What are U bickering about? U R still looking at the small personal BS. Look at the big picture! I really hope none of you are involved in EK because that would seriously worry me. :{

[BYMONEK]

Silky

Don't even waste your time answering this monkey......he just likes to corrupt this forum with the biggest load of Camel manure i've ever smelt in my life.

[Cap 56]

BYMONEK

So they didn't.

[Cap 56]

They knew they had gear and flap problems and didn't even land on the longest runway available ????:confused:

[Reverend Doctor Doug]

Dear Cap 56

I have not commented on this forum previously because I do not have access to the facts even though I am a lot closer to them than you are.

What i am going to say now that you have drawn me into this arena is that you are the most despicable kind of human being that exists.

You have lowered yourself to trying to judge fellow aviators on a public forum with half truths and inuendo. I dont actually care whether you are right or wrong. What i care about is the way you are attacking two of my colleagues who apparently have paid a very high price for following company direction.

The issue here is the process not the person. Even if it can be proven beyond any doubt that the PF made an unexplainable error. He is still a product of the system that trained and evaluated him. It is the system that is at fault, not the individual.

It is because of people like you, who will willlingly slander a colleague for the simple purpose of furthering their own percieved position or status, that we have the kind of culture that exists here.

You write anonymously, proclaiming to possess skills and judgement levels beyond those of everyone who cares to disagree with you. Let me say that few of us possess the ability to calmy calculate all your so called "cultural values" while dealing with an emergency of this magnitude. Error will inevitably be made. It is what you do after the error has been made that establishes who you are. These guys did good.

Evidence suggests that they were taught an incorrect rotation technique, so they cannot be blamed for that. From that point they managed to get a seriously disabled jet on the ground safely with no-one injured. That is what they are paid to do.

It is easy enough for you in your ivory tower, with the benefit of hindsight and no pressure, to pick holes in their decisions. I doubt if many people would have done a better job. I certainly don't believe that I would. For the record I dont believe that you would have either, despite your self proclaimed expertise.

EK has some serious issues to deal with. They may never get them sorted. But I am here to say that it is a better airline for not having you in it.

The Rev

[Jaywalker]

Reverend Doctor Doug

I think that your summary of Cap 56's personality is spot on.

I too,beleive that the crew did a good job in getting the a/c safely back on the ground,regardless of how they ended up in the pickle in the first place.

Thank you for a well thought out reply.

;) ;) ;) ;)

[Cerberus]

Cap 56,

Why are you asking questions about runways? Earlier in the thread you told me you were privvy to all sorts of information and were in close liasons with the CAAs of most planets in the known universe; before subsequently deciding to delete those comments. I thought you were the font of all knowledge and had a formula up your sleeve that could calculate with absolute certainty exactly what should be done under any circumstances:

Chances of Correct Action = (What happened + Hindsight) * 1.001 (Actual Credibility as an operator / Bullsh*t Factor to Show Perceived self importance)

As your PHd in Mathematics will tell you; Even if 10 weeks after the event you have actually worked out the best path to follow in any particular incident, dividing a zero by a big number in the second bracket comes out with a bigger zero and if you then multiply the first bracket by that zero you will still sc*ew up. Maybe that might have a bearing on why you left EK.

Before you start accusing me of a personal attack, even though it is, let me say that I am only commenting on the information that you have provided everyone about yourself during the course of this thread. It doesn't matter how much you slag EK off or show to the PPrune public what a superior operator you think you are; you can't have your job back!

Cerberus

[Cap 56]

What i care about is the way you are attacking two of my colleagues who apparently have paid a very high price for following company direction.

My friend, Aviation is a tough world and you need some lateral thinking here.

I criticize the EK training department and consequently but “indirectly” the crew.

Nothing will change within EK without pressure from outside; pilots are simply too scared to speak up.

The pilots have been fired and if you think they had any chance to be treated correctly then you are having an illusion. I have advised them to get out of the country as quickly as possible.

I do have a whole library here behind me but I have not opened a single book so far.

The fact that I do have this library speaks for itself. So this time I will give you some info from them.

It is known that professionals; doctors, pilots and others that need to make decisions based upon many parameters tend to revert to a heuristic thinking process, whereby, in most cases they get the right diagnosis but sometimes they get it completely wrong. Therefore it is advised that they check their initial thinking process trough via an algorithmic model in order to get their facts right.

In other words:

1. Heuristic model

Capt thinks A,B,C + F/O thinks C, D, E = decision based on A,B,C,D,E

2. Trained by both capt and f/o) algorithmic model A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H
Capt thinks A,B,C,E,F,G,H + F/O suggests to capt “I think you forgot D”

If you apply this also in daily operation it will become second nature you may also elect to put in the QRH. Human performance declines under stress, this model fills the gaps. It may be subject to improvement. It suposes that one is familiar with the basics of aviation.

The model that I proposed is not something that I have invented overnight; it was used as a standard model, incorporated in the FOM. It does not need complicated calculations but highlights the importance of all factors. It reduces stress and gets the whole crew and environment involved. I can assure you that it received a lot of criticism but in the end it proved it’s value and was accepted.

While I was with EK I was in contact with the specialist from Boeing on human factors who was working in the University of Delft on cockpits of the future on a B 777 platform called the SIMONA project.

EK was starting to fly mixed types, Airbus and Boeing and the man was prepared to get involved with a study on SOP in such an environment.

EK, “read the GMFO” refused for obvious reasons.

What happened in reality on this read is that I have applied my model while I am not even qualified on the aircraft. What this means in practical terms is the following.

If a complete layman would have been sitting on that flight deck with the algorithm in his hands and worked trough it, like if it was a checklist and challenge the captain with every decision he has made, would they have had a better situation awareness or not and taken another decision?

In the end my posts did exactly that and the data came on the table. Take it for what it is worth but I may have done you guys a big favour.

Perception is not always reality. This crew did not land on the longest runway available with known brakes and flap problems and were very lucky to walk away from it alive. Their future lives may well be traumatised till the end and those remaining in EK should be grateful if the system improves.

Unfortunately that’s the way things are.

[Shake]

Good post Rev.

To focus mainly on the pilots is to turn back the clock and ignore the evidence of countless other accident and incident investigations where other factors, coincident or otherwise, played their part.

Human factors was once the department which would initiate an indepth investigate by professionally qualified personnel that would address the problems in training if necessary as well as looking deeper into the effects of commercial pressures, company culture and other mitigating factors which have played their part in an incidence.

My point earlier in this thread about the difference in human factors and CRM is that the former has been overtaken by the latter; where anyone with an interest, who has read as little as HPL and The Naked Pilot, volunteers to be a company CRM expert and in the process we have lost the ability to investigate fully such circumstances and recommend any changes necessary to avoid it happening again.

Sacking the pilots does not deal with the problem and serves only to reinforce the message that we work within a 'blame culture' and whilst to 'err is human...don't get caught'.

These were good professional pilots with many hours and years in the job. Others have also been sacked or demoted having never been given the opportunity to see the 'official' report or been given the chance to defend themselves.

We could learn valuable lessons from this incident or bury it in the sand. If we bury it, which seems likely, the unfortunate truth is that will be revisting this forum with other incidents in the future.

[Cap 56]

Cerberus

I do not want my job back, I want much more.

[BYMONEK]

Reverend DoctorDoug
Iwas hoping that your well written piece would see the end of CRAP 56,but,alas...this wasn't to be the case.With Laymen now flying the aircraft and crew working their way through the alphabet before possibly using the QRH,your efforts to enlighten him have been in vain.It isn't even funny anymore and in fact i'm starting to find his efforts of keeping this thread alive by throwing oil onto the fire,insulting.Insulting to not only the crew who were sacked but to all the other decent and professional guys( and girls) out there.To everyone who reads this,please let's do all ouselves a favour.Let Crap 56 have the last word once and for all and just ignore him.Leave him alone in his own little world..............wherever that may be!

[Cap 56]

BYMONEK

Your emotions are getting hold of you once more. I never stated that QRH should be discarded.

I am only stating what the QRH states itself; “QRH cannot always deal with all problems definitely not in case of multiple failures. In this case it’s up to the crew to use sound judgement.”

Believe me that you can teach a 16 year old how to fly a modern airliner under normal conditions pretty quickly. Managing abnormal situations is beyond his reach.

You can be sure that in the labs were future cockpits are designed or even omitted the algorithms I talked about are being tested out. I know for a fact that they are.

The more we pilots srew up the faster they will get rid of us.

The next step will not be that a layman flies the plane; there will be no pilot whatsoever!

[Cap 56]

Airbus has already put you in a cocoon as far as the flight envelope is concerned.

Next step may well be an electronic checklist that is able to handle multiple failures as well were you as a pilot will be actively guided trough an algorithm. The industry will put you in a straight-jacked.

This kind of software already exists in the medical field.
You guys may be laughing but in the penthouse of the EK corporate building they may be laughing with you. Maybe a little to soon but nevertheless….

[Cap 56]

White Knight

If you have read one of the recent issues of Flight International you will have seen that recently a test flight has taken place in order to certify an a plane, without pilots to be integrated in the normal ATC environment.

dungfunnel

You are right, lets just hope that those that consider moving to EK will think very carefully and realise that the airlines in Europe they work for are not so bad after all.

Airlines in Europe should really make a case against the unfair competion from this goverment sponsered airline that does not respect the basic human rights.

[7x7]

Another post deleted for asking Cap56 a few too many pointed questions, Mr Moderator?

SO I'll ask one of them again. Did you serve your contractural three month's notice when you 'resigned'from EK, Cap56, or were you 'allowed' to depart immediately with absolutely no notice at all?

As Alice would say, 'curiouser and curiouser'...

[wagtail23]

Amen to that Rev

PS Nice to see you posting once in a while

[etrang]

Rev, if you really think that cap 56 is

"you are the most despicable kind of human being that exists. "

You really have led a very sheltered life indeed. I can assure you that he is not.

[ZFT]

As an aside, how significant is it that EK operate an A330-200/A340-500 convertible simulator and no A340-300 sim?

[White Knight]

Well, ZFT the EK sim is A340-300, 330-200 convertable actually. No -500 sim, guys do their IOE with a whizz around the local airports.

[ZFT]

White Knight.

Thanks for the correction

[Cap 56]

So what has happened to the crew?

Did they appeal the management decision yes or no and what was the outcome, I think many EK candidates want to find out.

[330 Man]

Cap 56,
I recently finished recurrent and we were told that the crew had filed the appeal, and that they were on non flight pay status( paid to sit at home) until the appeal is heard and the decision is announced. Your guess is as good as mine as to the outcome. I would like to think that common sense will prevail and they will be reinstated, but this is after all Emirates. So it will be a surprise to all because you never know what decisions will be made. This was mostly a training and company philosophy problem. The head of flight ops is gone, and the head of training has been demoted. The pilots have paid enough of a price to this point. The crew, along with every pilot at Emirates, and the pilots who participate in forums like pprune, have used this as a great learning tool. Just look at the number of pages on this thread, and the debate it has caused. We have all learned something from this. As big as Emirates is on the CRM program, is'nt learning the main goal? It is Emirate's time to shine. They will either reinstate the crew knowing that we are all smarter from this or they will fire them, telling us all that management only cares about saving face, at the expense of the crew. We tried to blame Airbus and that did not work, so the crew is all that is left . Time will tell!

Regards,

330 Man

[millerscourt]

A330 Man

Strange how Airbuses are getting airborne all the time is it not??

Cannot understand how you can blame Airbus or EK's training dept for this accident.

When SQ6 crashed at Tapei there were some who thought the Captain should not have been sacked which amazed me.

Isn't learning the main goal you ask?? No not at this level in one's career it is not. There are some things that we as Captains have to take responsibility for and this JNB incident is one of them regardless of the fact there was no loss of life,which in itself is truly amazing. There are some incidents where saying " sorry " is just not good enough and heads have to roll.

[CrazyHorse]

Cap56, who the hell are you? Where do you come from?

And where the hell are you now, because I want to dig a deep and gnarly furrow in the earth that's at least 10 miles wide, preferably with my bare hands, so as to warn people to stay the hell away from the dangerous zone you live in.

Folks, this guy is not a pilot.

He can't be. Surely not. We're not populated by such fools. Are we?

Some in the know ask why he left EK, which kind of infers he was a pilot - before he went to jail, or the local Psycho Ward.

Jesus wept!

I'm a bit of a mushroom myself. I have, after all, only just stumbled onto this thread. One thing is for sure, it certainly has developed some.

Summary: EK is a better airline and Dubai is a better place without this fool, regardless of what it may or may not be as a place to work and live.

And that's what I'm trying to figure out.

[330 Man]

Millerscourt,

Yes it is strange how airbuses keep getting airborne all of the time. In fact this one got airborne also, due to the skill of the pilots.

You said:"Cannot understand how you can blame Airbus or EK's training dept for this accident."

Emirates tried to blame Airbus, not me. There was a memo issued to the pilots on the rotation technique of the 340-300 because of the training problem. I will admit that I am avoiding the 340 for now, but I have many friends on the 340 and friends who are instructors on it, and to a man they will tell you that there was a serious training issue regarding the 340-300 and it's rotation technique. Our training department was so concerned about tail strikes, that they forgot to get airborne. I do not know who you fly for, but if it is Emirates, then you know full well what I am talking about. If you do not fly for Emirates then I will submit that you do not know what you are talking about, because all that you know comes from newspapers, magazines and forums like this.

I do not know you but I will bet you a case of beer that the level of my career is just as good as yours. When I asked the question about learning I was referring to CRM training. Judging by the attitude of your post, I can guess that you never learn anything at annual CRM recurrent because you already know it all. That, my friend is nothing more than a path to disaster, not to mention that it makes you a real treat to fly with. A real know it all knows nothing. The day that I fly a trip and do not learn something is the day that I have the balls to quit. You obviously do not feel that way.

You make the statement that heads have to roll because of this incident. What is that based on. Do you have the facts? Did you investigate this incident? Are you in the Emirates training department? Show us the facts you used to make such a brash statement and I will back off. But until you do show us the facts, consider this: before you toy with 2 families lives like a little boy playing with toy soldiers, you should stand back and wait for the facts.

Emirates pilots were issued new guidence regarding 340-300 rotation as a result of this incident. THAT IS A FACT! The pilots did what they were taught. THAT IS A FACT! Emirates tried to blame Airbus. THAT IS A FACT! In the beginning of the Emirates 340 program Airbus told the Emirates instructors on the 340 that they were teaching incorrect rotation technique. THAT IS A FACT! That airbus got airborne. THAT IS A FACT! The reputation of these 2 pilots will for ever be tarnished. THAT IS A FACT.

I have been in this industry for over 25 years and I do not really need you to explain to me the responsibilities of a Captain. But I thank you just the same for reminding me that every pilot I have ever flown with, be it Captain or First Officer, who thought they knew it all and were too smart to learn, actually knew very little. They had the most to learn!

Your post is offensive!

I obviously have taken offense to it, and THAT IS A FACT!

330 Man

[JW411]

Now then, I am sure that a whole lot of you out there in DXB are wondering where CAP56 has gone.

Sadly, he has not passed away but is now pontificating on the "BA777 returned to LHR" thread.

I have never flown the 777 or the 340 but I have nevertheless come to the firm conclusion that this guy is a sciolist.

Not only that, he must surely be a strong contender for the Monday Morning Quarterback Olympic championship to be held at LGAV soon!

[millerscourt]

A330 Man

This aircraft got airborne due to the skill of the Pilot!!! Please explain that statement.

I have 4000 hours on the A340 and have flown that very aircraft which only just got airborne at JNB. Although no longer current on type as back on Boeings I find your logic strange.

[330 Man]

Millerscourt,
How do you think it got airborne, through osmosis? Maybe it was magic? A magician performing a great feat of levitation? Of course it was the skills of the flight crew. If not they would have been the first at the scene of the accident.

As you said, “the fact that there was no loss of life which is truly amazing.”

Do you attribute this to luck? Luck, good or bad has no place in the cockpit, and is not a factor in an accident. As you well know any aircraft accident is a chain of events. Every event must take place, in a very specific order or the accident will not occur.

These pilots found themselves in a very difficult situation and it was their skill, once realizing their predicament that got this aircraft back on the ground. Do you think the airplane got back on the ground by itself? Of course the pilots were partially to blame for the predicament in the first place. But the point of my previous post was that there were other, larger factors as well. The Boss said I want these 8 airplanes now. No one here in management was able to convince him that we could not keep up with the growth now, let alone with 8 additional airplanes. Every department at this company from inflight to housing, medical to pilot records was stretched to the limit. These 8 additional airplanes made it that much worse. But when you fly for a company that is owned by the ruling family, when the Boss says go, you go. That is the company philosophy link in the accident chain.

The training department did not have anything ready for the 340-300 and had little time to prepare. They were up to their eyeballs on the 340-500 program. As you have 4000 hours on the 340 you well know that the difference between the dash 300 and the dash 500 is night and day. Then you have to add the fact that these airplanes are underpowered pieces of crap. If they were any good, then you would still be flying them at SQ instead of Emirates. The differences between the 2 models were not really taken into account in the beginning of the 340 program. There were training issues that were not being addressed because the training department was up their eyeballs in other things. This is the training department link in the accident chain.

The pilot link of the chain had been kicked around like a dead dog, so I will not even get into that. Suffice it to say that there definitely was a pilot error link in the accident chain.

The pilots made mistakes, but neither you nor I really know what those mistakes were. That is why I think your call for “heads to roll” was out of line. When the final report from the investigating team from South Africa comes out, it may very well be that the pilots should be terminated. Until then, for you to act like the Queen of Hearts, and yell “off with their heads” is not only premature, it is uncalled for. Wait for the report and make your informed decision, which will then be based on fact, not guesses. That is my logic.

330 Man

[prospector]

Very good points made there,

Just goes to show how dangerous a lot of money can be when used where experience and knowledge should be the main parameters.

Prospector

[peternorth]

Hey gang,

I can only say that the 340 under High, Hot and Heavy or any combination there of can be a bit of an eye opener. Even the slightest error in load information given to the pilots, therefore trim setting can lead to crap TO performance. I have seen it underperform especially in L/V wind conditions even after triple checking TO numbers before we went. I believe its called performance optimized but its just plain old underpowered IMHO. Nothing like a nice gentle rotation followed by a meager response with the last 2000' disappearing quickly. For whatever its worth.

happier times ahead......

[duckbelly]

330 Man, you're spot on.
The day I stop learning is the day I quit.

For those who subscribe to the 'hang em high' theory perhaps you should consider the 'he who is without error, let him cast the first stone' philosophy.

The nimber of times I've landed and thought 'if a few things had gone slightly differently.........'

NO accident is the sole fault of the crew. NONE. The Reason model of error chain is worthwhile looking at, if only to see that the poor bastards up the front are merely the last link in what is usually a catalogue of stuff ups leading to the the final prang.

Anyone who can walk away from an event like this and survive can only be the better for it. You can bet your arse they won't do it again, neither will any other Emirates crew. And that HAS to be good.

[etrang]

"NO accident is the sole fault of the crew. NONE."

Really? What about pilot suicide crashes?

[ELAC]

>>>Really? What about pilot suicide crashes?<<<

Those, by definition, wouldn't be accidents!

:(

[duckbelly]

etrang.......... being a smartass helps no-one.

Every accident/incident has lessons. You never know when you or your loved ones have been flying as a pax with a crew who have just avoided a major cockup from applying the lessons learned from other unfortunates.

[Cap 56]

It is quit obvious what will happen to the pilots involved in the Johannesburg incident.

Currently they are waiting for the conclusions of the investigation, this will take years. In the mean time their license will expire and no PPC will be scheduled since the investigation is pending.

At this time EK will say that they can no longer use them since they do not have a license and that it’s not their (EK) fault.

As a consequence the crew will be faced with a battle against the UAE CAA, all this will take time and lot of money. The only thing EK wants is that the pilot’s resign so EK can wash their hands in innocence and cover themselves legally.

This whole issue has turned into a simple case of blackmail the trademark of the dark side of this award buying Airline.

I can not possibly imagine that these chaps are still mentally fit to return to flying.

As such the UAE CAA holds another set of cards in their hands, that is to say that of pulling the crews license on medical grounds after mentally exhausting them by keeping them as prisoners in the golden cage.

EK may well have tried to put part of the blame on Airbus. What EK does not realise is that they have already a history with Airbus regarding their training standards.

Believe me, at Airbus they know how airlines in the Middle East function.

A European multinational like Airbus does not laugh about being blackmailed the way Boeing way by Egypt Air.

There are limits to what money can buy and as far as I know the President of the UAE lives in Abu not in Dubai and that’s what counts in the end, Airbus does not need EK to survive.


EK may have bought themselves a reputation with the general public, but within the Aviation Industry and rule making bodies the picture is very different.

[Cerberus]

Cap 56,

A load of old cobblers mate. And, by the way.......you still can't have your job back!!

Cerberus

[jettesen]

why is this thread still going on after 4 months????? time to retire it me thinks

[Cap 56]

The reason why this tread is going on is quite simple. Despite the image EK has managed to buy; the only and real issue of any importance to any pilot considering signing up with EK is “How does the EK system react when faced with a problem like this”.

Taking into account that many pilots are looking at EK as a potential employer this tread is more actual than any other EK related subject.

The pilots concerned were holder of a license issued by an European country and may well loose everything simply because EK employed them and wrongly taught them how to rotate an A 340.

[Cerberus]

Cap 56,

Wrong mate, the only reason this thread is still going is because a former, disgruntled employee (fired for his incompetence) keeps resurrecting the thread.

By the way; what does: 'more actual' actually mean?!?

You won't get your job back no matter how long you keep it going!! You just look sadder by the second, lighten up and let it go.

Cerberus

[Dropp the Pilot]

Cap56 says "I can not possibly imagine that these chaps are still mentally fit to return to flying"....

After four months of posting fatuous drivel he finally reveals his sole verifiable area of expertise.

[lead zeppelin]

Any recent news here, a la

1) Is the aircraft repaired

2) Has Emirates changed the training/procedures

3) What became of the pilots

Any info appreciated.

[White Knight]

1) Repaired months ago and been flying ever since
2) Slightly - also many changes in management (bye TCK)
3) Heard they were in the sim recently, it would be nice to think so!!

[lead zeppelin]

Thanks, WK

By the way, are the changes in training Airbus initiated or internally?

[Earl Hadlea]

Back to the top:-

Any concrete news on whether the crew are back on line or not ?:confused:

[BYMONEK]

Still suspended,on full pay, from flying duties until the report of the investigation is published from the South African CAA. As far as i'm aware,one,if not both pilots are working in depts within Emirates.

[SA242]

This incident with the EK guys reminds me of an incident which a friend of mine had many years ago when flying for the old BOAC. On landing in Nairobi in a 747 classic in extremely wet weather and in poor vis conditions, the managed to slip off the runway with full pax on board doing severe damage to the aircraft. He was suspended with full pay while an investigation and subsequent hearing in to the incident took place. Once the reasons for the incident were resolved, they went back to their jobs about 6 months later. It may be similar for the EK guys?? I suppose it all depends on airline policy and the outcome of the investigations...we’ll have to wait and see.

[BigGeordie]

It will be interesting to see, but this certainly isn't BOAC....