baggage and cargo security screening

[pelican larry]

Heard on a major tv network (Fox methinks)that even as of today, baggage and cargo were not screened on a permanent basis,that is every single piece of bag or box that goes on the plane, adding that explosive checking devises were underutilised at most major US airports. So the equipment is there , but they don't use it. Anyone at the forum could give some insight on why something that - given the state of affairs - seems so obvious, even criminal. Why three hour advance check-in if this is not included in the security procedure ??? :eek: null

[pelican larry]

Being a person for whom flying internationally via commercial airlines (particularly US ones )is a once a month routine, it is sort of unnerving to see how slow "real security measures " are being implemented. I thought sharing this article would be of interest to you guys; http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/14/200617.shtml . I truly hope I am just overeacting, but maybe some of you guys could have info that hopefully would relax frequent customers like me.Thanx in advance.

[pelican larry]

Getting closer. If the industry wants passengers back it should listen. Check the article below.
BTW, some of the info is inaccurate, no 100% baggage checking for international flights at some US airports,( I am not going to say which one though because I depart from it every week ) Pilots, crew and customers should make pressure towards a solution.
http://www.msnbc.com/news/645004.asp#BODY :mad:

[PaperTiger]

Everybody even remotely familiar with US operations (crew, pax, bagchucker) has known of this for years.

Having the media inform the public at large may provide the impetus to get it changed. I personally doubt it. And anyway it would take years to implement.

There have already been some 'shock,horror' reactions on Usenet. I fear this particular story at this time may do more harm than good.

[chiglet]

PT,
Eeerrrrrm have they? IF "they" had, then perhaps, just, perhaps, Sept11 "may" have been a "tad" more difficult. Hindsight, unfortunately is 100% effective.
we aim to please, it keeps the cleaners happy

[PaperTiger]

Sorry chiglet, I don't quite follow your drift. Screening checked bags (the context) would have made no difference whatsoever to Sept 11. Nor would PBM incidentally.

However if you mean that LY-type security should have been in place prior to then, you are probably correct. US airlines have resisted this at every turn (with the backing of congress). The flying public would simply not have accepted it in the absence of a tangible threat. Which sadly they now have.

The tradeoff always was security vs. convenience. It takes a disaster to prompt changes - metal detectors after Dawson's Field, bag matching after Lockerbie etc. It was a billion-dollar gamble, and we got away with it for a long time. The enemy has just upped the ante.

[ 21 October 2001: Message edited by: PaperTiger ]

[pelican larry]

PT; when you say "it would take years to implement"; when is the starting point?; do we need another disaster? Don't you think this is a matter that should be legitimately discussed at an operational level (pilots , crews etc...) ?
I think that when airlines like Jetblue unilaterally decide to install bulletproof doors (rather than " FAA approved reinforcement bars")are actually adressing what the frequent passengers are asking for and not a "let's wait and see " quick fix.
Going back to cargo and checked baggage screening, Robert Crandall stated at CNN that this was not only possible but urgent. :confused:

[PaperTiger]

My years to implement comment was a reference to baggage screening machines. I don't know how many US airports have airline service (the number 420 sticks in my mind), but full implementation would require at least one machine at each. It would take time to manufacture, install and train the operators. OK, maybe not years in the US but even at one a day that would still be the end of 2002. I suppose hand searches could be done at smaller airports or else dropping service to those places where the airlines deem it 'uneconomic' to screen bags.
And for it to be completely effective, it would have to be done worldwide. That will take years, if at all.

Don't get me wrong, I'm in favour of it and I would guess that all non-management people are too. It's going to come down to who pays for it.

I think we've covered the effectiveness or otherwise of passenger security checks, and since it appears there is no way to keep nutters, drunks or even terrorists off the plane then securing the flightdeck seems an appropriate response. Been that way on trains (and buses in some places) for years.

[ 21 October 2001: Message edited by: PaperTiger ]

[pelican larry]

Using the existing hardware to a full would be a start. The rest will have to follow otherwise they'll be placed in a different
security status which will be bad for business. Who pays ? As always, those who write the check . With all the appropiate security in place the airline industry will not be an attractive target to terrorists, lunatics,etc..

[Rapid_Climber]

It is all too easy to final start using some of the systems that have been available for years, however especially for ground security it's having trained and experienced people to use them. I spent a couple of years sometime ago as a security ground co-ordinator, only a couple of weeks ago I travelled from the UK to the US via EWR and it's revised security. Personally I was not impressed, for the public it looked good to have National Guard, State Troopers, and Port Authority all walking round armed. And it looked good having X-ray machines for bags, and Archway Metal Detectors for passengers, however it was all a waste of time. On my trip I did not see one member of security personnel who looked like they know what they were doing, I even set of the AMD and should have been searched by hand, instead a hand held detector was quickly waved over me. If I had wanted to, without even trying I could have got a number of security items past that team. Don't get me wrong they were all following procedure, but none of them knew or seemed to care why they were doing it. As someone who knows about security it worries me as I'm know a terroist would have as much or even more knowledge of its grey areas.

[Capone]

Pelican Larry,

actually, only 10% of the luggage that is boarded on domestic U.S. flights is screened for bombs!!! U.S. airlines are actually opposed to screening 100% of all luggage boarded on domestic flights because it would increase the turn around time of the plane as well as labor costs. Sounds ridiculous, but unfortunately it is true. Haven't these airline execs learned a few things in the wake of last months tragedies!

[pelican larry]

Something is missing. Turnaround should not be a problem because the screening is done on the ground regardless of the plane being or not at the gate. It is probably economics,
but a mistaken one. What the flying public wants more than ever is safety; what the professionals that operate the industry should do is to act accordingly, otherwise a massive return of the "flying public" will take a loooong time to happen. Pat Friend ,president of AFA mentions her concern. Check this: <http://www.cnn.com/2001/TRAVEL/NEWS/10/12/flight.attendants.ap/index.html>
Pilots have been rather quiet though, which has been a bit dissapointing. :confused:

[ft]

Having some firsthand experience of the subject I can tell you some of the sad facts of the matter.

To screen all luggage for a flight, you're looking at having one x-ray machine per flight and even then you have to expect five hours rather than three hours advance check-in for a widebody. In short, make that two or three machines per flight.

Each machine has to be manned by a trained professional. For each machine, you need a handler or two as well, not to mention the extra facilities needed.

Oh, and it wouldn't have stopped the events of 9/11 anyway.

Somehow, I think more lives could be saved using all that money on other safety issues.

Cheers,
/ft

[flypastpastfast]

As a frequent traveller, some of the comments above are TRULY INCREDIBLE.

Such as, '100% baggage screening would not have stopped sept.11th'...Doh! Get this, do you really think terrorists only attack aircraft in one way, like they did on september 11th. Jeez, the stupidity.

I would be very reluctant to take my family to the US right now, because I have seen the shambles that is called security. Getting a bunch of guys to stand in the terminal with guns on display will not ever stop a suicidal terrorist.

To those US airlines who think that full security is 'too expensive, 'too time consuming' or 'really difficult' Could you please GET A GRIP! September 11th was a reality check for you people.

Considering the current level of terrorist threat in the US, and the numbers killed on September 11th, I regard it as criminal for anyone in the airline industry to come out with cr@p about costs and so on. For god's sake WAKE UP AMERICA. The threat is real.

I know this is strongly worded, but what does it take for airlines in the US to stop being so dumb.

[phd]

Sadly we work in an industry that will not spend money on anything unless there is a direct and immediate return on investment, or unless legislation is passed which demands it. The aviation sector has not yet grasped the principle that safety & security can only be achieved through a relentless process of risk identification, assessment and reduction - and this requires serious and sustained investment in and attention to all safety and security threats. The devil as always is in the detail and we do not pay enough attention to the details. Terrorists know this and exploit the weaknesses in the aviation systems limited defences. If we want hijack free and accident free air-travel we - the travelling public - are going to have to put a great deal more pressure on our politicians and on the managers of airlines to deliver this and we are going to have to be prepared to pay for it - I mean really pay for it! Railtrack has paid the ultimate price for not putting passenger safety high enough on its corporate agenda and it is only a matter of time before 'World Airlines' PLC has to learn that 'profits first-protection second' may be an acceptable short term strategy but in the long term is financial suicide.
Cheerful subject eh?

[ft]

We will ALWAYS be vulnerable to attacks. Those vulnerabilities WILL be exploited by madmen trying to prove one point or another. The perfectly safe world does not exist, nor will it ever exist, outside of fairytales.

So yes, identify security problems and correct them within reasonable limits. But it would be insane to go completely hysterical about all the risks in one area just since this area is the one filling the tabloids right now.

Throw money where they do the most good. Cost IS an issue, to pretend otherwise is ignoring reality. You can ALWAYS spend MORE money getting a little bit safer but it will end up with us all sitting in bunkers since we can't afford the safety measures needed to leave them.

If you REALLY want to make sure there will never be an aviation related terrorist incident again, the only thing you can do is to go back a few years in the development of aviation. Almost a hundred years, in fact. To before the Wright Flyer 1.

I do hope you enjoy long boat trips.

Then again... ships can be sunk, can't they? Or carry nukes. Or pollute water reservoirs. Do you catch where this is going yet?

Put an end to terrorism. Kill every potential terrorist. Kill everyone. Then there will never be any acts of terrorism again. But only then.

/ft

[pelican larry]

ft:
With your experience , do you or anyone at forum know what's the procedure being used in Europe and Israel ?
Also on international flights the cargo load is substantial, does that have any security screening ?
BTW the whole point is to improve the use of equipment already in place which according to
the MSNBC report is being under utilized.
And yes a better screening would have avoided the PAN AM tragedy and would make it difficult for suicide type attacks . We understand that all efforts go to the extent to which they are economically feasible. The question is : Is the industry doing everything possible ?

[liftyryce]

ft:
I don't know what your relevant experience is but I can assure you that it doesn't require "5 hour check in" to screen 100% bags.

Pelican Larry:
To re-assure - All major airports at least, in the UK X-ray 100% of hold and cabin baggage (with usual 2 hour check in). Some get X-rayed more than once. Also, if passengers miss their flight - so do their bags - even if it means removing all of the other bags from the hold to get to them! (This is post Lockerbie and applies to all flights)

Not sure what the situation is like for the rest of Europe or the US.
:rolleyes:

[pelican larry]

Please check this:
http://www.msnbc.com/news/647876.asp

[ft]

liftyryce:
I don't know what your relevant experience is but I can assure you that it doesn't require "5 hour check in" to screen 100% bags.

I was mainly involved in the screening process around DC-10s and similar size a/c while working in handling. These were usually as full as they could get, with luggage in ULD:s and as bulk cargo. It was not uncommon for the screening to take four hours - the x-ray machine wouldn't go faster. Can you say "missed slot"? Ouch. And this was a modern screening machine, the kind which colorcodes and indicates items with the röntgen transparency of plastics and the like. It could easily take longer.

It doesn't take three hours to load up a normal flight either but you still have to check in that far ahead just since they don't want to be late if you hit a snag - drunks thrown off the plane, passports in luggage etc etc etc.

I assume that you know what you're talking about when it comes to the UK procedures and I'm curious as to what you're doing that we weren't. How is the screening done? Where are the machines, how many x-ray machines/flight, how trained are the x-ray operators etc etc? Erm, on second thought... let's remember not to mention specific procedures here, however interesting. For obvious reasons. :( But a more general description would be interesting.

---
As for pax willingness to wait/pay more/etc I do believe that they say they will claim to accept pretty much anything if asked "in the light of the events... bla bla bla". When standing at the airport and choosing between going in two hours and paying $150 or going in five hours and paying $250, I think that most people will still go with the former - 100% screening or not.

Customer opinion polls are very hard to keep objective - but very easy to design to give whatever results you want/will make the bigger headlines/will prove your point.

I worked in "the rest of Europe" and I'd be surprised if bags go without passenger anywhere in the western world these days (although recent news about the US security makes one wonder...). It was VERY strict - to the point that if a passenger was too ill (read: drunk) to describe his or her bag ("I think it's blue... or red... or maybe green...") when taken off the plane all the bags were unloaded, lined up and each passenger had to go out to find his/her luggage again. Major PITA, took HOURS. Same thing if you f@cked up counting the bags and ended up with one too many - a guaranteed method of earning the hate of your coworkers. :)

As for air cargo I don't know. We didn't have any cargo ourselves, we just got it on pallets, in boxes or in ULD:s from the cargo companies and loaded it on - whatever screening was done wasn't our responsibility.

As for the Israeli procedures, I have no direct experience but I've heard second hand from those who had that it's

a) very impressive and
b) a lot of extra work, described in lots of colourful terms by bored/frozen/wet/tired handlers. :)

Cheers,
/ft

[pelican larry]

A pilot speaks up. Excerpts from Salon.com:

Search for bombs, not nail clippers | 2

Most of us remember Pan Am 103, a New York-bound Boeing 747 named "Clipper Maid of the Seas," blown up by Libyan terrorists over Lockerbie, Scotland, three days before Christmas in 1988. A small amount of Czech-made explosives, hidden inside a Toshiba radio, brought down the 300-ton aircraft and took the lives of 269 people, most of them Americans. Following this disaster, several measures were put in place to enhance safety aboard international flights.

The most familiar of these, at least to seasoned travelers, is positive luggage/passenger matching, whereby a person's bag may not make the journey without the passenger who owns it. This may not be the most comprehensive insurance against someone on a suicide mission, but it's worth noting that the Lockerbie terrorists did not die over Scotland in the flaming plunge of Pan Am 103. They were safely on the ground in Valetta, Malta, the island from which they'd sent along the explosive-laden luggage aboard a connecting flight. The deadly suitcase, sans its owners, made its way to Frankfurt, and then to London, where it was "interlined," to use industry parlance, onto Flight 103.

Another post-Lockerbie advent, used at certain European airports, involves the placement of checked luggage in pressurized chambers that simulate the climb and descent of flight, detonating any barometrically triggered bombs before they're loaded into the holds of aircraft.

Most important, however, and with farthest-reaching potential, has been the development of highly sophisticated explosive-screening machines. Yet for reasons both political and economic, relatively few of these devices are in use at U.S. airports. The precise number, in fact, along with their exact whereabouts, is a guarded secret. But considering the hysteria and discipline at the metal detectors these days, it is downright tough to stomach a recent estimate that only about 5 percent of all checked luggage in the United States was undergoing any kind of high-tech explosives screening. This, during a virtual lockdown of the nation's airports.
Since the destruction of the World Trade Center, the focus of security has been inordinately "above deck," scrutinizing our pockets and carry-ons. We are forbidden to walk aboard with scissors, but the bags down below may or may not have been examined for explosives. (And, for good measure, the passenger/luggage match rules described above are still not applicable to domestic flights.)

The airlines, once reluctant to pursue such technology on a large scale for fears of delays and cost, know a bombing -- or multiple bombings -- could be a deadly slash to the jugular of the nation's already precarious economy, bringing ruin to their industry by paralyzing an already nervous populace. Behind the scenes they now are working to institute new, more extensive procedures, the details of which are wisely (or for lack of scope) kept confidential.

But the airlines, government and FAA cannot act fast enough, and need to have effective anti-explosive technology and procedures in place at every U.S. airport, as well as all foreign airports from which flights depart for U.S. destinations, as quickly as possible. Prior to recent events, FAA's goal for establishing a comprehensive detection network was the year 2017. That is, if you need help with the math, more than 15 years from now.

Advanced screening equipment costs as much as $1 million per unit, and several hundred, even thousands, of these would be needed to adequately equip more than 400 commercial airports across the country and beyond. Remember that the security of our airports is only as strong as the system's weakest, most vulnerable point. Passengers connecting in New York, Chicago or Boston may have boarded commuter flights at Appleton, Wis., Scranton, Pa., or Presque Isle, Maine. (Just as Mohammad Atta and the hijackers of American flight 11 cleared security not at Boston's Logan, but in Portland, Maine.) But we haggle over the cost at our own peril.

We cannot afford another postmortem frenzy over deficient security measures, not to mention the shame and embarrassment over how, possibly, we could have missed this one. Regardless of how it's paid for, we must soon be assured of an extensive and effective system. The billions of dollars required are a mere fraction of what we stand to lose.


salon.com

- - - - - - - - - - - -

About the writer
P. Smith is a pilot at a large airline. He asked that the airline not be named.

[ft]

Newswatcher posted a quote from the Houston Chronicle:

"And they are slow. Currently, these bomb-screening devices can only handle about 150 to 200 bags per hour."

150-200 bags/hr? To put that number into perspective: That's what we put into the BULK cargo of DC-10s/MD-11s/A330s to keep the W&B within limits! Add a hold full of ULDs with bags...

Perhaps on flights with mainly businesspeople travelling light but for charter and international... ? No. :(

Cheers,
/ft