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Stifler
3rd Mar 2004, 03:29
Last Thursday (26/02/2004), a jet aircraft belonging to a UK airline took off from a major UK airport, which was CAVOK, to fly to a smaller airport, where snow was falling. The primary alternate was also CAVOK.
The captain elected not to carry any extra fuel for the weather conditions at the destination. On arrival, the destination airfield was closed for snow, with ATC advising that it would be open in around half an hour. The captain elected to hold, commiting himself to land there as holding for that length of time would take him below Minimum Diversion Fuel. When the FO (handling pilot) questioned this decision, he was told to "Shut the **** up", and the captain took control.
After some time in the hold, ATC alerted him that it would now be at least an hour before the airfield was open. The aircraft diverted to its primary alternate, and a PAN call was made. Even after the fuel state dropped below Minimum Reserve, this call was not upgraded to a MayDay.
On landing at the primary alternate, the airfield Fire Service had to escort the aircraft to stand, as it was considered possible that there would not be enough fuel to get there.

The final irony is the identity of the captain: when not flying the line he is the company Safety Pilot...
Since I posted this, I have discovered this version of events was NOT what actually happened. My informant within the company concerned seems to have had his own axe to grind...

NdekePilot
3rd Mar 2004, 03:59
Mmmmmmmmm, sounds familiar, although might be someone else altogether.
Any clues.......at all?:uhoh:

trainer too 2
3rd Mar 2004, 04:14
Okay give us some more hints please... :ooh:

Grandpa
3rd Mar 2004, 04:38
How comes that a number of so-called "chief pilots" induce themselves to lose sight of aerial reality after being brainwashed for years by the management, so that they imagine they are seated in an office at the upper storey of company building and forget they are flying an aircraft.

I remember lots of them are still alive because flight engineers knew them and applied a correction to fuel quantity ......

Kaptin M
3rd Mar 2004, 07:02
So what?
The Captain ("the company Safety Pilot") chose to fly with the fuel that the company dispatcher - also a supposed specialist - decided was sufficient for this flight.
Many airlines demand an explanation if one elects to carry fuel above tha which is planned.
Most airlines these days treat, and pay, their pilots like 'bus drivers - and so it shouldn't come as a surprise to them when pilots decide to act accordingly.

"On landing at the primary alternate, the airfield Fire Service had to escort the aircraft to stand, as it was considered possible that there would not be enough fuel to get there."
Again, so what?
As long as the aircraft landed at the alternate the p.i.c. has complied with all requirements. If he has to be towed from the runway (of the alternate) to the parking spot due to lack of fuel, then he has absolutely complied with all requirements in accordance with the defined fuel policies. And demonstrated a remarkable knowledge of his aircraft's performance.
IMO, this pilot landed with TOO MUCH fuel, if the engines were still running when he got to the parking spot! :O

fireflybob
3rd Mar 2004, 07:14
Only time you've got too much fuel is when you are on fire!

GearDown&Locked
3rd Mar 2004, 07:25
When the FO (handling pilot) questioned this decision, he was told to "Shut the **** up", and the captain took control

Do they ever say "please"? :mad: :\

TAC On
3rd Mar 2004, 08:40
Kaptain M. I must be missing something!

By my understanding your response is so far off the planet, it is disturbing.

Wherever I have worked, Minimum Fuel, is the fuel required to be in the tanks as the wheels cross the fence at the ALTERNATE. This has, in my experience generally been 30 mins at the 1500' holding rate. The various companies I have worked for, have generally nominated a figure somewhat above that, and that figure , given that it is incorporated into the company operations manual, becomes the LEGAL Minimum Fuel.

Where you used to work, eons ago, it was called Fixed Reserve Fuel, was nominated as such on the lodged flight plan,and was required to be in the tanks on landing. (Remember that. The boxes as you went down the fuel calcs, were dest, alt, var res, fixed res.)
The fact that many companies now name it "holding fuel" seems to suck some in, to a misunderstanding of the true nature of the requirement.

To suggest, (by your comment, "so what") that it is OK to hold at a closed airport and throw away the option of a safe alternate, is mind boggling.

Have I misunderstood?

Kaptin M
3rd Mar 2004, 09:26
My understanding was the ONLY fuel that you theoretically were REQUIRED to land with is Fixed Reserve (which, as you say "eons ago" was 45 mins reduced to 30 min once airborne).
Theoretically, one needs arrive over destination with ONLY Alt + F.R. (there is no requirement for Alt + Var...or, Contingency). Once airborne, variable may effectively be included as Dest fuel (as was the extra 15 mins of F.R., in the days of 45 mins F.R.).
All other reserves are there to be used if/when necessary due to eg. (decreased) aircraft performance, incorrect met data at the flt planning stage.


However, the F.R. ONLY should be planned to be in tanks on landing. However due to the previous reasons (including a go-around) might not be.

"off the planet"? I don't think so.

By the same token, I believe they are fuel tanks, and NOT air tanks. :O

TAC On
3rd Mar 2004, 09:44
Kaptin M.

Fixed is not just "planned" to be, it is "required" to be, in the tanks at the ALTERNATE.

On that basis, your comment "so what" beggars belief.

The "gentleman" concerned held to the extent that he just made it to the ALTERNATE, with zip in the tanks.

"So what" indicates an agreement that what wasdone was OK. You've gotta be joking.

Tac On

fernytickles
3rd Mar 2004, 09:55
In the company I used to work for, our safety pilot was nicknamed Captain Fumes for treating the fuel tanks as air tanks.

Kaptin M
3rd Mar 2004, 10:26
It's a brave man who can pass judgement without being in full knowledge of WHY he arrived with the hearsay amount.

ratarsedagain
3rd Mar 2004, 11:29
TAC on,
Have to concur with Kaptin M who raises some valid points. Whilst operating in accordance with most companies sop's , you'll invariably get the day where you land with reserve fuel, or perhaps a bit less-and yes you'll shout for help if the latter is the scenario. It doesn't happen very often, but it can, and that's the sort of situation, as a professional, you get on and deal with.

rgds,

Basil
3rd Mar 2004, 11:45
Without prejudice to what really happened.

<<the fuel that the company dispatcher - also a supposed specialist - decided was sufficient for this flight>>
What's he/she got to do with it? Fuel is a command decision - not the despatcher, not the chief pilot, not the training captain - it is up to the aircraft commander.

menard
3rd Mar 2004, 12:03
Some guys shouldn't be captains because they are idiots, some others shouln't be because they ignore that they are idiots...

Hi Kaptin M.....

HotDog
3rd Mar 2004, 13:02
Kaptin M, don't know which company enjoys the benefit of your services but in my company, minimum diversion fuel, which was included in fuel required; meant fuel which is the sum of alternate fuel and reserve fuel. Reserve fuel meant 45 mins. holding at FL 100. This obviously was not available to our intrepid captain
in question. I'm glad you and I never flew together, I always hated arguing with my captains, which very rarely were necessary.:rolleyes:

Ignition Override
3rd Mar 2004, 13:16
We tend to always believe what our fuel gauges tell us.

The concept of CRM was initiated at a large US airline years ago because of a DC-8 accident in Portland, OR. The Flight Engineer was aware of questionable accuracy with their fuel gauges and expressed his concern-but the Captain seemed unconcerned....until three or four engines flamed out over the city.

Let's hope that none of us must divert to an alternate with either (maybe) reserve fuel remaining at ETA or marginal weather and/or a non-precision approach required, even in flat terrain: NDB anyone?

Certain mountain airports near lakes or rivers can easily have unforecast fog with no alternate fuel loaded. ...glaciers in the moonlight...and fresh snow covering up ALL of the runway lights at an uncontrolled airport.

So it seems silly to plan to land with more than 45 minutes fuel onboard?:ouch:

Wino
3rd Mar 2004, 15:00
I think you are talking about the united dc8 that crash landed on the highway. Its not that the guages were flawed. They were exactly right. The captain had been burned in a previous crash and was fixated on the subject and developed target fixation. each trip around the holding pattern was burning 5000 lbs of fuel and the captain started his last trip around the pattern with 5000 showing on the guages.

The FE was matter of factly telling the the captain that they were running out of gas, but the light didnt go on till the first two engines rolled back, at which point he said "open the crossfeeds man" but of course there was nothing to cross feed.

The captain had been planning to land on fumes but got target locked and wound up staying the pattern more or less paralyzed. The FO (who can't easily see the engineer panel) was out of the loop.

Oh yeah, I forgot to mention, the overcenter lock had broken on one of the main gears and it was reasonably certain that the gear was going to collapse on landing which is why they were trying to burn down to the miniumum fuel possible.

CHeers
Wino

Kaptin M
3rd Mar 2004, 15:03
Perhaps I'm not too good at conveying my thoughts, so please allow me to try once again.

At the flight planning stage the minimum fuel uplifted will be a total of the following:-
a) estimated trip burn from departure to destination;
+ b) a "variable", or "contingency";
+ c) estimated burn from planned destination to alt;
+ d) any extra due to decreased aircraft performance;
+ e) a fixed reserve.
To this minimum the crew may decide to take extra.

Once airborne, the only fuel that (theoretically) needs to be in tanks over destination is (c) + (e).
As an example, the aircraft may arrive at destination and for a variety of reasons (eg. extended taxi and holding time prior to take-off, stronger than forecast head winds, lower than planned levels, wx at destination, r/w closed at destination, etc, etc) and end up using (a) + (b) + (d).
Now getting down towards having only (c) + (e), a decision is made to divert to planned destination, and ATC advised accordingly. ATC now advise that a clearance is not immediately available, or available only at a much lower level (due perhaps to other aircraft diverting).
So far the crew have done EVERYTHING in accordance with normal procedures, and commenced a diversion to alt. with more than only (c) + (e), but now realise that they are going to use some of the F.R., and hence advise ATC that they require priority due to minimum fuel.

So I believe most of us are in agreement, however there MAY come a time in one's career that it is just not possible to land with the required full F.R., in spite of having uplifted the required fuel and then some.
Who hasn't yet had a single runway destination suddenly become unavailable, after having commenced approach?

peeteechase
3rd Mar 2004, 15:22
One issue which hasn't been touched on is the decision to throw away the alternate and commit to landing at destination. Would one really base committing on a snow clearance estimate?
In my company, (which has been criticized recently for its more cautious approach to snow at a small airfield) we use the term "landing assured" as a requirement for committing. In the reported case, if all the facts are correct, this clearly was not the case and this shows very poor judgement on the part of the Captain. No doubt his experiences will be related in his next safety magazine.

ATB, ptc

Stickies
3rd Mar 2004, 15:50
In the post Kaptin M made originally he said that both Captain and dispatcher decided that the fuel was sufficient for the flight then further goes on to say *as long as the aircraft LANDED at the alternate.... If it then has to be towed from the runway to the parking spot due to lack of fuel, then he has absolutely complied with all the requirements* Going back to basics, the requirement is for, amongst other things, enough fuel to complete the flight. As I remember it, an aircraft is legally deemed to be in flight from the time it first moves under its own power until it stops moving under its own power therefore the fact that it had to be towed off the runway means, in my book, that it had insufficient fuel to complete the flight.

TAC On
3rd Mar 2004, 16:02
Kaptin M

You are getting your knickers in a knot, through not having read the posts properly.

I concur with your summary in your last, but would add that over the destination one should take into account any others factors known or reasonably expected , and adjust the min divert accordingly. For instance if you know that there will be a dozen others diverting to the alternate it is reasonable to assume that a bit extra for vectoring and holding would be prudent. As you are well aware this is the undefined area of the op, where judgement and command perogative come into play.

Should you now take yourself back to the original post and re read it, you will note it is alleged, that whilst overhead the destination, the Captain, elected to hold further over an unavailable aerodrome. As is also alleged, he took no extra from the departure aerodrome. Ergo he was at or close to min divert fuel when he elected to remain over an unavailable aerodrome.

Such a decision, based on the facts alleged, is bodering on the criminal.

On the basis of the allegations made in the original post, I have no compunction in saying this man is an idiot, and anyone who considers that he is not a menace to aviation (based on the allegations made) is also an idiot. Having met you and enjoyed a few ales and a steak with you I assumed that you are not so, and can only presume that you have misread or misinterpreted.

If the circumstances are not as indicated in the original post I will gladly withdraw and reconsider.

With regard to my own experience and distance to run (I'll get to the finish line a long way before you), the mixing of terms is the result of having worked in many areas where the same things run under different names, and the self induced destruction of brain cells over time. My appolgies for being imprecise. analyse the handle and you may care to reconsider your inappropriate comments.

Personal attack is not your usual style Charlie. Suggest you leave off the saki before you post next time.

KAT TOO
3rd Mar 2004, 16:04
Your post gave me a good chuckle this Morning and i assume some of it was tounge in cheek?

I have no problem if in extreme circumstances someone lands with or just a above min reserve fuel following a diversion or after an unexpected hold at destination. It is worth remembering that if you divert with only min reserve + alternate fuel in the tanks then at arrival at your alt: you will have not much more than min reserve anyway, so holding over head at destination is an option

you would need to be certain of your approach time and the reason for the delay. Snow clearing operations always take longer than ATC think at least in the UK. I have yet to see a full sweep and inspection take less than 30-40 minutes. Given last weeks weather condition at some airports on the East coast where snow was blowing back on to the airfield as quick as it was cleared it is not surprising that it took longer than thought.

As for comments about carrying (or not ) extra fuel it could well be that it was due in part to landing performance on contaminated runways, braking action etc.

Most regional jets don't have thrust reversers so the Captain & F/O would have had plenty to think about that day. All this crap about company fuel policies is just that: in my company at least Commander are expected to take the fuel they need but no more, it is up to the Commander to decide what is needed.

In the mean time lets await the out come and learn from it!

Devils Advocate
3rd Mar 2004, 16:24
W.r.t. 'company dispatcher - also a supposed specialist'....

The difference here, as I understand it, is that in some countries ( especially the USA ) airlines have qualified 'dispatchers' who have some sort of pseudo legal authority and / or responsibility for the despatch ( or not ) of a flight.

In the UK there is ( to my knowledge ) no such equivalent, and the decision to despatch ( or not ) and / or the amount of fuel required is soley down to the legal / nominated commander of the aircraft - and CRM aside, the management of fuel, and indeed the whole filght, rests soley with the commander - wherein it's his/her head on the block when things do not go to 'plan' - alebit a two, or more, crew operation.

The commander is bound by the definitions and requirements laid out in his / her company Operations Manual / Part A / Section 8 ( Operating Procedures ) - it being a CAA / JAA approved / legal document - my own companies version of which is repro'd below for your enlightenment:

8.1.6 Determination of the Quantities of Fuel and Oil Carried

8.1.6.1 Based on the appropriate consumption figures for the stage of flight as contained in Part B of the manual for the specific aeroplane, the fuel on board at the start of each flight must be sufficient to cover the elements listed in the following paragraphs.

8.1.6.2 Standard Procedure

The fuel required is the sum of:

(a) Taxi Fuel - The total amount of fuel expected to be used prior to take-off including allowances for operation of ice protection systems and APU. (Normally 200kg for the B737).

(b) Trip Fuel - To include:

(i) Take-off and climb to initial cruising level/altitude, taking into account the expected departure routeing;
(ii) Cruise from top of climb (TOC) to top of descent (TOD), including any step climb/descent;
(iii) TOD to initial approach point, taking into account the expected arrival routeing and procedure;
(iv) Approach and landing at destination.

(c) Contingency Fuel - Which must be the higher of (i) or (ii) below :

(i) 5% of the planned trip fuel or, in the event of inflight replanning, 5% of the trip fuel for the remainder of the flight; or
(ii) fuel for 5 mins hold at 1500 ft above the destination aerodrome in ISA.

NOTE: At the planning stage not all factors that could have an influence on the fuel used to the destination aerodrome can be foreseen. Consequently contingency fuel is carried to compensate for items such as: Deviations of an individual aeroplane from the expected fuel consumption data;
Deviations from forecast meteorological conditions;
Deviations from planned routeings and/or cruising levels/altitudes.(d) Alternate Fuel - to include:

(i) A go-around from the applicable MDA/DH at the destination aerodrome to missed approach altitude, taking into account the complete missed approach procedure;
(ii) Climb from missed approach altitude to cruising level/altitude;
(iii) Cruise from TOC to TOD;
(iv) TOD to initial approach point taking into account the expected arrival routeing and procedure;
(v) Approach and landing at the destination alternate aerodrome selected in accordance with para 8.1.2.7.

NOTES If, in accordance with para 8.1.2.8, two destination alternates are required then alternate fuel must be sufficient to cover the case of the alternate requiring the greater amount of fuel.
The departure aerodrome may be selected as a destination alternate.[/list=1](e) Final Reserve Fuel
Fuel to hold for 30 minutes at 1500 ft above aerodrome elevation in ISA calculated with the estimated landing mass on arrival at the alternate or the destination, when no alternate is required.

(f) Additional Fuel
(to be carried if dictated by the type of operation e.g. ETOPs). This is only required to be carried if the fuel calculated in accordance with (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) above does not provide sufficient for the circumstances listed below:

(i) holding for 15 mins at 1500 ft above aerodrome elevation in ISA when an IFR flight is being operated without a destination alternate in accordance with para 8.1.3.1; and

(ii) following an engine or pressurisation failure at the most critical point en-route:[list] descend as necessary and proceed to an adequate aerodrome; and
15 minutes hold at 1500 ft in ISA above the adequate aerodrome; and
approach and landing.(g) Extra fuel
At the discretion of the commander.


8.1.6.3 Decision Point Procedure
When planning to a destination aerodrome via an en-route decision point the fuel required is:
The sum of:[list=a] taxi fuel;
trip fuel to the destination aerodrome, via the decision point;
contingency fuel of not less than 5% of the estimated fuel used from the decision point to the destination aerodrome;
alternate fuel, if a destination alternate is required;
final reserve fuel;
additional fuel, if required; and
extra fuel, at the discretion of the commander;[/list=a]8.1.6.4 Isolated Aerodrome Procedure
When planning to an isolated aerodrome for which an alternate does not exist the fuel required is the sum of:[list=a] taxi fuel;
trip fuel;
contingency fuel in accordance with para 8.1.6.2(c);
additional fuel if required, but not less than:
(i) for turbo-prop and turbo-jet aeroplanes fuel to fly for a minimum of two hours, calculated with the normal cruise consumption, after arriving overhead the destination aerodrome, including final reserve fuel; and
(ii) extra fuel, at the discretion of the commander.[/list=a]8.1.6.5 Predetermined Point Procedure
When planning to a destination alternate where the distance between the destination aerodrome and the
destination alternate is such that a flight can only be routed via a predetermined point to one of these
aerodromes the fuel required is the greater of (a) or (b) below:[list=a] the sum of:
(i) taxi fuel;
(ii) trip fuel to the destination aerodrome via the predetermined point;
(iii) contingency fuel in accordance with para 8.1.6.2(c);
(iv) additional fuel if required, but not less than that in para 8.1.6.4(d);
(v) extra fuel, at the discretion of the commander
or,
the sum of:
(i) taxi fuel;
(ii) trip fuel from the departure aerodrome to the alternate aerodrome, via the predetermined
point;
(iii) contingency fuel in accordance with para 8.1.6.2(c);
(iv) additional fuel if required, but not less than fuel for 30 mins hold at 1500 ft in ISA including Final Reserve fuel; and
(v) extra fuel, at the discretion of the commander.[/list=a]

8.3.7 Policy and Procedures for In-Flight Fuel Management

8.3.7.1 The commander must ensure that fuel checks are carried out at regular intervals throughout the flight. On flights of more than one hours duration, such checks are to be carried out at not more than hourly intervals. On flights of less than one hour, an intermediate check is to be made at a convenient time when the cockpit workload is low. At each check, the remaining fuel must be recorded and evaluated so as to:[list=a] compare actual consumption with planned consumption;
check that the fuel remaining will be sufficient to complete the flight; and
determine the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination.[/list=a]8.3.7.2 If an in-flight fuel check reveals that the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination will be less than the required alternate fuel (para 8.1.6.2(d)) plus final reserve fuel (para 8.1.6.2(e)) the commander will:[list=a] assess and take into account the traffic, operational and meteorological conditions prevailing and expected at the destination aerodrome; and
similarly along the diversion route to the alternate aerodrome; and
similarly at the destination alternate aerodrome;[/list=a]when deciding whether to proceed to the destination aerodrome or to divert, so as to land with not less than final fuel reserve fuel.

8.3.7.3 If an in-flight fuel check reveals that on a flight to an isolated destination aerodrome planned in accordance with para 8.1.6.4, the expected fuel remaining at the point of last possible diversion is less than the sum of:[list=a] fuel to divert to an alternate aerodrome selected in accordance with para 8.1.3.1.3;
contingency fuel; and
final reserve fuel[/list=a]the commander will either:[list=a] divert; or
continue to the destination provided that two separate runways are available at the destination[/list=a]and the expected weather conditions at the destination comply with those specified for planning in para 8.1.3.1.2.

8.3.7.4 The commander will declare an emergency when the actual usable fuel on board is less than final reserve fuel.

KAT TOO
3rd Mar 2004, 17:06
WoW

Thanks for that. According to the above posts the Commander only declared a PAN call and not a MAYDAY therefore it may? be safe to assume that the fuel on board was not at or below min reserve, i understand from other websites that the landing Alt airfield was EDI, what many may not be aware is that due to WIP EDI is a NDB/DME only airfield except when weather condition are below NDB/DME minima + a bit?

This is due to WIP in the ILS sensitive area, as a result if the weather is crap then the work in this area is withdrawn and the ILS switched back on.

The weather may well have been CAVOK but due to spacing of landing and takeoff requirement you often end up flying the procedure anyway and this always takes longer than a high speed ILS, in my experence at least another 10 mins at EDI.

Now if the Commander arrives at EDI with close to min fuel and is number 5 to land he has a choice, he can either sit it out and wait his turn and accept that once he goes into MRF then he MUST declare a MAYDAY which will almost certainly cause other aircraft to be either sent around or put in the hold, or he could say look were going be a tight on fuel for number 5 and that means a non standard PAN call, this action might save everyone a lot of hassell
albeit non standard.

Having made a pan call the Emergency services will be out anyway and will in any event follow him/her back to stand, but that doesn't mean the tanks were dry.

At the end of the day it will come down to how much fuelwas remaining at the time of Landing, if it was a above MRF then its no big deal and Kaptin M is spot on he squeezed every last drop of commercialism out of his aircraft, if it was below then he might well have a case to answer.

One final thought on this: If he had landed at destination he would have received no special thanks (from anyone) if he got it wrong then he/she could be out of work (or dead) always look after your own backside first that way its safer for you, your crew, your passenger and your compnay.

hatsoff
3rd Mar 2004, 17:17
Interesting thread from an ATCO's viewpoint.

For several years it's become clear to us on the ground that reserves are becoming dangerously low.
Whenever wx diversions take place it is almost inevitable that the trip to your alternate will not be quick , as others will be following the same plan. Does anybody think about that?

I believe that on the day in question my screen showed 3 SOS squawks at the same time. A shameful sight.

Stan Woolley
3rd Mar 2004, 17:40
If all these factors were known/ forecast and the Commander still took little or no holding fuel above minimum - it was clearly a flawed decision! Why?

As hatsoff highlights more and more people are carrying less and less fuel - the more I fly the more I like option enhancing fuel!

fireflybob
3rd Mar 2004, 18:50
hatsoff - you are absolutely right. This policy (?) of operating with minimum fuel is crazy - there is nothing commercial about running out of fuel or even diverting!

Also, you only need to throw in another factor such as the gear not coming down and you have a major emergency on your hands.

I will admit to not being up to speed on some of the JAR/OPS minutae but CAP 360 (Guidance notes to holders of AOCs) used to say that operators should instruct crew to carry extra fuel when operating in "congested areas" - I think that probably covers most of the UK! What happened to plain old "airmanship" and commanders acting like commanders?

By this I am not implying that one should never depart with only flight plan fuel but it all depends on the situation. If airports are likely to close due snow etc this seems like a cast iron reason for carrying some excess fuel.

IMHO, just a matter of time before somebody runs out one day!

411A
3rd Mar 2004, 20:37
Basil,

Perhaps that's part of the problem.
If European airlines operated in accordance with regulations in the USA, a proper licensed and qualified DISPATCHER would have a legal say in the matter as well, as to how much fuel the aircraft departed with.

Now having said all this, if poor enroute decisions are made...fumes are possible on landing (not a good thing in my book).:yuk:

Titus Adduxas
3rd Mar 2004, 20:50
Just to get this into perspective a little, the difference between carrying a load of extra fuel or not is that you can hold for longer at the destination. All the diversions are made with approximately the same fuel on board which is essentially diversion fuel + final reserve fuel + whatever you add on for your own comfort factor. When you divert under these circumstances you are always going to land with just above frf, all perfectly legal and reasonable.

If you have been given an eat at the destination airfield then whats the point in flying off to another airfield burning more fuel to make a landing there. It doesn't make sense and it's not a requirement to do so. Of course if the delay is indeterminate then thats a whole new ball game.

In this case the aircraft landed with well above frf and as such there was no need to update it to a Mayday, but given that they were a diverted aircraft, a Pan call would give them some priority, and that again seems like a perfectly reasonable call to me.

Out of interest, given that diverted aircraft are going to run out of fuel rather quicker than normal inbounds (generally) do atc give them priority anyway?

Titus

hatsoff
3rd Mar 2004, 22:31
Quote..
Out of interest, given that diverted aircraft are going to run out of fuel rather quicker than normal inbounds (generally) do atc give them priority anyway?

In the UK we don't.
We are instructed to afford no priority unless an emergency has been declared.

That's why I wish you guys would be more aware that a quick diversion to an alternate - given current UK Traffic Density - isn't always possible. Even getting you out of the original holding pattern and on your way can take 5 minutes or more depending on the complexity of the coordination involved.

Unless you call Pan or Mayday we can ( in theory ) offer no priority.

Meldrew
3rd Mar 2004, 23:27
Taking into account all the above, with management pilots like this around....I think I'll go by train:sad:

Send Clowns
3rd Mar 2004, 23:46
Titus AdduxasIn this case the aircraft landed with well above frfWhere does this information come from? Do you have any further information on the incident in question? As far as I could see in the description of the trip in the original post the aircraft arrived overhead with minimum fuel for the alternate plus final reserve. It was then flown in the hold waiting for the airport to open, diverting later. Assuming the calculations were roughly correct then it must have landed at the alternate with less than the final reserve fuel, therefore the Captain made the wrong decision and an emergency should have been declared. No-one has yet confirmed any difference from this interpretation.

Ranger One
4th Mar 2004, 00:15
Let's get this back to basics:

Without making any comment as to the truth of it, the original post said they landed so deep into their final reserve that there was concern they wouldn't manage to taxi to the gate.

Kaptin M doesn't see a problem.

I sincerely hope he's pulling our legs.

Where would they be if they had to go around?

****** fixed reserve vs. contingency vs. holding vs. planned. vs actual burn vs. WX vs. SOP vs. ANO vs. everything else, this isn't rocket science:

If you arrive anywhere, destination or alternate, without enough fuel in the tanks to go around should the need arise, you have a BIG problem and some serious airmanship questions. Declining to declare a mayday only compounds the felony.

IMHO.

R 1

cwatters
4th Mar 2004, 00:49
Assuming the incident happened as described...

What happens to him now? I mean lots of people know what happened and the overall view seems to be that it's outrageous. So how does he avoid reporting the event himself? Were boy's from the CAA waiting for him at the stand? Does everyone just turn a blind eye?

TopBunk
4th Mar 2004, 01:14
411A said:

If European airlines operated in accordance with regulations in the USA, a proper licensed and qualified DISPATCHER would have a legal say in the matter as well, as to how much fuel the aircraft departed with.

What you are saying is degrading the status of the COMMANDER of the operation. Scenario: sitting in the hold at destination with 45 min holding delays due unforecast heavy snow and the US captain has to ACARS/SATCOM for instructions? What a cr*p solution to a lack of airmanship. There is no substitute for route knowledge and a healthy degree of pessimism. The flight plans produced are the MINIMUM fuel required, I always try to think of reasons why I may need more, be it unrealistic div fuels or whatever. Having said that, I usually find no reason to take more than an extra 10 mins worth into LHR unless weather is bad.

What does a DISPATCHER bring to this decision that statistical data does not? He is not in the aircraft, his health is not on the line. Dispatchers (as per US) are not relevant nor are they useful in the modern age. We all have access via ACARS to all the MET data we need even in mid-oceanic flight - what exactly do US dispatchers add in value terms. 411A could you please tell us all here?

LYKA
4th Mar 2004, 01:18
Top Bunk

Utter rubbish.

see the link refering to the Hapag Lloyd incedent for more info.

Idunno
4th Mar 2004, 01:40
I seem to recall that in the well studied British Midland accident at East Midlands the Engine Shutdown drill was delayed for a significant period while the Captain sought approval from Company Ops to divert there. I never understood this.

kinsman
4th Mar 2004, 01:48
My god I thought I had heard it all until I found this thread! The Captain in question should be shot if the story is as reported in the original post. What he did was put his passengers in harms way. What if he had not been able to get the gear down or some other failure had occurred? Then we may be looking at an accident.

The only person in my view who decides how much fuel goes on my aeroplane is my F/O and myself. I will load what I need given all the conditions on the day! I do take Plog fuel from time to time when conditions permit but our job is to protect our passengers and at times the company from itself. Any pilot who does not see that should not be on the flight deck of a commercial aircraft.

The bottom line is this Captain clearly took a risk with his passengers and crews lives, which he had no right to do. Ignoring his F/O's concerns in this way was unforgivable, especially given his other role in the company.

For those who like to quote the rules remember rules are for the guidance of wise men/women and the adherence of fools and there is no place in this industry for fools like this man!

Kaptain M I can only hope you were stirring things up with your tongue firmly in your cheek otherwise please let me know which company you fly for as I shall make a point of never flying with them!

Rant over!
:mad:

Pirate
4th Mar 2004, 02:40
It's been said before but it apparently needs saying again. We all accept that a significant amount of fuel in a long-haul widebody is used just by being there, so there is a certain commercial case for limiting any extra carried. On smaller aeroplanes the savings are comparatively tiny - certainly not worth the stress imposed on the crew when that unexpected hold materialises.

Management wonks seem to need reminding that most of that "extra" fuel is still in the tanks for the next sector!

I have worked for a number of airlines. None has questioned any decision to carry extra fuel. Have I been lucky?

confundemus

Yarpy
4th Mar 2004, 02:59
>>Is it part of culture to second guess command decisions?<<

Spot on. I was there a few years ago and there were lots of demoted Captains. The problem seemed to arise when you made a safe decision that was deemed commercially expensive by a very senior person.

Add to that a discrete 'Tea & Biscuits' blame culture and you can understand why a Captain might double check with the airline about a choice of diversion.

I don't suppose it is too different in other airlines. However, the principle is that the Captain must always put commercial considerations second with an in flight emergency.

I have seen this included in some SIM training. Ops try to get you to divert to where they want and you have to overule them to avoid further safety problems.

You are better off with a clean licence and no job than no job and no licence . . .

Lou Scannon
4th Mar 2004, 03:06
Basil has hit the nail on the head.

Should you run out of fuel, it won't be the Chief Pilot's name that goes down in history, or the guy in ops that night.
It will be yours.

Think on!

pitchtrim
4th Mar 2004, 03:25
I work for this company and readily admit to not knowing the details of this incident yet, but the consensus amongst the guys I work with is that it was only a matter of time before something like this happened. Whilst slightly ironic due to the position this capt holds, I'm sure it will come as no surprise that this particular captain got there first.

The company fuel policy is simple. It reflects JAR ops requirements, but asks that crews do not carry more than they require. This for some reason is misinterpreted as pressure not to carry extra. I take this to mean, If you think you need it, take it. I do and so far no one has questioned me why. If there is a chance of snow closing your destination runway I think its sensible to take extra. Assuming the details posted above are correct, IMHO its appears an error of judgement was made.

This is a regional operation, the cost fuel burnt carrying the extra fuel really is tiny compared to this sort of carry on.

For example..... on the plog there is a burn correction figure given for different aircraft weights. For a domestic sector we are talking an adjustment of around 20kgs per hour per extra ton carried! To put this in perspective, carrying an extra ton gives you nigh on an hours holding! So for 20kgs, i dont understand the problem, if you think you might need it, take it and save everyone the stress.

Kaptin M
4th Mar 2004, 03:36
Yes, tongue was firmly in cheek.
The point of my posts was to try to highlight how there has - and is - a continuing erosion of the authority of the pic, perhaps to the point where it is now impacting on Safety.

One large airline in Singapore required a written explanation from the Captain if he ordered more than an extra 1,000kgs (6 minutes) above flight plan, this being on long haul flights of around 10 hours, to destinations where the alternates were usually more to meet the technical requirement rather than realistic.

With my current employer, they are often too quick to want to throw MORE fuel onboard for any reason (usually no complaints there, although it is sometimes over the top), however on the odd occasion I have increased the uplift I've had a 'phone call from the dispatcher wanting to know why.
The word "Safety" always gets a mention.

Could it be that in this particular instance, the pic was rigidly following company policy?
What IS the fuel policy of the company involved? And what is their "attitude" towards pilots who occasionally exercise their command prerogative to increase fuel above that on the flight plan?

(BTW, TAC On, I still haven't clicked. :confused: )

etrang
4th Mar 2004, 10:40
Simandall, your story doesn’t sound similar to the original post at all. Let me show you some of the differences.

Original Poster: captain elected not to carry any extra fuel for the weather conditions
Simandall: carrying extra fuel due weather

OP: the FO (handling pilot) questioned this decision, he was told to "Shut the **** up
Simandall: (no comment)

OP: ATC alerted him that it would now be at least an hour before the airfield was open. The aircraft diverted to its primary alternate
Simandall: The glideslope at Aberdeen failed and windshear caused a missed approach

OP: the fuel state dropped below Minimum Reserve,
Simandall: aircraft landed in Edinburgh with 140% of final reserve

Ignition Override
4th Mar 2004, 11:09
Wino: Thanks for the clarification. I had certainly forgotten which type of system problem they had on the DC-8. Had they gone all the way through the "Abnormal Gear Ind." checklist? The Captain might have gotten them all in big trouble anyway, even if they had left the holding fix sooner and were forced into another delay, i.e. a go-around on final, somehow.

etrang
4th Mar 2004, 11:20
Oh, and Captain "Shut the fcuk up", does indeed have the right of reply, we would all like to hear his version of events.

TopBunk
4th Mar 2004, 14:35
LKYA

:mad: :(

694c
4th Mar 2004, 17:47
Those who live by the sword die by the sword...

Angel`s Playmate
4th Mar 2004, 18:36
How much does a diversion of a fully loaden B747 cost your airline if, :

- 400 pax have to be bussed to origin, if poss at all

- replacement crew has to be shipped to alternate

-operating crew has to be hoteled somewhere unexpected

-outgoing flight will be delayed at least another 12 hrs. since everybody has already run or will be running out of duty time anyhow

-additional landing + handling fees

-more problems on that alt.field, bcoze nobody had seen your ship ever before.

-"you do NOT have ca$h, sorry but we do not take your credit card!"

.....and so on and on!

If you would take ,let`s say in a 35year airline career, on all of your flights 1oookgs of extra fuel-just for mum and the kids-it will be still LESS than only ONE diversion you will make in your whole time!

Airlines went NEVER bankrupt by pilots fuel decisions, only by beancounters!!!


Happy ldgs
Angel

Stick Flying
4th Mar 2004, 20:24
etrang

You seem to have been suckered in a beauty. And they talk about the press.

I think you should rephrase to Captain "Shut the fcuk up" allegedly. This chap seems to have been proven guilty buy the Kangaroo court already. Being one who was flying into EDI that night I didn't detect one ounce of tone which indicated the were anywhere near a level of fuel criticality. The fuel warning goes off at a point where you have about 20-25 minutes until you are into your final reserve. And when the warning goes off I am sure you start getting nervous. So perhaps this Captains first mistake was to declare a PAN PAN.

I have certainly been there myself so am I guilty of jeopardising the safe operation of the flight.

I suggest this will never get a satisfactory resolution and would point out this thread may be a victim of some porkys.

Coconuts
4th Mar 2004, 21:02
Kaptin M

I see you've been ingratiating yourself on this thread. LOL

It should be an interesting experience flying with you on fumes some day ;)

Coco

Titus Adduxas
4th Mar 2004, 21:32
Hats off

I have spoken to the Captain concerned as the allegations seemed most unlikely imho. I wouldn't claim to have all the facts but that they landed with well above final reserve fuel (frf) is certain. The fact that they allegedly had not put "extra" fuel on does not mean that they arrived over the airfield with alternate + frf. I went without extra the other day - held for 10 minutes at Talla whilst they repaired the runway at EDI - and still used less than the PLOG trip fuel. And I still had enough to hold for another 15 minutes before even getting close to diversion + frf.

I am sure that most of us consider whether other aircraft are likely to be diverting also as well as whether the diversion airport is normally busy anyway, when considering what fuel we would divert with.

To go back to the original allegations though, there are a number of flaws in them. For example:

Would you need to put extra fuel on if the forecast was "light snow showers"? - Not necessarily so, especially if you had performance issues. (I don't know what the forecast was)

Would you divert if you were assured of a landing in half an hour, especially if the diversion airfield was over half an hour away? - I wouldn't.

Would anyone honestly say "Shut the **** up" and "Take control"? - Not really very likely.

Why wouldn't you change your mind and divert if you were given new information that meant your landing wasn't assured? - I can't imagine you would even go into the diversion fuel before you were guaranteed a landing.

Would you seriously not upgrade to a "Mayday" IF you had less than frf? - Of course you would.

Stifler; I would be very careful what you say on here because some of this stuff is bordering on slanderous.

Titus

ps. I have never been a big fan of Pprune because of the ridiculous allegations that people make under pseudonyms, and this thread further confirms my thoughts.

simandall
5th Mar 2004, 02:23
Deleted my previous in order to double check some facts. Also because my anger was not helpful. No specific company or crew is implied by the following information. I know of an aircraft that may or may not be the one referred to in this item.

Aircraft was carrying extra fuel at departure from MAN due to the weather at destination.

Aircraft took up the hold at ADN with about forty minutes hold endurance before divert and FRF.

Aircraft began an approach during which the glidepath and NDB became u/s. Went around due to windshear warning.

Aircraft diverted immediately after missed approach to EDI with divert plus FRF.

Commander declared PAN due to Low Fuel warnings. Crew believe these were caused by the severe turbulence because indicated fuel was well above the normal trigger level.

Aircraft arrived on stand with 600kg. FRF is 440kg.

Aircraft had a planned trip time of 57 minutes. It was 2hrs 20 minutes block to block.

No evidence to suggest alleged bad language was used.

Believe it is libel when you make unsubstantiated allegations in writing. Much easier to prove than slander which is the verbal form of defamation.

pitchtrim
5th Mar 2004, 03:47
If the above post relates to the same incident it bears no relation to the original post.

40 mins hold, Multiple factors led to diversion, landed at alt above FRF? A completely different kettle of fish!

Might have to agree with Titus on this one. Best wait to read the ASR.

simandall
5th Mar 2004, 07:35
So now there are two possible versions of this story. The original is dramatic and highly implausible but a number of people took it as true and, without questioning the glaring gaps in it's credibilty laid into someone who had been cynically identified by the orginator hiding behind his apparent anonymity.

The second version has a ring of truth and it has been met with virtual silence (pitch trim excepted). Time will prove which is correct and since the apologies that should be made are clearly not going to be I think it is time to leave this one to the legitimate process that will surely be examining every aspect of this flight and will publish full details to those who work for the company in question.

Time to put this one out of it's misery.

Anthony Carn
5th Mar 2004, 15:09
On the other hand, simandall, we could generalise.

-- We could ask how many Captains in our own airline carry minimum fuel, even when destination weather is poor.

-- We could ask how many First Officers would remain silent in such situations. Silent at the flight planning stage. Silent in flight at the point where diversion was demanded.

-- We could ask how many First Officers receive adequate CRM, aircraft performance, fuel planning and job description training.

-- Ditto the last for Captains !

-- We could ask how many Captains regard First Officers as mere bums on seats, making up the numbers, whose opinions are worthless.

-- We could ask how many Captains are perfectly capable of abusive language directed at other staff.

-- We could ask how many Captains would be reluctant to declare a Mayday, in view of possible disciplinary repercussions.

-- We could ask if a combination of the above factors could lead to a safety threatening in-flight shortage of fuel.


Now, with this in mind, tell me that the worst scenario described previously in this thread could'nt happen.

What I want to know is why it does'nt happen more often !!! :uhoh:

:rolleyes:

KAT TOO
5th Mar 2004, 16:36
This is a non story, at least when the facts are known!

But people don't like the facts to get in the way of a good story!

What was sad about this post is that it was a deliberate attempt to castigate and identify the Captain, who had no right of reply without confirming his/her identity.

The Captain is a decent individual who works hard and makes a major contribution to the safety of the Airline for whom he/she works, moreover he/she would never treat another pilot in the way he/she has been treated by some of his/her own.

GGrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr

Out:ok:

fireflybob
5th Mar 2004, 19:28
Almost everyone who posts via this medium knows that sometimes things have to be taken with a pinch of salt. That does not mean that many of the comments and concerns are not valid although, perhaps, in this particular case they may be unfounded.

There is surely something inherently wrong when an ATCO posts that three aircraft have to issue a PAN call at almost the same time due fuel shortage! We are not talking about ultra long haul aircraft getting a bit near the bone after a 14 hour sector - the aircraft in question are quite capable of carrying a lot more fuel and anyone who has been around aviation for a while with any common sense knows that cutting it fine with fuel on a regular basis is setting yourself up for some interesting situations.

Kaptin M
5th Mar 2004, 19:39
Quite possibly correct, KAT TOO - "..a deliberate attempt to castigate and identify the Captain.." - however as the majority of readers (such as I) on a worldwide basis don't really care WHO the particular individual is, the discussion that has been stimulated is what has made this thread worthwile.

Anthony Carn - famous in J.B. - raises some very relevant issues, imo-- We could ask how many Captains in our own airline carry minimum fuel, even when destination weather is poor.

-- We could ask how many First Officers would remain silent in such situations. Silent at the flight planning stage. Silent in flight at the point where diversion was demanded.

-- We could ask how many First Officers receive adequate CRM, aircraft performance, fuel planning and job description training.

-- Ditto the last for Captains !

-- We could ask how many Captains regard First Officers as mere bums on seats, making up the numbers, whose opinions are worthless.

-- We could ask how many Captains are perfectly capable of abusive language directed at other staff.

-- We could ask how many Captains would be reluctant to declare a Mayday, in view of possible disciplinary repercussions.

-- We could ask if a combination of the above factors could lead to a safety threatening in-flight shortage of fuel.And my addition to A.C's list is
--We SHOULD ask how much unnecessary non-aviation management interference has created - and continues to create - an erosion of the Captain's authority, in an attempt to justify THEIR positions?

For the sake of this discussion, I submit, in part, the following fuel policy of one of the major international airlines, specifically wrt Fixed Reserve and their interpretation thereof:
The greater of Method A or Method B.
Method A:-

1. - Holding Fuel (Fuel required to hold for 30 mins at altitude of 1,500 ft over alternate airport.)

2. - Alternate Fuel (Fuel required to fly from destination to alternate airport with Optimum Speed Climb, Long Range Cruise, Normal Descent.)

3.- Contingency Fuel (Fuel required to fly for duration of 10% of flight time from departure to destination airport at final cruise altitude, temperature, and long range cruise. This fuel should not be less than the fuel required to hold 15 minutes at altitude of 1,500 ft over destination airport.)

4. - Burn off Fuel....no definition

5. - Taxi Fuel....no definiton

6. - Stored Fuel & 7. - Extra Fuel ...Only when necessary.

Method B:-

1. - 45 Minute Fixed Reserve Fuel (Fuel required to make LRC at cruise alt and temp to alt airport.)

2. - Alternate Fuel (Fuel required to fly from destination to alternate airport with Optimum Speed Climb, Long Range Cruise, Normal Descent.)

3.- Burn off Fuel....no definition

4. - Taxi Fuel....no definiton

5 - Stored Fuel & 6 - Extra Fuel ...Only when necessary.

Extra fuel is the fuel added when the PIC and the dispatcher have judged that adding such fuel will improve operational efficiency.

To change a flight plan during flight, the PIC and the dispatcher shall coordinate closely. PIC shall also obtain an approval from ATC.

(TAC, I assume that that may be the equivalent of ADD!)

pitchtrim
6th Mar 2004, 07:06
Kat too, Whats the real story then? We've had two different versions so far, one looks like it has been posted by someone with a grudge. The other makes sense.

Either way, i find Hatsoff post the most alarming, 3 sos squawks because of some snow ! Something is'nt right !

PPRuNe Towers
6th Mar 2004, 13:54
The post from Hatsoff and private mail from other ATCers is the real reason this thread is still running here and the prominence given to it.

Regards
Rob

simandall
6th Mar 2004, 15:11
Every time this one comes to the top the original post gets read. Perhaps the debate would be even healthier if the originator confirmed whether his story is true or not. All debates on here would be healthier if people did not infer the identity of individuals when making allegations. I appreciate that some on here don't know who is being discussed but he does and so do his colleagues. Perhaps those who operate on a worldwide basis don't care who he is but I hope they can find time among their pontifications to care about him as a person. He has been badly treated.

MeatHunter
6th Mar 2004, 15:59
The air in your tanks is about as usefull as the runway behind you or the airspace above you. Nuff said

BEagle
7th Mar 2004, 15:11
I've only landed a big aeroplane (VC10K) below mins once - 17 Jan 1991 at KKIA, Saudi Arabia. Night one of the Gulf War and we'd had to give away more than we'd been tasked to because of one receiver being perilously low after having to jettison his drop tanks - and then both hoses stuck in the trailed position, increasing our fuel burn by 7%.

That was war. All the posters on this thread have indicated that it is purely commercial greed which is driving them down to such low fuel states in 100% peacetime.

Get a grip, beancounters. No excuse whatever for such low fuel states exists in public transport operations - if you think that safety is too expensive, try estimating the price of an accident!

Stifler
9th Mar 2004, 04:27
I've now discovered that the version of events I posted was not what actually happened.
I apologise to the captain involved- I took as gospel what I was told from someone within the company concerned. It is a relief to discover that safe margins were preserved.
What IS interesting, however, is how many of his colleagues believed the version I was told....

G-LOST
9th Mar 2004, 04:33
Generated some worthy comment tho'...

carolosm
10th Mar 2004, 18:58
TO Kaptin M


Please tell me which airline you work with so i can put it in my (never fly list)


:cool: