Policy for F.O. taking controls from Captain

[jetjackel]

Interested in feedback concerning other airlines policy for the First Officer's "actions" under specific situations regarding aircraft being operated outside of limitations or intentionally below minimums by the Aircraft Commander.

For example: Cat I ILS, and at minimums Captain informs F.O. that he is continuing the approach to 100 feet or, worse yet, is going to make the landing.....or during crosswind landing, First Officers actions, after no reaction from the Captain, when ATC reports X-wind now exceeds aircraft limitation, and Captain is planning to continue the approach to landing.

What is "your" company policy? or professional policy?

[Captain Stable]

Adopt the PACE mnemonic

Probe:- "It's well below minima, Captain - what are your intentions?"
Alert:- "Captain, we can't land off this approach - we need to go around and plan what to do next"
Challenge:- "Captain, what you are proposing is, to my understanding, illegal. Please think again."
Emergency:- "At minima - nothing seen, I have control - going around."

AFAIK, no company has a specific policy on matters like this. You need to give the Captain every opportunity to explain his actions and intentions. If time is tight and other factors dictate getting on the ground in a hurry, there may be little or no time for him to brief you adequately. You do need to know what you're doing, though, otherwise it degrades into a one-man operation.

In your example of a XWC out of limits, ask him if he intends to land or to get as close as he can and abort if there is no lull in the wind - you can prompt him by saying something like "Would you like me to ask for wind checks in the final stages of the approach?"

If you get no response at all from the Captain to your questions or prompts, most operators I have known have a rule that you make two challenges and then take control.

Be aware, of course, that you will need to explain your actions later in the FM's office. Be sure that you can explain!

[M.85]

Fly the A/C:E
If he doesnt response or shows no positive answer..take control of your soul and get some altitude,speed and heading..

Safe flying,

M.85

[safetypee]

In the earliest days of Cat 3 there was the conundrum of what the First officer should do when there was no response from the Captain at the minimums call.

The resolution was simple (and safe):
P2 ‘Minimums’
P1 …
P2 ‘the captain is dead … long live the new captain’ … ‘Land’

Of course it was much safer to complete the autoland rather than fly a single pilot go around and diversion. Problems only occur when the autopilot dies.

[S76Heavy]

Indeed, when limits are (about to be ) broken and the Capt. does not respond to a verbal challenge, the P1 incapacitation drill would be appropriate (is even stated in my Ops manual). There is the sudden incapacitation but also the slow incapacitation, which starts with subtle clues.

But whatever you do, don't end up fighting for the controls at low level..

[411A]

Interesting question.

In the mid-eighties, an L1011-200 refueled in JED.
Due to a gross fuel loading error (and a complete cover-up by the fuel crew, one only), the aircraft taxied for takeoff with a lateral fuel imbalance of 23 tons.
The takeoff roll was more or less normal until rotation was commenced. Once airbourne, it was clearly evident to the PF (the Commander) that all was certainly not well. Full aileron and rudder were tried to keep the aircraft level, and as this was clearly not enough, thrust was reduced on number one engine, and this proved to be just enough to keep the aircraft under some semblence of directional control.
All of these maneuvers were accomplished at less that 300agl.

The First Officer, clearly having absolutely no idea what was going on, tried to increase the thrust on the number one engine.
The Flight Engineer, now realizing just what the problem(s) were, slapped the co-pilots hand away from the throttles, and told him to shut UP.

The aircraft returned for landing, and the F/O promptly stormed off to the L10 fleet managers office to complain.

Two days later, all were gathered together in the fleet managers office, and the main complaint the F/O had was that the Captain said absolutely nothing just after takeoff.

The Captains reply...no time to hold ground school at 300agl, with the aircraft about to roll inverted.

The Captain received a letter of commendation from the company, and the First Officer was sent back to the sim, for training...with a stern repremand, to keep his mouth firmly shut if he did not know what he was talking about.

297 folks are alive today because of very quick actions by an aircraft Commander who knew what he was doing.
And...a First Officer learned a valuable lesson.

IF the First Officer wants to intervene, he had absolutely better be sure, otherwise deep doggie do-do usually follows.

PS: The refueler went to jail for six months.

[Bealzebub]

Hmmm.... does rather beg the question what did the flight engineers panel show regarding fuel distribution prior to departure ?

Captains and F/E's not properly including the F/O "in the loop" was a frequent problem in days of old.

Didn't this same airline have an airborne and subsequent ground fire on a L1011, the subject of which filled many a CRM lecture for years up to and including this day ?

Good news that the Captain saved the day. Bad news that a chain of errors resulted in 3 crewmembers being so totally unaware the aircraft was improperly loaded with fuel !

[jetjackel]

Thanks for the feedback Captain Stable. The PACE procedure is heading in the right direction.

Like most companies we have a procedure for pilot incapacitation when callouts are not acknowledged etc.

Due to the spread in experience between the Captains and the First Officers, and the natural intimidation factor that can possibly occur, I am concerned mainly with "intentional" illegal conduct by the Captain, such as informing the F.O. that he intends to land below minimums or continue the approach disregarding aircraft limitations. The specific situation is that all crewmembers know the Captain is not unconscious, but possibly putting the aircraft in harms way. A difficult situation to build a procedure for but just courious for feedback.

Appreciate everyones imput.

[alf5071h]

jetjackel, the background to PACE can be downloaded here: P.A.C.E. (http://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/alf501h.htm) - half way down the page.

Studi, have no fear of CRM, difficult or otherwise. Its all about threat and error management with the aim of flying safely; see The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation. (http://www.raes-hfg.com/reports/15oct03-RHelmreich.pdf)

[Dick Deadeye]

Another from 411a's fund of anecdotes, giving his own, fortunately unique, view of the aviation world.

He appears to have omitted some important details that would have helped those of us who have flown large jets understand this event better.

How on earth does a L1011 taxi with a lateral fuel imbalance of 23 tons as stated, even if the ground refueller has screwed up and tried to hide it?

What gauge readings was the F/E looking at on his panel after refuelling?

Did the Captain not check the fuel distribution before signing the tech log?

Perhaps 411a will enlighten us with more details. Until then I remain unconvinced.


Whilst I normally agree with most of what Capt Stable writes, any NHP in my airline who looks out of the cockpit at DH for visual reference, rather than monitoring the approach on instruments as required, will shortly be back on training!

Bad practice having both pilots looking out at DH, as numerous accidents testify to.

[White Knight]

Yeah DD, I'd have expected the Captain to have been "chewed out" to use a brash americanism' for not checking the fuel distribution. And you're right, it's not hard to say "control problems"...... KEEP THE CREW IN THE LOOP.

Then again, 411 believes in single pilot ops only anyway....which would have resulted in a Lufthansa A320 crashing a couple of years back if it hadn't been for the F/O.. probably more examples to be found as well.

[411A]

Sorry to disappoint you Dick Deadeye, but the incident I discribed happened exactly as indicated.

During the investigation afterward, the company intentionally mis-fueled a TriStar to see if, during taxi, any untoward indications (wing low, difficult to taxi) could be noticed, and none were.

Further investigation revealed that the aircraft was dispatched (properly) according to the MEL, with an inoperative fuel gauge.
In this case, a dripless stick check of the concerned tank was to be carried out, but it was not completed by the refueler, in accordance with company policy and the MEL.
The refueler forged the fuel sheet, both to indicate that the stick check had been carried out, as well as the total fuel uplift, and the fuel sheet was presented to the Flight Engineer (not the Captain as on two crew aircraft) for his signature.
All the numbers agreed.
In addition, as this airline operated under US FAR regulations, the Captain was not required to sign the log book before the flight, only at the end.
Suspect you were not aware of this procedure.

Just why the refueler forged the fuel uplift sheet, I would have no idea.

This particular airline hired only experienced expat Captains for their wide-body fleet(s), and in addition, due to the relative inexperience of the First Officers, arranged the operating procedures (and even the checklists) so that the Commander and the Flight Engineer did most of the more difficult tasks, leaving the First Officer to fly the aircraft (on his leg) so as to gain 'handling experience', and thereby advance at a more reasonable pace.

The particular First Officer in question, was known on the TriStar as a 'wise a**" and it was not at all surprising that he ran off to the L10 fleet manager to complain.

When he emerged from said meeting with the fleet manager, he was white as a sheet. I have no idea what was said, but he was never a 'wise-a**' again....ever.

You don't argue with the boss and expect to keep your job.

[Dick Deadeye]

under US FAR regulations, the Captain was not required to sign the log book before the flight, only at the end. Suspect you were not aware of this procedure. Correct, I wasn't. It surprises me, but, if that's the US system....!

So when you saythe aircraft was dispatched (properly) according to the MEL, with an inoperative fuel gauge. The refueler forged the fuel sheet, both to indicate that the stick check had been carried out, as well as the total fuel uplift.if I now understand you right, the situation was that:

1) The aircraft was underfuelled by 23 tons.
2) All 23 tons was missing from the tank with the defective gauge.
3) The indicated fuel amounts, in all the other tanks, were correct for the total fuel load that had been ordered.
4) The refueller forged both the uplift and distribution figures.
5) No untoward indications could be noticed on the taxy out.

If that was the case, then I am more than happy to say the Captain deserved more than a letter of commendation, and the refueller deserved more than six months.

[411A]

Indeed it was the case, DD, and as a consequence, for the next six months, all refuelers were sent for re-training, all fuel tanks, on all aircraft in the fleet were, after refueling, checked with dripless sticks to be absolutely sure that the incident would positively not happen again, ever.

Seems reasonable to me.

[Bealzebub]

Sorry 411A, I am still very surprised by this analogy. I cannot believe that Federal Aviation Authority rules do not require a Captain to ensure that the aircraft under his command is properly loaded and fit for flight. An inoperative fuel guage is not an uncommon occurence, and it would normally require the careful scrutiny of the crew ( but especially the captain). Dripping the aircraft would surely have been done by an engineer or one of the crew, or more likely the flight engineer. To entrust such an action to a refueller is particularly odd ? The next cross check (the fuel uplift) would usually be monitored by one of the crew. Checking the bowser delivery meter is a simple matter. Not only does it confirm the uplift, but it ensures you are not being short changed. With three crew and a defective system is it not (under FAA rules) just a tiny bit incumbent upon the Captain to apply reasonable cross checks that are not totally devolved to refullers or other contractors ?

Good job the Captain saved the day, because his apparant negligence ( and that of the crew under his command) would seem to have contributed to it.

[411A]

studi,

You bring up an interesting point, about the role of the First Officer.
When I joined this carrier, was quite surprised that the flight deck duties were 'arranged' as I described.
Having a conversation with the L10 fleet manager one day in CDG, asked him just why they had adopted these particular procedures.
His quite frank comment was...."because we know the limitations of some of our guys, and hope to eliminate accidents."
This carrier was organized in 1945, and began operations two years later, and AFAIK had only one accident up to that time.

bealzebub,

<...because his apparent negligence (and that of the crew under his command), would seem to have contributed to it.>

The L10 Fleet Manager didn't think so.
Ditto for the Manager Flying, and the VP FlightOps.
Likewise for DG of the airline.

All quite knowledgeable guys, who had been around a very long time.

After this particular incident, I noticed a vast improvement in some of the 'attitudes' of many of the First Officers...as well as additional hiring of ex-pat Captains.

[Bealzebub]

"The L10 Fleet Manager didn't think so.
Ditto for the Manager Flying, and the VP FlightOps.
Likewise for DG of the airline."

No I don't suppose they did, since presumably they were responsible and accountable for allowing this culture to flourish.

But 411A what do you think ? It seems from your account that the deficiency didn't lie with the fuellers (who were all sent for re-training) or the Inexperienced First Officer ( who was a "wise a**" , and left the Fleet managers office with his tail between his legs), but with a Captain whose seeming situational awareness wasn't alerted until his aircraft start rolling over on rotation. Did he not think he had to manage the preparation of the flight ? Was his role (forgive the pun) to become the hero of his own deficiencies ?
was the real "cover up" the Refuellers ( a contractor) or the Captains failure to ensure suitable cross checks were applied to compensate for a systems deficiency (the fuel guage)? That managers saw fit to cover up for such seeming negligence is breathtaking but perhaps not unimaginable given their allowing such shortcomings in the first place. How far down the chain can you pass the buck ? Presumably to the re-fueller and the First Officer in this case.

No wonder the First Officer was so angry ! It sounds like he had every right to be. Again didn't this same companies In-flight and subsequent ground fire at Riyadh become one of the all time benchmarks in CRM mismanagement ?

I know it is a bit unfair to ask you these questions, but you did raise the example, and you seem to have had an intimate knowledge of the reactions of those involved.

[Captain Stable]

Dick, you are quite correct of course when you sayany NHP in my airline who looks out of the cockpit at DH for visual reference, rather than monitoring the approach on instruments as required, will shortly be back on training!I should, of course, have put the NHP/PNF as saying something along the lines of "Minima... MINIMA... I have control, going around."

Along with one or two others, I am also surprised at some of the circumstances of the incident 411A describes. The Captain is, of course, responsible AT ALL TIMES for the conduct of his flight. Yes, a fuel gauge can be U/S - yes, a refueller can (intentionally or by accident) omit actions he should have checked. But the Captain's backside is the one on the line. He's paid the money for it, he gets the glory, but he also gets the brickbats. Not good enough (in my book) to say "Well, this guy should have done this, that guy should have done that and my FO should have done the other - they didn't and I don't take responsibility for not checking".

[©hris]

Sounds to be very similar to the incident Captain R. Piche had with Air Transat.

Captain Piche did a phenomenal job of gliding an A330 from FL370 for almost 100 miles.

But it was his negligence and that of the crew he was in command of, that pissed away their remaining 37,000 gallons of fuel into the sky.

Fantastic Pilot - ****ty Airline Captain



-Chris

[411A]

studi,

Not choosen for ability, was 'who you know', period

bealzebub

The fuelers were company employees, not contractors, hence the required retraining.
It did not help of course that the company had decided to try to work locals into these positions, with limited success, at that time.
This process was re-evaluated, after this incident.

Is the Captain responsible, yes.
And, he took care of the problem.
All management types were in agreement on this aspect.

Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.

As it should be, in my opinion.

But hey, they are Captains now, and get to return the 'favor'.:ooh: :E

[calypso]

Welcome to another day in planet 411. For the 2175th week running the smash hit ' Captain saves the day, FO learns the hard way not to touch or say anything' reaches number one.

[jetjackel]

Alf5071h and Captain Stable my compliments. Thanks for the info and the website. Answered my question and will use the info in the operation.

[Bealzebub]

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"Not choosen for ability, was 'who you know', period".
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Well that clears up any doubt about the management style of this company then !
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"Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.

As it should be, in my opinion.

But hey, they are Captains now, and get to return the 'favor'. "
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Interesting statement. It wasn't unusual in the past for Captains to have a good understanding of authority, but a poor understanding of responsibility. very often this manifested itself as no effective management skills. Of course this is why CRM is now a seperate subject and is so prominent in Pilot training and refreshers. Authority without good human management skills often manifests itself as bullying. For the practioner, the authority was seldom challenged which in turn reinforced the behaviour. The supervisory culture was often little better and this protected the bully.
For the recipient the path of least resistance was usually to please the antagonist. Often this resulted in saying nothing that might offend or annoy. being pro-active would only be a good thing if the" Authority " was clearly encouraging of such behaviour. Many would however view it as a challenge to their authority.

So the subjugated First Officer, kept his "nose clean" and given a healthy dose of good luck went on to become promoted to Captain. Of course this now put him in authority where hopefully he would exhibit better overall management qualities. Unfortunetaly as so often happened, it was the past experience that came to the fore. The same company culture was present, indeed the previous Captain had probably moved into the Administrative management. So the whole cycle was perpetuated.
As 411A says:
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"Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.

As it should be, in my opinion.

But hey, they are Captains now, and get to return the 'favor'. "
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So many accidents resulted from this behaviour, that the whole subject became a serious cause for concern. Nowadays a better understanding of human behaviour and people management should enable a Captain and indeed all of his crew to better understand the bounds of authority and the skills necessary to ensure that those bounds do not impede safety or willfully stifle proper expression.

CRM in many of its aspects has always existed and I am not suggesting it is anything new. However a better teaching , understanding and awareness of it has contributed to breaking this cycle of bullying and subservience that was so often a feature of "Crew management" in days of old.

As Chris has pointed out, being an Airline Captain isn't just about being a good Pilot anymore. It is about being a good Manager as well.

As has been highlighted by 411A's example, the Captain sometimes had to be a quick thinker and a good Pilot, to compensate for the lack of effective communication and crew management. These days people often bemoan the demise of the Flight engineer with some justification. It is sad that in this example with 3 flightdeck crew (including an F/E) nobody was managed with the task of effectivley cross checking the fuel uplift.
Dripping the fuel tanks is never a popular task and one is left wondering why neither the F/E nor the F/O was tasked to do this. Perhaps it is understandable that the Captain didn't want to, but given their seeming contempt for their right hand seat colleagues would it not have been a fitting charge ?

As time moves on it is rare to see advocation such as this, and from a CRM point of view it is good to be able to discuss it in a forum dedicated to the subject.

[411A]

All very interesting comments bealzebub, but my example indicated was well before the days of CRM, and I suspect the company, knowing about the deficiencies of some of the players, arranged the management style as they did.
This is not to say of course that many of the First Officers in the company were not up to par.
Up to the time I left the company, all First Officers were sent to the USA for intensive training, and if they did not measure up, never made the line, 'knowing' someone or not.
In the rather long time I was with the company, only can recall one First Officer that was a problem. By the time they had reached the TriStar fleet, those that created problems on the B737 fleet, were kept there until they rearranged their thinking and, in several cases, were sent back to that fleet if they stepped out of line.
Another tool that was used with some success were spot line checks. The fleet manager seldom did these, but they were delagated to the fleet supervisors.
The First Officer was observed over several sectors, and if ground time permitted, were given a short oral quiz on the aircraft systems.
This is the only airline where I have worked where this was done and, if nothing else, resulted in excellent aircraft/systems knowledge. These guys knew their equipment very well, and most could handle the aircraft with ease, even in the most difficult situations...as the company demanded that hand flying skills be maintained to a well defined level....30knot crosswind, not a problem for most of these guys, they could roll it on very nicely. The TriStar is a delight to fly under these circumstances.

[fireflybob]

It's not possible to give advice for every situation but I think it's important to differentiate between what is safe or unsafe and/or what is illegal or against the SOPs.

Firstly, let me emphasise that, unless the commander has overriding flight safety reasons for doing otherwise, I would fully support the concept that commanders obey the rules, sops etc.

However, with respect to going below weather minima on a precision approach providing the FO has drawn attention to the fact that the aircraft is being operated outside the normal limits then if the FO judges that the aircraft is being operated "safely" then better NOT to take over and discuss said matters on the ground afterwards! All this, of course, is a matter of skill and judgement - who said the FOs job was going to be easy?!

On the other hand, if at any stage of the flight the FO judges that the aircraft is about to meet impending disaster then by all means take over!

[calypso]

Surely SOP's are there because the authority has approved them as a safe way to operate the aircraft. Unless there are serious overriding factors once you deviate away from them safety is presumably compromised.

How do you suggest one can asses the safety implications as the seconds tick by continuing your descend bellow minima in IMC. Assuming a DA of 200feet and a rate of descent of 700 feet/min it does not take very many seconds before you either see something or hit something. If you take the decide call repited a couple of times and allow some time for a response you can see it is not a nice place to be. On the other hand if the PF is looking outside for a visual clue he is bound to deviate from the loc/gs.

Extreme emergencies aside this is my recipe. Be poilte and considerate, speak your mind but also be receptive, stick to the script. If the other guy does something similar a good day out ensues. Who needs a guy busting minima or forcing you to do a 4 second safety audit on his latest theory.