Technical Faults Cause Most Accidents

[Pirate]

There is a very interesting article in Flight today. Apparently technical malfunctions have overtaken CFIT as the major cause of air accidents. Food for thought for those who tirelessly advocate pilotless aeroplanes on this forum and elsewhere?

confundemus

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Pirate

Apparently technical malfunctions have overtaken CFIT as the major cause of air accidents.

Considering the number of accidents attributed to system malfunctions no aircraft has ever met the 10 9 requirements of system failures causing loss of life.

:E :E

[Jet II]

As the statistical sample is so small - can you make any relevant assumptions at all from it?

Mechanical problems - in some cases known to have resulted from maintenance mistakes - were the trigger in 11 accident sequences in 2003 that resulted in the deaths of 295 people.
CFIT was responsible for 10 fatal accidents and 243 deaths - the second worst accident category.

[Globaliser]

The more relevant question must be how many accident sequences did technical errors and CFIT contribute to in past years? Overall accident numbers are down. If a large part of this is because CFIT is well down, then the word "overtaken" is a bit misleading.

[4Greens]

There is no such thing as a single accident cause. Human error is always in there somewhere. Such reports as CFIT and Technical problems causing accidents is simplistic at best and misleading at worst.

[PondLifeMan]

I guess that all this wouldn't have anything to do with the fact that.........
In Eurpoe there are fewer than ever Licenced Aircraft Enginers, more aircraft than ever and Airlines are using "partially" (A3) Licenced certifiers???????


Would it????

PLM

[John Farley]

Human error is always in there somewhere

4 greens - isn't that the truth!

There is no such thing as an act of God causing an aeroplane accident. Only humans design, maintain and operate aeroplanes so only humans cause the accidents they experience.

From 1950 to 1970 if you looked at the causes of accidents they were (very very roughly) 70% pilot error and 30% technical. The operational error ones like mid airs and ATC screw ups were less than 1%.

Then as newer designs required less piloting skill and compensation for poor handling or poor cockpit design the pilot error category has fallen steadily - at least in mainstream passenger operations.

Being realistic it will always be harder to avoid aircrew based errors from causing accidents just because they are up their on their own and so a finite resource to deal with poor design or the aftermath of the day to day mistakes we all make at work.

In the hangar (in theory) there is not the same finite and limited resource to check, double check, back up and so on. BUT commercial judgement re costs will always tend to err towards fewer people or less able people until events force a change.

Nothing very profound in any of this I am afraid.

But the bottom line is the whole safety thing is creeping better, however it breaks down in detail. Which has to be good.

[Nineiron]

PLM has made a valid point. Meanwhile the beancounters do risk assessments and refer to 'the acceptable number of hull losses'

[lomapaseo]

PLM has made a valid point. Meanwhile the beancounters do risk assessments and refer to 'the acceptable number of hull losses'

Actually, it's the safety engineers who do risk assessments and prioritize the various Service Bulletins in order to lower the acceptable number of hull loses to zero. Else the bean counters might select implementing the service bulletin that saves the most fuel money.

Something about robbing Peter to pay Paul lets hope that safety is always named Paul

[Blacksheep]

Safety engineers prioritizing service Bulletins Iomapaseo? I don't think so. Who exactly writes the Service Bulletins and who asks for them to be produced in the first place?

Typical priority instructions followed by development engineers to assess Service Bulletins for incorporation are generally headed by something like "Does this problem have a safety implication" followed closely by "Do we have this problem in our fleet?" In the regulatory bodies are engineers who may prioritize an SB by making it mandatory, but I've never encountered any mandatory SB that we hadn't already placed under action long before the regulators made it mandatory.

There are operators that have lower standards of course - you can find them on the banned lists for the USA and many European nations if you want to avoid flying with them. There are also plenty of operators that outsource all maintenance and rely on their contracted amintenance organization to recommend SBs. For this purpose the mandatories stand out easily from the crowd, but nevertheless nearly all contracts include non-mandatory SBs that address problems that the customer airline are experiencing.

The most important factors in improving technical standards have been reliabilty programmes and Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) based Maintenance Planning Documents (MPDs) that concentrate effort and reduce both workload and downtime. The latest maintenance schedules now include comprehensive Corrosion Prevention and Control Programmes (CPCP) - with prevention being the most important factor.

One area that holds plenty of room for improvement right now - and Lu Zuckerman would no doubt back me up - is at the design stage, Structures are fairly well understood but there are many system designs out there that lack full and accurate risk assessments. One example is the original B737 rudder system design that the manufacturer insisted was satisfactory until the third total loss; another good example is the widespread use of stabilizers that rely on a single screw jack so that a single point failure can (and at least once did) cause a hull loss. Generally though, good progress is being made in reducing the overall loss rate.

BTW what about that Airbus that got down safely after a total loss of all flight controls when it was hit by a SAM? Although all the hydraulic systems failed (how could it be otherwise?) the structure held despite the severe damage caused by a missile exploding in the fuel tank and the susequent fire. Most of all though, the crew were bloody marvellous! Human error might cause a lot of accidents but human efforts may also prevail in an otherwise hopeless situation. Never rule out the human element, either way.

**************************
Through difficulties to the cinema

[Lu Zuckerman]

It is true that the human factor no matter where it is plays a great deal as the underlying causes of accidents. However once the accident has occurred and once the causes are established it is completely out of the hands of the “safety engineers”.

Whether the necessary corrective action takes place or it is not effected is in the hands of the certification authorities. I can only speak for the FAA and this is what they do. First of all the FAA is more interested in preserving their relationship with the airlines than they are in protecting the flying public. That is the responsibility of the NTSB. Once the NTSB determines the cause of an accident they will tell the FAA what must be done in order to prevent further accidents from the same cause.

Once the FAA knows what must be done they perform a cost benefit analysis. In essence they will determine the financial impact on the airlines in order to make the changes and then they will determine the human cost in a similar accident. The cost of a human life is 2.5 Million dollars US. They will multiply this by the number of seats in a similar aircraft. If the total in human lives is greater than the financial impact on the airlines they will recommend the change. If the cost in human lives is less than the cost of making the change they will rule against the change.

I hope I got it right as it is almost midnight here.

If you want me to expound on the problems during the design stage i can do that as well but only after I get a bit of sleep.


:E :E

[Nineiron]

To what degree then can we equate technical failures with financial constraints? If money was no object, human factors and the limits of our understanding of the technology still remain.

As for the FAA cost benefit analysis influenced by multiples of pax rather than hull loss, does this make smaller aircraft less safe? I fly freighters, does nobody care?

[lomapaseo]

I'm afraid that some of you are being misled by so called FAA detractors for the sake of making a point about nobody but we care

You see there is no such thing as a cost benefit analysis or tombstones to count per plane when it comes to fixing things that are broke.

The regulations which govern the design are your FAR/JARs which you choose to accept when you take flight.

Things that are found to be wrong after the product is built come under another regulation which is part 39 continued airworthiness . The intent of this regulation is to bring the original product back into compliance in a time frame that does not contribute to the historic overall risk for the product line e.g.: part 25 aircraft etc..

Thus big problems get worked much faster than little problems. However, any operator can choose to incorporate fixes at a faster rate.

As far as incorporation rates go, the authorities do track these even as voluntary. Where compliance is not assured in a reasonable time (some operators just don't get the word) than mandatory compliance is required.

Of course there is some flexibility under voluntary compliance and that is often the case when an operator proposes an alternate means of compliance (offer evidence that the problem is addressed because of his operation or practices)

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Lomopaseo

When I was working as Reliability manager on a major Airbus program I discovered two design faults that could lead to the loss of the aircraft. I notified the large aircraft certification office in Seattle telling them of the problem. I sent the first letter with no response. I sent a second letter reiterating the problems. Two months later I received a letter thanking me for my input. In a second letter from the FAA I was told that they had spoken with the DGCA who told them that the problems had been corrected.

I contacted several friends that were still on the program and they indicated that the design had not been changed. When the various members of the consortium were made aware of the problems they took no action in order to avoid the cost of the redesign. They never mentioned the problems to Airbus and when they were made aware of the problems they took no action and by that time there were over 30 models of that aircraft flying in revenue service. I contacted the FAA and when they took action the Vice President and Chief Program manager were fired. The design was never changed and that model of Airbus is still flying with the design defects. And as far as the FAA not performing cost benefit analyses you are totally wrong.

I belong to the Lawyer Pilots Bar Association and in writing my book FINGER TROUBLE I contacted many of the lawyers in the organization for background information and they said that in effect you are wrong. When all of the Robinson R-22s were losing their rotors the NTSB fought tooth-and-nail to lift the certification for the helicopter and the FAA refused although 27 R-22s had been effected and each one had two souls aboard.

In other words stop being so defensive.


To: Nineiron

As for the FAA cost benefit analysis influenced by multiples of pax rather than hull loss, does this make smaller aircraft less safe? I fly freighters, does nobody care?

Even though you fly freighters the aircraft you fly is one of many models of the basic aircraft. If a change is to be made it will be incorporated in your aircraft. However if in the modification to your aircraft the offending part had been removed during the mod then your aircraft would not be effected.

:E :E

[lomapaseo]

I am not wrong about cost benefit analysis when it comes to fixing things that are broke..

People with blinders just want to see things their way.

My statement stands as posted. Some folks may have bothered to read it

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Lomapaseo

The following has been excerpted from the book Finger Trouble and is based on input from several aviation lawyers.

In the 747 explosion over the Atlantic, 230 passengers and crew were killed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has ruled that the cause was the build-up of fuel vapors and the introduction of a non-specific ignition source. They implied that the ignition source could have been caused by a static discharge (which further implies that the elements within the tank were not properly bonded). Another source of ignition could have come from a wire with broken insulation (it was a known fact that early 747’s used a type of wire that was insulated with a material that was subject to cracking from atmospheric and environmental exposure). One other source of ignition could be from a lightning strike in conjunction with inadequate bonding. The reader should know that every commercial airliner is hit by lightening on the average one time each year.

Having experienced one explosion in a 747, the NTSB wants to prevent similar explosions, so they suggest that future tank explosions could be prevented, if the airlines would install nitrogen inerting systems in the fuel tanks of all of their respective aircraft. To do this, the airlines would have to down their aircraft for the time it takes to install the systems, losing the revenue generated by the aircraft. In addition to this, they will have to absorb the costs of the modification. To determine the economic feasibility of such an extensive modification the FAA would perform a cost benefit analysis. The FAA could easily determine the financial impact on the airline industry but what do they weigh this figure against?

They must weigh these costs against the value of the human lives that would be saved if the modification were incorporated. The reader can trot down to the local super market to determine the sale price of a dozen eggs or the discount price for a gallon of milk, but where does he or she go to find the manufacturers suggested retail price for a human being? He or she would have to look no further than the Department Of Transportation (DOT) in Washington, D.C. The DOT is the parent organization of both the FAA and the NTSB. The DOT uses, what else, a complex mathematical formula that takes into consideration all types of numeric input to include the gross national product figures for that fiscal year. The latest dollar value placed on an American citizen at the time of this writing is 2.7 million dollars. In running their calculation, the FAA bean counters multiply the 2.7 million dollars, by the 230 lives lost in the 747 explosion. This equates to six billion two hundred ten million dollars. They weigh one figure against the other and if it costs more to incorporate the fix in America’s airliners than the value of the human lives saved, the FAA will not recommend the modification. That sounds cold but that’s the way it’s done. No aircraft will be modified and as a result, the conditions that caused the first explosion are still waiting in the wings (excuse the pun), ready to manifest themselves in a second explosion. It might interest the reader to know that several other aircraft along with a lot of passengers were lost due to fuel tank explosions. But those other explosions occurred in aircraft that were not on the FAA registry, so they don’t count.

What are the possibilities that a second or third or maybe even a fourth or fifth 747 might explode causing massive loss of life. And, if a second, third or a fourth explosion were to occur, would the FAA recalculate another Cost Benefit Analysis. Compared with the FAA’s allowable frequency of 10-9, for a single system failure that can result in an aircraft loss, the probability of another explosion is quite high.

PERSONAL COMMENT: In some cases where there is public outcry or enough bad publicity the FAA will acquiesce and authorize the change.

[lomapaseo]

One needs to understand the difference between a prescribed existing rule (FAR/JAR 25.xxx, rulemaking (additional rules beyond that already prescribed) and continued airworthiness (the means by which the product maintains its original safety assumptions through service bulletins, maintenance actions etc.).

I don't need somebody's book to interpret this.

[747FOCAL]

I'm gonna get shot for saying it here, but I was always told that 99.5% of all crashes were caused by pilot error. :(

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Lomapaseo

(the means by which the product maintains its original safety assumptions

The means used to determine the compliance with FAA design guidelines which state the frequency of a system failure that would result in the loss of one or more lives be not less than 10 9 are a farce and equates to black magic and the manipulation of numbers. In the annals of commercial flight no aircraft has ever met those criteria. It took the loss of several B-737s due to the same cause before the FAA took any action. When an aircraft is downed due to a system failure the FAA does not go into the calculations that stated the design met design criteria. To do so would place the FAA in a position of having blindly accepting the figures from the manufacturer.

I don't know how long you have worked for the FAA but I have been in the position of determining the reliability and safety of aircraft and military systems since 1968. I have seen it all and it makes me sick. I have tried to change the system for a long time and have run up against a brick wall.

To; 747FOCAL

I'm gonna get shot for saying it here, but I was always told that 99.5% of all crashes were caused by pilot error.

If pilot error can be proved directly or by assumptions (inability to recover the aircraft or possibly inability to come up with a final cause) the manufacturer, the operator and suppliers absolve themselves of any responsibility. That leaves the lawyers to go aftter the pilots estate.

:E :E

[747FOCAL]

How come I read about so many crashes attributed to pilot error just like this recent egyptian 737 crash? It might have been a systems failure, but that Alaska flight 261 was pilot error and I don't see anybody sueing the dead pilots. :(

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: 747FOCAL

The only error the pilot made was not knowing that the jackscrew was in a rapid stage of melt down. The error was in the maintenance practices of Alaska Airlines. The jackscrew had not been lubricated for a considerable time and the wear on the screw advanced quite quickly. This should have been detected during periodic checks but, it was not. The pilot was not aware of the advanced wear when he tried to trim out the tail plane.

Once the jackscrew failed the load was transferred to the attach point and it failed due to structural overload.


:E :E

[Ignition Override]

Mr. "Zuckerman": how about the ATR crash at Roselawn, IN?

Our "guardians" at the FAA were aware of some loss of control problems concerning at least one or two European ATR-42s, but they ignored the entire issue of icing certification-until the crash. How does the FAA hear about problems onboard a foreign-registered plane thousands (hundreds) of miles from the US, when it is also certificated for operation by a US carrier? Is the foreign authority where a plane is manufactured, such as the French DGAC, German BL** or whatever, required to somehow notify each agency in every country where the plane operates? Or does the local aviation authority force the manufacturer to tell the foreigh authorities? If a Twin Otter were to crash in the jungles of New Guinea due to a design defect, would (i.e.) Transport Canada notify every other authority which certified the Canadian plane?

As for the fairly recent requirement-for the first time in US civil aviation history-for reserve crews to be given designated rest periods within consecutive days in which a crewmember is ALWAYS available for an almost immediate duty period, this happened ONLY because of dead civilian passengers on the MD-80 in Little Rock. The long duty period of both pilots became publicized. If it had been a cargo plane, as with the Connie Kallitta crew at NAS G'mo Bay, Cuba years ago (the DC-8 cartwheeled), then there might still be no RAP and required rest period (8 consecutive hours [with no calls from the company]in each 24) for crews on reserve/standby for six days in a row etc.

After THAT crash, the NTSB, for the FIRST TIME in US civil aviation history, claimed that crew fatigue was the primary cause! If they had pointed to fatigue many years ago, what would have been the abrasive result from the FAA??

[Blacksheep]

The FAA know about occurances on foreign manufactured aircraft and equipment in exactly the same way that we find out about occurances on USA manufactured aircraft and equipment. A general rule followed by airworthiness regulatory bodies around the world is that, an action that is made mandatory by the regulatory body in the country of manufacture and/or design, is automatically mandatory in the State of registration. Significant exceptions to this general rule are the USA and Australia, where foreign mandatories must first be converted to local action. Thus, US operators can ignore foreign mandatories unless they have been covered by equivalent US FAA action.

On your profile, Ignition Override, you say you are in air safety coordination. How do you actually perform this coordination perchance? In our engineering departments, we operators receive notification direct from the foreign regulators. Meanwhile our own regulatory body oversees our compliance because they are seperately advised by the State of manufacture. How? - simple enough - we are all required to subscribe to the relevant airworthiness documentation. In our case we subscribe to various publications from the FAA, French, German, Dutch, Italian and other regulatory bodies covering our aircraft and airborne equipment not to mention those from the regulators of our engineering customers.

As with the law, ignorance is no excuse.

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Blacksheep

In some cases the manufacturer will initiate an AD and send it to the operators but it has no strength until the certification authorities act on it. A case in point is an AD issued by Airbus after the Air Transat A-330 landed in the Azores with empty tanks. That AD was issued early last year and is yet to be acted on by the FAA and Canadian MOT. I do not know if the DGCA acted and created an AD, which then must be acted on by all countries in which A-330s are registered.

Here is another case in which there might be some confusion when an AD must be translated from the language in which it was originally written. The A-310 was suffering from looseness in the flange connections on the slat and flap drive system. The FAA and Canadian MOT translated the AD from French to English and the two ADs did not agree with each other. There was further confusion in both translations. The AD directed the inspection of the “Vespel © bushings” of which there were four at each flange connection. The bushings were wearing and in some cases disintegrating. Those bushings that were defective were to be replaced and all bushings were to be tested for electrical continuity. If there was electrical continuity the bushings were to be replaced. In a previous post in this thread I alluded to design faults one of which was that the flaps and slats were not grounded to the wing structure. One of the means to assure grounding was that the previously mentioned bushings were to be impregnated with a carbon material in order to carry any static electricity to the PCU and the PPU which were grounded to the wing structure. The AD stated that if there was electrical continuity through the bushings they were to be replaced by a bushing that was non-conductive. This further exacerbated the non-grounding condition so that static electricity could not drain off to the grounded PCU and the PPU. This will further ensure that if there is a lightning attachment on a partially extended slat the wing tip and a large portion of the outboard wing will be blown off due to the lightning energy being ducted into the fuel tank when it flashes over from the outboard slat jack. The certification authorities never acted on this problem and when I contacted the FAA, MOT and the DGCA they never acted on the possibility of a mis-translation of the above mentioned AD.

Who in hell is watching the store? The FAA and I assume the other certification authorities have what is termed a “Tombstone mentality”. In other words they won’t act on a problem until people are killed and then they might not authorize a change if it costs too much.


:E :E

[747FOCAL]

Lu Zuckerman,

Your right the bad maintenance got flight 261 into trouble in the first place. Where the pilot went wrong was in forgetting the GOLDEN RULE: FLY THE F.....ing damn airplane!!!

When the Jackscew intitially had problems they went into their first dive of which they recovered and got stabalized. Instead of choosing to land the airplane, the pilot chose to go out over the water and try and trouble shoot it so he would not have to land at 180 kts. Its when they started playing around with it that it broke entirely and they went in the water, backwards I add.

In my opinion the pilot should have landed that plane after the first dive. They blamed the jackscrew, but everybody at the FAA and Alaska knows what really caused that crash.

My grandpa once told me: Screw around, screw around and soon you wont be around when it comes to airplanes.

[Blacksheep]

True Lu, but each part of the industry acts independently. I know of no case, in any of the four operators that I've worked for over the past thirty four years, where we failed to act on engineering information directly concerning air safety as soon as the information was received. That is to say, maintenance action was already in hand long before any mandatory action was issed from any regulator. In several cases it was an operator that discovered an unsafe condition and initiated corrective action in conjunction with the aircraft manufacturer.

I know that not all operators are the same; some that operate on the margins and shave their costs to the bone may not act until they are forced to by regulators. If low-cost operations force maintenance departments to carry out only mandatory inspections and modifications, then standards of maintenance will fall and accidents caused by technical failures will rise. That's something for the customers to think about when they buy their cheap tickets - as in all commercial transactions, you get what you pay for.

[4Greens]

All aircraft accidents have as contributory causes; 100% Human error. It is always useful to try and think of one that doesn't. A good challenge.

[Itlbefine]

Cannot comment on whether these findings are true or not but we are in for problems with aircraft maintenance in the near future.
Due to the changes with the JAR licencing system and the addition of some of the electrical responsibility being transferred to A + C (B1) engineers we are creating a situation whereby we are asking engineers to work in a field which is more a specilisation of the avionics engineer. This is further compounded when you realise that this qualification can be gained at the minute by passing a series of multi-choice examinations with current questions readily available and no requirement for any oral examination or proof of practical ability.
We are heading down a road where we will soon have an engineering work force which will no longer have trade seperation ie A+C and Avionics but will eventially have a system similar to the american A+P system where the engineer is responsible for all aspects of the aircraft systems.
With the current system we have engineers who are highly skilled and trained in airframe and engine systems and another group also highly trained and skilled in electrical and avionic systems. This has the benefit of trade specialisation and the benefits this provides. If this changes you will have an engineer who is an "expert" in everything, but in reality will have his skills and experience in one dicipline or the other and a basic understanding of the other. This in my opinion is a recipe for mistakes and is a step backwards.:mad:

[Jet II]

Itlbefine but will eventially have a system similar to the american A+P system where the engineer is responsible for all aspects of the aircraft systems.
Is this a problem? - do the US carriers have a larger amount of maintenace related accidents than UK carriers?

[asheng]

Jet 2, Nobody is saying there are more accidents with using the FAA ststem but to those of us using the JAR 66 licensing system can understand where Itlbefine is coming from.

For years the BCAR licence gave you A+C (Airframe and Engine) responsibilities and these alone on modern aircraft can be complexed as I am sure most people know and now we are all expected to get Electrics as well.
To me wiggly amps were always the domain of the avionic lads and will always remain so.

As an A+C engineer whilst I have an understanding of electrical systems my knowledge is nowhere as in depth as my avionic collegues as I am sure there Knowledge of some of the finer points of our art is much the same.

Now under the JAR/EASA system we are all expected to have in depth knowledge of electrics (no oral though,a definate backward step).

Hypothetically speaking,heres a scenario.....

One day your are going to be happily working away on an engine change and somebody is going to ask you to clear some electrical mod/repair off because you now have the coverage.You now have moved from an area that you are perfectly comfortable with and deal with everyday, to a position of having to release a task that you may not be altogether comfortable by virtue of the fact that all your life you have dealt with nuts and bolts, not wires and cables. You are obviously a very capable engineer as you hold the coverage that allows you to certify these tasks. How would you feel?This could happen to anyone of us in the future.

All our lives mechanics and avionics have been two sides of the same coin, but now the authorities want to merge the fields.Is this really good for the industry that relies and prides itself on the safety element everyday?

I have my own views but I also have to work within the current system of the day,like it or not.The only thing guys can do is rely on there own experiance and integraty when using there authorisations.Only time will tell if this has a direct impact on technical faults causing more accidents.

I for one hope that we can still rely on a safe industry and all accidents attributed to any reason can only be regarded as a tradgedy and lessons leant if required

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: BLACKSHEEP

True Lu, but each part of the industry acts independently. I know of no case, in any of the four operators that I've worked for over the past thirty four years, where we failed to act on engineering information directly concerning air safety as soon as the information was received.

This is true regarding relatively simple changes to a system such as re wiring or installing a switch or a placard. However, on major design changes such as installing an inerting system in a fuel cell or the redesign of a rudder PCU, the FAA will determine the man-hours to effect the change, the cost of the modification itself, and the lost revenue to the airline(s). With these figures in hand they will perform a cost benefit analysis. This will be done to determine if the cost in human lives and the cost due to hull loss is less than the costs to the airline(s) to effect the change then the FAA will recommend against the change.

If public uproar is strong enough they may reverse their decision.


:E :E

[Le Pen]

asheng....

Gotta say that if youre not happy signing something, then DONT sign for it.

I've been A&C for 25 years with limited Avionic Extensions on my types. Over the past few years, with the introduction of more computer based systems (777, A320), we have had to adapt. It only seems natural that we take that last small step to achieve B1. You know what is required of you, and you know your own personal limitations. The choice is ours to make. Not an easy choice for some.

4Greens.........

Spot on, Maintainance or Pilot........ The result is the same.

Love

LP

[lomapaseo]

Still spewing the same misinformation LU:O

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Lomapaseo

Still spewing the same misinformation LU

The FAA was informed in 1984 that the flap and slat system of a large commercial aircraft was ungrounded to the wing structure and in the event of a lightning attachment to a partially extended slat the lightning would be carried directly into a fuel tank. Yet, the FAA has taken no action in correcting this design fault.

The slat and flap drive as originally designed had the capability of draining low static voltages to the airframe but in the event of a lightning strike the system would be overloaded and it would fail.

A while back the FAA was notified that they may have mis translated an AD issued by the DGCA and in the process removed the ability of the system to drain the static charges from the slat and flap drive systems. Yet they took no action to determine if the AD had been mis translated. They were also informed that the FAA AD and the AD issued by Transport Canada were not in agreement on the same subject.

With the incorporation of this AD it will ensure that any lightning strike to a partially extended slat will be directed to the fuel tank.

Since you are with the FAA you can contact the Seattle office and talk to a Mr. Waterman or a Mr. Martenson


:E :E

[asheng]

Le Pen,

Couldn't agree more and I have always upheld this belief and luckily never been in a position where I have had to refuse to sign.

But you and I know that in this real world and someone, somewhere will end up feeling that scenario and having to cope with not only his own unease but probably have some commercial pressure placed upon him just to spice up the situation further. Hopefully common sense and experiance will prevail but my point was that the current licensing system noe allows for the situation to excist whereas before it couldn't.

Before anyone says it I am not some kind of dinosour harping back to the old days, I most certainly am not. I think change is a good aspect of all our lives and modernisation is great....If it works in the right direction to make our jobs less complicated.The only people to benefit from the JAR66 licences are the authorities and its mostly financial to them.As an engineer they don't really care too much what happens to you ( Have you tried to contact engineer licensing recently?) as long as you dont make an error that leads to there involvement.
:ok:

[Blacksheep]

Lu, I wasn't suggesting that the airlines design major modifications to deal with airworthiness related matters. I refer to the fact that we receive Service Bulletins from manufacturers and usually initiate action to incorporate those SBs long before the FAA get off their backsides and make any of them mandatory. We also discover potentially unsafe conditions when performing our inspections and draw the manufacturer's attention to them so they can make the necessary design changes.

We are but one small operator out of so many, but we have initiated several corrective modification actions to B757 and B767 aircraft over the past seventeen years. Three of my own design defect reports to Boeing ended in world-wide modification programmes, two of which were mandated by the FAA two years down the road. The point I make is that there is nothing unusual in that; its just what we do for a living.

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: BLACKSHEEP

I totally agree with what you are saying. The comment I was trying to get across is how the FAA handles the incorporation of major design changes. Although the FAA and the NTSB have the same boss the NTSB has to fight tooth-and-nail to get a change incorporated. Once the NTSB has determined what caused a problem and makes a recommendation for a change the FAA will do a cost benefit analysis to determine if the change should be incorporated keeping in mind how it will effect the operator and not the flying public. Lomapeseo does not agree with what I am saying. Keep em flying.


:E :E

[Itlbefine]

ASHENG thanks for the support. I would have much more confidence in the system if the oral examinations were still in place as these would weed out those who have studied questions parrot fashion with the only intention of passing an exam, from those who have genuinely studied and had some practical training.

The plot thickens with the news that BA are in negotiations with the CAA to allow the granting of a full B1 licence without the need for even the multi choice examination, the criteria is still to be set but it is along the lines of hold AV extension and show that you can read and understand a wiring diagram !!!!

JET II I am making the assumption that you are a pilot, if not accept my apologies. I take it that you think then that given that most engeneers hold around 3 aircraft types on approval at any one time that the addition of another licence type on top of this is a good idea? This possibly equates to you flying one sector in an A320, the next sector in perhaps an RJ100 and a couple in a 757 and for good measure we will add a 5th sector as a No.1 Cabin crew. How does that sound, I deliberately didn't add a 6th sector as this would probably take you into discretion!

:ok:

[dtur2424]

I'm not sure if I'm on the right forum but there was a program on Radio 4 tonight on air safety. Did anyone else catch it? It didn't present easy listening.

I had no idea there are operators allowed to fly into UK that are banned from flying into other European countries, because of their poor safety record. The list is in Holland with the JAA but the public can't get access to it. I don't suppose there's anyone out there on PPRUNE with access to this list of banned operators?



:uhoh: